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Turning tides A guide to Latin America’s busy 2018 election year A report by The Economist Intelligence Unit
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focused analysis on prevailing conditions and forecast trends.Turning tides
A guide to Latin America’s busy 2018 election year
Contents
Executive summary 2
Chile: It’s the economy, stupid 4
Honduras: Electoral disputes and social woes 5
Costa Rica: Divided we stand 6
Cuba: So long, farewell 7
Colombia: The usual suspects 8
Paraguay: Plus ça change 9
Mexico: Third time lucky? 10
Brazil: Draining the swamp 11
Venezuela: Stumbling towards chaos 12
© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2017 1Turning tides
A guide to Latin America’s busy 2018 election year
Executive summary
L atin America’s 2018 election season is an extremely busy one—and a vitally important one too.
All but one of Latin America’s top five economies will elect a new president in the next 12 months.
They will do so in an environment of increasing public anger over corruption, amid a plethora of
corruption scandals across the region in recent years.
In this environment, the political tide may well be turning. Disillusionment with the traditional
political class is growing; the leaders of Latin America’s big economies are for the most part extremely
unpopular (see below). All this creates opportunities for political outsiders—and populists on the
right and the left of the political spectrum—to tap into anti-establishment sentiment and spring
surprises in the 2018 polls. In Brazil, for example, Jair Bolsonaro, a right-wing former army officer,
has started to climb in the opinion polls. In Mexico, the leftist, populist Andrés Manuel López Obrador
is a front-runner.
Latin America's unpopularity contest
(Approval ratings, %)
50 50
45 45
40 40
35 35
30 30
25 25
20 20
15 15
10 10
5 5
0 0
Macri (Argentina) Bachelet (Chile) Santos (Colombia) Maduro (Venezuela) Pena Nieto (Mexico) Temer (Brazil)
Source: Press reports.
More established names are jumping on the anti-establishment bandwagon. Mexico’s Margarita
Zavala has left the centre-right Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) to run as an independent, and in
Colombia a myriad of familiar faces have registered new political movements in time for the 2018
race.
At stake is the region’s recent shift away from populism and towards a more fiscally responsible,
pro-globalisation stance that governments in the likes of Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Chile, Mexico
and Brazil hope will bring more sustainable long-term growth (and better progress in reducing
poverty) in a region emerging only slowly from a deep downturn in 2015-16. As the regional recovery
2 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2017Turning tides
A guide to Latin America’s busy 2018 election year
gathers steam in 2018, the benefits of such policies may become clearer. Even so, the 2018 election
season could prove a bumpy ride.
In this report The Economist Intelligence Unit provides a short guide to all the election races
in Latin America in the rest of this year and in 2018, starting with Chile’s November 2017 general
election and ending with the presidential poll due in Venezuela in December 2018 (but unlikely to
happen then). The guide provides just a snapshot of the in-depth political and economic analysis
included in our Latin America Country Reports.
The Economist Intelligence Unit produces Country Reports for 35 countries in Latin America and
the Caribbean. In an uncertain election period the information provided in these reports will be
vital for companies to understand the risks and opportunities presented by Latin America in the
coming year.
Election timeline
Chile, second-round Colombia, first-round Mexico, general
presidential election, if needed presidential election election
Venezuela,
Costa Rica, second-round presidential
19 November presidential election, if needed Colombia, second-round election, unlikely
Chile, general Costa Rica presidential election, if to be held as
election general election needed scheduled
Nov-17 17-Dec-17 Feb-18 4-Feb-18 11-Mar-18 1-Apr-18 11-Apr-18 27-May-18 17-Jun-18 1-Jul-18 Oct-18 Dec-18
Cuba Colombia Paraguay
26 November 28 October
presidential legislative general
Honduras, Brazil, second-round
election election election
general election presidential election, if
needed
7 October
Brazil, general
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit.
election
© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2017 3Turning tides
A guide to Latin America’s busy 2018 election year
Chile: It’s the economy, stupid
November 19th 2017 (first-round presidential election), December 17th (second round)
Chile will kick off Latin America’s election season with a race pitting a businessman and former
president (2010-14), Sebastián Piñera, from the centre-right Chile Vamos coalition, against a plethora
of candidates on the left and centre-left. The most important of these are two TV journalists-turned-
politicians: Alejandro Guillier, who has the backing of the majority of the ruling centre-left Nueva
Mayoria coalition, and Beatriz Sánchez, who will represent the newly formed left-wing Frente Amplio
coalition.
Mr Piñera consistently receives support of around 40% in opinion polls, compared with 25% for
Mr Guillier and around 15% for Ms Sánchez. Although we would expect a second round to be more
competitive, polling consistently gives Mr Piñera the edge in a run-off against any likely competitor.
The race is thus Mr Piñera’s to lose. His message of restoring dynamism to the national economy
resonates with Chileans, who will this year experience their fourth year of weak growth (averaging just
1.8% in 2014-17). Voters have tired of the haphazard structural reform agenda implemented by the
administration of the current president, Michelle Bachelet, which voters blame for having exacerbated
the economic slowdown.
Voters have also tired of a string of corruption scandals among the political and entrepreneurial
class (Mr Piñera has not been immune from allegations), which has led many voters to support an
outsider candidate such as Mr Guillier over more established figures. But in this race it looks as if the
state of the economy will be the deciding factor.
Regardless of who wins, there are already signs that the Chilean economy is turning around, and Ms
Bachelet’s successor should assume office in March 2018 against a sunnier economic backdrop.
Opinion polls over time
(% first-round support among likely voters) Sebastián Piñera Alejandro Guillier Beatriz Sánchez
50 50
45 45
40 40
35 35
30 30
25 25
20 20
15 15
10 10
5 5
0 0
07-Jul 14-Jul 21-Jul 28-Jul 04-Aug 11-Aug 18-Aug 25-Aug 01-Sep 08-Sep 15-Sep 22-Sep 27-Sep 06-Oct 13-Oct 20-Oct
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit.
4 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2017Turning tides
A guide to Latin America’s busy 2018 election year
Honduras: Electoral disputes and social woes
November 26th 2017 (presidential and legislative)
Barring a last-minute shock the incumbent president, Juan Orlando Hernández of the centre-right
Partido Nacional (PN), is on the path to re-election. Should he win, however, Mr Hernández’s victory
will be highly controversial and, according to his opponents, legally dubious. His ability to run is
based on a Supreme Court ruling from 2015, which suspended a constitutional ban on consecutive
presidential re-election. The ruling—and the president’s decision to stand again—has stoked political
polarisation that will persist beyond the election.
Opposition parties may even challenge the legitimacy of the results on constitutional grounds. For
now, three opposition parties have formed an electoral alliance, the so-called Alianza Opositora contra
la Dictadura, to try to challenge Mr Hernández in the election. They have picked Salvador Nasralla, a TV
presenter and political newcomer, as their candidate.
But Mr Hernández has the advantage. On top of the benefits of incumbency he can lay claim to
a well-performing economy, a declining (albeit still very high) murder rate and social programmes
introduced by his administration. According to a CID-Gallup poll published in September, he has 37%
voter support, against 22% for Mr Nasralla and 17% for Luis Zelaya of the centrist Partido Liberal.
Post-election, policymaking will not be smooth sailing. The legislature is fragmented, and the PN
is unlikely to have a majority after the November legislative poll. This will affect the government’s
ability to address some of the most pressing issues facing Honduras, including widespread poverty,
corruption and high levels of criminality. Reforms in some of these areas are under way, but major
additional advances could be stymied in an environment of political divisiveness and tensions.
Comparative poverty and murder rates
(Select countries)
% of population at national poverty lines (a) Murder rate, per 100,000 population, 2012
100 100
80 80
60 60
40 40
20 20
0 0
Honduras Guatemala Mexico Bolivia El Salvador Nicaragua Ecuador Panama Peru Costa Rica Chile
(a) Latest year available.
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit.
© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2017 5Turning tides
A guide to Latin America’s busy 2018 election year
Costa Rica: Divided we stand
February 4th 2018 (presidential and legislative); second-round presidential election April 1st
Costa Rica is grappling with a period of deep political change, which has seen the decline of traditional
political parties and the increasing fragmentation of Congress. With this process set to continue in
the run-up to the 2018 polls and with political reverberations from the recent “cementazo” corruption
scandal still likely, there is plenty of room for surprise in the presidential election.
A pluralistic electorate comprised largely of non-affiliated voters will make it difficult for any party
to surpass the threshold of 40% of the vote needed to avoid a second-round run-off in April. This has
implications for the electoral calculus: although Antonio Álvarez of the centrist Partido Liberación
Nacional (PLN) will lead in the first round, reflecting the strength of the PLN party machine, whoever
faces Mr Álvarez in the run-off will benefit from widespread anti-PLN sentiment, probably scuppering
the party’s chances of returning to power in 2018.
Whichever party comes second in the first round—the ruling Partido Acción Ciudadana (PAC) or the
centre-right Partido Unidad Social Cristiana (PUSC)—therefore stands a good chance of taking the
presidency. The PAC’s candidate, Carlos Alvarado, will receive broad support from left and centre-left
voters but will also have to grapple with criticism of the party after its first ever term in government.
Meanwhile, Rodolfo Piza of the PUSC, if uninspiring at times, exudes a centrist conciliatory tone similar
to that of Guillermo Solís when he won the presidency in 2014, which sits well with the centrist Costa
Rican electorate.
Whoever assumes the presidency will have been dealt a tricky hand in the form of a large public debt,
a creaking infrastructure and rising criminality. With a divided Congress and wounded public trust in
institutions, the only way to pass much-needed reforms will be through political consensus. But that
has proved elusive for several years now.
Declining support for traditional parties
Vote share of traditional parties (PLN & PUSC) as a percentage oftotal valid votes Abstention rate;
(first round, presidential election); left scale right scale
100 40
80 35
60 30
40 25
20 20
0 15
1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit.
6 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2017Turning tides
A guide to Latin America’s busy 2018 election year
Cuba: So long, farewell
February 2018 (TBC; presidential)
Finding Cuba in a guide to Latin American elections may seem counterintuitive. But Cuba will begin an
election process on November 26th 2017 that will culminate in the handover of power from Raúl Castro
to his successor in February 2018—the first time in almost 60 years that Cuba will not be ruled by a
member of the Castro family.
In November 2017 Cubans will go to the polls to elect municipal representatives. Municipal elections
are the only direct elections in Cuba, but they begin the process that ultimately culminates in the
election of the 612 members of the National Assembly; the National Assembly in turn elects the
president. The presidential handover is expected to occur next February, but this could be delayed
because the municipal elections have been pushed back by a month in the aftermath of Hurricane
Irma, which hit in September.
The most likely successor to Raúl Castro is his first vice president, Miguel Díaz-Canel. Although there
was initial optimism that Mr Díaz-Canel might be more reform-minded than his predecessor, several
leaked recordings have shown him towing the party line. What’s more, his room for manoeuvre will be
limited, given likely opposition from Communist Party hardliners and the fact that his former boss will
remain the head of the Communist Party of Cuba and probably also of the armed forces.
The transition happens as Cuba faces difficult headwinds resulting from a continued decline
in Venezuelan largesse; a rollback of the rapprochement with the US initiated by the previous US
president, Barack Obama; and the challenge of reconstruction post-Irma. The liberalisation of
economy policy has stalled, and bold but necessary economic moves—such as the unification of the
dual exchange-rate system—are unlikely to be undertaken before the leadership transition is firmly
entrenched. We should expect more continuity than disruption in the short term. There is no “Cuban
Spring” on the horizon.
The path to political transition
1 Municipal elections (November
26th; run-off December 3rd)
Cuba's only direct elections (held every 2.5
2 Provincial and national
elections (TBD)
Elections are held every five years for the
3 Presidential elections (TBD,
assumed February 2018)
The president is elected by the612 members of
years) are for the 12,589 municipal council 612-seat National Assembly of People's Power, the National Assembly. In 2011, the current
members. These delegates are most account- and were last held in February 2013. president, Raúl Castro, limited Cuban
able to the general public and address local Candidates are nominated by municipal presidents to two five-year terms. Mr Castro's
concerns. Elections are apolitical; candidates assemblies from lists compiled by municipal, second term will end in February, when he is
need only be nominated to stand; at least two provincial and national candidacy commis- expected to hand over power to a younger
and up to eight candidates must compete for a sions, with input from "mass organisations" leader. Nevertheless, Mr Castro will retain the
seat. Municipal councilmembers, once elected, controlled by the Cuban state. Only one president's traditional responsibilities as head
nominate candidates to stand at the provincial candidate appears on each voter's ballot of the ruling Partido Comunista de Cuba, as
and national level. paper, whom voters can either accept or reject. well as probably of the armed forces, which will
Although nominally the National Assembly is limit the next president's true power.
the "supreme organ of state power" according
to the Cuban constitution, in reality the body is
no more than a rubber-stamp parliament.
© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2017 7Turning tides
A guide to Latin America’s busy 2018 election year
Colombia: The usual suspects
March 11th 2018 (legislative), May 27th (presidential; first round), June 17th (presidential;
second round)
Evolution of voter perceptions, selected areas In Colombia’s 2018 election season new political
(Net improvement/deterioration in current situation; percentage points) movements are in vogue. With the prestige
20 Economy 40 Guerrilla of the traditional political parties plunging,
10 “independent political movements”—featuring
0 20
-10
some very familiar faces—have been created on
0
-20 the left and the right to try to capture votes from
-30 -20 an increasingly discontented, anti-establishment
-40
-50 -40 electorate.
-60 -60 One of these familiar faces is that of Sergio
-70 Fajardo, the centre-left former mayor of Medellín,
-80 -80
Sep Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Sep Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul although he has teamed up with some more
2010 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 2010 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
established political parties, including Partido
-20 Safety -10 Corruption Verde (led by Claudia López) and Polo (led by
-30 -20 Jorge Robledo), in a centre-left electoral alliance
-40 -30 called Coalición Colombia. It is still unclear
-40 whether Mr Fajardo or Ms López will actually run
-50
-50
-60 in May, but the coalition’s platform of support
-60
-70 for the historic 2016 peace deal with the FARC
-70
-80
guerrillas, combined with a commitment to
-80
fighting corruption, will sway large swathes of
-90 -90
Sep Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Sep Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul voters, and Coalición Colombia seems likely to
2010 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 2010 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Source: Gallup.
make it to the second round.
There the coalition is likely to come up against
Germán Vargas Lleras, the centre-right former vice president to the current president, Juan Manuel
Santos, who has also launched a new political movement. Mr Vargas Lleras can count on a strong
electoral machinery and has clearer security and economic credentials than the opposition.
With the FARC deal remaining a divisive topic, Mr Vargas Lleras’s ambivalent stance towards the
peace accord will also appeal to many voters on the right. The conditions of special peace courts that
will judge crimes committed by the guerrillas, as well as the FARC’s formal entrance into politics, will be
a matter of substantial debate during the campaign.
Whoever wins will inherit a long to-do list related to the implementation of the peace accord. But
opinion polls show that other concerns predominate, including corruption, security and the state of
the economy, and these will also need to be addressed. None of the candidates appears likely to offer
complete reassurance in all of these areas.
8 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2017Turning tides
A guide to Latin America’s busy 2018 election year
Paraguay: Plus ça change
April 22nd 2018 (presidential and legislative)
Paraguay’s long election season (all parties are to Political control of Paraguay, by department
hold primaries on December 17th) will culminate
in a contest between the feuding Partido Colorado BOLIVIA
(PC) and a broad, if unstable, opposition alliance
composed of the centre-left Partido Liberal Radical Alto Paraguay
Auténtico (PLRA) and the left-wing Frente Guasú BRAZIL
(FG) in April 2018. The campaign will focus on the
Boquerón
legacy of the president, Horacio Cartes, whose push
to modernise the public sector and the country’s
infrastructure while seeking foreign investment Amambay
Concepción
and finance has proven controversial within the
Presidente Hayes
PC and beyond. Secondary topics will include
charges of clientelism and corruption against the PARAGUAY
San Pedro Canindeyú
PC, the spread of organised crime and the (weak)
insurgency of the Ejército del Pueblo Paraguayo ARGENTINA
Asunción Cordillera Caaguazú
(the Paraguayan People’s Army, a Marxist rebel
Departamento Central Alto
group). Guairá Paraná
Paraguarí Caazapá
Mr Cartes’s failed attempt at extending
Party in power (governor)
presidential term limits, which culminated in the Partido Colorado Misiones Itapúa
death of a PLRA militant and the burning of part Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico Ñeembucú
Partido Revolucionario Febrerista
of the congressional building earlier in 2017, has Frente Guasú
widened divisions within the PC and resulted in ARGENTINA BRAZIL
a bitter primary race between Santiago Peña, a
protégé of Mr Cartes, and Mario Abdo, a traditionalist senator. Despite the virulence of the campaign,
in April the victor is likely to enjoy the full support of the PC’s widespread get-out-the-vote operation,
itself buttressed by the party’s strong territorial presence and history of electorally motivated public
spending (see figure). The PLRA president, Efraín Alegre, is the front-runner to head the PLRA-FG
ticket. Although the PLRA-FG campaign will be buttressed by the support of the FG’s leader and former
president, Fernando Lugo (2008-12), and that of Mario Ferreiro, the popular mayor of Asunción, the
PC’s formidable electoral machine gives its candidate a clear edge.
Whoever wins will have to contend with the economy’s over-reliance on agriculture, high poverty
and substandard infrastructure, coupled with the growing demands of a middle class that has proven
receptive to Mr Cartes’s international openness and modernisation agenda.
© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2017 9Turning tides
A guide to Latin America’s busy 2018 election year
Mexico: Third time lucky?
July 1st 2018 (presidential and legislative)
Enrique Peña Nieto’s disappointing presidency has been a breeding ground for anti-establishment
sentiment. After a promising start, which saw rave reviews for his quick success in pushing through
structural reforms, Mr Peña Nieto’s term is coming to a humiliating end. He is extremely unpopular,
reflecting a succession of corruption scandals involving fellow members of his party, the Partido
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). Voters are also deeply troubled by the evolution of Mexico’s
relations with the US under the presidency of Donald Trump.
All this is useful fodder for the current front-runner in the race, Andrés Manuel López Obrador,
the populist candidate of the leftist Movimiento Regeneración Nacional (Morena). A one-time mayor
of Mexico City, Mr López Obrador will be running for the third time in 2018. He came second in two
previous presidential attempts (in 2006 and 2012), and his support in the polls has remained steady at
around 30%. In Mexico’s first-past-the-post system he may not need much more than that to win.
But it is still early days, and Mr López Obrador’s lead could well slide once other parties have defined
their candidacies. The PRI is lagging well behind for now but could be revived once its candidate is
selected. A stronger challenge to Mr López Obrador will come from Margarita Zavala, a former first
lady who left the centre-right Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) in October to run as an independent. By
leaving one of Mexico’s “big three” parties, Ms Zavala may also be seeking to tap into voters’ desire
for change. It will be difficult, however, for her to
Disillusioned with democracy successfully brand herself as a political outsider
(Percent of respondents answering question: "How satisfied are you with the way democracy is given her long-standing ties with the PAN—and
working in our country?”)
Unsatisfied Satisfied those of her husband and former president, Felipe
60 60 Calderón (2006-12). She will also lack the vast
40 40 political machinery long considered necessary to
20 20 win elections in Mexico.
So far the economy has brushed off political
0 0
concerns, growing by a steady if unspectacular
20 20
rate of just over 2%. All this could change as the
40 40 election draws closer, however, reflecting investor
60 60 jitters over the election result itself and over the
80 80 status of ongoing talks to renegotiate the North
100 100
American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the
Global Argentina Brazil Peru Venezuela Latin Colombia Chile Mexico US and Canada. If the talks grow more hostile or
median America
median collapse, nationalist sentiment will grow, boosting
Source: Pew Research Center.
support for Mr López Obrador.
10 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2017Turning tides
A guide to Latin America’s busy 2018 election year
Brazil: Draining the swamp
October 7th 2018 (legislative and presidential), October 28th (second-round presidential)
The outlook for Brazil’s October 2018 polls is unusually uncertain. Politicians from major parties have
been hugely discredited by the high-profile corruption investigations that have made daily headlines
over the past three years. This is fertile ground for figures outside the political establishment, such as
Jair Bolsonaro, a right-wing politician and former army officer. He is popular with Evangelical Christian
groups (a growing political force), and his law-and-order discourse appeals to many Brazilians terrified
by the rise in violent crime.
Ironically, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a former president (2003-10) of the left-wing Partido dos
Trabalhadores, leads in the polls, despite the fact that he has been convicted of corruption and
may well be barred from standing if his appeal fails. He retains support among poorer Brazilians,
particularly in the north, who benefited from socioeconomic improvements during his tenure.
Assuming Brazil’s incipient economic recovery strengthens, the chances of victory for a candidate
from a centrist party—most likely from the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB)—will
brighten. At the same time, high disapproval ratings would almost certainly scupper the chances of
extreme left-wing or right-wing candidates in an all but certain second round, unless this second
round pitted a candidate from the extreme left against one from the extreme right (a scenario that
would represent a break from Brazil’s pragmatic consensus-seeking history).
Whoever prevails will inherit the country’s shaky public finances and will need to steer unpopular
pension reforms and other fiscal adjustments through a fragmented Congress to stop the public debt
reaching 100% of GDP and triggering a debt crisis.
In this context, the election campaign will be overshadowed by concerns about a return to the
economic populism that contributed to Brazil’s brutal 2015-16 recession. For now, investors are taking
a sanguine view, but nerves will begin to fray in the run-up to the elections.
Fiscal woes
(% of GDP)
Fiscal deficit; left scale Public debt; right scale
-4.0 100
-4.5 90
-5.0 80
-5.5 70
-6.0 60
-6.5 50
-7.0 40
-7.5 30
-8.0 20
-8.5 10
-9.0 0
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit.
© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2017 11Turning tides
A guide to Latin America’s busy 2018 election year
Venezuela: Stumbling towards chaos
Presidential and legislative: TBD
In theory, Venezuela is due to hold presidential and legislative elections in December 2018. In reality,
it is unclear whether the increasingly authoritarian government of Nicolás Maduro will stick to this
timetable. If elections do happen, it seems all but impossible that they will be free and fair.
The constituent assembly put in place in August amid violent protests to draft a new constitution
has a two-year remit. The Supreme Court would undoubtedly rubber-stamp any attempt to delay the
presidential election until after this period expires. If the government wished, it could thus push the
vote back to August 2019 (with further delays a possibility). Alternatively, the government could seek
to bring the election forward to take advantage of a weak opposition.
The opposition is in disarray in the aftermath of regional elections in October, in which it gained just
five out of 23 seats (it had expected to win up to 18). The playing field was uneven. Coercion of voters
was clear; the opposition states that it has proof of full-blown fraud. But cracks in the opposition
alliance are deepening amid despair over what to do next.
Despite all this, and although 2018 may well bring more of the same—more centralisation of power
in the regime, more opposition disarray and more violent but ineffectual protests—we do not see the
Maduro regime lasting in the long run.
The scale of economic mismanagement and corruption and the government’s unwillingness and
inability to address the root causes of Venezuela’s economic malaise bode ill for an economy that has
already been in recession for several years. Default and hyperinflation are looming—either could tip
the Maduro regime over the edge, producing a chaotic transition audited by the military.
But even without default or hyperinflation, the decimation of domestic production and the ongoing
destruction of Venezuela’s oil-producing capacity (its only source of dollar revenue) will, without
massive inflows of investment from abroad, in the end run the Maduro government into the ground.
But 2018 may not be the year.
Destruction of GDP
Real GDP (BsF bn); left scale Real GDP (% change); right scale
70 15
60 10
50 5
40 0
30 -5
20 -10
10 -15
0 -20
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Sources: Local sources; EIU estimates.
12 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2017Copyright © 2017 The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited. All rights reserved. Neither this publication nor any part of it may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited. While every effort has been taken to verify the accuracy of this information, The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd. cannot accept any responsibility or liability for reliance by any person on this report or any of the information, opinions or conclusions set out in this report.
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