Trade Issues and Beyond: Mexican Perceptions on Contemporary China
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Trade Issues and Beyond: Mexican Perceptions on Contemporary China Romer Cornejo, Francisco Javier Haro Navejas, and José Luis León-Manríquez Opposing the idea that emerging powers in an increasingly multipolar world should have incentives to cooperate, this article analyzes how Mexican perceptions of contemporary China have enhanced competition between the two countries. The article identifies the Mexican trade deficit and the rivalry of Chinese and Mexican manufacturing exports in the U.S. market as the main sources of mistrust. Despite increasing exports of oil and copper to China, these commodities do not offset Mexico’s imports from China. We focus on perceptions and misperceptions forged by Mexican media, politicians, and business, as well as the recurrent diplomatic divergences between Mexico City and Beijing that these attitudes feed. The gap between the heated views of these groups and the more favorable views reported in opinion polls and articles by Mexican scholars is also discussed. This article concludes that, as long as most Mexican perceptions of China are negative, attempts to craft closer relations will not go very far. Desafiando la idea de que los poderes emergentes en un mundo cada vez más multipolar deberían tener incentivos para cooperar, este artículo analiza cómo las percepciones mexicanas sobre la China actual han realzado la competencia entre ambos países. El artículo identifica el déficit comercial mexicano y el desplazamiento de las manufacturas mexicanas por parte de China en el mercado estadounidense como las principales fuentes de desconfianza. Argumentamos que, a pesar del aumento de las exportaciones de petróleo y cobre a China, estos productos no equilibran los números rojos de México en el comercio bilateral. Nos enfocamos en las percepciones y las ideas equivocadas forjadas por los medios, los políticos y los empresarios mexicanos, así como en las recurrentes diferencias diplomáticas entre México y Beijing alimentadas por estas actitudes. El artículo también discute la brecha entre las acaloradas perspectivas de estos grupos y las percepciones más favorables que reportan las encuestas y artículos escritos por académicos mexicanos. Concluye que, mientras que las posturas negativas infiltren gran parte de las percepciones mexicanas respecto a China, los intentos de construir relaciones más estrechas no prosperarán. Key words: China, Mexico, perceptions, trade deficit Latin American Policy—Volume 4, Number 1—Pages 57–75 © 2013 Policy Studies Organization. Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
58 Latin American Policy
Introduction
P erceptions and images have long been used to achieve political and eco-
nomic goals. The Boxer Rebellion (1898–1901) sparked a symbolic fight in
which the contenders (China and the foreign powers) resorted to perception as
a combat weapon. The dragon was turned into an icon, occasionally as a rep-
resentation where Saint George (the “West”) confronted and defeated a beast
(the “Orient”). Even today, the dragon is the symbol that represents an
unfriendly, threatening People’s Republic of China. From theoretical and politi-
cal perspectives, the issue is meaningful, because if different governments and
societies see each other as enemies, the way is paved to “misperception and
conflict” (Castano, Sacchi, & Gries, 2003, pp. 449–468). Closer to the sphere of
ideologies and soft power than discussions on hard power, the construction of
perceptions and images is an essential issue of international relations debates
(Hunt, 1987).
Despite formally amicable Sino–Mexican relations and the potential for bilat-
eral cooperation in an increasingly multipolar world, Mexican perceptions of
China have become a hindrance to better bilateral ties. Where do these percep-
tions come from? Since the 19th century, the Chinese presence in Mexico has had
different socioeconomic dimensions, mostly expressed in trade and immigration.
The increased scale of that presence has led to uneven reactions in Mexico. Most
of these perceptions materialize in heated opinions full of prejudice and verbal
aggression. Some feature xenophobic-oriented humor, targeting Chinese piracy
and the eventual harm it could do to Mexican businesses and institutions. Few
Mexican perceptions of China are based on accurate historical, economic, or
political information.
Trade in energy and mineral resources has been growing slightly since 2010,
but it is still far from being a pillar of Sino–Mexican economic relations. Con-
versely, massive Mexican imports of Chinese consumer goods have sparked a
skewed trade balance since the early 2000s. Our thesis is that unfavorable per-
ceptions of China in Mexico mostly spring from this uneven economic relation-
ship with China and are chiefly boosted by mass media, business, and politicians.
In the absence of consistent and accurate economic policies, many Mexicans
create distorted images and react emotionally, regardless of whether they are
involved in activities related to China. The main reason for the growth of this
irrationality is that some actors tend to blame “the other” for their own faults. If
China’s influence is unilateral, decisive, and irreversible, it affects Mexico in an
irreparable way. Under this victimized self-perception, Mexicans are not respon-
sible for their own problems but are defenseless victims who lose their jobs
because of unfair Chinese trade. As we shall explain, perceptions give rise to
emotions, which in turn may become actions. In the end, these perceptions in
Mexico are an indirect outcome of the lack of sound economic policies and the
incapacity of the political class to fulfill its promises of enhanced welfare for the
population. Although some actors think they perceive the Chinese threat, they
may be looking at their own distorted image, which scares them. As in almost
every perception, what lies behind dominant Mexican views is “the paradigm of
territorial state, which places China in a cultural vacuum” (Shih, 2003, p. 29).
This article divides the discussion of Mexican perceptions on China into six
parts. The first addresses the relevance of perceptions and misperceptions inMexican Perceptions on China 59
international politics and reviews the material interests that underlie Mexican
perceptions of contemporary China, including oil and mineral resources. The
second part offers some examples of how Mexican media address the Chinese
increasing economic competitiveness. The third section analyzes the competition
that Mexican rulers and businesses have set with China in terms of allegiance to
democracy and free markets, and the fourth part notes some of the diplomatic
skirmishes that these two “strategic partners” have fought since 2000. The fifth
portion of the article studies the contrast between the inflammatory statements
of the media and politicians and the more-relaxed vision of Mexican public
opinion. The last section reports the thinking of some Mexican scholars and
former diplomats whose visions of China are not so distorted; unfortunately, this
sector has scant influence in shaping Mexican perceptions of China.
From Perception to Reality: Sources of Misunderstanding in
Sino–Mexican Relations
Confirming that perceptions matter, Jervis (1976) points out,
Logic permits us to distinguish between the “psychological milieu” (the world as
the actor sees it) and the “operational milieu” (the world in which the policy will
be carried out) and to argue that policies and decisions must be mediated by
statesmen’s goals, calculations and perceptions. (p. 13)
According to our analysis, these two aspects are intertwined. In specific situ-
ations (the contextual milieu), actors carry out their policies based on the percep-
tions they have constructed. Weak or incompetent actors are shaped by the
contextual milieu; strong or skillful actors not only are shaped by the context but
also shape it.
Perceptions are nonscientific political constructs (images) based on skewed
impressions of reality. Political and economic actors pursue their actions on the
basis of perceptions, or images. These images—sometimes shadows, sometimes
distortions in a mirror—crystallize into actions that may lack objectivity. There is
always a gap between milieus; successful actors are those who shorten the void
between them. The more distorted a perception is, the less likely actors are to
achieve their particular interests (Haro-Navejas, 2007, p. 456).
Before addressing Mexican perceptions on China, let us retrieve some hard
data that can be useful in understanding such views. China has three main
interests in Mexico: natural resources (mostly mining), closeness to the U.S.
market, and Mexican demand for consumer goods. Its concerns are achieving
steady bilateral diplomatic relations and avoiding measures that impede the flow
of their goods into Mexico. China’s increased presence in Mexico has provoked
different emotions, which are not necessarily spontaneous. More often than not,
they are linked to the visions of local groups affected by the Chinese economic
clout.
These perceptions have objective and clearly identifiable sources in the mate-
rial realm, the increasing share of Chinese exports in the U.S. market, and the
large Mexican trade deficit with China. Mexican exports to the U.S. market began
to fall dramatically in 2002, whereas those of China grew rapidly, displacing60 Latin American Policy
Figure 1. Bilateral Sino–Mexican Trade, 1990–2010
Source: Secretaría de Economía, August 2, 2011,
http://www.economia-snci.gob.mx/sic_php/pages/estadisticas/mexicomay2011/Z3bc_e.html.
Mexico to third place in 2003. In July 2005, China’s exports to the United States
also topped, albeit only temporarily, those of the leader, Canada. In the case of
Mexico, 12 of the top 20 export sectors to the United States are in open compe-
tition with Chinese products. Prominent among them are textiles, cotton prod-
ucts, industrial machinery, televisions, and VCRs. The rapid penetration of China
into the U.S. market has meant for Mexico the cancellation of some of the initial
major benefits of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which
went into force in 1994.
Regarding bilateral trade, when China and Mexico reinstated diplomatic rela-
tions in 1972, commercial exchanges were almost negligible, but Mexico
recorded a long-lasting trade surplus. Since 1988, China had turned the tables; in
the second half of the 2000s, it became Mexico’s second-largest trade partner. As
can be seen in Figure 1, Chinese exports to its trans-Pacific partner grew expo-
nentially. Today, Mexican imports from China account for the bulk of bilateral
trade. This competitive edge of China has affected some industrial sectors in
Mexico, such as textiles and apparel, shoes, toys, and chemistry. Mexican busi-
ness has systematically complained about massive job losses due to unfair com-
petition and has pressed the government to impose restrictions on China’s access
to the Mexican market.
Not surprisingly, Mexico was reluctant to accept the inclusion of China in
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 and was the last country to sign
bilateral treaties necessary for China’s accession to the multilateral agency. Unlike
the South American countries, Mexico has refused to recognize China as a
market economy. Despite the insistence of Beijing, Mexico argues that, insofar asMexican Perceptions on China 61 China is a centrally planned economy, it is impossible to endorse its status as a market economy. No protectionist measure has been enough to curb Mexico’s skyrocketing imports from China. The unbalanced trade between Mexico and China could be reduced by increasing Mexican exports of oil, minerals, and foodstuff. Currently, these products account for the bulk of South American trade with China. Brazil sup- plies China with pig iron and soy; Argentina exports soy complex; Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela export oil; and Chile and Peru provide China with copper. Unlike these economies, commodities in Mexican trade with China are still marginal. Oil was part of the Mexican basket export to some to East Asian countries (mostly Japan and South Korea) in the late 1970s and 1980s. Since the early 1990s, Mexican oil was chiefly exported to the United States, and the quest for alternative markets was almost discarded. In 2010, Mexico began to export oil to China; its value was US$714.7 million, which accounted for 17% of total exports to China. In 2011, the value of oil exports almost doubled, reaching US$1.3 billion—22.3% of Mexican exports. However dynamic it may seem, the supply of energy to China has been far from steady; Mexican oil has been sent to China occasionally to offset temporary shortages from third partners. The reason for this haphazard exchange may well dwell in the specific conditions of Mexican oil and the refining capacities of China. Three-fourths of Mexican oil exports are made of heavy Maya oil, and China’s capacities for refining heavy fuel are limited.1 In recent years, Chinese refiners have built or upgraded facilities to process heavy and sour oil. In early 2011, China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) and the state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA) started building a US$9.08 billion joint refinery project in Guangdong province (El Universal Caracas, 2012). It is expected that this refinery will significantly boost Chinese abilities for refining heavy oil such as that from Venezuela, Sudan, and Mexico. It remains to be seen whether Mexican oil exports to China turn into long-term trade or remain as episodic as they have been. Another commodity, copper, is also gaining importance in Mexican exports to China. Although not as abundant as in Chile, there are important copper reserves in the states of Sonora, Chihuahua, and Zacatecas in the north of Mexico. The value of Mexican copper exports to China rose from US$118.4 billion in 2007 to US$1 billion in 2011. In the last year, copper accounted for 16.8% of Mexican exports to China (Secretaría de Economía, 2012). Why is trade of oil and copper still marginal on the larger map of Sino– Mexican economic relations? The answer may dwell in the United States, a third party indirectly involved in China–Mexico economic relations. From Mexico’s perspective, the straightforward access of its goods and services to the U.S. market implied in NAFTA is a strong incentive for concentrating its exports of oil and minerals in the North American market. On the Chinese side, it seems that Beijing is cautious regarding engaging major U.S. trade partners if the United States might feel threatened by China’s presence in its immediate area of influence. Hence, China seems to be looking for suppliers in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, which are less closely tied to the United States than Mexico.
62 Latin American Policy
China’s Image in the Mexican Media: Disinterest,
Distortions, and Actions
Given the imbalance in the commercial pattern in Sino–Mexican relations and
the virtual impossibility of overcoming it through Mexican exports of energy and
mineral resources, it comes as no surprise that Chinese competition provokes a
range of reactions (most of them negative) in different sectors in Mexico. Media
is a key factor in forging perceptions of China. Broadly speaking, there are two
main sets of media that influence perceptions: electronic and written. Regarding
the former, television and radio are the most salient. The Mexican state owns its
own television stations (Canal 11 and Canal 22), which usually are targeted to
highly educated people; news there is usually descriptive and rather sober. The
more influential medium in Mexico is the virtual television duopoly made up of
Televisa and TV Azteca. In a country where, according to the 2010 national
census, more households have television sets (93%) than refrigerators (82%) or
showers (65%), the influence of television is pervasive. China is not a priority for
this kind of electronic medium, where news shows are more focused on national
issues, brief economic notes, sports, and celebrity gossip.
The private, so-called national newspapers such as La Jornada, El Universal,
Milenio, and Reforma and local television stations, radio stations, and newspapers
usually raise the distortions and misperceptions on China. With the exception of
some monthly journals that intellectuals run (Nexos and Letras Libres), rich fami-
lies, politicians, and former journalists own most of the private media in Mexico.
Owners impose what is called the “editorial line,” which usually depends on
their pacts with specific political groups. As in other countries, all forms of
Mexican journalism are far from objective. The overarching goal of the Mexican
media has more to do with making money than anything. Unfortunately, exces-
sive empowerment of the media has been one of the by-products of Mexico’s
transition to democracy.
The interest of Mexican media in China has increased for multiple reasons:
China’s accession to the WTO in December 2001, Mexico’s growing imports of
Chinese goods, competition in the U.S. market, awareness of mounting Chinese
economic and political influence, and the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008. The
strategy of economic growth in China, its consequences in terms of increasing
competitiveness in the Mexican and U.S. markets, and the nature of the Chinese
cultural, social, and political systems have frequently been ignored or, even
worse, reported with poor quality information. Although some Mexican media
have correspondents in China, news generally depends on dispatches from
foreign agencies.
China sporadically becomes a trendy topic, usually for negative reasons. Nega-
tive information dominates the perception of threat that specific sectors of gov-
ernment and business and opinion leaders in Mexico express. The absence of a
national strategy to face Chinese competition is justified through the construction
of negative imageries about China, which is blamed for Mexico’s unemployment
and faltering economic policies. The medium where more anti-Chinese positions
have grown is the Internet. One of the earliest and most compelling Web pages is
http://pincheschinos.blogspot.com/, founded in January 2005. This site contains
humor-oriented updates on China’s pirated products, but it lacks any self-
containment or political correctness.Mexican Perceptions on China 63
Instead of encouraging better knowledge about China, Mexican media fre-
quently portray China as their “favorite villain.” As Serrano (2006, p. 27) notes,
“We blame China for taking away our jobs, investment and competitiveness. Rare
is the day that media does not mention that China represents a big threat to our
country.” Mexican media contribute to shaping perceptions on China, usually in
a sensationalist way. Some illustrative headlines taken from mainstream printed
media illustrate the point. The following sample was taken from the newspapers
El Universal, Milenio Diario, El Financiero Reforma, and Reporte Índigo (Mexico
City), between 2003 and 2012. The ideological spectrum of such media swings
between right and center-left. Despite these orientations, none of these newspa-
pers could be classified as openly sensationalist. Let us review some of their
headlines on China:
China ‘swallows’ the Mexican market (Jardón, 2003).
Common front against China, demands Derbez (Milenio Diario, 2003).
Manufactures, increasingly fragile; China, a threat (Becerril, 2005).
Chinese command attacks to evacuate town (Jiménez, 2005).
Mexico at war against China in the WTO (Castro, 2005).
China hits markets (Opalín, 2005).
The dragon monopolizes (Reforma, 2005a).
Chinese pirates invade Chiapas (Reforma, 2005b).
Chinese motorbikes invade Mexico (Cantera, 2006).
Chinese attack the peso (Loret de Mola, 2009).
China threatens national security (Howard, 2012).
Beyond this supermarket tabloid style, it is not unusual to note that content
and headlines have no relation. Although a headline is pure sensationalism,
information is descriptive, day-to-day news. More often than not, the media
portray a vision of a threatening China, helping to shape biased perceptions in
their audience.
To what extent have these perceptions derived into anti-Chinese actions?
Unlike the 1910s or the 1920s, when anti-Chinese rhetoric in Mexico grew into
expropriations of Chinese business and even physical aggression, contemporary
conflict has mostly been symbolic. For instance, there have been some demon-
strations outside the Chinese Embassy in Mexico City to complain about job
losses in the textile sector and the shoe industry. In Monterrey, state of Nuevo
León, 31 Chinese engineers were arrested in June 2004 for a few hours because
craft workers of a local market accused them of pirating their designs (La Nación,
2004). The media may have encouraged those artisans; a few days earlier, there
was news about Chinese designers stealing Mexican handicraft designs.
Other incidents occurred in 2007. On December 12, when Catholics celebrate the
apparition of Our Lady of Guadalupe, an important element in the make-up of the
Mexican identity, there were some unrelated acts connected to specific aspects of
the Chinese presence in the country. The first developed in Mexico City, where
deputies to the Legislative Assembly of the capital, members of the Social Demo-
cratic Coalition, sledge hammered Chinese bathroom fixtures under the double
argument that it was an illegal import and that it did not meet the Mexican Official
Norm (Norma Oficial Mexicana, NOM) on the proper use of water (Ayala, 2007).
The other event took place in the industrial city of León, Guanajuato, where
approximately 20,000 workers and employers, politically educated in the corpo-
ratist nationalism of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), marched to64 Latin American Policy
the beat of a military band, shouting loud songs against the Chinese. The event
was labeled La marcha por la unidad y el empleo (Rally for Unity and Employment).
Concerned by what they saw as the imminent loss of their regional identity and
jobs in the shoe industry, demonstrators protested against “unfair competition”
from China. One of the speakers, José Antonio Abugaber Andonie, president of
the Chamber of the Footwear Industry of the State of Guanajuato, said, “200 years
ago, we refused to be part of another country, Spain. Today we refuse to be part
of China” (Aguinaga, 2007).
A more concrete action against Chinese interests took place in November 2012,
in Puebla state’s Zautla County. Against the will of the state and federal govern-
ments, and after 10 days of intense mobilization, some 5,000 people closed the
facilities of JDC Minerals. Holding posters in local languages and in Chinese,
protesters mixed environmental concerns with xenophobic expressions. After an
ultimatum of the popular assembly, 10 workers of JDC’s gold, silver, and copper
mine La Lupe (whose development was still in the early phases), had to leave
town (Camacho, 2012). This movement targeted mining, one of the few sectors in
which Chinese firms are eager to invest in Mexico.
In all of the above situations, actors responded from a particular perception of
reality and acted accordingly and, with differing doses of symbolic violence,
defeated negotiation and politics. In a broad contextual milieu, perception over-
took rationality, and emotion overflowed. A demonstration allegedly to defend
employment became the defense of a motherland that was concerned about
falling into the hands of China, a foreign power. In the case of lawmakers in
Mexico City, their political performance and emotional action shows a desire to
attract voters but also reflects their inability to address the problem with laws and
the encouragement of competitiveness policies at the local level.
“Free Market” Versus “Exploitation:” The Perceived Competition
between Two Economic Models
Many Mexican politicians do not know what to do with democracy and
seldom respond to the mandate of their constituents. Although incumbents do
not deliver suitable policies, they feel proud of a “Mexican model,” whose main
trait would be respect for democracy and free market policies. Divisive Mexican
democracy has been used as an ideological tool against the Chinese government.
Unable to compete with China through increasing exports or greater GDP
growth, Mexican politicians and businesspeople underline the purported supe-
riority of the “Mexican way.” Regardless of each country’s economic growth,
allegiance to democracy and free-market policies becomes the only yardstick of
success in this discourse. A brief selection of phrases by top Mexican officials
illustrates our point.
In an attempt to justify Mexican economic backwardness, in September 2003,
President Vicente Fox declared that the international competitiveness of China
was founded on an authoritarian labor system (La Jornada, 2003). The Mexican
leader criticized low wages and lack of social benefits in China. He made this
statement a few hours before meeting the new Chinese Ambassador, Ren Jingyu,
for the first time.2 In April 2003, Fernando Canales Clariond, then the Mexican
minister of economy, stated, “Mexico is a democratic country where there is
respect for human rights, freedom of the press, alternation of power, long-termMexican Perceptions on China 65
policies, and an efficient banking system. With all due respect, China is not a
democratic country, does not respect human rights, and has no solid political or
financial institutions . . . the current Chinese administration promotes business,
but who knows what the next one is going to do” (El Universal, 2003a). When the
Chinese Embassy and Mexican opposition parties reacted against his speech, his
apology was that he had heard these arguments from Mexican businesspeople
(El Universal, 2003b).
In September, Antonio Muñiz Trincado, president of the Industrial Association
of Vallejo (an industrial zone in northern Mexico City), echoed the minister’s
words. To explain poor Mexican economic performance, he compared labor
conditions in Mexico and China, complaining about “illegal imports” from the
latter. He said that Chinese workers “have no medical insurance, housing credits
or yearly bonus; they do not have a bunch of social benefits that we luckily have
in this country” (Cornejo, 2008, p. 347).
Although the Mexican government has been trying to mend fences with China
since 2006, ex-President Felipe Calderón and his aides could not avoid compar-
ing what they saw as a Mexican economic success with the perceived failure of
China. Quoting the projections of some consultancy firms, Calderón frequently
stated that Mexico would be the fifth-largest economy in the world in 2040, after
China, the United States, India, and Brazil (Pueblo en línea, 2009). However
accurate this kind of argument may be, it still resembles Aesop’s fable The Frog
and the Ox. In that fable, a frog inflates itself to show its peers that he can be as
big as a grazing ox. When it is about to reach the ox’s size, the frog explodes.
Ex-President Calderón and his ministers’ comments in which they favorably
compare Mexico with China could fill a book. In late February 2007, during a
temporary drop in the Shanghai Stock Exchange, Calderón declared that the fall
demonstrated the “fragility” of the Chinese economy and reinforced the view
“that Mexico is a good place to invest . . . because it has a very strong economy in
order and a financial system also in order” (El Economista, 2007). A few months
later, reality tested the Mexican president’s assessment. With the global crisis of
2008–2009, Mexico’s GDP fell 6.5% in 2009. China weathered the storm with more
success, achieving a growth rate of 8.7%. Moreover, China was a key factor in
leading the economic recovery in Asia and the world.
The purported moral superiority of the Mexican model is frequently reflected
in the mirror in which Mexican business wants to see its own image. During the
29th Ordinary Assembly of the Consejo Coordinador Empresarial, an umbrella
organization of top business chambers, ex-President Calderón (2011a) declared,
Regarding manufacture exports to the United States, we are already the most
competitive economy in the world. As shown by a study of AlixPartners, Mexico
has the lowest production cost of manufacturing exports to the U.S. market. This is
also clear, for example, in the business indicator of the World Bank. When I entered
the Presidency of the Republic, we were number 73 in the Doing Business Index of
the World Bank. Now we are ranked in number 35, which means that Mexico is
more competitive to open new businesses than all of Latin America, and even
more competitive than the BRICs, Brazil, Russia, India or China, just to mention a
few.
As for democracy, political freedom, and even technical capabilities,
ex-President Calderón (2011b) noted that Mexico bests the Asian giants, includ-
ing what he considers an undemocratic India:66 Latin American Policy
All over the world, global companies are not only looking for competitive, low-
cost salaries . . . they are increasingly seeking quality people who work for them.
They are looking for that in Mexico, not for low wages, because they can go to
China, India, and many places that have very low wages, with no unions, no
freedom, and no democracy for workers. Nor they are only looking for the logistic
costs of raw materials. They are looking for the quality of technicians and
engineers.
In the Murky Mirror of Diplomacy
Politics, both internal and foreign, is a singular sphere in which to construct
and transmit perceptions. There have been contextual milieus where Chinese and
Mexican governments face a murky mirror. They perceive each other in elusive
ways without understanding the core of the problem. A good example from the
Mexican side is former President Vicente Fox (2000–2006), whose offensive
remarks against some countries and groups of people (including China and the
Chinese) are unforgettable.
In October 2004, with the visit of the Dalai Lama as a backdrop, Mexican
government officials showed their inability to act as politicians with experience.
An almost ritualistic situation, such as the Chinese complaint about the Dalai
Lama’s visit, became a diplomatic conflict. Ren Jingyu, the Chinese ambassador
to Mexico City, branded the Mexican officials as ignorant people who did not
know about the Tibet issue and were unaware of the Dalai Lama’s personality.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested almost on the spot. This situation
opened an opportunity for the media to construct the perception of a powerful,
arrogant China, able to impose its conditions on its Mexican counterpart. After
critically commenting on the position of the Chinese ambassador, a favorite
high-middle class analyst (Dehesa, 2004, p. 1) affirmed, “damn nosy Chinese
(pinche chino metiche).” Although we do not advocate a political position or a
specific ideology, we think that the use of derogatory expressions can pave the
way to racist generalizations that could brand millions of people.
On March 9, 2006, in a ceremony at the Honda assembly plant in the state of
Jalisco, Fox criticized the opposition candidate and the negative effects on the
economy of increasing public expenditure in the 1970s. To prove his point, he
said that, during past populist governments, “We were teased as vile Chinese”
(Vargas & García, 2006).
After he took office in late 2006, President Felipe Calderón tried to reduce the
verbal belligerence against China. During the first two years of his tenure, Sino–
Mexican relations seemed to gain momentum, as the Mexican government
shifted its discourse from threats to opportunities and sought to improve the
institutional framework. Mexico tried to mend fences with China via the Taiwan
issue. In January 2008, former President Vicente Fox had to cancel a private trip
to Taipei to attend the First Global Forum on New Democracies because of
pressure from the Chinese Embassy. In July 2008, during former President
Calderón’s visit to China, the two countries signed seven cooperation
agreements.
Those signals notwithstanding, Mexican leaders’ perceptions of China have not
substantially changed. The Calderón administration was too absorbed in its own
problems and did not seem to have a comprehensive policy to deal with Asia,
China, or the world other than the United States. Mentions of China in theMexican Perceptions on China 67 National Development Plan (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2007–2012) are just a few lines, whereas most of the emphasis of Mexican foreign policy is put on the dwindling Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, rather than on powers such as China, India, or Japan (Poder Ejecutivo Federal, 2007). In addition to the obses- sive comparison of the two economic models, overt or disguised conflict with China has far from disappeared. The most unpleasant diplomatic friction with China since the tenure of the Partido Acción Nacional began in 2000 occurred between April and May 2009, during the outbreak of the AH1N1 virus in Mexico. In what could be seen as a normal procedure, especially taking into account Mexico’s sloppy handling of the health crisis and the awful image transmitted to the outside world, the Chinese government put a group of 40 healthy Mexican tourists under quaran- tine and suspended direct flights from Mexico. This situation allowed Mexican media and government to construct a negative perception that encouraged nationalistic anger against China. Nobody recalled that, in 2003, the Mexican health authorities acted in a similar fashion with 38 Chinese sport trainers during the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome. Even though they had medical certificates, as soon as they arrived at the Centro Ceremonial Otomí (a place near Toluca, state of Mexico, where high-performing athletes train), the group was put under observation (El Universal, 2003c). After Mexicans were quarantined in China, most of the Mexican mass media reacted angrily. Hence, they spread opinions based on distorted perceptions. The situation worsened when former President Calderón provided an abrupt answer. In a television intervention he said that, unlike other countries, Mexico was facing the epidemic in a transparent way. The reference to China and its initial manage- ment of the SARS outbreak in 2002–2003 was clear (López, 2009). Bilateral rela- tions reached their lowest point since 1972. Beijing closed its consulate in Mexico for two weeks and withdrew Mexico’s status of special guest at an international event where Mexican farmers would present, among other things, their pork products. Misperceptions and aggressive language once again led to diplomatic conflict. After that incident, relations somehow improved. The Mexican government had a two-pronged policy. It was seeking to reach the Chinese market while at the same time adopting less-severe policies to ease constraints on Chinese goods. One of the main initiatives signed on the occasion of Calderon’s 2008 trip to China was the Agreement on Trade Remedy Measures, which establishes Mexico’s obligation to eliminate antidumping duties for a total of 953 tariff lines covered by the Protocol of Accession of China to the WTO in December 2001. During the first year of the new agreement, Mexico eliminated antidumping duties on 749 Chinese products and established 749 transitional measures for the remaining 204 tariffs. The government pledged to eliminate all of the quotas on December 11, 2011. Imme- diately, some Mexican businesspeople expressed their dissatisfaction with the agreement and sought unsuccessfully to block it in the courts. After the same trip, the Calderón administration tried to change its focus from commercial claims to a discourse of economic alliance, centered on the mutual possibilities of attracting and protecting foreign direct investment (FDI). Both countries signed an agreement for investment promotion. During a meeting with businesspeople in Shanghai, Calderón compared Mexico’s openness to FDI with
68 Latin American Policy
that of other Latin American countries (Venezuela) “that are not hospitable to
investment” (Terra, 2008). Other Mexican top officials have also stressed this
view. During his opening statement at the Investment Forum China–Mexico 2011
in Mexico City, the director of Proméxico (the government trade promotion
agency), Carlos Guzmán Bofill, said that Mexico and China must create better
collaboration schemes for investment. “The key for promoting economic integra-
tion in the two countries is investment; so far, trade has been the linchpin of our
economic deals” (Chinese Embassy in Mexico City, 2006).
This effort to attract Chinese investment does not appear to be a sound choice.
Unlike trade, Chinese investment in Mexico is marginal. According to data from
China’s embassy in Mexico, 57 Chinese firms operate in Mexico, whereas Mexico
has 109 projects with US$65 million of investment in China. Conversely,
Proméxico reports that only eight Chinese companies have FDI in the country
(Chávez, 2011). Beyond these statistical discrepancies, the hard fact is that China
remains a marginal partner in terms of investment. In 2008, Chinese FDI in
Mexico represented only 1/3,579 of the United States, 1/879 of the Canadian,
1/132 of the South Korean, and 1/53 of the Japanese (León-Manríquez &
Haro-Navejas, 2009).
Pragmatic Beams in the Mirror of the Polls
In Mexican public opinion, perceptions seem to be clearer, more pragmatic,
and less emotional than those of the media, business, and the political class.
There is a stark contrast between the militancy of those groups and popular
perceptions of China. China is not usually one of the main concerns in the design
of opinion polls in Mexico. Few of them ask how citizens could feel directly
affected by bilateral relations, and none assess perceptions of the presence of
Chinese in Mexico. It is still possible to find some perceptions of China in the
framework of broader research about more general topics.
In November 2005, 35% of respondents to a poll conducted by Ipsos-Bimsa had
good or very good perceptions of China; on the opposite side, 19% had a bad or
very bad opinion. This poll also showed that 30% considered that Mexican
relations with China were good or very good, against 20% who thought they
were bad or very bad. It is worth underlining that the higher the educational level
of the respondents, the better opinion of China they had. Paradoxically, 52%
considered that China represented unfair competition for Mexican firms, and
27% thought that China could be a potential market. Close to 54% expressed that
the increased intensity of the bilateral relations was beneficial, 41% said it was
economically harmful, and 30% said it was prejudicial for the common people.
Regarding employment, 33% of respondents said that deeper bilateral relations
would increase employment, and 28% felt that they would lower it (Centro de
Estudios Sociales y de Opinión Pública, 2006).
Many Mexicans (46%) who responded to another poll by Consulta Mitofsky
(2007) stated that the United States had the strongest friendship with their
country. In the eyes of 33.6% of the respondents, China was in the third position
of positive opinion behind Spain (48.6%) and United States (34.5%). The same
firm conducted another poll in May 2008 and found the 10 countries with the best
image among Mexicans. After France and Spain (45%), Mexicans placed ChinaMexican Perceptions on China 69 (39.3%), the United States (37.3%), and Argentina (33.5%). Consulta Mitofsky argued that the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing may have triggered this positive Chinese image (Campos & Penna, 2008). Mexican perceptions of China are also traced, in a more systematic fashion, through biennial polls conducted by the Center for Economic Research and Teaching since 2004. These polls are aimed at measuring perceptions of elites and the Mexican population in general. In 2006, 47% of the respondents saw a threat in the rise of China as a world power. Two years later, on the eve of the Olympic Games, this percentage decreased to 32%. In 2006, 36% saw it as a negative trend that China’s economy was catching up with that of the United States, but a similar proportion (33%) perceived this as positive; in 2010, posi- tive opinions about the growth of the Chinese economy reached 40%, whereas negative ones remained at 37%. These percentages were radically different when posing the same questions to top businesspeople, politicians, opinion makers, and scholars. In 2006, 67% of that group said that Chinese economic strength was positive, but such favorable opinion fell to 59% in 2010. In 2006, Mexicans had a favorable opinion of China as a country and gave it a high grade, fifth place, with 66 points, behind Canada (75), the United States (74), Australia (69), and Japan (68). In the 2010 poll, China was in sixth place, with 62 points. Despite this slight deterioration of China’s image, 76% of the respon- dents said that Asian countries were more an “opportunity” than a “threat” to Mexico (González & Minushkin, 2007, pp. 39, 45, 51; González, Martínez i Coma, & Schiavon, 2007, pp. 49, 64–65; González, Schiavon, Crow, & Maldonado, 2011, pp. 74, 90–91). The outcomes of these surveys converge with larger-scale studies that confirm improvements in some aspects of international perception, contradicting Cooper Ramo’s (2007) point that “China’s greatest strategic threat today is its national image” (p. 12). For example, a study conducted in 27 countries by the firm GlobeScan and the University of Maryland for the BBC (2011) found that Germany was the country with the best image in the world, followed by the United Kingdom. The United States and China ranked seventh and eighth, respectively. According to the survey, 44% of respondents saw China as a positive influence, compared with 40% in 2010 and 39% in 2009. Meanwhile, the percent- age of people with critical views of the international role of China remained unchanged at 38% in 2010 and 2011. The most favorable views toward China were found in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia; the least hospitable opinions came from the United States, Western Europe, Northeast Asia, and India. What accounts for this obvious gap between the tough anti-Chinese verbosity of the Mexican media and politicians and the more-relaxed view of public opinion? Lacking further hard data, we can only posit a thesis. As long as most of the people shape their worldviews through the television, where international affairs and China-related news are a third- or fourth-level priority, the effect of anti-Chinese discourses must be limited. Conversely, newspaper readers are a dwindling minority, mostly concentrated in urban areas. In 1994, total print of newspapers in Mexico was 1,090,261; in 2000, it had decreased to 901,283; in 2008 it declined further to 824,090 issues (Vidal Bonifaz, 2008). In a total population of 106 million people, the penetration of written media (where anti-Chinese views are more recurrent) is modest.
70 Latin American Policy
A Less Distorted (but Marginal) Image of China
Mexican public opinion of China might be better than that of politicians and
media, but some actors still see a clearer Chinese image in the mirror. They
mostly belong to the ranks of Mexican academia and proto think thanks, but
there are still some respectable voices within the media and the political class.
Their reasoning is diverse. Some think that Mexico should not blame China for
Mexico’s own shortcomings; according to them, responsibility for the rampant
trade deficit falls instead with the federal government for not having designed
appropriate trade and industrial policies to face Chinese competition. A second
group makes the case for the advantages of mutual understanding and invites us
to explore further possibilities of economic, cultural, and political collaboration
between the two countries. A third group advocates a closer analysis of the
specific features of Chinese history, politics, and economic strategy; some among
them suggest, implicitly or explicitly, that Mexico should emulate the Chinese
development experience. Here are some examples of these positions.
The first group of analysts sees Mexico in the Chinese mirror, but unlike the
government discourse of moral superiority, it thinks that China’s success sharply
contrasts with the meager outcomes of the orthodox strategy that Mexico has
followed since 1982. The root of the problem is that trade liberalization has not
been matched by effective industrial and trade policies. These analysts also think
that an important source of the trade deficit with China resides in Mexican
businesspeople’s reluctance to explore different markets from those that they
have historically entered.
Héctor Vázquez Tercero, a consultant and former trade officer for the Mexican
government, contends that,
In Mexico we blame China for all our misfortunes. We ask its government to help
us stop smuggling of Chinese products. We exchange state visits and welcome and
celebrate multiple agreements. In practice nothing is effective. We lack rulers made
in China. (Cornejo, 2008, p. 349)
A university researcher (De la Cruz, 2010) deems that the main problem lies in
the different decision-making capacities of the two countries. “China decides and
moves; Mexico does not.”
A small variation in this discourse accepts the idea that China does not always
respect the rules and frequently practices unfair trade, but concurring with the
uneasiness about the “Mexican model,” this interpretation notes that
Mexican businessmen and government officials tend to blame the PRC for the ills
of national economy without realizing that, no matter what Chinese do or fail to do,
Mexico is obliged to do its own work. It is always easier to blame others for one’s
mistakes. (Rosas, 2007, pp. 469–471)
The second position is somehow normative and seeks to turn China into an
opportunity, instead of the threat that the media and politicians depict. This
position underscores the need for economic synergies with China and the idea
that cultural and political contacts with Beijing can be used to diversify Mexican
foreign policy options. A former vice minister of international trade negotiations
at the Ministry of Economy affirms that, “besides being a strong competitor,Mexican Perceptions on China 71
China may be an important partner if Mexico strengthens its presence in the
global production chains through Asia” (Villalobos, 2007, p. 113).
Beyond economic alliances, León-Manríquez and Haro-Navejas (2009) argue
that
The bilateral relationship can be more complex, having richer and more profound
effects in the long term, especially in the cultural aspect. This does not mean that
trade will lose relevance. Conversely, the need to reduce trade imbalance is com-
pounded by the goal of breaking the paradox between the upbeat speeches and the
limits of mutual economic relations. (p. 65)
Kerber Palma (2009) goes further with this line of analysis, saying that, “far
from complaining that the Mexican flags, crafts, or even the Virgin of Guadalupe
are made in China . . . political connections with China should be strengthened”
(p. 375).
The third group postulates that, to compete with China, Mexicans must have a
deeper knowledge of the important features of specific Chinese traits. Scholars
and former diplomats who were in contact with China before it became a trendy
issue in the 2000s often defend this position. The director of one of the main Asian
study centers in Mexico believes that, “in order to avoid misjudgments, it is
necessary to extend the knowledge about China’s participation in the global
economy, as well as understand the economic and political systems that support
it” (Hernández Hernández, 2004, p. 7). The first Mexican ambassadors to China
appraise the lessons of that country in economic theory and consider that
the successful experiment of implementing a successful mixed economy within a
socialist political system put into question static notions about the operation and
viability of economic policies with high state component. (Rodríguez y Rodríguez
& Anguiano Roch, 2008, p. 272)
In an analysis published by a Mexican liberally oriented think tank
(Herrera-Lasso et al., 2008), a group of scholars and former ambassadors to
China states that
The so-called “China Syndrome” is nothing more than the efficient management
mix of the “old” economy with the “new” economy. That is, the combined use of
traditional elements with the best global models, integrated into a country’s
strength factor, where ideologies and political factors are subsumed.
With a similar view, Ventura Valero (2007), a former director general for Asia-
Pacific at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs writes the following:
The future development of the relationship [China–Mexico] . . . has much to do
with internal factors such as the competitiveness of our economy, investment in
education, scientific and technological development, job training and infrastruc-
ture, among other factors beyond the scope of [Mexican] foreign policy. (pp. 50–51)
Sometimes these calls to improve the understanding of the Chinese experience
become uncritical admiration and even an open quest for imitation. For example,
in an interview with Xinhua (2011), the chairman of the Senate Committee on
Asia-Pacific stated that, in a short amount of time, China managed to achieve
development with social balance, taking millions of Chinese out of poverty to a72 Latin American Policy
better standard of living. The lawmaker noted that these measures should be a
model for other economies, because China showed the world that it is possible.
The senator concluded that “Mexico should see China as a model to copy”
(Xinhua, 2011).
Although generally better informed and empathetic, these voices are far from
being a majority and are only seldom taken into account. Inasmuch as they have
a small influence on the public debate, the construction of a middle-ground
position different from the perceptions of the bulk of the media and politicians
becomes a difficult task. Most perceptions that Mexicans have of China still
oscillate between frustration, indifference, and envy.
Conclusions
Mexican perceptions of China are far from homogeneous. Most of them are
based on a superficial knowledge that takes into consideration spare elements
that are usually out of context: economic growth, the political system, or both.
Instead of understanding the East Asian country’s history through its own
context and cultural milieu, perceptions usually reflect Mexicans’ despair. In
other words, scientific knowledge is only occasionally employed to explain what
has happened in China.
We have analyzed two main sets of heterogeneous perceptions that represent
specific political, economic, and intellectual sectors that are torn between envy
and frustration and admiration. For Mexican elites, Chinese economic clout and
increasing worldwide presence is difficult to handle. Although the electronic
media do not pay much attention to China, the written media usually adopt
sensationalist positions that do not contribute to a deep understanding of China’s
growing influence in Mexico. In turn, politicians’ dominant perceptions tend to
reflect their own inability to deliver stability and economic growth. As for busi-
ness, intense competition with China in Mexican and U.S. markets engenders
an emotional and hostile approach toward China. The main problem is that
misperceptions limit the capacity of Mexican actors to craft more-assertive atti-
tudes and policies toward a rising China.
By contrast, general public opinion is softer on China. Some specific sectors,
mostly linked to academia and diplomacy, advocate for scientific understanding
and more-constructive approaches to China. Regardless of how educated and
well informed their audiences may be, this group has limited influence in
shaping the vision of business or the political class. Although bilateral diplomatic
rhetoric stresses that China and Mexico are “strategic partners,” illusions have
faded. Most likely, China and Mexico will remain not only on parallel, but also on
opposite paths in the future. At least from the Mexican angle, mutual perceptions,
dominated in turn by a peculiar mix of disinterest, ignorance, and gross distor-
tions, will encourage this “friendly distance.”
About the Authors
Romer Cornejo is Professor of Contemporary History of China in the graduate
program of Chinese Studies at El Colegio de México, Mexico City, and editor of
the journal Estudios de Asia y África. Among other books and articles, he hasMexican Perceptions on China 73
published En los intersticios de la democracia y el autoritarismo. Algunos casos de Asia,
África y América Latina (ed), Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 2006; China. Radiografía de
una potencia en ascenso (ed), Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 2008; and China.
Estudios y ensayos (Ed.), El Colegio de México, forthcoming.
Francisco Javier Haro Navejas has written extensively on different topics
related to Asia, especially China. He is professor at the Department of Economics,
Universidad de Colima, México. Some of his works are The People’s Republic of
China in Central America and the Caribbean: Reshaping the Region; Constructing
Chinese Identity; Beijing frente a las “minorías nacionales”: La fe grande y las fes
pequeñas, Three Amigos & A Non-Regional Player: China As a Challenge Inside and
Outside NAFTA Box.
José Luis León-Manríquez is Professor of International Affairs & East Asian
Studies in the Department of Politics and Culture, Universidad Autónoma
Metropolitana-Xochimilco, Mexico City. He is a former diplomat and holds a PhD
in Political Science from Columbia University, New York. He has published more
than 80 articles in journals and book chapters. His most-recent books are China en
el siglo XXI. Economía, Política y Sociedad de una potencia emergente (coeditor),
Mexico City: MA Porrúa and UAM-Iztapalapa, 2006 and China Engages Latin
America. Tracing the Trajectory (coeditor), Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
2011.
Notes
1
We thank an anonymous reviewer for his/her observations on Mexico’s exports of heavy oil.
2
Before becoming president, during his tenure as governor of Guanajuato, Fox started economic
policies to attract foreign assembly plants (maquiladoras), some of them with Sino–American capital.
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