Nuclear asia - paradigm_shift - ANU College of Asia & the Pacific
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
Summer 2017-18
Edition 02
asia
paradigm_shift
nuclear
A publication produced by
ANU College of Asia & the Pacific
paradigm_shift
nuclear
ANU College of Asia & the Pacific
A publication produced by
Summer 2017-18
Edition 02
asia
ANU College of Asia & the Pacific
HC Coombs Building #9
The Australian National University
Canberra ACT 2601 Australia
T 1800 620 032
E asiapacific@anu.edu.au
W asiapacific.anu.edu.au
ANUasiapacific
ANUasiapacific
anu_asiapacific
ANU College of Asia & the Pacific
CRICOS Provider #00120C
01 Professor Michael Wesley 10 Dr Stephan Frühling
A new arms race in Asia Missiles and missile defence
02 Professor Ramesh Thakur 11 Associate Professor Matthew Sussex
Asia in the second nuclear age Russia and nuclear instability
in Asia
03 Adjunct Associate Professor Ron Huisken
12 Distinguished Professor Amin Saikal
China and nuclear proliferation:
the case of North Korea Iran and Saudi Arabia:
proliferation pressures
04 Dr Brendan Taylor and Dr H. D. P. Envall
13 Dr Tanya Ogilvie-White
A nuclear arms race in
Northeast Asia? Responding to the nuclear crisis
in Northeast Asia: the dangers of
nuclear fatalism
05 Dr Michael Clarke
Multipolar Asia, strategic
14 John Tilemann
stability and nuclear
deterrence: toward life in the Institutional tools for curbing
‘grey zone’? nuclear threats in Asia Pacific
06 Associate Professor O. Fiona Yap 15 Professor Ramesh Thakur
Domestic drivers of proliferation The UN Nuclear
Weapons Ban Treaty
07 Dr Benjamin Zala
16 Dr Richard Brabin-Smith
Nuclear balances and the
challenge of advanced Nuclear risk in Asia:
conventional weapons in Asia how Australia should respond
08 Dr Leonid Petrov 17 Professor Gareth Evans
North Korean nuclear program Nuclear disarmament:
and the continuing Korean War the global challenge
09 Professor Rory Medcalf
Submerged risk - the
undersea dimension of Asia’s
nuclear contest
The Australian National University does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented
here are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the University, its staff, or its trustees.
01
Summer 2017/18
Professor Michael Wesley Professor Michael Wesley is Professor of Thirty years ago, the American and Soviet
International Affairs and Dean of ANU College of presidents signed the Intermediate-Range
Asia & the Pacific. He has published on foreign Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty; the first bilateral
policy, international relations and state-building nuclear disarmament agreement between the
A new arms race in Asia two superpowers since the start of the Cold War.
interventions. Previously, Professor Wesley
was Director of the Coral Bell School of Asia The treaty would commit them to scrap an entire
Pacific Affairs within the College. Prior to this, class of nuclear weapons from their arsenals. It
he led the Lowy Institute for International was a moment when much of the world breathed
Policy as Executive Director from 2009–2012. a sigh of relief at the prospect of a possible
end to the “delicate balance of terror” that
had existed since the 1950s. Each superpower
possessed more than enough nuclear warheads
to destroy all life on the planet, and had for
decades lived under a regime of mutually-
assured destruction (MAD), acknowledging that
its only defence against its opponent’s nuclear
weapons was the ability to threaten complete
destruction in retaliation if attacked. It had
been a world seemingly a heartbeat away from
ending due to either sudden escalation or error.
Continues on next page
Professor Michael Wesley
For the past decade, the world has looked to
the Asia Pacific as the new centre of dynamism
in the global economy. This collection shows
this optimistic view of the region needs to be
tempered with sustained attention to more
sobering trends associated with increasingly
destructive rivalries in Asia and the Pacific.
A new arms race in Asia 02
01
paradigm_shift — Edition 02 Summer 2017-18
The decades that followed the INF Treaty provocations have concentrated attention on
seemingly continued the positive trend. The several developments that have been unfolding
1990s began with the end of the Cold War and over the past decades which, taken together,
the collapse of the Soviet Union, and continued place the world closer to a possible nuclear
with the denuclearisation of South Africa, the exchange than at any time since the end of the
negotiation of new treaties banning nuclear Cold War. In their essays, Leonid Petrov and
testing, chemical weapons, trade in fissile Ron Huisken provide vital insights into North
material, and the extension of the nuclear Korea’s motivations, demonstrating clearly why
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). More sobering we should not have been surprised by its flurry
counter-trends were the breakthrough to nuclear of nuclear and missile tests in recent months.
status of India and Pakistan and tensions over
While the Cold War was a global stand-off
nuclear programs in Iraq and North Korea. The
between two superpowers located on separate
following decade saw attention shift towards
continents, the new nuclear dynamics are
terrorism, despite confrontations over Iran and
driven by six established and new nuclear
North Korea’s nuclear enrichment and missile
powers and are predominantly concentrated
development programs. Nothing seemed
in the Asian region. As essays by Michael
more unlikely than a nuclear exchange during
Clarke and Brendan Taylor and H. D. P. Envall
America’s “unipolar moment”. In 2009, a new
in this collection note, this makes the current
American President, Barack Obama, committed
situation arguably much more unpredictable
to seeking a world free of nuclear weapons.
and dangerous. Geographic proximity, hyper-
Nuclear war steadily receded as a threat in the sonic speeds and new detection capabilities
consciousness of most people as the twenty-first all have the effect of collapsing reaction times,
Professor Michael Wesley
century moved into its second decade. Terrorism substantially raising the risks of miscalculation
remained a preoccupation, while climate change and over-reaction. And while our attention is
caused mounting anxiety. Tensions again rose rightfully on two sub-regions–Northeast Asia
over Iran and North Korea’s nuclear programs, and South Asia–we should not be blind to
but arguably both countries were seen more proliferation pressures in Central and West Asia.
as rogue states than genuine disturbances
Taken together, there are several trends that
to the nuclear order. By mid-2017, the United
have been apparent over many years that should
Nations General Assembly had voted for a
place the dangers of new nuclear rivalry in Asia
Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty (NWPT).
at the very forefront of policy deliberation and
Against this background, North Korea’s public discussion. Most obviously, the numbers
seemingly sudden and certainly determined and quality of nuclear weapons are increasing
sprint towards gaining nuclear-tipped, as established and new nuclear weapons states
intercontinental ballistic missiles in 2016 and modernise and upgrade existing nuclear
2017 has come as a sudden shock. Like a flash stockpiles, build more nuclear warheads, and
of lightening on a dark night, Pyongyang’s develop more sophisticated missiles and missile
The Cold War was a global stand-off between
two superpowers located on separate
continents, the new nuclear dynamics are
driven by six established and new nuclear
powers and are predominantly concentrated in
the Asian region.
03 ANU College of Asia & the Pacific A new arms race in Asia 04
01
paradigm_shift — Edition 02 Summer 2017-18
defence systems. A separate but related trend Surveying the landscape of Asia’s “second
is that the number of nuclear weapons states nuclear age”, Ramesh Thakur focuses on
This collection of essays draws on the
is steadily growing, all the while increasing dangerously eroding boundaries between collective expertise and experience of scholars
the incentives for other states in Asia to nuclear and conventional weapons, tactical
develop their own nuclear capabilities. As and strategic nuclear weapons, and the in the Australian National University’s College
essays by Benjamin Zala, Rory Medcalf and nuclear, cyber and space domains. As the US,
Stephan Frühling in this collection show, rapid Russia, China and now newer nuclear states of Asia & the Pacific. This institution and its
technological developments in non-nuclear discard their political commitment to mutual
weapons systems have also introduced new deterrence, acquiring new means to target
predecessors have produced, over decades,
sources of rivalry and destabilisation into the
mix, raising further incentives to increase
each other’s nuclear systems, the temptations
to consider pre-emptive strikes are rising.
some of the most respected analyses of
the number, quality and variety of nuclear
Tanya Ogilvie-White argues in her essay that
nuclear strategy and arms control, and today
weapons at hand. As many of the essays point
out, technological change has slipped the bonds
an equally worrying trend is the spread of the College boasts a breadth and depth of
what she calls “nuclear fatalism”–the belief
of either arms control regimes or deterrent
doctrines and is rapidly outpacing both.
that arms control is increasingly quixotic and knowledge and insight that few institutions in
that only deterrent responses are adequate in
Consequently, nuclear, conventional and the current climate of rising rivalry. Richard the world can rival.
unconventional weapons technologies are Brabin-Smith shows that Australia is both
both the results and the drivers of increasingly deeply implicated in and profoundly affected
complex rivalries in Asia. As Clarke and by the new nuclear and missile dynamics
Taylor and Envall demonstrate, it is no longer unfolding to its north. Clearly these dynamics
possible to think in terms of bilateral stand- must become central to Australian defence and
forefront of public or policy consciousness. We should not forget that nuclear weapons
Professor Michael Wesley
offs between nuclear-armed opponents. The foreign policy planning. The essays by Gareth
During the Cold War, the recentness of the are the starkest existential threat the planet
complex rivalries and stark imbalances in Evans, Ramesh Thakur and John Tilemann
Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear explosions, faces. There are no prospects of survival,
capabilities across Asia give rise to interlocked assemble a sobering range of challenges that
and the intuitive but horrifying simplicity of recovery, mitigation or adaptation against an
nuclear “trilemmas”, where attempts of one or confront arms control efforts in the current
mutually assured destruction (MAD) between extended nuclear exchange. Even a limited
two nuclear rivals to stabilise a nuclear balance climate. Equally concerning are the observations
the superpowers, made the nuclear balance exchange could have catastrophic effects on the
and protect themselves give rise to cascades of Amin Saikal and Matthew Sussex that
the foremost concern for governments and environment and the institutions that underpin
of insecurity and destabilising countermoves American efforts in counter-proliferation
publics. The result was sustained attention on global production and commerce. We stand
by others. This is a context in which extended and nuclear primacy have decisively eroded
developing and coordinating deterrent doctrine, at a point at which nuclear weapons could
nuclear protection guarantees between the its credibility as a trusted participant in
putting in place crisis management frameworks, transition from being a dampener of conflict
United States and its Asian allies could rapidly establishing systems of reassurance and
and negotiating arms control agreements. among great powers to a driver of deepening
lose their credibility, leading to sequences stabilisation on the unfolding situation.
distrust and arms racing among them.
of nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia. Today’s dangers are neither intuitively simple
This collection of essays draws on the collective
O. Fiona Yap examines the public opinion data nor particularly imaginable to any but a For the past decade, the world has looked to
expertise and experience of scholars in the
of Northeast Asian states for signs of growing handful of academic and policy specialists. the Asia Pacific as the new centre of dynamism
Australian National University’s College of
demand for independent nuclear deterrents. Whereas the superpowers’ overt ideological in the global economy. This collection shows
Asia & the Pacific. This institution and its
rivalry during the Cold War drew attention this optimistic view of the region needs to be
Surveying the landscape of Asia’s “second predecessors have produced, over decades,
to their nuclear competition, in the current tempered with sustained attention to more
nuclear age”, Ramesh Thakur focuses on some of the most respected analyses of nuclear
era the nuclear rivals trade intensively, join sobering trends associated with increasingly
dangerously eroding boundaries between strategy and arms control, and today the College
common institutions and use public displays destructive rivalries in Asia and the Pacific.
nuclear and conventional weapons, tactical boasts a breadth and depth of knowledge and
of comity to mask their mutual competition. Even if the North Korean crisis subsides, the
and strategic nuclear weapons, and the insight that few institutions in the world can
Consequently, there is little sustained attention dangerous intersecting trends it has illuminated
nuclear, cyber and space domains. As the US, rival. The current volume collects this talent
given to the dangers of nuclear rivalry in Asia will not recede. This region, and the world,
Russia, China and now newer nuclear states and concentrates it towards illuminating the
or growing pressures to address them. Asia’s cannot afford to turn its attention elsewhere,
discard their political commitment to mutual complex dynamics of nuclear rivalry unfolding
crowded terrains are attended by none of the hoping that nuclear stability will somehow
deterrence, acquiring new means to target in the world’s most dynamic region. Its main
understandings or agreements that kept the Cold autonomously reassert itself. There needs
each other’s nuclear systems, the temptations purpose is to try to bring the dangers of these
War cold, while little diplomatic effort seems to to be sustained attention to addressing the
to consider pre-emptive strikes are rising. trends much more public and policy attention.
be devoted to finding new ways of containing perilous dynamics unfolding in the Asia Pacific.
There is a danger that both secrecy and rivalries and arresting technology races. Crucial to addressing these dynamics must
complexity will continue to keep the risks of be understanding and building awareness–a
Asia’s deepening nuclear rivalries far from the process this collection is intended to promote.
05 ANU College of Asia & the Pacific A new arms race in Asia 06
Summer 2017/18
02
Professor Ramesh Thakur Professor Ramesh Thakur is Director of the Centre In a world in growing disarray, we seem to
for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament be at a nuclear inflection point. One of many
(CNND) at ANU Crawford School, Co-Convenor of strong headwinds buffeting world affairs
the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear is an intensifying and multiplying number
Asia in the second of nuclear threats. The first nuclear age was
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN) and
Editor-in-Chief of Global Governance. He was a shaped by the overarching ideological rivalry
Commissioner and one of the principal authors of of the bipolar Cold War protagonists, the
nuclear age
The Responsibility to Protect, and Senior Adviser on competitive nuclear arms build-up and doctrines
Reforms and Principal Writer of the United Nations of the two superpowers, and the development
Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s second reform of progressively robust mechanisms for
report. His books include Nuclear Weapons: The maintaining strategic stability. The normative
State of Play 2015 (CNND); Nuclear Weapons and anchor of the global nuclear order was the
International Security: Selected Essays (Routledge);
1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
and The United Nations, Peace and Security:
Reflecting the geopolitical balance of power of
From Collective Security to the Responsibility to
the time, led by the United States and Soviet
Protect, 2nd Ed. (Cambridge University Press).
Union, the NPT embedded the non-proliferation
priorities of the five nuclear weapon states (NWS)
that also included China, France and the United
Kingdom. Immediate, binding, verifiable and
enforceable non-proliferation obligations were
imbalanced with relatively weaker, vaguer and
non-enforceable disarmament commitments.
Professor Ramesh Thakur
In an interesting manifestation of the shift
in the normative balance of power to non-
major powers and countries from the global
south, on 7 July 2017, 122 states adopted a new
United Nations nuclear weapons prohibition
treaty that I discuss separately in a later essay.
Conscious of the elevated nuclear threats
and increasingly resentful of the hypocrisy
of the five NWS in indefinitely deferring
disarmament while enforcing non-proliferation
on others, countries of the Asia Pacific voted
strongly with the majority, but the four
possessor and three umbrella states were
among the dissenting one-third minority.
Continues on next page
page
Asia is the world’s only site, and Japan the
only victim, of the use of nuclear weapons in
war. The Indian subcontinent and the Korean
peninsula are also two of the least unlikely
theatres of a nuclear war, while a direct China-US
confrontation from an escalation spiral starting
in the South China seas is also possible.
Asia in the second nuclear age 08paradigm_shift — Edition 02 Summer 2017-18
02
Second nuclear age Yet the overall risks of nuclear war–by
Asia is the only continent where nuclear
design, accident, rogue launch or system
In ‘the second nuclear age’, a phrase coined by
Paul Bracken in his book, the site of the main
error–have grown with more countries stockpiles are growing. Even though their
with weaker command and control systems
great power rivalry has shifted from Europe to in more unstable regions possessing combined stockpiles total only three per cent
Asia. The second nuclear age is characterised these deadly weapons, terrorists wanting
by a multiplicity of nuclear powers with criss- them, and vulnerability to human error, of global nuclear arsenals, warhead numbers
crossing ties of cooperation and conflict, the system malfunction and cyber attack.
fragility of command and control systems, the are growing in all four of the Asian nuclear-
critical importance of cyber-security, threat The geostrategic environment of the
perceptions between three or more nuclear- subcontinent, for example, had no parallel armed states of China, India, North Korea
in the Cold War, with shared borders, major
armed states simultaneously, and asymmetric
territorial disputes, history of many wars since
and Pakistan.
perceptions of the military and political utility
of nuclear weapons. The Cold War nuclear 1945, compressed timeframes for using or losing
dyads have morphed into interlinked nuclear nuclear weapons, and political volatility and
chains with a resulting greater complexity instability. In the Russia-US strategic rivalry,
of deterrence relations between the nine submarine-based nuclear weapons deepen
US and its allies, and secondly between the North Korea is unique in the family of
nuclear-armed states–the five NWS plus India, strategic stability by enhancing survivability
US allies and the Soviet Union. No equivalent nations: a communist dynastic dictatorship
Israel, North Korea and Pakistan. The nuclear and reducing successful first-strike possibilities.
dialogues exist in the Asia Pacific either among that has committed acts of aggression and
relationship between India and Pakistan, The race to attain continuous at-sea deterrence
allies or between adversaries. The boundaries serial provocations against its more populous,
for example, is historically, conceptually, capability through nuclear-armed submarines
between nuclear and conventional weapons, prosperous and democratic southern kin
politically, strategically and operationally is potentially quite destabilising in Asia because
tactical and strategic warheads, and nuclear, state; acts of state criminality in kidnapping
deeply intertwined with China as a nuclear the regional powers lack well-developed
cyber and space domains are eroding. Japanese citizens in Japan and smuggling
Professor Ramesh Thakur
power. With North Korea now possessing a operational concepts, robust and redundant
them into North Korea; and acts of state
weaponised intercontinental nuclear capability, command-and-control systems, and secure
for the first time in history the US must posture communications over submarines at sea. Asia Pacific terrorism. It is similarly unique in relation to
the non‑proliferation regime as the world’s sole
for and contend with three potential nuclear The strategic boundary between nuclear Asia–and only Asia–contains states with the full NPT defector state. North Korea’s unchecked
adversaries–China, Russia and North Korea. warheads and conventional precision spectrum of nuclear weapons status in relation nuclear ambitions could, in turn, trigger a
munitions is being steadily eroded. Moreover, to the NPT, with the clear majority being non- cascade of proliferation throughout the sub-
There are substantially fewer nuclear weapons
state-sponsored cross-border militancy and NWS parties of the NPT. Three US allies depend region, with the sole exception of Mongolia
today than at the height of the Cold War and
extremism involving nuclear-armed states is for their national security on the extended which like New Zealand has enshrined its
they play a lesser role in shaping relations
another contemporary reality, as is the fear nuclear deterrence provided by US nuclear nuclear-free status in national legislation.
between Moscow and Washington, so that the
of nuclear terrorism. The first nuclear age weapons. Russia and the US also have a massive
risk of a nuclear war between them is low. The other three Asian nuclear-armed states
was also marked by the practice of strategic geographical footprint each in the Pacific.
also have their own sets of troubling issues and
nuclear policy dialogues firstly among the China is Asia’s only NPT-recognised NWS and problems. These include inventing the legal
the sole Asian permanent member of the UN fiction of a ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ while
Security Council, which functions as the global violating the terms of international civilian
enforcement authority in the maintenance of nuclear assistance; acting as the enabler for
nuclear peace and security. Pakistan is the another nuclear-armed state; and pursuing a
North Korea is unique in the family of nations: only one of the nine nuclear-armed states policy of managed nuclear instability vis-à-vis
where nuclear weapons were developed by the a major irredentist claim on a neighbour.
a communist dynastic dictatorship that has military, are essentially under military control
and the decision to use them will be made by Asia is the only continent where nuclear
committed acts of aggression and serial the military rather than civilian leadership. stockpiles are growing. Even though their
India is the only one to have territorial conflicts combined stockpiles total only three per cent of
provocations against its more populous, with two nuclear-armed states, China and global nuclear arsenals, warhead numbers are
growing in all four of the Asian nuclear-armed
prosperous and democratic southern kin state; Pakistan, over long and contested borders.
states of China, India, North Korea and Pakistan.
acts of state criminality in kidnapping Japanese The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),
citizens in Japan and smuggling them into signed by 183 countries and ratified by 166, is
a key barrier to both vertical and horizontal
North Korea; and acts of state terrorism. proliferation. This still leaves eight out of 44
09 ANU College of Asia & the Pacific Asia in the second nuclear age 10paradigm_shift — Edition 02 Summer 2017-18
02
Annex 2 countries whose ratifications are unlikely pathways to a nuclear exchange. But
needed to bring it into force. Four holdouts the toxic cocktail of growing nuclear stockpiles,
are Asian - China, India, North Korea and expanding nuclear platforms, irredentist
Pakistan. Since the treaty’s adoption in 1996, territorial claims, and out of control jihadist
the handful of nuclear tests have all been in groups makes the Indian subcontinent a high-
Asia: five by India in 1998, six by Pakistan risk region of concern. Even a limited regional
in 1998, and six by North Korea between nuclear war, in which India and Pakistan used
2006–17. North Korea is the only country 50 Hiroshima-size (15 kiloton) bombs each,
where nuclear weapon tests are still being could cause a famine through nuclear winter
conducted. Meanwhile, Pakistan has consistently effects that destroy crop production, disrupt
blocked the commencement of negotiations global food distribution networks, and over
on a fissile materials cut-off treaty (FMCT). a decade, kill up to two billion people.
The subcontinent is not free of the risk of a
Elevated nuclear risks nuclear exchange triggered by acts of terror
and threats committed on Indian territory by individuals
and groups linked to networks in Pakistan.
Not surprisingly, nuclear risks and threats that
No one can be confident that another Mumbai
exist globally are also present in Asia, in some
style terrorist attack like the one in November
cases more acutely. Security complexes and the
2008 on a major Indian city will not take place,
main drivers of nuclear weapons policy tend
with links back to jihadists based in Pakistan;
to be primarily regional–and indeed, in the
that India will not retaliate militarily; and that
Asia Pacific, sub-regional–rather than global,
this will not escalate to another war which
although obviously there are cross-linkages
Professor Ramesh Thakur
then crosses the nuclear threshold. That is,
between the two. Moreover, the sub-regional
the brittleness of deterrence stability is a
nuclear insecurity complex across Asia does not
function of fragile crisis stability mechanisms.
always coincide with the geographical sub-
Moreover, each party will feel more insecure
region. For example, in the subcontinent, there
with every increase in the other’s nuclear side wants include a fatal miscalculation in the and concerns about Trump’s tweeted perceptions
is a triangular nuclear relationship between
weapons stockpiles and capabilities. instrumental recourse to brinksmanship by of free riding allies and relaxed attitude to
China, India and Pakistan. The other South
Asian states are largely irrelevant to the core both sides. US threats could spook Kim Jong- nuclear weaponisation by them, have been
In an interview with The Mainichi in July 2017,
dynamics of the nuclear equation, although un into launching a pre-emptive attack, or catalysts for pro-nuclear arguments in Japan and
General Pervez Musharraf, who was President
they would be severely impacted with any use Kim’s serial provocations could incite a South South Korea. Growing Chinese belligerence and
of Pakistan in 2002, confessed to having
of nuclear weapons and by nuclear accident. By Korean or US military response that creates diminished faith in the US security guarantee
contemplated the use of nuclear weapons in
contrast, in Northeast Asia, every country is part an unstoppable escalation spiral. The logic of could also attract interest in Taiwan in the pursuit
the year-long military standoff with India
of the nuclear equations complex. In Southeast US President Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ of an independent deterrent. However, there
following a terrorist attack on India’s Parliament
Asia and Oceania, no country has or is likely to policy contains the rationale for preventing are also substantial political, economic, and
in December 2001. He refrained from doing so
seek nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future. North Korea from acquiring the capacity to reputational constraints in all three, reinforced
for fear of Indian retaliation in kind. The claim
Some Southeast Asian countries are interested strike the US mainland, regardless of the scale by additional legal, bureaucratic, scientific,
may be true or false: on matters of national
in nuclear power, but Oceania is entirely free of and gravity of the harm inflicted on South and public opinion potential vetoes in Japan.
security, Musharraf is more than capable of
nuclear power reactors; and both sub-regions Koreans, Japanese and others in the region
asserting something that fits Pakistan’s narrative Internationally, the NPT constrains the weapon
are covered by nuclear-weapon-free zones. ‘out there’ instead of Americans ‘over here’.
of a nuclearised bilateral conflict that the world option, the US nuclear extended deterrence
should mediate. Regardless of the veracity of the A verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation bolsters Japan’s security confidence, and
Asia is the world’s only site, and Japan the
claim, the very fact that Musharraf asserted it of North Korea would also be the most effective weaponisation could rupture relations with
only victim, of the use of nuclear weapons in
in an on-record interview has the consequence bulwark against the growth of pro-nuclear Washington. Tokyo is also acutely conscious
war. The Indian subcontinent and the Korean
of further weakening the taboo on nuclear weapon sentiments in non-nuclear East Asia. of the extreme regional sensitivities to any
peninsula are also two of the least unlikely
weapon use and softening the non-use norm. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are examples nuclearisation. Domestically, the three non-
theatres of a nuclear war, while a direct China–
US confrontation from an escalation spiral of states with advanced latency: mastery of the nuclear principles, the very strong nuclear
Northeast Asia is the world’s most dangerous
starting in the South China Seas is also possible. sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technologies and allergy in public opinion, and the atomic
cockpit for a possible nuclear war that could
In mid-2017 China and India faced each other in availability of and access to sensitive nuclear energy basic law that limits nuclear activity
directly involve four nuclear-armed states–
a tense military confrontation at the tri-junction materials. Rising nationalism in the region, to peaceful purposes are additional powerful
China, North Korea, Russia and the US–plus
with Bhutan in the Doklam plateau for well over territorial disputes in the East and South China constraints on the weapons option.
South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan as major US
a month. Premeditated nuclear strikes seem Seas, continued North Korean nuclear defiance
allies. The pathways to a war that neither
11 ANU College of Asia & the Pacific Asia in the second nuclear age 12Summer 2017/18
Adjunct Associate Professor Ron Huisken Adjunct Associate Professor Ron Huisken joined North Korea is China’s only formal ally, the
the Strategic & Defence Studies Centre at ANU result of a relationship forged in the 1950-
03
in 2001, where he focused, in particular, on 53 Korean War. North Korea’s first postwar
US and Chinese security policies, multilateral leader, Kim Il-sung, repeatedly pressed the
China and nuclear Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin for permission and
security processes in East Asia and arms control.
Dr Huisken spent nearly 20 years in government support to take over South Korea by force and
with the departments of Foreign Affairs & Trade, make the entire Korean peninsula part of the
proliferation: the case of
Defence, and Prime Minister & Cabinet. Prior Socialist bloc. Stalin eventually agreed but on
to government, he worked with the Stockholm the condition that China’s new leader, Mao Tse-
International Peace Research Institute, the dung, also support this initiative. Mao joined in,
North Korea
University of Malaya, and the United Nations watched how close the North came to complete
secretariat in New York. He holds degrees in success before its forces were routed by the
economics from the University of Western
United States-led United Nations coalition and
Australia and the Royal Stockholm University,
then found himself having to decide whether to
and a PhD in international relations from ANU.
resist the UN coalition or accept having US forces
stationed just over the Yalu River. North Korea’s
buffer state value to China is still recited as a
core reason for China’s tolerance of its excesses.
Some 400,000 Chinese troops remained deployed
in North Korea until 1958. Long before that,
Adjunct Associate Professor Ron Huisken
however, Kim il-sung had begun to take North
Korea on its singular national journey. Kim
set out to purge opponents, including the
leaders of factions close to the Soviet Union
and China, and to build a personality cult
that exceeded any known precedent, together
with the societal controls needed to compel
compliance. This process included the narrative
that the US and its puppet regime in Seoul had
been the aggressors in 1950 and were seeking
a second opportunity, establishing a fierce and
relentless belligerence toward these states as
the default setting for North Korea’s foreign and
security policy. A perpetual state of extreme
and urgent threat to the existence of North
Korea clearly underpins widespread privation,
draconian instruments of domestic control and
compulsory fanatical devotion to the leadership.
In addition, the curious fact that North Korea,
located quite literally in China’s armpit, seems
both invulnerable and utterly paranoid about
its security might also suggest that, for deep-
seated historical reasons, it has a very limited
appetite for security support from China.
China has done as much as it deemed necessary
Continues on next page
to look as though it disapproved and wanted it
to stop. But it is hard to argue that China ever
regarded stopping the North Korea program as
critical or even important to Chinese interests.
China and nuclear proliferation: the case of North Korea
14paradigm_shift — Edition 02 Summer 2017-18
China and the Soviet Union essentially washed weapons. In a similar vein, as its confrontation North Korean military personnel growth = 1000 military personnel
their hands of North Korea after the 1950-53 with the Soviet Union eased from the mid-1980s
03
war. Nikita Krushchev made one determined and lessened the value of its defacto alliance
effort, in 1956, to unseat Kim Il-sung. China also with the US, Beijing entered a prolonged phase
Mid-1950s
participated but more cautiously because Mao of trying to exploit the priority Washington
did not wish to depose Kim, only to see him attached to non-proliferation. Beijing and
change his ways. Thereafter, Chinese-Soviet Washington jousted over whether Washington
Union relations deteriorated steadily until would make fundamental concessions on
the decisive split in 1959-60 and the ensuing Taiwan to rein in Beijing’s nuclear and ballistic
three decades of declared enmity, including a missile dealings with Iran and Pakistan.
struggle for leadership of the socialist movement.
In the 1960s, China began to forge with Pakistan
Moscow and Beijing vied for North Korea’s Early-1990s
what became amongst its closet political
support, but only so long as it appeared to be
relationships. The strategic prize was the ability
reliably contained, essentially by the US. This
to effectively checkmate India, a prize more
was especially so from the 1980s onwards, as
than attractive enough to outweigh nuclear
the US could be depended on to suppress any
non-proliferation objectives. There has long
interest in Japan and South Korea in acquiring
been speculation that, in 1982–pursuant to
an independent nuclear weapon capability, and
an agreement with Mao in 1976–China gave
from then they showed little further interest
Pakistan 50 kilograms of highly enriched
in changing the persona of the entity that they
uranium and the blueprints for a fission device
had played such a decisive role in creating.
Adjunct Associate Professor Ron Huisken
sufficiently compact and lightweight to fit on
China has long had a cautious and calculated a ballistic missile. In return, Pakistan shared
attitude toward the proliferation of nuclear information on the latest centrifuge technology
weapons, coming across as a guarded actor that Pakistani nuclear physicist Abdul Qadeer
on this issue rather than a champion of either Khan had stolen from a Dutch plant. The
promiscuity or denial. China was the last of possibility of such a transaction was confirmed
the UN Security Council’s five permanent when the warhead design surfaced in Libya in
members (the P5) to demonstrate its mastery 2003. This is of interest in the present context for
of this technology, conducting its first test what it suggests about China’s posture toward
explosion in October 1964. China, along with the non-proliferation regime and because in
France, declined to join the1968 Nuclear Non- the mid-1990s, US intelligence picked up traces
Proliferation treaty (NPT)–the centerpiece of of a Pakistan-North Korea nuclear deal. It was
the international non-proliferation regime– considered likely that it would be a barter
preferring to present itself as the champion of arrangement, as both countries were broke, and
the non-aligned community and protecting in due course North Korea’s ballistic missiles and a clandestine uranium enrichment facility, a chemical weapon capability and modestly
their rights to unrestricted access to nuclear the associated manufacturing technology turned kicking off the second North Korea nuclear improved Soviet short-range ballistic missiles
technology for peaceful purposes. China up in Pakistan. Suspicions that centrifuge- crisis. Western intelligence agencies had long that could reach most of Japan (probably with
balanced this distancing from the NPT through uranium enrichment technology might flow had their suspicions about Abdul Qadeer chemical warheads). North Korea’s belligerence
committing to a posture of minimal deterrence in the other direction seemed to be confirmed Khan, but they did not succeed in penetrating was not simply rhetorical. Major incidents
and proclaiming that it would not, under in 2002 when the US accused North Korea of and exposing his proliferation network until included attacks on US surveillance platforms,
any circumstances, be the first to use nuclear breaching their Agreed Framework by building 2002-03. What China knew about Khan, tunneling under the Demilitarised Zone, using
and when it knew it is still unknown. submarines to insert commando teams into
South Korea, the attempted assassination of
Kim Il-sung initially focused on developing
South Korean leaders, bombing the South Korean
North Korea’s conventional capabilities.
China has long had a cautious and calculated Military personnel numbers grew steadily from
cabinet on a visit to Myanmar and bombing
international airliners and naval engagements,
attitude toward the proliferation of nuclear around 350,000 in the mid-1950s to a staggering
1.1 million by the early 1990s, operating large
including torpedoing a South Korean frigate.
weapons, coming across as a guarded actor numbers of obsolescent combat aircraft, tanks The opportunity cost of this massive force
and submarines supplied primarily by the was crushing, leaving North Korea among
on this issue rather than a champion of either Soviet Union and China. This arsenal was spiced the poorest and most economically vulnerable
by a 200,000 strong ‘special forces’ contingent, countries in the world, often soliciting
promiscuity or denial.
15 ANU College of Asia & the Pacific China and nuclear proliferation: the case of North Korea
16paradigm_shift — Edition 02 Summer 2017-18
In recent weeks, a number of prominent
03
observers have argued that the battle has been
lost, that North Korea has irreversibly broken
into the club of nuclear weapon states...
emergency economic assistance from the very George W. Bush administration declined to
countries that bore the brunt of its belligerence– accept this stance, insisting that other parties,
the US, Japan and South Korea. Importantly, notably China and South Korea had to be part
however, somewhere along this path the North of the solution. Perhaps because it sensed that
Korean leadership also realised that sustaining the situation was dangerously unstable, Beijing
this force and modernising its weaponry would changed its approach and became a willing
be beyond its capacities. Nuclear weapons participant in what became the Six Party Talks. export control restrictions, as with the sharp and wanted it to stop. But it is hard to argue
loomed as the natural solution. A small research Importantly, however, it engaged in the process acceleration in achieving missile and warhead that China ever regarded stopping the North
reactor provided by the Soviet Union was as a host and facilitator when in fact China’s technological milestones in recent years. Korea program as critical or even important
upgraded over the period 1979-86. In 1985, stake in the issue was large and direct. The to Chinese interests. Given the durability of
In recent weeks, a number of prominent
Adjunct Associate Professor Ron Huisken
the US and the new Soviet leader Mikhael Six Party Talks process suffered from China’s this posture, it seems rather likely that China
observers have argued that the battle has been
Gorbachev jointly pressured the DPRK to join absence as a player with significant and direct continued to see the potential for significant
lost, that North Korea has irreversibly broken
the NPT before the upgraded reactor went interests in the outcome. Beijing had ample gain at an acceptable risk in the reverberations
into the club of nuclear weapon states, and
critical. The DPRK became a party to the NPT opportunity to pursue its interests but was emanating from the North Korea program. Has
that old mindsets need to be discarded so full
in December 1985. North Korea’s nuclear story free to do so quietly, behind the scenes. Beijing now concluded that it misjudged this
attention can be directed toward the entirely
began in earnest in 1989 when, with Pyongyang issue–perhaps underestimated how dangerously
During the Six Party Talks, a key topic of different proposition of ensuring a nuclear
continuing to stall on the conclusion of an disruptive these reverberations could become,
speculation was how resilient the China-North armed North Korea is quickly settled in as a
inspection regime with the International Atomic taken by surprise by the characteristics of
Korea relationship was proving to be. The stable and resilient component of the political
Energy Agency (IAEA)–a requirement for NPT North Korea’s new leader or did not fully
evidence was ambiguous. When Pyongyang and security environment of Northeast Asia.
parties–the reactor was shut down for long appreciate how much it would continue to
conducted its first and subsequent nuclear
enough to replace the fuel rods and speculation This pessimism is in no way misplaced. The depend on the US to preclude reactive nuclear
tests, in most cases despite high-profile Chinese
began on how much plutonium North Korea had only force that now has even a faint chance weapon programs in Japan and South Korea?
exhortations for restraint, Beijing signaled
harvested. These actions escalated into the first of denuclearising the Korean peninsula
undisguised displeasure and pointedly A perpetual government is not given to
nuclear crisis with North Korea from 1991-94 peacefully is the US and China acting in
allowed the analytical community to explore acknowledging major errors of judgement
that was ultimately defused by a remarkable determined and sustained collaboration
North Korea’s true value to China’s interests but the possibility exists that Beijing, as well
meeting between Kim Il-sung and former and cooperation. This possibility would be
dispassionately. Many analysts concluded that as Washington, are now asking the question:
US president Jimmy Carter. Subsequently, predicated on two crucial conversations. The
the damage to the relationship was irreparable How confident can we be that North Korea
the US and North Korea negotiated the 1994 first, between the US and China, would focus
and that a decisive change in Beijing’s behaviour will abandon its belligerence and be content
Agreed Framework that sought to put in place on separation and deconfliction as well as
toward Pyongyang could be expected. to exist quietly behind its nuclear deterrent
a prolonged pause to provide time to work cooperation. The second, between Beijing and
But that change never quite happened. or that we can find the will and the authority
out the basis for a permanent solution. Pyongyang, would essentially be a message
to quash the possible revival of interest in
In contrast to some of Beijing’s unfavourable of tough love. There is no evidence that either
As the first North Korea nuclear crisis from Japan and South Korea in getting their own
diplomatic signals, China’s compliance of these conversations has taken place.
1992-94 unfolded, Beijing signaled to Washington nuclear weapons if the North Korean arsenal
with UN Security Council sanctions was
that it regarded the issue as essentially a This makes it somewhat ironic that the US is accepted as a permanent capability? If
frequently assessed to be lax. Since the
matter for the US and North Korea to resolve. and Chinese positions on North Korea are North Korea is deemed by both China and
breakup of the Soviet Union and the collapse
Eight years later, when the US declared the probably closer at the present time than they the US to be a dangerous loose cannon,
of its economy, China has become utterly
Agreed Framework nullified by North Korea’s have been at any point over the past 25 years. addressing the issue could become a shared
dominant in underpinning the North Korean
construction of a clandestine enrichment Stepping back a little makes it hard to avoid the enterprise that will have wider transformative
economy, including hosting some 90 per cent
facility and the latter retaliated by announcing conclusion that over the three decades or so of consequences for the management of the
of its international trade. This has left China
its intention to withdraw from the NPT and clear North Korean interest in acquiring nuclear power transition currently underway.
rather exposed when evidence has emerged
seek a nuclear weapon capability, Beijing again weapons, China has done as much as it deemed
of North Korea eluding sanctions and other
sent this signal. On this occasion, however, the necessary to look as though it disapproved
17 ANU College of Asia & the Pacific China and nuclear proliferation: the case of North Korea
18Summer 2017-18
Dr Brendan Taylor and Dr H. D. P. Envall Dr Brendan Taylor is an Associate Professor Speculation is rife that North Korea’s burgeoning
and Acting Director of the Coral Bell School of nuclear and ballistic missile programs will
Asia Pacific Affairs at ANU. Specialising in great spark a dangerous new Northeast Asian
power strategic relations in the Asia-Pacific, arms race. In May of this year, senior officials
A nuclear arms race in in United States President Donald Trump’s
the US-Australia alliance and regional security
architecture, he served as Head of the Strategic administration reportedly confided in Australian
04
& Defence Studies Centre from 2011-2016. Foreign Minister Julie Bishop their fears that
Northeast Asia?
He has published over 100 scholarly papers, such an arms race was “inevitable” should
including in a number of the world’s leading the international community fail to rein in
journals such as the Washington Quarterly, Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile advances.
Survival and International Affairs. He has also During an interview on CNN in October 2017,
authored or edited eight books. His current former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
research focuses on flashpoints in Asia, to be
agreed, asserting that “we will now have an
published as a book by Black Inc in 2018.
arms race–a nuclear arms race in East Asia”.
H. D. P. (David) Envall is a Research Fellow in Senior political figures like Minister Bishop and
the Department of International Relations at Secretary Clinton have encountered no shortage
ANU. In addition to having worked as a copy of strategic analysts willing to substantiate
editor and corporate editor/writer, David their claims. The prominent American
has formerly held appointments at Tokyo commentator Michael Auslin, for instance,
International University and La Trobe University. argued recently that “North Korea is ensuring a
David has a BA (Hons) from the University of nuclear arms race”. Similarly, the late Desmond
Dr Brendan Taylor and Dr H. D. P. Envall
Melbourne, an MA from Hitotsubashi University, Ball pointed presciently to a predominantly
and a PhD from the University of Melbourne. naval Northeast Asian arms race–through
His research interests include Japanese one with clear nuclear dimensions–in a paper
political leadership, Japan’s post-war security published just over half a decade ago.
politics, and security in the Asia-Pacific.
The arms race concept is widely employed.
While its precise meaning remains
contested, most experts agree that, used
correctly, it applies to a relatively rare
phenomenon in international relations.
Pyongyang is clearly in a hurry to
develop its inter-continental ballistic
missile capability, to enable it to deliver
a nuclear strike on the continental US.
North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, has
authorised more missile tests in 2017
alone than his father, Kim Jong‑Il, did
during his entire reign from 1994-2011.
A nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia? 20paradigm_shift — Edition 02 Summer 2017-18
First and foremost, a defining characteristic are indeed reactive. Rather, they appear to
of any arms race is the notion of “reciprocal reflect nothing other than the culmination
interaction”. In other words, two or more states of a decades-long determination to establish
need to disagree over the “proper” balance North Korea as a fully-fledged nuclear power.
of military power between them and they
There is certainly some evidence to suggest,
need to be self-consciously increasing their
however, that South Korea has been responding
04
arsenals–quantitatively or qualitatively, or both–
to Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile advances
specifically in response to that disagreement.
in ways consistent with the arms race concept.
Second, for arms-racing in any genuine sense of
Much to China’s chagrin, for instance, Seoul in
the term to occur, this action-reaction dynamic
July 2017 confirmed that it would proceed with
ought to be occurring rapidly. The classic
the installation of the US Terminal High Altitude
historical example of the arms race phenomenon
Area Defense (THAAD) missile defence system
is that involving Britain and Germany in the
immediately following a North Korean ICBM
period prior to the First World War. Then, the
test. Similarly, in September 2017 in the wake
British responded to Germany’s naval build-up
of North Korea’s sixth nuclear test, the Trump
by developing a powerful new class of warship
administration acceded to a request from Seoul
called the dreadnought, which the Germans
to remove the 500-kilogram weight limit in place
subsequently copied. In the decade preceding the
on conventional warheads provided by the US
First World War, the number of dreadnoughts
to South Korea. Removing these restrictions
built by Britain was influenced significantly by
affords Seoul much greater capacity to strike
the numbers built by Germany, and vice versa.
Dr Brendan Taylor and Dr H. D. P. Envall
against the North in the event of conflict.
Pyongyang is clearly in a hurry to develop
Yet South Korean responses to Pyongyang’s
its inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM)
advancing nuclear and missile programs have
capability, to enable it to deliver a nuclear strike
not been as rapid as the arms race concept would
on the continental US. North Korea’s leader,
anticipate. THAAD deployment, for instance,
Kim Jong-un, has authorised more missile
was politically fraught and proceeded fitfully.
tests in 2017 alone than his father, Kim Jong‑Il,
The decision to deploy was initially announced
did during his entire reign from 1994-2011.
by the US and South Korea in July 2016. Yet this
Likewise, three of North Korea’s six nuclear
decision was called into question by the May
tests have taken place under Kim Jong-un’s
2017 election of President Moon Jae-in. Whilst
watch. Consistent with the arms race concept,
on the campaign trail, Moon had pledged
North Korea’s foreign minister Ri Yong Ho has
to review THAAD deployment. Likewise,
indicated that Pyongyang’s pursuit of nuclear
while South Korean conservatives have called
weapons is intended to realise a “balance
for the redeployment of US tactical nuclear
of power with the US”. Moreover, there has
weapons removed in 1991 to the Peninsula,
been an evident action-reaction dynamic to
South Korea’s Defense Minister Song Young-
the increasingly vitriolic statements traded
moo dismissed this as a potential reaction to
between Kim and Trump. Beyond the rhetoric,
Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile advances
however, there is very little evidence to suggest
following a meeting with his US counterpart,
that Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile advances
Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, in October 2017.
North Korea’s foreign minister Ri Yong Ho has
indicated that Pyongyang’s pursuit of nuclear
weapons is intended to realise a “balance of
power with the US”.
21 ANU College of Asia & the Pacific A nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia? 22paradigm_shift — Edition 02 Summer 2017-18
What such prognoses fail to account for, that both superpowers maintained provided
There is some evidence to suggest the however, is the tradition of self-restraint them with a reaction time of approximately
existence of action-reaction dynamics in the which has long been a feature of Asian 30 minutes”. In Northeast Asia today,
strategic culture. Writing in the late 1980s however, “the region is simply too compact,
responses of Seoul and Tokyo to those North and challenging the conventional wisdom such that warning times of a pre-emptive
that arms control measures were next to first strike will be virtually non-existent”.
Korean advances. Again, however, those
04
non-existent in this region, for instance, the
Growing speculation notwithstanding, the
respected strategic commentator Gerald Segal
reactions have not occurred with the degree of concluded that informal and inherently more
spectre of a Northeast Asian nuclear arms race
thus still appears some way off. To be sure,
rapidity anticipated and required by the arms flexible arms control measures “based as much
Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile capabilities
on unstated self-restraint” constituted one
are advancing faster than most analysts
race concept. of “the hallmarks of Asian arms control”.
anticipated. Yet there is little evidence of
Three decades on, it would be worth exploring reciprocal interaction–the very essence of arms-
further whether Tokyo and Seoul’s thus racing–as a driver of North Korean behaviour.
far quite measured responses in the face of
There is some evidence to suggest the
Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile advances are,
existence of action-reaction dynamics in
in fact, a product of this deep-seated culture of
the responses of Seoul and Tokyo to those
self-restraint. Is China’s still relatively modest
North Korean advances. Again, however,
Tokyo’s reactions to North Korea’s nuclear nuclear and missile advances have been nuclear arsenal a reflection of this culture
those reactions have not occurred with
and missile advances have followed a similar highly incremental and protracted. Contrary too? Will North Korea continue to expand
the degree of rapidity anticipated and
Dr Brendan Taylor and Dr H. D. P. Envall
pattern. Over the course of the past quarter to the expectations of the arms race concept, its nuclear and missile forces indefinitely,
required by the arms race concept.
century, these advances have steadily pushed it is thus hard to sustain the contention that or will a measure of self-restraint appear
Japan into reforming key elements of its national Japan’s reactions to Pyongyang’s provocations from Pyongyang at some point also? Further, Japanese and South Korean responses
defence policy. The August 1998 Taepodong constitute a major qualitative or quantitative can also be seen as the product of the continued
Should such a culture of self-restraint today
missile test fired by North Korea over Japanese shift, as opposed to reflecting a more considered erosion of American extended nuclear
exist, the Singaporean practitioner Bilahari
territory, for instance, pushed Tokyo into military modernisation process. Mounting deterrence. In other words, Tokyo and Seoul
Kausikan calls for its abandonment. In a
further reviewing its defence capabilities and, speculation that Japan “going nuclear” will be are not simply engaging in an arms race with
provocative, yet sophisticated contribution to
ultimately, cooperating with the US on ballistic a central element in Northeast Asia’s emerging North Korea but are also hedging against
the Northeast Asian nuclear arms race debate,
missile defence. Likewise, North Korea’s nuclear arms race runs into similar difficulties. the risk of abandonment by the US. Indeed,
he asserts that regional stability would be best
October 2006 nuclear test prompted open Beyond the political and public arguments it is not altogether inconceivable that either
served by Japan and South Korea pursuing
discussion in Japan about the utility of that would have to be made within Japan, or both might ultimately embark down the
nuclear weapons. Following a Waltzian logic,
possessing an indigenous nuclear deterrent. substantial and complex operational planning nuclear path themselves if they no longer
Kausikan argues that such a development would
would be needed for such a development to view the US nuclear umbrella as a sufficient
Pyongyang’s most recent nuclear and missile allow for “a six-way balance of mutually assured
occur. As the technologically-savvy strategic deterrent to Pyongyang. Suggestions that
tests appear to be triggering even more destruction (MAD) among the US, China, Russia,
commentator Richard Bitzinger has recently such a development is inevitable, however,
substantial reactions. They have, for example, Japan, South Korea and North Korea” to form.
observed, numerous operational steps and underestimates the self-restraint which has long
prompted former Japanese Minister of Defense Just as the fear of MAD served to effectively
capability issues would need to be resolved, been a feature of this region’s strategic culture.
Shigeru Ishiba to raise the prospect Tokyo might deter the Americans and the Soviets from
and there is little evidence today that Japan has
loosen its three non-nuclear principles and entering the nuclear abyss during the Cold War, While a Northeast Asian nuclear arms race seems
even begun to put such a process in place.
seek to have the US introduce nuclear weapons Kausikan contends, so will it ultimately unlikely at this juncture, arguments that such a
into Japan. Tokyo is considering developing Commentators predicting the emergence of prove stabilising in Northeast Asia today. shift might ultimately prove stabilising should
further counterstrike capabilities to provide a Northeast Asian nuclear arms race might be treated with considerable caution. Northeast
However, Kausikan’s proposal underestimates
a more multi-layered response strategy for argue that South Korean and Japanese policies Asia’s strategic dynamics are considerably
the difficulty of applying the Cold War construct
retaliating against a North Korean attack. to date have only been possible because of the more complex and fluid than those obtained
of MAD to contemporary Northeast Asia.
Japan’s Ministry of Defense has also requested confidence that Seoul and Tokyo have had in between the superpowers during the Cold War.
The greater number of players involved here
an increase in the country’s defence budget for the nuclear umbrella provided by their senior
renders this region infinitely more complex and Ensuring that a proper Northeast Asian
2018, with specific items including an onshore ally, the US. Yet as the confidence of Seoul and
unpredictable than the much simpler bipolar nuclear arms race does not take off, however
version of the Aegis missile defence system. Tokyo in US extended nuclear deterrence erodes
world which existed during the superpower improbable one might seem, should
in the face of North Korea’s nuclear and missile
Yet there are also important weaknesses in stalemate. Moreover, Northeast Asia’s strategic thus remain a matter of high priority for
advances, these commentators would argue, so
the argument that Japan is engaged in arms geography is different. As another Singaporean both regional and US policymakers.
too are the pace of Japanese and South Korean
-racing behaviour. As in the South Korean scholar Bernard Loo has recently observed,
reactions to those advances likely to increase.
case, Tokyo’s reactions to North Korea’s during the Cold War “the early warning systems
23 ANU College of Asia & the Pacific A nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia? 24You can also read
