Yale University Thurman Arnold Project

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Yale University
  Thurman Arnold Project
             Competition Policy Modules
                  Finance Team

Updating Antitrust and Competition Policy:
              Finance Issues
                           May 2021
Banking & Credit Access:              Common Ownership:
    Daniel Backman                      Andrew Granato
     Jake Langbein                     Alicia Schleifman
    Nicole Cabanez                       Joel Michaels
    Areeb Siddiqui
     Drew D’Alelio
     Natalie Giotta
    Andrew Breckel
This report includes a set of proposals for the Biden Administration and Congress to address two
key groups of competition issues in the financial sector: 1) Problems of unequal access to retail
banking and credit for low-income communities and communities of color; and 2) Issues relating
to common ownership of stocks by large mutual funds.

Part I: Expanding Access to Retail Banking & Credit

                                                 Introduction

More than 30 million American households lack access to affordable basic banking services.1 The
market for retail banking and credit does not provide affordable, equitable products for low-income
communities and communities of color. As a result, expensive and often predatory alternatives
have filled the market gap. Low-income Americans without access to mainstream banking and
credit options spend around 10% of their income each year in fees and interest on financial services
that those with access to mainstream services typically get for free.2 The COVID-19 crisis both
highlighted and magnified the disadvantages associated with being unbanked, as consumers
shifted even further to online payments and millions of unbanked Americans waited weeks or
months to receive their stimulus payments.3 Meanwhile, other countries like China,4 Canada,5 and
Brazil6 are investing in digital currencies and faster payment systems as the United States
continues to lag behind.

At the same time, as many as 60 million adults in the U.S. have difficulty applying for credit cards
and other loans. This number adds those with blemishes on their credit reports to the 26.5 million
adults who are “invisible” due to not having credit reports or scores. Such individuals have a more
difficult time withstanding financial difficulties or other emergencies.7 Lack of competition in the
credit score market—in which one player, the Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO), claims a 90 percent
market share—appears to contribute to these disparities by stifling innovation in credit scoring
methodology.

The proposals in this section would address each of these challenges. First, a public option for
retail banking services would expand access to affordable, equitable basic banking and credit
services for millions of unbanked and underbanked Americans. The Biden Administration should
work with Congress to establish a public option for retail banking services that builds upon

1
  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, “How America Banks: Household Use of Banking and Financial Services:
2019 FDIC Survey Executive Summary,” October 2020.
2
  Mehrsa Baradaran, It’s Time for Postal Banking (February 24, 2014), 127 Harvard Law Review F. 165.
3
  Aaron Klein, “A Big Problem for the Coronavirus Economy: The Internet Doesn’t Take Cash,” Brookings
Institution, March 25, 2020.
4
  James Areddy, “China Creates Its Own Digital Currency, a First for Major Economy,” Wall Street Journal, April 5,
2021.
5
  Julie Gordon & David Ljunggren, “Bank of Canada Accelerates Work on Digital Currency Amid Pandemic,”
Reuters, February 10, 2021.
6
  Paulo Trevisani & Jeffrey T. Lewis, “Brazil’s Central Bank Uses Payment System to Spur Competition,” Wall
Street Journal, March 26, 2021.
7
  Jonnelle Marte, “U.S. consumers' access to credit may be worse than previously thought: Fed study,” Reuters,
September 24, 2019.
                                                                                                                1
proposals for FedAccounts, postal banking, and other related proposals that have emerged in recent
years. Several scholars, advocacy organizations, Members of Congress, and the Biden-Sanders
Unity Task Force endorsed versions of a FedAccounts or postal banking model.8 This report
outlines recommendations for a model that addresses some of the major critiques facing these
proposals and lays out considerations for the Administration as it seeks to implement this idea.

Second, this report recommends two key actions to increase competition in the credit score market:
developing a public credit score alternative and lowering regulatory barriers to new private market
entrants. These include a combination of legislative and executive actions for the Biden
Administration and Congress to take to expand access to credit for low-income communities and
communities of color while addressing potential pitfalls associated with artificial intelligence (AI)
innovation in the credit score market.

Proposal 1: Designing a Banking Public Option

Problem & Context
The market for retail banking and credit does not provide affordable, equitable products for low-
income communities and communities of color. These services are critical prerequisites to an
equitable recovery from the COVID-19 crisis and to full participation in the 21st century economy.

Disparities in Access to Basic Banking
In 2019, an estimated 5.4% of U.S. households (7.1 million households) were “unbanked,”
meaning no one in the household had a checking or savings account at a bank or credit union.
While that number decreased steadily since 2011, about two thirds of the decline is attributed to
improved socioeconomic circumstances (income level, income volatility, employment,
homeownership, and educational attainment) of U.S. households during that period. For that
reason, the FDIC believes the recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic is likely driving this
rate back up.9

Another 24.2 million U.S. households were underbanked in 2017, relying at least in part on money
orders, check cashing, rent-to-own, or other alternative financial services. In 2017, the last year
for which the FDIC reported underbanked status, 18.7% of U.S. households who had a checking
or savings account also used alternative financial products such as money orders, check cashing,
payday loans, and pawn shops.10 Unbanked and underbanked households are disproportionately
low-income, Black or Hispanic/Latino, less educated, disabled, and noncitizen.

Failures of the Private Market
We do not propose a federal public solution lightly. Rather, we believe, as the Biden
Administration does, in an expansive definition of infrastructure. Banking, and access to credit,
are foundational to the healthy functioning and growth of our society. Therefore, as we put forth

8
  See infra Proposal 1.
9
  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, “How America Banks: Household Use of Banking and Financial Services:
2019 FDIC Survey Executive Summary,” October 2020.
10
   Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, “FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households: 2017
Executive Summary,” October 2018.
                                                                                                           2
our solutions to these seemingly intractable issues, we want to contextualize our findings with an
explanation of why even the combination of existing banking services and the advent of “FinTech”
players will not sufficiently address this problem. First, we will explore the various reasons why
unbanked and underbanked households eschew or supplement banks. Next, we consider the banks
(or other financial service providers’) perspective to elucidate certain insurmountable gaps
between consumer needs and provider services.

The reasons households give for being unbanked suggest that the retail banking market is not
providing affordable, trustworthy products.11 In 2019, the most common reasons households gave
for not having a bank account was 1) that they did not have enough money to meet minimum
balance requirements, 2) that they don’t trust banks, 3) that they are concerned about their privacy,
4) that bank account fees are too high, and 5) that bank account fees are too unpredictable.12
Moreover, these five reasons and their relative frequency in the survey have remained consistent
since the 2015 FDIC survey, suggesting that the prevailing sentiment among unbanked consumers
has not changed much.

Indeed, providing basic bank accounts and credit services to consumers is often unprofitable for
mainstream banks due to relatively low-dollar account balances and higher default risk on loans.13
Past efforts to create affordable, government sponsored banking and credit options (e.g. credit
unions, Savings and Loans, etc.) were undermined by deregulation and concentration in the
banking sector.14 Further, when large companies from other sectors, like Wal-Mart in 2005, have
attempted to enter this market and provide basic banking services, the existing players have
successfully lobbied to prevent them from entering.15

In 2011, the FDIC also surveyed the home office of 567 banks to better understand why these
institutions were struggling to provide access to certain households. Although the survey itself is
dated, its findings remain relevant.16 Across business and product related obstacles to serving the
unbanked and underbanked, respondents ranked the following as their top 5 impediments (at least
a “minor obstacle) to providing service17:

     ● Fraud (79%)
     ● Lack of Consumer Understanding (74%)
     ● Effective Product Marketing (74%)
11
    In 2019, the most common reasons households gave for not having a bank account was 1) that they did not have
enough money to meet minimum balance requirements, 2) that they don’t trust banks, 3) that they are concerned
about their privacy, 4) that bank account fees are too high, and 5) that bank account fees are too unpredictable. See
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, “How America Banks: Household Use of Banking and Financial Services:
2019 FDIC Survey Executive Summary,” October 2020.
12
   Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, “How America Banks: Household Use of Banking and Financial Services:
2019 FDIC Survey Executive Summary,” October 2020.
13
   Id. at 493.
14
   Mehrsa Baradaran, How the Poor Got Cut Out of Banking (March 11, 2012). 62 Emory Law Journal 483, 487
(2013).
15
   Michael Barbaro, “Bankers Oppose Wal-Mart as Rival,” New York Times, October 15, 2005.
16
   Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, “Survey of Banks’ Efforts to Serve the Unbanked and Underbanked: 2011
Executive Summary,” April 2021.
17
   Id.
                                                                                                                   3
● Underwriting (70%)
     ● Profitability (63%)

All of the above obstacles for banks either imply or directly relate to profitability challenges.
Increased costs to build consumer understanding, develop proper marketing, specialize
underwriting for the subprime segment, and prevent fraud through further AML/KYC
requirements require cost expenditures from financial services providers. Along these lines, in her
analysis of how lower socioeconomic status consumers have been cut out of banking, Baradaran
contends that providing financial services to the poor is intrinsically unprofitable.18 In the context
of loan origination, the argument is that the costs of originating a small loan are essentially
equivalent to a large loan; thus, a natural incentive exists to make larger loans.

A similar argument can be made regarding the provisions of checking and savings accounts -
although there is more flexibility to tailor costs and revenue (through interest rates). Banks are
unlikely to develop extensive consumer listening efforts to understand the deposit needs of poor
consumers and equally unlikely to create extensive marketing campaigns to reach them as all of
these resources could be redirected toward more profitable consumers. Adding to the costs of
serving low income customers is their disproportionate use of cash. A 2016 Pew Research Survey
found that lower income households are far more likely to make all of their purchases in cash and
that Black and Latino households are also more likely to use cash on a weekly basis.19 Meanwhile,
cash is operationally expensive for banks: it costs money to store, transport, and monitor.

Indeed, many banks justify fee income and minimum balance requirements using this logic. Given
that fee avoidance and minimum balance requirements are major concerns for underbanked
consumers and banks’ reliance on fees to cover the increased costs of serving poor consumers, it
is unlikely that banks will sustainably address the needs of this segment of the population. It is
equally as unwise to wait and see if this hypothesis proves true.

Further, bank closures and consolidations after the financial crisis have increased the number of
both rural and urban areas that are considered banking deserts. More than 6% of bank branches
were closed between 2008 and 2016, and they were disproportionately located in rural Hispanic
areas and low-income urban neighborhoods. As of 2016, residents of low-income census tracts
were 80% more likely to live in a banking desert than are residents of higher-income census
tracts.20 These trends contribute to the racial and socioeconomic disparities in banking access and
underscore the limitations of the private market in meeting the needs of these populations.

Just as banks have curtailed physical access for poor consumers, they have also raised service fees.
A 2019 examination of trends in noninterest income by the Cleveland Federal Reserve
demonstrated that service charges from commercial banks (including ATM and overdraft fees)

18
   Baradaran, supra note 13, at 487.
19
   Aaron Smith & Monica Anderson, “New Modes of Payment and the ‘Cashless Economy,’” Pew Research Center,
December 16, 2016.
20
   NCRC, “Research Memo: Bank Branch Closures from 2008-2016,” available at https://ncrc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/NCRC_Branch_Deserts_Research_Memo_050517_2.pdf.
                                                                                                        4
have grown in share of non-interest revenue (from 14% in 2001 to 25% in 2018)21. Service charges
jumped considerably after the financial crisis—with the increase most pronounced among mid-
sized banks. The study concluded that overall reliance on service charges may be increasing due
to net interest margin pressure (from lower rates), especially when other forms of noninterest
income were adversely affected by the Great Recession.

As a result of all these forces, alternative, often predatory financial products have emerged to fill
the gap. Estimates suggest that low-income Americans without access to mainstream banking and
credit options spend around 10% of their income each year in fees and interest on financial services
that those with access to mainstream services typically get for free.22 In 2018, unbanked,
underbanked, and other low-income households in the U.S. spent $189 billion in fees and interest
on financial products, and that number is growing. That includes $16.7 billion spent on fees for
payments and deposits and another $39.9 billion on fees for single payment loan products like
payday loans.23 Spread across an estimated 31.3 million unbanked or underbanked households, the
total cost represents about $6,000 per household.24

As Baradaran puts it starkly, “What we have today are two forms of banks—regulated mainstream
banks that seek maximum profit for their shareholders by serving the needs of the wealthy and
middle class, and unregulated fringe banks that seek maximum profits for their shareholders by
taking advantage of the needs of the poor.”25 The private market is failing tens of millions of
Americans, and a public option is necessary.

The United States’s Slow, Costly Payment System
Another contributor to the failures of the private retail banking market for low-income Americans
is the lack of access to real-time payments. Real-time payments systems facilitate money transfers
from one bank/brokerage account to another instantaneously. The U.S. lags behind Mexico,
Europe, and other advanced economies in implementing widespread real-time payments systems.
Brazil’s central bank recently launched a state-owned instant payments system.26 In the United
States, however, consumers and businesses often have to wait multiple days for their funds to
transfer.

This friction creates detrimental liquidity challenges for families with low or volatile incomes, for
whom a three-day delay in their rent payment getting to their landlord or their paycheck landing
in their checking account can be particularly costly. These delays cause many families who do
have bank accounts to opt for more expensive check cashing, payday loan, or other alternative
financial services. One estimate suggests that lack of universal real-time payments costs low-

21
   Joseph G. Haubrich & Tristan Young, “Trends in the Noninterest Income of Banks,” Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland, September 24, 2019.
22
   Baradaran, supra note 2, at 127.
23
   Financial Health Network, “Financially Underserved Market Size Study 2019,” 2019.
24
   This rough estimate divides the $189 billion cost for financial products by an estimate of the total number of
unbanked (7.1 million in 2019) and underbanked (24.1 million in 2017) households.
25
   Baradaran, supra note 13, at 487.
26
   Jamie McGeever, Marcela Ayres, & Carolina Mandl, “Brazil launches ‘Piz’ instant payments system, Whatsapp
to enter ‘soon,’” Reuters, November 16, 2020.
                                                                                                                    5
income families $7 billion a year.27 In other words, the lack of universal real-time payments
infrastructure drives up the rate of underbanked Americans.

Insufficient competition in the market for real-time payments systems has driven these increased
costs and decreased quality for consumers of basic banking services. The U.S. market for real-time
payments systems for retail banking consumers is dominated by The Clearing House, a bank
services provider owned by the world’s largest banks. The Clearing House’s Real Time Payments
(RTP) system enables real-time transfers for low-dollar transactions between participating
financial institutions. But it excludes smaller banks and other competitors.

A public solution is necessary to expand access to real-time payments and thereby reduce reliance
on alternative financial products. The Federal Reserve is working to create FedNow, a public
option for real-time payments processing that would be operated as a public utility accessible to
all banks.28 This would provide competition to the private RTP option and ensure that smaller
banks, businesses, and communities can access real-time payments.29 However, the project has
been delayed and is not currently on pace to launch until 2023-2024.30 In the meantime, a bank
account public option promises to immediately make the Fed’s existing instant payment
infrastructure available to any American who wants it, free of charge.

COVID-19 Challenges
The COVID-19 crisis has only magnified the disadvantages associated with being unbanked. The
increasing reliance on online shopping and digital payments has made unbanked families’ reliance
on a combination of cash and expensive prepaid cards increasingly untenable.31 Meanwhile,
millions of Americans’ stimulus payments were delayed because they were unbanked, often by
weeks or months.32 Indeed, some Americans waited about 20 weeks after payments were
authorized by Congress.33 These challenges will only continue as the Administration rolls out
monthly Child Tax Credit payments: millions of Americans who need the payments most risk
getting them last.

In recognition of these challenges, the FDIC recently launched localized campaigns to encourage
more low-income Americans to open low-cost private bank accounts.34 However, it is unlikely
that these efforts will close the large gaps illustrated above, given a) the lack of trust that many

27
   Aaron Klein, “The fastest way to address income inequality? Implement a real time payment system,” Brookings
Institution, January 2, 2019.
28
   Federal Reserve, “Federal Reserve announces details of new 24x7x365 interbank settlement service with clearing
functionality to support instant payments in the United States,” August 6, 2020.
29
   Peter Conti-Brown & David A. Wishnick, Private Markets, Public Options, and the Payment System, 37 Yale J.
on Reg. (2020).
30
   Id.
31
   Klein, supra note 3.
32
   Elisabeth Buchwald, “14 million Americans risk major delays in their stimulus checks — should they use Square,
PayPal or a bank account?” MarketWatch, April 29, 2020.
33
   Amanda Fischer & Alix Gould-Werth, “Broken plumbing: How systems for delivering economic relief in
response to the coronavirus recession failed the U.S. economy,” Washington Center for Equitable Growth, July 29,
2020.
34
   Michelle Singletary, “The FDIC wants to make it easier for millions of ‘unbanked’ Americans to get their
stimulus payments,” Washington Post, April 6, 2021.
                                                                                                                6
unbanked Americans express toward banks, and b) the lack of real-time payments associated with
those accounts. Many cash-strapped consumers who are unable to wait 2-3 days for their child tax
credit payment to clear in their account may choose to pay the fee for instance check cashing,
reducing the value of their tax credit.

The Rise of Digital Currencies
While electronic payments and online banking have already transformed a lot about how banking
is done—at least for those with access to the banking system—a more dramatic recent
technological shift is the rise of digital/crypto currencies. In reaction to innovations like blockchain
distributed ledger currencies (like Bitcoin) and stablecoins (like Facebook’s Libra), central banks
are exploring Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) as complements to existing cash and
payment options.35 In April 2021, China was the first major country to announce plans to launch
its own CBDC.36 A retail banking infrastructure operated through the Federal Reserve’s existing
systems, as we propose here, would both enable the move to digital-first currencies that CBDC’s
aim for without many of the risks (privacy, stability, and otherwise) associated with CBDC models
(though it would also not preclude the Fed from exploring CBDC models, too).37

Solution

Legislative Action: Congress should pass legislation to allow all U.S. citizens, residents, and U.S.-
domiciled businesses and institutions to open a banking account at the Federal Reserve. This
program, as discussed in detail below, would fill market gaps not being served by private financial
institutions and reduce costs and other burdens that low-income Americans face in accessing basic
financial services.

Current Proposals for Banking Public Options

Postal Banking
The traditional postal banking proposal, as put forward by legal scholar Mehrsa Baradaran in
2014,38 contains two key components. First, the U.S. Postal Service would provide basic checking
and savings accounts, ATMs, and in-person customer service at all post offices. Second, the Postal
Service would offer small-dollar loans to individuals (up to $500 at a time and $1,000 per year)
with low fees and low interest rates compared to private alternatives.39 USPS would also be
authorized to create remittance services; check-cashing services; and other basic financial services
as deemed appropriate by the agency.40

35
   Lael Brainard, “An Update on Digital Currencies,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, August
13, 2021.
36
   Areddy, supra note 4.
37
   Morgan Ricks, John Crawford, & Lev Menand, “Central Banking for All: A Public Option for Bank Accounts,”
The Great Democracy Initiative, 7, 2018.
38
   Baradaran, supra note 2.
39
   In 2014, the Postal Service estimated that it could provide a $375 loan with just $48 in interest and fees, compared
to $520 in fees and interest that would be charged on the average $375 payday loan from a private payday lender.
See U.S. Postal Service, Providing Non-Bank Financial Services for the Underserved (2014), 14.
40
   S.2755 - Postal Banking Act, introduced April 25, 2018.
                                                                                                                     7
Proponents of postal banking point to the fact that it has been done before: the USPS offered basic
banking services from 1911 to 1966. Most other developed countries also offer some type of postal
banking service.41 By leveraging the existing post office infrastructure, postal banking would reach
zip codes that have lost bank branches.42 As a relatively well-trusted institution, the Postal Service
would provide a safe, non-predatory option for communities that are distrustful of private banks
and who may instead rely on expensive alternative financial products.43 Further, some have argued
that postal banking could provide the Postal Service with revenue to help close its budget shortfalls.
However, Baradaran and other progressive proponents insist that the program not aim to turn a
profit, given the risk of recreating predatory or inaccessible products for the low-income
Americans that need this public option most.

The USPS’s Inspector General’s Office endorsed a version of this proposal in 2014,44 and the
American Postal Workers Union supports it.45 Senators Gillibrand and Sanders introduced the
latest version of their postal banking legislation in 2020.46 Recently, the ACLU launched an effort
to advocate for postal banking legislation or executive action.47

FedAccounts
A complementary proposal for a banking public option is FedAccounts, which would provide basic
bank accounts through the Federal Reserve system. Under this proposal, as put forward by Morgan
Ricks, John Crawford, and Lev Menand, Congress would authorize the Federal Reserve to
establish basic banking accounts for all U.S. citizens, residents, and U.S.-domiciled businesses and
institutions. Like postal banking, the accounts would have no regular fees or minimum deposits
and no credit check requirements for opening an account.48 Unlike the traditional postal banking
proposal, these accounts would be accessible on a user-friendly online interface, including debit
card, ATM access, and direct deposit and online bill pay functionalities.49 The proposal also
includes phone customer service support, as well as in-person support at Federal Reserve branches
and other locations. Further, as discussed further below, post offices could be used to provide
physical points of service for these accounts—meaning this proposal could operate similar to
postal banking, but with the Fed providing the back-end account infrastructure.50

41
   Mehrsa Baradaran, “A Short History of Postal Banking,” Slate, August 18, 2014.
42
   U.S. Postal Service Office of the Inspector General, “Providing Non-Bank Financial Services for the
Underserved,” January 25, 2014. See also New America, “Mapping Financial Opportunity: Where are Financial
Services Located?” visited May 1, 2021, available at https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/mapping-financial-
opportunity/where-are-financial-services-located/.
43
   Baradaran, supra note 2.
44
   U.S. Postal Service Office of the Inspector General, “Providing Non-Bank Financial Services for the
Underserved,” January 25, 2014.
45
   “Campaign for Postal Banking,” American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, visited May 1, 2021, available at
https://apwu.org/postal-banking.
46
   Kirsten Gillibrand, “Senators Gillibrand And Sanders Reintroduce Postal Banking Act To Fund United States
Postal Service And Provide Basic Financial Services To Underbanked Americans,” September 17, 2020.
47
   Rakim Brooks, “Why We Need the Post Office to Close the Racial Wealth Gap,” ACLU, March 18, 2021.
48
   Note that, despite the lack of regular monthly fees, the account could still include other small fees to help defray
costs of particular transactions and discourage abuse, such as small fees for bounced checks.
49
   Ricks et al., supra note 37.
50
   Id.
                                                                                                                          8
One key benefit of the FedAccounts model is that it would enable every American to connect
directly to the Fed’s existing instant payment system, allowing payments between FedAccounts to
clear in real time. It would also enable payments to be made without fees—so, for example, a
business accepting a FedAccount debit card payment would not have to pay a fee on the
transaction. Further, FedAccounts would provide a simple, universal mechanism for the federal
government to distribute payments like stimulus checks and monthly Child Tax Credit payments.
It could also serve as a broader tool for monetary policy and macroeconomic stability.51

Senator Sherrod Brown and Representative Maxine Waters both introduced legislation for
FedAccounts as part of the initial COVID-19 stimulus discussions in Spring 2020.52 Sen. Brown
also discussed including this proposal in the American Rescue Plan legislation.53

Critiques and Challenges to Existing Proposals
Despite widespread political support for these proposals, some criticism has emerged. This section
discusses four critiques that we feel merit additional discussion at this stage in the debate. We note
that others have responded to these and other critiques at some length.54

Critique 1: New FinTech products will close the existing disparities
Some question whether a public option is necessary to reach the unbanked and underbanked in the
face of nimbler, non-traditional banking players that fall under the broad umbrella of “FinTech.”
For example, Brookings Institution released a report discussing the potential for FinTech to expand
financial access given the right regulatory changes.55 Given the ubiquitous use of mobile,
especially among younger generations, it is easy to imagine that online-only financial products
could reduce costs and create more user-friendly, attractive options for those who for a variety of
reasons choose not to use existing banks.

However, as discussed above, the unbanked and underbanked population has been staying steady
or even growing, suggesting that new financial products are not closing the gap. Indeed, even with
increasing smartphone ownership, a lack of consistent high-speed broadband and mobile internet
is a major inhibitor to seamless FinTech adoption. While most studies tend to center on increasing
broadband internet access, an FCC working paper supplements this view with an examination of
mobile internet, finding that rural networks are relatively more dependent on non-WiFi mobile
technology and that counties with a greater share of minority residents are more likely to rely on

51
   Id.
52
   S.3561 - Banking for All Act, introduced March 23, 2020; https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-
bill/6321/text?r=1&s=1
53
   Smith, Talmon Joseph, “Sherrod Brown: Progressives Will Be ‘Pretty Happy’ With Biden,” New York Times,
January 14, 2021.
54
   See, e.g., Ricks et al., supra note 37; “Know the Facts,” Campaign for Postal Banking, visited May 1, 2021,
available at http://www.campaignforpostalbanking.org/know-the-facts/.
55
   Michael Barr, Karen Gifford, & Aaron Klein, “Enhancing anti-money laundering and financial access: Can new
technology achieve both?” Brookings Institution, April 2018.
                                                                                                                  9
dated mobile technology.56 Further, low-income                      consumers      and    small     businesses
disproportionately rely on in-person banking services.57

Outside of mobile and broadband infrastructure, low-income consumers' emphasis on cash and
other “expensive” banking services remains a key impediment for FinTech companies. Finally,
these new entrants still face headwinds in building trust and must beware aligning themselves too
heavily with the technology industry—which recently hit new lows in public perception.58
Although FinTechs often bring an intense focus on user experience, design, portability, and
mobility, they face many of the same structural hurdles as their banking peers. Once more, the
economic incentive to serve low-income consumers is simply subordinated to the pursuit of more
profitable, digital-ready consumers.

Critique 2: A public option could endanger community banks and credit unions
Supporters of community banks and credit unions argue that a public option could threaten their
position in the market in favor of the largest and most profitable banks. They also argue that these
institutions already serve many areas that have been abandoned by the large banks.59 However, the
data is clear that these institutions are not able to serve the unbanked and underbanked populations,
and that the number of banking deserts is growing rather than shrinking.60 In fact, many of the
unbanked live in areas without community banks or credit unions.61 Nonetheless, as discussed
below, we think these institutions can and should play an important role as part of a banking public
option ecosystem, alongside the Fed and the Postal Service.

Critique 3: Positioning the U.S. government as a collector on small-dollar loans may be
undesirable
Other critics contend that we may not want to put the federal government in the position of creditor
on small-dollar consumer loans that have been put forward as part of the postal banking proposal.
Because some borrowers would inevitably default on their loans, the postal service or another
agency would be in the position of having to collect on these loans, potentially in the form of wage
garnishment, liens, and other methods. Legal scholar Peter Conti-Brown has argued this would be
both politically undesirable and would undermine the current favorable view that Americans have
toward the USPS when it becomes a collector.62

This very issue is why Baradaran and others have insisted that the public option not be used to turn
a profit for the government or close the gap in the USPS’s budget. Nonetheless, the question of

56
   Judith Dempsey and Patrick Sun, “The Digital Divide in U.S. Mobile Technology and Speeds: OEA Working
Paper 51,” Office of Economics and Analytics, Federal Communications Commission, December 30, 2020.
57
   Jason Richardson and Zoe Paige, “Bank Branches Are Still Essential for Small Business Communities,” National
Community Reinvestment Coalition, June 10, 2019; Jad Edlebi, “Research Brief: Bank Branch Closure Update
(2017-2020),” National Community Reinvestment Coalition, visited May 1, 2021.
58
   Megan Brenan, “Views of Big Tech Worsen; Public Wants More Regulation,” Gallup, February 18, 2021.
59
   ICBA, “Our Position: Postal or State-Owned Public Banks,” visited May 1, 2021, available at
https://www.icba.org/our-positions-a-z/postal-and-state-banks/postal-banking.
60
   Jad Edlebi, “Research Brief: Bank Branch Closure Update (2017-2020),” National Community Reinvestment
Coalition, visited May 1, 2021.
61
   John Heltman, “Postal Banking Is a Solution But to Which Problem?” American Banker, August 29, 2020.
62
   Peter Conti-Brown, “Why the next big bank shouldn’t be USPS,” Brookings Institution, May 31, 2018.
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how much the government should subsidize these loans and to what lengths it should go to collect
on defaulted loans is one that should be considered in these proposals. Moreover, it is important
to note that the lending component of the public option is not central to the proposal. The Fed or
the Postal Service can still provide basic banking and payment services even without also
providing small-dollar loans. The need to think through these considerations around the loan
component should not hold up the immediate implementation of a public bank account option.

Critique 4: Shifting deposits to the U.S. government could undermine other functions of the
financial system
Finally, some have raised concerns about the prospect of consumers’ deposits shifting from private
banks—where they sit now, at least for those with bank accounts—to the Fed or the postal service.
This migration could remove significant assets from banks’ balance sheets and restrict their ability
to lend. (This assumes, of course, that not just low-income, currently-unbanked consumers but also
higher-income consumers with larger balances would move to the FedAccount system en masse.)
However, FedAccounts proponents have written about the Fed’s ability to address this issue
through their discount window. In addition, these assets could enable the Fed to develop additional
creative lending and investment vehicles targeted to underinvested areas and national priorities.63

Proposed Structure and Design Options
A combination of the features of FedAccounts and postal banking can address each of the
challenges and critiques outlined above while still closing the disparities in access to retail banking
services. This section outlines what we think are the most promising design features of a banking
public option. Some of these contain considerations for further research and discussion.

Design Feature 1: Federal Reserve as Backbone Account Infrastructure & Digital Platform
The Federal Reserve should provide the underlying accounts for a banking public option. As
discussed above, the Fed is best positioned to provide universal, digital-first accounts, and it can
do so on top of its existing instant payment infrastructure and connections to the banking sector.

Congress should enable the Fed to make these accounts available to all U.S. citizens, residents,
and U.S.-domiciled businesses and institutions. To successfully fill the market gap and meet the
needs of low-income Americans, these accounts should include at least the following key features:
   ● A debit card, ATM access, and direct deposit and online bill pay functionalities;
   ● No regular fees and no minimum deposits, in order to maximize accessibility;
   ● No credit check requirement for opening an account, and no profitability considerations
       used to determine account opening;
   ● Real-time payments between accounts, a critically important feature made possible because
       the accounts would operate on the Fed’s existing real-time payments infrastructure;
   ● User-friendly, accessible interfaces available in multiple languages;
   ● Customer service available by phone in multiple languages and in person at Federal
       Reserve branches and other locations.

63
   Saule T. Omarova, The People’s Ledger: How to Democratize Money and Finance the Economy (October 20,
2020). Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 20-45, Vanderbilt Law Review, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3715735 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3715735.
                                                                                                          11
Ricks, Crawford, and Menand propose that these accounts offer the same interest rate that
commercial banks receive on their balances. As of June 2018, that was 1.75%. That rate would be
significantly higher than that offered in private checking and savings accounts.64 We agree that
these accounts should offer generous interest rates and can do so given the economies of scale and
lack of profit motive associated with this public option. That said, to the extent private banks may
consider that rate impossible to compete with, the Fed could consider lowering the rate slightly in
a compromise, if necessary. For instance, the Fed offer over an interest rate at or around the average
rate offered in the market.

Design Feature 2: Post Offices as Points of Service
Though the online FedAccounts interface would have all the necessary functionality, U.S. Postal
Service branches should be used to provide physical points of service for those with limited
computer literacy or trust. Fed ATMs should be placed at every post office location, and post office
employees should be trained to handle cash and check deposits and cash withdrawals. The Fed
does not have experience with customer service, and it only has 12 Federal Reserve branches
located across the country. The Postal Service could provide necessary in-person services,
including handling cash, and could leverage its popular reputation in ways the Fed could not. This
arrangement would combine the benefits of postal banking with the significant benefits of the
Fed’s account platform, as discussed above.

Design Feature 3: Community Banks, Credit Unions, & Other Qualifying Banks as Pass-through
Account Providers
In addition to the Postal Service, community banks and credit unions should also play an important
front-end role on top of the FedAccounts infrastructure. Sen. Brown’s and Rep. Waters’s
FedAccounts legislation included a provision that would have required every member bank of the
Federal Reserve system (approximately 3,000 commercial banks across the country) to provide
“pass-through” FedAccounts. The banks would provide the front-end account opening, customer
service, and other interactions with the consumers, and the deposits would be held at the Federal
Reserve rather than on the banks’ books. The legislation also allowed state-chartered banks and
credit unions that are not Fed member banks to opt in to provide pass-through FedAccounts,
subject to limitations, but it did not mandate it. Further, it provided that any participating bank or
credit union with less than $10 billion in total consolidated assets would be reimbursed for
operational costs incurred in offering these pass-through accounts.65

While this proposal offers one creative way to integrate private banks into this system, we propose
an alternative that prioritizes community banks and credit unions as partners and provides
sufficient incentives to make participation valuable for them. The Federal Reserve could allow
financial institutions to bid on becoming a pass-through account provider, and it could give
preferences to smaller banks, credit unions, and institutions located in underserved areas. Further,
it could allow these institutions to market other products alongside the pass-through FedAccounts

64
     Ricks et al., supra note 37
65
     See, e.g., H.R. 6321, introduced March 23, 2020.
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product.66 This opportunity to offer the Fed’s attractive account option could help these institutions
reach new customers and give them a competitive advantage relative to the largest banks, pushing
back against consolidating and closures in the banking sector. The leaders of two prominent
national credit union associations, including one that has publicly opposed postal banking67, put
forward a similar idea last year as a version of postal banking that their membership could
support.68

Design Feature 4: Integration with FinTech Products to Drive Innovation
The digital-first FedAccounts model presents a valuable opportunity to promote innovation in the
FinTech space. As part of its FedAccounts system, the Fed should put in place an open application
programming interface (API) functionality. This would enable third-party developers to create
applications for FedAccounts and link existing services and products to people’s FedAccounts.69
To the extent that the cost and complexity of providing back-end accounts hinders smaller FinTech
providers from entering the market, allowing them to plug into and build off of the FedAccount
infrastructure could create many more opportunities for innovation.70

Design Feature 5: Postal Service as Small-dollar Lender
This system could also include the small-dollar loan component of the postal banking proposals.
As proposed in Sens. Gillibrand and Sanders’s legislation, Postal Service could be authorized to
provide small-dollar loans (up to $500 at a time and $1,000 per year) with low fees and low interest
rates compared to private alternatives71 As discussed above, some have raised questions as to the
wisdom of the federal government becoming a creditor (and collector) on small-dollar loans.
However, given the significant costs that the most economically vulnerable Americans pay to
access small amounts of credit through alternative, often-predatory financial products, a non-
predatory public option could provide significant value to low-income Americans and should be
incorporated.

Design Feature 6: Redirecting Deposits to Private Banks and/or Public Investment Priorities
To address concerns about significant assets migrating from private banks to the Federal Reserve
as consumers shift their funds into FedAccounts, the Fed can redirect some or all of these deposits
back to private banks for lending purposes. As discussed above, this can be done through the Fed’s

66
   The Fed should pre-approve and regularly review the products that banks market alongside the pass-through
FedAccounts, and the marketing collateral and strategies used, to ensure that the products are not exploitative or
deceptive. If a financial institution that offered FedAccounts were engaged in exploitative practices via co-marketed
products, the Fed should consider removing that financial institution as a FedAccounts provider.
67
   American Bankers Association et al., “Joint Financial Services Trades Letter to the House: Oppose the Pascrell-
Kaptur Postal Banking Amendment,” July 30, 2020, available at https://www.aba.com/advocacy/policy-
analysis/joint-financial-services-trades-letter-to-the-house-oppose-pascrell-kaptur-postal-banking-amendment.
68
   B. Dan Berger & Anthony Hernandez, “BankThink: USPS needs to keep an open mind on postal banking,”
American Banker, August 21, 2020.
69
   Ricks et al., supra note 37
70
   While it takes a different approach, the UK’s Open Banking model has similarly opened up retail banking APIs to
third parties, enabling integration with fintech products and innovation in the fintech space. See, e.g., Victor
Chatenay, “The UK’s Open Banking regime has turned three years old,” Business Insider, Jan 14, 2021.
71
   In 2014, the Postal Service estimated that it could provide a $375 loan with just $48 in interest and fees, compared
to $520 in fees and interest that would be charged on the average $375 payday loan from a private payday lender.
See U.S. Postal Service, Providing Non-Bank Financial Services for the Underserved (2014), 14.
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discount window. The Fed could also consider targeting these assets toward community banks or
those in underbanked areas. Further, as discussed above, these assets on the Fed’s balance sheets
could enable the Fed to engage in new lending and investments, including loans for small- and
medium-sized businesses, financing for large-scale public infrastructure projects, and expanding
their portfolio of trading assets for the purposes of financial market stabilization.72 Finally, we note
that this scenario will only arise if the public option is wildly successful. The Fed has several
options to address this problem if/when it arises.

Executive Action Option: If Congress does not pass the above proposal, the Administration can
establish a public banking option through the Postal Service by executive action. Experts on postal
banking, as well as the Postal Service itself, have said it can offer basic checking and savings
accounts and some other financial services within its existing authority.73 This would simply
require a vote of the Board of Governors. The Administration should appoint pro-postal banking
leaders to the four open seats on the USPS Board of Governors. Democratic appointees would then
make up a majority of the board and could establish postal banking. If necessary, the Board could
also remove current Postmaster General Louis DeJoy, who has been opposed to postal banking,
from his position.74 Congress could then add the small-dollar loan, digital FedAccount, and pass-
through account components through subsequent legislation.

Proposal 2: FICO Score Alternatives

Problem
As many as 60 million adults in the U.S. have difficulty applying for credit cards and other loans.
This number adds those with blemishes on their credit reports to the 26.5 million adults who are
“invisible” due to not having credit reports or scores. Such individuals have a more difficult time
withstanding financial difficulties or other emergencies.75 There is also a racial gap in consumer
access to credit. A CFPB study revealed a 34th percentile median FICO score for consumers in
zip codes that were majority non-white, as opposed to a 52nd percentile median FICO score for
consumers in zip codes that were majority white.76 Credit score impacts not just access to, but
quality of, credit. The drop off in credit scores from 760+ to 620-639 corresponds to a 66% increase
in interest rate.77

The Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO) enjoys a virtual monopoly in the credit score market, providing
its proprietary analytical output to each of the three major credit bureaus: Experian, TransUnion,
and Equifax. FICO claims that its scoring models capture a 90 percent share of the market. In
March 2020, the DOJ opened an antitrust probe into FICO, centering on alleged “exclusionary

72
   Omarova, supra note 63.
73
    Covert, Bryce, “Create a Public Option for Simple Banking,” The American Prospect, September 25, 2019.
74
   Estes, Adam Clark, “How the Biden administration can save the Postal Service,” Vox.com, January 22, 2021.
75
   Jonnelle Marte, “U.S. consumers' access to credit may be worse than previously thought: Fed study,” Reuters,
September 24, 2019.
76
   Lisa Rice, “Missing Credit: How the U.S. Credit System Restricts Access to Consumers of Color,” Testimony
before the U.S. House Committee on Financial Services, February 26, 2019.
77
   Megan DeMatteo, “This is the credit score lenders use when you apply for a mortgage,” CNBC.com, December 2,
2020.
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practices.” 78 The three major credit bureaus, who also wield considerable market power in a
triopoly, have also created their own credit score, VantageScore, to challenge the FICO paradigm.
Because the three credit bureaus have the power to control access to and pricing of their data, the
likelihood of VantageScore driving down costs and improving credit scoring is uncertain.79

Because of the lack of competition in this domain, there has been limited innovation in scoring
methodology. Current algorithms fail to account for a number of variables (e.g. rent, telecom, and
utility payments) that are positive predictors of credit behavior.80 FICO’s older model, FICO 4, is
still the only model used for mortgage underwriting and pricing, even though it is outdated. There
are also a number of fledgling startups that are attempting to disrupt the credit score industry via
the inclusion of new—and more inclusive—scoring mechanisms.

Solutions

Legislative Action: Establish a Consumer-Centered Public Credit Registry
In accordance with the Biden-Sanders Task Force Recommendations, Congress should pass
legislation to create a Public Credit Registry to generate competition in the credit scoring and
reporting market.81 Credit is an essential vehicle to wealth accumulation in the United States. Yet,
our current model for deciding which consumers may have access to credit rests on a system that
is incentivized to think of consumers, and full consumer participation in credit markets, as its last
priority. That is because the credit scoring and reporting business models exclude consumers as
relevant stakeholders. As a consequence, Fair Isaac, which generates the ubiquitous FICO scores
lenders use to determine borrower creditworthiness, and the three major credit bureaus, Experian,
Equifax, and Transunion, are left with perverse incentives in the marketplace.82 The credit bureaus’
primary customers are creditors, employers, and prospective landlords who want a way of
assessing the financial health, and risk, of individual consumers. Consumer data, often collected
without individual consumers’ consent, is their product, and their bottom line is ultimately only
accountable to prospective creditors.83 The result is that credit bureaus and scorers are incentivized
to be over-inclusive in their reporting, and slow to react to consumer complaints. This leads to
systemic inaccuracies that block consumers from fully participating in the U.S. economy,
particularly those with already limited access.84

A public credit registry would have a consumer-centered mission to collect, score and report on
accurate data, and would be the best measure to counteract these perverse incentives in the
marketplace. The registry would be housed in the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and once
established, major lenders would be required to pull consumer reports from the public credit

78
   Jann Swanson, “FICO Being Investigated by Anti-Trust Committee,” Mortgage News Daily, March 19, 2020.
79
   Progressive Policy Institute, “Updated Credit Scoring and the Mortgage Market,” December 2017.
80
   Laurie Goodman, “In Need of An Update: Credit Scoring in the Mortgage Market,” Urban Institute, July 2017.
81
   “Biden Sanders Unity Task force Recommendations” 18, available at https://joebiden.com/wp-
content/uploads/2020/08/UNITY-TASK-FORCE-RECOMMENDATIONS.pdf.
82
   Amy Traub, “Establish a Public Credit Registry,” Demos, available at
https://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/2019-03/Credit%20Report_Full.pdf.
83
   Id.
84
   Chi Chi Wu, “Automated Injustice: How a Mechanized Dispute System Frustrates Consumers Seeking to Fix
Errors in Their Credit Reports,” National Consumer Law Center, January 2019.
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registry in addition to any other privately generated credit report when making underwriting
decisions. When making any adverse credit decisions on the basis of a consumer’s credit score,
creditors would have a duty to notify what the basis of the adverse decision was. And if the adverse
decision was based on a private measure not factored into the public score, the creditor should
have to provide a permissible reason to rely on the private credit score. Any private credit reporting
or scoring agency would then be incentivized to meet the baseline level of completeness and
accuracy set by the public registry, which would produce an incentive to fill in “thin files” and
expand reporting to previously credit invisible individuals. In being a consumer-centered model,
such a public registry would also have the added advantage of incorporating voluntary disclosure
of alternative data,85which has been a primary concern among consumer advocates when
discussing alternative data in credit scoring.86 The public registry would also adjust scoring
algorithms to account for varying types of debt, minimizing the impact of unexpected debt like
medical debt, or predatory loan products.

Lastly, a public credit registry would serve as a countervailing pressure against the inertia in the
credit scoring market, which contributes to Fair Isaac’s monopolist position in the market. While
other reform proposals addressing competition in credit scoring may be effective in encouraging
entrance into the market, lenders are often slow to adopt updated, more accurate scoring models.87
While the home mortgage market is hindered by FHFA regulations, auto and credit card lenders
unhindered by this approval process nonetheless have been hesitant to adopt later versions of the
FICO score.88 This suggests that lenders would be even slower to purchase credit scores from new
entrants into the market absent any external pressure to do so. The public credit registry coupled
with a legislative mandate to incorporate scores generated by the public credit registry would have
the power to disrupt this inertia.

Executive Action: Lowering FHFA Regulatory Barriers
The Biden Administration should take action to ensure that competing credit models reach and are
considered by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in a fair and timely manner. Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac are federally chartered companies which supply mortgage funds throughout the country. In
2018, Congress passed the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act,
which allowed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to consider non-FICO scoring models for mortgages.
However, no non-FICO models have yet been adopted. Potential competitors have been stalled by
a multi-year FHFA validation process that they must pass through before even being considered

85
   Traub, supra note 2, at 9
86
   “Statement Regarding Bank Regulators’ Guidance on Alternative Data,” National Consumer Law Center, Dec. 4,
2019.
87
   Nick Clements, “Finally: Anyone Can Get Their Official FICO Credit Score For Free,” Forbes, May 6, 2016;
Sarah O’Brien, “Why FICO’s New Scoring Model May Not Mean Much for Consumers,” CNBC, Feb. 10, 2020;
Tara Siegel Bernard, “Your Credit Score May Soon Change. Here’s Why,” NY Times, Jan. 25, 2020 (“Many other
lenders are also using older FICO formulas, and it remains to be seen how quickly they adopt the new scoring
method — or if they will decide to change.”).
88
   “Who's Keeping Score? Holding Credit Bureaus Accountable and Repairing a Broken System: Hearing Before
The Committee on Financial Services,” 116th Cong. 3, 2019 (statement of Chi Chi Wu, staff attorney, National
Consumer Law Center). (“The problem is that lenders would have to accept that data, and right now, we can't even
get them to accept FICO 9, which reduces the impact of medical debt.”); “Which FICO Scores Do Lenders Use?,”
Investopia, Mar. 5, 2021.
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