SAUDI ARABIA'S HOLD ON PAKISTAN - MADIHA AFZAL - Brookings Institution
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POLICY BRIEF
SAUDI ARABIA’S HOLD ON PAKISTAN
MADIHA AFZAL
MAY 2019
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have had a close relationship through the decades, during both Pakistan’s
military and civilian regimes. Saudi Arabia has offered generous economic assistance to Pakistan,
and the two countries have cooperated on defense matters.
• Since the 1970s, Saudi Arabia has exercised enormous influence on Pakistan behind the scenes
through its funding of Ahl-e-Hadith and Deobandi madrassas (religious seminaries), which teach a
more puritanical version of Islam than had traditionally been practiced in Pakistan. While the funding
is not directly traceable, scholars and analysts report that much of this funding to madrassas comes
from private sources in Saudi Arabia. Central to this is the flow of Saudi money to madrassas that
trained the Afghan mujahedeen in the 1980s, but the funding both predated and outlasted the
Afghan jihad.
• The Saudi funding of Pakistan’s madrassas derives from Saudi Arabia’s anti-Iran ambitions and its
bid to control the version of Islam, and specifically Sunni Islam, taught and practiced in Pakistan.
• Two historic events in 1979—the Islamic revolution in Iran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—
increased Saudi influence in Pakistan thereafter. The Iranian revolution bolstered Saudi incentives
to control Sunnism in Pakistan, and the Soviet-Afghan war gave the Saudis a mechanism to do so,
through the funding of madrassas.
• While the Saudi-Pakistan relationship is certainly durable, it has not been unconditional. In a
surprising move, in April 2015, soon after receiving a $1.5 billion Saudi loan, Pakistan’s parliament
voted overwhelmingly to stay neutral in the Saudi intervention in Yemen against the Houthis. Iran
was central to Saudi Arabia’s Yemen intervention, as Riyadh sees the Houthis as being supported
by Tehran. Pakistan’s response to the intervention, then, is a clear reflection of how it delicately
balances its relationship with Saudi Arabia and with Iran, while affirming its friendship with and
support for Riyadh.
• In recent months, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and Pakistan’s Prime Minister
Imran Khan have formed an opportunistic friendship, forced in some ways by Pakistan’s most recent
debt crisis and Khan’s desire to stay away from Western aid, as well as by MBS’ troubles with the West
after the killing of Jamal Khashoggi. The relationship grew closer with the crown prince’s February
2019 visit to Pakistan, during which he signed $20 billion in memorandums of understanding, and
was given a no-expenses spared, red-carpet welcome by both Imran Khan and the chief of army staff.
1• The bottom line: Saudi Arabia has succeeded in changing the character of Pakistan’s religiosity
in a bid to expand its influence in the Muslim world, and in its mission to counter Iran. Yet Saudi
influence has its limits—Pakistan is skillful at balancing its relationships between Iran and Saudi
Arabia, and while its relationship with the latter is on balance the stronger one, it still manages to
“wriggle free” of having to overtly pick sides in the Iran-Saudi dispute.
Pakistan’s largest mosque is the Shah Faisal Masjid, Staff Raheel Sharif the first commander-in-chief of
built with a $120 million grant from the Kingdom of the multicountry Islamic Military Counterterrorism
Saudi Arabia. For a few years after its completion Coalition he had created in 2015. In recent months,
in 1986, it was the largest mosque in the world. the relationship between Pakistan’s new Prime
It quickly became one of Pakistan’s best-known Minister Imran Khan and MBS has grown close;
structures, surpassing many centuries-old buildings MBS made a splashy first trip to Pakistan as crown
of historic significance—appropriately symbolic, prince in February 2019, signing memorandums
perhaps, of rising Saudi influence in the country. of understanding (MOUs) worth $20 billion to help
Pakistan’s struggling economy, and leaving Khan
Since the 1970s, the relationship between Pakistan with a feather in his cap.
and Saudi Arabia has been marked by large official
flows of money from the Kingdom to Pakistan,
MADRASSAS
including aid and relief—well in the billions of dollars,
though there is no clear tally of the total. In the wake As visible as Saudi influence on Pakistan has
of the economic sanctions imposed by the United been, it has been just as important behind the
States on Pakistan after its 1998 nuclear test, for scenes. The flow of money to madrassas (religious
example, Saudi Arabia provided the country with seminaries) that trained the mujahedeen in the
free oil for three years. Another significant marker 1980s both predated and has outlasted the Afghan
of the relationship was the joint Saudi-American jihad. The money cannot be traced easily to Saudi
funding of the Afghan-Soviet jihad of the 1980s, Arabia—Pakistan’s madrassas receive private
money with which Pakistan armed and trained the donations, and they flatly deny Saudi funding
mujahedeen that fought the war. sources, but scholars and analysts report that it
is private money from Saudi Arabia that is funding
The close relationship between the two countries Pakistan’s Ahl-e-Hadith and Deobandi madrassas.
has persisted through Pakistan’s democratic and Both the Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith traditions of
military leaders, from Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Islam are more puritanical than the traditional Sufi
Bhutto’s co-chairing of the Islamic conference in Islam practiced in South Asia; the more extreme of
Lahore in 1974 (with Saudi King Faisal’s blessing), to the two, the Ahl-e-Hadith tradition, is essentially the
the Afghan jihad during President Muhammad Zia- same as the Salafi or Wahhabi Islam practiced in
ul-Haq’s military regime, to the relief given to Prime Saudi Arabia.
Minister Nawaz Sharif’s government in 1998 in the
wake of U.S. sanctions. The Kingdom has given Vali Nasr has drawn a clear link between Pakistan’s
refuge to exiled Pakistani political leaders, including madrassas, the rise in sectarianism and Sunni
Sharif, who fled there when he was overthrown by militancy in the country, and Saudi funding.1 He
the military in 1999. states, for example, that the reported rise in the
number of madrassas between 1975 and 1979
In 2017, then-Saudi Defense Minister and current in Pakistan was supported by money from the
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, also known Persian Gulf monarchies, thus predating the
as MBS, named Pakistan’s former Chief of Army Afghan jihad.2 He also notes that 1700 out of
2nearly 2500 registered madrassas in Pakistan in The number of madrassas in Pakistan continued to
1996 were receiving support from non-Pakistani increase beyond the mid-2000s. According to a U.S.
sources.3 Nasr argues that Saudi funding of Consulate cable to the State Department in 2008
Pakistan’s madrassas was part of its “anti-Iranian on extremist recruitment in South Punjab, money
regional policy,” its agenda to promote “its version directed toward the Kashmir earthquake after 2005
of Sunnism through Islamic education,” and to through charities such as the Jamaat-ud-Dawa
control the “intellectual and cultural life” of the (Lashkar-e-Taiba’s charity organization) and the al-
Muslim world. He argues that Saudi Arabia was Khidmat Foundation, including from Saudi Arabia,
not alone in these ambitions—that Iraq also had a “was siphoned off to Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith
similar motivation—saying that both countries had clerics in southern and western Punjab to expand
“a vested interest in preserving the Sunni character these sects’ presence in a traditionally hostile, but
of Pakistan’s Islamization.”4 Even the placement of potentially fruitful, [extremist] recruiting ground.
Pakistan’s madrassas was part of Saudi anti-Iran The initial success of establishing madrassas and
policy, he notes, quoting an observer: “if you look at mosques in these areas led to subsequent annual
where the most madrassahs [sic] were constructed ‘donations’ to these same clerics, originating in
you will realize that they form a wall blocking Iran Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.”9 The
off from Pakistan.”5 Conversely, Pakistan’s Shiite cable links the “exponential” growth in madrassas
madrassas are reported to receive funding from in this area during this time to increased recruitment
Iran. of militants.
According to one estimate, the number of The cable goes on to discuss the quantity of the
madrassas in Pakistan tripled between the mid- funding and to identify their sources more precisely:
1970s and mid-1990s.6 The exact numbers of “[Pakistani] government and non-governmental
these seminaries are in dispute, because many sources claimed that financial support estimated
madrassas in Pakistan continue to be unregistered, at nearly 100 million USD annually was making
but they number in the thousands. Pakistan’s its way to Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith clerics in the
madrassas came under worldwide scrutiny after region from ‘missionary’ and ‘Islamic charitable’
September 11, and although initial reports pegged organizations in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
them in the tens of thousands, a set of academics Emirates ostensibly with the direct support of those
have used survey data to show that madrassas are governments.”10
far less prevalent in Pakistan than sources have
claimed, and that they only account for a very small All this has changed the kind of Islam practiced
percentage of student enrollment (less than 5 and taught in Pakistan, which had traditionally had
percent in most areas of the country).7 Regardless, more of a Sufi bent. While the roots of the Deobandi
many madrassas are ideological, teach a biased tradition go back to madrassas founded as part of the
view of the world, and their students display a Islamic revival in 19th-century India, the Deobandis
low tolerance for minorities and a preference for fundamentally oppose Sufi or “folk” Islam and its
jihad. And the significance of madrassas extends central concept of intercession by saints (the Barelvi
beyond their numbers: Madrassa graduates go tradition subscribes to this notion). The Ahl-e-Hadith
on to become preachers in mosques and teach tradition is even more puritanical and is also linked
the compulsory Islamic studies course in public to extremist groups: two militant groups in Pakistan,
schools.8 A small number of hardline madrassas the Kashmir-focused Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the
in Pakistan have been directly connected with anti-Shiite Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, subscribe to the Ahl-
militancy and terrorism, including the Dar-ul-uloom e-Hadith interpretation. Markaz-al-Dawah-al-Irshad,
Haqqania in Akora Khattak, run by the (late) Islamist the LeT’s madrassa in Muridke, is an Ahl-e-Hadith
leader Sami-ul-Haq. seminary.
3By some estimates, 80 percent of the madrassas in the Shah of Iran to refuse to attend). Bhutto wanted
Pakistan are now Deobandi.11 Pakistan’s two main to appease the Saudis, not least to beef up his
Islamist parties, the Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islam and the own Islamic credentials at home—he was under
Jamaat-e-Islami, follow the Deobandi tradition, constant political pressure from the country’s
which came out of the madrassa at Deoband in Islamists during his tenure, owing at least partly
Uttar Pradesh, founded in 1866 in colonial India. to his personal lack of religiosity. “Mr. Bhutto is so
The Taliban, too, follows an extreme version of the anxious to please the Arabs that he’s even started
Deobandi faith. Vali Nasr argues that Saudi Arabia talking about the ‘Gulf’ without a hint of the all-
is responsible, both intellectually and financially, important adjective ‘Persian,’” the Shah is reported
for the Deobandi resurgence across the Muslim to have said about him.14 King Faisal is also said to
world.12 have influenced Bhutto’s decision later that year to
name Ahmadis, a persecuted religious minority, as
And while Saudi Arabia has had a close relationship non-Muslim.
with Pakistan’s Deobandi Islamist parties, this
alliance has also had its limits. Pakistan’s political Two historic events in 1979—the Islamic revolution
Islamists try to not be overtly sectarian, and, in Iran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—
according to Nasr, that pushback has led Saudi increased Saudi influence in Pakistan thereafter.
Arabia to look elsewhere to fulfill its sectarian The revolution in Iran increased the Saudi
ambitions in Pakistan—specifically, to the Ahl-e- imperative to cultivate Pakistan’s Sunnism, and the
Hadith Ulema, thereby empowering them.13 Afghan jihad and the training of mujahedeen that
Pakistan embarked on gave the Saudis a vehicle
In general, the “Saudi-ization” of Pakistan and the to do so, via the funding of Deobandi and Ahl-e-
changing nature of the country’s religiosity are Hadith madrassas in Pakistan. These madrassas
driven from the ground up—through the influence served up both the manpower and ideology that
of madrassas and the Ulema—rather than from fueled the Afghan jihad. Sources suggest that the
the top down, despite Zia’s overt alliance with the number of madrassas grew exponentially during
Saudis in the 1980s and his Islamization of the this time. According to Mariam Abou-Zahab,
country’s laws and curricula at the same time. “mosques and deeni [religious] madrassas with
This means that the Pakistani state—though the sectarian affiliations were built everywhere [during
establishment is predominantly Sunni—never took this decade], often on state lands.”15
on an explicitly sectarian character or followed
a specific Islamic tradition, for that matter. This, This perfectly complemented Zia’s parallel
of course, makes sense given the non-theocratic Islamization project in Pakistan, in which the
nature of its government, but it is a nuance that is Jamaat-e-Islami was his accomplice as he set
useful to state explicitly. out to Islamize public school curricula. Zia also
amended Pakistan’s penal code in that decade,
THROUGH THE DECADES, A CLOSE instituting death as a punishment for blasphemy,
RELATIONSHIP WITH POLITICIANS AND THE and introduced draconian (and markedly Saudi-like)
punishments such as stoning to death for adultery
MILITARY
and cutting off hands for theft—although the most
Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto held the second extreme of these have not been carried out.
Islamic summit—a meeting of the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation (OIC)—in Lahore in February Through the decades, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia
1974. King Faisal, the chairman of the OIC, was have cooperated on defense; the military-to-military
present; Bhutto was named co-chairman. The relationship was strong before, and continued to be
February dates were picked by Faisal (prompting after Zia as well. In addition, there is speculation of
a nuclear partnership between the two countries,
4though both deny it.16 And Pakistan has had a MBS AND IMRAN
strong economic relationship with Saudi Arabia
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and
that has continued through its military and civilian
Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan have formed
regimes. The countries trade with each other at
an opportunistic friendship in recent months, forced
high volumes, with Pakistan enjoying a surplus over
in some ways by Pakistan’s most recent debt crisis
Saudi Arabia. Over the years, more than 2 million
and Khan’s desire to stay away from International
Pakistanis have travelled to Saudi Arabia to work;17
Monetary Fund loans, as well as by MBS’ troubles
their remittances help Pakistan’s economy, and the
with the West after the killing of Saudi journalist
siphoning of zakat (charitable giving) from those
Jamal Khashoggi. As the writer Mohammed Hanif
remittances and earnings toward madrassas also
put it, “the prince is playing with Pakistan and
significantly benefits Saudi Arabia.
India because he is being temporarily snubbed by
Saudi Arabia has also helped bail out Pakistan’s the boys and girls of the West, the ones he really
economy at multiple points. It helped in 1998 after wanted to play with.”21
Pakistan’s nuclear tests and resulting economic
Khan attended the Saudi investment conference in
sanctions, as mentioned above. In 2014, Saudi
October 2018, which many countries pulled out of
Arabia gave Pakistan a $1.5 billion loan to shore
after the Khashoggi murder. He came away with $6
up its economy.18 Both times, Nawaz Sharif
billion in debt relief—$3 billion in direct loans and
was in power. Saudi Prince Alwaleed bin Talal
$3 billion in deferred oil payments. The relationship
has described Sharif as “Saudi Arabia’s man in
grew closer with the crown prince’s February 2019
Pakistan.”
visit to Pakistan, during which Pakistan gave the
But the relationship, while certainly durable, has not prince a royal welcome, with a formation of jets
been unconditional. In a surprising move, in April welcoming his plane into Pakistani airspace, both
2015 (during a Sharif government, and soon after the prime minister and chief of army staff present
receiving the $1.5 billion loan in 2014), Pakistan’s to receive the prince with a red carpet, and with
parliament voted overwhelmingly to stay neutral in Khan breaking protocol and personally driving
the Saudi intervention in Yemen against the Houthis. MBS to the prime minister’s residence, where he
This seemed to take Saudi Arabia by surprise, stayed. No expense was spared for the visit, which
since it had listed Pakistan among the countries lasted barely over a day—the prince brought eight
joining its coalition, fully assuming Pakistan would luxury cars, gym equipment, and furniture with him.
come to its help in Yemen. While Pakistan said it Large banners welcomed the prince even in cities
would not send troops or supplies to Yemen, it did he did not visit—“we welcome His Royal Highness
reiterate that it stood “shoulder to shoulder” with to his second home,” said a banner in Lahore.
Saudi Arabia.19 Iran was central to Saudi Arabia’s In Rawalpindi and Islamabad, the government
Yemen intervention, as it sees the Houthis as declared a public holiday and heightened security,
being supported by Tehran. Pakistan’s response to establishing as many as a thousand police
the intervention, then, is a clear reflection of how checkpoints and deploying elite force commandos.
it delicately balances its relationship with Saudi
MBS, who had brought along 40 top Saudi
Arabia and with Iran, while affirming its friendship
businessmen for the visit, signed $20 billion in
with and support for Riyadh. Not unsurprisingly, the
MOUs, including in energy, oil refining, and mineral
pro-Saudi Islamist parties, including the Jamiat-
development. The exact conditions for these deals
Ulema-e-Islam, and fundamentalist groups such
are unknown—but Saudi money is not going to
as the Jamaat-ud-Dawa led large street protests in
be free. Pakistan’s president awarded MBS the
Pakistani cities against parliament’s decision.20
Nishan-e-Pakistan, the country’s highest civilian
5award. MBS rode a horse-drawn carriage to the there is no guarantee that this level of friendship
event at the presidential residence. Khan engaged will sustain, dependent as it is on the confluence of
in extraordinarily flowery expressions of praise for these multiple variables. During the prince’s visit,
the prince, even saying that the prince would win Khan earned points domestically by asking for the
more votes in an election in Pakistan than Khan release of Pakistani prisoners in Saudi Arabia. The
himself: “You are extremely popular,” Khan said, “if prince agreed, yet the next month, Saudi Arabia
it hadn’t been for security reasons, you would have continued its practice of draconian punishments
seen thousands and thousands of people on the on foreigners, executing two Pakistanis for drug
streets welcoming you.” trafficking.
Iran was not far from the Saudis’ minds on the
CONCLUSION
trip; at a live press conference, the Saudi foreign
minister launched into a tirade and called Tehran It is clear that Saudi Arabia’s money buys it influence
the chief supporter of terrorism in the world. in Pakistan—especially religious, but also cultural.
Pakistani television channels hushed to mute his The Arabization of culture has even become
remarks. visible on some car license plates in Pakistan’s
major cities, with Pakistan written in Arabic as “al-
It was partly President Trump’s tweetstorms Bakistan.” As Mohammad Hanif put it, it is a “happy
against U.S. aid to Pakistan that pushed Khan into marriage between God and budget deficits.”22 Saudi
the Saudis’ arms; so have Khan’s own populist Arabia has succeeded in changing the character of
promises of reduced dependence on the West. But Pakistan’s religiosity in a bid to expand its influence
the Khashoggi episode has played a significant role in the Muslim world, and in its mission to counter
as well, and Khan’s willingness to overlook that has Iran. Yet Saudi influence has its limits—Pakistan is
won him MBS’s friendship and financial backing. skillful at balancing its relationships between Iran
In fact, such is Khan’s desire to appease MBS and Saudi Arabia, and while its relationship with
that Pakistan’s federal investigation agency has the latter is on balance the stronger one, it still
begun investigating those journalists and activists manages to “wriggle free” of having to overtly pick
who changed their social media display photos to sides in the Iran-Saudi dispute.23
Khashoggi’s face to protest the prince’s visit. Still,
6REFERENCES
1 S. V. R. Nasr, “The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the
Ulama in Society and Politics,” Modern Asian Studies 34, no. 1 (2000): 139-80, http://www.jstor.org/
stable/313114.
2 Ibid., 142.
3 Ibid., 144.
4 Ibid., 157.
5 Ibid.
6 Haroon K. Ullah cited in Madiha Afzal, Pakistan Under Siege: Extremism, Society, and the State
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2018), 129.
7 For a more detailed overview of these studies, see Ibid., chapter 5.
8 See Ibid. for a detailed discussion.
9 “2008: Extremist recruitment on the rise in south Punjab madrassas,” Dawn, May 21, 2011, https://
www.dawn.com/news/630656.
10 Ibid.
11 Farhan Bokhari, “Pakistanis debate ‘Saudi-isation’ amid terror concerns,” Financial Times, December
29, 2015, https://www.ft.com/content/a65d2616-a78b-11e5-955c-1e1d6de94879.
12 S. V. R. Nasr, “The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan.”
13 Ibid., 159.
14 Alex Vatanka, “Pakistan’s game,” Foreign Affairs, January 17, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/pakistan/2016-01-17/pakistans-game.
15 Madiha Afzal, Pakistan Under Siege, 129.
16 Bruce Riedel, “Enduring Allies: Pakistan’s Alliance with Saudi Arabia runs deeper,” Force, December
2011, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/1209_saudi_arabia_pakistan_riedel.
pdf.
17 Ankit Panda, “Pakistan’s Approach to Navigating the Saudi-Iranian Split,” (Washington, DC: U.S.
Institute of Peace, February 2019), https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/02/pakistans-approach-
navigating-saudi-iranian-split.
18 Mehreen Zahra-Malik, “Saudi Arabia loans Pakistan $1.5 billion to shore up economy,” Reuters,
March 13, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-saudi/saudi-arabia-loans-pakistan-1-5-
billion-to-shore-up-economy-idUSBREA2C13G20140313.
19 Ankit Panda, “Pakistan’s Approach to Navigating the Saudi-Iranian Split,” 13.
720 “Pakistan won’t join Saudis in bombing Yemen’s rebels,” CBS News, April 10, 2015, https://www.
cbsnews.com/news/pakistan-parliament-no-to-saudi-arabia-bombing-yemen-shiite-houthi-rebels/.
21 Mohammad Hanif, “A happy marriage between God and budget deficits,” New York Times, February
19, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/19/opinion/pakistan-saudi-arabia-prince-bin-salman.html.
22 Ibid.
23 Alex Vatanka, “Pakistan’s game.”
8ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Madiha Afzal is a visiting fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution,
and was previously assistant professor of public policy at the University of Maryland,
College Park. She is the author of the book Pakistan Under Siege: Extremism, Society,
and the State (Brookings Institution Press, 2018). Afzal has published in Public Choice,
and is the author of a USIP special report on education and attitudes in Pakistan,
as well as several book chapters, journal articles, and policy reports. Afzal writes for
Pakistani and international publications including Dawn, Foreign Affairs, The Cairo
Review, Foreign Policy, and The Washington Post. In addition, she consults for various
organizations, including the World Bank, the United States Agency for International
Development, and the U.K. Department for International Development. She has also
taught at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.
The Brookings Institution is a nonprofit organization devoted to independent research and
policy solutions. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based
on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and
the public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely
those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or
its other scholars.
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