Alliance of Civilizations International Security and Cosmopolitan Democracy Seminar Conclusions - Kristina Kausch and Isaías Barreñada
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Alliance of Civilizations
International Security and Cosmopolitan Democracy
Seminar Conclusions
Kristina Kausch and Isaías Barreñada
October 2005
ICEI WP 03/05 - FRIDE Working Paper # 13
WORKING PAPERThe present paper sums up the debates held during the international seminar "Alliance of Civilizations. In-
ternational Security and Cosmopolitan Democracy", organized by the Instituto Complutense de Estudios
Internacionales (ICEI) and the Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior
(FRIDE), on June 6 and 7, 2005, in Madrid, sponsored by Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Caja Madrid
and the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. This paper has been elaborated by Kristina
Kausch and Isaías Barreñada.
The views expressed in the paper do not necessarily reflect the opinion of ICEI or FRIDE.
***
Este documento resume los debates que tuvieron lugar durante el Seminario "Alianza de Civilizaciones.
Seguridad Internacional y Democracia Cosmopolita", organizado por el Instituto Complutense de Estudios
Internacionales (ICEI) y la Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE),
celebrado en Madrid los días 6 - 7 de junio de 2005, que fue patrocinado por la Universidad Complutense de
Madrid, Caja Madrid y el Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación. El documento ha sido elabo-
rado por Kristina Kausch e Isaías Barreñada
ICEI y FRIDE no comparten necesariamente las opiniones expresadas en este trabajo.Abstract The initiative to form an “Alliance of Civilizations” as a means to overcome cultural and political gaps originated in a proposal made by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero to the Secretary-General of the United Nations during a speech at the 59th UN General Assembly on September 21, 2004. Kofi Annan officially took over the initiative, co-sponsored by the UN, the Spanish and the Turkish governments, on July 14, 2005. The Secretary-General also put in place a process to form a High Level Panel, which is expected to hold its first meeting in late November, in order to convert this first impulse into a feasible and operative concept by the end of 2006. On June 6-7, 2005, the Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales (ICEI) and the Funda- ción para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE) organized an international seminar in Madrid, bringing together experts, academics and practitioners to analyse contemporary challenges, reflect critically on their implications for the present initiative, and enhance and enrich it. The present paper summarizes the main ideas for an Alliance of Civilizations, the major critical points, and the suggestions made, during the seminar, in order to tackle them. Resumen La propuesta de formar una “Alianza de Civilizaciones” para superar las divergencias políticas y culturales tuvo su origen en la propuesta de José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero al Secretario General en un discurso ante la 59ª Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas el 21 de septiembre de 2004. El 14 de julio de 2005, Kofi Annan oficialmente adoptó la iniciativa, co-auspiciada por Naciones Unidas y los gobiernos de España y Turquía, y puso en marcha un proceso para formar un Grupo de Alto Nivel, cuya primera reunión se espera para finales de noviembre, con el objetivo de convertir este primer impulso en un concepto viable y operativo hasta finales de 2006. Los días 6 y 7 de junio de 2005, el Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales (ICEI) y la Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE) organizaron un seminario internacional en Madrid, con el objetivo de analizar retos contemporáneos y sus implicaciones para el futuro concepto de una Alianza de Civilizaciones. El presente documento de trabajo resume las principales ideas, puntos críticos y sugerencias surgidas en el seminario.
Contents
1. The Alliance of Civilizations Initiative ……………………………………….. 1
2. The Need for an Alliance of Civilizations: Global Challenges………………… 2
2.1. Growing Gaps ………………………………………………………….. 2
2.2. The Self and the Other: Identities and Perceptions …………………... 4
2.3. Global Governance, Multilateralism and Cosmopolitan Democracy … 11
3. Implications and Ideas for a Tangible Alliance of Civilizations ………………. 16Alliance of Civilizations.
International Security and Cosmopolitan Democracy
Seminar Conclusions
1. The Alliance of cultural background, media representati-
ves and other representatives of the diffe-
Civilizations Initiative rent civilizational entities. A list of the 18-
member Panel and its terms of reference
1. The Alliance of Civilizations initiative will be made available shortly. The High
originated in a proposal made by the Spa- Level Panel will be supported by a secreta-
nish President of Government, José Luis riat in its task to elaborate a set of recom-
Rodríguez Zapatero, to the Secretary-Ge- mendations to the UN Secretary-General
neral of the United Nations, during a by the end of 2006, and to issue an action
th
speech at the 59 UN General Assembly on plan with concrete, practical measures.
September 21, 2004. Zapatero presented
his idea to form an “Alliance of Civiliza- 5. The Turkish government, represented
tions” as a means to overcome cultural and by Prime Minister Erdogan, agreed to co-
political gaps, and called on the Secretary- sponsor the initiative alongside with the
General to adopt the initiative. Spanish government and the UN. This
Turkish co-sponsorship is symbolically ex-
2. The proposal was taken up by the Spa- tremely valuable and constitutes a strong
nish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Miguel political signal.
Ángel Moratinos, in his address before the
Arab League the following December, as 6. Beyond the question of co-sponsorship,
well as in an intervention held together an informal group of 19 states and two or-
with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on ganizations already expressed their sup-
March 9, 2005, in Madrid. The Secretary- port for the Alliance of Civilizations initia-
General officially took over the initiative tive. These are: Argentina, Costa Rica, E-
on July 14, and put in place a process to gypt, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Jordan, Malay-
form a High Level Panel in order to con- sia, Mexico, Pakistan, Poland, Turkey, Phi-
vert this first impulse into a feasible and lippines, Senegal, South Africa, Sweden,
operative concept. Tanzania, Thailand, and Tunisia, as well as
the Arab League and the Islamic Con-
3. A working group, composed of repre- ference.
sentatives from the UN and the Spanish
government, was formed to bring forward 7. Parting from a general unease due to the
that process. For this purpose, Kofi Annan widening gaps between certain parts of the
appointed Iqbal Riza and Giandomenico world, the Instituto Complutense de Estu-
Picco as Special Advisers. On behalf of the dios Internacionales (ICEI) and the Fun-
Spanish government, which was asked by dación para las Relaciones Internacionales
the Secretary-General to take a leading role y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE), two institu-
in bringing forward the initiative, Ambas- tions dedicated to the studies of Interna-
sadors Máximo Cajal and Juan Antonio Yá- tional Relations, were both convinced that
ñez were appointed. This working group this was an initiative that was put forward
has elaborated an initial concept paper for at the right time and which was worth sup-
the Alliance of Civilizations to serve as a porting through assistance to its further
basis for the work of a High Level Panel development. On June 6-7, 2005, FRIDE
which was nominated by the Secretary- and ICEI, in collaboration with Univer-
General on September 5, 2005, and which sidad Complutense, Caja Madrid and the
is expected to hold its first meeting in late Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
November. Cooperation, organized an international
seminar in Madrid, bringing together ex-
4. The composition of the Panel counts perts, academics and practitioners to ana-
with a wide regional and civilizational re- lyse contemporary challenges and reflect
presentation, and comprises politicians out critically on their implications for the pre-
of office, academics with a religious-
1Kristina Kausch and Isaías Barreñada
sent initiative, enhance and enrich it and entity “civilization” as a compact and more
think of ways of making a real impact. or less closed reality, thereby indirectly, or
partially, confirming Samuel Huntington’s
8. The seminar was attended by a wide theory of a “clash of civilizations”. The de-
range of academic scholars, experts, diplo- bate on a possible “clash”, as predicted by
mats, journalists, as well as representatives Huntington in 1993, is indeed closely lin-
of the United Nations, the Spanish govern- ked to some of the core issues of the
ment and civil society. Particularly welco- Alliance of Civilizations. However, there
med was the presence of the representa- was agreement among the participants of
tives of the Spanish government for the the seminar that Huntington’s theory has
Alliance of Civilizations, Máximo Cajal had a highly unconstructive effect on pu-
and Juan Antonio Yáñez, and the Special blic discourse, poisoning public debate
Adviser on behalf of the UN, Iqbal Riza. and people’s minds for over a decade with
The debates were organised around four ideas that have been feeding hostile at-
sessions where the following issues were titudes.
discussed: possible contents of an Alliance
of Civilizations; which is or could be Eu- 12. Up until the 18th century, the term “ci-
rope’s role in the relation between the vilization” described the opposite of barba-
West and the Islamic world; how does the rism. Today it has gained a new meaning
Alliance of Civilizations fit into the multi- as a virtual synonym for culture and socie-
lateral framework of global society, espe- ty. Huntington’s definition of a civilization
cially in terms of international law; and fi- is similar: “A civilization is a cultural en-
nally, which could be the role of civil so- tity [...] the highest cultural grouping of
ciety within the framework of this Allian- people and the broadest level of cultural
ce? identity people have [...].”1 According to
Huntington, “[t]he great divisions of man-
9. The present conclusions summarize the kind and the dominating source of conflict
main ideas for an Alliance of Civilizations, will be cultural.”2, and a clash of civiliza-
major critical points, challenges, and the tions will occur between nations and mem-
suggestions made in order to tackle them. bers of different civilizations, with the fault
lines between civilizations as the battle li-
nes of the future. After the Cold War, he
says, the two blocks of capitalism and
communism will be replaced by “the West
versus the rest” as the main line of con-
2. The Need for an Alliance of flict. But the creation of fault lines between
Civilizations: Global cultures, civilizations and societies, so his-
Challenges tory has shown, can only happen over ti-
me. And which are the borders of civili-
10. The first set of issues was related to the zations? According to Huntington, a civili-
present intercultural and intercivilizational zation is the broadest level of identification
relations, the nature of existing tensions an individual can participate in, and this
and their possible root causes. identification lays the foundation for the
clash that is to come, with the main source
of conflict being the antagonistic relation-
2.1. GROWING GAPS ship between the “West” and the “Islamic
World”.
11. An immediate criticism of the Alliance
of Civilizations which had arisen after its 13. According to some participants, Hun-
proposal by the Spanish Head of Govern- tington’s theory had been granted too
ment before the UN claimed that the pro- 1
Huntington, Samuel P.: “The Clash of Civilizations?”, Foreign
posal took for granted the existence of the Affairs, nº 3/1993.
2
Ibid.
2Alliance of Civilizations.
International Security and Cosmopolitan Democracy
Seminar Conclusions
much scientific significance, and was best one hand, responding to Huntington’s ar-
opposed by ignoring it. However, in prac- gument, trying to soften it and reduce the
tice, the theory has attracted vast attention, damage by providing a human, anti-racist
and no matter to what degree one might concept using the same terms, and on the
consider the “clash of civilizations” to re- other hand, reacting to the fact that the
flect current realities, there is no doubt USA and Spain were, for the first time, the
that it has been successfully used in main targets of large-scale terrorist attacks,
Western political discourse for agitation which eventually led to the powerful agen-
against Islam. Similar discourses – cons- da-setters calling for a global remedy. O-
piracy theories, demonization of the Wes- thers considered that, given the increa-
tern culture - exist in Islamic countries. So singly hostile perceptions among some ci-
even though Huntington’s general picture vilizations, Zapatero’s proposal was simply
might be simplistic, cut and dried - all jus- a pro-active initiative at the right time.
tified critique of his ideas cannot distract
from the fact that we do face an authentic 16. However, there was no doubt that the
threat: the enormous intensification of growing tension between the West and the
hostile perceptions between the “Islamic Islamic World constituted a true threat to
World” and “the West”. As we have had to international peace and security, which
witness in the past, the manifestation of could not be ignored and must be coun-
these hostile perceptions through violence teracted by adequate measures. Hostile
can do terrible harm. The confrontation perceptions do not only exist in extreme
between the Islamic World and the West right-wing circles, but are spreading across
has reached a civilizational dimension. the minds of intellectuals, youth, ordinary
This is why we need an Alliance of Civi- people in all parts of society, leaving peo-
lizations. ple in both worlds more and more convin-
ced of the bad faith of the other. Stereo-
14. There was consensus among the work- types such as the imaginary army of radical
shop participants that the current confron- bomb-throwing Bin Ladens, or the deca-
tation and the whole discourse on conflict dent non-believers trying to colonize the
and dialogue between civilizations are at Islamic World for oil and imperial domina-
its heart about the relationship between tion, are subject to instrumentalization by
the “Arab-Islamic World“ and the “West”. religious and political extremists, who
Consequently, the improvement of this re- themselves firmly believe in their own ste-
lationship was considered a key issue of reotypes and the rejection of the other.
future action of an Alliance of Civiliza- The question was raised whether the Al-
tions. Moreover, it was expressed that the liance of Civilizations should be a political
term “civilization” was used only for rea- initiative only, or include also a religious
sons of political correctness or politeness. dimension. As desirable as it may be lea-
Nevertheless, it was clear to most people ving religion aside, it was concluded to be
that from the Western point of view, the impossible because religion had de facto
term was mainly aimed at religion in gene- turned into a political instrument.
ral and Islam in particular. This impres-
sion seemed indirectly confirmed in the 17. For some Muslim extremists, the
context of the seminar by the regional re- “clash of civilizations” provides a most
presentation of the speakers, who exclu- welcome support, feeding their belief of
sively originated from Western and Islamic being warriors of Jihad against the new
countries. crusades, and facilitating the recruitment
of followers. Some participants considered
15. In an attempt to explain the narrow fo- that the dominance of a globalized neoli-
cus of a debate which should actually be of beral economy was crucial in this respect
global scale, it was expressed that the ini- because in many parts of the world it re-
tiative to form an Alliance of Civilizations moved the “safety net” provided by states
was a merely reactive framework: on the which used to give ordinary people shelter
3Kristina Kausch and Isaías Barreñada
by providing basic health, education, ele- rism, even though by no means an exclu-
mentary and economic rights. Once remo- sively modern phenomenon, has today de-
ved that shelter, people find relief in the veloped into a large-scale lethal threat
charity and welfare institutions of religious which at the same time constitutes, illus-
organizations, some of them extremist. trates and reinforces the confrontation be-
The social and welfare work is precisely tween Western and Islamic societies. The-
one of the strongest assets of Islamist orga- re is nothing by which terrorism can be
nizations and a way to ensure support and justified. However, in order to be able to
recruitment. In some occasions, a similar tackle the problem, the underlying reasons
phenomenon has been observed in Chris- behind it must be well understood. Dea-
tian extremism. As long as secular forces ling with the root causes and motivations
do not take a stand and religious groups of terrorism means trying to resolve the
are the only societal forces which address Gordian knot, and still it is a much more
the needs of people, be they social and sustainable and therefore promising ap-
economic needs, or fear and anger vis-à-vis proach than trying to tackle the problem
imperial foreign occupation, the field is merely through security measures. Despe-
left to non-secular forces. It was stressed ration and anger of a long-term suffering
that the question of how to stop the flows and injustice from the hands of a powerful
of recruitment by bringing forward poli- opponent often provide the fertile ground
cies should be at the centre of reflection, on which extremism and terrorism can
and that the issue of foreign occupation, grow. With regard to the Alliance of Civili-
most particularly in Iraq and Palestine, zations, it was strongly believed that any
played a major role in this regard. initiative which contributed to successfully
countering hostile perceptions between
18. When talking about the need for an members of different civilizations would
alliance between civilizations, the notion also help to stop the violence.
of terrorism as one of the fiercest expres-
sions of the existing confrontation is una-
voidable. Some raised the question whe-
ther the fight against terrorism by the do- 2.2. THE SELF AND THE OTHER: IDENTITIES
minant Western powers was not the new AND PERCEPTIONS
mask of a modern colonialism. According
to another critical argument, the fact that 20. A clear image of the other, as well as of
terrorism, as a threat which causes not a one’s own identity, are preconditions for
fraction of the fatalities caused by war, di- recognizing and respecting each other’s
sease and starvation, had been put on top differences. When talking about an Allian-
of the global agenda gave evidence that ce of Civilizations, who are we talking of?
this agenda was not being set according to What constitutes “the West”? Is there an
the objective scale and dimension of the “Arab-Islamic Civilization”, and if so, how
threat, but rather according to its target is it characterized? In accordance with the
group, and according to who had the po- mentioned perceptions, the answers to
wer to determine when there is or not an these questions are very different, depen-
urgent need for concerted global action. ding on which side of the Mediterranean
one enquires.
19. The phenomenon of terrorism is so
complex that, for decades, the internatio- 21. There was general agreement that a cut
nal community was unable to define it and dried characterization of either “the
properly, and the term keeps on being mi- West” or “the Islamic / Arab World” did
3
sused for other kinds of violence. Terro-
rism, which would make it clear that, in addition to actions al-
ready proscribed by existing conventions, any action constitutes
3
In his report In larger freedom: towards development, security terrorism if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm
and human rights for all, published on 21 March 2005, the UN to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating
Secretary-General fully endorsed the High-level Panel on a population or compelling a Government or an international
Threats, Challenges and Change´s call for “a definition of terro- organization to do or abstain from doing any act.”
4Alliance of Civilizations.
International Security and Cosmopolitan Democracy
Seminar Conclusions
not do justice to the complexity of either apparently, failing to make up a precise de-
of them. Moreover, even if one allowed the finition, the debate sticks to the West as
existence of such civilizations as relatively only including the US and the EU only to
homogeneous entities, by using these reduce complexity. Despite the general re-
terms one encounters the practical diffi- jection of the whole “East-West” termino-
culty of not knowing whom to include. logy for being all too cut and dried and ac-
Does Israel belong to the West? Does Ja- tually out-dated, the terms kept on being
pan? Does the “Islamic World” include used due to the lack of more suitable alter-
only Arab states or also Far Eastern Islam? natives.
And where to place Turkey?
24. In the reflection on what constitutes
22. Historically, the terms “East” and the identity of the West from a Western
“West” arose from the split of the Chris- point of view, the current European iden-
tian Church in the Roman Empires of the tity crisis, illustrated by the paralyzation of
West and East, thus out of a break within the Constitutional ratification process, gai-
Christianity, not as a distinction between ned special attention. In fact, one of the
Christians and Muslims. Speaking of an reasons for the present crisis was seen in
“Arab-Muslim World” is per se not accep- Europe’s unwillingness to cut the umbili-
table, because the term is mixing up reli- cal cord to the United States. The question
gion with ethnicity by equating the re- of to what extent the negative referenda in
ligion of Islam with the Arab ethnic group. France and the Netherlands constituted
Such a blend of categories reinforces ste- any reliable evidence of the European po-
reotypes (“All Arabs are Muslims”, “All pulation’s general unhappiness with the
Muslims are Arabs”) and must therefore be development of the European Union, or
carefully avoided. The term “Arab World” even meant the failure of the European
remains extremely limited, while the term project, was controversially discussed.
“Muslim World” appears rather too exten-
sive, especially if one includes not only 25. The issue of a possible future Turkish
those states where the majority of the po- EU membership was agreed to be greatly
pulation is of Muslim confession, but also relevant for the inquiry after the European
those with a considerable Muslim minori- identity. With regard to the present semi-
ty, which would again include almost all of nar, one participant noted that the fact that
Western Europe. And even if a suitable Turkey was singled out as the only country
term could be found, given the variety of to be assigned a special notion in the pro-
the different forms of Islam as a religion, gram of a seminar on the Alliance of Civi-
the range of political systems in Arab lizations suggested that “Turkey was trou-
countries, and the many inner-Arab con- ble”, an attitude which greatly reflected the
flicts throughout history, it would remain general European posture towards the
daring to speak of this entity as a homoge- country. At the same time it was admitted
neous block without further differentia- that as a matter of fact, there were many
tion. reasonable objections to Turkey’s EU
membership. Officially, it is a candidature
23. The quest for an entity called “the like any other, with criteria such as human
West”, in order to find a term one can ac- rights and democracy, social-economic de-
tually operate with, does not prove much velopment, etcetera. However, participants
easier. Participants especially expressed largely agreed that in spite of all well-
their difficulties in mingling together Eu- intended attempts to claim the opposite,
rope and the United States, given the subs- the main reason why Turkey, unlike Eas-
tantial differences between them. And even tern European countries, was not being
if one accepted to define the “West” as immediately accepted as a future EU mem-
comprising the European Union and the ber state was not its economic or human
United States, and maybe Israel, what rights situation, but its Muslim identity.
about Japan, and many other countries? So
5Kristina Kausch and Isaías Barreñada
26. Since the country’s possible accession four generations, Muslims in Europe are
has come closer and has thus become a fre- denominated as foreigners. The idea that
quent issue of debate, Islam has increa- Islam might be European, too – and Chris-
singly been seen as an obstacle to EU ac- tianity Middle Eastern – does not enter
cession on both sides. Turkey is a country into people’s heads, in spite of the obvious
hard to classify; depending on the criteria realities. Muslims in Europe are eternally
applied, it could be included both in Wes- immigrants, and Islam is considered the
tern and in Islamic civilizations. Euro- religion of immigrants, thus non-Euro-
peans fear that the presence of millions of pean. How many generations will it take
Muslims might challenge European cul- European Muslims to be recognized as full
tural integrity – a fear that neglects the fact citizens? There has to be a moment when
that a broad Muslim presence in Europe people are granted the label “integrated”,
has been a reality for decades. But even meaning European citizens. Multicultura-
though such fears are present, there is no lists, who only want to build bridges, and
total majority opposition against Turkey’s only bridges, pave the way for the cons-
accession within the EU population. Ne- truction of walls.
vertheless, according to the Turkish per-
ception of the inner-European debate, the 28. The issue of the separation of state and
issue of their country’s accession is seen religion, laïcité, is of considerable impor-
through the “prism of the Christian club”. tance in the immigration debate, but also
Even though Turkey’s “bridge role” has in the interplay of perceptions between
been often exaggerated, it was noted that Western and Muslim countries. The West
paradoxically, Turkey was probably one of is all too ready to criticise Muslim coun-
the non-European states which most re- tries for their lack of secularism in the pu-
sembled the pattern of a Western Euro- blic sphere. In the Middle East, many peo-
pean nation-state. But again, by labelling ple found their identity on Islam. A lot of
Turkey with the emblem of Islam, religion political parties have been founded in or-
and state are mixed up. Participants stres- der to conform politics with Islamic prin-
sed that, if Europe really understood the ciples. Most of these are respectable, but
practical meaning of laïcité, it would not some are immeasurably orthodox, and so-
be discussing Turkey’s EU accession in me of them want the religious law (Shari’a)
terms of Islam. to be also a political one. But also in the
West, even though Christian political par-
27. The case of Turkey reveals a lot of the ties are essentially secular, protestant mo-
European identity debate, because the vements – namely in the US – are having a
central question, whether or not the EU great political impact. In this sense, par-
can integrate millions of Muslims in their ticipants argued that the West was not en-
midst, ignores the detail that there are al- titled to praise its own superiority in terms
ready millions of Muslims living in the of secularity of public space.4
heart of Europe. Islam in Europe, or Euro-
pean Islam, is not an option but a reality. 29. We live in an era of a “re-enchantment
All too often, it was bewailed, Islam is trea- of the world” (Morris Berman), a parallel
ted as if it were a problem in itself. In the spreading of technology and religion
debate on how Islam fits into European so- through globalisation, through which reli-
cieties, again, the issue of how Europe de- gion seems to live a comeback. But the re-
fines itself is crucial. So far the European vert to religion is not a return. What re-
Union has been stating negatively attribu- turns is not religion, but religious practi-
tes which did not form part of the alleged ces. Globally speaking, there is an increa-
European identity, but failed to clearly de-
fine itself positively, and in this sense, Is- 4
In the United States, American nationalism is formally secular
lam has always been a factor of distinction. but in fact functioning according to a Biblical archetype, since
The perception of Islam being an eastern its defenders see themselves as a people with a mission to bring
salvation to humanity, even if it were by force.
religion is so deeply rooted that even after
6Alliance of Civilizations.
International Security and Cosmopolitan Democracy
Seminar Conclusions
sing social pressure to exercise religious cipants noted some kind of hysteria about
practices, mostly transmitted by the media Islam in Western public discourse, with a
and boosted by the process of globalisa- little bit of Islam being mingled in every-
tion, resulting in a “merchandization” of where. At the same time, cultural relati-
religion. American neoliberalism supports vism, which tries to explain terrorism with
the revival of religion in the US, but in fact a lack of true understanding of Islam in
it is not a real religious comeback but a Western societies, thereby establishing a
political recourse to the religious as a direct connection between Islam and terro-
means to secure imperial dominance. In rism, was considered unacceptable. A clear
Europe, too, laïcité has not been real. In distinction of religion, ethnicity and natio-
spite of all secularisation throughout his- nality, a real understanding of laïcité, must
tory, the formally secular nationalism has be the basis of any discourse on European
maintained a strong underlying sense of identity.
the religious, which has been often instru-
mentalized to gain and secure power. No- 32. Even though Islam does not per se
wadays, discourse in many European clash with democratic principles, the Euro-
countries is double-faced: people easily pean capacity to integrate Muslims in their
claim superiority in terms of laïcité and societies is rather decreasing. In European
judge Islam, but on the other hand, in con- collective memory, three chapters of cru-
venient occasions, it does not bother them cial importance for the relationship bet-
that religion enters the political sphere. ween Europe and the Muslim World are
practically absent: the memory of the Mus-
30. But is there a problem with European lim philosophical heritage (which is cur-
Islam after all? Today’s difficulties with Is- rently reduced to name-dropping), the
lam in Europe are not of a legal or reli- memory of colonialism, and an awareness
gious nature. Muslims do not have per se of the contribution of Muslim exile wor-
any problems with European legislation. kers in the context of European recons-
However, secularisation and laïcité have in truction. In order to solve the problems of
the Muslim World often been perceived as the present, public memory must be com-
being anti-Islamic. This perception beco- plete and vivid. For example, unlike in the
mes more understandable when looking at case of Christian philosophy, the establish-
the different models of imposed seculari- ment of a link between religion and ratio-
sation, which left in many countries the nalist philosophy is being categorically
footprint of secularisation as being anti- denied to Islam. This imposed separation
religious, and which has above all served constitutes an intolerable limitation, and
as a means to impose autocratic regimes. ignores the long rational Islamic tradition.
Fortunately, in Western immigrant socie- By denying Muslims the ability to rational
ties this perception is today changing. thinking, they are implicitly denied the
Muslims who migrate to the West should ability to participate in public debate. Peo-
have a very clear understanding of the ple who build the present today have to
meaning of secularism, citizenship, etc. understand that rationality belongs to eve-
Europe, on its part, must be very clear and ryone and not, as selective memory sug-
coherent as to what are the non-negotiable gests, to the West only.
principles of public space.
33. With regard to the view on Islam in
31. So instead of a true understanding of Western discourse, a major criticism was
laïcité, there is a great confusion between that the religion of Islam was being treated
nationality and religion. Frequently, the as a monolith, with an image of unvaried
term “Islam” is being used as if it were an and inflexible backwardness, while in fact
ethnic group or nationality, while as a mat- it is a religion with many different expres-
ter of fact it is a religion with a universal sions and with a long tradition of rationa-
vocation, not limited to any ethnic, geo- list philosophic thinking. The Western dis-
graphical or linguistic group. Some parti- course is characterized by a strong essen-
7Kristina Kausch and Isaías Barreñada
tialization of Islam, in the sense that all 36. Some Spanish participants expressed
Muslims are being lumped together, in or- their view that, despite the positive chapter
der to facilitate the terms of reference for of al-Andalus, taking into account most of
the West. This essentialization constitutes the rest of Spanish history up to the pre-
a powerful weapon of domination, because sent, Spain could not possibly serve as a
essentializing the other, presupposing it good example as the “country of dialogue”
being a monolith immovably caught in the between cultures and civilizations. In addi-
status quo, is a violent simplification and tion, they stressed the general importance
thereby inferiorization of the other. of avoiding mystification, and to rather fo-
cus on finding solutions for the present
34. An example for the essentialization of and the future rather than dwell too much
Islam is provided by the current debate on on the past in the sense of historical revi-
democracy and terrorism, and in security sionism. Al-Andalus and the Jewish-Arab
policy in general, where Islam and terro- heritage must not be neglected, but neither
rism are frequently equated with each mystified.
other. In a debate on terrorism, Muslims
are supposed to talk. In a debate about de- 37. The crisis of identity is by no means an
mocracy, Muslims are supposed to listen. exclusive matter of the West. The issue of
The fact that nobody considers the possi- identity in the Arab-Muslim World is a
bility that a European citizen, democrat pressing question in many ways, especially
and of Islamic confession, might have so- in relation to the development of Islam
mething to contribute to the debate on the and its traumatic clash with modernity.
future of European democracy is very tel- There are problems in today’s Umma, but
ling. Terrorism indeed requires a political these religious issues are not to be discus-
response, but this response cannot consist sed by Christian or Jewish interlocutors,
in security policies which institutionalise but must be discussed between Muslims,
discrimination, racism and a supply of evi- in the Muslim World.
dence based on a general suspicion.
38. During the colonial era, a sensation
35. In line with its selective memory, Eu- had emerged in the progressive parts of Is-
rope fails to remember that the Greek-La- lamic societies that, compared to the West,
tin heritage has led to a break in the Me- they had somewhat stayed behind. Inde-
diterranean, and to an expulsion of the Je- pendence movements were founded whose
wish-Arab heritage, the Arab origins of Eu- aim was to lead their societies into the mo-
ropean culture, our “forgotten heritage” dern era and enable them to compete with
(Alain de Libera). It was repeatedly stres- the West on an equal foot. They appealed
sed that, in the context of the Alliance of to religion in order to gather support, but
Civilizations, Spain would be perfectly sui- were opposed by the traditionalist clerics,
ted to move the northern Mediterranean who rather thought Islamic societies were
towards a re-appropriation of its Jewish- behind for not having pursued religious
Arab heritage. This heritage is of particular principles strictly enough. Thus the key to
significance for the civilizational dialogue, salvation was believed to be found in the
because it proves, once more, that neither fundamental principles of Islam. Among
civilization can be seen as a stereotyped the militant subgroups there was by that
single block, since there has been a long time a sensation that they had reached a
history of mutual influence and exchange. historical moment in which their religion
Moreover, it was emphasized that “al-An- suffered an attack by the West, whose se-
dalus” as a symbol of tolerance and tri-cul- cularism had turned their societies profane
tural and religious coexistence very well and decadent, and was thus the one to bla-
reflected the idea of the Alliance of Civi- me for the loss of the Golden Age of the Is-
lizations. lamic Empires.
8Alliance of Civilizations.
International Security and Cosmopolitan Democracy
Seminar Conclusions
39. However, during the same period, the- a long-term suffering and injustice from
re was also a strong exchange of knowled- the hands of a powerful opponent, espe-
ge and ideas between the two civilizations, cially under foreign occupation. Crucial in
through scholars, embassies, and travel- this respect is the issue of Palestine. The
lers. In fact, contrary to a frequent Wes- daily suffering and humiliation of the Pa-
tern belief, the Muslim World has never lestine people are transmitted on TV and
been sealed-off, not to the Enlightenment, inflame the hearts and minds of Muslims
not to the World Wars, and nor is it today. worldwide. The same is true for Israelis
The Muslim youth, participants argued, and Palestinian suicide bombers. Some
knows perfectly well what is going on in participants argued that, the atrocities on
the West; so rather, one should be worried both sides are the result of an occupation
about the lack of knowledge in the domi- protracted for almost forty years, and will
nant Western countries. not stop before there is an agreement to
guarantee security in Israel and a viable
40. Today it is an acknowledged fact that independent Palestinian state. Besides, one
the achievements of medieval Muslim should not forget that the Palestinians res-
scholars built the bridge that connected ponsible for the attacks also consider
Hellenism with Renaissance. To the degree themselves as a legitimate armed resistance
that Europe and the New World progres- group, although they are labelled “terro-
sed, the era of science in the Islamic World rists” by others.
declined. Four schools of Islamic jurispru-
dence represented by that time different 43. The presence of Western troops in Af-
interpretations of Islamic Law. The more ghanistan is another factor fostering re-
liberal Ulema favoured independent reaso- sentment in the Islamic World. The 9/11
ning and the effort to reach consensus, attacks were so severe that they did not
whilst the orthodox condemned these libe- leave the US any other choice than to over-
ral interpretations. The latter won the throw the Taliban regime. For Taliban
struggle, and in the 14th century, the clerics supporters and al-Qaeda, the presence of
declared the doors of Ijtihad (independent Western troops equals a continuation of
interpretation of Islamic Law by Muslim the 80´s Soviet occupation. Likewise, the
scholars) closed − a decisive moment in presence of Western troops in Saudi-Ara-
which a big paving stone closed up the de- bia was another source of anti-Western
velopment of Muslim rationalism and con- resentment, especially with the country
troversy. being the guardian of Islam’s two holiest
shrines.
41. As a consequence of this development,
as well as of the colonial domination, ma- 44. Finally and perhaps most importantly,
ny Islamic societies remain in relative stag- the invasion and occupation of Iraq has
nation up until today. They are drowned left in Muslim societies the conviction of
in a decidedly unequal relation of power Islam being an objective of Western ag-
especially with the West. Domestically, gression. In addition, people all around the
they are often incapable of providing their world are extremely angry about the sanc-
youth the education and opportunities to tions imposed on Iraq that let half a mil-
empower them, and in many cases, they lion children under five years old die. Ho-
cannot even provide employment and the wever, Saddam’s dictatorship and his inva-
most basic social services their people sions of Muslim countries (Iran, Kuwait),
need. are hardly being taken into account. Ins-
tead, the foreign occupation of Iraq is
42. But all these frustrations in Islamic so- being compared to the occupation of Pa-
cieties alone cannot explain the authentic lestine. The Iraq issue is clearly becoming
lethal threat that has undeniably emerged. part of the confrontation between Islam
As mentioned above, the rise of terrorism and the West, and provides a great source
is often rooted in desperation and anger of of inspiration for al-Qaeda and other mili-
9Kristina Kausch and Isaías Barreñada
tant groups, who see in Iraq another hot emphasized. In the seminar there was ge-
spot for their Jihad. neral agreement that in both civilizations,
people live in an atmosphere which was
45. On top of all this, the revealed torture denominated “ideology of fear”: a wanted
of prisoners by Western guards such as in strategy to make people fear the other and
Abu Ghraib undermines the credibility and maintain conflictive perceptions. In Euro-
trustworthiness of the West which prea- pe, fear is mostly directed towards immi-
ches democracy and human rights while at gration and terrorism, and creates a local
the same time spurning them. The impact suspicion which itself nourishes those po-
of these terrifying acts on the symbolic le- litical problems that seem to confirm Islam
vel is substantial, since it plainly confirms being a threat in itself. This fear is created
the Muslim perception of the West, and es- in part by the emotionality that dominates
pecially of the demon USA, nourishing a the debate. Political forces try to keep this
particular hostility against Islam. emotionality as negative as possible with
regard to Islam, in order to keep up the
46. In order to stop violence in the Middle fear, which they deliberately instrumenta-
East, it was considered that the most ur- lize for political ends. Most surprisingly,
gent things for the West to do was to end this very questionable kind of political agi-
the American occupation of Iraq, and to tation is not even necessarily being ques-
put massive pressure on Israel to grant Pa- tioned as a legitimate political tool; one
lestinians their rights. With regard to the participant noted that even the renowned
latter, scepticism was expressed that the sociologist Anthony Giddens had recently
political weight American Protestantism stated at the UK House of Lords that at
had under the Bush administration, rather certain times in history, it was necessary to
showed an America that would most likely create cultural fear.
support Israel unconditionally in its conti-
nued colonialism. Civilizations can close 49. The strategic use of such an ideology
up intellectually as an act of resistance. of fear has been a very important tool of
The longer these situations continue wit- the Bush administration, both domestically
hout a viable political solution, the more and internationally. Most importantly, this
the mutual hostilities among the civiliza- fear has successfully been used to boaster
tions will grow, and the more recruits al- acquiescence and support for the so-called
Qaeda and other extremist organizations “war on terror”. However, it was expressed
will get. that the Western fear had a very strong ra-
cist element. The fact that, in the Euro-
47. One participant expressed astonish- pean context, nobody feared white Bosnian
ment on the relative absence of two as- Muslims but only ethnic non-Europeans,
pects in the present debate: on the one gave evidence that actually it was not a
hand, why only so few mentioned Guan- fear of Islam in European societies, but
tánamo and the embarrassment before this fear of Arabs, an expression of the old fear
action of an allegedly free and democratic of the different and the unknown which al-
country such as the US which on top clai- ways constitutes a key component of ra-
med moral superiority. And on the other cism. Paradoxically, the uninformed peo-
hand, in more general terms, why nobody ple in the US and Europe probably know
mentioned that the Muslim World should more about Islam than about Confucia-
also make an effort to earn itself the trust nism or Buddhism, which shows again that
of those members of other civilizations the fear used to foster the present religious
with good faith? antagonism has its roots not only in cultu-
re or religion but also in racism.
48. Looking at how negative perceptions
in both civilizations are created and nou- 50. Similar patterns of fear of the unknown
rished, the role of public political debate in the population, with political forces
and especially the mass media was strongly creating and deliberately nourishing fear
10Alliance of Civilizations.
International Security and Cosmopolitan Democracy
Seminar Conclusions
for political ends, can be observed in Isla- Both civilizations were asserted to have
mic and Arab societies. It was expressed stereotyped images of the other, and that
that in both civilizations, the ideology of religion, as well as imperial dominance in
fear was fostered by extremists, Islamic as the past and present, played important
well as Christian, so that one of the main roles in this regard. It was emphasized that
threats consisted not in Islam or Christia- those stereotypes must be cleaned up
nity, but in the dangers inherent to reli- through massive means, and that the cul-
gious fundamentalism in general, which ture of confrontation arising from it must
countering must be the main aim of an be counteracted. An Alliance of Civiliza-
Alliance of Civilizations. tions which managed some impact in this
regard would be a very valuable contribu-
51. Within Western societies, the descri- tion.
bed ideology of fear leads to several conse-
quences. Firstly, ideas that until recently
had been stigmatised as belonging to extre-
me right-wing discourse, are now adopted 2.3. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE,
and advocated by classical conservative MULTILATERALISM AND COSMOPOLITAN
discourse and thereby made acceptable, a DEMOCRACY
development which is very dangerous.
Secondly, it reinforces the fear of a loss of 54. Beyond the idea of what constitutes the
cultural uniformity/ integrity in Europe. In self and the other, resentment and hosti-
many European countries, Muslims were lities between nations and civilizations
first told to integrate, and once they have might also be created by some more tan-
done so, they are explicitly being distin- gible disagreements regarding the way the
guished, since their integration might put current international system is designed
in danger the cultural uniformity of the and operated. Particularly in the weaker
country. This is a very subtle and dange- countries, resentment is increasing to the
rous discourse, bordering racism. degree that the powerful take advantage of
their superiority to dominate the way the
52. Finally, the ideology of fear has an im- international economy, peace and security
pact in the field of citizenship. As mentio- and other global issues are being dealt
ned above, Muslims must do much more with, according to their national or regio-
than others to prove they are genuine citi- nal interests, thereby contradicting the ve-
zens. This leads to the emergence of a rela- ry idea of the United Nations. Controver-
tionship between state and citizen which is sial issues in this regard which were dis-
not based on trust, but on control. Citizens cussed during the present seminar include
of Muslim confession may be tolerated, but the call for multilateralist solutions (espe-
are not valued as equal, because people cially in the context of UN Reform), the
cannot imagine that a Muslim citizen can development and enforcement of Interna-
be completely and fully part of their socie- tional Law, and the promotion of demo-
ty. Instead, control is exercised over what cratic values, including human rights.
they do. But citizenship is per definitionem
not attached to religion or ethnicity, but is 55. The current system of global gover-
a personal choice, an exercise of personal nance, institutionally represented by the
freedom to adopt the rights and duties of a United Nations, starts from the principle
society. that any threat to global security must be
dealt with on the grounds of multilateral
53. In a general view on identities and per- decision-making. However, with the US
ceptions in Arab and Islamic societies and left as the only superpower, politically,
the West, the most central issue was con- economically and militarily highly supe-
sidered to be the lack of genuine informa- rior to any other, the multilateral system
tion and knowledge of each other, which faces the difficulty of enforcement of Inter-
form the basis for all distorted perceptions. national Law vis-à-vis an invincible power,
11Kristina Kausch and Isaías Barreñada
which is naturally tempted to submit its gether, backed by larger, more powerful
sovereignty under the rule of the UN only countries, they were able to provide the
where it matches its interests. core of a governmental challenge to Was-
hington’s drive towards unilateral war.
56. The United States today takes advan- How was that possible? Because people in
tage of its unique position in a selective the streets massively demanded it, so at so-
application of values, in particular related me point the price governments would ha-
to what is declared the universal value of ve had to pay for giving in to Washington
democracy. The United States, it was ex- turned higher than the price for saying no
pressed, imposed on the world their rules, and standing up against the US as a part of
challenging International Law and the Uni- the global resistance movement. Even
ted Nations, down-playing the role and though this opposition of the masses this
significance of the UN. Nevertheless, in time was not enough to prevent unilateral
sixty years of its existence, the UN had ne- military action, it illustrated the power of
ver been more relevant than when it stood the people and showed that, where there is
up against Washington and said “No” to union, an opposition against a single su-
war. perpower’s unilateralism can have an im-
pact.
57. To the extent the US applies unilateral
ad hoc solutions, instead of leaving the 59. The distribution of power and effective
task of managing global governance and multilateralism are central issues within
particularly peace and security to the UN, the ongoing process of UN Reform. How
anger is generated in the rest of the world. can the United Nations be consolidated as
Particularly those who are target of US a reference point for effectively safeguar-
unilateral action and lack the strength to ding global peace and security, based on
counteract, are filled with indignation be- multilateral decision-making? Again, one
fore the absence of effective mechanisms faces the dilemma of how such a reform
to implement multilateral solutions and can possibly be adopted with the consent
the impotence of the global community of the only superpower if it aims to force
and especially the UN, which is supposed that very superpower under the rule of
to be safeguarding the rights of the wea- law. Some participants emphatically un-
kest. The most significant case in point is derlined the need that the world reclaimed
the unilateral US invasion of Iraq, which what the UN charter stands for, that the
was not backed up by the UN Security global community’s interests must not be
Council and thus illegal under Interna- driven by the powerful, but by all. In this
tional Law. sense, the unique opportunity of the pro-
cess of UN Reform must be taken advan-
58. The invasion of Iraq provoked the mo- tage of to make multilateralism accounta-
bilization of civil society around the globe, ble to stand up even to superpowers.
of people on the streets saying “No” to
war, disgusted at the US’ single-handed 60. Is this a feasible aim? A talk about re-
action. Even though this was not the first form is a talk about power, is a talk about
time anti-war demonstrations were held, the Security Council, which up to today is
governments around the world were for- so often the representative of the strongest,
ced to listen in a collective and collabora- as well as of the least democratic agents of
tive manner. Due to the global scope of the UN. Participants considered that in
protests, powerful governments could pro- theory, a reasonable reform of the Security
vide a kind of political backing for the Council would have to abolish the veto
smaller ones, a group called the “Uncom- and expand the Council in order to make
mitted Six”5, six countries each of them it a truly representative organ. In practice,
too weak to oppose the US on its own. To- a more realistic proposal to make the Se-
curity Council accountable was seen in the
5
Cameroon, Guinea, Angola, Pakistan, Mexico and Chile. creation of an oversight panel, composed
12Alliance of Civilizations.
International Security and Cosmopolitan Democracy
Seminar Conclusions
not of country representatives but of indi- 63. Some participants argued that even if it
viduals, influential jurists foremost in In- was viable to establish a true multilatera-
ternational Law, to ensure that Security lism, it would not suffice to satisfy con-
Council decisions did not themselves vio- temporary requirements. Multilateralism,
late International Law. it was argued, included only governments
in the decision-making process, so what
61. Moreover, there must be a shift of po- was needed for a democratic global gover-
wer from the Security Council to the Ge- nance was a system based on a new kind of
neral Assembly. Legally, according to the multi-levelled “internationalism”, invol-
Uniting for Peace Resolution, when the Se- ing the UN as both actor and venue, na-
curity Council is paralysed for any reason tional governments, as well as the most
– which could be a veto, or threat of it – important non-state actors of civil society,
the General Assembly is authorized to take in order to challenge the whole range of
up issues that ordinarily would only be issues relevant to global governance.
6
allowed to be taken up in the Council.
There are ways the General Assembly can 64. The hard end of multilateralism is the
reclaim power to reflect the interests of the enforcement of International Law. Multila-
non-powerful. The run-up to the Iraq war, teralism can only be effective if Interna-
even though it did not stop the war in the tional Law is applied universally. However,
end, already gave an idea of how that due to the current distribution of power,
could work. there are in practice different measures for
the US and for the rest of the world. UN
62. Some wondered whether the very call Resolutions are being applied or not de-
for an Alliance of Civilizations was not a pending on whose interests are affected by
proof that the project of the United Na- the envisaged actions. This insufferable hy-
tions, founded in 1949 as a true Union of pocrisy, participants criticized, was under-
Nations, had failed, for not being able to mining the credibility of the UN as an im-
conduct a global policy that safeguarded partial global intermediary. As a matter of
national politics by placing itself above it. fact, International Law is currently in a ve-
In response, it was admitted that in some ry precarious situation. The system opens
ways, the UN had failed to fulfil its object- no space for an opposition of the weakest
tives, and thus the Alliance of Civilizations to the most powerful, in case the latter de-
should contribute to its renewal. On the cide not to stick to the rules.
other hand, people argued that the huge
efforts and achievements made by the UN 65. Why is this so? Since the Middle Ages,
in some fields, e.g. in the Palestine issue, the world has been organized in political
had been too often neglected. Moreover, it communities around the principle of sove-
was not a failure inherent to the UN if its reignty, first monarchs, then nation states.
members lacked the common sense to ap- With the development of military techno-
ply laws and agreements. The UN, it was logy, wars between sovereign European
argued, had its strengths and weaknesses, states reached a level of violence which, af-
and among its strengths, UN action in the ter two World Wars, led to the founding of
field of humanitarian intervention and the the UN as a system of global harmoniza-
development of the rule of law were men- tion on the basis of a common law. Parallel
tioned. The necessary UN Reform, partici- to that, sovereignty, which had been the
pants added, must not be reduced to “sla- symbol of the majesty of power and the
shing budget and firing staff”, but instead independence of people, became the object
be a reform aimed at openness, democrati- of desire of the people in the colonized
sation, transparency, and broadening to in- territories, and their elites imitated the po-
clude civil society. litical form of the sovereign state in the
th
20 century process of decolonisation in a
6
universal extension. Sovereignty thereby
UN General Assembly Resolution 377(V): Uniting for peace,
03.11.1950. became the basic principle of International
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