PARTIAL GRANT OF RELIEF - Regulations.gov
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Aviation Safety 800 Independence Ave
Washington, DC 20591
In the matter of the request of
PACTEC International Relief No. 18867
Docket No. FAA-2021-0666
For relief from
NOTAM KICZ A0020/21
PARTIAL GRANT OF RELIEF
By letter dated July 29, 2021, Stanley R. Unruh, Agent for Service/Deputy Director of
Operations, requested relief on behalf of PACTEC International (“PACTEC” or “the
requestor”), P.O. Box 28, Nampa, Idaho 83653, from NOTAM KICZ A0020/21, issued by the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on July 25, 2021. On July 29 and 30, 2021, the
requestor provided further information to the FAA in response to the agency’s written request
for information. The requestor also spoke with FAA personnel to provide further information
regarding its proposed operations. The proposed relief, if granted, would permit PACTEC to
operate three U.S.-registered Daher Kodiak 100 aircraft 1 between Hamid Karzai International
Airport (ICAO Code: OAKB) in Kabul, Afghanistan, and various other airports and airstrips
in Afghanistan to conduct evacuation flights for various nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs). PACTEC also sought to continue operations, including non-evacuation NGO
support flights, within Afghanistan for the next two months with the option to reevaluate
changes to the security situation.
1
For security reasons, the aircraft registration numbers are not included in this partial grant of relief and are
instead included in the confidential Appendix 1.
AFS-22-00106-E2 The requestor seeks relief from the following NOTAM: On July 25, 2021, the FAA issued flight prohibition Notice-to-Airmen (NOTAM) KICZ A0020/21, which prohibits civil flight operations in the Kabul Flight Information Region (FIR) (OAKX) at altitudes below Flight Level (FL) 260, except for operations into and out of Hamid Karzai International Airport (OAKB) in Kabul, by: all United States (U.S.) air carriers and commercial operators; all persons exercising the privileges of an airman certificate issued by the FAA, except when such persons are operating U.S.-registered aircraft for a foreign air carrier; and all operators of aircraft registered in the U.S., except when the operator of such aircraft is a foreign air carrier. The FAA Administrator issued this NOTAM as an emergency order under 49 U.S.C. 40113(a), 44701(a)(5), and 46105(c) due to the risk to U.S. civil aviation posed by extremist/militant activity and limited mitigation capabilities. The requestor supports its request with the following information: PACTEC requested immediate relief from the flight prohibition NOTAM to carry out security evacuations to mitigate the impact NOTAM KICZ A0020/21 has presented to numerous NGOs. The requestor also sought to continue operations, including non-evacuation NGO support flights, for the next two months with the option to reevaluate changes to the security situation. Public Interest PACTEC stated it has many years of experience providing air services to humanitarian, relief, and development organizations in Afghanistan. PACTEC indicates that the European Union and the Government of Switzerland presently partner with PACTEC in financially underwriting the costs of the humanitarian flight services. Specifically, the Directorate- General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) provides subsidies that support PACTEC’s operations. The requestor stated that immediate suspension of PACTEC air services would leave NGO staff trapped in remote locations with limited to nonexistent transportation options. The requestor asserted that to immediately cease humanitarian aviation support without adequate notice or at least a period of drawdown would not be in the interest of the Afghan people in remote regions, the desire and purpose of humanitarian actors in the region, nor the compassionate intent of the American people. Over the years, PACTEC stated it has partnered with hundreds of NGOs and flown thousands of hours to provide relief and medical evacuations in support of the Afghan people. PACTEC stated its operations rely on three Daher Kodiak 100s to safely transport workers to many parts of Afghanistan, helping them overcome the constraints of time, inhospitable terrain, and AFS-22-00106-E
3 roads that are insecure. PACTEC asserted the service it provides is often the only air service able to assist and support aid workers in the most remote regions of Afghanistan. PACTEC stated there are NGO staff doing crucial humanitarian work for the Afghan people. That work has potentially placed them in locations that could be overrun by government opposition forces in the future. They have been living and working in these locations knowing that if security were ever in question, they could count on PACTEC air services to remove them to safety. PACTEC asserts that an effort to quickly respond and allow PACTEC to move humanitarian workers in the safest manner possible, which is by air, and authorizing relief from the NOTAM contributes to the safety of aid workers that rely on PACTEC. PACTEC estimates that about one month of operations will be necessary to evacuate all NGO staff. In addition, PACTEC states security evacuations have always been a normal part of PACTEC’s operations in Afghanistan and are not new since the international troop withdrawal. PACTEC indicates the security context of Afghanistan has been very dynamic for the last 20 years and that, as a result, PACTEC often evacuates humanitarian aid workers due to degrading local security. In most cases, PACTEC explains, the aid workers will be brought back as soon as security has improved to an acceptable level again. PACTEC indicates this has always been an ongoing part of operating in Afghanistan for both PACTEC and NGOs. PACTEC states many of the remote areas where NGOs have projects are still secure and the NGOs do not want or need to evacuate. In other areas, PACTEC states, aid workers need to be evacuated temporarily until security either improves or stabilizes to an acceptable safety level. PACTEC asserts that, if it were forced to cease operations to the remote airports and airstrips, these NGOs may be forced to cease their projects. No Adverse Effect on Safety PACTEC stated that PACTEC and its parent organization have more than 70 years of experience operating in challenging environments in the developing world. The requestor stated it believes its security protocols, cultivated from years of operating in Afghanistan, provide a level of operational safety that warrants relief from the requirements found in NOTAM KICZ A0020/21. The requestor also maintained that the security protocols described in its request for relief provide a comparable measure of security to what exists around the Kabul airspace, thereby warranting relief by the FAA for other airports and airstrips. PACTEC stated that the safety of its pilots and passengers are its highest priority and that it has safely and consistently operated in Afghanistan as a humanitarian aviation organization for many years. PACTEC also indicated that it has an agreement with the Afghanistan Civil Aviation Authority (ACAA) to operate in the country and has intentionally developed and matured flight operations that are uniquely positioned and specifically suited for the challenges that are inherent to Afghanistan. By separate confidential submission, PACTEC provided the FAA with a list of the airports and airstrips at which it sought to operate. Since PACTEC’s operations are below FL260, the AFS-22-00106-E
4 requestor stated risk mitigation actions must be taken to obtain an acceptable level of safety during operations. PACTEC stated it operates between 13,000 to 18,000 feet mean sea level (MSL) 2 and operates on published routes when operating between major airports. PACTEC stated an important risk mitigation action is the avoidance of flights over specific areas or flight below certain altitudes. For locations that are not served by a published route, PACTEC stated it selects routes that avoid areas of insurgent activity based on current security information, and aircraft always maintain an altitude above surface-to-air fire and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) range. PACTEC stated that much of its operations occur in the central highlands, which form a geographic and tribal barrier to insurgent activity. The PACTEC security team monitors the relevant security information and adjusts routes and minimum altitudes as appropriate. Since PACTEC operates ad-hoc charters, it does not operate flights on a regular schedule. PACTEC listed several organizations from which it receives security information, including: the ACAA, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International NGO Safety Organization (INSO), and the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS). The requestor also stated it has access to airport management and local assets for site-specific information. Further, PACTEC staff are registered with their respective embassies; for American staff they receive security briefs from the Regional Security Officer (RSO). Contact with the RSO is straightforward and accessible; however, direct contact is limited because PACTEC’s security team receives regular security briefs from the Department of State’s Overseas Advisory Council (OSAC). PACTEC indicates that their main source of security information, INSO, has access to security information disseminated by the RSO. PACTEC stated that it proactively manages security through a systematic integration of all the obtained security-related information into its operations. PACTEC stated it uses the security-related information it receives to make risk assessments for every airport where PACTEC operates. The level of risk is re-evaluated daily. PACTEC stated mitigation actions are taken to obtain an acceptable residual risk. As of the date of its request, PACTEC represented it had not had a single incident of aircraft damage due to small arms fire. Before an aircraft is dispatched, PACTEC indicated its security team establishes contact with airport management and local assets for a current security update. Other established sources may also be consulted prior to dispatching an aircraft. PACTEC states that its security team uploads security information into the Electronic Flight Bag that each crew member is required to read prior to dispatch, including airport risk level, identified risks and the required mitigation actions for the specific mission, and parts on the routing where low overflight is to be avoided. Prior to dispatching an aircraft, the crew is briefed on the most recent security information related to the specific mission. All relevant information is readily available to the crew through the use of the Electronic Flight Bag. Electronic Flight Bags are synchronized 2 PACTEC indicated that its aircraft are unpressurized but equipped with oxygen for crew and all passenger seats. Due to the high terrain, PACTEC stated pilots use oxygen on almost all flights, and passengers are often supplied oxygen, depending on the altitude and duration of the flight. AFS-22-00106-E
5 before every flight. PACTEC explained the route and altitude of a specific mission is dependent upon current security information, with flight altitudes used to avoid being within firing range of weapons available to extremists and militants. PACTEC aircraft do security descents to avoid low flight over higher-risk areas, i.e., they descend while directly overhead a secure airport. PACTEC stated its aircraft are tracked through satellite tracking, and that flightcrews have satellite communications equipment to maintain continuous communication with PACTEC flight tracking staff. Satellite tracking and communication is a requirement for dispatching an aircraft. The security team continuously monitors the security status throughout any flight. When necessary, a PACTEC aircraft will be directed to return to home base through satellite communication. Prior to landing at high-risk airports, PACTEC stated that its security team will make a final security assessment approximately 15 minutes prior to landing. Without the PACTEC security team giving a landing clearance to the pilot, or when no ground contact can be established with PACTEC’s local assets or airport management, PACTEC indicated the crew will divert to an alternate site (normally home base). PACTEC stated that, after each flight, the flightcrew is debriefed. Any relevant information is used to re-evaluate the risk level for the routes and airports. PACTEC stated that any relevant information will be shared with other PACTEC flightcrews through internal processes. PACTEC indicates that the airports and airstrips at which it operates are controlled by Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and managed by the ACAA. The requestor states that security measures at these locations vary, with airports in high-risk areas have a high ANSF presence and those in low-risk areas have a lower ANSF Force presence. PACTEC states it will not operate into airports unless protection from government security forces can be guaranteed. PACTEC further states all of the main airports at which it operates have baggage screening procedures in place and all PACTEC passengers are registered employees of the NGOs PACTEC serves. PACTEC asserts all airports and airstrips PACTEC uses are in very good condition. PACTEC explains its aircraft are rugged aircraft, engineered for unimproved, high altitude airstrips, a description that only applies to a few of the airstrips in Afghanistan. According to PACTEC, most airports and airstrips associated with this request are paved, few are lighted, but all have wind indicators, and there is fuel available at Kabul and several other locations in Afghanistan. PACTEC states that the proposed flights would all be daytime flights, conducted under visual flight rules (VFR), with limited time on the ground. PACTEC has search and rescue (SAR) procedures in its General Operations Manual and a Memorandum of Understanding with UNHAS regarding SAR and recovery. AFS-22-00106-E
6
PACTEC stated that most security evacuation flights are back and forth to Kabul; however,
routine supply flights tend to include multiple stops. PACTEC indicated multiple stop flights
are generally in the central highlands where there is limited risk due to tribal and geographic
boundaries that have prevented insurgent activity. However, PACTEC further stated that each
leg of a multiple stop flight has the same security scrutiny and protocols.
PACTEC submitted the registration numbers of the aircraft it plans to use, airmen
certification information, and the list of airports and airstrips in Afghanistan at which it
proposed to operate to the FAA in confidential submissions due to the security situation
in-country. In that list, PACTEC identified those airports and airstrips at which it had
discontinued operations temporarily for security reasons at the time of its request.
The FAA’s analysis is as follows:
Public Interest
The FAA recognizes the safety of aid workers who have provided assistance and support to
the Afghan people is of critical importance. Based on PACTEC’s long association with
various NGOs, it is reasonable to believe that those NGOs and their staffs have come to
depend on PACTEC’s services to provide transportation by air throughout Afghanistan,
which is often the safest way for them to travel within the country. Maintaining the
availability of these services presents an opportunity to foster goodwill towards the United
States in the international humanitarian organization community and among those countries
whose citizens evacuate on PACTEC flights. However, the FAA is required to consider
“assigning, maintaining, and enhancing safety and security as the highest priorities in air
commerce.” 3 Consequently, operations such as those PACTEC proposes are only in the
public interest to the extent the FAA determines they can be conducted safely.
No Adverse Effect on Safety
The FAA recognizes PACTEC’s long experience operating in Afghanistan and in other
challenging environments around the world and its extensive security procedures. However,
the security environment for U.S. civil aviation operations in the Kabul FIR (OAKX) at
altitudes below FL260, except for operations into and out of Hamid Karzai International
Airport (OAKB) is fluid and high risk unless sufficient risk mitigation measures are in place,
and deteriorating following the withdrawal of coalition forces and the associated removal of
risk mitigation measures previously deployed at several airports and airstrips. The Taliban are
taking advantage of the security vacuum, have swiftly taken control of significant territory,
and are threatening major cities, including Kandahar, Herat, Kunduz, and Lashkar Gar. These
3
49 U.S.C. § 40101(d)(1).
AFS-22-00106-E7 circumstances have resulted in disruptions to civil aviation operations and increased risks to such operations outside Kabul. Afghan airports and airstrips are at risk from indirect and direct attacks and aircraft are at significant risk while on the ground and during low-altitude flight operations. The Taliban and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash Sham – Khorasan (ISIS-K) have demonstrated their intent and capabilities to target airports and airstrips with rockets, mortar fire, and direct assaults. Taliban elements have an emerging weaponized unmanned aircraft system (UAS) capability that has been used to target Kunduz airfield on multiple occasions over the past year. As Taliban elements contest control of strategic cities with Afghan military and security forces, their advance has increasingly put Afghan airports and airstrips outside of Kabul at risk of attack and/or flight disruptions. Ongoing clashes in Herat have resulted in suspension of flight operations for a period of over 72 hours, and a rocket attack against Kandahar International Airport (ICAO Code: OAKN) over the weekend of July 31-August 1, 2021, damaged the runway and resulted in a suspension of flight operations. Low-altitude flight operations are at risk of surface-to-air fire from a variety of weapons, including small-arms fire, RPGs, light anti-aircraft artillery, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) and potentially man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). Some MANPADS present a risk up to 25,000 feet above ground level. The primary anti-aircraft threats observed over the past year have been from small arms, RPGs, and ATGMs targeting low-altitude flight operations as targets of opportunity, typically below 5,000 feet above ground level. Recent MANPADS incidents have been infrequent and have targeted military aircraft. Given the extremely fluid security situation as Taliban forces continue their efforts to seize control of territory and strategic cities through increasingly violent means following the withdrawal of coalition forces from Afghanistan, the FAA has determined that even the extensive security procedures PACTEC proposes to use do not adequately reduce risks to civil operations at all of the locations PACTEC requested. The FAA has further determined that it can only safely authorize evacuation operations to bring NGO staff to Hamid Karzai International Airport (OAKB) from a limited number of the other airports and airstrips in Afghanistan PACTEC requested for a limited period of time, rather than the two months of continued operations, including non-evacuation NGO support, that PACTEC requested. The FAA has determined that U.S. civil aviation operations cannot be conducted safely into some of the airports and airstrips that PACTEC requested because those locations are in contested areas where there are ongoing clashes as amassed Taliban forces attempt to seize control. In addition, with the ongoing Taliban offensive and fluid security environment in Afghanistan, the FAA cannot safely approve long-term flight operations. With the withdrawal of coalition forces, risk mitigation measures have been removed from airports outside Kabul, such as counter unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS) and counter-rocket, artillery and mortar systems (CRAMs), leaving airports and airstrips outside Kabul more vulnerable to attacks. AFS-22-00106-E
8 However, the FAA has determined that it is currently safe for PACTEC to conduct limited operations at a few of the requested airports and airstrips outside Kabul for a brief period of time for the purpose of conducting security evacuations of NGO staff. The FAA bases this determination on the current security situation at those locations, which are not under immediate or very near-term threat from the advancing Taliban forces. For those locations, the FAA has determined PACTEC’s flight planning and security measures reduce the risk to an acceptable level of safety when combined with the conditions and limitations set forth in this partial grant of relief. However, the FAA emphasizes that the situation in Afghanistan remains extremely fluid and risk conditions could further deteriorate at any time, potentially requiring modification or rescission of this grant of relief. The FAA’s Decision Partial Denial of Relief In its request for relief, PACTEC sought to continue its operations in support of NGOs, including non-evacuation NGO support flights, for the next two months with the option to reevaluate changes to the security situation. In its confidential submission, PACTEC provided the FAA with a list of all airports and airstrips into which it wished to conduct operations, including some where PACTEC had already temporarily suspended operations due to security concerns. As discussed above, the security situation in the Kabul FIR (OAKX) at altitudes below FL260, except for operating into and out of Hamid Karzai International Airport (OAKB) is extremely fluid, as Taliban forces continue their efforts to seize control of territory and strategic cities. The withdrawal of coalition forces and associated risk mitigation measures at airports outside Kabul leaves those airports and airstrips outside Kabul more vulnerable to attacks. Some of the airports and airstrips where PACTEC requests to operate are in contested areas and/or are potentially under immediate or near-term threat from advancing Taliban forces. For these reasons, the FAA denies PACTEC’s requested duration of operations, its request for non-evacuation NGO support operations, and its request to operate at those airports and airstrips listed in Groups A and B in Appendix 1. 4 Group A includes those airports and airstrips where PACTEC indicated it had ceased operations temporarily due to security concerns, and Group B includes those additional airports and airstrips at which PACTEC requested to operate where the FAA has determined U.S. civil aviation operations also cannot be conducted safely. Partial grant of relief 4 Since the FAA approves a limited amount of the relief PACTEC requested, Appendix 1 is kept confidential for the security of PACTEC’s flights. AFS-22-00106-E
9
The FAA has, however, determined that it is currently safe for PACTEC to conduct limited
flight operations into a few of the requested airports and airstrips for a brief period to evacuate
NGO staff. These airports and airstrips are in areas that are not currently contested and that
are not expected to be under immediate or very near-term threat from the advancing Taliban
forces. For these locations, PACTEC’s security procedures, coupled with the conditions and
limitations specified in this grant of relief, reduce the residual safety risk to an acceptable
level for the airports and airstrips identified in Group C of Appendix 1.
Therefore, in consideration of the foregoing, I conclude that granting partial relief from
NOTAM KICZ A0020/21 to enable PACTEC International to conduct security evacuations of
NGO staff from the airports and airstrips identified in Group C of Appendix 1 is in the public
interest and would not adversely affect safety. Therefore, pursuant to the authority contained
in 49 U.S.C. 106(f) and 40113, delegated to me by the Administrator, PACTEC International
is granted relief from NOTAM KICZ A0020/21, only to the extent necessary to allow
PACTEC to operate three Daher Kodiak 100 aircraft to conduct evacuation flights for NGO
staff from the listed airports and airstrips to Hamid Karzai International Airport (OAKB),
subject to the conditions and limitations listed below.
Conditions and Limitations
1. Prior to operating under this partial grant of relief, PACTEC must complete and
submit to the FAA Flight Standards Service, Air Transportation Division the
attached document, captioned “Waiver of Claims and Agreement to Indemnify and
Hold Harmless the United States of America,” containing the PACTEC’s
agreement to release the U.S. Government from any and all damages, claims and
liabilities, as well as its agreement to indemnify the U.S. Government with respect
to any and all third party damages, claims, and liabilities relating to any and all
events arising from or related to operations authorized under this partial grant of
relief.
2. This partial grant of relief is strictly limited to flight operations necessary to
evacuate NGO staff from the airports and airstrips identified in Group C in
Appendix 1 to Hamid Karzai International Airport (OAKB).
3. All operations conducted under this partial grant of relief must be conducted in
strict compliance with the processes and procedures described in PACTEC’s
request for relief of July 29, 2021 included in this partial grant of relief as appendix
2.
4. All flights conducted under this partial grant of relief will originate from Hamid
Karzai International Airport (OAKB), fly to one airport or airstrip listed in Group C
in Appendix 1, and return to OAKB with no intermediate stops.
AFS-22-00106-E10
5. PACTEC must conduct a thorough review of weather, threat reports, and security
conditions at the destination airport or airstrip, as well as any concurrent flight
operations, to assess risks before conducting any flight operation(s) under this
partial grant of relief.
6. No flight may occur under this partial grant of relief if the pilot in command
determines that safety, security, or other conditions at the airport or airstrip where
the operation will be conducted do not permit safe operations.
7. When conducting operations under this partial grant of relief, the pilot in command
must operate the aircraft in accordance with all applicable operating rules and
procedures.
8. Only day VFR operations are authorized.
9. PACTEC will minimize ground time at airports or airstrips other than Hamid
Karzai International Airport (OAKB) to the maximum extent possible, with no
more than 60 minutes time on the ground at airports or airstrips other than OAKB.
There will be no extended stay or remain overnight (RON) operations at any airport
or airstrip other than OAKB, barring an aircraft emergency. In such cases,
PACTEC will implement appropriate security measures to secure and protect the
aircrew and aircraft and notify the FAA Washington Operations Center (WOC) at
(202) 267-3333, as promptly as operationally feasible.
10. PACTEC will operate above 5,000 feet Above Ground Level (AGL) to the
maximum extent possible and conduct appropriate descents and climbouts
consistent with security needs and safe operation of the aircraft. Additionally,
PACTEC will plan routing to minimize overflight of population centers and
contested territory to the maximum extent possible and will vary routing and
schedules to reduce the potential for observable patterns.
11. PACTEC must report hostile fire and/or security incidents to the FAA’s Current
Intelligence Threat Evaluation Watch (CITE Watch) at (202) 267-3203 and/or at:
FAAWatch@faa.gov, as promptly as operationally feasible.
12. PACTEC will ensure all aircrew members are properly trained in the PACTEC’s
and UNHAS’s Search and Rescue procedures before they conduct any operations
under this partial grant of relief to support effective search and rescue operations if
needed.
13. Prior to initiating any flight operations under this partial grant of relief, the
requestor must submit its flight schedule of planned flights for its first 48 hours of
operations under this grant of relief to the FAA Washington Operations Center
AFS-22-00106-E11
(WOC) at 9-AWA-ASH-WOC@faa.gov. Thereafter, PACTEC must submit
operational status updates to the FAA every 48 hours. Each such update must
include planned flights for the next 48 hours, number of evacuation flights
conducted in the previous 48 hours, number of passengers evacuated on those
flights, and any safety/security incidents not already reported to the FAA.
14. This partial grant of relief is not transferable to any operator, airmen, or aircraft
not identified in this document or in Appendix 1 to this partial grant of relief. This
partial grant relief applies, however, to individual airmen to the extent necessary to
allow them to exercise the privileges of their FAA-issued airman certificates to
conduct the operations authorized by this partial grant of relief.
15. A copy of this partial grant of relief (not to include Appendix 1) must be carried
aboard any aircraft operated under this partial grant of relief.
This partial grant of relief does not relieve PACTEC of the responsibility to operate in
compliance with all other applicable regulations, as well as all conditions required by its
operating certificate(s) and Operations Specifications (OpSpecs).
This partial grant of relief terminates at 2359Z, August 9, 2021, unless sooner superseded or
rescinded.
Issued in Washington, D.C.
Sincerely,
Digitally signed by
ROBERT C ROBERT C CARTY
Date: 2021.08.01
CARTY 22:26:27 -04'00'
Robert C. Carty
Deputy Executive Director, Flight Standards Service
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