N. 19 BEYOND NETWORKS, MILITIAS AND TRIBES: RETHINKING EU COUNTER-SMUGGLING POLICY AND RESPONSE

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N. 19 BEYOND NETWORKS, MILITIAS AND TRIBES: RETHINKING EU COUNTER-SMUGGLING POLICY AND RESPONSE
N. 19
                    Policy Study

BEYOND NETWORKS, MILITIAS
AND TRIBES: RETHINKING EU
COUNTER-SMUGGLING POLICY
AND RESPONSE
Gabriella Sanchez
Coordinator
Kheira Arrouche
Matteo Capasso
Angeliki Dimitriadi
Alia Fakhry

                                   © Marta Sánchez Dionis 2020
N. 19 BEYOND NETWORKS, MILITIAS AND TRIBES: RETHINKING EU COUNTER-SMUGGLING POLICY AND RESPONSE
N. 19
                                     APRIL 2021
Policy Study

               BEYOND NETWORKS,
               MILITIAS AND TRIBES:
               RETHINKING EU
               COUNTER-SMUGGLING
               POLICY AND RESPONSE

               Gabriella Sanchez
               Coordinator
               Kheira Arrouche
               Matteo Capasso
               Angeliki Dimitriadi
               Alia Fakhry
EuroMeSCo has become a benchmark for policy-oriented research on issues
related to Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, in particular economic development,
security and migration. With 104 affiliated think tanks and institutions and about
500 experts from 29 different countries, the network has developed impactful tools
for the benefit of its members and a larger community of stakeholders in the Euro-
Mediterranean region.

Through a wide range of publications, surveys, events, training activities, audio-
visual materials and a strong footprint on social media, the network reaches
thousands of experts, think tankers, researchers, policy-makers and civil society and
business stakeholders every year. While doing so, EuroMeSCo is strongly engaged
in streamlining genuine joint research involving both European and Southern
Mediterranean experts, encouraging exchanges between them and ultimately
promoting Euro-Mediterranean integration. All the activities share an overall
commitment to fostering youth participation and ensuring gender equality in the
Euro-Mediterranean experts’ community.

EuroMesCo: Connecting the Dots is a project co-funded by the European Union
(EU) and the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) that is implemented
in the framework of the EuroMeSCo network.

As part of this project, five Joint Study Groups are assembled each year to carry out
evidence-based and policy-oriented research. The topics of the five study groups
are defined through a thorough process of policy consultations designed to
identify policy-relevant themes. Each Study Group involves a Coordinator and a
team of authors who work towards the publication of a Policy Study which is
printed, disseminated through different channels and events, and accompanied by
audio-visual materials.

POLICY STUDY

Published by the European Institute of the Mediterranean
Peer Review
Academic Peer Reviewer: anonymous
Policy Peer Reviewer: We are grateful to the Human Trafficking and Migrant
Smuggling Section of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
for its substantive support to the development of this Policy Study, through the
contribution of Ms. Morgane Nicot as a Policy Peer Reviewer.
Editing
Karina Melkonian
Design layout Maurin.studio
Proofreading Neil Charlton
Layout Núria Esparza
Print ISSN 2462-4500
Digital ISSN 2462-4519
April 2021
This publication has been produced with the assistance of the European Union. The contents of this
publication are the sole responsibility of the authors and can in no way be taken to reflect the views
of the European Union or the European Institute of the Mediterranean.
The European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), founded in 1989, is a
think and do tank specialised in Euro-Mediterranean relations. It provides
policy-oriented and evidence-based research underpinned by a genuine
Euromed multidimensional and inclusive approach.

The aim of the IEMed, in accordance with the principles of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), is to stimulate reflection and action
that contribute to mutual understanding, exchange and cooperation between
the different Mediterranean countries, societies and cultures, and to promote
the progressive construction of a space of peace and stability, shared prosperity
and dialogue between cultures and civilisations in the Mediterranean.

The IEMed is a consortium comprising the Catalan Government, the Spanish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation, the European
Union and Barcelona City Council. It also incorporates civil society through its
Board of Trustees and its Advisory Council.

The mission of the Migration Policy Centre (MPC) at the European University
Institute (EUI) is to conduct advanced research on the transnational governance
of international migration, asylum and mobility. It provides new ideas, rigorous
evidence and critical thinking to inform major European and global policy.
The MPC has three core aims:

 · Advancing Academic Research and Knowledge: It conducts theoretical and
   empirical research linking different types of migration, geographies, levels of
   policy-making and governance, and policy issues.

 · Policy Engagement and Dialogue: It proactively engages with users of
   migration research to foster dialogue in Europe and globally about migration
   policy and governance while building links with other key global challenges
   and changes.

 · Training: It provides advanced training for researchers, policy officials, civil
   society organisations and others dealing with migration issues in the form of
   executive training courses and its renown annual Migration Summer School.
Policy Study
Content

Executive Summary                                       8

Introduction                                           12
Gabriella Sanchez

Revisiting the Counter-Smuggling Approach              14
Gabriella Sanchez

Countering Smuggling of Migrants through Social
Media Monitoring: Looking for a Needle in a Digital
Haystack                                               34
Angeliki Dimitriadi

Hiding in Plain Sight: Investigating the Blind Spots
of Counter-Smuggling Efforts in Niger                  52
Alia Fakhry

Current Trends and Challenges on the Facilitation of
Irregular Migration in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco    76
Gabriella Sanchez, Kheira Arrouche, Matteo Capasso

List of acronyms and abbreviations                     96
Executive Summary
Countering migrant smuggling and its actors – described as the men behind the
facilitation of migrants’ irregular journeys – are important elements of the
European Union (EU)’s migration and border control policy. Under the new Pact
on Migration and Asylum, the EU has proposed to promote tailor-made and
mutually beneficial partnerships with third countries specifically to address
migrant smuggling. EU Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson has also
promised a predictable and reliable migration management system that
includes “stepping up the fight against human traffickers and smugglers”.

The EU has certainly taken important steps to counter irregular migration,
including making considerable financial commitments to the fight against
smugglers and their networks, to whom the journeys of irregular migrants into
Europe are almost single-handedly attributed. Smugglers, characterised as
inherently violent and exploitative, are also described as relying on a specific
business model that generates incalculable earnings. Much has been written
about how these profits, if unmonitored, can be funnelled by smugglers into
other criminal enterprises like drug trafficking or weapons smuggling, but also
into the more nefarious practices of sex trafficking or terrorism.

Within this context, smugglers are also said to exploit an ever-growing number
of naïve and desperate victims, primarily young men from sub-Saharan Africa
who, driven solely by the power of social media and the iconography portraying
European soil as a dreamed destination, do not think twice about embarking on
dangerous journeys across vast deserts and seas. At high level policy events and
academic exchanges, participants often cite examples of young men who,
tricked by Facebook and Instagram posts, arrive in Europe after enduring
harrowing experiences only to find themselves in even more desperate
situations of homelessness and deprivation, having believed the lies and false
promises of smugglers, friends and family members posted online. Migrant
women, on the other hand, tend to be described as young sex slaves or
prostitutes, victims of the depravity of sexually-predatory smugglers who do not
hesitate to exploit them for profit in cities across North Africa and Europe.

Migrants do face violence and intimidation at the hands of smugglers. These
experiences have been documented at length in a vast number of reports
targeting European audiences. Kidnapping, extortion, and physical and sexual
assault are undeniable and troubling realities on the migration pathway, and
migrants do experience them often at the hands of smugglers. Women, girls,
and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and questioning migrants are
also more vulnerable to specific forms of sexual and gender-based violence
(SGBV), which are often compounded by racism and other forms of
discrimination – this does not preclude the fact that SGBV against migrant men
is also common on the migrant trail.

Policy Study n. 19
This policy study, developed by a team of migration scholars based in EU
research institutions, argues that while these general notions have guided the
mainstream, collective understanding of migrant smuggling, they do in fact
pose several and serious limitations that, if not considered closely, can lead to
faulty conclusions and inadequate policy responses. Echoing other studies, this
report shows that irregular migration and counter-smuggling policy are often
based on limited empirical data, drawn from similar if not identical stakeholders,
and developed by a reduced and identifiable core of researchers (most of them,
European and/or Europe-based). While this body of work has to a large extent
expanded the understanding of smuggling, it has simultaneously privileged
Euro-centric perspectives and law enforcement priorities at the expense of
silencing the experiences (other than those involving victimisation and abuse) of
the very people who rely on smugglers for their journeys. Chapter one examines
how research has shown that while in most law enforcement, policy and
academic circles the facilitation of irregular migration for profit is articulated as
a crime, for most migrants the people behind their journeys merely facilitate a
service of mobility, which may be in some instances illicit but not criminal,
rooted in the lack of accessible, affordable, legal and safe paths for migration.
These actors, commonly depicted in academic publications and research
reports as heinously violent and predatory members of tribes or other ethnic
and racialised groups, are quite often valued and well-respected people in
communities across North Africa and the Sahel, trusted for the efficiency of their
mobility, trade and transportation services. Known or depicted as smugglers in
policy reports, these facilitators are quite often ordinary men and women,
recognised for their contributions to the local economy, including the provision
of mobility solutions for young and adult migrants unable to secure the
protections afforded by passports or visas.

The study also showcases how, contrary to smuggling’s depiction as a domain of
adult men organised into criminal networks, the facilitation of irregular
migration often takes place as a community-based enterprise, where local
groups – often comprising extended families, women, children and elderly
people – play critical roles in the facilitation of migrants’ journeys, sharing and
reincorporating profits to the local economy. As shown throughout this study,
the provision of smuggling services is an important source of income for
women, who are often engaged in the provision of room and board, the care for
injured or hurt migrants, running flats within ghettos, and in some instances
transporting migrants across borders. The study shows that when seen from a
local, micro-level perspective, the provision of smuggling services is perceived
as a viable source of income, especially among marginalised groups – tribal
communities in remote regions, women, migrants in transit and/or stranded,
migrant children and youths travelling unaccompanied. Simultaneously,
examples from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Niger included in this study
highlight the impact of attempts to counter the activities of smugglers, not only
on those who directly or indirectly benefit financially from migrants’ journeys,
but on migrants themselves.

Efforts to counter smuggling by both the EU and third countries – for example,
the monitoring of social media pages by EU law enforcement bodies, the
10                            Beyond Networks, Militias and Tribes: Rethinking EU Counter-Smuggling Policy and Response

introduction of a migrant smuggling statute in national criminal law as in the
case of Niger, or the designation of irregular departures in Tunisia, Algeria and
Morocco as criminal – often have either ineffective or counterproductive effects.
Chapter two showcases how social media data-mining efforts by EU law
enforcement appear to have scant impact on the operation of migrant
smuggling groups yet raise concerns over institutional transparency and
migrants’ right to privacy. In the case of Niger, chapter three shows how the
introduction of the counter-smuggling statute pushed the long-standing local
economy of mobility and trade underground, depriving of income sources not
only those directly involved in the facilitation of migrants’ journeys but those
who benefited from the presence of people in transit – particularly women,
children and youths who generated an income from the sale of food, equipment
or accommodation, and whose presence is often disregarded in smuggling
analyses and policy recommendations. Chapter four showcases how across
Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, apprehension and conviction for irregular
departure – often punished through hefty fines – further compound the debt
and precarity of young men and their families, and reinforce the desire or need
to migrate, often with devastating consequences. Chapter four also provides
important evidence that, in these three countries, groups of friends and family
members – rather than smuggling groups – are behind the organisation of their
own irregular journeys, pulling together their own resources and knowledge.

Recommendations

The EU’s stated commitment to counter the negative impacts of migrant
smuggling activities constitutes an opportunity to rethink the traditional
approaches to smuggling, and to re-energise a body of research that has been
vastly dominated by Euro-centric perspectives and foci.

     • Improved knowledge and understanding of smuggling can only come
       from radical changes to the way research is created and data analysed.
       This involves expanding the web of informants and stakeholders but also
       diversifying the body of researchers and research entities traditionally
       tasked with conducting smuggling research. Efforts to incorporate junior,
       female, Global South researchers and consultants and to expand
       perspectives through the recruitment of a wider net of informants through
       alternative and innovative research methods are urgently needed.

     • Most analyses on smuggling and counter-smuggling policy efforts are
       devoid of references to the way race, class and gender shape the
       experiences of both migrants and those who facilitate their journeys. To
       this one must add the systematic racism and discrimination sub-Saharan
       and other racialised migrants face and which shape their interactions with
       migration authorities and their overall experiences of migration.
       Furthermore, the experiences of women (both as migrants and as
       facilitators of their journeys) continue to be underexplored. Policy
       responses must take into consideration how migrants and those behind
       their journeys experience enforcement and controls.

Policy Study n. 19
Beyond Networks, Militias and Tribes: Rethinking EU Counter-Smuggling Policy and Response                11

                            • Efforts to access data revealed a deeply entrenched culture of secrecy in
                              EU enforcement bodies dedicated to counter-smuggling work. Interviews
                              were often denied, requests for access went unanswered despite multiple
                              official requests, and access to data was often limited. Mechanisms that
                              allow rapid and transparent access to data in a fashion that does not
                              compromise the nature of investigations are key to improving
                              smuggling and counter-smuggling analysis and policy development.
                              The creation of an open access database including information concerning
                              smuggling investigations and case law would be a welcome step towards
                              transparency.

                            • Along these lines, it is critical to ensure that any counter-smuggling effort
                              relying on social media data-mining is in line with European law and
                              that it protects the rule of law and human rights of migrants and asylum
                              seekers.

                            • If the EU is indeed committed to dismantling exploitative smuggling
                              operations and their actors, equal access to safe, legal and orderly paths
                              to migration in line with the Migration Compact must be implemented.
                              The demand for smuggling services does not emerge in a vacuum. Instead,
                              it is rooted in the lack of access to mechanisms allowing for safe transit.
Introduction
Gabriella Sanchez
Research Fellow and Lead of Migrant
Smuggling Research, Migration Policy
Centre (MPC) at the European University
Institute (EUI)
Beyond Networks, Militias and Tribes: Rethinking EU Counter-Smuggling Policy and Response                            13

                        Amid the end of Operation Sophia,                   The policy study examines EU counter-
                        the announcement of a new migra-                    smuggling programmes and strate-
                        tion package together with a new Se-                gies, documenting and improving the
                        curity Union Strategy, and the release              understanding of their impacts not
                        of the Roadmap to the European                      only in North Africa and the Sahel, but
                        Union (EU) Action Plan against mi-                  in EU policy and law enforcement cir-
                        grant smuggling (2021-2025) – all in                cles. Relying on field-based research
                        the context of the COVID-19 pande-                  and other empirical sources, it also
                        mic – there is momentum to reflect                  provides evidence-based understan-
                        critically on the actions and instru-               dings of the dynamics present in the fa-
                        ments the EU has deployed to coun-                  cilitation of irregular migration
                        ter migrant smuggling in the                        (including those shaped or impacted
                        Mediterranean and beyond, and to                    by the COVID-19 emergency) and the
                        propose what should be done diffe-                  current challenges faced by migrants in
                        rently under the forthcoming term.                  transit and in need.

                        This is the goal of this policy study. It           The study is divided into four chapters.
                        acknowledges that EU’s counter-smug-                Chapter one identifies policy-makers’
                        gling strategy has been an essential                understanding of migrant smuggling
                        component of EU migration manage-                   and its implications in light of the forth-
                        ment discourse, policy and response,                coming EU migration package. Chap-
                        often being showcased as a sign of                  ter two examines the use of social
                        the strong collaborative ties between               media by law enforcement in counter-
                        the EU and countries in North Africa                smuggling operations and its ethical
                        and the Sahel. It also identifies a se-             implications. Chapter three identifies
                        ries of challenges. The counter-smug-               the impacts of counter-smuggling acti-
                        gling strategy’s strong focus on the                vities in Niger, and the ways they have
                        Libyan case has left smuggling dyna-                impacted the lives of migrant transpor-
                        mics in other regions virtually unexa-              ters and other merchants – in particu-
                        mined. The lack of inputs from third                lar, women – who benefited from the
                        countries; the criminalisation under                presence of migrants. The fourth and
                        the migrant smuggling rubric of long-               closing chapter examines how irregular
                        standing transportation and trade                   departures from Tunisia, Algeria and
                        practices – in the process disturbing               Morocco have been organised over
                        local, tribal economies – the reliance              the last year in spite of the pandemic,
                        on migrant returns, incarceration and               and the implications of the facilitation
                        detention practices, combined with                  of irregular migration for migrants.
                        the high death rate in the Mediterra-               Furthermore, the study provides a se-
                        nean, all have raised questions over                ries of recommendations related to re-
                        the strategy’s effectiveness. Further-              search development, the urgent need
                        more, the focus on dismantling smug-                to diversify the makeup of migration
                        gling operations has also been                      researchers and their informants, the
                        criticised for the way it deflects atten-           concerning veil of secrecy over counter-
                        tion from the reason at the core of the             smuggling activities, and the demand
                        demand for smuggling services – the                 for responses that address the reason at
                        reduced availability of safe, orderly               the core for the demand of smuggling
                        and regular paths for migration as                  services: the lack of equally accessible,
                        outlined in the Global Compact for Mi-              safe, legal and orderly channels for mi-
                        gration.                                            gration.

Policy Study n. 19
Revisiting
the Counter-Smuggling
Approach
Gabriella Sanchez
Research Fellow and Lead of Migrant Smuggling
Research, Migration Policy Centre (MPC) at the
European University Institute (EUI)
Beyond Networks, Militias and Tribes: Rethinking EU Counter-Smuggling Policy and Response                                       15

                        Introduction                                          into a country other than his or her own
                                                                              without authorisation. In the context of
                                                                              the so-called European refugee crisis of
                        This chapter examines how European                    2015 and given the large number of arri-
                        Union (EU) policy-makers engage with                  vals to the EU of people seeking protec-
                        the concept of migrant smuggling and                  tion, migrant smuggling – a topic
                        how this in turn shapes policy conversa-              extensively explored in the early 2000s
                        tions and decision-making. It identifies               by criminology scholars, particularly in
                        four specific elements or notions which                the case of irregular journeys bound for
                        are often mobilised to speak about and                Italy – acquired renewed relevance, and
                        frame migrant smuggling in counter-                   policy-makers signalled their interest in
                        smuggling policy: the concept of net-                 understanding its actors and dynamics.
                        work, the gendering of the smuggler as                This translated into the production of a
                        male, the smuggling business model                    large body of publications concerning
                        and the privileging of law enforcement                migrant smuggling, not to mention into
                        perspectives. These elements, despite                 funding by the EU of a vast number of
                        being cited constantly, have scant evi-               initiatives in third countries to counter
                        dence supporting them. Their use in the               irregular migration by tackling smug-
                        security and migration discourse reflects              gling. Third countries themselves, in an
                        significant inconsistencies in knowledge               attempt to be perceived as supportive
                        and data, and serious cognitive biases.               EU partners, but also to advance their
                        Policy – often trying to reconcile EU                 own migration and border enforcement
                        perspectives with “national level” prio-              policy (see Sanchez et al., this report),
                        rities and their specific contexts – is the-           have also become heavily engaged in
                        refore likely to articulate or propose                activities that aim to dismantle the so-
                        responses to counter migrant smuggling                called “business model” of migrant
                        that are not in line with the conditions              smuggling. This has typically involved
                        on the ground, further muddling an al-                adopting border and immigration con-
                        ready complex conceptual and policy                   trol initiatives to counter the operations
                        field. The chapter ends with a series of               of smugglers through the containment
                        recommendations on how to address                     of irregular migration, most notably
                        these gaps and to strengthen the crea-                across North Africa and the Sahel.
                        tion of evidence-based knowledge and
                        policy concerning migrant smuggling.                  While references to migrant smuggling
                                                                              are commonplace in EU migration-rela-
                        What do we talk about                                 ted policy initiatives and communica-
                                                                              tions (Fakhry, this report), there is still a
                        when we talk about                                    quite limited understanding of what the
                        migrant smuggling?                                    practice actually entails. Policy-makers
                                                                              across EU entities still struggle with its
                        Migrant smuggling involves the facilita-              basic definition and often conflate it with
                        tion for profit of the entry of a person               human trafficking.1 Along these lines,

                        1
                         Human trafficking is an act involving the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of
                        persons through the threat or use of force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or
                        vulnerability, or giving payments or benefits to a person in control of a victim. It is carried out for the
                        purpose of exploitation, which includes sexual exploitation, forced labour, slavery or similar practices
                        and the removal of organs. Retrieved from https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/
                        protocoltraffickinginpersons.aspx

Policy Study n. 19
16                                  Beyond Networks, Militias and Tribes: Rethinking EU Counter-Smuggling Policy and Response

it is not unusual to find communications            basis of quite specific contexts or
that refer to smugglers as traffickers and          dynamics – a specificity often driven
vice-versa, adding to the conceptual               by geopolitical priorities. In other
clutter.2 It is also common to come                words, despite often recognising the
across references to cases in which                need for contextual analysis and tai-
search and rescue efforts carried out              lored recommendations that unearth
by civil society and individuals have              or identify unique circumstances, po-
been designated as smuggling in                    licy-makers simultaneously call for
courts of law, in a fashion that contra-           country-wide approaches to smug-
dicts the spirit of the United Nations             gling that can be implemented or
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)                  even replicated across countries
Protocol against the Smuggling of Mi-              (Fakhry, this report). This results in
grants, which calls for the non-crimi-             specific contexts or experiences being
nalisation of humanitarian assistance              used to explain or address others, des-
(UNODC, 2000; Carrera et al., 2018).               pite their potential for detrimental,
                                                   damaging effects.
It is true that in practice the difference
between migrant smuggling and human                This form of engaging with smuggling                   The difference
trafficking is hard to draw (GAATW,                 dynamics is perhaps best exemplified                    between
2011; Aziz et al., 2015). Many migrants            in the case of Libya. Following the                    migrant
who consensually enter into a migrant              spike in EU arrivals of 2015, Libya be-                smuggling and
smuggling agreement may suddenly                   came the paradigmatic case of smug-                    human
find themselves under coercion, facing              gling in the Mediterranean, its long                   trafficking is
conditions of forced manual or even se-            history as a migrant smuggling hub                     hard to draw
xual labour, or other forms of abuse.              (see Pastore et al., 2006; Hamood,
Many trafficking victims may also be                2006) often dismissed. The demand
able to negotiate arrangements with                for research products to understand
smugglers for the purpose of advancing             the arrival and departure of migrants
their journeys (Kook, 2018). However, re-          to and from Libya and the rush to sa-
ferences to smuggling and trafficking,              tisfy it left virtually all other smuggling
rather than showcasing these nuances,              contexts in the Mediterranean under
often suggest an absence of conceptual             or unexamined. It is true that the
and empirical clarity. The challenge the-          focus on Libya was the result of its role
refore becomes one of deciding how to              as the main point of departure for EU
prevent these limitations from conti-              irregular arrivals. But recent develop-
nuing to trickle down into policy deve-            ments in migration dynamics in Tuni-
lopment, leading to the articulation or            sia, Algeria and Morocco to the EU
implementation of solutions that do not            (especially in the context of the pan-
match the phenomenon or the dynamics               demic) have begun to show the impli-
on the ground.                                     cations of the hyper-focus on Libya, as
                                                   knowledge on smuggling and its
There is also a tendency to understand             dynamics in these three countries is
or frame migrant smuggling on the                  scant at best (see Sanchez et al., this

2
 See, for example, UN Security Council 2019: Letter Dated 6 August 2019 from the panel of experts
established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) on Mali addressed to the president of the Security
Council, where the panel of experts reads: “Human traffickers [is] a term covering both trafficking in
persons and the smuggling of migrants” (p. 33).

Policy Study n. 19
Beyond Networks, Militias and Tribes: Rethinking EU Counter-Smuggling Policy and Response                          17

                        report), and the generalisations that               analysis carried out primarily in the
                        can be derived from the Libyan case                 context of the so-called refugee crisis
                        are limited. Even in the case of Libya it-          and its aftermath. Just as an example,
                        self, the focus on mapping country-                 a recent International Organization for
                        wide smuggling dynamics, rather than                Migration (IOM) report mapping mixed
                        local specificities, has generated sim-              migration research and collaborative
                        plistic knowledge and short-lived solu-             initiatives in North and West Africa bet-
                        tions (Al-Arabi, 2018). In short, the               ween 2015 and 2019 identified a total
                        narrow focus on Libya resulted in a sig-            of 191 reports and articles (2020). Writ-
                        nificant data and analysis gap concer-               ten by organisations ranging from
                        ning other corridors of critical                    think tanks to international non-go-
                        importance to the EU’s migrant smug-                vernmental organizations to intergo-
                        gling response, to the point that re-               vernmental entities like UNODC and
                        searchers and analysts are struggling               IOM and EU bodies, 34 of the reports
                        to identify and document current de-                specifically focused on the topic of
                        velopments in a manner that leads to                smuggling and trafficking; over 90
                        solid and effective analysis and policy-            delved into the dynamics in Libya
                        making.                                             and/or the Sahel. Another 40 exami-
                                                                            ned violence and abuse related to
                        In sum, while ever-present in the EU’s              smuggling, while an additional 41
                        discourse and policy, the notion of                 examined trends and routes – inclu-
                        smuggling is often misunderstood and                ding those involving irregular travel
                        misapplied. When deployed, it focuses               and/or with the support of smugglers.
                        on specific contexts, often too nar-                 At first sight, the numbers could sug-
                        rowly. While Libya is indeed a critical             gest that there is significant data on
                        element of the EU’s war against smug-               migrant smuggling generated in
                        gling, it is far from the only case. The            these last five years through the work
                        employment and focus on its dynamics                of international bodies and consul-
                        alone has led to smuggling dynamics                 tants, assembled into vast databases
                        identified and policy responses – often              documenting displacement and mo-
                        based on limited evidence – to guide                bility. However, a closer look at the
                        what is a rather partial conversation on            studies, their sources and content re-
                        smuggling in the Mediterranean.                     veals important trends. Most reports
                                                                            on smuggling are authored by similar
                        How do we “know”                                    if not identical bodies, relying on a
                                                                            consistent group of authors (most of
                        smuggling?                                          them European). Reports also tend to
                                                                            cite each other and reflect an overre-
                        Along with the definitional challenges               liance on the same informants and
                        and the almost single-handed focus on               sources. Most reports tend to recycle
                        the Libya case, the issue of data is                or reproduce already available data
                        another important challenge in unders-              that reveals a clear Eurocentric focus,
                        tanding smuggling dynamics and the                  reflective of the concerns and inte-
                        development of counter-smuggling                    rests of the researchers’ target au-
                        policy. There are indeed many publica-              dience – European policy-makers
                        tions on migrant smuggling in the lar-              (Triandafyllidou & Ricard Guay, 2019).
                        ger context of the EU-Africa                        In short, the data contains almost
                        relationship, derived from research and             identical perspectives and/or expe-
18                                 Beyond Networks, Militias and Tribes: Rethinking EU Counter-Smuggling Policy and Response

riences, in part because it has systema-           sumed to be men, tend to be descri-
tically relied on the same stakeholders            bed as inherently violent, as showing a
who have simultaneously based their                preternatural inclination to engage in
analyses on similar sources and docu-              sexual violence, and as financially rapa-
ments.3                                            cious (Sanchez, 2018). The emphasis
                                                   on their ethnic identities further sets
The absence of the perspectives of                 them apart from European lifestyles or
third country actors outside of those              modes of governance, affirming them
assigned to government agencies or                 as different, even primitive or back-
bodies in line with EU perspectives is             ward (Bland, 2020; Sharma, 2020). This
also quite notorious. With counted ex-             is quite visible in the case of Libya,
ceptions, there is a clear preference to           where there has been a tendency to
identify and describe smuggling along              describe violent smuggling acts in as-
the lines of EU Law Enforcement Agen-              sociation with references to the smug-
cies (LEAs), or to favour/privilege EU             glers’ tribal affiliations. This does not
rather than third country understan-               mean to suggest that smugglers do
dings and approaches to smuggling                  not pertain to specific groups or tribes
and its control (Baird & van Liempt,               but rather that smuggling-related vio-
2016). A clear example of this gap in-             lence is often depicted as inherent or
cludes the lack of data from the facili-           natural to their nature as such.
tators     of     migrants’     journeys
themselves, which figure prominently                Despite the limited amount of know-
in the conversations of third country              ledge and data on smuggling, acade-
actors, which recognise smugglers as               mics and policy-makers have noticed
important facilitators of mobility in              hesitation on the part of EU officials to
their communities, rather than as crimi-           rely on, further build or expand the evi-
nals (Achilli, 2018; Ayalew, 2018; Bra-            dence base on smuggling (Perkowski &
chet, 2018). With the exception of the             Squire, 2019; Alagna 2020). As Dimi-
work of the Mixed Migration Centre –               triadi's chapter in this study shows,
which has been surveying smuggling                 agencies are reluctant to share infor-
and migration facilitators along migra-            mation or to communicate data out-
tion corridors in Africa – and a planned           side      of     official     channels    or
joint study by UNODC, the United Na-               authorised/vetted stakeholders. Obtai-
tions Entity for Gender Equality and               ning interviews with law enforcement of-
the Empowerment of Women, the Uni-                 ficials involved in counter-smuggling
ted Nations Children’s Fund, and IOM               initiatives for this project proved difficult
on gender and smuggling in Libya, that             in some cases and impossible in others.
seeks to collect data on local smug-               Researchers were asked to follow speci-
gling dynamics, the perspectives of                fic guidelines, yet their fulfilment did not
those behind migrants’ journeys are                necessarily lead to either interviews or
virtually absent (Baird & van Liempt,              data (at the time this report goes into
2016; Zhang et al., 2018). Instead,                print, our researchers are still waiting
smugglers are often depicted in rather             for replies to requests filed in the sum-
gendered, racialised ways. They are as-            mer of 2020). Claiming this reluctance

3
  The Research and Evidence Facility for the Sahel and Chad of the EU Emergency Trust for Africa,
for example, has relied on the same four research entities for the development of the nine research
reports listed on their webpage. See https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/content/research-
facility-sahel-and-lake-chad_en

Policy Study n. 19
Beyond Networks, Militias and Tribes: Rethinking EU Counter-Smuggling Policy and Response                          19

                           is related to concerns related to secu-             work of Salt and Stain on characteri-
                           rity and confidentiality or to the politi-           sing the facilitation of irregular migra-
                           cised nature of the topic is also                   tion as a business (1997), Koser’s
                           problematic, as the researchers were                analysis on the smuggling business
                           not seeking secret or sensitive data but            model (2011), and the more recent cri-
                           rather to gain an improved understan-               tique by Baird and van Liempt concer-
                           ding of data collection and analyses                ning the production of knowledge in
                           processes (in this case, the role of so-            migrant smuggling (2016) come to
                           cial media in counter-smuggling activi-             mind. Here they are brought together
                           ties). The reluctance of some bodies to             to show the way in which they are em-
                           engage with researchers suggests the                ployed/mobilised in the smuggling and
                           existence of not only a culture of se-              counter-smuggling discourse, and how
                           crecy (see Dimitriadi, this report) but             they are insufficient at explaining the
                           the tendency of some EU bodies to                   extent to which smuggling operates.
                           control the access to information and
                           its dissemination (Lixi, 2019; Hartwig,             The concept of network
                           2020).
                                                                               A quick examination of any EU docu-
                           What do policy-makers                               ment on smuggling reveals the wide-
                                                                               spread use of the term network to
                           mean when talking about                             convey a sense of smuggling presenting
                           migrant smuggling?                                  a complex and well-defined structure –
                                                                               or as set up in a “vibrant and organised”
                           Policy-makers’ views of migration                   fashion (REF, 2020, p. 17). The EU Action
                           dynamics (including migrant smug-                   Plan against Smuggling for example, re-
                           gling) shape the possibilities and limi-            fers to smuggling as set up in the form
                           tations of migration regulations and                of “ruthless criminal networks […] that
                           policy (Lixi, 2019). Simultaneously, go-            make substantial gains while putting mi-
                           vernance systems play a definite role in             grants’ lives at risk” (EC, 2015). Lan-
                           the way policy-makers see and tackle                guage from the EU Emergency Trust
While migration            challenges (Geddes & Lixi, 2018).                   Fund for Africa (EUTF) also argues that
policy-makers              While migration policy-makers and mi-               smuggling is constituted into transnatio-
and migration              gration analysts describe smuggling as              nally-operating entities that the EU, the
analysts                   posing significant challenges to migra-              African Union, international organisa-
describe                   tion governance systems and to EU se-               tions, member states and third countries
smuggling as
                           curity, there is limited insight into how           must fight collectively (2020). Publica-
posing
                           they understand smuggling. This sec-                tions from the International Criminal Po-
significant
challenges to              tion identifies a set of four                        lice Organization (INTERPOL), the
migration                  concepts/paradigms common to the                    European Border and Coast Guard
governance                 way smuggling and counter-smuggling                 Agency (Frontex) and the European
systems and to             are spoken about in policy circles: the             Union Agency for Law Enforcement
EU security,               concept of network; the (gendered)                  Cooperation (Europol) cited here have
there is limited           persona of the smuggler; the smug-                  almost invariably claimed smuggling is
insight into how           gling business model; and the privile-              organised into vast networks of trans-
they understand            ging of law enforcement perspectives.               national influence and reach.
smuggling                  Some elements of this analysis have
                           been discussed or identified previously              There are several implications with the
                           by other researchers – the important                use of the term network, the first one
20                            Beyond Networks, Militias and Tribes: Rethinking EU Counter-Smuggling Policy and Response

tied to the way it is defined and used.       enemy to fight. By extension, this faci-
As Campana shows (2016), while there         litates the introduction of other con-
has been a tendency to speak about           cepts that go in line with this network
smuggling as a network, the concept          narrative, like the kind related to pro-
“is very limiting and often hard to re-      fits. Seen solely as networks, it is easier
concile with real-world manifestations       to communicate the notion that mi-
of criminal endeavours” (Campana,            grant smuggling groups together ge-
2016, p. 3). There is in fact vast evi-      nerate massive financial returns. A
dence that the facilitation of irregular     2019 infographic from Europol claims
migration involves multiple actors and       smugglers generated 190 million
configurations – from hierarchically-or-      euros, although it does not indicate
ganised groups to migrants and asylum        over what term (Europol, 2019);
seekers operating independently on           UNODC’s 2018 smuggling report cal-
behalf of other migrants to migrants         culates that the estimated value of the
guiding/organising their own journeys        smuggling enterprise along the three
(Achilli, 2018; Maher, 2018; Richter,        main Mediterranean routes into Eu-
2019; Sanchez et al., this report). Cam-     rope annually generate between 320
pana (2016) has also shown through           and 550 million dollars (UNODC, 2018,
analyses on smuggling that networks          p. 20). Bundled together, numbers can
as depicted in law enforcement com-          effectively “convey an aura of objective
munications (structured, hierarchical,       truth and scientific authority despite
centralised transnational groups) are        the extensive interpretive work that
not the ideal mechanism for smuggling        goes into their construction” (Merry,
operations of the kind present in the        2016, p. 1).
Mediterranean to succeed.
                                             Furthermore, speaking about smug-
Here it is not suggested that policy-        gling as networks also makes it easier
makers or law enforcement officials are       to allege interactions occur between
unaware of the existence of other or-        them and other criminal actors of con-
ganisational structures or arrange-          cern to the EU. The alleged smuggling-
ments in the facilitation of migrant         terrorism       connection       figures                The overreliance
                                                                                                    on the term
smuggling. Europol’s February 2016           prominently among the concerns of re-
                                                                                                    network –
report on smuggling makes reference          searchers and policy analysts, who fre-
                                                                                                    despite the
to “freelancers” working in smuggling,       quently claim terrorist organisations                  multiplicity of
and the 2018 UNODC Global Report             may be generating funds through their                  actors and
on Migrant Smuggling also acknowled-         engagement in migrant smuggling                        structures
ges the diversity of organisational stra-    and/or that terrorists may be using mi-                present in
tegies in the facilitation of irregular      grant smuggling organisations to travel                smuggling –
migration, dividing them into hierarchi-     into the EU to carry out their aspira-                 oversimplifies
cal, network-like, mixed groups, and in-     tions (Dokos, 2019; Aerens, 2016; GIT-                 smuggling’s
dividuals (UNODC, 2018, p. 8). What          NOC, 2015). The Europol-INTERPOL                       dynamics, and
this chapter suggests is that the ove-       2016 Report on Migrant Smuggling                       creates the
                                                                                                    illusion that
rreliance on the term network – des-         Networks, for example, while admit-
                                                                                                    there is a
pite the multiplicity of actors and          ting that a systematic link between ter-
                                                                                                    specific,
structures present in smuggling – over-      rorism and migrant smuggling has not                   tangible,
simplifies smuggling’s dynamics, and          been proven, claims that “foreign ter-                 organised target
creates the illusion that there is a spe-    rorist fighters may use migratory flows                  or enemy to
cific, tangible, organised target or          to (re)enter the EU” (2016, p. 4).                     fight

Policy Study n. 19
Beyond Networks, Militias and Tribes: Rethinking EU Counter-Smuggling Policy and Response                            21

                        While examples of criminal conver-                  to carry out a terrorist activity would
                        gence (that is, the coming together of              opt to travel through mechanisms that
                        different criminal markets) are quite               are not exactly characterised as reliable
                        frequent in the conversations of policy-            or expedited forms to reach a destina-
                        makers and often cited as a growing                 tion. The October 2020 case of a Tuni-
                        global security concern, they are not               sian migrant who attacked and killed
                        supported by the empirical literature               three people inside a church, while ini-
                        (Andreas, 2021; Achilli & Tinti, 2019).             tially raising concerns about its poten-
                        In the specific case of smuggling, there             tial terrorist ties, has not yielded
                        is in fact no evidence pointing to terro-           information suggesting the perpetra-
                        rist organisations seeking to engage in             tor entered Europe for the sole pur-
                        the transportation of migrants when                 pose of engaging in what was
                        their goals, ideological in nature, rely on         ultimately designated by the French
                        their ability to enlist followers (Achilli &        government a terrorist act.
                        Tinti, 2019; Achilli & Abu Samra, 2019;
                        Procter, 2021). Migrants in transit are             The gendered persona of the
                        typically people who are seeking to                 smuggler
                        move and travel, and not join ideologi-
                        cal quests (Fan, 2007). The evidence                The EU policy discourse has historically
                        available further indicates that people             conceptualised smugglers as men. To a
                        engaged in terrorist activities are neither         lesser but also important degree, these
                        forced nor must travel clandestinely, but           men have also often been racialised as
                        by virtue of being citizens or permanent            non-European, identified as organised
                        residents of countries within the EU,               into ethnic networks. References to
                        have access to legal travel mechanisms              smugglers presenting a specific tribal
                        (Fan, 2007; Saux, 2007).                            affiliation, ethnic background or natio-
                                                                            nality or pertaining to a specific racial
                        Furthermore, the very nature of terro-              group are common in law enforcement
                        rism requires, if not demands, that the             accounts of smuggling activity (see, for
                        activities of their members remain as               example, Europol & INTERPOL, 2016)
                        covert and unknown to outsiders as                  but also in policy circles. Said references
                        possible. The involvement of terrorist              reaffirm smugglers as male and foreign,
                        groups, even if peripheral in migrant               and their practices as falling outside of
                        smuggling, would divert significant                  what are considered European tradi-
                        time and energy from ideological cau-               tions or culture – for example, through
                        ses into the logistical difficulties related         statements that establish them as vio-
                        to transporting people whose very pre-              lent on the basis of their origin (Bland,
                        sence could ultimately compromise a                 2020). A report for the European Com-
                        potential operation, for their loyalty –            mission’s Directorate-General for Migra-
                        or discretion – cannot be easily guaran-            tion and Home Affairs quotes the
                        teed. Migrants maintain constant com-               Maltese Security Service arguing that
                        munication with friends and family                  some migrant smuggling organisations
                        members to remain safe by reporting                 are more professionally organised than
                        their whereabouts but also to report                others by virtue of “being foreigners”
                        the smuggler should any abuse arise                 (2015, p. 51).
                        (Achilli, 2018; Ayalew, 2018). Further-
                        more, it is hard to believe that a person           Despite the androcentric characterisa-
                        with a clear, predetermined aspiration              tion of smuggling, women have been
22                               Beyond Networks, Militias and Tribes: Rethinking EU Counter-Smuggling Policy and Response

active if not always visible participants       women, children and the elderly, for
in the market. Their participation and          the wellbeing and livelihood of their
roles are far from a recent or new de-          extended households (see Niger-Tho-
velopment, and they should not be la-           mas, 2001; Moussaoui, 2015; Sanchez,
belled as evidence of a female “take            2020). The framing of smuggling as
over” of the smuggling market. Re-              male does not merely make the pre-
search by scholars like Moussaoui,              sence of women, children or the el-
Souiah and Richter attest to the way in         derly invisible but also obscures the
which, historically across North Africa,        ways in which policy and practice im-
what eventually became known as                 pact their lives.
smuggling and contraband has relied
on tasks performed by both men and              And yet, despite smuggling’s focus on
women, who perform them to earn a li-           the persona of the male smuggler, it is
ving, supplement their income from              surprising that EU-funded initiatives
other sources (licit or illicit), “playing on   have often turned to women as part of
the increasingly strong demand […] for          harm-reduction efforts implemented
[goods and services] that cannot be             following the introduction of mecha-
found outside the informal circuits or          nisms to disrupt the provision of activi-
at prices accessible to the majority of         ties considered smuggling, as in the
the population” (Moussaoui, 2015, p.            case of Niger. As Fakhry examines in
121). Women work administering flats             her chapter of this study, EU-funded
across towns in Morocco and Algeria             projects in the context of the EUTF like
for migrants in transit (Arrouche, forth-       Plan d’Actions à Impact Economique
coming; Richter, 2019). Sporadic de-            Rapide à Agadez (PAIERA) sought to
tentions of local women attempting to           provide financial support for “people
cross migrants into Tunisia on the Libya        who benefit directly and indirectly from
border have generated concern                   the economic benefits linked to the
among civil society of the involvement          smuggling of migrants, especially
of women in more visible smuggling              young people and women in the Aga-
roles (Sanchez, 2020). Zandonini (2019)         dez region” (EUTF, 2017) that could
has also shown how the introduction of          foster the creation of small businesses                Across North
                                                                                                       Africa and the
the counter-smuggling law in 2015 in            in the aftermath of the introduction of
                                                                                                       Sahel, activities
Niger had gendered implications, eli-           counter-smuggling initiatives. According               like the
minating jobs for men, but also for the         to a journalistic investigation, two years             facilitation of
women who worked in the vast market             after PAIERA’s launch, only 371 of the                 migration tend
of services developed to support mi-            6,550 smuggling actors registered had                  to be collective
grants’ journeys.                               received funds (about 2,300 euros each)                tasks, not
                                                to start new activities (Zandonini, 2019).             merely
While these examples show migrant               It is not known how many of these be-                  restricted to
smuggling has to be further examined            neficiaries were women.                                 isolated actors
through the lens of gender, research                                                                   or groups, but
has also documented the community-              Initiatives of this kind often impose ad-              performed by
                                                                                                       men, women,
based nature of trans-border forms of           ditional responsibilities upon women,
                                                                                                       children and the
trade. Across North Africa and the              who are expected to generate income                    elderly, for the
Sahel, activities like the facilitation of      that substitutes that of men, introdu-                 wellbeing and
migration tend to be collective tasks,          cing solutions without having a clear                  livelihood of
not merely restricted to isolated actors        understanding of what women’s con-                     their extended
or groups, but performed by men,                texts or needs are, or of the ways in                  households

Policy Study n. 19
Beyond Networks, Militias and Tribes: Rethinking EU Counter-Smuggling Policy and Response                           23

                        which expecting them to assume spe-                 (UNODC, 2018); to its reliance on the
                        cific financial responsibilities may fur-             facilitation of document fraud and fi-
                        ther the gender-based inequalities                  nancial crime (EMSC, 2019), and even
                        they already face. The inclusion of ini-            as in itself constituting a life-threate-
                        tiatives of this kind further – and rather          ning criminal model (Europol, 2020).
                        simplistically – assumes that the mere              Much less is known about how the
                        introduction of financial solutions is like-         model is to be tackled, other than fre-
                        ly to restore the disruption to long-               quent references to the ways in which
                        standing forms of survival caused by                law enforcement should “follow the
                        enforcement activities.                             money” – or as the European Commis-
                                                                            sion has put it, pursuing “proactive fi-
                        The smuggling business model                        nancial investigations and effective
                                                                            asset recovery operations” (2015).
                        Almost every single document concer-
                        ning EU migrant smuggling policy in-                The broadness of what constitutes
                        cludes or makes reference to a                      the model is often counterproductive,
                        “smuggling business model”, which                   to the point that it prevents a defini-
                        needs to be dismantled to curtail the               tion of what the model actually is or
                        ability of smuggling networks to facili-            stands for (Brachet, 2018), other than
                        tate the journeys of migrants (EC,                  involving a demand-and-supply logic
                        2015, p. 7). The notion of the business             fuelled by migrants’ desperation and
                        model is in part derived from the criti-            smugglers’ greed – a logic in fact not
                        cal piece from Salt and Stein, who sug-             restricted to smuggling.
                        gested that the migration business was
                        “a system of institutionalised networks             What the notion of model often fails
                        with complex profit and loss accounts,               to account for is the fact that a signi-
                        including a set of institutions, agents             ficant proportion of irregular migra-
                        and individuals each of which stands to             tion is self-facilitated, and cannot
                        make a commercial gain” (1997). The                 solely be traced to smugglers or their
                        business model notion has also been                 groups – recent research in Tunisia
                        used to describe smuggling as a                     and Algeria for example suggests
                        “transnational service industry” (Gam-              that many families organise their own
                        meltoft-Hansen & Nyberg Sørensen,                   journeys independently, without the
                        2013) of vast profits.                               help of smugglers or any other kind
                                                                            of facilitators (see Sanchez et al., this
                        There is no shortage of references to               report). The focus on models further
                        the model’s characteristics. A 2017                 obscures the fact that smuggling ac-
                        study prepared for the European Com-                tivities are often community-based
                        mission’s Directorate-General for Mi-               operations seeking to support the
                        gration and Home Affairs describes                  journeys of their members, rather
                        “the business model [as] network                    than profits. While smugglers who fa-
                        based, forming active hubs where the                cilitate migrant journeys for a living
                        intensity of smuggling activities is grea-          do seek to generate financial returns,
                        test” (2017, p. 6). Other documents                 these profits vary widely given the
                        make reference to the model’s profita-               precarious conditions faced by many
                        bility (Collet, 2015); to the way smug-             migrants, who in fact often enter into
                        glers build their business around the               agreements with smugglers in order
                        needs arising from people’s aspirations             to work off their fees – this is often the
24                              Beyond Networks, Militias and Tribes: Rethinking EU Counter-Smuggling Policy and Response

case of young people and children tra-         makes it easier to communicate and jus-
velling unaccompanied (IOM, 2016), or          tify the vast demand for resources to
of men and women who forge personal,           contain a seemingly growing threat –
close and intimate relationships with          the groups that facilitate the irregular
other people along the journey to im-          entries of migrants who can pose untold
prove their conditions and at times their      risks to the Union and its security.
ability to move further (Migrating out of
Poverty, 2019). Furthermore, even in the       The criminological perspective is often
cases of for-profit smugglers, most of          built alongside that of border enforce-
their returns are immediately recircula-       ment and control, on the premise that
ted into their communities, often to           the EU – and to a degree, the third
cover their own household’s basic needs        countries it considers critical to its stra-
(Al-Arabi, 2018; Sanchez, 2020) rather         tegy – has the right to protect and seal
than funding external interests or net-        its borders and defend itself from any
works. If at all, the oft-cited business       threats. The EU has signed a vast num-
model of smuggling rather constitutes          ber of agreements with third countries
the mechanism developed by people              in an attempt to control irregular migra-
who have been historically marginalised        tion – agreements that alongside the
to support the facilitation of mobility        provision of equipment and technology,
along corridors where this is limited or       and the promotion of training and edu-
restricted, and who benefit financially          cational programmes and initiatives,
and in kind from the provision of their        allow them to deter or limit the migra-
services. The increasing criminalisation       tion of nationals from other countries or
of their labour through the introduction       even its own.
of legislation that designates it as smug-
gling has in turn reshaped understan-          Perhaps the best example of the weight
ding of mobility, transportation and           of the criminological approach to coun-
support, often leading to abusive and          ter-smuggling lies in the implementation
violent exchanges.                             of the EUTF. EU’s trust funds, although
                                               varying in scope, objectives, funding
The privileging of law                         and governance arrangements, were
enforcement and                                originally set up to address the root caus-
                                               es of conflict and instability, and to assist
criminological approaches                      conflict-afflicted countries (Kangas &
                                               Knoll, 2016). The EUTF, implemented at
While scholars and policy-makers can           the Valetta Summit in 2015, expressed
tackle the facilitation of irregular migra-    from the onset a clear goal to fund ef-
tion in multiple ways, the criminological,     forts to fight irregular migration and
law enforcement approach has been the          forced displacement by “stepping up
most dominant (Baird & van Liempt,             the fight against smugglers and traffic-
2016; van Liempt & Sersli, 2013). This         kers and increased cooperation with
has in turn and not unexpectedly led to        Egypt, Tunis and Algeria – preventing
the development of policies and practi-        irregular migration and the displace-
ces that support a law enforcement res-        ment of routes” (EC, 2017).
ponse to what is depicted as the domain
of extended criminal networks and their        While the trust funds can indeed fund
facilitators. The focus on networks as the     migration management interventions,
only structures present in smuggling           they were set up with the goal of fun-

Policy Study n. 19
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