Vladimir Putin: His Continuing Legacy - Dale R. Herspring Social Research: An International Quarterly, Volume 76, Number 1, Spring 2009, pp ...
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Vladimir Putin: His Continuing Legacy
Dale R. Herspring
Social Research: An International Quarterly, Volume 76, Number 1, Spring
2009, pp. 151-174 (Article)
Published by Johns Hopkins University Press
For additional information about this article
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/527655/summary
[ Access provided at 17 Apr 2020 01:20 GMT with no institutional affiliation ]Dale R. Herspring
Vladimir Putin: His
Continuing Legacy
VLADIMIR PUTIN CONFRONTED A STAGGERING ARRAY OF PROBLEMS
w h e n he b ecam e in te rim p re sid e n t o f Russia o n Jan u a ry 1, 2000.
“R ussia,” h e n o ted, “is in th e m idst o f one o f th e m o st difficult peri
ods in its histoiy. For th e first tim e in th e p ast 200-300 years, it is
facing a real th re a t o f sliding into th e second, and possibly even th ird
echelon o f w orld states” (Putin, 2000). The co u n try ’s econom y was in
sham bles, its political system in chaos, and its social and m oral struc
tu re in an advanced state o f decay. To m ake m atters worse, P utin was
v irtu ally u n k n o w n , b o th in Russia an d abroad. A fo rm er KGB officer,
he h ad re tu rn ed to his native Leningrad from a KGB assignm ent in East
G erm any to becom e an assistant to Anatoly Sobchak, his form er profes
sor, at Leningrad State University. Only a few years later, th e obscure
P utin was th e co untry’s president.
In 2008, P utin left th e presidency in accordance w ith th e consti
tu tio n , w hich forbids m ore th a n tw o consecutive periods in office. He
has now becom e prim e m inister. W hile th e n atu re o f his relationship
w ith th e n ew p resid en t, D m itry Medvedev, rem ains a qu estio n m ark
to Russians as w ell as outsiders, P utin’s eight years in th e presidency is
certainly certainly long enough to provide us w ith enough m aterial to
b egin to m ake suggestions concerning his contributions to postcom m u
n ist Russia. First, to w h at degree was he and his regim e successful (or
unsuccessful) in dealing w ith Russia’s problem s? Second, and perhaps
even m o re im p o rtan t, w h e re did he lead th e country? W h at w ere his
goals for Russia, o r did h e even know w here he was tak in g th e country?
social research Voi 76 : No 1 : Spring 2009 151Before we a ttem p t to shed lig h t on th ese questions, however, let us take
a closer look a t this m an w ho tried to rebuild Russia intern ally w hile a t
th e sam e tim e w orking to regain th e in tern a tio n al prestige th e country
lost u n d e r President Boris Yeltsin.
PUTIN, THE MAN
The p u b lish ed facts ab o u t P u tin ’s ca ree r are sketchy, b u t th e follow
ing discussion w ill at least p e rm it th e reader to u n d ersta n d th e m ajor
events th a t influenced his life.1P utin was b o m in 1952 in w h a t w as th e n
Leningrad (now again St. Petersburg). W hile in school, h e was train e d
in ju d o and in 1974 becam e th e Leningrad city cham pion. In his auto
biography he credits ju d o as th e tu rn in g p o in t in his life. “If I h a d n ’t
g o tten involved in sports, I’m n o t sure how m y life w ould have tu rn ed
out. It w as sports th a t dragged m e off th e stre e ts” (Putin et al„ 2000:
19). His lifelong dream was to becom e a m em b er o f th e KGB. Indeed, he
recalls going to th e local KGB office w hile still in high school and telling
a som ew hat startled officer, “I w a n t to get a jo b w ith you” (23). He w as
advised instead to atten d th e university an d study law.
A fter g ra d u atin g fro m Leningrad State U niversity in 1975 w ith
a degree in law, P utin applied again to th e KGB, this tim e successfully.
He was sen t to Moscow fo r in itial tra in in g an d w as th e n assigned to
foreign intelligence in Leningrad, w here h e sp en t th e m ajority o f his
tim e spying o n foreigners a n d Russians w ho h ad contacts w ith th em . He
studied G erm an and was eventually posted in D resden in th e G erm an
D em ocratic Republic, w here h e an d his wife spent five years and th e ir
tw o daughters w ere born. This was also w here h e perfected his G erm an.
Putin was no n atu ra l in th e w orld o f espionage, b u t h e learned th e craft
quickly and effectively, according to one G erm an agent h e controlled
(Franchetti, 2001).
In 1989, P utin re tu rn ed to Russia an d becam e head o f th e Foreign
Section (Inotdel) at Leningrad State University. In th a t capacity he served
as an assistan t fo r in te rn a tio n a l affairs to his fo rm er law professor,
Anatoly Sobchak, w ho was th e university’s rector. A year later Sobchak,
w ho h ad becom e a m ajor force in Leningrad politics, asked P u tin to
152 social researchm ove to city hall as his advisor on in ternational affairs. In 1991, Sobchak
becam e Leningrad’s m ayor an d appointed Putin chairm an o f th e city’s
foreign relations com m ittee. It was n o t long before Sobchak gave h im
responsibility for a n u m b er o f reform program s, including foreign invest
m ents, w here P utin im pressed those w ho dealt w ith h im as a m an w ho
could get things done.2 Indeed, it was during his tim e in St. Petersburg
th a t h e m ade his re p u tatio n as an o utstanding adm inistrator.
In 1996 Sobchak failed in his bid for reelectio n am id charges
o f co rru p tio n , an d it ap p eared th a t P u tin ’s post-KGB career w as at an
end. Having h ea rd o f P u tin ’s re p u ta tio n as a “doer,” however, Anatoly
Chubais, a w ell-connected adviser to Yeltsin, got h im a jo b w orking w ith
Pavel Borodin, w ho was head ofY eltsin’s staff (Bortsov, 2001:132). Yeltsin
to o k notice o f Putin, and in th e tu m u ltu o u s adm inistrative upheavals
o f th e Russian executive in 1998, he was appointed first deputy h ead o f
th e p residential ad m in istratio n in charge o f relations w ith th e regions,
a n d la te r th a t year, h ead o f th e Federal Security Service (the succes
sor to th e KGB), a m ove he claim ed m ade h im u n h ap p y because o f th e
secretive life it w ould entail. “It p u t you in a co n stan t state o f tension.
All th e papers are secret. This isn ’t allowed, th a t isn ’t allow ed” (Putin et
al„ 2000:131). Shortly th ereafter, he was p u t in control o f th e body th a t
coordinated all o f Russia’s security an d intelligence m inistries. Not bad
for a fo rm er KGB lieu ten an t colonel!
On August 9,1999, th e ailing Yeltsin surprised th e w orld by appoint
ing P utin as his p rim e m in ister and designated successor. On D ecem ber
31, Yeltsin again astonished everyone by resigning and m aking P utin
Russia’s acting president. Yeltsin k new his tim e was lim ited and w anted
to ensure his protégée had th e best possible chance to w in th e forthcom
ing presidential elections. On M arch 26, 2000, P utin stood for election
an d w on over 52 percent o f th e vote in th e first round—enough to avoid
a runoff. He becam e Russia’s second elected president.
PU TIN ’S APPROACH TO POLITICS
P erhaps because o f his KGB background, P utin gave th e im pression
th a t h e believed th a t even th e m ost difficult problem could be resolved,
Vladim ir Putin: His Continuing Legacy 153p ro v id ed th e d e c isio n m a k e r follow ed th ro u g h a n d to o k p erso n al
re sp o n sib ility for th e outcom e. In sh o rt, his p ast exp erien ce m ade
h im in to a d ed icated p ro b lem solver. Sobchak called h im a “d e te r
m ined, even stu b b o rn young m a n ” (O’Neil e t al., 2000). Once h e m ade
u p his m in d —w h e th e r it w as to be a ju d o ch am pion, a KGB officer,
or a presid en tial aide—his bosses could rely on h im to see a problem
th ro u g h . G raham Hum es, w ho dealt w ith P utin w hile H um es was direc
to r general o f CARESBAC, a n in tern atio n al h u m an itarian organization
in St. P etersburg associated w ith CARE, spoke o f th e im p o rta n t role
P utin played in th e city. “He overcam e one bureaucratic obstacle after
a n o th e r to ensure th a t h u m an itarian aid from abroad was delivered in
a tim ely and fair m a n n e r” (Humes, 2000). P utin faced a different chal
lenge d u rin g his te n u re in charge o f regional affairs in dealing w ith
th e co u n try ’s regional governors w hile w orking for Yeltsin. The latter,
w h o h ad given th e governors considerable au to n o m y in re tu rn for
th e ir support, was concerned about th e ir tend ency to side w ith form er
Russian p rim e m inister, Yevgeny Primakov, an d th e m ayor o f Moscow,
Yuri Luzhkov, in th e battle fo r political power. Yeltsin asked P utin to
b reak up this b u dding alliance. P utin agreed. In a sh o rt tim e, th e gover
n o rs h ad becom e m ore n e u tra l w h e n it cam e to p o w er struggles in
Moscow (Gessen, 2000: 23).
Once he becam e president, P utin set about to rebuild th e Russian
state. “P u tin believed in stro n g a n d effective g o v ern m en t. He also
believed in stro n g leadership, especially his own. He was in favor o f
dem ocracy, b u t th e coherence o f the state in his m ind w as m ore im por
ta n t” (Sakwa, 2008: 301). Tow ard this end, h e created seven federal
districts (or super-regions) th a t w ere headed by presid en tial envoys—
w hose jo b was to w atch over th e local leaders. T hen h e n e u te re d th e
u p p e r house, th e Federal Council. In th e past, th e sitting governors and
ch airm en cam e to Moscow for m eetings, b u t h ad m ain tain ed th e ir posi
tions in th e ir hom e districts. He replaced th e m w ith representatives—
w ho w ould be in Moscow full tim e a n d th ere fo re subject to p ressu re
from th e Kremlin. In addition, h e pushed laws th a t p erm itted th e presi
d en t to rem ove governors u n d e r certain circum stances. And th e n after
154 social researchth e Septem ber 1-3,2004 m assacre at Beslan, w here hundreds o f school
ch ild ren w ere slaughtered by C hechen rebels, he elim inated th e direct
p o p u lar election o f governors, in effect tak in g on th e pow er to appoint
and dism iss regional leaders.3
In co n trast to his predecessors, P utin claim ed to be nonideologi-
cal. As he p u t it in his m illen n iu m speech shortly afte r he to o k over
fro m Yeltsin, “I am against th e re sto ra tio n o f a n official state ideol
ogy in Russia in any fo rm ” (Putin, 2000: 5). P utin appeared prim arily
in tere ste d in adopting w h atev er strategy th a t w ould w ork to attack a
problem . The u ltim ate pragm atist, h e was know n to try th e solutions
o f th e left as w ell as th e right. P utin also gave th e im pression th a t he
trie d to be hig h ly ra tio n a l in his ap p ro ach to dealing w ith political
and econom ic issues. As a fo rm er KGB colleague p u t it, “H e’s always in
co n tro l o f his em otions, k eeping his cards close to his chest. He m u st
have a w eakness, b u t I d o n ’t know w h a t it is” (Franchetti, 2001). In th e
policym aking arena, he appeared b o th th o u g h tfu l and m ethodical. To
q u ote tw o Russian w riters, “W e have to say this for Putin: he is n o t in a
h u rry to m ake a choice w ith regards to th e reform s and th e m ethods o f
th e ir im plem entation. He is tak in g his tim e, w aiting for his team to be
form ed to th e e n d ” (Kazennov an d Kumachev, 2001).
P u tin ’s style was also ad m in istrativ e, in th a t h e expected th e
b u reau cracy to im p le m e n t his m andates, and his decisions ten d ed to
be o f th e gradual, in crem en tal type th a t one w ould expect from som e
one w ho sp en t his life in a bureaucratic organization like th e KGB. As
Yuri Bortsov p u t it in com paring P utin w ith A leksandr Kerensky—th e
h ead o f th e short-lived n o n co m m u n ist g o v ernm ent in th e im m ediate
afte rm ath o f th e czar’s fall in 1917— “A leksandr Fedorovich Kerensky
was a n irresponsible rom antic, b u t V ladim ir P utin is pragm atic, and it
is for th a t reason in his policies from th e beginning h e has ta k e n th e
tactical approach o f ‘th e possible.’ P utin is a statesm an—Kerensky was
not, P utin is for stability, Kerensky was for a revolution, Putin is a m an
o f action, Kerensky was a n o u tstan d in g o ra to r (Bortsov, 2001: 215). In
th is sense, P u tin also stood in co n tra st to Yeltsin, w ho was a revolu
tio n ary in th a t h e destroyed th e old system , especially th e control o f
Vladim ir Putin: His Continuing Legacy 155th e C om m unist Party. As Sakwa argued, “P utin rejected revolution as a
m eth o d and sought to build a law-governed state based o n stable in sti
tu tio n s and predictable ru le s” (Sakwa, 2008: 302). In short, P utin w as a
leader w ho believed in structured, stable decision-m aking.
D espite his early re p u ta tio n as a “laid b ack ” KGB ag en t (Rahr,
2000:64), du rin g his civilian period he quickly developed a m ore active
im age. P utin delegated, b u t h e was also deeply involved in dealing w ith
th e problem o f th e m om ent. Bortsov p u t it b est w h e n h e com m ented
on th e difference betw een Boris Yeltsin and V ladim ir Putin: “The p rin
cipal difference w as th a t th e te x t was w ritte n for Boris N ikolaevich,
w hile V ladim ir V ladim irovich w rites th e th e se s” (Bortsov, 2001: 175).
This hands-on approach w as also evident in P u tin ’s dealings w ith th e
various d ep a rtm en ts an d agencies in th e Russian g o v ernm ent. Take
Chechnya, for exam ple.
As h e n o ted in his autobiography, P u tin ’s initial response to th e
conflict was c e n tralizatio n a n d im proved coord in atio n . “I m e t w ith
th e to p officials o f th e M inistry o f Defense, th e G eneral Staff an d th e
In te rio r M inistry. W e m et alm o st every day—som etim es tw ice a day,
m o rn in g and evening. And w ith a lot o f fine-tuning, th e m inistries w ere
consolidated. The first th in g I h ad to do was overcom e th e disarray
am o n g th e m in istrie s” (Putin et al., 2000: 140-141). In th e sam e vein
P utin believed in personal responsibility—a tra it th a t was again evident
in Chechnya, w h ere Moscow’s m ilitary operations w ere n o t successful
du rin g th e early p a rt o f his tim e in office (Bortsov, 2001:199).
Pragm atic solutions to im m ediate tasks, however, depend o n th e
d efin itio n o f th e problem . A nd P u tin ’s w orldview ap p eared to play a
role. He sp en t his career in th e state apparatus, w ith in an agency tasked
w ith b ein g th e sw ord an d shield o f th e regim e. He cam e to pro b lem
solving w ith a bias tow ard gov ern m en t actions and a n o tio n o f society
as subservient to th e interests o f th e state. He belongs to a long trad i
tio n o f R ussian statesm en w ho have sought to m old society th ro u g h
autocratic action from above (Cohen, 2000).
If P u tin ’s ch aracter contains an “ism ,” it w ould be a statism th at,
like nationalism , em braces a deep-seated desire to restore Russia to th e
156 social researchg reatn ess o f its Soviet years, especially th ro u g h th e exercise o f state
pow er. His w ords are instructive: “P atriotism is a source o f courage,
stau n ch n e ss a n d s tre n g th o f o u r people. If w e lose p a trio tism an d
n atio n al p ride an d dignity, w h ich are connected w ith it, we w ill lose
ourselves as a n a tio n capable o f g re at achievem ents (Putin, 2000: 6).
Revealingly, P u tin ’s personal h ero is P eter th e G reat, th e leader m ost
associated w ith o pening Russia to th e W est (Bortsov, 2001: 111). Indeed,
if P u tin h ad a bias in th e foreign policy realm d u rin g his early years
in office, it w as tow ard th e W est in general, and th e U nited States and
G erm any in particular. G erm an was one o f his b est subjects in school
an d h e served th e re long en o u g h to becom e quite com fortable in th e
language—flu en t enough to address th e B undestag in G erm an w h e n he
visited in 2001. Indeed, his affinity for G erm any was strong enough th a t
one o f his biographers called h im th e “G erm an in th e K rem lin” (Rahr,
2000). Those w ho w orked w ith him , however, considered him prim arily
a Europeanist (Bortsov, 2001:122), an d his actions in th e afterm ath o f
th e attack o n th e Pentagon a n d th e W orld Trade Towers show ed th a t in
th e beginning, at least, h e favored strong ties w ith th e U nited States.
Despite P u tin ’s desire to restore Russia to its g reat pow er status,
th e re is no evidence th a t h e is allied w ith th e jin g o istic right. He is
clearly w h a t B ortsov called a “h ea lth y co nservative” (Bortsov, 2001:
277). P u tin ’s m ajor concern w as to rebuild Russia so th a t it played th e
k in d o f role in th e w orld it did 20 or 30 years ago, and h e was n o t bashful
ab o u t saying so. This brings u s to th e question: How w ell does th e short
biographical sk etch m atch u p against P u tin ’s eight years in office? In
o th e r words, to w h a t degree d id he act in accordance w ith th e personal
ity characteristics described earlier?
THE YELTSIN LEGACY
As a n u m b e r o f analyses o f th e Yeltsin p erio d have show n, Yeltsin’s
prim ary concern was to m a in ta in his ow n power. Toward th a t end, he
did n o th in g to create th e k in d o f political in fra stru c tu re th a t w ould
estab lish a fu n ctio n in g dem ocracy in th e W estern sense o f th e term .
As Lilia Shevtsova has w ritte n , “His w o rst m istak e b o th fo r Russia
Vladim ir Putin: His Continuing Legacy 157an d him self, has b een his failure to establish strong political in stitu
tions an d stable rules o f th e gam e. He has displayed little respect for
th e law. More often th a n not, he has obeyed only his sense o f political
expedience, ap p arently placing th e hig h est priority o n his ow n politi
cal am b itio n s” (Shevtsova, 1993). Indeed, fo r a w h ile one o f th e best
sports for Moscow w atchers w as to b et o n (a) how long Yeltsin’s cu rren t
p rim e m in iste r w ould last, a n d (b) w ho w ould replace h im as Yeltsin
p ro ceed ed to play m usical chairs w ith his to p officials. The m in u te
anyone appeared to grow to o pow erful o r becam e a political liability,
Yeltsin rem oved him . Yeltsin believed th a t Russia could only survive if
it h ad a strong president.
One could argue th a t in th e afte rm ath o f his 1993 w ar w ith th e
Dum a, Yeltsin h ad no choice b u t to create a co n stitu tio n th a t enshrined
th e idea o f a superpresidency. W ith recalcitrant legislators, com m unists,
and hu n d red s if n o t thousands o f o th e r opponents, h e h ad no altern a
tive. However, as Shevtsova noted, “M any people, even in Russia, a t first
h o p ed th e ‘superpresidency’ th a t Yeltsin established was only tem p o
rary. But this stru ctu re, designed to overcom e deadlocks and to serve
as a m ajo r reform force, has now becom e th e m ain source o f political
disarray” (Shevtsova, 1993: 3).
A tem p o rary superpresidency m ig h t have w orked if Yeltsin had
b een a different leader. However, his p o o r health , his alcoholism , his
acceptance o f cronyism a n d co rru p tio n , a n d his fe ar o f com petitors
u n d erm in ed his effectiveness. F urtherm ore, as tim e w ore on, instead o f
developing effective political institutions such as th e Dum a, he fought
one b attle after a n o th e r w ith it u n til he generally ignored it in favor o f
p residential decrees. His actions w ere often contradictory and his lead
ersh ip w eak a t best.
This m ean t th a t w h en Putin cam e to power, Russia had a consti
tu tio n th a t p u t alm ost all p ow er in th e h ands o f th e co u n try ’s p resi
dent. In th e m eantim e, n o th in g was done to create a rule o f law system
th a t w ould n o t only enable ju stice to be dispensed in a fair and im par
tial m anner, b u t w ould allow th e m illions o f daily interactions b etw een
individuals an d firm s and th e g o v ern m en t to be regulated. Similarly,
158 social researchp o litical p artie s—w ith th e exception o f th e C om m unist Party—w ere
n onexistent. By Soviet standards, th e press was free, as was th e m edia
in general. However, th e m ajo rity o f th e co u n try was ow ned by th e
oligarchs, a sm all g roup o f pow erful a n d w e alth y individuals w ho
gained th e ir pow er as a resu lt o f Yeltsin’s need for th e ir support during
his 1996 electio n cam paign. In th e m ean tim e, m an y o f th e c o u n try ’s
89 regions paid little a tte n tio n to Moscow. They passed w hatever local
laws th ey preferred, even if th e y ran co u n ter to th e R ussian constitu
tio n . The c o u n try ’s econom y w as in sham bles afte r th e A ugust 1998
crash o f th e ruble. Finally, th e m ilitary was m ired in w h a t appeared to
b e a n u n w innable w ar in C hechnya, and th e K rem lin’s standing on th e
w orld stage was at an all-tim e low.
PUTIN TAKES POWER
In P u tin ’s m ind, he had tw o m ajor goals w h e n h e took over as presi
dent. First, on th e internal front, he believed th a t th e Russian state had
to be recreated. Yeltsin had given away pow er to th e p oint th a t Moscow
ex erted very little control over w h a t h ap p e n ed in th e country. The
Krem lin w ould have to set about rebuilding th a t state if it hoped to m ake
Russia a world pow er again. This was as tru e in th e econom ic sphere as
it was elsewhere. For exam ple, speaking about th e im portance o f creat
ing a stable, h ealthy economy, Putin observed in his m illennium speech
th at, “It will take us approxim ately fifteen years and an annual grow th
o f o u r gross dom estic product by 8 percent a year to reach the p er capita
GDP level o f present-day P ortugal or Spain, w hich are n o t am ong th e
w orld’s industrialized leaders” (Putin, 2000: 5). Richard Sakwa probably
described P utin’s relation to th e state best w hen h e observed th a t Putin
favored “a strong role for th e state to ensure th a t the business rem ained
business, and n o t politics, and to rem ain firm ly in control o f econom ic
policy-making, accom panied by support for th e energy, m ilitary defense,
and m an u factu ring sectors” (Sakwa, 2007: 14). Little did he know th a t
th e oil boom w ould give Russia’s econom y a shot in th e arm .
P u tin ’s o th e r goal, besides rebuilding th e R ussian state, was to
g ain back fo r Russia th e re sp ect and influence it h ad in th e area o f
Vladim ir Putin: His Continuing Legacy 159foreign policy. After all, Russia h ad b een a g reat power, a superpow er
along w ith th e U nited States, an d if it was going to be ta k e n seriously
by th e o th e r m ajor pow ers in th e w orld, P utin w ould have to find a way
to show th e m th a t th e y should tak e Russia seriously, n o t ignore it as
h ap p e n ed so o ften during th e nineties w h e n Yeltsin w as in power. In
short, h e w an ted th e re st o f th e w orld to accept Russia as a g reat power,
an d as an im p o rtan t an d n o rm al state.
T here are five factors th a t help to explain P u tin ’s ra th e r un iq u e
ap proach to political and econom ic problem s. The first, w hich should
n o t com e as a m ajor surprise given his career in th e KGB, is his devotion
to th e state. To Putin, th e state is ju s t a larger form o f th e bureaucracy
he once served in. Indeed, th is is key to his som ew hat am bivalent atti
tu d e to w ard dem ocracy. D uring his tim e in th e KGB, P u tin w as p a rt
o f a n o rg an izatio n in w h ich m eritocracy, discipline, an d o rd e r w ere
param o u n t. If h e w as given a n order, h e was expected to carry it out.
For m an y years h e did ju s t th a t. This w as th e m odel h e im posed on
th e co u n try h e governed for eight years. W hile this approach appears
a u th o rita ria n to m any, to P u tin it m ade logical sense. F u rth erm o re,
even th o u g h P u tin saw th e w h o le Russian system as one big b u re a u
cracy, h e did n o t try to reim pose a Soviet o r Stalinist regim e on Russia.
T h at d an g er always existed, o f course, b u t h e show ed n o in te re st in
enforcing strict conform ity th ro u g h o u t th e system . Rather, as is n orm al
in a bureaucracy, P utin believed th e guy o n to p should be able to set th e
o rg a n iz atio n ’s p aram eters, a n d th o se w ho w ork in it should op erate
w ith in them .
This h elp s to explain his ap p ro ach to th e press. P u tin w as n o t
opposed to criticism . He believed it served a valuable purpose in expos
ing problem s. However, ju s t as P utin did n o t believe one could ru n a
b ureaucracy if o rd er was lacking, o r if th e re was no one in charge, he
felt th a t g o v ern m ent h ad th e rig h t to set certain param eters—to decide
w h a t could be p u b lish ed a n d w h a t could not. P u tin n ev e r to o k th e
Russian m edia back to th e p o in t o f Soviet-style censorship. This w riter
has follow ed th e R ussian m ilitary m edia for m any years an d th e re is
no d o u b t in m y m in d th a t th e m ilitary press is fa r m ore open th a n it
160 social researchw as u n d e r Soviet leaders Leonid B rezhnev o r even M ikhail Gorbachev.
Senior officers are regularly criticized. Indeed, even th e defense m inis
te r is openly criticized (H erspring, 2008). C ertain topics w ere open for
criticism , som e w ere not. For exam ple, w hile Russians w ere free to crit
icize th e governm ent, th e y w ere n o t free to criticize P utin personally.
The p resid en t stood above th e fray.
P u tin believed it was th e g o v ern m en t’s duty to d eterm in e w h at
w as p u b lish ab le a n d w h a t w as not. In his m ind, w h e n h e to o k over
Russia was a very u n stab le country, a n d h e believed th a t th e “chaos”
o f th e Yeltsin years w ould m ake it im possible to rebuild Russia in any
m ean in g fu l sense. A ccordingly, th e K rem lin set th e p a ra m e te rs for
w h a t could be criticized an d w h a t was off lim its to criticism , an d it was
u p to th e m ed ia to abide b y th em . P erhaps Russia w ill be ready for a
m o re op en press in th e future, b u t n o t during his tim e in office.
P u tin ’s b u reaucratic m in d set also helps explain his approach to
issues such as legal reform , th e m ilitary, an d even C hechnya. It is up
to h im to com e u p w ith a stru ctu ral paradigm , an d he th e n expected
th e re st o f th e system to fall into line. In his ow n m ind, th e answ ers to
m an y q uestions h e faced cam e in th e form o f b u reau cratic m odifica
tions. He seem ed to believe th a t once th e bureaucracy was w ell ordered,
th e system w ould w o rk better.
This also influenced his a ttitu d e tow ard th e Dum a. P utin believed
th a t it was im p o rta n t for Russia to have a constitutionally based politi
cal system . T h at m ean t th a t in articu latin g and im p le m e n tin g policy,
h e generally w e n t th ro u g h th e Dum a. Indeed, as Tom R em ington has
p o in ted out, th e use o f presid en tial decrees fell considerably once Putin
to o k over as p resident. However, w hile h e believed in m aking use o f
th e process, h e also m ade sure during his tim e in office th a t he, and th e
p arty h e created, th e U nity Party, controlled th e Dum a. By th e tim e h e
left office, h e could re st assured th a t any policy th e president proposed
w ould alm ost certainly be approved by th e D um a an d th e Federation
C ouncil (Rem ington, 2007: 56).
A second an d equally im p o rta n t factor is political culture. W hile
h e did n o t u se th e te rm itself, h e has m ade use o f th e concept. For
V ladim ir Putin: His Continuing Legacy 161exam ple, w h en asked if Russia plan n ed to im itate th e Chinese m odel,
h e responded, “No, th is is im possible o f course.” He was asked w hy
and responded, “Because w e have a d ifferent culture. After all, Russia
is p rim arily a co u n try o f E uropean c u ltu re ” (Putin, 2005). In a n o th e r
in stan ce he co m m ented, “R ussia is a c o u n try th a t, by th e w ill o f its
people, chose dem ocracy for itself. It set ou t on this course itself and,
observing all generally accepted political norm s, w ill decide for itself
how to ensure th a t th e principles o f freedom and dem ocracy are im ple
m en ted , taking into account its historical, geographical and other character
istics" (em phasis added; RTR Russia TV, 2005). In short, P utin does not
believe Russia should im p o rt a W estern-style dem ocratic system . This
b elief in Russia’s separate political culture was also one o f th e reasons
th a t Russia later ra n into problem s w ith th e W est, in general, an d th e
U nited States in particular.
Indeed, after eight years it was clear th a t Putin h ad no in ten tio n
o f grafting W estern ideas an d institutions onto th e Russian body poli
tic. In P u tin ’s m ind, it w e n t against everything Russian. T ransplanting
W estern ideas an d in stitu tio n s w ould create chaos in Russia. To p ara
phrase Stalin w ith regard to th e in tro d u ctio n o f com m unism in Poland,
Putin believed it w ould fit th e Russian people like a saddle fits a cow.
Indeed, this was a n o th er p o in t P utin m ade in his m illen n iu m speech in
January 2000:
It will n o t h ap p en soon, if it ever h appen s a t all, th a t Russia
w ill becom e th e second ed itio n o f say, th e U.S. o r B ritain
in w hich liberal values have deep historic traditions. Our
state and its in stitu tio n s have always played an exception
ally im p o rtan t role in th e life o f th e country and its people.
For Russians a strong state is n o t an anom aly th a t should
be got rid of. Q uite th e contrary, th ey see it as a source and
g u aran to r o f order a n d th e in itiato r an d m ain driving force
o f any change (Putin 2000).
A nother area w here this difference in political culture was evident
was in his use o f th e term dem ocracy o r demokratsiya. W hen observers in
162 social researchth e W est saw Putin use th e te rm dem okratsiya in his m illennium speech,
and often thereafter, they translated th e te rm to m ean “dem ocracy” as
th a t term is understood in th e West. However, Putin and th e m ajority o f
Russians h ad a different definition o f th e term in m ind. In short, w h at
P u tin m ean t was au th o ritarian ism —b u t w ith o u t repression. A fter all,
this has been th e n ature o f Russian governance for m ore th a n a thousand
years. P u tin ’s use o f th e te rm sovereign democracy to describe Russia in
2005 was n o t an accident. Its purpose was “to indicate th a t Russia w ould
find its ow n way to dem ocracy” (Sakwa, 2007:14).
The m o st im p o rta n t in d icato r o f th e success o f P u tin ’s lead er
ship style cam e from public opinion polls. P u tin ’s approval ratin g was
b etw een 70 an d 80 p ercen t in 2008 (Tayler, 2008: 32). Very few politi
cians anyw here in th e w orld could hope to have such a high approval
rating.
This b rin g s us to th e th ird facto r th a t played a m ajo r role in
P u tin ’s decision-m aking approach—one th a t seem ed even stronger in
Putin th a n his bureaucratic approach to solving problem s. T hat is his
nonideological a ttitu d e n o ted earlier.
The key question for P utin in dealing w ith a problem is will th e
pro p o sed so lu tio n w ork? If th e answ er is yes, th e n let us do it th a t
way. If th e an sw er is no, th e n an o th er approach was needed. This, too,
should n o t com e as a surprise, given his background. W hen it cam e to
p ro b lem solving, th e KGB was one o f th e least ideological organizations
in th e Soviet Union. The task was to g et th e jo b done, to solve th e prob
lem at hand. Talking to KGB agents over th e years, this w riter has th e
im pression th a t, w hile th ey believed th ey w ere th e “shield and sw ord”
o f th e state, th ey saw th e ir p rim aiy task as solving th e problem s given
to th e m by th e “center.”
This n o n ideological ap p ro ach ce rtain ly c h a rac te rized P u tin ’s
foreig n policy. He was n o t b o u n d by som e ideological paradigm . He
was prep ared to be very flexible w h en th e occasion w arran ted it. This
was clearly evident in his in itial response o f th e events o f 9/11. He was
th e first fo reig n lead er to p h o n e P resid en t George W. Bush, an d he
personally oversaw efforts to assist th e U nited States in its operations
in Afghanistan. After all, it was P utin w ho visited m ilitary headquarters
Vladimir Putin: His Continuing Legacy 163and blasted his generals for n o t helping th e A m ericans in A fghanistan.
The situ atio n changed im m ed iately th ereafter. It was also P u tin w ho
stepped in an d convinced th e C entral Asian leaders to g ra n t th e U nited
States lan d in g rights for th e ir search-and-rescue team s. If h e h ad n o t
ta k e n those tw o steps—w h ich w ere very u n p o p u lar w ith elem ents o f
th e m ilitary—th e w a r in A fghanistan m ig h t have developed very differ
ently, especially in its initial stages.
P utin con tinued to follow a nonideological approach th ro u g h o u t
his te n u re in office. W hen w ork in g w ith th e U nited States helped advance
Russian interests h e was prep ared to m ove in th a t direction. Similarly,
w h e n he decided n o t to crack dow n on Iran ’s nuclear p rogram th e way
th e U nited States w an ted h im to do, h e did so in spite o f W ashington’s
com plaints. F u rtherm ore, in spite o f th e co n cern expressed by som e
in th e W est over P u tin ’s decision to fly Russian bom bers n ea r W estern
borders, P utin w as un d au n ted . It was n o t p a rt o f a “g ran d plan.” It was
sim ply a case o f P utin tak in g steps th a t he believed w ould dem onstrate
to th e w orld th a t Russia w as “b ack” and, as in Soviet tim es, it was now
playing a m ajor role in w orld affairs.
There was, however, o n e aspect o f W estern policy th a t co n tin u
ally u p set P utin an d caused problem s in East-West relations. T hat was
th e ten d en cy on th e p a rt o f th e W est to criticize Russia for n o t adopting
W estern-style dem ocracy a n d h u m a n rights. He was especially b ru ta l
in his criticism o f th e W est for its policy to w ard Russia in his speech
a t a conference in M unich in February 2007. He did n o t believe th a t
W estern-type dem ocracy an d its view o f h u m a n rights w ere universal
tru th s —ideas th a t W ashington a n d m o st o f Europe co n tin u ally used
to criticize Moscow. To quote Foreign M inister Sergei Lavrov, “T here is
only one criterion u sed [by th e W estern powers] to assess th e readiness
o f a country to pass th e ‘dem ocratic’ test—th e ir readiness to follow in
th e slipstream o f o th ers’ policies” (cited in Averre, 2008: 33).
T he fo u rth c h a rac te ristic o f P u tin ’s ap p ro ach to political an d
econom ic problem s was th a t P utin was n o t a long-range planner. His
focus was on th e h ere and now, ju s t as it w as w h en h e w as in th e KGB.
This helps explain w hy h e did n o t com e u p w ith a long-range p lan for
solving th e c o u n try ’s econom ic problem s. His focus w as o n concerns
164 social researchsuch as th e price o f oil, o r g ettin g rid o f obnoxious oligarchs, o r forcing
generals to go along w ith th e n ew defense m in ister’s reform plans. He
h ad n e ith e r th e tim e n o r th e tem p eram en t to look at problem s from a
long-term , conceptual standpoint.
Finally, as m an y w rite rs have n o te d , P u tin w as ca u tio u s—a
co m m o n ch a rac te ristic a m o n g b u re a u c ra ts an d in tellig en ce agents.
His decision-m aking ap p ro ach has ten d ed to be increm ental. As no ted
previously, stab ility was o n e o f his p rim ary concerns. As h e said on
A pril 4, 2001, “T here w ill b e no m ore revolutions o r counter-revolu
tio n s” (Putin, 2000). In o th e r w ords, stability is prim ary. This has b een
m o st ev ident in his dealings w ith th e regions, o r in his a ttitu d e tow ard
leg al re fo rm , o r his h e sita tio n to ad o p t a n econom ic re fo rm plan.
R ath er th a n p u rsu e th e “h a reb ra in e d schem es” o f a K hrushchev, P utin
trie d o ne ap p ro ach after an o th er, even if, as in th e case o f C hechnya,
th e y did n o t w o rk o u t as w ell as h e m ig h t have liked. W h en h e found
p roblem s in th e defense m in istry —first w ith p ersonalities, a n d la te r
w ith co rru p tio n —h e m ade changes in a gradual fashion. He began by
convincing th e defense m in iste r to go in to retire m en t. N ext he changed
th e relatio n sh ip b etw een th e m in iste r o f defense an d th e c h ief o f th e
G en eral S taff (m aking th e la tte r su b o rd in a te to th e form er). T hen,
w h e n th e m assive scale o f c o rru p tio n in th e m ilitary becam e evident,
h e b ro u g h t in a n ew defense m in ister w hose forte was in finance an d
b u d g etary m atters. P utin w as th e k in d o f lead er w ho saw a p ro b lem
th ro u g h u n til it w as solved. He was stu b b o rn once h e m ade u p his
m ind, how ever. Speed was n o t critical, b u t perseverance was. In short,
P u tin ’s ap p ro ach to ch ange w as th e ap p ro ach o f th e to rto ise ra th e r
th a n th e hare.
This is n o t to suggest P u tin could n o t m ove very quickly w h en th e
o p p o rtu n ity presented itself. This was clearly w h at he did in th e after-
m a th o f th e attack on th e U nited States o n S eptem ber 11,2001. He used
th is tragic ev en t n o t only to m ove Russia closer to th e W est, b u t also to
overcom e opposition o n th e p a rt o f th e m ilitary and o th e r conservatives
to his desire for closer ties w ith W ashington. Similarly, once it becam e
clear to h im th a t U kraine w as firm ly re sista n t to R ussian influence,
h e cu t subsidies on oil th e K rem lin sold to Kiev. After all, w hy should
Vladim ir Putin: His Continuing Legacy 165Russia subsidize U kraine? W hile he m ade an econom ic arg u m en t, its
political ram ifications w ere obvious to eveiyone, East and West.
ALL IS NOT W ELL, HOW EVER
On th e one han d , P u tin ’s accom plishm ents should n o t be u n d e re sti
m ated. In place o f th e chaotic, b u t dem ocratic (in th e W estern sense)
political system , an d in spite o f th e im poverished m ilitary pow er and
th e econom ic m orass th a t Yeltsin left behind, Russians now have tw o
item s th a t th ey lacked 10 years ago—predictability an d stability (stabil-
nost’ i predvidenie). They can n ow plan for tom orrow , and th e vast m ajor
ity o f th e m have achieved a certain degree o f stability in th e ir lives—due
in large p art to P u tin ’s actions.
At th e sam e tim e, m ajor problem s rem ain—problem s th a t it will
tak e m ore th a n a decade to resolve. Let us go th ro u g h a list o f them .
First, th ere is a dem ographic crisis. Today Russia has a p o pulation o f
149 m illion. However, instead o f increasing th e population is decreas
ing. C u rren t projections suggest th a t by 2050 Russia’s population will
fall below 100 m illion (“Russia’s Army,” 2008) The aging population also
presents m ajor problem s in a society in w hich th ere are few er and fewer
individuals in th e w orkforce to support those w ho have retired. Already
th is p o p u latio n loss is adversely affecting th e Russian m ilitary. T here
are n o t enough qualified young m en to draft. Furtherm ore, the m ilitary
faces th e prospect o f seeing an increasingly larger proportion o f Muslim
recruits, som ething th a t strikes fear into th e hearts o f Russian generals—
w ho have th e ir ow n concerns about Islam ic terrorism . Given th e low
pay for soldiers in Russia, an d in light o f th e poor econom ic situation
th a t m any young Muslim m en find them selves in, th ere is concern th a t
a grow ing percentage o f recruits will be Muslims. At least one estim ate
suggests th a t one-fourth o f th e Russian Arm y will be M uslim by 2050.
M eanw hile, m ajor problem s afflict th e co u n try ’s physical infra
stru ctu re. Russia does n o t possess a road system sim ilar to th e super
highways in th e U nited States. However, w h a t it did have has fallen into
disrepair. Housing, w hich w as never especially p len tifu l in Russia or
th e USSR, rem ains a n extrem ely difficult problem . The Russian m ilitary
is in deplorable shape, despite P utin’s efforts to tu rn m atters around.
166 social researchRussians are far b e tte r o ff econom ically th a n th e y w ere before
Putin. Yet in d u stry in Russia has still n o t recovered from th e postcom
m u n ist collapse. In 2004 oil prices took off, filling th e K rem lin’s coffers.
One w ould th in k th a t th e co u n try w ould be aw ash in m oney given th e
h ig h price o f oil on w orld m arkets today. However, little o f it has been
p u t back in to b uild in g th e c o u n try ’s in d u strial in fra stru ctu re. “The
co n sequence in Russia, was n o t a h ig h e r g row th ra te b u t aggravated
repressio n , c o rru p tio n , re-n atio n alizatio n and all econom ic reform s
stalled” (Aslund, 2008: 7). U nfortunately, from P u tin ’s and M edvedevs’
stan d p o in t, th e re cen t d ro p in oil prices, along w ith th e w orldw ide
recession, has p u t a crim p in th e ir efforts to m odernize th e country. At
th is p o in t it is u nclear w h a t long-term political im pact this econom ic
d o w n tu rn w ill have on th e country.
W hile P u tin m ade considerable process in developing th e rule
o f law, m u ch rem ain s to be done. K athryn H endley has called th e
legal system in Russia a “dual system ” (Hendley, 2007: 99). C ourt cases
involving th e average citizen are handled in accordance w ith th e law.
F urtherm ore, th e courts are being used to a far g re ater degree by aver
age citizens th a n ever was th e case d u rin g th e Soviet period. T hat is
th e good news. The problem com es w ith those involving individuals in
p ositions o f power. As H endley w rites, “ju stice is possible and m aybe
even probable, b u t cannot be g u aran teed ” (99).
Violent crim e is u p by 17 percent according to one source, w ith
R ussia’s poorly paid, an d o ften c o rru p t police officers o u tg u n n ed by
th e “b ad guys” (Knight, 2008). Issues w ith co rru p tio n are n o t lim ited
to th e police. It rem ains one o f th e co u n try ’s biggest and m ost serious
problem s. P utin talked a good gam e about gaining control over it, and
to be fair, h e jailed som e o f th e m ore outrageous exam ples. A nother
serious problem is th e ever p re sen t bureaucracy. D espite th e dem ise o f
th e Soviet U nion, Russia rem ains one o f th e m ost b ureaucratized coun
tries in th e world, and it is heavily corrupt. N othing happens w ith o u t
th e h an d o f som e b u reau crat being greased.
T hen th e re is th e m edical situation. The articles on M oscow’s
m edical problem s are legion. Life expectancy for m en is now dow n to
less th a n 59 years. W hile this is due in large p a rt to alcohol and cigarette
Vladim ir Putin: His Continuing Legacy 167sm oking, th e co u n try also faces very serious problem s w ith HIV/AIDS
an d traffic fatalities. M eanw hile, th e re is a serious shortage o f hospi
tals, and m edicines. To m ake m atters w orse, it is o ften necessary to
pay a bribe to physicians to g et p ro p er m edical trea tm e n t. T hat m eans
th a t if one does n o t have th e additional funds, one w ill have to go w ith
o u t m edical care. Indeed, according to Amy Knight, in 2007 th e W orld
H ealth O rganization ranked Russia 130th ou t o f 190 countries—below
b o th Bolivia and Guyana—in term s o f h ea lth care (Knight, 2008).
It m ay seem ironic for a country th a t once proclaim ed to th e w orld
th a t it h ad abolished econom ic and social classes now is experiencing a
grow ing gap betw een th e rich and th e poor. Furtherm ore, a good p a rt o f
th e populace is nearly destitute and a lot o f those w ho live in th e coun
try side are m oving to th e cities in search o f work. The situation is n o t
m ade any easier by th e 12 p ercen t inflation rate in 2007. Food prices,
always a sensitive issue am ong Russians, are also on th e rise.
The quality o f Russian education is likew ise going dow nhill, w hile
problem s w ith th e m edia hig h lig h ts one o f th e m ajo r problem s w ith
P u tin ’s approach. There is a tendency on th e p a rt o f local authorities to
in te rp re t w here th e Krem lin draws th e line betw een w h a t is p erm itted
an d w h a t is not. Editors o r local officials n o t w ishing to draw th e w ra th
o f sen io r security o r political authorities te n d to engage in self-censor
ship. W hy tak e a chance an d publish som ething th a t w ill backfire and
get one in trouble? The easy way ou t is to avoid th e problem . A fter all,
ru m o rs in Moscow have it th a t P utin m ade it very clear to th e oligarchs
th a t w hile h e w ould n o t go a fte r th e ir ill-gotten econom ic gains, h e
w ould n o t p u t u p w ith efforts by th e m to use this w ealth for political
purposes. Two o f th em , V ladim ir Gusinski and Boris Berezovksi, ignored
h im an d b o th n ow find them selves in exile. M ikhail K hordokovskii,
also step p ed over th e line—in P u tin ’s eyes—by engaging in political
activities and is in a Russian p riso n camp.
T here is also th e issue o f political institutions. It is no secret th a t
P u tin co n tro lled th e m ain p o litical p arty —U nited Russia—a n d th a t
b o th legislative bodies are subordinate to th e executive. P utin “system
atically tu rn e d elections in to n o th in g m o re th a n a process in w h ich
th e public is given a chance to validate decisions already m ade in th e
168 social researchK rem lin. The M arch 2008 elevation o f D m itry M edvedev to succeed
P u tin is sim ply th e latest m ilestone in th is process” (O rtnung, 2008: 2).
P u tin claim ed , how ever, th a t h e w a n te d to re v ita lize th e
D um a—to m ak e it a viable political body, playing a m ajor role in th e
p o litical process. He is n o w in a p o sitio n w h e re h e can m ake th a t
h ap p en —i f th a t is his in ten tio n . One could argue th a t it was necessary
to co n cen trate p ow er in th e executive w hile P utin w orked to g et th e
co u n try back on its feet. Now, if P utin really does w a n t a m ore dem o
cratic polity, it is tim e to devolve som e o f th e executive’s highly concen
tra te d pow er to th e legislature. Assum ing, o f course, th a t Putin rem ains
a m ajo r pow er an d th a t h e sincerely w ants a m ore dem ocratic (as th a t
te rm is u n d ersto od in th e W est) country. Only tim e w ill tell.
Finally, th e re is th e q u estio n o f foreign policy. In contrast to th e
Soviet Union, one expert has no ted th a t “‘Russia’s business is business.’
T hat has special w e ig h t,. . . because th e people w ho rule Russian also
ow n it” (quoted in Lucas, 2008:11). M eanwhile, relations w ith th e West,
an d especially th e U nited States, m ay be b e tte r th a n th ey w ere u n d e r
th e Soviets, b u t th e y are also w orse th a n th e y w ere in th e im m ediate
afterm ath o f 9/11. Moscow sees NATO en larg em en t as a m ajor th rea t. In
spite o f prom ises m ade to G orbachev by George Bush, NATO has contin
u ed to ad m it countries th a t Moscow sees as follow ing in its sphere o f
in flu en ce—th a t is, th e Balkans and E astern Europe. Moscow becam e
even m ore incensed over NATO’s pu rp o rted plans to ad m it Georgia and
w as one o f th e reasons for th e K rem lin’s decision to use m ilitary force
in A bkhazia an d South Ossetia.
In m any ways, th e K rem lin’s c o n sta n t com plaints ab o u t NATO
e n la rg e m e n t have backfired. They convinced m an y states th a t th ey
should jo in NATO for pro tectio n against th e K rem lin an d countries like
Georgia will probably continue th e ir efforts to jo in th e alliance in spite
o f th e m ilitary action by th e K rem lin against th e secessionist regions o f
Georgia, A bkhazia an d S outh Ossetia.
T here are also strains in Russian-European relations, w here m any
fe ar th a t th e K rem lin w ill use its vast oil reserves as pressure against
th em . Moscow has b een developing closer relations w ith China, b u t it is
u n clea r how far th o se relations w ill go.
Vladim ir Putin: His Continuing Legacy 169W h at does th is m ean for th e fu tu re o f R ussian foreign policy?
Moscow is caught in th e m idst o f a dilem m a as one observer com m ented.
“R ussia’s choice is a stark one. It can drop its p reten sio n s to em pire
an d its p eculiar version o f history, in w h ich case it can m ove sharply
closer to th e EU and NATO. O r it can go dow n th e ro u te o f in dependent
foreign policy, e ith e r in alliance w ith th e M uslim w orld o r w ith C hina”
(Lucas, 2008:12).
BUT PUTIN ISN’T REALLY GONE . . .
One o f th e new cottage industries in M oscow and abroad is th e effort
to d eterm in e th e n atu re o f th e pow er relationship betw een Putin and
new ly elected President D m itri Medvedev. After all, th e latter, w ho m ost
recently was head o f th e gas corporation g ian t Gazprom , is a protégé o f
th e form er. W ith o u t P utin’s support, Medvedev w ould never have h ad a
gh o st o f a chance o f becom ing president. In fact, Medvedev never previ
ously ra n for office. Is th e fo rm er really going to give u p his pow er to
th e 42-year-old Medvedev? Is M edvedev going to agree to be president
in n am e only? How will the pow er-sharing arran g e m e n t w ork? Keep in
m in d th a t Russia has n o t h ad tw o pow erful m en sharing pow er perhaps
since th e days o f th e Soviet Union. F urtherm ore, it is n o t norm al for any
politician, m uch less one from Russia, to voluntarily give u p a significant
p a rt o f his power. A ccording to one poll, “67 p ercen t o f Russians believe
M edvedev w ill co ntinue to ‘act u n d e r th e co n tro l’ o f P utin and his in n e r
circle” (Finn, 2008). Certainly, th e cabinet th a t P utin announced at th e
b eg in n in g o f May was full o f P utin stalw arts. Moreover, th e re was no
in d icatio n th a t P utin was forced to accept anyone n o t considered to be
one o f his strong supporters.
CONCLUSION
P utin was w ell aw are o f W estern concerns over his actions th a t m oved
th e country in th e direction o f a m ore au th o ritaria n form o f rule. Yet, as
was noted, he feared th a t if h e did n o t im pose o rd er th ro u g h th e pow er
o f th e state, th e Russian state w ould collapse. He was in charge o f a
co u n try w ith alm ost no experience w ith dem ocracy. He w orried th a t
if he did n o t tak e a strong h a n d in ru n n in g th e country, it could sink
170 social researchback into th e anarchy o f th e Yeltsin period. As a result, he believed th e
restrictions he placed on th e m edia w ere necessary as h e tried to guide
Russia to w ard w h a t he considered to be a m ore stable “d em o cratic”
political future. Besides, from P u tin ’s p o in t o f view, this is th e way th e
Russians w an ted things. They longed for a strong m anager d uring th e ir
c u rre n t “tim e o f troubles.”
The Russia Putin left was, in th e w ords o f one observer, “a k ind o f
plebiscite dem ocracy, w here one-m an rule is preserved th ro u g h dem o
cratic in stitu tio n s. . . . But as long as th e re is stability, people w ill be
p rim ed to tru st this m an, a n d only this m a n ” (Vitaly Tretakov quoted
in Weir, 2004). Russians ap p ear to have a m ore optim istic view o f th e ir
fu tu re th a n th ey did w hen P utin cam e to power. And to a large degree,
P u tin ’s presidency is th e reason. “T here is a totally different m ood in
th is co u n try from w h a t we h ad six years ago,” said Russian scholar
Vyacheslav Nikonov. “Everyone was su n k in d epression after all th e
disasters and h u m iliations o f th e 1990s. Today th ere is optim ism . The
co u n try is m oving ahead, a n d w e have th in g s to be p roud o f a g a in ”
(quoted in Weir, 2004).
It is w o rth n o tin g th a t P u tin w as b e ttin g o n th e econom y an d
th e h ig h price o f R ussia’s oil exports as th e basis for a stable political
system . How ever, w ith th e w orld w ide recessio n an d th e fall in oil
p rices, th e c o u n try now faces an u n c e rta in fu tu re . If th e c o u n try ’s
eco n o m y c o n tin u e s to d ec lin e , o r a n o th e r c a ta stro p h e sh o u ld h it
Russia, th e p rogress th a t N ikonov m e n tio n s could tu r n in to stag n a
tio n , w ith all th e political u n k n o w n s th a t such a situ atio n could have
for Moscow.
P utin laid th e gro u n d w o rk for a fu tu re R ussian state an d econ
omy. A ssum ing M edvedev co n tin u es along th e sam e p a th as h e has
th u s far, th e R ussian state w ill continue to be highly centralized, and
au th o ritarian . This seem s to be th e kin d o f w orld th a t Russians w ant.
He and M edvedev have avoided repression—except against those w ho
openly challenge th e existing system. Interference in th e affairs o f state
by outsiders w ill n o t be tolerated.
Sim ilarly, P utin c reated th e basis for an in d e p e n d e n t R ussian
foreign policy. Moscow w ill co n tin u e to w ork w ith th e W est w h e n it
Vladimir Putin: His Continuing Legacy 171is in its in tere st. The K rem lin w ill also have no qualm s about w o rk
in g w ith China or Iran or Venezuela regardless o f w h e th e r W ashington,
Paris, London, o r Berlin likes it.
Predicting th e future is always difficult—all th e m ore so w h en it
comes to a country like Russia th a t is in transition. In this context, I am
rem inded o f som ething the French political scientist B ertrand de Jouvenel
said several years ago. He argued th a t political questions are too com plex
to be “solved.” As soon as one political problem is “solved,” it gives rise to a
new one. Political problem s, h e adm onished us, can only be “settled,” and
even th en , it is a tem porary situation. I doubt Putin o r Medvedev has ever
heard o f de Jouvenel, b u t I suspect they w ould agree w ith his com m ent
concerning th e tem porary n atu re o f political “solutions” (de Jouvenel,
1963: 207). I th in k I know th e general outline o f w here Medvedev will
take th e country—P utin has laid dow n th e basic param eters. Still, as de
Jouvenel observed, one problem begets another. And Russia certainly has
enough problem s for any president to try to “settle.”
NOTES
1. M uch o f th e follow ing biographical in fo rm atio n is ta k e n from
H erspring and Kipp (2001).
2. See G raham H um es’ discussion o f P u tin ’s role an d effectiveness at
this tim e in Hum es (2000).
3. For an excellent discussion o f th e relationship betw een th e periphery
and th e center, see Petrov and Slider (2007: 76).
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