MES-Perspektiven 2/2017 - The EU-Turkey Agreement on Migration: Objective and Reality
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MES-‐Perspektiven 2/2017 The EU-Turkey Agreement on Migration: Objective and Reality Anne Wahnberger
MES-‐Perspektiven 2/2017 Die MES-Perspektiven werden vom MA European Studies der Europa-Universität Viadrina herausgegeben. Die MES-Perspektiven sind dem interdisziplinären Charakter des Studien- gangs verpflichtet. Sie präsentieren in loser Reihenfolge wissenschaftliche Erträge, die die Mitglieder des Studiengangs – d.h. Studierende und Dozenten – gewinnen. Ein besonderes Augenmerk wird dabei auf solche politische, rechtliche und wirtschaftliche Prozesse des europäischen Integrationsprozesses gelegt, die disziplinäres Wissen herausfordern und weiterentwickeln. Über die Autorin Anne Wahnberger schloss ihren Doppelmaster European Studies der Europa-Universität Viadrina (Frankfurt/O.) und der İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi im Jahr 2017 ab. Zuvor studierte sie Islamwissenschaft, Wirtschaftswissenschaften und Turkistik. Während des Studiums arbeitete sie am Zentrum für Türkeistudien und Integrationsforschung (ZfTI) in Essen und absolvierte zahlreiche Praktika u.a. bei der Vertretung des Landes Brandenburg in Brüssel und dem Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung in Berlin. Schwerpunktmäßig beschäftigt sie sich mit Türkei-EU-Beziehungen sowie europäischer Asyl- und Migrationspolitik. Anne Wahnberger lebt in Berlin und Istanbul. Herausgeber der Reihe MES-‐Perspektiven Prof. Dr. Timm Beichelt, Prof. Dr. Carsten Nowak, Prof. Dr. Reimund Schwarze Kontakt Professur für Europa-Studien Europa-Universität Viadrina Postfach 1786 15207 Frankfurt (Oder) Redaktion dieser Ausgabe Kerstin Hinrichsen Erscheinungsdatum 19. April 2017
MES-Perspektiven 2/2017
Abstract
The deal concluded in March 2016 between Turkey and the European Union to
manage the refugee movements from Turkey to the Greek islands attracted cri-
ticism from various quarters. This thesis examines the legal and political back-
grounds of the agreement and advances understanding of why it was so urgent-
ly needed.
Based on related legal texts, press reports and interviews conducted with EU
officials, I evaluated the agreement itself as well as its implementation until Sep-
tember 2016. The findings from the research show that legal and ethical reser-
vations are indeed justified. I concluded that the agreement may alleviate symp-
toms of the current refugee crisis, yet a real European migration policy was mo-
re needed than ever.
Özet
Mart 2016‘da Türkiye‘yle Avrupa Birliği arasında gerçekleşen, mültecilerin Tür-
kiye‘den Yunan adalarına geçişini düzenleyen anlaşma çeşitli çevrelerden
eleştiri aldı. Bu tez, anlaşmanın hukukî ve siyasi arka planını incelemeyi ve
neden acilen gerekli olduğuna ilişkin anlayışı ilerletmeyi amaçlar.
İlgili hukukî metinlere, basındaki haberlere ve AB görevlileriyle yapılan
ropörtajlara dayanarak söz konusu anlaşmanın kendisini ve Eylül 2016‘ya kadar
uygulamasını değerlendirdim. Araştırmanın sonuçları, hukukî ve etik çekincele-
rin yerinde olduğunu gösteriyor. Çıkardığım sonuç; anlaşmanın güncel mülteci
krizin semptomlarını hafifletebileceği, ancak gerçek bir Avrupa mülteci politi-
kasına en çok ihtiyaç duyulan dönemde olduğumuz yönünde.Inhaltsverzeichnis
List of Acronyms 2
Introduction 5
Chapter 1: Political and Legal Framework 10
1.1 Turkey‘s Transition to a Country of Immigration 10
1.2 Turkey‘s Evolving Migration Policies 13
1.2.1 The Geographical Limitation 17
1.3 Europeanization of Turkish Migration and Asylum Policy 19
1.4 EU Migration Policy 22
1.5 EU Cooperation with Third Countries in the Field of Migra-
tion 28
1.5.1 Cooperation Frameworks 29
Chapter 2: Background of the EU-Turkey Agreement 32
2.1 The Syrian Civil War 32
2.2 Syrian Refugees in Turkey 34
2.3 The European Union‘s Response to the Refugee Crisis 38
2.3.1 The European Agenda on Migration 39
2.3.2 Hotspots 40
2.3.3 European Border and Coast Guard 41
2.3.4 Quota System 42
2.3.5 Common EU List of Safe Third Countries 43
Chapter 3: The EU-Turkey Agreement 44
3.1 Formation of the Agreement 45
3.2 Basis of the Agreement 49
3.2.1 Greece-Turkey Readmission Agreement 49
3.2.2 EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan 50
3.2.3 7th March EU-Turkey Statement 52
3.3 The Agreement 53
3.4 Assessment of the EU-Turkey Agreement 54
Conclusion 60
Bibliography 64
Annex 78MES-Perspektiven 2/2017
List
of
Acronyms
AFAD……………………….………...…..Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı
(Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency)
AKP……..………..Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
CAMM…………....……………...….Common Agenda for Migration and Mobility
CEAS………….…...…………………......….Common European Asylum System
CFSP………………...……………………..Common Foreign and Security Policy
EASO………………...…………………………..European Asylum Support Office
EBCG……………..…………………………...European Border and Coast Guard
EC………………………...…….European Commission, European Communities
ECHR……………..…..…………………European Convention on Human Rights
ECJ……………………………………………………….European Court of Justice
ECRE…………………………………European Council on Refugees and Exiles
ECSC…………….….………...…………...European Coal and Steel Community
ECtHR………….…………..…...….…………..European Court of Human Rights
EEAS……………………..…………………….European External Action Service
EEC…………….………..………...…………….European Economic Community
EFTA………….……….……………...………..European Free Trade Association
EP……………………..………….……...……………………European Parliament
EU………………..….……………………...……………………….European Union
EURA………………….………………European Union Readmission Agreement
EUREMA………………………..Pilot Project for intra-EU Relocation from Malta
EURTF……………….…………....………European Union Regional Task Force
GAMM……………….………………..Global Approach to Migration and Mobility
JHA…………….……....……………………...………….Justice and Home Affairs
LFIP…………….….……………Law on Foreigners and International Protection
MP………………..…..…………………………………………Mobility Partnership
NAP…………….…...………………………………………….National Action Plan
NATO…………………………………...……...North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO……………………………....………...……..Non-governmental organization
PKK………..……….….Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (Kurdistan Workers‘ Party)
SIS…………..………......………………………….Schengen Information System
2MES-Perspektiven 2/2017
TEU…………...……….…………………………...……Treaty on European Union
TFEU…………….….………...Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TP……………………..……………………...Regulation on Temporary Protection
UN………………….………………………………………………….United Nations
UNTOC..…United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
UNHCR………..………………United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNDP…………..…….…………….…..United Nations Development Programme
3MES-Perspektiven 2/2017
cal repression and the climate
change.2 This global development
reached Europe in terms of a gro-
wing number of arriving migrants at
the coast of Mediterranean EU
member states as well as a rapid
rise of shipwrecks off the European
coasts since 2013. Due to the lack
We can build walls, we can build fences. of legal ways to enter the EU, only
But imagine for a second it were you,
in 2015 more than one million mig-
your child in your arms,the world you
knew torn apart around you. There is no rants risked their lives to reach the
price you would not pay, there is no wall European Union according to num-
you would not climb, no sea you would bers provided by the Council of the
not sail, no border you would not cross if European Union. 150,000 had be-
it is the war or the barbarism of the so- en rescued by EU ships, 3,770
called Islamic State that you are fleeing. people died at sea within the same
– Jean-Claude Juncker in his Speech on time period according to official
the State of the Union 2015 statistics.3
The ongoing civil war in Syria since
2011 can be seen as one of the
main reasons for the latest huge
wave of migration with more than
4.8 million refugees forced to live
Introduction
outside their origin country.4 Alt-
hough the majority of these people
found accomodation in the close
The European continent looks back
neighbourhood of Syria, the Euro-
on a rich history of emigration and
pean Union struggles to cope with
immigration. Especially within the
what is called the ‘refugee crisis’. In
last decades the member states of
this context the cooperation with
the European Union1 (EU) became
third countries becomes more and
an attractive destination to an in-
more important to the EU;– be it
creasing number of asylum see-
through bilateral agreements on
kers, refugees and irregular mig-
return and readmission or through
rants. Today worldwide more than
the financial support of refugee aid
247 million people find themselves
outside Europe. Turkey as the only
displaced, often as a result of push
factors like wars, religious perse-
cutions, interethnic tensions, politi- 2 According to the United Nations
assessments of 2015 (UNDP: Human
1 The European Union includes the follo- Development Report 2015).
wing states: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, 3 Council of the European Union:
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Migration Crisis – The Inside Story.
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Scripted and directed by Isabelle Brussel-
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mal- mans, released 18th April 2016.
4 Precise number of “total persons
ta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United of concern” published by the Syria Regio-
Kingdom. nal Refugee Response on
16th of August 2016: 4,808,229.
5MES-Perspektiven 2/2017
country separating the conflicts in building process and the significant
Syria and Iraq from the external role of ‘Turkishness’ in emigration
borders of the EU has a key role to policy.7 This is changing since the
play in managing the current illegal 1980s, when Turkey evolved from
immigration flows. As Donald Tusk, a country mainly known for immig-
President of the European Council, ration to an emigration and transit
declared on 29th November 2015 migration country.8 The country‘s
at a meeting of the EU heads of accession process to the European
state or government with Turkey: Union since 2005 is also reflected
“Approximately 1.5 million people in the Turkish asylum law because
have illegally entered the EU in Turkey is expected to adapt the EU
2015. Most have come through acquis.9 In the context of the latest
Turkey.”5 migratory flows, the Turkish main-
i) Research Question tenance of the geographical limita-
One major attempt of the Union to tion to the 1951 Convention
solve the crisis was the conclusion presents a major challenge,10 parti-
of the so-called EU-Turkey Deal on
7 İbrahim Sirkeci and Barbara Pusch
Migration in March 2016. A few (eds.): Turkish Migration Policy. London,
months after the agreement came 2016.
into effect, I would like to examine it 8 Kemal Kirişçi: Turkey – A Country
of Transition from Emigration to Immigrati-
on concrete backgrounds and la- on. Mediterranean Politics;
test outcomes. The main research Vol. 12, No. 1, March 2007.
Ahmet İçduygu: Turkey‘s Migrati-
question of this thesis is to ask on Transition and its Implications for the
whether the content of the EU- Euro-Turkish Transnational Space. Global
Turkey refugee deal signed in Turkey in Europe, Working Paper 07, April
2014.
March 2016 was instrumental Ahmet İçduygu: Turkey‘s Evolving
enough in resolving the refugee Migration Policies – A Mediterranean Tran-
sit Stop at the Doors of the EU. IAI Working
crisis. Hence, the thesis will be a Papers 15/31 (September 2015).
rather descriptive one analysing the Biner in Ayşem Biriz Karaçay and
agreement from legal and political Ayşen Üstübici (eds.): Migration to and
from Turkey – Changing Patterns and
perspectives. Shifting Policies. Istanbul, 2014.
ii) Literature Review 9 İbrahim Kaya: Reform of Turkish
Asylum Law – Adopting the EU Acquis?
The role of migration and mobility CARIM Research Reports 2009/16.
in Turkish-European relations is Kemal Kirişçi: Turkey‘s New Draft
described by Aydın-Düzgit and Law on Asylum – What to Make of it? In:
Paçacı Elitok, Seçil and Thomas Straub-
Tocci.6 Although Turkey has been haar, eds. (2012): Turkey, Migration and
a migration country since the Otto- the EU – Potentials, Challenges and Op-
portunities. Hamburg.
man Empire, there was no com- Juliette Tolay: Turkey‘s ‘Critical
prehensive legislation on migration Europeanization’ – Evidence from Turkey‘s
and asylum yet due to the nation- Immigration Policies.
In: Paçacı Elitok and Straubhaar,
eds. (2012).
5 Introductory remarks by President 10 Kemal Kirişçi: Is Turkey Lifting the
Donald Tusk at the meeting of EU heads of ‘Geographical Limitation’? – The November
state or government with Turkey on 29th 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey. In:
November 2015. International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol.
6 Senem Aydın-Düzgit and Nathalie Tocci: 8, No. 3, Oxford, 1996.
Turkey and the European Union. London, 2015. İçduygu (2015).
6MES-Perspektiven 2/2017
cularly in view of the large numbers and human rights to the UNHCR
of Syrians the country is hosting.11 Pia Oberoi for instance states that
Having said that, the EU is also ‚migrant‘ describes “a diverse array
struggling to establish a European of people who move to and live in a
migration policy based on solidarity country that is not their own.”14 An-
among the member states.12 The derson and Blinder name catego-
agreement concluded in March ries such as the country of birth,
2016 between Turkey and the Eu- nationality and the length of a stay
ropean Union is expected to be as fundamental data to define a
part of a solution in the so-called migrant. The huge variability of
refugee crisis. these criteria however leads di-
However, the signatories are con- rectly to a problem of comparabili-
fronted with many reservations ty.15
concerning legal and ethic short- An important distinction that has to
comings.13 be made is the one between ‘mig-
Preliminarily an examination of the rant workers’ and ‘refugees’ as the
term ‘migrant’ is needed since the- former enjoy the possibility of re-
re are diverse definitions of what a turning to their home countries
migrant is. Advisor on migration when they wish to.16 In contrast,
refugees are generally fleeing from
11 Şenay Özden: Syrian Refugees in
Turkey. MPC Research Report 2013/05. untenable conditions such as war
Ahmet İçduygu and Evin Millet: or persecution what makes a return
Syrian Refugees in Turkey – Insecure
Lives in an Environment of Pseudo-
on the short run not very likely.
Integration. Global Turkey in Europe Work- Refugees are entitled to specific
ing, Paper 13, August 2016. legal protection according to inter-
Zümray Kutlu-Tonak: Endless
Escape - From Syria to Turkey, Then to national agreements, migrants in
Europe. Studies in Ethnicity and Nationa- contrast enjoy no such protection.17
lism, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2016.
Ayhan Kaya and Aysu Kıraç:
Ludger Pries distinguishes four
Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refu- types of migration: emigrati-
gees in Istanbul. s.l., 2016. on/immigration, return-migration,
12 Corinne Balleix: From Lampedusa
to the Post-Stockholm Programme – Difficult diaspora-migration and transit-
European Solidarity in the Field of Migration. migration. In the case of the EU-
European Policy Brief, No. 24 (March 2014).
Sergio Carrera, Steven Block- Turkey Agreement, primary the
mans, Daniel Gros and Elspeth Guild: The type of transit-migration will be of
EU‘s Response to the Refugee Crisis - particular importance.18
Taking Stock and Setting Policy Priorities.
CEPS Essay, No. 20/16, December 2015.
13 Elizabeth Collett: EU Cooperation
with Third Countries – Rethinking Concepts 14 Pia Oberoi: What‘s in a Name?
and Investments. In: Forced Migration Re- The Complex Reality of Migration and
view, No. 51 (January 2016). Human Rights in the Twenty-first Century.
Özgehan Şenyuva and Çiğdem 2015.
Üstün: A Deal to End “the” Deal – Why the 15 cf. Anderson and Blinder in
Refugee Agreement is a Threat to Turkey- Sirkeci and Pusch, eds. (2016): p. 12 f.
EU Relations. GMF on Turkey, July 2016. 16 Bertelsmann Stiftung (May 2016):
Nilgün Arısan Eralp: Challenges of Religion Monitor – Migration and Diversity.
the German-Led Refugee Deal between 17 ibid.
Turkey and the EU. 18 Ludger Pries cited in Barbara
In: CESifo Forum, Vol. 17, No. 2, Pusch: Bordering the EU – Istanbul as a
Summer 2016. Hotspot for Transnational Migration. In:
7MES-Perspektiven 2/2017
Within the Turkish context it is ne- to the highest form of international
cessary to acknowledge that the protection.22
terms ‘migrant’ (the active party in Subsidiary protection concerns
migration), ‘immigrant’ (someone third-country nationals or stateless
who resides to another country) persons who do not meet the UN
and ‘emigrant’ (someone who definition of refugees but “face a
leaves his own country) are all real risk of suffering serious harm”,
translated to Turkish as ‘göçmen’, that is “(a) death penalty or execut-
as Sirkeci and Pusch underline.19 ion; or (b) torture or inhuman or
This problematic lack of differentia- degrading treatment or punishment
tion reflects the Turkish immigration of an applicant in the country of
history which was formerly charac- origin; or (c) serious and individual
terised by migrants who were main- threat to a civilian‘s life or person
ly of Turkish descent and culture. by reason of indiscriminate vio-
Although the migration to Turkey lence in situations of international
became more heterogeneous or internal armed
within the last three decades, the conflict.”23 EU member states are
terminology remains the same to a permitted to grant people with sub-
great extent.20 sidiary protection a national sta-
With this in mind, a distinction of tus.24
the international protection status Additionally, humanitarian shelter
determined in the EU legislation is allows third-country nationals or
of fundamental importance as well. stateless persons to remain in the
There are two major forms of pro- territories of the EU member states
tection that EU member states can on a “discretionary basis on com-
grant to asylum seekers: passionate or humanitarian
25
Refugee status is based on the grounds”. The recognition of this
1951 Convention Relating to the status is object to national legislati-
Status of Refugees and its 1967 on. It is mostly offered to people
Protocol. EU member states are who can not be returned on health
committed to grant refugee status
to third-country nationals who have
Stateless Persons as Beneficiaries of In-
a “well-founded fear of being per- ternational Protection, for a Uniform Status
secuted for reasons of race, religi- for Refugees or for Persons Eligible for
on, nationality, political opinion or Subsidiary Protection, and for the Content
of the Protection Granted.
membership of a particular social 22 ESI (17th October 2015): The
group” in the country of nationali- 2015 Refugee Crisis through Statistics – A
Compilation for Politicians, Journalists and
ty.21 The status of a refugee entitles Other Concerned Citizens; p. 21.
23 European Parliament/Council of
Paçacı Elitok and Straubhaar, eds. (2012): the European Union (13th December
p. 181. 2011).
19 cf. Sirkeci and Pusch in Sirkeci 24 Elspeth Guild and Sergio Carrera:
and Pusch, eds. (2016): p. 13. Rethinking Asylum Distribution in the EU –
20 cf. 2016: p. 15. Shall We Start with the Facts? CEPS
21 European Parliament/Council of Commentary, 17th June 2016.
the European Union (13th December 25 European Parliament/Council of
2011): Directive on Standards for the Qua- the European Union (13th December
lification of Third-Country Nationals or 2011).
8MES-Perspektiven 2/2017
grounds, or to unaccompanied mi- the present situation of refugees in
nors.26 Turkey and the implementation of
iii) Rationale of the Research the agreement as far as possible.
As the EU-Turkey Agreement has Besides, secondary literature play-
been concluded only six months ed an important role in the thesis
ago, there are legal evaluations as I used academic works such as
available and papers dealing with articles and books to analyse the
mainly ethic concerns. What is historical and legal backgrounds of
missing in the literature is a com- the topic. Finally, unstructured in-
prehensive approach to the EU- terviews that I had conducted with
Turkey Agreement, covering legal EU officials in Brussels and Berlin
and political background as well as between 2nd – 13th June 2016
the outcome of the deal‘s imple- have been evaluated and are
mentation. Hence, the thesis is presented in form of narratives.
designed to contribute to the clo- The interviews were held unstruc-
sure of this gap in the literature. tured in a sense that there existed
iv) Methodology almost no predetermined list of
As the research question aimes at questions and the respondents
actual outcomes of the EU-Turkey were permitted to take control of
Agreement, the research is of the conversation as well as to lay
descriptive nature. Due to the cur- emphasis on areas they considered
rent relevance of the research I relevant.28
preferred using qualitative methods v) Scope of the Study
in order to gain newer insights into In Chapter 1 relevant backgrounds
the topic. By the term ‘qualitative of Turkey‘s migration and asylum
research’, any kind of research was policy are examined from a histori-
taken into account that “produces cal perspective as well as in view of
findings not arrived by statistical the policies‘ Europeanization.
procedures or other means of Furthermore, EU migration policy is
quantification”.27 presented with a special regard to
To investigate the questions men- cooperation with third countries.
tioned above, in first place I exa- Chapter 2 deals with the actual
mined the legal contexts of the EU- incidents leading to the EU-Turkey
Turkey Agreement: That is the EU Agreement, that is in first place the
acquis, the Turkish legislation on civil war in Syria with millions of
asylum and migration (with a spe- people fleeing their home country.
cial regard to the Europeanization The situation in Turkey and the
process), and the treaty texts EU‘s policies in response to the
themselves. Syrian crisis are presented. The
I used primary sources such as agreement concluded in March
statistics and surveys to examine between Turkey and the EU to deal
with the outcomes of the crisis is
26 ESI (17th October 2015): p. 21.
27 Strauss and Corbin (1998) cited dealt with in Chapter 3. Relevant
in Jane Ritchie and Jane Lewis (eds.):
Qualitative Research Practice. London, 28 cf. John Kuada: Research Me-
2003; p. 3 thodology. Frederiksberg, 2012; p. 113.
9MES-Perspektiven 2/2017
associated treaties and the EU- spectively most important agree-
Turkey Statement itself are ment, however, was the 1961 bila-
presented and a comprehensive teral agreement between Turkey
assessment of the Agreement is and West Germany which initiated
made. Finally, the agreement as a the so-called ‘guest worker’ pro-
whole is evaluated in the Conclu- gramme in order to meet the needs
sion with the findings of the rese- for workforce in post-war Germany.
arch. Turkey, on the other hand, was to
benefit from the agreement through
remittances while the workers were
Chapter
1
in Germany as well as through an
Political
and
Legal
Framework
increase in their know-how after
they would have returned back
1.1 Turkey‘s Transition to a Count- home.32 In the course of the ag-
ry of Immigration reements‘ implementation modern
It is indispensable to take Turkey‘s Turkey witnessed for the first time
role as a migration country in the massive emigration of its Turkish-
international context into account to Muslim citizens.33
understand the backgrounds of the The agreement resulted in an in-
agreement concluded between the crease of the Turkish population in
European Union and Turkey in Germany from 6,700 in 1961 to
March 2016. The trinity of being a 605,000 in 1973 – the year when
country of emigration, immigration an economic downturn resulting
and transition makes it crucial to from the oil crisis led to a recruit-
scrutinize the historic and legal ment stop.34 In the long term
features.29 Although Turkey has around 30 per cent of the Turkish
received important inflows of im- migrants resided in Germany, addi-
migration especially throughout the tionally joined by their families.35 In
20th century, it has been known a similar manner the other labour-
primarily as a country of emigrati- demanding industrialized countries
on, not of immigration.30 In particu- such as France and the Nether-
lar the migration of Turkish natio- lands increased their Turkish popu-
nals to the booming western Euro- lation from the 1960s on after the
pean countries in the 1960s and admission of ‘short-term’ migrants
1970s contributed to this percepti- from less-developed countries such
on. Belgium, Britain and France
were the first to sign recruitment
from Turkey – Changing Patterns and
agreements due to increasing de- Shifting Policies. Istanbul, 2014; p. 17.
mand for labor force.31 The retro- 32 Aydın-Düzgit and Tocci (2015): p.
135.
33 Ahmet İçduygu and Damla B.
29 cf. Kirişçi: (2007): p. 91. Aksel in Stephen Castles, Derya Ozkul and
30 Juliette Tolay in Paçacı Elitok and Magdalena Arias Cubas (eds.): Social
Straubhaar, eds. (2012): p. 41. Transformation and Migration. London,
31 Ayşem Biriz Karaçay: Re- 2015; p. 120.
Assessing Migration Systems – The Case 34 cf. Ayhan Kaya cited in Aydın-
of Turkey. In: Ayşem Biriz Karaçay and Düzgit and Tocci (2015): p. 135.
Ayşen Üstübici (eds.): Migration to and 35 ibid.
10MES-Perspektiven 2/2017
as Turkey.36 The 1961 agreement of visa obligation for Turkish citi-
which was foreseen to lead only to zens coming to Europe.39
temporary migration in order to The shift from a country that has
solve a short-term labour shortage been well-known as emigration-
marks the initial point of Turkish generating with only little immigra-
migrant communities in Europe.37 tion from the Balkans, the Cauca-
After the military coup in Turkey in sus and Central Asia to a destinati-
1980 and the eruption of a “de fac- on of immigration occurred in the
to civil war” between the Kurdistan 1980s and 1990s – in the course of
Workers‘ Party (Kurdish: Partiya the overall beginning globalization
Karkerên Kurdistanê, abbreviated: process.40 At that time, the compo-
PKK) and the Turkish state in 1984, sition of the migration flows to Tur-
an increasing number of asylum key changed dramatically.41 Beside
seekers fled from Turkey to Euro- the facilitation of the movement of
pe.38 It was the European fear of a people, goods, technologies, ideas
large-scale immigration in these and finances, political upheavals
days that led to the first introduction and economic transformations in
the region forced people to migrate
to saver and more-developed
countries such as Turkey.42
36 According to Akgündüz cited in In addition to that, political develo-
İçdyugu and Aksel, between 1961 and pments like the liberalisation of
1974 a total of nearly 800,000 Turkish
workers went to Europe. Out of these wor-
Turkey‘s economy in the 1990s and
kers, 649,000 (81 per cent) went to Ger- the resulting economic growth as
many; 56,000 well as a liberal visa regime intro-
(7 per cent) went to France;
37,000 (5 per cent); went to Austria and duced by the Justice and Develo-
25,000 (3 per cent) went to the Nether- pment Party (Turkish: Adalet ve
lands (İçdyugu and Aksel in Castles et al.,
eds. [2015], p. 120).
Kalkınma Partisi, abbreviated:
37 In 2009, it was estimated that AKP) government in the early
there were approximately 3.1 million Tur- 2000s were reasons for Turkey
kish citizens living abroad with 2.7 million in
European countries – a substantial in- becoming a ‘migration transition’
crease from the numbers of 1973. There country.43
are further 800,000 Turkish nationals who
have taken the citizenship of their host Finally one should not underesti-
countries between 1991 and 2002 (Kirişçi mate the effects the beginning of
[2007]: p. 92). negotiations for full EU mem-
38 Aydın-Düzgit and Tocci (2015): p.
137. bership in 2005 had. According to
According to UNHCR statistics, İbrahim Kaya, already to be an EU
between 1981 and 2005 over 664,000
Turkish citizens applied for asylum in vari- candidate country meant for Turkey
ous European countries. The refugee significant increases in foreign in-
recognition rates varied from country to
country but have been very low though;–
because of the multiple trial to make “frau- 39 cf. Kirişçi (2007): p. 92.
dulent use of the asylum channel” – as 40 cf. ibid.
İçdyugu and Kirişçi state (Ahmet İçdyugu 41 Pusch (2012): p. 167.
and Kemal Kirişçi [eds.]: Land of Diverse 42 İçduygu and Aksel in Castles et
Migrations – Challenges of Emigration and al., eds. (2015): p. 123.
Immigration in Turkey. Istanbul, 2009; p. 43 cf. Aydın-Düzgit and Tocci
6). (2015): p. 138.
11MES-Perspektiven 2/2017
vestments. These, as a corollary, occures generally when migrants
are reasons for growing rates of do not have access to an orderly
migration to Turkey44 – “a transfor- border-crossing to their country of
mation from being mainly a country destination and are consequently
of emigration to one of immigrati- “forced to choose disorderly and
on.”45 One can call present Turkey step-by-step moves through vari-
a migration-sending, migration- ous countries in between.”50
receiving and transit country at the But it is not only the geographical
same time.46 location that makes the country a
Beginning in the 1980s, approxi- migration hotspot – Turkey also
mately up to one million (transit-) constitutes a demarcation line
migrants, refugees, suitcase tra- between the global rich and the
ders, circular migrants, clandestine global poor. Pusch refers to the
workers and ethnical “Turks” en- famous “Fortress Europe” when
tered Turkey, as Barbara Pusch stating that the line between rich
noticed in 2012.47 In contrast to and poor is visualized by the strict
previous times, the migration flows EU migration regulations.51
have become much more diverse According to numbers provided by
within the last decades. However, Ahmet İçduygu and Damla B. Ak-
Turkey is not the main destination sel, only between 1995 and 2013
country for all migrants crossing more than half a million transit mig-
Turkish borders. Rather the geo- rants heading towards the Euro-
graphic position between the Midd- pean
le East, Asia, Africa and Europe; Union were registered in Turkey.52
the lack of sufficient controls at the Naturally, a not insignificant num-
country‘s southern borders and an ber of actual transit migrants is also
“incomplete” migration regime tur- stranding in Turkey instead of con-
ned Turkey into one of the top des- tinuing the journey towards Europe,
tinations for transit migrants wan- may it be due to a lack of money or
ting to enter the EU.48 Transnatio- of opportunity.
nal migrants are people whose
“daily lives depend on multiple and
constant interconnections across
international borders and [whose]
public identities are configured in
relationship to more than one nati-
on-state”, as defined by Nina Glick
rant to Transmigrant – Theorizing Transna-
Schiller.49 Irregular transit migration tional Migration. Anthropological Quarterly,
68:1, 1995; p. 48.
44 Kaya (2009): p. 1. 50 Ahmet İçduygu: The Irregular
45 İçduygu and Aksel in Castles et Migration Corridor between the EU and
al., eds. (2015): p. 125. Turkey – Is it Possible to Block it with a
46 cf. Pusch (2012): p. 168. Readmission Agreement? EU-US Immigra-
47 2012: p. 167 f. tion Systems 2011/14, San Domenico di
48 İçduygu and Yükseker cited in Fiesole, 2011; p. 2.
Aydın-Düzgit and Tocci (2015): p. 138. 51 Pusch (2012): p. 168.
49 Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch 52 İçduygu and Aksel in Castles et
and Cristina Szanton Blanc: From Immig- al., eds. (2015): p. 125.
12MES-Perspektiven 2/2017
1.2 Turkey‘s Evolving Migration politically but lost economically”, as
Policies53 Ayhan Aktar outlines.58
As in many European states also in Still, this compulsory population
Turkey the migration policies in the exchange had an important impact
first half of the 20th century were on the nation-building process of a
based on nationalism and nation- homogeneous Turkish state: In
building.54 As Ahmet İçduygu 1906, about 20 per cent of the Ot-
summarizes: “Exclusion of the non- toman population was non-Muslim;
Turkish and non-Muslim populati- in the years between 1914 and
ons and inclusion of Turks and 1924 the composition of the popu-
Muslims was the first comprehensi- lation changed so dramatically that
ve system of migration policy in the in 1927 only 2.6 per cent non-
country.“55 In its last days the Ot- Muslim citizens were counted.59
toman Empire faced a massive The founding fathers of the Turkish
exodus of the country‘s non-Muslim Republic were driven by the deep-
minority populations due to several seated belief that the Ottoman Em-
push and pull factors.56 A key part pire had been doomed to failure
of the transforming of the multi- because of its inherent multi-ethnic
ethnic empire into a homogeneous and multi-cultural character. For
nation was the compulsory popula- that reason Turkish-speaking Mus-
tion exchange between Greeks and lims as well as ethnic groups who
Turks, set out in the Lausanne Tre- were considered to “easily melt into
aty in 1923.57 This forced migration a Turkish identity” were encoura-
of more than one million people ged to immigrate to the newly
changed the social and political founded state.60 Consequently,
patterns and influenced the eco- from the founding of the Turkish
nomy of both Greece and Turkey: Republic in 1923 until 1997 more
“It might be said that Greece has than 1.6 million migrants settled
gained economically and lost politi- and successfully assimilated in
cally, and that Turkey has gained Turkey on the legal basis of the
Law on Settlement of 1934.61
58 Ayhan Aktar: The Turkish Experi-
ence of Population Exchange Reconsi-
53 More detailed information about dered. In: Renée Hirschon (ed.): Crossing
the legal framework on migration and the Aegean – An Appraisal of the 1923
asylum in Turkey are inter alia provided by Compulsory Exchange between Greece
Juliette Tolay (2012) and İbrahim Kaya and Turkey. Oxford, 2003; p. 80.
(2009). According to Colin Bundy, the act
54 cf. İçduygu (2014): p. 4. of “unmixing” saw even 1.7 million people
55 ibid. moving in both directions (Colin Bundy:
56 İçduygu and Kirişçi (2009): p. 2. Migrants, Refugees, History and Prece-
One important push factor was dents. In: Marion Couldrey and Maurice
“economic nationalism” as a first step in Herson [eds.]: Forced Migration Review –
Turkish nationalization, emerging since Destination: Europe. Issue 51, January
1912 in the Ottoman Empire (Ayhan Aktar: 2016; p. 5).
Economic Nationalism in Turkey – The 59 Çağlar Keyder: State and Class
Formative Years, 1912 – 1925. Boğaziçi in Turkey – A Study in Capitalist Develop-
Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1–2, 1996; p. 263). ment. London, 1987; p. 79.
57 Sirkeci and Pusch in Sirkeci and 60 İçduygu and Kirişçi (2009): p. 10.
Pusch, eds. (2016): p. 9. 61 cf. ibid.
13MES-Perspektiven 2/2017
Since the 1980s however, the Tur- and resettled in third countries like
kish Republic experienced new the United States and Canada.66
forms of – non-Muslim and non- The second tier of the country‘s
Turkish – immigration, involving “two-tier asylum policy” relates to
nationals of neighbouring countries, people coming from non-European
European states, as well as illegal states.67 Before the extreme in-
transit migrants heading for the crease in numbers, these people
West.62 Turkey‘s asylum policy were allowed to be sheltered by the
could be divided into “two tiers” as UNHCR with the condition not to
Turkey is one of the original signa- locally integrate but to be resettled
tories of the 1951 Convention Rela- out of Turkey if recognized as refu-
ting to the Status of Refuees63 who gees.68 However, by the end of the
are maintaining the geographical Cold War, these existing policies
limitation clause excluding asylum came to a crisis because of the
seekers from outside Europe.64 changes in quantity and quality of
The state allows the United Nations the migratory flows.69 On the one
High Commissioner for Refugees hand, most of the mass influxes of
(UNHCR) to conduct refugee status Iranians, Iraqi Kurds in 1988 and
determination procedures on Tur- 1991, Bulgarian Turks in 1989 and
kish territory.65 Asylum applications Bosnian Muslims in 1992/93 could
are examined by the Turkish autho- neither be accepted in Turkey un-
rities in coordination with the UN- der the Law on Settlement nor un-
HCR; recognized refugees are ex- der the 1951 Refugee Convention;
pected to be resettled in third on the other hand they led to gro-
countries. Within the framework of wing concern among Turkish offi-
that cooperation for instance cials.70 Driven by the fear of Iran
asylum seekers coming from the possibly assisting Islamic terrorist
Soviet Union to Turkey as a wes- groups in Turkey and of potential
tern ally until 1991 were processed PKK militants among asylum see-
kers, the control of the country‘s
The Law on Settlement restricted
possible settlement and asylum applica- eastern borders became more and
tions to people of “Turkish descent and
culture”, which means that only people
fulfilling the ethnic or religious preconditi-
ons were allowed to immigrate to Turkey. 66 Kemal Kirişçi: Managing Irregular
These have been in first place different Migration in Turkey – A Political-
groups of Sunni Muslims from the Balkans Bureaucratic Perspective.
(Kemal Kirişçi: The Question of Asylum CARIM Analytic and Synthetic
and Illegal Migration in European Union – Notes, 2008/61; p. 8.
Turkish Relations. Turkish Studies 4 Currently 33 countries offer resett-
[2003]; p. 88 f.) lement or humanitarian admission in UN-
62 İçduygu and Kirişçi (2009): p. 11. HCR-facilitated programmes. The countries
63 Also referred to as ‘The 1951 admitting most resettled refugees in 2015
Refugee Convention’. were in the same order: the United States,
64 According to the UNHCR, in 2015 Canada, Australia, Norway and the United
the following states still maintained the Kingdom (UNHCR: Resettlement Fact
geographical limitation: Congo, Mada- Sheet 2015).
gascar, Monaco and Turkey (States Parties 67 Kirişçi (2007): p. 94.
to the 1951 Convention relating to the 68 cf. 2007: p. 94 f.
Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol). 69 Tolay (2012): p. 42.
65 İçduygu (2015): p. 6 f. 70 Kirişçi (1996): p. 299 f.
14MES-Perspektiven 2/2017
more an issue of particular im- the principle of ‘non-refoulement’75
portance to the Turkish state.71 has almost been accepted, what
At that time the Turkish legal regu- stands for another important step
lations on migration issues were regarding the fundamental rights of
altogether incomplete and incom- asylum seekers in Turkey.76 The
patible as they were consisting of principle of non-refoulement has
“a handful texts [laying] down clau- been the reason for several com-
ses and modalities regarding the plaints and trials due to alleged
entry, exit, stay and residence of Turkish violations of the obligation
aliens”,– beside the Law of Resett- anchored in The European Con-
lement, mainly the Law on Foreig- vention on Human Rights (ECHR)
ners and the Turkish Citizenship “not to return persons to a country
Law.72 Yet there were no legal re- where their lives might be in
gulations regarding issues of danger,- even if they were not
asylum or labour. To overcome covered by the 1951 Convention”,
these shortcomings the Directive as Kemal Kirişçi notes.77
on Asylum Regulation was intro- “A time of earthquake reforms” was
duced in November 1994 as a first succeeding the “early step” of the
serious step in reforming Turkey‘s 1994 Asylum Regulation,–78
legislation regarding migration.73 throughout the 2000s, the immigra-
Once the new regulation was adop- tion issue in general became more
ted, the right to apply for asylum in and more a political concern to
Turkey was granted to non- manage.79 Far-reaching revisions
European refugees as well,– but of many regulations on asylum and
still with the condition that officially migration were adopted between
recognized refugees would be re- 2002 and 2005 when Turkey was
settled in a third country.74
75 Article 33 of the 1951 Convention
Furthermore, with the introduction declares the principle of non-refoulement:
of Article 29 (“Deportation”) stating “No Contracting State shall expell or return
that (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories
where his life or freedom would be threate-
“a refugee or an asylum seeker who is ned on account of his race, religion, natio-
residing in Turkey legally can only be nality, membership of a particular social
deported [...] within the framework of group or political opinion [...]” (UNHCR:
the 1951 Geneva Convention relating Convention and Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees).
to the Status of Refugees or for 76 Kirişçi (1996): pp. 303 and 317.
reasons of national security and public 77 1996: p. 303 f.
order”, Particularly attracting public at-
tention was the decision of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the
Abdolkhani and Karimnia case. Turkey was
found guilty for violation of a number of
71 ibid. articles of the ECHR because of the at-
72 İçduygu and Aksel in Castles et tempt to deport the two Iranian refugees to
al., eds. (2015): p. 123; their home country denying them the con-
Tolay (2012): p. 42. testation of the deportation decisions
73 For a detailed analysis of the (Kirişçi [2012]: p. 77).
Directive on Asylum Regulation, see Kirişçi 78 Tolay (2012): p. 43.
(1996). 79 Üstübici in Biriz Karaçay and
74 Tolay (2012): p. 42. Üstübici, eds. (2014): p. 361.
15MES-Perspektiven 2/2017
trying to align its visa policy to the approach and mindset within Tur-
Schengen negative and positive kish bureaucracy”.84
lists. In this context among others Lastly in 2013, the Law on Foreig-
the Law on Citizenship was ners and International Protection
amended, the Law on Work Per- (LFIP) was adopted by the Turkish
mits for Foreign Nationals as well parliament, representing “Turkey‘s
as the additional protocols against main legislative document defining
migrant smuggling and human traf- its asylum policy.”85 It combines the
ficking of the United Nations Con- two separate previously planned
vention against Transnational Or- laws, namely the Law on Aliens
ganized Crime (UNTOC) were and the Law on Asylum and is
adopted.80 considered as rather progressive.86
These were followed by the Natio- The LFIP is viewed as a “milestone
nal Action Plan on Asylum and Mig- advancement” in the process of
ration (NAP) for Adoption of the EU aligning the Turkish migration po-
Acquis in the Field of Asylum in licy system to international and EU
2005,– the first fully-fledged ap- standards. Also by this law, the
proach on Turkish immigration po- principle of non-refoulement is
licy and part of the EU pre- clearly recognized, thus the “refu-
accession requirements.81 The ac- gees‘ irrefutable right to cross a
tion plan determined a time frame country‘s border in situations of
and the tasks Turkey intended to persecution and war.”87 Furthermo-
accomplish in order to develop a re, the status of ‘subsidiary protec-
comprehensive national status- tion’ is formalized and an agency to
determination system, to lift the centralize asylum applications is
geographic limitation and to adopt being introduced.88 Although the
EU directives on asylum and migra- lifting of the geographical limitation
tion related topics in general.82 of the 1951 Convention is a major
Three years after the NAP‘s adop- condition for Turkey to join the Eu-
tion, accordingly steps were under- ropean Union, this law does not
taken by the establishment of a affect the limitation‘s validity.89 Still,
task force on migration and asylum the process as a whole indicates
in 2008.83
According to Juliette Tolay, this 84 ibid.
was not only important because it 85 Juliette Tolay: The EU and Tur-
key‘s Asylum Policies in Light of the Syrian
initiated the creation of a new com- Crisis. Global Turkey in Europe, Policy
prehensive migration policy, but Brief 10, January 2014; p. 3.
86 Üstübici in Biriz Karaçay and
because it indicates a “change in Üstübici, eds. (2014): p. 362.
87 Clemens Peter Leonard Wilbertz:
UNHCR‘s World of Refugees and Asylum
80 Tolay (2012): p. 43; within a Changing Security Discourse –
Üstübici in Biriz Karaçay and The Principle of ‘Nonrefoulement’ vs. the
Üstübici, eds. (2014): p. 361 f. Practice of Border Closure.
81 Ministry of Interior (17th January Copenhagen, 2012; p. 8.
2005): National Action Plan for Asylum and 88 Tolay (2014): p. 3.
Migration (2005). 89 Jonathon Burch (2013): Turkey
82 İçduygu and Aksel (2015): p. 125. Has New Law on Asylum, But Sets Limits
83 Tolay (2012): p. 44. for Non-Europeans.
16MES-Perspektiven 2/2017
that there are institutional changes cerns that had led to the limitation
going on in the governance of im- have been reinforced.95 Kirişçi
migration in Turkey.90 reasons that the geographical limi-
tation has traditionally been a
1.2.1 The Geographical Limitation “central characteristic” of Turkey‘s
Although Turkey is among the first asylum policies and led to the for-
signatories of the 1951 Refugee mation of an overall two-tiered
Convention and the 1967 Protocol, asylum policy.96 The two tiers differ
non-Europeans are not legally inasmuch as the first tier applies to
recognized as ‘refugees’ under the European refugees, rooting in the
current legislation.91 İbrahim Kaya Cold War years.
puts it pointedly by stating that the At that time Turkey received
only difference between ‘refugees’ asylum seekers fleeing from the
and ‘asylum seekers’ in Turkey was communist countries in Eastern
“whether the events causing them Europe and the Soviet Union. In
to flee took place in Europe or close cooperation with the UNHCR,
elsewhere.”92 Historically, the geo- Turkey granted refuge to them until
graphical limitation gave states the they would have been resettled to a
possibility to accept the applicability third country. These people would
of the 1951 Convention only to in- enjoy all the rights provided by the
dividuals who became refugees as 1951 Convention.97 Kirişçi notices,
a result of events in Europe. A time that there have been “never any of
limitation on the other hand made it the economic, political and social
possible to accept only individuals problems often associated with
who became refugees before 1951. integrating refugees” with the ap-
In 1967 the UN adopted an additio- proximately 13,500 asylum seekers
nal protocol to the 1951 Convention enjoying protection in Turkey
which gave states the possibility to between 1970 and 1996.98
lift both limitations.93
In Turkey, the limitation had been
introduced to encounter the chal-
lenges originating in “events occur-
ring outside Europe” and the resul-
ting migration waves the country
experienced since the 1980s at its
eastern and southeastern bor-
ders.94 By the influx of more than
half a million Kurds from Iraq in
1988 and 1991 the security con-
95 Kirişçi (2003): p. 83.
96 2003: ibid.
90 Üstübici in Biriz Karaçay and 97 Kirişçi (2007): p. 94.
Üstübici, eds. (2014): p. 362. According to Kirişçi, only a small
91 Kaya (2009): p. 5 f. number of asylum seekers were allowed to
92 2009: p. 6. stay in Turkey in the long-term, mostly
93 Kirişçi (2003): p. 103. because they married Turkish nationals
94 Kaya (2009): p. 5; Kirişçi (2012): (Kirişçi [2003]: p. 83).
p. 64. 98 ibid.
17MES-Perspektiven 2/2017
The second tier of Turkish asylum Iraq in 1991 resulted in a change of
policy concerns the even more dis- this policy. The authorities began to
cussed refugees from outside Eu- deport asylum seekers arguing
Figure 1: Basic structure of asylum law in Turkey 1
rope, also referred to as ‘non- either that they are coming from a
Convention refugees’. Although safe region as ‘economic migrants’
there has not been any legal basis or that they had reached Turkey via
on which the status of these “real a third country.100 This handling led
foreigners” could have been gover- to growing criticism from the inter-
ned, a “policy based on pragma- national community, combined with
tism and flexibility” evolved as gro- the demand to apply the principle
wing numbers of refugees began to of non-refoulement to ‘non-
arrive from outer Europe.99 Convention refugees’ too.101
Iranian citizens fleeing from Ayatol- With the Asylum Regulation intro-
lah Khomeini‘s post-revolutionary duced in 1994, the Turkish authori-
regime during the 1980s were the ties ended the dispute with the
first to benefit from practices gran- UNHCR about the legal definition
ting them residence permit in Tur-
key while they were waiting to be 100 cf. 2003: p. 86.
Another reason for deportations of
examined and resettled by the people was their non-compliance with the
UNHCR. Turkish officials applied requirement to apply for asylum within a
maximum of five days. This rule has often
this practice from then on to sever-
been interpreted strictly, so that applicants
al nationals arriving in the country. exceeding the term have been refused. In
However, the massive exodus from 1999, the limit for filling an asylum applica-
tion had been increased to ten days (2003:
p. 87).
99 2003: p. 85. 101 ibid.
18MES-Perspektiven 2/2017
of a ‘refugee’ by introducing their lifting of the geographical limitation
own status determination. How- until Turkey‘s accession, it seems
ever, the background of this regula- to be quite unlikely that the geo-
tion was rather security-motivated graphical limitation will be touched
than focused on strengthening re- on as long as Turkey‘s prospects of
fugees‘ rights, Kristen Biehl calls it EU membership remain vague.106
even the first sign of a “migration
securitization” approach in Tur- 1.3 Europeanization of Turkish Mig-
key.102 The regulation introduces ration and Asylum Policy
measures for the Turkish authori- There are several definitions of the
ties to increase their control on concept of ‘Europeanization’,– the
asylum issues and illegal move- perhaps most common view is the
ments of people into and through one paraphrased by Başak Kale,
Turkey but could not have been who states that “Europeanization
interpreted as a development towa- can be defined as [the] changes
rds the lifting of the geographical caused by European integration
limitation.103 process at the domestic level.”107
It is obvious that the limits of Tur- Héritier defines it rather as a “pro-
key‘s obligations in international cess of influence deriving from Eu-
refugee law are not unproblematic ropean decisions and impacting
at least since the country is a mig- member states‘ policies and politi-
ration destination. The lifting of the cal and administrative structures.”
108
geographic limitation became one One should add that this is not
of the major conditions that Turkey only a phenomenon affecting
has to fulfill in order to be part of member states, but prospective
the European Union. In the past, member states too: Turkey as a EU
the Turkish government defended member state candidate is expec-
the maintenance of the limitation ted to adapt and enforce the entire
with security concerns as well as legal structure of the EU, the ac-
with the argumentation that the quis,109 as a fundamental prerequi-
lifting would lead to mass influxes site for full membership.
of refugees.104 The European side
then again claims that Turkish de-
nial of asylum status to non- 106 cf. Kirişçi (2012): p. 65.
European asylum seekers makes 107 Başak Kale: The Impact of Euro-
peanization on Domestic Policy Structures
these people irregular immigrants – Asylum and Refugee Policies in Turkey‘s
in the EU on the long term.105 Since Accession Process to the European Union.
Ankara, 2005; p. 39.
the Union approved a delay of the 108 Héritier cited in Kale (2005): p.
39.
102 cf. Kirişçi (2007): p. 95. 109 By ‘acquis communautaire’ or
Kirsten Biehl cited in Sibel Ka- shortened ‘acquis’, the entire body of EU
radağ: Europeanization of Migration and legislation is indicated. The adoption of the
Asylum Policy – A Critical Analysis of Tur- totality of EU acquis ranks among the basic
kish Case [sic!]. London, 2012. prerequisites of European Union mem-
103 Kirişçi (2003): p. 309. bership (Siegmar Schmidt and Wolf J.
104 2003: p. 83. Schünemann: Europäische Union – Eine
105 Aydın-Düzgit and Tocci (2015): p. Einführung [European Union - An Introduc-
144. tion]. Baden-Baden, 2013; p. 207).
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