PhilosoPhy News2 017 2 0 18 - INSIDE - University of Toronto
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
Philosophy News
2 0 17 - 2 0 18
INSIDE
Profile on Alumni Interviews: In Memoriam:
Epistemology Charles Mills and Henry Pietersma, John (Jack)
Deepak Ramachandran Canfield, Kenneth Schmitz
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
2 Philosophy News
CONTENTS
Welcome & Reports 3 Profile on Epistemology 8 Arthur Ripstein’s Killam Project 14
Alumnus: Charles Mills 16 25 Years of CPAMP 20 Alumnus: Deepak Ramachandran 22
In Memoriam 24 People & Awards 26 The Aristotle Contest 31
Philosophy News
www.philosophy.utoronto.ca We wish to thank Editor: Jovana Jankovic
the generous donors to Proofreader: Ian Drummond
Department of Philosophy the Department of Philosophy, Layout: Dragon Snap Design
University of Toronto without whom Philosophy News
170 St. George Street, 4th Floor would not be possible. Philosophy News
Toronto ON M5R 2M8 2017-2018 Edition
Canada Please support the Department
in our endeavours!
Tel: 416-978-3311
Fax: 416-978-8703
YOUR PRIVACY: The University of Toronto respects your privacy. We do not rent, trade or sell our mailing lists. Your information is collected
and used for the administration of the University’s advancement activities undertaken pursuant to the University of Toronto Act, 1971.
If you have any questions, please refer to or contact the University’s Freedom of Information and Protection
of Privacy Coordinator at 416-946-7303, McMurrich Building, Room 201, 12 Queen’s Park Crescent West, Toronto, ON M5S 1A8.
If you do not wish to receive future correspondence from the Department of Philosophy, please contact us at 416-978-2139 or
at address.update@utoronto.ca
3 Philosophy News University of Toronto 3
Welcome
A
s always, Charles Mills currently serves as president of the Central
it gives Division of the American Philosophical Association (APA).
me great He will be succeeded this summer by our colleague
pleasure to Jennifer Nagel, who serves this year as the vice- president/
present you with president-elect of the Central Division of this largest and
a new issue of most important association of philosophers world-wide.
Philosophy News, And there is a further Toronto connection: both Charles
the annual maga- and Jennifer follow Valerie Tiberius (BA 1990), who served
zine of the U of T as the Central APA’s president in 2016-17.
Departments
In the research section of this issue we focus on two areas:
of Philosophy.
first, you can read about some of the exciting research
Thanks to the
happening in epistemology, where the department has a
relentless efforts
particular strength. The accounts of the various research
of Jovana Jankovic,
projects undertaken by faculty, postdocs, and graduate
our Communications
students give an insight into the vibrancy of and diversity
Officer, this latest
in this field. The second focus is on Arthur Ripstein’s proj-
issue presents
ect on the ethics of war. At present, Arthur is conducting
you with another
this project with the help of a two-year Killam Research
interesting spotlight on what is going on in our community.
Fellowship. In 2019, Arthur will present some of the results
I hope you enjoy reading about our activities and some
of his research in his Tanner Lectures at the University of
of the things that kept—and still keep—us busy during the
California, Berkeley. The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
current academic year.
is one of the most prestigious lecture series in ethics and
Because the present issue follows right on the heels of related fields.
our (delayed) 2016-17 edition, we decided to highlight two
As this magazine goes to press we enter the busiest phase
topics of which we are especially proud: our alumni and
of our winter term. As our senior undergraduates take their
our research mission. These topics will also be the focus
last courses before graduating and some of our graduate
of future issues; we especially hope to learn more from
students are getting ready to defend their dissertations,
our alumni!
the department is entering the “admissions season” for
In two interviews, Charles Mills and Deepak Ramachandran our graduate programs. On top of this, we are conducting
share impressions of their time at U of T and how it searches for three faculty positions. This year we are trying
impacted their future careers. Deepak obtained his BA in to fill two junior positions, one in ancient philosophy on
philosophy and chemistry from U of T in 1991, where he the UTSC campus and one in metaphysics and epistemol-
was active in student government at the Department of ogy on the downtown campus. The third open position is
Philosophy, before completing his BPhil at Oxford in 1994. the Senator Jerahmiel S. and Carole S. Grafstein Chair in
Since then he has become an investor and entrepreneur Jewish Philosophy. We are all very much looking forward
in the areas of software, clean technology, and electronics. to the new colleagues joining our community in the not too
Charles obtained his MA in 1975 and his PhD in 1985. He distant future.
is currently a Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the
If you enjoy reading about our past activities, consider
Graduate Center of the City University of New York. Before
checking out our more current events and news on our
joining the Graduate Center, he taught at the University
department website and also on Twitter and Facebook. It
of Oklahoma, the University of Illinois at Chicago, and
would be a pleasure to welcome you at one of our upcom-
Northwestern University. He has published important work
ing department events. We would also be very happy to
in social and political philosophy, particularly around
hear from you with feedback and suggestions.
issues of class, race, and gender. Both interviews make for
very compelling reading, as they also shine some light on Martin Pickavé
the nature of our academic discipline. Chair, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts & Science
Chair, Graduate Department of Philosophy
4 Philosophy News
UTM Philosophy News
T
he 2017-18 Reading Minds”—concerns what it means to “read”
year has been faces, texts, and minds, among other things. Jennifer, an
as busy as epistemologist, will work on a project titled “Extracting
ever. In our last Belief from Knowledge.” (She won’t live entirely in the
issue I wrote that ivory tower, though, as she will also begin her term as
we had introduced president of the Central Division of the APA.)
some new courses
Andrew, who was promoted to associate profes-
in order to attract
sor with tenure in 2016, won the first UTM Annual
a broader range
Research Prize in the Humanities for “outstand-
of students—in
ing contribution to research and scholarship for
particular, PHL204:
the period up to and including two years post
Philosophy in
tenure.” Congratulations to Jennifer and Andrew!
Everyday Life and
Next year fully half of the faculty will be either on
PHL221: Philosophy
research leave (sabbatical or fellowship) or occupied
at the Movies, both
with full-time administrative assignments that take them
at the 200 level.
away from the classroom.
With an eye to our
highly international student body, we also arranged to
have our PHL235: Philosophy of Religion course taught
this year on Buddhism. PHL204 was offered this fall to
a class of 90 students and was well received; such pro-
vocative topics as abortion, religion, free will, and the
nature of art inspired extremely lively and often exciting
discussion. PHL221 will be offered this coming summer,
and the religion course is being offered right now to a
full class of 60.
I’m delighted to report also
that we presented the inau-
gural Jacqueline Brunning
Award in May 2017 to gradu-
ating student Theo Lindgreen. Andrew Sepielli
If you would like to make This will present a big challenge to those of us who
a donation to the Brunning remain, but it will also provide a fine opportunity for
Award fund, please visit some of our recent PhDs and postdocs who have not
uof t.me/donate-utm-phil yet secured faculty positions elsewhere. We will need
and scroll down to the to replace at least 15 half courses!
Brunning Award. To read
Prof. Jackie Brunning I will keep you updated as to how things go.
more about Jackie, visit
UTM Philosophy Department
uoft.me/brunning. 1982-2016 Diana Raffman
Chair, Department of Philosophy
Our faculty publications and awards continue to keep
University of Toronto Mississauga
our department among the top departments at UTM.
Roughly half of the faculty hold prestigious multi-year
SSHRC grants, and both Jennifer Nagel and Andrew
Sepielli have won significant awards. During 2018-19,
Jennifer will be a fellow (the only UTM faculty member
chosen this year!) of the Jackman Humanities Institute.
The Institute’s theme for next year—“Reading Faces—
5 Philosophy News
UTSC Philosophy News
W
e are for- dent of the Society for the Metaphysics of Science and
tunate that gave the presidential address, “On Characterizing the
growth Fundamental,” at the annual conference at Fordham
and new initiatives University in October, 2017.
are the order of
In addition to our research and teaching commitments,
the day—or rather
we are all busy with new initiatives. We are working
year—in philosophy
with the UTSC architectural team on designing a per-
at UTSC. Our enrol-
manent new home for the department to which we will
ments continue to
move in fall 2018. The curriculum committee is devel-
grow as a result
oping an experiential learning dimension for the final
of a happy con-
year of our program. This will be a capstone course
fluence of factors:
that will give students the “hands-on” experience of
student interest,
leading tutorials and marking essays in first-year intro-
new programs at
ductory classes while carrying out their own individual
the campus that
research projects with a faculty member. This venture
draw on philosophy
is inspired by the successful Socrates Project at the
courses, and inter-
St. George campus. We have also started an essay
esting new classes
clinic and will be announcing the Howard Sobel Essay
developed by our faculty such as Topics in Arabic
Prize. Our Association of Philosophy Students is very
and Jewish Philosophy. The small “portable” we have
active this year as well, holding a number of informal
called home for four years is bursting at the seams,
events and organizing their annual conference on the
definitively outgrown.
theme of “Political Philosophy” with Professor Rahul
As incoming chair, I can report that this year is anything Kumar (Queen’s University) as the keynote speaker on
but “business as usual.” Rather, we are hitting a critical March 24, 2018.
mass where it is possible to make it my aim to push at
Last but not least, there is also a more personal
old boundaries, to expand and improve and innovate.
addition: congratulations to Assistant Professor Julia
We began the new academic year by adding an Nefsky on the arrival of her second child, Archie.
assistant professor (contractually limited) position in
We look forward to another year of growth, new
applied and biomedical ethics that reflects the tre-
initiatives, and stellar research and teaching at UTSC.
mendous student interest in biomedical ethics at UTSC
and the growing program in Health Studies. Assistant Sonia Sedivy
Professor Joshua Brandt is the first to hold this position. Chair, Department of Philosophy
Aside from teaching two sections of Biomedical Ethics University of Toronto Scarborough
(with over 800 students), he has designed courses in
biomedical ethics from second to fourth year that will
allow students to pursue this topic throughout their stud-
ies. With these courses in place, the next step will be to
offer a minor in biomedical ethics. The second addition
to our department—for whom a search is underway—
will be an assistant professor (tenure-track) in ancient
philosophy, who will design new course offerings in the
foundations of Western philosophy.
As always, our faculty have been actively publishing
and presenting their research at international con-
ferences from New Orleans to London, Stockholm,
Groningen, and the Esalen Center for Theory and
Research. Professor Jessica Wilson served as presi-
6 Philosophy News
From the Graduate Department
T
he Graduate students will visit the department, meet with faculty
Department and graduate students, and take part in a range of
was delight- recruitment activities. A highlight of the weekend is the
ed to welcome its keynote talks given by two of our graduate alumni. Our
2017-18 entering MA speakers this year are Janette Dinishak (Wittgenstein,
and PhD students philosophy and history of psychology, disability), current-
last September. ly assistant professor in the Department of Philosophy
These students are at the University of California at Santa Cruz, and Jacob
enrolled in a wide Weinrib (legal and political philosophy), currently assis-
variety of courses, tant professor in Queen’s University’s Faculty of Law.
and, at the time of
Congratulations for several graduate students (or for-
writing, are hard mer graduate students) are in order. Ariel Melamedoff’s
at work on final essay, “Atomistic Time and Simultaneous Causation in
papers for their Hume’s Treatise” won the Martha Lile Love Essay Award.
first term. Despite Nir Av-Gay (“Gradability in Discourse”) and Jared
their diverse inter- Riggs (“Moral Theory Without Metaphysics”) received
ests, students have Honourable Mentions for their papers. Benjamin Wald
the opportunity to was the winner of the Martha Lile Love Teaching Award
develop a strong cohort consciousness in their pro- for his UTSC undergraduate political philosophy course.
seminars, with an MA proseminar on Platonism and Finally, Jacob Stump and Adam Murray successfully
Naturalism and a PhD proseminar on Rationality. Our defended their dissertations last summer. Both Jacob
MA students have as well completed their Professional and Adam have taken up lecturer positions in the St.
Development Seminar, with sessions on a broad range George undergraduate philosophy department.
of issues in the profession—from turning a term paper
into a publication to freedom of speech and aca- Our entering and early-year PhD students did excellent
demic freedom in the classroom. The PhD Professional work in preparing scholarship applications, with appli-
Development Seminar runs in the winter term, and will cations for the Vanier, Trudeau, and SSHRC doctoral
help students prepare for the transition into the job awards advancing from the University competition to
market. Ottawa for adjudication. We are extremely fortunate
to have very responsible and hard-working students
We were also delighted to welcome back our return- in the department, with every eligible student in the
ing graduate students. The students’ works in progress department taking the time and expending the energy
are supported by student-run reading groups and the to apply for SSHRC doctoral funding.
Graduate Forum. Speaking of student-run activities,
organization is well underway for this year’s cleverly The students’ work in this regard is part of a depart-
titled graduate conference, PsyPhi: Philosophy Meets ment-wide commitment to maintaining and improving
Psychology. The conference will take place May 7-8, funding for our students, funding that now consider-
2018, and will feature keynote speakers Joëlle Proust ably outstrips University base funding. The Graduate
(Ecole Normale Supérieure) and Shaun Gallagher Department is very happy to report that our students
(University of Memphis and University of Wollongong). are better funded than roughly 90% of departments in
It should be a terrific event—see torontophilgradconf. the Faculty of Arts & Science. This enviable situation
wordpress.com for more information. Thanks to Elena is made possible to a large extent by student and
Rabinoff-Derksen and Michaela Manson for their orga- faculty efforts to secure external funding. The depart-
ment is also very happy to report that we have raised
nizational work.
our departmental minimum funding commitments to
This year’s Graduate Research Weekend is scheduled $18,000 for MA students and $22,500 for PhD students
for March 16-17, 2018, during which time prospective (University base funding is $17,000). Students also
continued on page 27
7 Philosophy News
From the St. George Undergraduate Department
E
very student in The department is trying its best to create more opportu-
the Faculty of nities for smaller learning environments. Our most recent
Arts & Science initiative is the PHL1 mentorship program that we have
is enrolled as developed together with the Philosophy Course Union,
either a specialist, the association of philosophy undergraduate students.
a double major, or The purpose of the PHL1 mentorship program is to foster
a major with two an interest in philosophy within a community of first-year
minors. We are very students enrolled in PHL100Y1 or PHL101Y1.
proud of our spe-
cialist, major, and Students in the PHL1 program meet biweekly. The
minor programs, meetings are led by a peer mentor and assistant peer
but also always mentor, who are senior undergraduate philosophy stu-
looking for ways to dents. Topics and activities for these meetings will vary
improve them. The at the discretion of the mentors, but may include the
year before last we following: workshops on reading and writing philosophy,
got together with meetings with faculty members and graduate students,
the Department field trips to a law firm or the Royal Ontario Museum, or
of Mathematics to even just a fun afternoon. We currently have more than
overhaul the philos- 40 first-year students enrolled in the program and are
ophy and mathematics specialist program. This year we very happy with the uptake and the level of activities. We
have overhauled the philosophy minor. The aim of the are very grateful to Sheridan Cunningham and Ashley
minor is to make a mini-program in philosophy avail- Khan, the two student mentors this year, and to Eric
able to students whose main academic homes are in Correia, our outstanding undergraduate administrator,
other departments. We think that the new structure we for getting PHL1 off the ground and running.
have introduced, which will take effect next year, is a big Though we are proud of our programs, we are even
improvement from the point of view of this overall aim. prouder of the achievements of our students. One way
In other curriculum reform news, we have introduced we recognize some of these achievements is through
new 400-level seminars in Philosophy of Law and History our annual award of prizes. We usually acknowledge
of Analytic Philosophy, and a new 300-level class in the prizewinners during our annual UNESCO World
Indian Philosophy. These add to an already very diverse Philosophy Day event in November. But let me use
and broad set of courses offered by our department. this occasion to again congratulate our prizewinners
from the 2016-17 academic year: Carl Abrahamsen,
Readers may wonder how changes of this kind are Manula Adhihetty, Antonia Alksnis, Alaric Mckenzie-
actually formulated and approved. First, someone has Boone, Amitpal Singh, Bella Soblirova, and Usman
to notice a point where a change might be a good Zahid. Well done!
idea: sometimes suggestions for change come from the
chair or director of undergraduate studies; sometimes We also recently hosted our Undergraduate Research
they come from our administrative staff; sometimes Conference on April 6 and 7, 2018, which was a terrific
they come from our students. The proposed change success and featured a keynote address by Samantha
is brought to the department’s curriculum committee, Brennan (Guelph), the president of the Canadian
which comprises academic administrators and elected Philosophical Association.
student and faculty representatives. If the change passes Last but not least, I would like to welcome our new
the department’s curriculum committee, it goes to the lecturers and assistant professors (CLTA), who have
Faculty of Arts & Science’s humanities curriculum com- joined our dedicated teaching staff this academic year:
mittee—where representatives from all the humanities Francesco Gagliardi, Jacob Stump, Jordan Thompson,
departments discuss one another’s proposed changes— and Benjamin Wald. Without these dedicated instructors
for approval. So each change we make has a lot of our course offerings at the undergraduate level would
thought and consultation behind it. look much less exciting than they currently are.
Our programs are very popular, as can be gathered Imogen Dickie
from the high enrolment numbers. The flipside of this Associate Chair, Undergraduate
is that classes in the first years are often very large.
8 Philosophy News
Profile on Epistemology
The tri-campus Department In addition to Professors
of Philosophy is very proud Benj Hellie (UTSC),
of the breadth of specialists Jennifer Nagel (UTM),
we have in all branches Gurpreet Rattan (UTM),
of philosophy. Jonathan Weisberg
(UTM), Franz Huber
Henceforth, each edition
(St. George),
of Philosophy News
Lecturer Kenneth Boyd
will feature brief
(UTSC), and PhD students
reflections from a
Jessica Wright and
diverse range of our
Julia Smith, our complement
scholars on key issues
of epistemologists was
in their particular fields.
expanded by the arrival of
In this issue, we focus on Professor David Barnett
epistemology, the branch of (St. George) last year and
philosophy concerned with Postdoctoral Fellow Stefan Lukits
the theory of knowledge and (St. George) this year.
related concepts such as truth,
In what follows, a few of these
belief, and justification.
scholars share some of their
contemplations on various
problems in epistemology.
Theoretical Rationality and Belief
Julia Smith
The question of theoretical rationality is the question of if evidence about the requirements of rationality were
what beliefs we should have, if we are rational. There is different.
plenty of disagreement among epistemologists about
Can mistakes about what we ought to believe
what the requirements of theoretical rationality are. be rational? Deep exploration of this question
Directly bearing on this disagreement is an interest- will help shed light on the nature of rationality,
ing question about whether it is ever possible to be a key norm in epistemology.
rationally mistaken about what theoretical rationality
requires. On the other hand, if a rational person can sometimes
be wrong about what rationality requires her to believe,
On one hand, if a rational person can never be wrong we get the odd result that there are cases in which
about what rationally requires her to believe, we get agents ought to believe Moore-paradoxical proposi-
the odd result that one’s total evidence regarding the tions of the form “P, but it’s not rationally permissible for
requirements of rationality can never be misleading. me to believe that P.” So, can mistakes about what we
This is unusual because our everyday lives are rife ought to believe be rational? Deep exploration of this
with misleading evidence (for example, false testimony question will help shed light on the nature of rationality,
from a usually reliable source), so it would be strange a key norm in epistemology.
9 Philosophy News
Cheshire Cat Partial Beliefs
Stefan Lukits
In metaphysics, Nietzsche complains that Descartes’s In modern physics, just as in epistemology, depen-
conclusions about the existence of a thinking self are dence on a particular representation in coordinates
based on grammar rather than sound logical inference. can become more of a liability than an asset. Modern
My current project is to pursue a Nietzschean-type physicists often do not want to think of space in terms
criticism in formal epistemology. The culprit is again of coordinates. Relativity theory especially has acceler-
Cartesian, but this time it is the Cartesian coordinate ated the transition from the vectors of the Cartesian
system that implements a grammar misleading us to grammar to the tensors and fibre bundles of differential
unwarranted epistemological conclusions. geometry. The relevant relationships are now no longer
Statisticians think of the set of normal distributions between parametric representations (for example, the
as manifolds—sets that behave locally like Euclidean mean and standard deviation of the normal distribu-
space. Normal distributions, for example, are charac- tion), but between derivations (generalized derivatives,
terized by the mean and the standard deviation, which thus the name differential geometry) and a metric
serve as coordinates that map normal distributions based on an inner product defined on tangent spaces
onto Euclidean space. (such as the Fisher information matrix).
In modern physics, just as in epistemology, For the categorical distribution with a finite event space
dependence on a particular representation in (for example, die rolls and coin tosses) the finite set
coordinates can become more of a liability of probabilities is usually considered to be the set of
than an asset. parameters or coordinates of the belief state—in order
It is a current trend in formal epistemology to evaluate to characterize the probabilities 60% for heads and
competing belief states using a scoring rule or some 40% for tails I would consider the point (0.6, 0.4) in a
metric. Compromise is necessary between informative Cartesian coordinate system. But then highly counter-
and accurate beliefs. Formal epistemologists want to intuitive things happen!
use mathematical models to provide useful descriptions When Foucault talks about sexuality, he uses the
of this compromise. A scoring rule will ideally reveal the Cheshire Cat of Alice in Wonderland as an illustration
conditions of commensurability between informative- of “smiles, happinesses, pleasures, and desires as
ness and accuracy (given a number of assumptions). A qualities without an abiding substance to which they
proper scoring rule ensures that the belief state of all are said to adhere. As free-floating attributes, they
and only true beliefs fares well. suggest the possibility of a gendered experience that
Coordinate systems are useful in creating these math- cannot be grasped through the substantializing and
ematical models. The Brier score or information entropy hierarchizing grammar of nouns and adjectives” (Judith
are interesting examples of these models. Deceptively, Butler in Gender Trouble, page 32).
sometimes we begin to think of credal states as geo- The current ambition in formal epistemology is to high-
metrically embodied in their parameters rather than light parameter invariance as a discriminating feature
represented by them. between mathematical models. Following successes in
My Nietzschean criticism encourages a move away physics and statistics, I am looking for ways in which
from coordinates towards the manifolds of differential the parameters can become an afterthought rather
geometry. When you first learned what the constant than a determining constituent of how we think about
angle sum of a plane triangle was you most likely the relationships between different belief states. Let the
absorbed the news in coordinate-free geometry. Later doxastic landscape be, as Foucault expresses it in a
on, however, geometry became easier by using coor- very different context, “a world of pleasures in which
dinates, usually Cartesian coordinates. grins hang about without the cat.”
10 Philosophy News
The Intellect and Its Limits
Gurpreet Rattan
Thinkers have a capacity to understanding, methodological understanding, inter-
evaluate and improve their subjective understanding, and objectivity. Knowledge
own and others’ thinking, even infused by the intellect aspires to clarity of thought and
at the most fundamental lev- method, deep understanding of conflicting perspec-
els of belief and method. At tives, and objectivity in the evaluation of one’s own and
these most fundamental levels, conflicting perspectives.
the relevant kind of evalua-
tion involves targeting not only This account of the intellect lands the intellect at the
what one thinks, but also the centre of a network of fundamental philosophical
conceptual and methodologi- debates about truth, disagreement, and relativism. My
cal resources used to think account of the intellect is the basis for unified answers
and reason at all. The intellect to some hard questions in these debates, like: what dif-
is the faculty of mind that underlies these capacities. ference does possessing the concept of truth make for
Although significant attention has been paid to the our knowledge? What is the epistemic significance of
cognitive bases of much of our rational belief and deep disagreement? And: how should the doctrine of
knowledge—including perception, memory, metacogni- relativism be formulated and evaluated?
tion, introspection, communication, and inference—the Finally, my project is concerned not only with the nature
intellect has been, in contemporary philosophy at least, of the intellect, but also its principled, necessary, lim-
largely overlooked. its. Ultimately, my account of the intellect is meant to
What difference does possessing the concept of cast illumination on the trenchant difficulties involved
truth make for our knowledge? What is the in justifying our fundamental beliefs and methods, in
epistemic significance of deep disagreement? changing one’s framework for thinking, in persuading
And: how should the doctrine of relativism others with whom one is in deep disagreement, and
be formulated and evaluated? for claiming an objective basis for one’s perspective.
In my current project, I aim to correct this oversight For the last 50 years or so, the doctrine of relativism
and to provide foundations for future work by giving has held out the promise of explaining some of these
an account of the intellect. On the view that I develop, difficulties. The main innovation for thinking about these
the intellect is concerned with establishing a pro- difficulties that I would like to introduce is to suggest a
prietary kind and quality of knowledge—knowledge move away from relativism and towards an apprecia-
that is informed by epistemic values of conceptual tion of the role of the problem of other minds.
Epistemology with Mind-First Logic
Benj Hellie
In my view, epistemology is about rationality in belief, Since the dawn of the analytic philosophical tradition,
which is a psychological matter, and hence one for the dominant assumption, presupposed in almost all
philosophy of mind; but philosophy of mind should start work, has been that logic is about truth, which is determi-
with the “semantics” (theory of meaning) for mental nately fixed by the world, authoritatively, once and for all,
language; and semantics is ultimately based on logic. setting the standard of correctness for what to believe.
But what if logic isn’t about truth? But what if logic isn’t about truth? In particular (as on
Maybe logic is about endorsement, the “partial logic” of the 1980s), maybe logic is about
a relation to mental conditions endorsement, a relation to mental conditions (espe-
(especially belief states). cially belief states). Where there is only one world, there11 Philosophy News
are many belief states: mine now and at various times my simulation (a.k.a. mindreading) for Fred.
in the past and future, yours now and at various times
If the conflict is faultless, philosophy is not forced
in the past and future, and so on. None of these belief
states are fully determinate (we are all uncertain about to choose—and the problem vanishes.
the exact number of stars in the galaxy), disagreement Now, language that is “expressive” is a well-known
is widespread among them (I used to think that goats
source of “faultless disagreement”: if I express my simu-
eat cans, but I changed my mind), and no one’s belief
state sets the standard of correctness for anyone else’s. lation of Fred as believing that goats eat cans and you
express your simulation of Fred as not believing this,
An endorsement-logical foundation has big ramifi-
neither of us has entered into controversy. And once
cations through the rest of philosophy. Truth-based
we are in a position to allow faultless disagreement
semantics treats a mental claim and a chemical claim
alike, as “describing” the world, as encoding a condi- over someone’s mental condition, epistemology starts
tion the world has to meet in order for the claim to to look very different. After all, many long-standing
be true. But endorsement-based semantics can treat problems (Frege puzzles, self-knowledge versus content
these claims very differently: a chemical claim still externalism or attitude externalism, retraction of earlier
conveys information which is potentially controversial, belief, self-location) are framed in terms of forcing phi-
but a mental claim merely “expresses a sentiment”—
losophy to take sides in a conflict between our take on
“I do not believe the galaxy has an odd number of
stars” merely puts my uncertainty on display without someone’s mental condition and their own take. But
conveying any controversial information, while “Fred if the conflict is faultless, philosophy is not forced to
believes that goats eat cans” merely puts on display choose—and the problem vanishes.
Epistemic Evaluation and Responsibility
Jessica Wright
Consider two common ways in which we ethically Are these attitudes the proper subjects of epistemic
assess other people. First, we evaluate others’ actions, evaluation, or do they fall outside this normative realm
calling them good or bad, altruistic or selfish, and altogether?
so on. Second, we hold others responsible for their
It is also unclear how we can justifiably hold others
actions, blaming them when they act badly and prais-
responsible for their beliefs and attitudes (even the non-
ing them when they act as they should.
deviant ones). Many theorists have argued that we can
An interesting problem in epistemology is analogous to be held responsible only for what we do intentionally
this one in ethics. It concerns how we should evaluate and voluntarily. But is this the right model to apply to
others’ beliefs and attitudes, and whether we can hold the epistemic realm? If none of our beliefs are under
others responsible for them. our voluntary control, it may mean that we cannot be
Unlike our actions, the content of our mental states held responsible for any of our mental states; or it
is not always clear, even to the agent herself. may mean that epistemic responsibility needs to be
reconceived.
We can and do evaluate others’ explicit beliefs, calling
them true or false, rational or irrational. But what about My own view is that epistemic evaluation and respon-
our other mental states? Unlike our actions, the content sibility are not best founded on voluntarist assumptions,
of our mental states is not always clear, even to the which are strongly internalist—requiring introspective
agent herself. This is especially urgent, as recent work awareness and control. A hybrid picture, where evalu-
in cognitive science tells us that many of our attitudes ation is external to the agent but responsibility requires
are deviant—introspectively inaccessible, associative, some level of reflective control, is the best solution to
or outside of typical (reflective) avenues of control. these thorny problems.12 Philosophy News
The Puzzle of Intellectual Autonomy
David Barnett
An intellectually autonomous agent is one who thinks this fundamental requirement of rationality. If you have
for herself, and doesn’t just go along with received no independent evidence that consistency with your
opinion. We usually think of autonomy as a rational beliefs is a better guide to the truth, then why aim for
ideal. But autonomous agents face the charge of consistency with your beliefs rather than mine?
chauvinism. If you have no independent evidence
I think a solution to these challenges requires a bet-
supporting that you of all people are the one whose
ter understanding of how beliefs (and other mental
judgment is objectively most reliable, then trusting your
states figuring into rational requirements) contribute
own judgment can seem like objectionable chauvinism.
to the subjective perspective of the agent. Beliefs are
This challenge to autonomy arises most obviously in transparent, in the sense that when you believe that it
social epistemology. Conciliationists about disagree- will rain, from your perspective it appears to be a fact
ment charge you with chauvinism unless you grant about the world that it will rain. But if someone else
equal weight to the beliefs of peers as to your own. believes that it will rain, then from your perspective this
And anti-reductionists about testimony say it is chau- appears merely to be a fact about that person’s state
vinistic not to trust others’ beliefs by default, as you of mind.
allegedly must your own.
This contrast is important, because the puzzle of intellec-
Even the most basic requirements of tual autonomy only arises when we consider an agent’s
rationality would have us grant special authority beliefs from a third-person perspective. Because an
to our own beliefs. But the charge of agent typically does not adopt this perspective on her
chauvinism can be raised against even this own beliefs, exercising intellectual autonomy does not
fundamental requirement of rationality.
involve chauvinistically privileging her own beliefs over
But I think the local problems they identify with their others’. Instead, it requires only privileging the truth over
opponents’ views are just symptoms of a deeper what is merely believed. When you try to see to it that
challenge. Even the most basic requirements of ratio- your belief is consistent with the truth, you will of course
nality would have us grant special authority to our end up making it consistent with what you believe to
own beliefs. For example, rationality requires that you be the truth, rather that with what some other person
see to it that your belief is consistent with your other believes. But from your perspective, this is not a matter
beliefs, rather than with other people’s beliefs. But of privileging your beliefs over another person’s, but
the charge of chauvinism can be raised against even instead simply of privileging the truth.
Epistemology and Beyond
Franz Huber
One way to engage with epistemology is as a normative question really is a means to attaining the end the norm
discipline: to study how one should believe. For instance, is conditional upon. In other words, we justify a norm by
we might propose the norm that one’s beliefs be consis- showing that some means-end relationship obtains.
tent. This raises the question of why one’s beliefs should
For instance, we can justify the norm that one’s beliefs
be consistent. That is, we need to justify this norm.
be consistent by showing that one’s beliefs are true
To do so requires clarifying the nature of normativity. only if they are consistent. That is, we justify the norm of
According to one view, normativity consists in taking the consistency by showing it to be a necessary means to
means to one’s ends: a norm is a hypothetical impera- attaining the end of holding only true beliefs—an end
tive telling one what to do conditional on the assumption one may, or may not, have.
that one has a certain end. We justify such a hypo-
Three features of this way of engaging with epistemol-
thetical imperative by showing that obeying the norm in
ogy are worth being stressed.13 Philosophy News
First the bad news. Showing that a means-end relation- special circumstances, be equal to the chances if one
ship obtains requires carrying out a proof or argument. is certain what they are. Another norm requires one’s
No sweet without sweat. degrees of belief to be probabilities.
Next the sobering news. Engaging with epistemology Once these norms are justified by a means-end argu-
in this way tells one which means to take in order ment, one can explore their consequences. It turns out
to achieve various ends one may, or may not, have. that some of these consequences—such as the thesis
However, it does not tell one which ends to have. To do that chances are probabilities—are entirely metaphysi-
so would be to succumb to dogmatism. cal. These metaphysical consequences are necessary
conditions for the satisfiability of said norms, and thus
Finally, the good news. We can consider norms that go
for the attainability of certain ends.
beyond epistemology and relate one’s beliefs to infor-
mation about non-epistemological things. One such The upshot of this is that, by engaging with epistemol-
norm concerns degrees of belief and chances from ogy in this way, we can go beyond it and also make
metaphysics. It requires that one’s degrees of belief, in progress in metaphysics.
Knowledge and Mindreading
Jennifer Nagel
The word “mindreading” sug- explanations of action, passing over the hard fact that
gests a theatrical trick: the stage we speak more often of knowledge than belief.
magician presses his hand to
You might think that knowledge would be harder to
your forehead and mysteriously
track, because the knower has to meet a higher stan-
detects what you are thinking.
dard. But sometimes high standards make things easier:
But mindreading is also the
standard term in social psychol- tracking knowledge involves recognizing both its pres-
ogy for our natural capacity to ence and absence. If your view of an event is blocked,
attribute mental states to oth- I can tell that you don’t know what is happening, even
ers. When you watch someone when it’s a really open question what you might believe.
reaching for something, you Meanwhile, knowledge is in one key respect simpler
see another person who wants than belief: while agents can believe almost anything,
something—the salt, say—and is trying to get it. On the they can only know what is true. Young children talk
basis of facial expression, speech, and gesture, we about knowledge well before they can talk about belief,
instinctively attribute goals, traits, desires, beliefs, and and non-human primates also spot knowledge and
knowledge. My current project focuses on the difference ignorance in their competitors even when they can’t
between belief and knowledge, and on what we can keep track of any false (or accidentally true) beliefs that
learn about these states from studying the ways they their competitors might have.
are instinctively tracked by our everyday, non-magical My own view is that the complex rules naturally used for
social instincts. instinctive belief attributions are a systematic expansion
There’s something puzzling about our instinctive track- of a simpler set of rules used for knowledge detection.
ing of knowledge and belief. If someone wants the My current project aims to explain the nature of these
salt, it will make no difference whether he knows or rules, drawing on cross-linguistic work on mental state
just believes that it is to his left: he will make the same attribution, developmental and comparative psychol-
motion either way. However, if you dig into big data on ogy, and also on some very old-fashioned theoretical
how we talk about other people, you see that we keep work in epistemology. And, although my central aim
marking the distinction between believing and knowing, is to demystify what is going on in natural social intel-
and use both of these terms heavily in describing what ligence, I have to confess that sometimes I do feel there
people are doing. It’s not obvious why we do this—and is something almost magical about the way we are
indeed, many philosophers who work on social naviga- able to detect invisible states like knowledge, on our
tion just focus on belief attributions and belief-desire way to making sense of each other.14 Philosophy News
Kant and the Law of War
Arthur Ripstein
I am spending my Killam Fellowship working on a are morally impermissible in any other circumstance,
book developing and defending Kant’s views about and they do them on a massive scale. Kant describes
the morality and law of war. Kant wrote in Germany war as “barbaric” and “to be repudiated entirely,” but
in the late 18th century, and is best known for his also argues that morality governs it. Kant’s insight is
works on theoretical philosophy and ethics. My 2009 that the grounds for abolishing war also provide the
book, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political structure of the morality governing it. He offers a novel
Philosophy, showed the continuing relevance of Kant perspective on each of the grounds of going to war,
to fundamental debates in philosophy and public life, the conduct of war, and what happens at the end of
focusing on Kant’s distinctive views about the rela- the war.
tion between the state and its citizens, as well as his
Kant develops his arguments against the backdrop
account of the way in which legal institutions can cre-
of two prominent approaches in medieval and early
ate a system of equal freedom for citizens. That book
modern writing about war. One is the just war tradi-
contained only brief discussions at the end of each of
tion, which received early expression in the writings of
two chapters of Kant’s important views on internation-
Augustine and Aquinas, and was developed further in
al relations. This book will give those parts of Kant’s
the 16th century by Vitoria and Suárez. For this tradi-
view the attention they deserve.
tion, a war is legitimate if done with a good motive
Kant’s views about international relations and war for a just cause. Questions about the conduct of war,
were prominent historically, but have attracted much and what happens after a war, are subordinated to
less attention in contemporary debates. He is some- those of just cause. Versions of the just war approach
times dismissed as a naive moralizer with little to structure most contemporary moral debates about
contribute to reducing the horrors of war; other times war. Recent writers in this tradition have questioned
his views are assimilated to those of Thomas Hobbes, the familiar idea that combatants on both sides of the
or situated in what is taken to be an outdated philoso- war are subject to the same moral restrictions, on the
phy of history. grounds that those fighting on the just side are not at
Nations at war do things that are morally imper- fault, and so are not liable to have force used against
missible in any other circumstance, and they do them.
them on a massive scale. Kant’s insight is that The other is sometimes called the “regular war” tradi-
the grounds for abolishing war also provide the
tion, and is less prominent in contemporary debates.
structure of the morality governing it.
It has its origins in Roman law, and is developed
My book will establish Kant’s continuing relevance (sometimes in the vocabulary of the just war view) in
to thinking about war. Nations at war do things that 17th-century writers including Grotius, Pufendorf, and15 Philosophy News
Vattel. The regular war view conceives war as a pro- is in the right has already been resolved. The regular
cedure for resolving disputes. Sovereigns resort to it war tradition grasps that war is not about the merits,
because no court or procedure has jurisdiction over but regards it as acceptable anyway, because it sup-
them—that is the sense in which they are sovereign. poses that a sovereign state must be able to enforce
For these writers, the central question is whether a what it believes to be its rights.
war is conducted in accordance with the procedure;
The irresolvable tension between force and right leads
questions about just cause are replaced with ques-
Kant to the surprising claim that peace is the central
tions of whether the party starting the war has what
concept in the morality of war. Peace is the precondi-
lawyers call a “cause of action,” that is, whether there
tion of disputes being resolved on their merits, but it
is a genuine dispute about the respective rights of the
can only be achieved if everyone accepts that past
two states. Questions about who is in the right do not
disputes are fully resolved apart from their merits.
enter into the moral analysis of the war, because war
Otherwise peace would have to precede itself and so
is the procedure through which such disputes are sup-
would be impossible.
posed to be resolved.
Kant develops this idea to show how the possibility
Kant is sharply critical of what he calls
of a future peace can govern the conduct of war. In
the “sophistry” of the just war tradition and
the “miserable comforters” of the regular framing the issue in this way, Kant generates important
war tradition. consequences for each of the moral questions about
war. The only ground of war is another nation’s breach
Both of these approaches argue for a broad power of the peace; that is, only defensive wars are accept-
to wage war. The just war tradition views a state able. A future peace also dictates the terms on which
engaged in war as each of prosecutor, judge, and it can be fought. The role of a future peace enables
executioner, competent to address both past and Kant to explain the relevant sense in which belliger-
prospective wrongdoing. Augustine defended punitive ents in a war are symmetrically situated, regardless of
wars; Suárez defended the Spanish conquest of the who started the war or who is in the right. The regular
Americas on the grounds that the indigenous inhabit- war tradition treated this symmetry as the product of
ants were likely to resist attempts by missionaries to an agreement to resolve the dispute through force.
convert them and by settlers to colonize underutilized Recent philosophers writing about war have argued
areas. The regular war tradition is even more permis- that the treatment of aggressor and defender alike
sive. Grotius argued that a sovereign may resort to is a moral mistake, and that fighting a war does not
war if no court is available, or if one party is not sat- confer any novel permissions, least of all permission to
isfied that an available court will deliver the correct kill, on an aggressor.
verdict. Vattel explicitly compares battles to legal pro-
An aggressor that fights in conformity with
ceedings, and justifies Fredrick the Great’s conquest of
the rules of war is not justified in what it does.
Silesia as a way of resolving a disputed claim to an If it violates those rules, it commits a further,
inheritance. distinctive type of wrong.
The irresolvable tension between force and right On this “revisionist” account, the “deep morality” of
leads Kant to the surprising claim that peace is
war looks nothing like the international law govern-
the central concept in the morality of war.
ing it. Some of these revisionists suggest that the law
Kant is sharply critical of what he calls the “sophistry” should be changed; others regard the rules as an
of the just war tradition and the “miserable comfort- acceptable compromise of morality, only because
ers” of the regular war tradition. His complaint is not making the morally correct rule illegal would likely
simply that they justify too many wars. The larger prob- lead to abuse, and so to even more unjustified killing.
lem is that they fail to grasp the fundamental moral Other revisionist writers have questioned the moral
problem with war: it resolves matters through force, significance of the distinction between civilians and
and so determines results independently of the merits. combatants, seeking to replace it with an account that
The just war tradition overlooks this because its focus is sensitive to the culpability of soldiers and civilians,
on just cause presupposes that the question of who rather than to their specifically legal status.
continued on page 1916 Philosophy News
Alumnus Q&A: Charles Mills
Charles Mills The 1970s were the high point of Jamaican, and
(PhD, 1985) is an broader Anglo-Caribbean, political radicalism. The
alumnus of U of 1968 banning of Guyanese historian Walter Rodney
T’s Department led to protests and riots, sparking a national debate
of Philosophy, whose overall consequence was the rebirth of radical
and is currently politics (class, race). Riding on a wave of mass dis-
Distinguished content, the opposition People’s National Party (PNP)
Professor of was elected and announced a program of “demo-
Philosophy at the cratic socialism.” Years of intense political struggle
Graduate Center, followed, locally and globally, as Prime Minister
City University Michael Manley attempted, with other progressive
of New York. Third World leaders, to lobby for a more equitable
Before joining global economic order, incurring the wrath of First
the Graduate World conservative forces.
Credit: Gareth Smit
Center, he taught
So it was in that context that I started looking for a
at the University
subject that could provide a “big picture” overview
of Oklahoma, the
of what was going on. With complete naivety about
University of Illinois
the field, I chose philosophy, not really knowing what
at Chicago, and
I was getting into. It’s like that great exchange in
Northwestern University.
Casablanca between Humphrey Bogart and Claude
Professor Mills specializes in social and political Rains: “I came to Casablanca for the waters.” “The
philosophy, particularly in oppositional political theory waters? What waters? We’re in the desert!” “I was
around issues of class, race, and gender. His first misinformed.”
book The Racial Contract (Cornell University Press,
1997) has become a seminal text in the study of PN: Tell us a little bit about your time in
imperialism, white supremacy, critical race theory, and Toronto (MA, 1973-75, and PhD, 1977-1985).
the critique of liberalism. His sixth book, Black Rights/ Why did you choose Toronto and how did
White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism, was your time here shape your career?
published in 2017 by Oxford University Press. Did anything in particular make a significant
impact on you?
Here, Professor Mills reflects on his time in Toronto,
the present state of the discipline of philosophy, and CM: I had won a Commonwealth Fellowship and
current issues in racial politics. could go to Britain, Canada, Australia, or New
Zealand. I chose Canada, as the closest to home,
Philosophy News: Your undergraduate and the University of Toronto as the best university in
degree was in physics, but you switched to the country, and thus presumably home to the best
philosophy in graduate studies. philosophy department. But I thought it was safer to
What attracted you to philosophy? do an MA first to get a sense of what philosophy was
like before I decided to embark on the doctorate.
Charles Mills: Physics was not a free choice in the
(And here I would like to thank John Slater, who—as
first place, but a consequence of my favourite humani-
he later told me at my 1985 graduation—pushed for
ties teachers leaving my high school, which severely
me to be admitted, despite my almost complete lack
restricted my options at the University of the West
of background in the subject.)
Indies. After graduation I taught natural science for
two years, which only confirmed that I needed to get My crucial formative experiences were really extra-
out of this career track sooner rather than later. academic: the radicalization of the Anglo-Caribbean
in the 1970s, and the challenge to the postcolonial/
Meanwhile, dramatic things were happening.
neocolonial social order. Given Toronto’s large Anglo-17 Philosophy News
Caribbean population, this resurgence of the left settlement, Atlantic slavery, and so forth.
manifested itself in a ferment of activity: the formation
So the interest I would develop in the history of
of support groups, and constant forums, rallies, and
European political philosophy came out of my histori-
talks by visiting Caribbean speakers. So I became
cal formation as a Third World/Global South subject,
part of that scene [of] progressive campus, city, and
not from being at a historically oriented department.
Caribbean solidarity politics.
In fact, I didn’t do a single course in the history of
Academically, I came to regard Marxism as most European political philosophy as such while I was
congenial to my interests. So I worked with Frank there. That all came a decade later, when I switched
Cunningham and Danny Goldstick, the department’s to working on race, and began to systematically edu-
Marxists, on an “analytical Marxist” dissertation cate myself about the role of race in the history of
on the concept of ideology. Frank and Danny were Western political philosophy.
both key figures for my philosophical education, and
though I no longer focus on Marxism in my writing,
PN: You’ve explored themes around the
key left themes have continued to inform my work: “epistemology of ignorance,” and white igno-
materialism; skepticism about “ideal theory”; getting rance in particular, in which dominant groups
the actual history right; highlighting social oppression subscribe to an “inverted” epistemology built
and exploitation, group dynamics and group interests; around self-deception and non-knowings. In
recognizing structural causation and the importance “White Ignorance” (2007), for example, you
of locating the ideational in a sociopolitical matrix. note the relationships between collective
My current project of developing a “black radical memory and the production of ignorance,
liberalism” to tackle racial injustice can be seen as which then obscure racial injustices and the
need for reparations. The last year has seen
the attempt to bring such commitments into a (trans-
increasingly public displays of white suprem-
formed) liberal framework. acy, many of which reproduce violences and
iconography often dismissed as “in the past.”
PN: Toronto is more historical in orientation Are we any better off now than a decade
than many other philosophy departments. ago (let alone a year ago) with regard to
Your most famous work, The Racial Contract, white ignorance, and has its heightened
is very historically informed and yet very display helped or hindered this? What steps
critical of European political philosophy. should we be taking today to resist white
When did your critical interest in the history ignorance and other privileged group-based
of philosophy begin? Do you wonder about ignorances?
what kind of philosopher you would be if you
had completed your education in a depart-
ment with a strictly contemporary focus? CM: I think it’s one of those complicated situations
where we have both progress and regression. On
CM: Because of the unusualness of my career the one hand, as a result of the activism of the Black
path, these factors were less important for me than Lives Matter movement, and the protests around
for someone who came to philosophy out of an Confederate flags and statuary, there is far more dis-
acquaintance with, and love for, the subject. In my cussion of these issues in the public sphere.
case, it was much more a matter of struggling with
White ignorance is simultaneously
a discipline I found very white, very resistant to what
more exposed and under attack,
I wanted it to do. Remember this was largely before and more militant and belligerent.
critical philosophy of race, before the global justice
literature had really gotten off the ground, before phi- On the other hand, the very airing of these subjects
losophy began to confront the colonial past (actually has exacerbated backlash from white Americans
we’re still basically in that “before”). Rawlsian “ideal worried about losing their historically differentially
theory” was the way to do justice, starting with societ- privileged status, emboldened by a president whose
ies conceived of as “cooperative ventures for mutual white nationalist sympathies are not hidden. So white
advantage” and completely lifted out of the real-world ignorance is simultaneously more exposed and under
history of colonialism, imperialism, expropriative white attack, and more militant and belligerent.You can also read
