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THE VICTIMS AND LAND RESTITUTION LAW
IN COLOMBIA IN CONTEXT
An analysis of the contradictions between the
agrarian model and compensation for the victims

Paula Martínez Cortés
THE VICTIMS AND LAND RESTITUTION LAW IN COLOMBIA IN CONTEXT
An analysis of the contradictions between the agrarian model and compensation for the victims
Paula Martínez Cortés| FDCL, TNI| December 2013

Editors:
Forschungs- und Dokumentationszentrum                     Transnational Institute (TNI)
Chile-Lateinamerika – FDCL e.V.                           PO Box 14656, 1001 LD Amsterdam,
Gneisenaustraße 2a, D-10961 Berlin                        Niederlande
Fon: +49 30 693 40 29                                     Fon: + 31 20 662 66 08
Fax: +49 30 692 65 90                                     Fax: + 31 20 675 71 76
eMail: info@fdcl.org                                      eMail: tni@tni.org
Internet: http://www.fdcl.org                             Internet: http://www.tni.org

Author:          Paula Martínez Cortés
Layout:          Monika Brinkmöller
Print:           Copy House
Cover photo:     svenwerk / flickr.com
Translation:     Simon Phillips (Linguatransfair)

© FDCL, Berlin, December 2013

            Produced with financial support from the European Commission.
            The views expressed herein are those of the author and not of the EC.

Published by FDCL and TNI for the Hands off the Land Alliance

Paula Martínez Cortés

Paula Martínez Cortés studies political science at the National University of Colombia.
She is a master’s student in local rural development, and participates in the European Union
Agris Mundus program.
THE VICTIMS AND LAND RESTITUTION LAW
IN COLOMBIA IN CONTEXT
An analysis of the contradictions between the
agrarian model and compensation for the victims

Paula Martínez Cortés

Forschungs- und Dokumentationszentrum
Chile-Lateinamerika (FDCL), Transnational
Institute (TNI) – December 2013
Contents

         Contents

         Introduction                                                                                        3

         1. The context of the socioeconomic, political and internal armed conflict in Colombia              4

         2. Serious human rights violations and denial of the conflict
            by the previous government (2002—2010)                                                           5

         3. Juan Manuel Santos’ government: ‘cleansing’ Colombia’s image
            in order to continue the extractivist, neoliberal model of development                           7

         4. Demonstrations of ‘good will’: the Victims Law and peace negotiations
            as inconsistent rhetoric                                                                        10

         5. The debates about Law 1448 (2011), better known
            as the Victims and Land Restitution Law                                                         11
                5.1      A post-conflict law in the midst of an unfinished conflict                         11
                5.2      A transitional law that oscillates between the longing for peace
                         and the persistence of war and impunity                                            12
                5.3      Discriminatory treatment of victims by a law that is supposed to recognize them    13
                5.4      ‘Fiscal sustainability’ is prioritized over compensation for the victims           14
                5.5      Land restitution: consensus between supporters of opposing models of development   15
                5.6      Recovering the land just to die for it                                             15
         6. Favoring the land grabbers: two representative cases                                            17
                6.1      Land grabbing in the Colombian Altillanura: the Orinoquia region                   17
                6.2      Land grabbing in the Montes de María mountain range in Bolívar and Sucre           19
         7. Conclusion                                                                                      20

         8. Bibliography                                                                                    22

         Endnotes                                                                                           27

2
Introduction

Law 1448 passed in 2011, better known as               behind victimization”.3 Reports have also been
the Victims and Land Restitution Law, has been         published by NGOs and organizations in an at-
promoted officially as a demonstration of ‘good        tempt to defend human rights by pressing the
will’ by the Juan Manuel Santos government             Colombian state to fulfill its obligations. At the
in Colombia. The law represents a cog in the           same time, the Victims and Land Restitution Law
transitional policy aimed at facilitating steps        has been the object of intense debate among
towards a post-conflict scenario. However, the         different national and international sectors.
law’s main objective is to provide recognition
to the victims of the Colombian armed conflict.            This study seeks to contextualize Law 1448
This stands in contrast to the policy of denial        and frame the discussion in relation to the spa-
enacted by the previous government. In order           tial scenario in which the law is being applied:
to provide recognition to the victims, the law         Colombian rural areas. The aim is then to high-
aims to secure victims’ rights to access truth,        light urgent issues that could act as indicators of
justice and appropriate compensation while             rhetorical intention in favor of the (mainly rural)
guaranteeing these people will never be victim-        victims. These intentions are not consistent with
ized again. As such, this law is not merely about      the development policies imposed by the na-
officially recognizing the conflict and its victims,   tional government and actually hinder the pro-
it also aims to provide victims of the conflict        vision of comprehensive reparations to the very
with compensation.                                     people the law is supposed to defend.

    These demonstrations of political will are rep-         Furthermore, this study aims to relate the
resentative of the unusual debate surrounding          land restitution process, and the possibilities
the conflict; a debate that has been confounded        of achieving its goals, to the recent national
by a number of factors that make implement-            scandals associated with the extractivist, ex-
ing the law particularly difficult. Furthermore,       clusionary and developmentalist model imple-
the law is formulated in a manner that reflects        mented by Juan Manuel Santos’ government.
the diversity of the field it seeks to regulate, and   These policies include: i) land grabbing in the
this is clear throughout its 80 pages.1 However,       Colombian Altillanura, and other regions such
this should not imply that the law is being suc-       as the Montes de María mountain range; ii) ef-
cessfully implemented on the ground. This is           forts by the government to dismantle the few
a particularly important factor, as the law was        legal instruments that defend indigenous, Afro-
only designed to regulate the current transition-      Colombian and peasant farmers’ territories;
al period. Moreover, the armed conflict in Co-         iii) and the repressive treatment of dissent and
lombia continues, and is fundamentally linked          protests against the imposition of the govern-
to conflict in the political and socioeconomic         ment’s model. One example is the recent na-
spheres.                                               tional agrarian strike. The government’s reac-
                                                       tion to the strike was characterized by a lack of
    Since Law 1448 was enacted in 2011, vari-          understanding of the conflict’s complexity: the
ous reports have been published that evaluate          conflict is more than just an armed conflict; it
the law’s potential and the challenges faced by        is also aggravated by diverse policy measures
its implementation. These reports range from           and official decisions.
an official analysis that presents data with-
out providing significant references to their             Finally, this study highlights the role of the in-
context;2 to publications in national media such       ternational community. Although many of the in-
as the Victims Report in the magazine Semana           ternational community’s diverse actions have fur-
that illustrate the data by focusing on “victimiz-     thered the defense of human rights, at other times
ing events but not the background or meaning           they have sharpened the conflict in Colombia.

                                                                                                               3
1. The context of the socioeconomic,
    political and internal armed conflict in Colombia

    Colombia has been submerged in a socio-               nesses in collecting information due to the lack
    economic, political and internal armed conflict       of political will to recognize and assume re-
    for more than a half a century. Its causes have       sponsibilities in terms of the state’s obligation to
    been widely debated, but if there is one factor       guarantee human rights throughout Colombia.
    that traverses the entire conflict, it is the dis-    For example, in the case of forcibly displaced
    pute over land and territories as a source of         people, the system of official registration only
    economic and political power. This situation          began in 1997; this was due to an initial lack
    remains unresolved. Additionally, Colombia is         of recognition of the problem. This situation oc-
    also faced by an extremely high concentration         curred despite the fact that in 1985 the Colom-
    of wealth: it is the third most unequal country       bian Bishops’ Conference publicized the mag-
    in Latin America.4 Clearly, Colombia is not only      nitude of this issue.8 As such, it is important to
    experiencing an armed conflict, it is also experi-    contrast official data with alternative information
    encing profound social conflicts that have vari-      collected by other organizations. In this particu-
    ous forms of expression.                              lar case, the Consultancy for Human Rights and
                                                          Displacement (CODHES) estimates that between
       The ¡Stop Now! Report (¡Basta Ya!) produced        1985 and 1995 819,510 people were displaced
    by the Historical Memory Group (GMH) esti-            as a consequence of the armed conflict. Conse-
    mates that the armed expression of the conflict       quently, a conservative estimate of the number of
    led to the death of at least 220,000 people           displaced people could be close to 5,700,000;
    between 1958 and 2012.5 This means that the           the majority of these people are peasant farm-
    armed conflict has caused one in every three          ers, indigenous people and people of African
    violent deaths in the country. Furthermore, civil-    descent. This figure represents 15% of the total
    ians have been the most affected population:          population of Colombia.9
    for every dead combatant, four civilians have
    been killed.6                                            These displacements have led to between
                                                          6.6 and 8 million hectares of land to be expro-
       The violence of the conflict also has a wide       priated through diverse mechanisms. This “has
    range of non-lethal dimensions that are just as       exacerbated the historical hoarding of land by
    serious.                                              large landowners, drug traffickers, paramili-
                                                          tary forces and big business”.10
       “Up to March 31, the Victims Unique Record
       (RUV) reported a total of 25,007 missing peo-         “[…] between 1985 and 2012, the data shows
       ple, including 1,754 victims of sexual violence.      that 26 people were displaced every hour in
       A total of 6,421 boys, girls and adolescents          Colombia as a consequence of the armed con-
       had been recruited by armed groups, and               flict, while every 12 hours someone was kid-
       4,744,046 people had been forcibly displaced.         napped. The period between 1996 and 2005
       The work done by Cifas & Conceptos for the            was even worse: someone was kidnapped
       GMH estimated that there had been 27,023              every eight hours, and a civilian or soldier was
       kidnappings associated with the armed conflict        killed every day by a landmine. This means
       between 1970 and 2010, while the Presiden-            Colombia is second only to Afghanistan as the
       tial Program of Integral Attention against Land-      country with the largest number of landmine
       mines (PAIMA) reported that there had been            victims, but remains the country with the largest
       10,189 victims of landmines between 1982              number of forcibly displaced people”.11
       and 2012”.7
                                                             As the GMH report states, this has been a
      Discussions about these data have focused           limitless war characterized by a frightening level
    on under-registration, and institutional weak-        of cruelty.12 Paramilitary groups in particular

4
have practiced this cruelty, but all armed ac-             “The violence of the forced disappearances,
tors have played a role in attacks directed at             the violence committed against union lead-
civilians. Guerrillas, paramilitaries (including           ers, the violence of forced displacements, of
the mistakenly labeled ‘Bandas Criminales Emer-            the threats to and expropriation of peasant
gentes’ or ‘emergent criminal gangs’ – BACRIM)             farmers, the sexual violence and many other
and state forces (the National Army, Colombian             forms that are often neglected and left out
Air Force, National Police including the Mobile            of the public arena are experienced in the
Anti-Disturbances Squadrons – ESMAD) have                  midst of profound and painful solitude. The
participated in the conflict in various ways, and          routinization of violence on the one hand,
deploy diverse modes of violence depending on              and the rurality and anonymity at the nation-
their particular objectives.13                             al level of the vast majority of the victims,
                                                           on the other, has resulted in an attitude of
    The GMH report also correctly points out that          indifference, if not passivity, which is fed by
armed violence is not lived and perceived in the           a comfortable perception of economic and
same way throughout the country or by all parts of         political stability.” 14
the population. Rural areas have been the settings of
extreme violence, and despite the millions of victims      However, such stability is only enjoyed in
many people still consider the conflict to be ‘some-    the main cities, and by the comparatively small
body else’s problem’ and do not view the conflict as    numbers of people belonging to the high and
linked to their own realities and interests.            middle class.

2. Serious human rights violations and denial of the
conflict by the previous government (2002—2010)

Without going too far, the previous govern-                 Uribe Vélez’s government left behind a con-
ment, which was headed by Álvaro Uribe                  stitution that had been reformed so as to enable
Vélez between 2002 and 2010, systematically             the former president to be reelected; even Barack
denied the existence of the internal armed              Obama told Uribe that he viewed Ulribe’s ree-
conflict.15 At the same time, during this pe-           lection as inappropriate.17 Ulribe’s government
riod the victims of the conflict remained ‘in-          was responsible for various grave cases of hu-
visible’. The government of the time argued             man rights violations.18 Among the most well-
that the country was faced by terrorists whose          known are the cases of extrajudicial, summary
strength was diminishing and that should be             or arbitrary execution19 perpetrated by the army.
suppressed by all of the forces available to            This was an attempt to present “civilians as guer-
the state. This perspective led to the polari-          rilla members killed in combat. In reality, these
zation of society by diluting the principle of          people were civilians who had been deceived,
distinguishing between combatants and civil-            or kidnapped, and then executed and buried in
ians: the government judged anyone express-             unidentified graves or in mass graves in remote
ing dissent as “collaborators or defenders of           regions so as to avoid repercussions with the
the terrorists”.16 Moreover, this polarization          families”.20 This happened as part of a system
was also a useful means of legitimizing the             of incentives through which members of the mili-
innumerable abuses committed by state mili-             tary were rewarded with days off, promotion and
tary forces. In some cases, the military col-           awards depending on the number of kills they
laborated with paramilitary groups in actions           reported in combat. More than 3,000 civilians
taken against the population including people           are thought to have been assassinated as part
seeking to defend human rights, trade union-            of this system,21 which belonged to the infamous
ists, teachers and students.                            democratic security policy.

                                                                                                             5
At the time, Juan Manuel Santos was Uribe’s         In 2004, during Uribe’s presidency, the
    defense minister and Freddy Padilla de León        constitutional court issued judgment T-025
    served as general commander of the Colom-          criticizing the ongoing “unconstitutional state
    bian armed forces. Once president, Santos          of affairs”.32 The court was referring to the
    designated the then retired general as ambas-      multiple, massive and continuous infringe-
    sador to Austria. However, Padilla was forced      ments of fundamental rights against displaced
    to resign in October 2013 after a complaint        populations as victims of the internal conflict.
    by the European Center for Constitutional          The ruling not only criticized the lack of state
    and Human Rights (ECCHR). The ECCHR had            response in the form of providing attention
    compiled a compendium of serious allega-           and effective protection to the victims, but also
    tions against the former general; however, his     the bureaucratic formalities demanded by the
    diplomatic immunity meant that no investiga-       authorities before fulfilling their duty to pro-
    tion could be carried out.22                       tect the population. In this sense, the court or-
                                                       dered the government to take specific action
        The other major scandal during Uribe’s         to ensure it complied with its constitutional
    time in government concerns the intimidation,      responsibilities. These recommendations in-
    fear tactics and espionage conducted by the        cluded assigning adequate resources to deal
    Administrative Department of State Security        with serious breaches of rights, and securing
    (DAS)23 against members of the opposition,         the necessary cooperation between different
    NGOs, people defending human rights, jour-         branches of government.
    nalists, judges from the supreme court, and
    even against members of the government’s              Nevertheless, the 2011 Monitoring Act
    own cabinet.24 This case resulted in the dis-      (No. 219) led the constitutional court to con-
    mantling of the DAS and the investigation          firm “the persistence of the unconstitutional
    and/or condemnation of several of its staff,       state of affairs”.33 The court argued that there
    including its former directors Jorge Noguera,25    was still no effective guarantee of rights for
    (its director between 2002 and 2005); Andrés       displaced populations.34
    Peñate,26 (director between 2005 and 2007),
    and Maria del Pilar Hurtado. The latter direct-       In short, the Uribe government consid-
    ed the institution between 2007 and 2008, but      ered the victims of the conflict to be ‘some-
    was granted asylum by Panama and escaped           one else’s problem’, and saw no link between
    from the legal case brought against her.27         solving the victims’ problems and its own in-
                                                       terests. Moreover, the Uribe government left
       Even former president Uribe is currently        behind a large number of scandals ranging
    under investigation due to his alleged involve-    from human rights violations, to authoritari-
    ment “in the promotion, organization and           anism, and other illegal acts (or it reformed
    support of paramilitary groups and Convivir        the law to legalize its actions). Some of these
    associations that were directly linked to them;    scandals are currently being investigated.
    through actions and omissions, and colluding
    with them, not only as governor of Antioquia,         Nonetheless, the former president, whose
    but also later as president of the country.”28     suspected links to paramilitaries are currently
    This court case was first brought by the justice   under investigation, is canvasing for the sen-
    system,29 but it has suffered delays that have     ate. He leads a closed list that includes his
    been criticized by more than twenty members        previous presidential advisor, Jose Obdulio
    of the European Parliament30 and judges be-        Gaviria, cousin of the famous illegal drug
    longing to the High Court of Medellín. The         dealer and head of the Medellin Cartel, Pablo
    judges who first ordered the investigation         Escobar. Furthermore, Gaviria has been ques-
    have received death threats.31                     tioned about the role he played in advising
                                                       the leaders of the ‘Don Berna’ paramilitary
                                                       units during their demobilization.35

6
3. Juan Manuel Santos’ government:
‘cleansing’ Colombia’s image in order to continue
the extractivist, neoliberal model of development

After a government such as Uribe’s, in which             Among the reasons that explain why the US
several of the former president’s closest aids, as   Congress decided to ratify the agreement,41 the
well as senators from congress, have been in-        following stand out: the recognition of the inter-
vestigated and/or sentenced for their links with     nal armed conflict by the government of Juan
paramilitary groups, some of whom are now            Manuel Santos; the Colombian president’s dem-
fugitives, the Juan Manuel Santos government         onstration of ‘good will’; and his commitment to
took up the task of improving the general im-        human rights through Law 1448 (2011), better
age of Colombia’s state institutions. The new        known as the Victims and Land Restitution Law.
government particularly focused on improv-           These factors, along with peace negotiations with
ing relations with the international commu-          the Revolutionary Forces of Colombia – People’s
nity, which was concerned about the multiple,        Army (FARC-EP), were perceived as concrete evi-
systematic and continued violations of human         dence of political will on the part of the govern-
rights in Colombia and the impunity enjoyed by       ment to begin paying back the historical debt
the perpetrators.                                    owed by the Colombian state to the victims of
                                                     the conflict.
   Colombia’s ‘bad image’ abroad led to
specific economic consequences that – at least          As Human Rights Watch points out, even
momentarily – hindered the interests of pow-         though the United States continues to be the
erful national and international sectors. One        most influential foreign actor in Colombia (in
example was the proposed free trade agree-           2012 the US provided almost US$ 481 million
ment (FTA) between Colombia and the US: the          in assistance, of which approximately 58% was
ratification process was frozen due to persist-      destined for the armed forces and the police) it
ent human rights violations against trade un-        has not demanded that military support be made
ionists.36                                           dependent on compliance with human rights
                                                     requirements. This situation continues, despite
   During his presidential candidacy, Barack         the US Department of State’s remarks about the
Obama stated that he considered signing the          persistence of threats and attacks against people
FTA “a mockery of the very labor protections         defending human rights, land activists, trade un-
that we’ve insisted be included in these kinds       ionists and journalists, among others.42
of agreements”.37 However, two years later, the
newly elected President Obama called the agree-          It is important to interpret these supposed
ment a ‘win-win for both nations’.38                 demonstrations of ‘good will’ in the context of
                                                     the extractivist, neoliberal and exclusionary eco-
   In April 2012, Obama enacted a labor ac-          nomic model driven by the Santos government.
tion plan urging the Colombian government to         This model should also be understood as a con-
stop the violence against trade unionists. This      tinuation of what Uribe Vélez was preparing dur-
was done to soften the reactions of the US Con-      ing his mandate. Colombia is currently develop-
gress, which did not want to be associated with      ing an economic model that does consider rural
the country responsible for the highest rate of      populations, and that continues to reproduce the
assassination of trade unionists in the world.39     conditions which led to the multiple violations of
The treaty was ratified in October 2011 and fi-      human rights that are still occurring today.
nally came into effect on May 15, 2012, despite
the complaints and warnings about the adverse          It is no coincidence that this ‘good will’ was
effects it might have on the people of Colom-        demonstrated at the same time as the president
bia.40                                               was successfully ratifying free trade agreements

                                                                                                          7
and others negotiated during Uribe’s presi-            Other sectors of the population have joined
    dency. According to the government’s official      protests led by the dairy farmers and potato,
    website, Colombia currently has thirteen com-      coffee, cacao and rice growers. These people
    mercial treaties, including an FTA with the US,    have included truck drivers and students in ur-
    the European Union, Canada, and the EFTA           ban centers demonstrating their solidarity with
    states, among others. Furthermore, two trea-       the peasant farmers’ legitimate demands. These
    ties have been endorsed: one with Korea and        protests remind the government of the existence
    one with Costa Rica; but these have yet to con-    of large popular sectors that have been made
    clude the ratification processes. Moreover, the    permanently ‘invisible’ by the developmental-
    Colombian government is also negotiating fur-      ist plans imposed on the country.
    ther agreements with Panama, Turkey, Japan,
    Israel, the Pacific Alliance43 and the Dominican      The national agrarian strike started on Au-
    Republic.44                                        gust 19, 2013 and ended in most regions on
                                                       September 10 after agreement was made on
        These treaties have aggravated the internal    a number of measures in favor of the peas-
    conflict, and although the government presents     ant farmers. Nevertheless, at the current time,
    the conflict as a simple armed confrontation,      some of the strikers have once again criticized
    the conflict actually has a delicate socioeco-     the government for breaching this agreement,
    nomic and political background. The imple-         and the peasant farmers are currently consid-
    mentation of the FTA with the US on May 15,        ering mobilizing themselves again. 47
    2012 exacerbated the obscene levels of vio-
    lence in rural areas,45 which have occurred due        Additionally, since October 14, 2013,
    to disputes over productive and resource-rich      demonstrations initiated by the ‘indigenous,
    territories that promise raw materials with high   social and popular Minga in defense of life,
    market value.                                      territory, autonomy and sovereignty’ have
                                                       blocked 22 major roads in 17 regions of the
        Moreover, the implementation of the FTA        country.48 These peasant farmers claim that
    with the European Union, on August 1, 2013,        more than 70% of the agreements that were
    was the main trigger behind the national agrar-    reached more than three years ago have not
    ian strike started by peasant farmers from dif-    been met. These agreements were supposed
    ferent regions of the country.46 The farmers       to solve the historic marginalization and dis-
    were protesting against neoliberal policies that   crimination suffered by indigenous communi-
    forced them to compete with highly subsidized      ties, which is aggravated by the armed ex-
    products from Europe. The farmers viewed           pression of the conflict. 49 This led the Minga
    these policies as a threat to their farms, and     to establish a list of demands based on five
    to indigenous and Afro-Colombian lands and         points (see box).
    territories. This situation occurred in a coun-
    try where these people already face extremely         The different indigenous organizations
    adverse conditions and a history of economic       that form the Minga once again denounce
    marginalization.                                   the “historic violation” of the rights of the 102
                                                       indigenous communities in Colombia, 35 of
       For example, the FTA meant Colombia would       which are in danger of physical and cultur-
    have to compete with dairy farmers in the Eu-      al extinction, as stated by the constitutional
    ropean Union; a region responsible for 30%         court.57
    of global milk production. In fact, according to
    José Felix Lafaurie, the president of Fedegán         The international community has not acted
    (the livestock sector), in just 15 days Europe     responsibly regarding the humanitarian crisis
    produces 6,500 million liters of milk; this is     in Colombia. This is also clear from the dis-
    equivalent to the total annual Colombian pro-      cussions held in the European Parliament dur-
    duction. Even though Fedegán represents the        ing the ratification process of the FTA between
    biggest livestock owners, most Colombian dairy     Colombia and the European Union. On the
    farmers own less than 50 cows, and 236,000         one hand, this discourse insists human rights
    dairy farmers in Columba own less than 10; in      be respected; on the other hand, when rele-
    other words, these people are extremely poor       vant decisions need to be taken, the economic
    smallholders.                                      interests of specific sectors prevail despite the

8
The list of demands by the indigenous, social and popular Minga
in defense of life, territory, autonomy and sovereignty:

1) “HUMAN RIGHTS, ARMED CONFLICT AND                       the resguardos, but even President Santos
   PEACE: adopt the rights set out in the Unit-            has stated publicly: “consultations and public
   ed Nations Declaration on the rights of In-             audiences are a headache because they are
   digenous Peoples (UNDRIP); demilitarize the             used as an excuse to stop development”.54 In
   indigenous territories; dismantle the Consoli-          this sense, the Minga calls for mining contracts
   dation Plans, and respect the exercise of ter-          or concessions to be revoked in indigenous
   ritorial control by the indigenous guard.”50            territories if such contracts do not conform to
   This is aimed at ending the human rights vio-           the regulations set out in the constitution or to
   lations occurring as part of the internal armed         community rights.
   conflict, and which are being committed by           4) AUTONOMY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT: the
   legal and illegal combatants. In 2012, 78 in-           exercise of autonomy and self-government
   digenous people were murdered and 10,515                is based on the idea of territorial autonomy
   were forcedly displaced.51                              and on the practice of self-regulated govern-
2) TERRITORY: guarantee protection for the in-             ment by indigenous people according to in-
   digenous resguardos (territories), because              digenous views of the world.
   national constitutional laws on their extension      5) FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND AGRICUL-
   and sanitation52 are not being respected. Fur-          TURAL POLICY: promote a referendum aimed
   thermore, protect native seeds.53                       at annulling the FTAs or re-negotiating them;
3) CONSULTATION REGARDING MINING,                          repeal all regulations that are contrary to food
   ENERGY AND HYDROCARBON PROJECTS:                        sovereignty”.55 This is important because FTAs
   even though consultation mechanisms are                 prioritize the interests of multinationals over
   recognized by the constitution, investment              those of ancestral communities, as expressed
   projects are commonly implemented without               by Luis Fernando Arias, secretary general of
   consulting the affected indigenous communi-             the National Indigenous Organization of Co-
   ties. This is the only mechanism that protects          lombia (ONIC).56

consequences that these agreements have for                 It is also important to highlight that Santos’
people’s lives. This situation has even led a           diplomatic style only applies to the international
number of European parliamentarians and                 community; at the national level, the govern-
political parties to call for the suspension of         ment stigmatizes social dissent, and legitimizes
the treaty.58                                           repression carried out by state forces against
                                                        people who go against the government. This is
    It is in the midst of this exclusionary and ex-     particularly evident with the approval of Article
ploitive economic system’s search for legitimacy,       353A of the Penal Code, which establishes pun-
which continues despite the profound humani-            ishments of between 24 and 48 months impris-
tarian crisis in Colombia, that it is possible to un-   onment for people who obstruct transportation
derstand the meaning of Law 1448 better known           routes as part of non-authorized demonstra-
as the Victims and Land Restitution Law. Presi-         tions.59 Moreover, the defense minister is seeking
dent Santos’ diplomatic style has contributed to        to strengthen this article “to enhance the punish-
optimism among the international community              ments and effectively sanction people who incite,
regarding the situation in Colombia. However,           lead, provide means for or promote violent acts
although we are seeing a change in government           and proceedings that affect public order or citi-
style, there has been no substantial change in          zens’ normal activities”.60 In addition, the Mobile
terms of the economic model that is being im-           Anti-Disturbances Squadrons (ESMAD) are to be
posed on the country. Consequently, it is cur-          doubled in size; yet these squadrons are respon-
rently impossible to create the conditions that         sible for innumerable abuses of the use of force,
would enable an ‘effective guarantee of rights’         and this has even been recorded by passersby
in Colombia.                                            and journalists.61

                                                                                                               9
4. Demonstrations of ‘good will’: the Victims Law
     and peace negotiations as inconsistent rhetoric

     If we take into account the pressure from the          Although the ‘peace’ negotiations do not
     international community on the economic in-         involve representatives of popular agrarian
     terests defended by Álvaro Uribe Vélez and          sectors, two retired army generals and the
     Juan Manuel Santos, the new government’s            president of the National Industrial Associa-
     eagerness to demonstrate ‘good will’ is under-      tion (ANDI) will be taking part. The only space
     standable. Law 1448, dated June 10, 2010,           for indirect participation has been organized
     and the peace negotiations that took place in       by the UNDP and the National University of
     Havana, Cuba with the FARC-EP, and those            Colombia in a joint effort to bring together di-
     that are expected to take place with the Na-        verse sectors of the population to participate
     tional Liberation Army (ELN), are examples of       in discussion forums on the topics covered in
     this ‘good will’.                                   Havana. The results of these forums are to be
                                                         sent to the negotiations in the form of recom-
         There should be no doubt that Colombia          mendations by civil society. There are other
     needs to end the socioeconomic, political and       peace initiatives that are being built by social
     internal armed conflict, but the problem is ac-     movements and organizations such as Con-
     tually the lack of government recognition of        greso de los Pueblos (People’s Congress) and
     the socioeconomic and political dimensions          Marcha Patriótica (Patriotic March) that are also
     behind the conflict. The government contin-         promoting social empowerment of the peace
     ues to reduce the conflict to its armed expres-     process.
     sion. Even if the negotiators in Havana have
     reached partial agreement on the agrarian              The government’s interest in the negotia-
     problems in the country, the model of devel-        tions seems to be focused on pacifying Colom-
     opment promoted by the government stands            bian territory to make it easier to implement
     in opposition to the interests of rural commu-      the large scale extractive investment projects
     nities. Yet these are the very communities that     that constitute part of the various free trade
     have been excluded from decision-making             agreements.
     processes and made ‘invisible’. These exclu-
     sionary policies affect rural communities, and         Even though negotiations with the guerril-
     for example, hinder their ability to collectively   las represent a very important step towards the
     develop their own territory. These populations      construction of peace in Colombia, these ne-
     have been forcibly displaced, murdered, and         gotiations only represent one dimension of the
     tortured because they lived on lands that mul-      discussions that need to take place. The im-
     tinationals or national enterprises wanted in       plementation of social, political and economic
     order to exploit natural resources or the land’s    justice is also crucial if a solid foundation for
     productive potential.                               peace is to be constructed.

         The government itself has stated, “the cur-        Assuming the dialog between Juan Manuel
     rent model of economic development in Co-           Santos’ government and the guerrillas evolves
     lombia; the legal regime that protects private      into a peace agreement, Colombia will con-
     property; the current foreign investment mod-       tinue to be faced by a situation of ‘multiple
     el, and military doctrine are not going to be       organized criminality’ with the presence of
     part of peace negotiations between the gov-         ‘black hands’, mistakenly known as BACRIM
     ernment and the FARC-EP”.62 However, it is          (reorganized paramilitary structures that con-
     precisely these issues that have been continu-      tinue to threaten and murder people). Fur-
     ally postponed, and that continue to accentu-       thermore, state institutions will continue to
     ate the socioeconomic and political conflict in     be directly or indirectly involved in human
     the country.                                        rights violations, and this will make it diffi-

10
cult to generate the necessary environment           through threats to and assassinations of peas-
that could enable the collective construction        ant farmers claiming their lands, and through
of peace, and an effective implementation            the intimidation of public servants dedicated
of the Victims and Land Restitution Law. This        to implementing the law. This is demonstrated
violence has manifested itself, for example,         in the next chapter.

5. The debates about Law 1448 (2011), better known
as the Victims and Land Restitution Law

Juan Manuel Santos’ government is imple-                Even if peace negotiations with the guerril-
menting Law 1448 to “dictate measures for            las are successful, the problem of the reorgan-
the consideration, and the provision of assist-      ized narco-paramilitary groups will persist: the
ance and restitution to the victims of the in-       so-called ‘Bandas Criminales Emergentes’, which
ternal armed conflict”. From the design-stage        include Águilas Negras, Los Rastrojos, Urabeños
to the formulation of the law, several debates       and Erpac. These groups continue to commit nu-
arose among different sectors and these were         merous human rights violations65 and some even
never completely solved.63 These differences         specially focus on impeding the land restitution
are clear from the inconsistent and lengthy          process by murdering the farmers’ leaders. These
wording of the law, and have been worsened           groups call themselves ‘Ejércitos anti-restitución
by a number of challenges that surfaced dur-         de tierras’ (anti-land restitution armies) and are
ing the law’s year-long implementation. Some         located in Cesar,66 Magdalena, Guajira,67 Sucre
of these debates and challenges are discussed        and Bolívar.68
in the following in the context of their political
framework.                                              The persistent actions of these groups, and
                                                     the impunity they enjoy, are permanent remind-
                                                     ers of the continued presence of the dirty war in
5.1 A post-conflict law in the midst                 Colombia. Between the late 1980s and the early
of an unfinished conflict                            1990s, genocide was committed by the Unión
                                                     Patriótica.69 This organization was granted legal
    Law 1448 is an attempt to move towards so-       status once again in July 2013,70 and the mur-
cial reconciliation. This begins with providing      ders of Nancy Vargas and Milciades Cano, two
acknowledgement and restitution to victims who       former members of this movement, on October
have been historically marginalized, particularly    6, 2013, seem to suggest it may be resurfac-
by the government of Uribe Vélez. The current        ing.71
government’s position is that the law is a dem-
onstration of peace and a firm step towards con-         The Unión Patriótica was a leftist party found-
structing a post-conflict situation. However, the    ed in 1985, mainly composed of demobilized
law is being applied before the conflict has even    members of the FARC who had left the armed
ended.                                               struggle to participate in the dynamics of elec-
                                                     toral politics. Two of its presidential candidates,
    The challenge faced by the law is enormous:      eight members of congress, thirteen deputies,
victims from the past are joining those from         seventy councilors, eleven mayors and about
the present and the future. This poses serious       five thousand militants were systematically mur-
doubts about the temporary framework being           dered through the joint collaboration of the state
developed by the law. Estimates suggest that the     security forces, paramilitary groups and drug
armed expression of the conflict led to 200,000      traffickers. This case has not been taken to the
new victims in 2012 alone.64                         Inter-American Court of Human Rights. As such,

                                                                                                           11
justice has not been done regarding these               will end. Theoretically, conflicting parties would
     events; rather they have become a specter that          first be expected to agree on peace (or one of
     disrupts the ongoing peace negotiations be-             the parties would impose peace on the other),
     tween the FARC-EP and the national govern-              before a transitional justice framework would be
     ment. This leads to the question as to whether          developed. As this has not yet happened in Co-
     demobilized combatants can expect real guar-            lombia, the local context is viewed as particularly
     antees of participating in politics, considering        interesting by many people.
     that during the current Juan Manuel Santos gov-
     ernment, the same government that is holding                However, the originality of the Colombian
     negotiations in Havana, several leaders of the          case results in an outlook where the govern-
     land restitution process have been murdered.            ment continues to provide excessive concessions
                                                             to armed (and unarmed) actors in the name of
         Even the attorney general, Eduardo Monteale-        an unforthcoming situation of peace and social
     gre, accepts that, “there will be a dirty war in Co-    reconciliation. This negatively affects victims’
     lombia during the post-conflict period, and this        rights to truth, justice, restitution, and guaran-
     will be one of the greatest challenges affecting        tees that they will never be victimized again. The
     the Colombian state”.72 Unfortunately, the dirty        accumulated history of impunity in the country
     war is not something destined for the future: it is     worsens this situation, and the Justice and Peace
     already happening, and no effective measures            Law, which paved the way towards ‘transitional
     have been put in place to end it.                       justice’, constitutes part of that history.

                                                                 This juridical framework created to promote
     5.2 A transitional law that oscillates                  paramilitary demobilization has been strongly
     between the longing for peace and the                   criticized.75 First, it has failed in its main objec-
     persistence of war and impunity                         tive, as the paramilitaries have reorganized and
                                                             continue to commit crimes.76 Second, it passes
         The Victims Law needs to be interpreted as          soft sentences on the actors involved, despite the
     part of a process that began during Uribe Vélez’s       massive human rights violations being commit-
     government with Law 975 (2005). This law is             ted and violations of international humanitarian
     popularly known as the Justice and Peace Law            law in return for statements made at ‘free ver-
     (Ley de Justicia y Paz) and was aimed at paramili-      sion’ hearings that depend on the willingness
     tary demobilization. It formed part of the gov-         of the criminals involved to participate.77 These
     ernment’s denial of the armed conflict, and was         hearings often lead to half-truths, and rarely
     an attempt to demonstrate to the international          provide new information about the paramilitary
     community that Colombia was passing through             phenomenon and its promoters.
     a ‘transitional’ stage and on the path to peace.
     At the same time, however, it opened the door               Furthermore, the current situation makes it
     to impunity for crimes committed by the para-           difficult for paramilitaries to make statements at
     militaries.                                             these hearings. There has been a massive ex-
                                                             tradition of paramilitary leaders to the United
         The government’s proposal was strongly criti-       States, and this can be viewed as an attempt to
     cized by the national and international commu-          conceal inconvenient truths about the most pow-
     nity, and this led it to be substantially modified.73   erful sectors of the country. This has not been
     The law was eventually approved in a modified           widely discussed in the country, and as such,
     form; although it still did not take into account       Colombian society is generally unaware of what
     persistent omissions that had been identified by        has been happening.
     the law’s retractors. This opened the path to what
     is known as the situation of ‘transitional justice’         According to the minister of justice, Alfonso
     in the country.74 Both the Justice and Peace Law        Gómez Méndez, the main problem with the law
     and the Victims Law are part of that ‘transitional’     is that the entire truth is rarely demanded. De-
     process.                                                mobilized paramilitaries who speak about their
                                                             versions of the events tend to “suffer from par-
          Colombia is the first country in history to have   tial amnesia: they only remember people who
     begun speaking about transitional justice before        are no longer in this world and the country has
     it is even clear when armed conflict in the country     never found out how paramilitary activity began,

12
who financed it, and who are its accomplices”.78         “The victims of forced displacement and other
Crimes against women, and this includes sexual            human rights abuses committed before 1985
violence, are made particularly invisible, and            may only benefit from symbolic reparations,
this is worsened by the difficulties women have           and not from land restitution or economic
in gaining access to justice.79                           compensation.

    The Victims Law was approved, among other            The victims of human rights abuses commit-
reasons, as a response to criticisms of the Justice       ted between 1985 and 1991 have the right to
and Peace Law, which was providing a juridical            receive economic compensation but not land
framework for the impunity of paramilitaries and          restitution.
enabled them to continue committing crimes.
Furthermore, the Justice and Peace Law led the           Victims whose lands were unlawfully taken or
victims to be forgotten. Although the Victims Law         occupied through human rights abuses after
corrected the errors put in place by the Justice          1991, but before the expiration of the law,
and Peace Law, the two laws coexist and this is           have the right to land restitution. Since the
causing difficulties in implementation.                   law is valid for 10 years, this would mean un-
                                                          til June 10, 2021”.
   This problem has not yet been overcome.
Moreover, implementing flexibility in justice has           The second distinction refers to a person’s
not led to peace or the fulfillment of victims’         recognition – or lack of it – as having been an
rights to truth, justice, reparations and guaran-       armed actor in the conflict. Clearly, victims are
tees that they will no longer be victimized.            unable to benefit from this legislation. This be-
                                                        comes a problem, due to the government’s in-
    The lack of justice regarding the atrocities        sistence on disregarding continuity among the
that continue to be committed in Colombia               paramilitary forces.81 This is not only an attempt
sends a clear message to people participating           to deny the complete failure of the Justice and
in the conflict: whether they are involved in the       Peace Law, but also implies marginalizing the
conflict’s armed, political or socioeconomic di-        victims of paramilitary action before the failed
mensions, they are guaranteed impunity for their        2006 demobilization process.
crimes, and this particularly remains the case for
the most powerful actors.                                   It is no coincidence that instead of calling
                                                        things by their real names, the government la-
                                                        bels reorganized paramilitary groups as ‘emerg-
5.3 Discriminatory treatment                            ing criminal bands’ and includes them as part of
of victims by a law that is supposed                    wider crime. Thus, victims of reorganized para-
to recognize them                                       military groups are excluded from the scope of
                                                        Law 1448, despite the fact that “in many cases,
Although Law 1448 sets out “measures for the            there seems to be a clear relationship between
provision of attention, assistance and reparation       continued paramilitary activity and the constant
to the victims of the internal armed conflict”, the     taking of lands”.82 This situation is worsened by
truth is that not all the victims are covered by        the difficulties faced by victims when they are de-
the law, and those who are, do not necessarily          clared trespassers by state representatives.
receive the same treatment. This has made it dif-
ficult for some people to access compensation              The third distinction concerns the victims’ lev-
and land restitution measures in particular.            el of involvement in the dynamics of the armed
                                                        conflict. It disregards people who have partici-
    The circle of victims has been reduced be-          pated as aggressors, which means:
cause of three conceptual distinctions: a tempo-
ral distinction; official recognition (or the lack of    Illegal armed actors who have suffered hu-
it) of a person’s participation in armed conflict;        man rights violations or infringements of in-
and a victims’ involvement in the dynamics of             ternational humanitarian law cannot be ac-
the armed conflict.                                       knowledged as victims.

   Recalling the argument of Amnesty International,80    This is a particularly thorny issue when ap-
the temporal distinction ensures:                         plied to minors who are victims of forced re-

                                                                                                              13
cruitment. These young people are only rec-              This debate was closely related to a constitu-
        ognized as victims if they are still minors at       tional amendment processed the same year by
        the time of their demobilization.                    the minister of the treasury, Juan Carlos Echever-
                                                             ry. This amendment modified Article 334 and
      In cases of illegal killings committed by the state   defined fiscal sustainability “as an instrument to
       security forces, which usually claim that the vic-    progressively reach the purposes of the social
       tims belonged to an illegal armed group, rela-        and democratic state based on the rule of law”.
       tives are only recognized as victims if a criminal    However, several critics have argued that this
       investigation confirms that the deceased person       was both unnecessary and inconvenient. On the
       was not part of one of those organizations.           one hand, the government already has the tools
       Given the difficulties in clarifying such member-     to achieve responsible and sustainable public
       ship, it may be impossible for relatives to obtain    finances. On the other hand, this amendment
       compensation by virtue of this law.                   reflects a narrow understanding of an objective
                                                             that, although desirable, could be approached
         These three conceptual distinctions demon-          in different ways and not just by reducing social
     strate that Law 1448 does not provide measures          expenditure, limiting compensation to victims,
     for the provision of attention, assistance and          and amending the constitution to include fiscal
     reparation to all victims of the internal armed         sustainability.86
     conflict. Moreover, practical limitations worsen
     this situation. Survivors of human rights viola-            Similarly, Iván Cepeda, a member of the
     tions, who have remained close to the lands they        House of Representatives, recalled that under
     claim, only require formal acknowledgement              the Victims Law, the massive violations of human
     that they are victims of the conflict. In contrast,     rights committed for decades are to be compen-
     people who fled the areas where they once lived         sated with 40 billion pesos over a period of 10
     face difficulties if they have not been recognized      years. However, the country spends close to 20
     as forcefully displaced people.83                       billion pesos annually on defense and security,
                                                             and this is not being questioned by the govern-
        Consequently, bureaucracy (among other               ment.87
     aspects) plays a role in the difficulties faced by
     people in their attempts to gain victim status. This        This narrow and one-sided understanding of
     makes it difficult for victims to access their rights   fiscal stability is evident in the government’s re-
     to truth, justice, compensation and guarantees          peal of Presidential Decree 2170 of October 7,
     that they will no longer be victimized.                 2013. This decree was issued by the State Coun-
                                                             cil in order to reverse the abusive implementa-
                                                             tion of the health, location and home premiums
     5.4 ‘Fiscal sustainability’ is prioritized              foreseen by Law 4 of 1992. Law 4 also aimed to
     over compensation for the victims                       increase the – already quite generous – salaries
                                                             of deputies in congress88without justification. As
     A further debate about Law 1448 regards the so-         such, had the government not repealed Decree
     called criterion of ‘fiscal sustainability’. This law   2170, the nation could have saved more than
     was aimed at limiting the amount of compensa-           2.1 billion pesos89 (more than 800,000 euros)
     tion provided to victims in order to safeguard the      every month.90
     macroeconomic stability of the state. As such,
     this law never aimed to ensure the return of all            These situations demonstrate (among other
     belongings to displaced people; neither did it          things) that this narrow and one-sided under-
     foresee complementary measures such as com-             standing of ‘fiscal sustainability’ is used to limit
     pensation for loss of profit.84                         the rights of vulnerable populations in Colom-
                                                             bia, and is ignored in discussions on the provi-
        Various actors have criticized the govern-           sion of benefits to the most powerful people in
     ment for continuing to find ways of restricting         Colombia.
     the social rights of the most vulnerable, instead
     of questioning “the corruption, the enormous ex-           Furthermore, some organizations have de-
     pense on defense, the generous taxes and tax            nounced the fact that the government seems to
     benefits provided to the richest”85 Colombians          have confused the issue of providing access to
     and foreign nationals.                                  basic social services with the provision of compen-

14
sation measures, as it offers preferential access to        Accordingly, this first perspective calls for a
social services to victims, although such services      massive policy of restitution, the provision of ti-
should be provided to the entire population.            tles and updating the registry and information
                                                        systems to organize and legitimize existing rural
                                                        property titles. This would also help remove the
5.5 Land restitution: consensus between                 suspicion of land ownership being based on ex-
supporters of opposing models of                        propriation.
development
                                                            In contrast, the second perspective conceives
After reconstructing the institutional debates that     land restitution not only as a means of securing
led to the Victims and Land Restitution Law, Rod-       justice for the victims, but also as an acknowl-
rigo Uprimny and Camilo Sánchez91 conclude with         edgement of farmers as fundamental social,
a question that is interesting in the context of this   cultural, economic and political actors. This per-
text: “How was a consensus reached on a topic           spective views farmers’ involvement as essential
that society and the state had abandoned for dec-       for the construction of the inclusive agrarian
ades and which is affected by so many opposing          model being advanced in the discussion of the
economic, political and even military interests?”.92    historical problem of inequitable land distribu-
                                                        tion. It also views this as constituting the root of
   Several precedents that influenced the law           the conflict.
have been mentioned. Uprimny and Sánchez ar-
gue93 that the need for land restitution in Colom-          In summary, whereas the first perspective
bia was accepted by different political trends, but     aims to ‘cleanse’ and organize land property ti-
they identify two main perspectives with different      tles as a means of offering legitimacy and juridi-
scopes and purposes. The first perspective con-         cal security to investments; the second perspec-
ceptualizes land restitution as an instrument of        tive views land restitution as a fundamental step
agricultural development and free trade; in oth-        towards building solutions to the diverse dimen-
er words, clear and legally protected ownership         sions of the conflict.
rights are needed to secure incentives for invest-
ment, savings and the accumulation of wealth.               Although both perspectives could be de-
This perspective, which is based on neoliberal-         veloped in accordance with the land restitu-
ism, criticizes informal ownership titles and the       tion process, their understandings of ‘agrarian
weak institutional protection provided to them.         development’ are mutually exclusive: the first
                                                        perspective aims to enable the accumulation
    However, Colombia is characterized by high          of wealth, and does not seek to guarantee the
levels of informal ownership in rural areas, and        development of farmers’ territories. Instead, the
suffers delays in its official notarial and registry    first perspective would rather move towards in-
system. This is reflected in the lack of up-to-date     tensive large-scale production or the extraction
and properly systematized information. A cadas-         of high-value raw materials for sale on the in-
tral survey has never been undertaken in some           ternational markets. In this case, farmers would
areas of the country. “The information concern-         only have the possibility of acting as cheap la-
ing areas that have been surveyed was updated           bor, or leasing or selling their lands to inves-
in 1994 and 2007; 54% of land registrations             tors.
were not up-to-date”94. Additionally, the infor-
mation available in these surveys is inconsistent          In contrast, the second perspective aims to
with the information held in other official sourc-      empower historically marginalized farmers and
es, and it only records ownership of the land but       enable them to collectively enjoy, and live and
no other rights such as possession, occupation          build on, their lands and territories, rather than
or tenancy.                                             suffering.

    Informality of ownership, violence and the
circuits of illegal economies result in an obscure      5.6 Recovering the land just to die for it
land market that responds to dynamics which,
although they are not difficult to detect, value the    The title of this subsection is based on an article
land according to variables that are not neces-         by Aura Patricia Bolivar, a researcher with De-
sarily related to the actual market price.              justicia dedicated to assessing the implementa-

                                                                                                               15
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