Status and dynamics of the political situation in Burundi
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ISSUE 1 | July 2014 Central Africa Report Status and dynamics of the political situation in Burundi Yolande Bouka Summary Once hailed as a peacebuilding success story, Burundi has recently experienced escalating political tensions that threaten the stability of country ahead of its 2015 general elections. Frictions between political actors stem partly from the closing of the political space by the government, which prevents the opposition and civil society from operating freely in the country. Moreover, attempts by the ruling party to allow President Pierre Nkurunziza to run for a third mandate, in violation of the current constitution, have raised concerns about the democratic future of the country. Additionally, UN reports alleging that the CNDD-FDD has taken steps to arm and train its youth wing, the Imbonerakure, and recent violent incidents attributed the youth chapter, have heightened fears of a relapse of political violence. In 2010 Burundi held its first general election by universal suffrage in 17 years. While the polls were intended to mark the end of the immediate post-transition period and the consolidation of democratic governance after decades of war and crisis, the contested results increased tensions and entrenched the ruling National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) party. The country experienced two years of instability and violence that was generally blamed on the activities of the CNDD-FDD youth wing (the Imbonerakure), the intelligence services and the police. Most opposition leaders fled the country, leaving a political vacuum. While violence had subsided by the end of 2012, paving the way for the return of the exiled leaders in 2013 under negotiated security guarantees brokered by the UN, uncertainty remains about the stability of the country as it gears up for elections in 2015. Indeed, recent political and legislative developments, such as the passing of a new and restrictive media law, a controversial new framework for the national land commission (CNTB), a disputed review of the constitution by the ruling party, and a rift between the CNDD-FDD and its coalition partner, the Union for National Progress (UPRONA), have created a tense political environment.
CENTRAL AFRICA REPORT
A year ahead of the next general The war was triggered in 1993 by the
elections, a number of questions arise. assassination of Melchior Ndadaye, the
What are the potential effects of the first democratically elected and the first
contested legislative changes on the Hutu president of the country. Ndadaye,
political dynamics of Burundi? What are a member of the moderate Front for
the concerns of the opposition and civil Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU), was
society with regards to the ruling party’s killed by Tutsi military officers opposed to
actions? How can the recent behaviour a political shift after decades of Tutsi rule
of the CNDD-FDD be explained? What by UPRONA.
are the short and long-term security risks Initially a cross-communal party,
of such sustained political tensions? Is UPRONA became dominated by the
there a possibility of a return to ethno- Tutsi elite shortly after the country’s
political violence? independence. Its tenure was marked
The Arusha Peace Agreement put an end to
a 12-year civil war that claimed the lives of some
300 000 Burundians
This report, which is based on field by multiple episodes of ethnically
research and interviews conducted in engineered violence against Hutus by the
the Burundian capital, Bujumbura, in Tutsi-controlled military in 1965, 1972
February 2014, has the aim of analysing and 1988. Ndadaye’s murder triggered
the status and dynamics of the political violent ethnic reprisals, which eventually
situation in Burundi. It is divided into developed into a full-blown civil war.
five sections. The first part analyses the FRODEBU splintered following Ndadaye’s
background to Burundi’s current political assassination, with the more radical
framework. The second explores the membership splitting from the party and
morphing into the CNDD and its armed
nature of and the contributing factors to
wing, the FDD.1
the current political crisis. The report then
assesses the quality and breadth of the The Arusha peace agreement was the
political space as the country approaches result of intense negotiations between
the 2015 elections. The fourth section 20 Burundian groups and political
examines the potential implications of the parties. The main parties to the talks
21 October security and stability situation in Burundi.
Finally, the way forward in preparation of
were UPRONA, FRODEBU, the CNDD
and the Party for the Liberation of the
1993
successful and transparent elections next Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU). While the
year is addressed. political wing of the CNDD headed by
Leonard Nyangoma signed the Arusha
Arusha, consocialism and agreement, the FDD refused to do so,
power-sharing declaring the CNDD political leadership
The war in Burundi illegitimate. This split the CNDD further
Burundi’s contemporary political
is triggered by the and resulted in the formation of the more
framework is anchored in the Arusha
assassination of radical CNDD-FDD under the leadership
Peace and Reconciliation Agreement
Melchior Ndadaye, the of Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye.
and its various protocols. This agreement
first democratically
elected and first Hutu was signed in the year 2000 and put an Typifying the situation in Burundi as a
president of the country end to a 12-year civil war that claimed political conflict with important ethnic
the lives of some 300 000 Burundians. dimensions,2 the Arusha agreement
2 Status and dynamics of the political situation in Burundihad, among other things, the aim of and reaped the benefit of the demise arrest of the party’s former chairman,
developing a system of democratic of two main political rivals, namely Hussein Radjabu, who was believed to
governance for the country that FRODEBU and the Forces Nationales de be the party’s successor to Nkurunziza at
would ensure the security of ethnic Libération (FNL), both of them Hutu- the next elections. So, almost as early as
4
minorities. The consocialist agreement dominated parties. the ascent to power by Nkurunziza and
was to ensure power sharing at the his inner military circle they demonstrated
The CNDD-FDD’s first term was
political level by dividing executive their willingness to suppress opposition
characterised by a combination of
powers between a president and two within and outside the CNDD-FDD.
notable successes and worrying trends.
vice-presidents from different political
On the one hand, under Nkurunziza’s It was against this backdrop of increased
parties and ethnic backgrounds. In
leadership, the FNL signed a deal political repression that Burundi prepared
addition, it required that a high majority
effectively putting an end to the last for the 2010 general elections. In the
to pass legislation and amend the
remnant of rebel activity. Negotiations months before the polls the ruling party
constitution.2 This provision was not
initially stalled as the FNL refused to used all the resources at its disposal to
only aimed at preventing legislative
recognise the legitimacy of the 2005 engineer favourable electoral conditions
domination by a single ethnic group,
indirect presidential elections. After fierce for the CNDD-FDD and to restrict
but also to promote dialogue and
fighting between government forces and the political space. For example, the
consensus across political divides.
the FNL, the rebel group unexpectedly party made multiple attempts to have
Furthermore, to promote power sharing signed a ceasefire in September 2006. electoral rules ratified that would give
in the security sector, the agreement However, the ceasefire was violated by the CNDD-FDD an advantage. One of
made provision for the various armed both the government and the FNL on these was an attempt to introduce an
groups to be integrated into the existing numerous occasions as negotiations electoral code that would transfer some
army and for the army not to comprise continued tenuously. Finally, in May of the responsibilities of the electoral
more than 50 per cent of a single ethnic 2008, an agreement was signed. In the commission to the president.
There was also evidence of the CNDD-
Even in the early years of his mandate, FDD hindering the opposition’s ability
to compete freely and efficiently in the
President Nkurunziza displayed a tendency electoral process. Rights of assembly,
to silence dissent by force of public demonstration and of political
expression were violated regularly.
Members of the opposition and of civil
group. The rationale of this compromise following year the FNL joined the political
society were intimidated, harassed and
was that ethnic balance would ensure fold when it officially registered as a
arrested by the police and the intelligence
the stability of the armed forces, prevent political party.
services on numerous occasions.6 UN,
ethnic violence and reduce the possibility
However, even in the early years of diplomatic and NGO reports7 have
of a coup d’état.3 As a result of this
his mandate, President Nkurunziza documented the ruling party’s use of
provision, the army received an infusion
displayed a tendency to silence dissent the Imbonerakure to intimidate the
of Hutu soldiers, removing the previous
by force. One prominent example is opposition. Many members of the youth
domination of the Tutsi elite.
the suspension of the accreditation wing are demobilised CNDD-FDD fighters
In addition to preparing the way for a new of the non-government organisation who have allegedly been re-armed by
constitution and detailing the transitional Forum for the Strengthening of Civil the party to disrupt opposition political
political arrangement, the Arusha Society (FORSC). This occurred after meetings.8 FRODEBU and the FNL also
agreement stipulated that the first post- it had threatened to disclose the accused the ruling party of creating
transitional president would be elected names of individuals they suspected dissident groups within their parties and
by the national assembly. It was under of being involved in the assassination of offering financial incentives to leading
this framework that Pierre Nkurunziza of of anti-corruption campaigner Ernest opposition figures so that they would
the CNDD-FDD was elected Burundi’s Manirumva.5 In addition, dissent among join the CNDD-FDD. The aim, they said,
president in 2005. While not a signatory members of the CNDD-FDD also resulted was to weaken parties with strong Hutu
to the Arusha agreement, the party in the dismissal of 22 of its members bases that were a potential challenge the
signed a final peace agreement in 2003 from parliament in 2008 shortly after the CNDD-FDD.9
CENTRAL AFRICA REPORT • July 2014 3CENTRAL AFRICA REPORT
The electoral season started in May UPRONA’s participation in the legislative
2010 with local elections. The CNDD- elections was seen as betrayal by
FDD won 65,5 per cent of the vote, some members of the coalition, but it
while the runner up, the FNL, received resulted from strategic consideration.
14,5 per cent. Even before the official The Constitution stipulates that the
results had been released the opposition vice-presidents must be from a different
accused the ruling party of fraud and ethnicity and from different political
demanded that the results be invalidated. parties. In addition, 40 per cent of
In particular, the FNL accused the the ministerial positions and national
ruling party of falsifying poll results assembly seats have to go to the Tutsi.
and intimidating voters. International UPRONA, being the most prominent and
observers, while admitting that some popular Tutsi party in Burundian politics,
minor irregularities had been observed, thus had an assured position not only in
declared that the results were for the the executive branch, but the legislative
most part valid,10 while the electoral branch as well.
commission (CENI), credited for its
In the aftermath of the elections,
neutrality, denied the opposition request.
violence and instability gripped Burundi
In response to these results the throughout 2011 and most of 2012.
opposition created a coalition of Reports by the UN and human rights
12 parties, which included the organisations document numerous cases
FNL, Sahwanya-FRODEBU (one of of torture, disappearances, extrajudicial
40 per cent of ministerial positions and national
assembly seats have to go to the Tutsi
FRODEBU’s splinter parties), the killings and massacres. These were
CNDD, the Movement for Solidarity and committed mainly by government forces,
Before 2010, Democracy (MSD) and the Union for but also by the FNL, which raised
the CNDD-FDD held Peace and Development (UPD), calling fears that Burundi was on its way to a
59 of 106 it the Alliance for Democratic Change resumption of fully fledged armed hostility
(ADC-Ikibiri). This coalition contested the between the political parties.11
seats in the national results and boycotted the remainder of In addition, members of the media and
assembly the elections, notably the presidential civil society continued to be harassed
election in June, the national assembly and arrested during this period.
and senate elections in July, and local Opposition members were forbidden
administrative elections in September. to meet and many of them were found
Nkurunziza ran unopposed and captured murdered, while leading opposition
the presidency with 92 per cent of the leaders such as Agathon Rwasa (FNL),
vote. UPRONA decided at the last Alexis Sinduhije (MSD) and Pancras
minute to rejoin the electoral process, Cimpaye (FRODEBU) fled the country.12
but the damage had been done. The It is important to note that the post-
party won only 17 of the 106 seats while election violence was mostly political in
After 2010,
the CNDD-FDD increased its seats in nature, pinning Hutu against Hutu in an
the CNDD-FDD won
the national assembly from 59 to 81, intense struggle to win over the Hutu
81 seats thereby ensuring their almost complete
dominance of the assembly and a return
to a de facto single party state.
constituency. UPRONA and the Tutsi
were for the most part left out of the
violence and political struggle.
4 Status and dynamics of the political situation in BurundiIn hindsight, to most observers, to be one of Nkurunziza’s most important 2. A new law governing the land
the election boycott was clearly a rivals, left him with a reduced popularity commission (Commission Nationale
miscalculation by opposition leaders. 13 and less viability as a candidate. des Terres et Autres Biens, CNTB).
Their hope was to undermine the
3. Constitutional amendments
credibility of the elections and the CNDD- Setting up the political crisis
proposed by the CNDD-FDD.
FDD by boycotting the remainder of the The 2015 elections should be the litmus
electoral process. However, Nkurunziza The Arusha agreement provided for the
test of Burundi’s democratic system.
was able to maintain domestic and establishment of a transitional justice
However, the current political climate
international legitimacy. Although programme that would include a Truth
challenges the possibility of peaceful
the international community was of and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)
and legitimate elections. Indeed, the
the opinion that the CNDD-FDD had and a Criminal Tribunal to deal with the
politicisation of state institutions over
engaged in unsavoury practices during the past decade in order to restrict the most serious crimes.15 The TRC was
the electoral process, it also considered political space has stifled the opposition’s to be a non-judicial body mandated
the internal division and lack of discipline ability to mount a credible challenge to to determine the causes and nature
among the opposition parties as having the ruling party. of the Burundian conflict, to identify
crimes committed since the country’s
independence, and to identify individuals
The 2015 elections should be the litmus test who committed acts of genocide, crimes
against humanity and war crimes during
of Burundi’s democratic system the various episodes of violence. The
Tribunal was to be a judicial mechanism
contributed to their demise. Confirmation Moreover, the current tensions between that would address, prosecute and
by the international observers that the the ruling party and the parliamentary punish crimes of genocide, crimes
elections met their basic standards opposition, which consists of UPRONA, against humanity and war crimes.
meant that international support of the FRODEBU-Nyakuri and three Batwa However, only in April 2014 did the
outcome was only logical. Participation delegates, has left the national assembly government unilaterally move to establish
in the elections by UPRONA gave further deadlocked over constitutional changes a TRC, but unaccompanied by a Criminal
legitimacy to the process. that could have a serious effect on the Tribunal, despite strong objections by
upcoming elections and the country’s the opposition, civil society and the
The boycott and the ensuing post-
future political landscape. For the past international community.16 The framework
election crisis had a devastating impact
year, the CNDD-FDD has unilaterally of the transitional justice programme
on the image of the extra-parliamentary
drafted and adopted controversial new has been a point of contention between
opposition and the credibility of some of
legislation to protect the party’s interests, the CNDD-FDD and UPRONA for over
its leaders. It paralysed the opposition’s
thereby turning the national assembly a decade. After national consultations
ability to contest the CNDD-FDD within
into a place where little to no dialogue in 2009 that indicated that Burundians
existing institutions and lost it the
between the CNDD-FDD and the
opportunity to constitute a blocking wanted truth, justice and reparations to
opposition occurs.
minority in parliament. The CNDD-FDD anchor the country’s transitional justice
had gained sufficient seats to pass many Recent relations between UPRONA and programme for crimes committed
laws championed by the executive, some the CNDD-FDD have been so antagonistic between 1962 and 2008, the CNDD-FDD
that the political partnership between decided that priority should be placed
of which imposed greater restrictions
the two parties and the health of the on the establishment of the TRC, rather
on political activity. In addition, the
democratic system is being jeopardised. than trying to seek retributive justice.17
post-election crisis gave the ruling party
As the elections approach, some positions UPRONA argued that this approach
the opportunity to damage opposition
taken by the ruling party on sensitive would simply promote impunity and
networks in the country through politically
issues have resulted in a hardening of advocated for the implementation of the
motivated arrests and killings. The long
relations between the two parties. The transitional justice programme outlined in
absence of opposition leaders from the
mains points of contention are:14 the Arusha agreement.18
domestic political scene also dimmed
their status. For instance, the three-year 1. A government-proposed structure of This divergence in opinion should be
exile of Agathon Rwasa, once believed transitional justice. understood through the prism of the
CENTRAL AFRICA REPORT • July 2014 5CENTRAL AFRICA REPORT
passage of time. While UPRONA was when tit-for-tat violence following
indeed in power during many of the Ndadaye’s assassination resulted in a
country’s episodes of violence, many of second Hutu exodus and a wave of
the main decision-makers and suspects Tutsi displacements. While the 1993
are no longer in positions of power or Hutu refugees and the Tutsi internally
even alive. Similarly, many of the victims displaced persons (IDPs) were less
of the events of 1965 and 1972 are often victims of expropriation, many
dead or are no longer in the country. still struggle today to regain their
The passage of time also makes it properties.
difficult for testimonies and evidence to
The Arusha agreement provided for
be gathered. On the other hand, war
the creation of a land commission
crimes committed by former CNDD-FDD
responsible for ’(i) Examining all cases
combatants who are currently in power
of land owned by old caseload refugees
are more recent and this may contribute
and state owned land; (ii) Examining
to the party’s reservations about
disputed issues and allegations of abuse
implementing a criminal prosecution
in the (re)distribution of land and ruling
mechanism.
on each case in accordance with the
The CNDD-FDD’s sudden adoption, above principles.’ 20 The revision of laws
after years of inertia in this regard, of governing the commission enacted in
a law establishing the TRC was, with December 2013 expanded the CNTB’s
the exception of UPRONA’s François jurisdiction to all land disputes, i.e. not
Kabura, second vice-president of the only to those resulting from conflict-
national assembly, attended by no other induced displacements, but also to cases
member of the parliamentary opposition. that may have been solved by earlier land
By forgoing the establishment of a commissions.
criminal tribunal, the adoption of the
Some opposition and civil society
law effectively shields members of the
representatives have accused the
CNDD-FDD from prosecution for crimes
new law governing the CNTB of
committed during the civil war.
having a pro-Hutu bias.21 Many of
The second point of contention between those consulted, particularly those
the CNDD-FDD and UPRONA is the of Tutsi background, argue that this
government’s 2013 review of the CNTB, revision will enable the commission to
which manages land conflict resulting wrongfully expropriate Tutsi land without
from the war and other episodes of compensation based on a simple
violence.19 There have been two main accusation of land grabbing.
waves of mass displacement in Burundi.
While UPRONA voted against the
In the first, which occurred in the wake
measure, the CNDD-FDD together with
of ethnic violence in 1972, some 300
some members of FRODEBU-Nyakuri
000 Hutu fled the country. The UPRONA
had sufficient votes to pass the law.
government subsequently redistributed
April 2014
The ruling party claims that UPRONA’s
their land, issuing new land titles. While
opposition to the law is rooted in the fact
some of the land was given to Hutu
that under its leadership much of the land
individuals, some of whom were relatives
was acquired illegally or redistributed
When government of the exiled Hutu, a far greater share
poorly. They defend the new tribunal as a
unilaterally moved to was parcelled out to the Tutsi which
tool that will speed up the process since
establish a TRC, but contributed to the ethnicisation of land
unaccompanied by a many cases get held up for years in the
conflict in Burundi.
Criminal Tribunal, despite regular justice appeal process, frustrating
strong objections The second wave of displacement repatriations and heightening tensions
derived from the events of 1993, over land disputes.
6 Status and dynamics of the political situation in BurundiHowever, the most important conflict two vice-presidents with a ’powerful’25 UPRONA, wrote to Nduwimana declaring
between the two parties stems from the prime minister, who could come from the his action illegal. President Nkurunziza
proposed constitutional changes that same party as the president, and a mostly then dismissed Busokoza,26 which was
were drafted by the CNDD-FDD at the ceremonial vice-president. In addition, it quickly followed by the resignation of the
end of last year. The dispute does not is proposed to restrict access to seats in three UPRONA cabinet ministers.
rest in the amendment of the constitution the National Assembly to parliamentarians Article 128 of the Constitution states that,
per se, as there was a general consensus whose parties have won at least five ’In the case of resignation, death or of
that the electoral code needed to be per cent of all votes cast, instead of the any other cause of definitive cessation
amended22. However, two important current two per cent. of the functions of a Vice-President of
matters drew the ire of UPRONA and civil
The proposed changes would the Republic, a new Vice-President of
society, and alarmed the international
consolidate the power of the CNDD- the Republic originating from the same
community. First, the CNDD-FDD
FDD and jeopardise the ethnic power ethnicity and of the same political party
unilaterally drafted an extensive revision
balance that was hard won and is as their predecessor is appointed.’
of the constitution without consulting
essential for Burundi. The opposition’s President Nkurunziza attempted to
other stakeholders. The opposition was
concerns were increased when at coax Bonaventure Niyoyankana, a
taken by surprise in November 2013
the beginning of 2014 the ruling party former president of UPRONA, to replace
when it came to light that the Council of
ignored the consensus struck at a Nditije and to submit a list of UPRONA
Ministers was reviewing the revised bill.23
two-day consultative workshop on the nominees to replace Busokoza and the
Secondly, the extent of revisions is revision of the constitution in December three ministers.
seen by some as an abrogation of the 2013. It was convened by the president However, Niyoyankana, under pressure
current constitution and a dismissal of of the national assembly and participants from former UPRONA president Nditije
the Arusha accords. Among the most included members of government, the and core of the party, refused to play into
controversial proposals is the removal of opposition, civil society and religious President Nkurunziza’s hand, forcing him
article 302, which stipulates that the first groups. Among other things, it was to turn to Concilie Nibigira, Niyoyankana’s
post-transition president is to be elected agreed to leave any revision of the former vice-president, to give him a list
by the national assembly. This would only
number of presidential mandates until of potential UPRONA candidates. Her
leave article 96, which stipulates that a
after the 2015 elections. acquiescence gained her the leadership
president is to be elected by universal
Despite this, the CNDD-FDD submitted of the government-approved wing of
suffrage, renewable once. Adoption of
its bill,to a vote. However, UPRONA UPRONA. By mid-February, all vacant
this revision could open the door for
and FRODEBU managed to block its positions had been filled by pro-
Nkurunziza, who was once elected by
ratification despite the ruling party’s government UPRONA members, who
the national assembly and once by a
efforts to influence and intimidate were almost immediately disowned by
popular vote, to run for a third term.
reticent members of the assembly. The their own party.
Critics argue that the Arusha agreement
explicitly states that ’no one may serve constitutional revision fell one vote short It should be noted that even before the
more than two presidential terms’. 24 of passing. current crisis, UPRONA was split between
The mounting tension between the a wing that was conciliatory to the CNDD-
Moreover, the opposition and civil society
FDD and another that had greater support
accuse the CNDD-FDD of attempting CNDD-FDD and UPRONA finally came to
from the core of the party and refused
to weaken the power-sharing and a head this February when the CNDD-
to work with government. Until recently,
consocialist nature of the constitution. FDD Minister of the Interior, Edouard
pro-government UPRONA members such
The bill proposes the reduction of current Nduwimana, summarily dismissed
as Nditijie and Busokoza had enjoyed
voting quorums from a two-thirds majority Charles Nditije from UPRONA’s
relatively peaceful and mutually beneficial
to a simple majority. Adoption would presidency. His dismissal was linked to
relationships with the CNDD-FDD.
allow the CNDD-FDD, should it win over his increasingly critical public statements
50 per cent of the seats in the national against the CNDD-FDD, particularly The recent events beg the question as
assembly, to legislate without interference since the passing of the new CNTB law to why the CNDD-FDD is moving so
from other parliamentary parties. The bill in 2013. The dismissal so enraged the boldly to make the legislative changes
also proposes to change the structure UPRONA leadership that the country’s now instead of taking the opportunity to
of the executive branch by replacing the first vice-president, Bernard Busokoza of do so immediately after its 2010 victory.
CENTRAL AFRICA REPORT • July 2014 7CENTRAL AFRICA REPORT
Some observers suggest that the CNDD- the internal management of opposition
FDD’s forcefulness is aimed at ensuring parties. Similar to before the 2010
Nkurunziza’s third term in the belief that elections, the opposition once again
he is the most popular candidate of the accuses the ruling party of creating
CNDD-FDD. Every week he visits rural dissident groups within their parties.
areas to build schools, play football The CNDD-FDD benefits from leadership
and attend religious services with the crises within the opposition and it
population.27 routinely promotes dissension within
In 2010, the CNDD-FDD and Nkurunziza parties by providing incentives to some of
were riding the wave of a fresh victory their leaders in an attempt to encourage
and the reality of the president’s term them to split from their parties, as
limit was not one of the party’s most illustrated above.
The ruling party has taken specific steps to limit the
political space available to the opposition
pressing concerns. But now, as the party Interference by government should,
has failed to live up to expectations, however, not be interpreted as the sole
is accused of widespread corruption source of division in opposition parties.
and has lost some support because The Burundian opposition is diverse,
of dismal socio-economic conditions, fragmented and obtains its majority
it may be trying to buttress its position support from the urban elite. These
by maintaining at its head a likable are all factors that contribute to the
candidate. difficulties it has in mounting a successful
challenge to the current government.
Observers also interpret some of the
With regard to the fragmentation of
constitutional amendments proposed
the opposition, it should be noted that
by the CNDD-FDD as being a quiet
it is divided between a parliamentary
admission that, given the determination
of the opposition to participate in the opposition and an extra-parliamentary
upcoming elections and its own loss opposition. The former comprises the
of popularity in recent years, even if it government-recognised branch of
manages to win the majority of national UPRONA, FRODEBU-Nyakuri and three
assembly seats in 2015, it will not have Batwa representatives. The main extra-
the same margin as it has currently. parliamentary opposition parties are part
Hence, the move to reduce voting of the ADC-Ikibiri and include the CNDD,
quorums may be an attempt to ensure the FNL (without Rwasa at its head), the
that the CNDD-FDD will maintain the MSD and Sahwanya-FRODEBU.
level of legislative control it has had Even on the major issues that constitute
since 2010. the main points of contention between
the ruling party and some opposition
Opposition and political parties and civil society, there are
space divergences in position. For instance,
The opposition once
Apart from the measures discussed within the national assembly, FRODEBU-
again accuses the
ruling party of creating above, the ruling party has taken specific Nyakuri joined the CNDD-FDD on the
dissident groups within steps to limit the political space available land commission vote in 2013, while it
their parties to the opposition. The Minister of the boycotted the recent vote on the new
Interior continually tries to interfere in land tribunal and the TRC in concert
8 Status and dynamics of the political situation in Burundiwith UPRONA and the Batwa delegates. The law stipulates that organisations Other politicians, such as MSD leader
The latter, however, joined the CNDD- must give four business days’ notice Alexis Sinduhije and former UPRONA
FDD in its failed attempt to amend the to local administrative authorities of a president, Charles Njitije, fled the
constitution in March 2014. Because of planned rally, demonstration or party country for fear of being arrested.
these fault lines between members of the meeting. The authorities then have 48 Sinduhije fled after an MSD jogging
opposition, the CNDD-FDD can move its hours to forbid the meeting if they deem rally on 8 March 2014 when youth
agenda forward with ease. that such an event risks endangering and police officers, deployed under
30
public order. In fact, article 10 of the auspice of the new law governing
A careful analysis of the internal dynamics
the law states that ’the administrative public demonstrations, clashed and
of many political parties exposes their
authority can at any time, in spite of a dozens of MSD party members were
own internal rifts as well. For example,
declaration done in accordance to the arrested. After a quick trial, 21 of them
FRODEBU and FNL both have multiple
law, differ or put an end to any meeting, were convicted and sentenced to life
political wings. Given the nature of
procession, parade, gathering on public in prison for insurgency, rebellion and
politics in many developing countries,
roads and in public places, if required assault of law enforcement officers.
where access to a political post is one
to maintain public order’.31 As ’public There is now a warrant for Sinduhije’s
of the few ways of gaining power and
order’ is only vaguely defined in the law, arrest for participating in this so-called
wealth, the manipulation of allegiances
civil society members and opposition insurgency and rebellion.34
is easy and allows the CNDD-FDD to
groups claim that it has now become
exploit pre-existing vulnerabilities. Government efforts to restrict the political
almost impossible to hold meetings in
space is indicated by its clampdown
In a continuation of the trend begun the provinces as local authorities often
on society’s democratic checks and
in 2005, the CNDD-FDD has made it deny them the right to meet.32
balances, notably that of the press.
Burundian society and media are among
A new media law severely restricts news reporting the most vibrant in the region35 and they
and imposes heavy fines for violating vaguely have filled the void left by the exile of the
extra-parliamentary opposition leaders by
defined offenses questioning and challenging government.
In 2013, the CNDD-FDD passed a media
increasingly difficult for political parties The ruling party has also gained control law that severely restricts news reporting
to engage fully in political activities and of judicial nominations by influencing the and imposes heavy fines for the violation
to compete in the electoral process judicial system to neutralise opposition of vaguely defined offenses, such as
by using its overwhelming majority to members. The ruling party is often able the publication of material that hinders
pass very restrictive laws. A 2012 law to arbitrarily arrest opposition leaders on national unity.36 While the law has not
governing opposition parties imposes fabricated charges and to then use the yet been applied, members of the media
fines and prison terms for opposition courts to legitimize their incarceration, fear that as the elections draw closer, the
leaders found guilty of lies or slander thereby excluding, even if temporarily, government will not hesitate to apply it to
with the intent of disturbing peace and competitors from the political scene. silence dissent.37
28
security. Another law passed in 2011 For example, in December 2013, former
prohibits the formation of coalitions Burundian vice-president and current Security
outside electoral campaign periods.29 leader of the extra parliamentary branch
For many observers the most worrying
Under this law, the ADC-Ikibiri, which of FRODEBU, Frédéric Bamvuginyumvira,
aspect of the growing political tensions
constitutes the bulk of the extra- who was believed to be the consensus
is its potential impact on the stability and
parliamentary opposition, is an illegal presidential candidate for ADC-Ikibiri,
security of the country. However, a return
organisation and cannot operate freely in was arrested with a woman and charged
to a full-blown civil war seems unlikely.
the country until the government officially with adultery and debauchery.33
While certain civil society observers
decides to announce the start of the
The charges were later dropped, but he suggest that some members of the
electoral campaign.
was remanded for allegedly attempting former Burundian armed forces (Forces
A law on public demonstrations passed to bribe the arresting officers and he is Armées Burundaises, FAB, which was
in 2013 has further curtailed the ability expected to stand trial in front of the mostly a Tutsi army)38 have kept an eye
of political parties to operate freely. anticorruption tribunal later this year. on the situation and could split from
CENTRAL AFRICA REPORT • July 2014 9CENTRAL AFRICA REPORT
the army if they believe that the power- police force is accused of being used by
sharing agreement is under serious the state to neutralise opponents.
threat, most civil society and diplomatic
The most significant security concern
observers consulted believe that the
is the growing presence of the
army is likely to stay out of any political
Imbonerakure in the countryside. The
crisis, as it did during the post-election
group started to make its presence
violence in 2010.
felt shortly before the 2010 elections
The Burundian army now considers and was accused of intimidating the
its task the protection of the territorial opposition. They were heavily involved
integrity of the republic. It has gained in the post-election violence against
a favorable reputation through members of the opposition in rural areas.
its involvement in international According to some members of civil
peacekeeping missions in Somalia, the society and the diplomatic community,
Central African Republic and Mali. Those they have not only grown in number but
A return to full-blown civil war seems unlikely as the
army will probably stay out of any political crisis
missions are not only a source of pride now also cover most of the countryside.
in the armed corps, but are also an In some areas they have taken over local
important source of revenue. On the one administrative authorities and the police.
hand this satisfies the ambitions of high- Working outside the law, they reportedly
ranking officers who might otherwise be impose curfews and arrest, beat and kill
inclined to get involved in politics, and individuals.40
on the other it keeps the ex-FAB out of The government denies using the
Nkurunziza’s way. A further factor is that Imbonerakure and maintains that it
because of the level of ethnic integration is merely a youth wing like any other
within the army, the opportunities by party’s youth group. According to a
either ethnic group to prepare a coup representative of the CNDD-FDD, crimes
without the other side knowing about committed by some members of the
it are limited. Most observers thus Imbonerakure are not representative of
agree that the necessary elements for the group and are the acts of misguided
a relapse to a politicised and ethnically individuals.41 But for most observers,
polarised army, as well as pre-Arusha their documented acts of intimidation
violence, are not present.39 against the opposition in the countryside,
While the army is considered to be a their disruption of political meetings
and the fact that they are above the
stable force in Burundi, the same cannot
law are a serious threat to the stability
be said of the police force. The latter’s
of the country as elections approach.
establishment is relatively new (2004)
Some civil society members, particularly
and is an amalgam of former gendarmes
those associated with the Tutsi ethnic
(Burundian armed forces with civilian
The government denies group, have expressed a concern that
police duties) and former members of the
using the Imbonerakure the Imbonerakure are being armed and
and maintains that it armed political movements. The police
trained by the ruling party.
is merely a youth wing is very unpopular among the population
like any other party’s as they are perceived to be poorly In April 2014, a leaked cable of the
youth group disciplined and trained, and are routinely UN Integrated Office in Burundi
abusive towards the general public. The (BNUB) authoritatively documented
10 Status and dynamics of the political situation in Burundiweapons distribution to members of to challenge the nomination at the former soldiers whose backing is
the Imbonerakure. The CNDD-FDD Constitutional Court. However, according essential for a successful nomination.44
vehemently rejected the allegation and to some diplomats, the opposition is likely
The passing of a new and consensual
called for the expulsion of BNUB’s head to lose the case for two reasons, namely
electoral code is the only positive
of security, Paul Debbie, who is now a) a case could be made for Nkurunziza’s
recent political development on the
a persona non grata in Burundi.42 In eligibility to run for a third term, and b)
Burundian political landscape. Following
February 2014 the ADC-Ikibiri sent a given the strong influence of the executive
consultations between all political parties,
warning to the UN Secretary-General on the judiciary, the court may simply give
the national assembly on 25 April 2014
warning him that the ruling party in to the will of CNDD-FDD.
unanimously adopted a new code for
was preparing genocide. While most
Many observers have, however, also the 2015 elections. The CNDD-FDD’s
observers doubt that the political crisis
indicated that there are signs of a rift acceptance of the electoral code came
could lead to genocide in Burundi,
between CNDD-FDD generals and the as a surprise to most observers as it
there is consensus that should
civilian members of the party. The divide was the ruling party’s first indication
violent confrontations escalate, the
dates back to the sacking and arrest of of a willingness to engage with the
Imbonerakure would in fact be one of the
former CNDD-FDD chairman, Hussein opposition. The CNDD-FDD even
greatest causes of violence.43
Radjabu in 2007. He was condemned accepted to eliminate a provision that
Looking ahead to 2015 to 13 years imprisonment for conspiracy required presidential candidates to hold
in planning an armed rebellion. As far as university degree, a provision agreed
The CNDD-FDD many people are concerned, the charges to by the CNDD-FDD and most of the
The CNDD-FDD definitely has the against Radjabu were fabricated by opposition parties, but opposed by FNL
incumbent’s advantage of having at its Nkurunziza’s inner circle to prevent the supporters loyal to Agathon Rwasa
disposal a great deal of resources to win general from seeking the CNDD-FDD’s who would have been disqualified from
the elections in 2015. Despite the CNDD- presidential nomination in 2010. running for president. The opposition and
FDD’s slowly decreasing popularity, civil society have welcomed the adoption
Political actors consulted for this report
Nkurunziza has continued to travel and of the new electoral code.45
argue that Radjabu’s sacking clearly
The opposition
The new and consensual electoral code is There is a clear determination by the
opposition to participate fully in the
the only positive recent political development
electoral process. The consensus is that
in Burundian politics the current political situation is largely a
consequence of the 2010 boycott and
campaign in the countryside to maintain that the opposition needs to be active
indicated a consolidation of power in
the party’s hold in the rural areas. The throughout the elections to stand a
the hands of a very small group of the
ruling party understands that its victory chance of challenging the CNDD-FDD.
CNDD-FDD military elite. After the 2010
is contingent on maintaining its edge Even so, the opposition faces an uphill
elections, Nkunuziza’s small military
outside Bujumbura. Hence, the CNDD- battle. It is difficult to say how, given the
inner circle continued to control the
FDD will most likely continue to restrict many difficulties placed in their way, the
direction of the party, frustrating CNDD-
the ability of the opposition to campaign opposition parties will manage to carve
FDD intellectuals. Observers suggest
freely, in rural areas in particular, as it out the necessary political space so as to
that the intelligentsia of the party would
did during the 2010 electoral campaign. conduct an efficient campaign.
rather rally behind Dr Gervais Rufyikiri,
What is not certain is the level of
the current second vice-president, for The opposition will be unable to muster
resistance and resilience the opposition
the 2015 elections. He is popular with the necessary voter support if it is unable
will display in the months to come.
technocrats and international donors, to mobilise and campaign effectively in
Observers believe that the CNDD- which makes him a strong candidate. the countryside. But the parties’ ability
FDD will most likely press ahead with However, the fact that he was not part to mobilise and campaign successfully is
Nkurunziza as the party’s presidential of the armed rebellion and that he holds not only contingent on the political space
candidate for 2015. The move would dual citizenship (Belgian and Burundian) available to them; it also depends on
most likely prompt the opposition is unlikely to win him the support of their ability to consolidate their support
CENTRAL AFRICA REPORT • July 2014 11CENTRAL AFRICA REPORT
base and to maintain a united front have been more cautious in their criticism
throughout the electoral process. Will of the country’s policies in view of the
individual parties like the FNL, FRODEBU fact that in recent years a number of
and UPRONA be able to get their diplomats have been expelled from
factions under control and move forward Burundi. Nevertheless, the UN and
as unitary parties? Also, should the ADC- the US have explicitly condemned
Ikibiri choose to continue to challenge the the violence between the police and
ruling party as a coalition, it is imperative members of the MSD in March, and
Most observers agree that Burundi has the sovereign
right to amend its constitution, but they question
whether the country is ready to move away from
the Arusha agreement
that its leadership settles on a clear have warned the government against its
platform, a single presidential candidate attempts to amend the constitution in a
and electoral list, and that these issues way that will strip it of the fundamental
are decided sooner than later. power-sharing provisions stipulated in the
Arusha agreement.46
International community
International observers consulted for
Given the Burundian government’s heavy
this research agree that it is essential to
dependence on the country’s foreign
ensure stability and peace in Burundi.
partners – 50 per cent of Burundi’s
For the country to move to peaceful
annual budget is funded by international
and legitimate elections, they call on
donors – members of the opposition
all parties involved to engage in good-
and civil society expect the international
faith dialogue. Most observers agree
community to put a significant amount
that Burundi has the sovereign right to
of pressure on the ruling party to
amend its constitution but they question
ease current tensions and to prepare
whether the country is ready to move
transparent elections. In the past few
away from the Arusha agreement and its
years, most initiatives aimed at mitigating
consocialist arrangement. In any case,
conflict between the CNDD-FDD and
should Burundians decide to engage in
other actors have been driven by the
a significant revision of the constitution
international community, in particular
it should be as a result of broad
the UN. While the BNUB’s mandate
consultations and wide participation
was renewed until the end of the 2014,
in the decision-making process. In the
reliable UN sources confirm that this is its
meantime, sufficient political space
last mandate, leaving the country without
50%
should be available for healthy political
an important moderating voice after
participation by the opposition.
January 2015.
Recently the CNDD-FDD has displayed
a measure of indifference to international
of Burundi’s annual pressure. In the name of national
budget is funded sovereignty, it has passed legislation
by international donors opposed by the international community.
The international partners themselves
12 Status and dynamics of the political situation in BurundiNotes
1 Peter Uvin, 1999, Ethnicity and power in and Dr Christophe Sebudandi, Executive 26 Decret N° 100/25 du 01 Fevrier 2014 Portant
Rwanda: different paths to mass violence, Director, AfroBaromater, personal interviews, Destitution du Premier Vice-President de la
Comparative Politics 31(3):262. Bujumbura, February 2014. Republique, http://www.presidence.bi/spip.
2 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement 15 Arusha agreement, Protocol II, Democracy php? article4451 (accessed 18/6/2014).
signed on 28 August 2000, Article 4.a. and Governance. 27 Antoine Kabuhare, Director, IWACU, personal
Constitutional amendments require a four- 16 The CDNN-FDD stated that a tribunal would interview, Bujumbura, February 2014.
fifths majority in the National assembly and be established at a later time. Burundi: 28 Republique du Burundi, Cabinet du
a two-thirds majority in the Senate, while l’Assemblée nationale adopte le projet de loi President, Loi N.1/25 du 14 Novembre 2012
organic laws require three-fifths majority portant création de la CVR, 18 April 2014, Portant Statut de l’Opposition Politique au
in the National assembly and the senate http://french.china.org.cn/foreign/txt/2014- Burundi, Articles 19-21.
approval. See articles 6.5 and 6.6, Protocol II, 04/18/content_32130547.htm (accessed 29 Republique du Burundi, Cabinet du
Democracy and Governance. 18/6/2014). President, Loi N.1/16 du 10 Septembre
3 Protocol II, Democracy and Governance, 17 CNDD-FDD, Mémorandum du parti 2011 Portant Revision de la Loi N.1/006
Articles 11.5.d and 14.1.g. du 26 Juin 2003 Portant Organisation et
CNDD -FDD sur la Commission Vérité
4 International Crisis Group, 2004, Crisis et Réconciliation et le Tribunal Spécial, Fonctionnement des Partis Politiques,
Watch, no. 9: 2, http://www.crisisgroup. Bujumbura, 5 May 2007: 6. Article 8.
org/~/media/ Files/CrisisWatch/2004/cw9.pdf 30 Republique du Burundi, Loi N.1//28 Du
18 UPRONA, Mémorandum du Parti UPRONA
(accessed 18/6/2014). 5 Decembre 2013 Portant Reglementation
sur la mise en place de la Commission
5 International Crisis Group, 2009, Crisis Vérité et Réconciliation et le Tribunal Spécial, des Manifestations sur la Voie Publique et
Watch, no. 76: 2, http://www.crisisgroup. Bujumbura, 17 April 2007: 6. Reunions Publiques, Article 5.
org/~/ media/Files/CrisisWatch/2009/cw76. 31 Article 10 : L’autorité administrative peut
19 The commission has been seen as a useful
pdf (accessed 18/6/2014). à tout moment, nonobstant la déclaration
conflict resolution tool. Land is an essential
6 Between May and November 2010 the UN resource in a country where 90 per cent régulièrement faite, différer ou mettre
Integrated Office in Burundi (BNUB) report of the population relies on agriculture, fin à toute réunion, tout cortège, défilé,
365 politically motivated arrests, Seventh with most of them involved in subsistence rassemblement sur la voie publique et dans
Report of the Secretary-General, BNUB, farming. Land has been and continues to be les lieux publics, si le maintien de l’ordre
S/2010/608: 8. a source of intense conflict in communities. public l’exige, ibid.
7 International Crisis Group, 2009, Crisis Watch, In addition, the multiple episodes of violence 32 An MSD meeting scheduled for 18 February
no. 76: 2, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media have resulted in large numbers of internally 2014 in Bugendanawas is an example. Alexis
/Files/CrisisWatch/2009/cw76.pdf (accessed displaced persons and refugees, some of Sinduhije, IWACU, 21 February, 2014: 3.
18/6/2014); US Department of State, 2011, whom are returning to the country. 33 RFI.fr, Burundi: le leader de l’opposition
2010 Human Rights Report: Burundi, http:// 20 Arusha Agreement, Protocol IV, écroué dans une affaire de mœurs,
www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/ af/154334. Reconstruction and Development, Article 8.j. 10 December 2013, http://www.rfi.fr/
htm (accessed 18/6/2014). afrique/20131210-burundi-le-leader-
21 Times Live, Political crisis in Burundi as Tutsi
8 Maitre Isidore Rufyikiri, Former Head of the opposition-ecroue-une-affaire-moeurs/
ministers quit, 5 February 2014, http://www.
Burundi Bar Association, personal interview in (accessed 18/6/2014); RFI.fr, Burundi:
timeslive.co.za/africa/2014/02/05/political-
Bujumbura, February 2014. US Department un opposant poursuivi pour corruption,
crisis-in-burundi-as-tutsi-ministers-quit1
of State, 2011, 2010 Human Rights Report: 25 February 2014, http://www.rfi.fr/
(accessed 18/6/2014).
Burundi, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/ afrique/20140225-burundi-opposant-
22 Between 11 and 13 March, the BNUB poursuivi-corruption/ (accessed 18/6/2014).
hrrpt/2010/af/154334.htm (accessed
organised a workshop in Kayanza with the
18/6/2014). 34 The East African, Burundi opposition chief
representatives of major political parties and
9 International Crisis Group, Burundi: ensuring charged with rebellion: prosecutor, 12 March
other actors. The objective of the meeting
credible elections, 2010: 9. 2014, http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/
was to assess the previous elections and
news/Burundi-opposition-chief-charged-
10 European Union, Burundi: Rapport Final. to develop a strategy in preparation for the
with-rebellion/-/2558/2241114/-/8d7xu0/-/
Elections communales, présidentielle, 2015 elections. At the conclusion of the
index.html (accessed 18/6/2014).
législatives, sénatoriales et collinaires 2010: 3. workshop, a 42-point electoral roadmap
was agreed upon, which addresses the legal 35 Antoine Kaburahe, Director, IWACU, personal
11 International Crisis Group, Burundi: bye-bye
framework that should govern the coming interview, Bujumbura, February 2014.
Arusha, 2012: 4.
electoral process, security provisions that 36 Republique du Burundi, Cabinet du
12 According to BINUB, there was an increase
should be in place to protect political actors President, Loi N.1/11 du 4 Juin 2013
in extrajudicial killings and/or politically
and the facilitation of their activities, and the Portant Modifications de la Loi N.1/025 du
motivated killings from 27 cases in 2009
management and conduct of the elections. 27 Novembre 2003 Regissant la Presse du
to about 30 cases in 2010 and 61 in 2011
Burundi, Article 18.a.
Report of the Secretary-General on BINUB, 23 Willy Nindorera, Consultant; Pierre-Claver
S/2011/751, 2013: 9. Seventh Report of the Mbonipa, President, APRODH, personal 37 Antoine Kabuhare, Director, IWACU, personal
Secretary-General on BINUB: 8. It should be interviews, Bujumbura, February 2014 interview, Bujumbura, February 2014.
noted that some members of the government 24 Arusha agreement, Protocol II, Democracy 38 The post-war Burundian military is now
affiliated with the CNDD-FDD were also and Governance, Article 7.3. known as the National Defense Forces.
murdered during this period. 39 Samuel Ngede, Political Officer
25 IRIN News, 2013. Alarm over Burundi’s
13 Personal interviews, Bujumbura, February planned constitution changes, http://www. BNUB, personal interview, Bujumbura,
2014. irinnews.org/report/99355/alarm-over- February 2014.
14 Honorable Emmanuel Nkenguruste, UPRONA burundi-s-planned-constitution-changes 40 Report of the Secretary-General on the
Senator, Dr Julien Nimumbona, Professor, (accessed 18/6/2014). BNUB, 2013: 4.
CENTRAL AFRICA REPORT • July 2014 13CENTRAL AFRICA REPORT
41 Honorable Victor Burikukiye, Vice-President
of the CNDD-FDD, personal interview,
Bujumbura, February 2014.
42 Jeune Afrique, Burundi: un diplomate
de l’ONU est expulsé du pays. 17 April
2014, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/
Article/ ARTJAWEB20140417175123/
onu-diplomatie-burundi-pierre-nkurunziza-
diplomatie-burundi-un-diplomate-de-l-onu-
est-expulse-du-pays.html
43 IRIN, Looming polls raise Burundi’s risk
profile,17 April 2014, http://www.irinnews.org/
report/99951/looming-polls-raise-burundi-s-
risk-profile (accessed 18/6/2014).
44 Personal Interviews, Bujumbura, Feburary
2014; Arc-En-Ciel N. 363, 31 January 2014,
11.
45 IRIN News. New election law a step forward
for Burundi. April 28 2014., http://www.
irinnews.org/report/100002/new-election-
law-a-step-forward-for-burundi (accessed
18/6/2014).
46 Reuters UN warns Burundi leaders against
stoking political violence, April 10 2014,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/10/
us-burundi-un-idUSBREA3923Q20140410
(accessed 18/6/2014); Voice of America, US
urges Burundi to drop constitution changes,
avoid ‘dark days’, 8 April 2014, http://www.
voanews.com/content/reu-us-urges-burundi-
to-drop-constitution-changes-avoid-dark-
days/1889081.html (accessed 18/6/2014).
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