Analysis selection for JCC - June 2021 Colombia: Violent protests - Franco Vago
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
Analysis selection for JCC June 2021 Colombia: Violent protests 1 Jun 2021 - Country Risk | Strategic Report Protests broke out in Colombia on 28 April over President Iván Duque’s introduction of controversial tax legislation. Despite his withdrawal of the legislation on 2 May, the unrest has continued, completing a month of daily demonstrations. The violence has resulted in at least 42 deaths, 2,000 people injured, and 159 disappearances as of 26 May, according to Colombia’s Ombudsman’s Office. The first attempts at dialogue with leaders of the protests began on 10 May; the two sides have held 10 meetings so far with some limited progress, owing to the mediation of the UN and the Catholic Church. This has helped to reduce levels of violence; however, the leaders of the strike have announced that the right to protest must be respected and have demanded guarantees that the police will refrain from violence before a specific agenda is considered. • The high levels of violence at the beginning of the unrest have receded, but fresh bouts of looting are likely if ongoing negotiations with the government fail. The main targets of violence have been the bus rapid transit infrastructure in major cities, bank branches, supermarkets, and police stations. While the majority of violence has been in Cali and the capital Bogotá, dozens of other middle-sized cities have also experienced vandalism. Violence is likely to persist until the government reaches an agreement with the leaders of protest, some of whom come under the National Strike Committee (Comité Nacional del Paro: CNP), an umbrella organisation made up of dozens of groups with different agendas. The CNP has called for protests to continue parallel to the negotiations; this increases the risk of new bouts of violence. Under such a scenario, assets most likely to come under attack are the bus rapid transit systems such as TransMilenio in Bogotá and MIO in Cali, which are soft targets; anarchist groups and, according to the government, criminal groups have set dozens of bus stations and vehicles on fire. There is also an increased risk of new looting affecting supermarkets and bank branches across major cities. Comandos de Atención Inmediata (CAIs), the neighborhood police sentry posts, are also likely to be targeted by protesters. Setting up new roadblocks, which initially restricted access to Bogotá, Cali and the key seaport of Buenaventura, is also likely. • The breadth of demands and the decentralised nature of the protests is likely to slow down negotiations and protract their resolution. The current protests have been more widespread nationally and more decentralised in leadership terms than in previous cases. Initially driven by indigenous groups and labour unions, they have expanded as students, pensioners, taxi drivers, truck drivers have joined. The CNP is a nebulous structure of over 40 groups with sometimes diverging interests. Meetings have been held since 10 May between leaders of the CNP and government representatives, through the mediation of the Colombian Episcopal Conference (Catholic Church), and UN officials. This has helped to mitigate levels of violence; however, CPN leaders have warned that unless the government guarantees the right to peaceful protest and consider prosecuting police officers responsible for human right abuses, no progress in negotiations would be possible. Given the decentralised and wide-ranging nature of protest grievances, it is likely that further violent demonstrations will take place sporadically during the negotiation process and into Confidential | Copyright © 2021 IHS Markit Ltd
Analysis selection for JCC - June 2021
the 2022 presidential election cycle.
• The withdrawal of the tax bill has severely weakened President Duque’s administration. For the 12
months until the 2022 presidential election, Duque’s government will be in a weaker position that threatens to
limit scope for implementation of its policy agenda, with indications that government support in Congress is
faltering, as key allies are distancing themselves from the fiscal plan outlined by the government. Government
popularity has declined sharply, even before the protests, to 33% from about 54% in late 2020, encouraging
greater pushback against government initiatives on electoral grounds. Duque withdrew the tax bill that sought
to increase tax revenue by USD4.1 billion or 1.4% of GDP, via higher income taxes and increased value-
added tax (VAT) rates. He is seeking consensus and has offered a new, diluted version avoiding these areas,
but even this faces ongoing political challenges. Additional tax revenue therefore seems increasingly likely to
be sourced from increases in corporate taxes and taxes on dividends. One rating agency (S&P Global) has
already downgraded Colombia to junk status, noting that without tax increases, the narrowing of the large
fiscal deficit is now less likely in the near term. The other two rating agencies have maintained Colombia’s
investment grade; however, international capital markets are already trading Colombia’s sovereign bonds as
junk, with similar spreads to junk-rated Brazil and Guatemala, although at present this would imply only limited
increases to the country’s likely borrowing costs. However, falling into junk levels would be a significant
political reversal and could damage funding access during a future period of rising US rates and monetary
policy tightening.
• The success in stopping the tax bill through protests will encourage further pushback against
government initiatives. Reversal of policies because of unrest is highly unusual in Colombia. Violent
nationwide protests staged in late 2019 led to President Duque accepting a national dialogue rather than
unilaterally withdrawing policies. On this occasion, however, the protests have forced the withdrawal of a key
economic initiative. This sets a precedent for further protests, portraying the government as weak. Already,
the healthcare bill, another of Duque’s flagship reforms was abandoned by Congress on 19 May, as strike
leaders made it a key demand to progress in the negotiations.
• The protests are also likely to weaken parties favouring pro-market business reforms. Duque’s badly
timed tax bill has seriously undermined the political capital of ruling party Democratic Centre (Centro
Democrático: CD) and its allies in government. The latest opinion poll (published on 25 May) shows a 76%
rejection of the Duque government, compared with 59% in February. The left has been the main beneficiary,
particularly left-wing leader Gustavo Petro, who is leading the 2022 presidential race by a margin of more than
20% over his most immediate rival. During previous presidential election campaigns, Petro has advocated the
nationalisation of the financial sector and the phasing out of oil and extractive industries, while promoting a
strong anti-US stance.
Indicators of changing risk environment
Increasing risk
• Deployment of the army to the streets of Colombia's main cities is rejected by most political parties, with
labour unions defying curfews.
• Growing numbers of protesters are reported to have been killed by police, particularly in Cali and Bogotá.
Decreasing risk
• The government orders the withdrawal of army troops and Escuadrón Móvil Antidisturbios (ESMAD) riot police
from the streets.
• The government abandons plans to table a revised tax bill, calling instead for a national dialogue including the
left-wing opposition.
• The government offers to make temporary universal income for the poor permanent.
|2Analysis selection for JCC - June 2021
Malaysia’s two-week nationwide COVID-19 lockdown increases likelihood of
extension of state of emergency, forestalling PM’s removal
1 June 2021 - Country Risk | Headline Analysis
Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin on 28 May announced a two-week nationwide “total lockdown” from 1 to 14
June as Malaysia faces a surge in coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) cases. The government on 31 May
reported 6,824 new COVID-19 cases and 2,796 deaths, almost three times more than the number of cases
when the national State of Emergency was declared on 12 January.
• The national lockdown order imposes a ban on all non-essential social and economic activities, but allows
many export-oriented industries to operate with reduced capacity. Businesses that provide daily necessities
such as supermarkets, pharmacies, and petrol stations are allowed to remain open. Furthermore, the
government permits 18 key manufacturing and service industries, many of them export-oriented, including
electrical and electronics, petrochemicals, and rubber gloves (an industry where Malaysia is the world’s
largest exporter), to operate with 60% of the workforce, subject to permission from the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry.
• Although Muhyiddin said there would be a relaxation of the current ban for certain unspecified economic
sectors after the two-week lockdown subject to a reduction in case numbers, this is unlikely as cases continue
to rise and the progress of Malaysia’s vaccination programme remains slow. Official government figures show
that only 1.5 million out of Malaysia’s 32 million population have had their first vaccine dose. Moreover,
previous movement control orders were typically extended after their initial two-week imposition.
• The national lockdown increases the likelihood of an extension to the State of Emergency that is due to expire
on 1 August, preventing attempts by Muhyiddin’s opponents to remove him from office as the emergency
suspends all elections and parliamentary business. Muhyiddin’s opponents from within his ruling coalition and
the opposition had threatened to call for a vote of no-confidence before the State of Emergency was declared.
Muhyiddin’s 2021 budget in December 2020 – the most recent indicator of support for his government – was
passed with a three-vote majority, indicating his slim majority. Muhyiddin’s opponents are likely to attempt to
unseat him through a no-confidence motion once the State of Emergency is lifted. This is likely to take place
in early 2022 at the earliest, assuming that the State of Emergency will be extended for another six months.
• The state of Sarawak is due for a state-wide election, with the state assembly mandate set to expire on 7
June 2021. Under the constitution, election must be held 90 days after the dissolution of the assembly. Given
the previous experience in neighbouring Sabah when a September 2020 state election led to a sharp increase
in COVID-19 cases, it is unlikely that the federal government would allow the Sarawak state election to take
place this year. With emergency powers, the federal government can postpone the election to another date.
Somalian PM brokers new electoral agreement, further decreasing likelihood
of small-arms fighting in capital
1 Jun 2021 - Country Risk | Headline Analysis
After negotiations in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, on 27 May, leaders of the country’s five Federal Member
States (FMS) and Benadir region and the prime minister of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) agreed
that elections to select the FGS members of parliament, senators, and president should be concluded within
60 days. Main opposition presidential candidates Hassan Shiekh Mohamud and Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and
President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (alias ‘Farmaajo’) were also present at the talks. The agreement
resolved outstanding differences regarding election protocols in Jubaland’s Gedo region and Somaliland. In
|3Analysis selection for JCC - June 2021
Gedo region, a parliamentary election is to be held in the regional capital, Garbaharey, under the security of
the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The composition of the electoral commission organising
elections in Somaliland was also resolved during the negotiations, with Deputy Prime Minister Mahdi
Mohammed Gulaid, an ally of Farmaajo, likely nominating most commissioners and Senate speaker Abdi
Hashi agreeing to nominate only a minority. Prime Minister Mohamed Roble is to chair an election security
committee, which is also to include AMISOM, state-level, and federal police commanders.
Significance: Because the new electoral arrangement has been agreed between all major political
stakeholders and is likely to go ahead, it further reduces the likelihood of renewed significant violent protests
or opposition militia fighting with small arms against the Somali National Army (SNA) in Mogadishu. Small-
arms fighting in late April after Farmaajo’s term was extended displaced more than 250,000 people, according
to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. However, limited attacks on election
events and candidates remain likely. Militia loyal to Abukar Warsame Huud, who opposes the leadership of
Hirshabelle regional president Ali Guudlawe in Hiiraan region, are likely to attempt to disrupt the electoral
caucus scheduled in Beledweyne with small-arms fighting against the SNA. In addition, jihadist group Harakat
al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (Al-Shabaab) is likely to continue targeting government officials and electoral
candidates with improvised explosive device (IED) attacks on personnel in transit, and probably fire mortars at
the Halane compound in Mogadishu where electoral events are likely to be held over the next two months.
Risks: Civil war; Government instability; Terrorism
Sectors or assets affected: Cargo (Ground); Defence and security forces; Individuals; UN and
peacekeeping
European Council aims to extend EU-Turkey migration deal, but illegal
migration causing cargo disruption still likely
28 May 2021 - Country Risk | Headline Analysis
At their next meeting in June, European Union leaders plan to review the 2016 EU-Turkey migration deal,
under which the EU has provided EUR6 billion (USD7.3 billion) for relocated Syrian refugees. The Council
tasked the European Commission in March to propose options to continue financing for Syrian refugees in
Turkey and elsewhere, agreeing to promote a positive agenda for its relationship with Turkey. Within the EU,
Syrian migrants primarily target Greece and Bulgaria given their geographic proximity.
Significance: The European Council is likely to provisionally approve the allocation of additional funds to host
refugees in Turkey. An updating of the EU-Turkey migration deal should reduce irregular migration flows from
Turkey into Greece, Cyprus, and Bulgaria in the two-year outlook, mitigating the risk of heavy inflows like
those that occurred in March 2020 after Turkey’s cessation of border controls. New EU funds are likely to
reach Turkey only in 2022, given likely operational delays in the EU collecting potential amounts of around
EUR2.5 billion from member states. Until then, irregular migration from Turkey is likely to continue, particularly
during June–September 2021, with Turkey unlikely to implement strict measures to stop illegal crossings until
it receives the funds. This will cause border cargo disruption in the Balkans, also affecting Bosnia, Croatia,
and North Macedonia. Bulgaria has already reported increased numbers of illegal land border crossings from
Turkey and Greece in 2021 versus 2020. If EU countries were to reduce funding or offer sums Turkey
considers insufficient, this would increase the risk of tens of thousands of irregular entries into EU Balkan
states in the one-year outlook. As part of the talks to extend the EU-Turkey refugee deal, Turkey has also
requested negotiations to modernise the EU-Turkey customs union and initiate visa liberalisation for Turkish
citizens. If Turkey fails to achieve these goals, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is likely to use
refugees as a leverage tool versus the EU, increasing the risk of large-scale migrant flows. Additional
|4Analysis selection for JCC - June 2021
indicators of sizeable migration from Turkey include the highly likely resumption of fighting in Syria’s
northwestern Idlib province and growing fiscal pressure on Turkey in the one-year outlook.
Risks: Ground cargo
Sectors or assets affected: Transport
|5Analysis selection for JCC - June 2021
Proposal limiting foreign truck drivers in South Africa raises likelihood of
violent protests against cross-border trucking companies
25 May 2021 - Country Risk | Headline Analysis
The South African government pronounced on 22 May that it would change road traffic regulations to limit
foreign workers in the country’s trucking industry, with a view to eventually only employment of South African
truck drivers. In November 2020, a truck drivers’ protest against the hiring of foreign drivers turned violent,
with over 20 trucks burned on the Johannesburg–Durban road, which has the largest port in the country. At
least three other trucks on the route were hijacked and looted by criminals taking advantage of the violent
protests.
Significance: The proposed regulations are part of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) party’s wider
efforts to improve unemployment figures and gain support from its alliance partners, including the largest
trade union in the country, ahead of local elections in October 2021. The ANC needs the trade unions to
campaign on its behalf in those elections, if it hopes to win back major economic urban areas such as
Johannesburg, which it lost in the 2016 local elections. IHS Markit assesses that the proposal is likely to
embolden unemployed South African truck drivers belonging to the All-Truck Drivers Foundation, opposition
political parties, civil society organisations, and factions of the ruling party that support restriction of foreign
workers to protest against foreign workers in the industry. Protests are likely to turn violent against foreign
truck drivers (mostly from Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique), who are likely to be physically assaulted. If
they fight back, their vehicles are likely to be burned. Protesters are likely to block the National Road 3 (N3)
from Durban to Johannesburg, delaying ground cargo for up to two days. Police are likely to react slowly, and
thus be ineffective. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) truck drivers’ association is likely
to pressure governments from the region to ban South African truck drivers, and trucks registered in the
country from crossing their land borders. However, given the importance of South Africa to regional trade, the
matter is likely to be referred to the SADC for a resolution.
Risks: Policy instability; Regulatory burden; Protests and riots; Death and injury
Sectors or assets affected: Cargo (Ground)
Anti-coup sentiment likely to precipitate increasing insurgencies in Myanmar’s
states, targeted attacks on military government in cities
24 May 2021 - Country Risk | Headline Analysis
Local media reported on 22 May that Kachin Independence Army (KIA) insurgents had attacked and seized
control of military (Tatmadaw) posts at Hkamti township in Sagaing Region, close to the Tatmadaw’s mining
operations in the area.
• Longstanding insurgencies are very likely to intensify, increasing the risk of collateral damage to
commercial assets and trade routes. Attacks on Tatmadaw forces and their assets – similar to the one in
Hkamti township – have increased across Myanmar’s states, particularly in Shan, Kachin, and Kayah. More
than 10 ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) have said that they oppose the coup and would not participate in
future military-led peace negotiations. Reports indicate that the Tatmadaw is using fixed-wing aircraft and
helicopter gunships to attack insurgents. On 3 May, KIA insurgents also claimed to have shot down a
Tatmadaw helicopter in Kachin state. The fighting increases the risk of collateral damage to cross-border
trade routes – particularly with Thailand and China – and to infrastructure, factories, and warehouses in these
states. It has also increased the intensity of population displacement, with many families fleeing these states
and seeking refuge in neighbouring China, Thailand, and India. The National Unity Government (NUG) of
|6Analysis selection for JCC - June 2021
ousted civilian leaders said on 5 May that it planned to establish a People’s Defence Force – a precursor to a
federal army – against the Tatmadaw. Sporadic support from EAOs for the federal front is likely, but a united
front will probably be unsustainable given conflicting interests and longstanding distrust of the NUG’s political
leadership.
• Civilian resistance to the Tatmadaw will increasingly lead to local people forming new ‘defence forces’
in multiple states. On 18 May, the Tatmadaw re-established territorial control of the town of Mindat in Chin
State following an attack with artillery strikes. The Chinland Defence Force, comprising civilians opposed to
the military government, confirmed that it had retreated. Besides the Chinland Defence Force, a similar civilian
defence force has been formed in Sagaing Region, known as the Tamu People’s Defence Force (T-PDF).
Local media reported on 12 May that at least 15 Tatmadaw soldiers were shot dead by T-PDF forces in two
separate attacks – the first attacks claimed by the group. These new forces are most likely to be formed in
states where ethnic minority groups have publicly opposed the military government – including in Shan,
Kachin, Kayah, and Mon – and also in administrative regions, including Bago, Dawei, and Magway. The
capabilities of these groups will likely remain limited, including rudimentary weapons and hunting rifles,
deployed to target Tatmadaw forces. Their challenge to the Tatmadaw for territorial control is likely to occur in
some towns, but will probably be quickly reversed by security forces.
• Although anti-coup protests have decreased in Myanmar’s cities, crude improvised explosive device
(IED) explosions targeting the military government are increasing, particularly in Yangon. The
Tatmadaw’s use of lethal force has substantially disrupted the anti-coup protest movement in cities like
Yangon, Mandalay, Naypyidaw, and Bago. However, the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) – through
which thousands of people have abstained from work to disrupt the country’s administration – is continuing in
multiple sectors. On 22 May, the Tatmadaw suspended nearly 126,000 teachers for participating in the CDM.
In anticipation of a lethal military response, protests are unlikely to resume to the scale prevalent until April
2021, but anti-coup sentiment has resulted in increasing crude IED attacks in cities like Yangon. One
explosion was reported outside a ward office of the military government on 18 May, and another detonated
outside a local supermarket on 20 May (both caused no damage). Separately, a military government
representative was shot dead on 18 May in Yangon. No specific group or individuals have been identified as
suspected perpetrators, but military government buildings and representatives will continue to be targeted in
Yangon. Patrols by Tatmadaw forces, detentions of suspects, and curfew restrictions are likely to increase
accordingly.
Indicators of changing risk environment
Increasing risk
• Collateral or targeted damage to Chinese commercial assets – either in Yangon or in states with insurgencies
– would increase pressure on the Tatmadaw to deploy heavier force to disrupt the opposition. In Yangon, this
would significantly increase mass detentions of suspects and deployment of armoured vehicles.
• The military government’s election commission said on 21 May that it was considering dissolving ousted State
Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) party, and charging its leadership with
high treason (punishable by death). Should this become official, it would significantly increase momentum for
nationwide protests to resume.
Decreasing risk
• Although currently unlikely, should the Tatmadaw propose a unilateral ceasefire that insurgent groups accept,
this would reduce the intent for and instances of fighting in multiple states.
• On 21 May, Commander-in-Chief General Min Aung Hlaing scrapped the rule setting his retirement age at 65,
which had been due in July 2021 and partly motivated the coup. If protests in July remain muted, despite
|7Analysis selection for JCC - June 2021
public opposition to his move, the Tatmadaw would view this as tacit public acceptance.
Israel-Hamas ceasefire
21 May 2021 - Country Risk | Strategic Report
A ceasefire came into effect on 21 May between Israel and the Palestinian Islamist militant group Hamas in
Gaza. The agreement ended 11 days of fighting between Hamas and its allies and Israel, during which
approximately 232 Palestinians and 12 people in Israel were killed. On 10 May, following an ultimatum for
Israeli security forces to withdraw from East Jerusalem’s Al-Aqsa Mosque and Sheikh Jarrah neighbourhood
and to free detained protesters, Hamas – for the first time since 2014 – fired seven rockets towards
Jerusalem, all of which were either intercepted or landed in uninhabited areas, causing only minor blast
damage. Israel subsequently responded to the rockets with extensive airstrikes on Hamas sites, as well as
assassinations of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) leadership figures inside Gaza (Op. Guardian of
the Walls). Over the course of the conflict Hamas and PIJ launched salvoes of up to several hundred rockets
at a time at population centres, including Tel Aviv region. Most were intercepted by the Iron Dome defence
system. Intercommunal violence involving attempted lynchings has meanwhile occurred in mixed cities inside
Israel.
• The ceasefire was agreed through heavy regional and international mediation efforts, particularly
involving an Egyptian proposal for a ceasefire to begin on 21 May. Hamas had reportedly signalled its
willingness for a ceasefire on several occasions, but Israel’s political leadership has deferred that decision,
likely to accomplish military objectives including destruction of military infrastructure and top-level leadership
assassinations. Despite mobilisation and massing of additional ground troops early on, there was no ground
incursion into Gaza, probably based on political calculations that such an operation would significantly
increase the risk of IDF casualties and abductions, and would meet no political objective unless it led to the
full reoccupation of Gaza, which Israel currently rejects. Israel is likely to have exhausted the most tactically
significant locations of its target bank and has factored growing international condemnation of its operations,
particularly from the United States, into its decision to accept ceasefire proposals. Although Hamas continued
to fire mortar shells and short-to-medium-range rockets at Israeli border communities in the lead up to the
agreed ceasefire time, there was no final escalation of rocket fire into central Israel, as has been the case in
the past, indicating a genuine willingness not to disrupt the ceasefire. Restrictions on movement were to be
lifted at 1800 local time in Israel on 21 May. There remain outstanding areas of disagreement between the two
parties, particularly a claim made by Hamas that Israel will take into account its demand not to proceed with
evictions of Palestinians in Sheikh Jarrah, which the Israeli Defence Minister subsequently denied.
• As of 0200 on 21 May (the 11th day of operations), Israel had responded to over 4300 rockets launched
from Gaza with airstrikes and land-based artillery shelling. Hamas and PIJ militants aimed their rockets
mainly at population centres in the south of Israel especially the Gaza border, Ashkelon, Ashdod, and
Beersheva regions, and to an extent, central Israel. Hamas/PIJ also unveiled longer-range projectiles such as
the “Ayyash 250” and “al-Qassim”, reportedly dispatched weaponised suicide unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) towards border Israeli communities, and unmanned marine vehicles towards Israeli offshore assets.
Hamas widened its target set to include airbases (Chatzor, Chatzerim, Nevatim, Tel Nof, Palmachim, and
Ramon as of 21 May), as well as some critical civilian facilities including airports, ports, and gas rigs.
Hostilities killed approximately 232 in Gaza and 12 in Israel, three of them being foreigners. Rocket fire on
Ben Gurion International Airport prompted the rerouting of incoming flights towards southern Israel, as well as
unilateral flight suspensions by several international airlines. One rocket on 11 May struck and ignited a fire at
an oil silo in Ashkelon, but it remains unclear whether this was targeted or incidental. Upon the Israeli Energy
Ministry’s request, US oil giant Chevron shut down and depressurised its Tamar offshore gas platform along
Ashkelon’s coast – although this decision was reportedly reversed on 21 May, there was no indication from
|8Analysis selection for JCC - June 2021
Chevron as to when the field would be restarted. Meanwhile, Israel reported having killed 225 members of
Hamas’s Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades and PIJ’s Quds Brigades, and unsuccessfully tried to assassinate
Muhammad Deif, al-Qassam Brigades' top commander. In addition to military infrastructure and a large
network of tunnels, Israel has, with prior warning, also felled high-rise residential blocks allegedly hosting
military-relevant activity, including one that housed several international media outlets.
• Violence in Arab-majority areas inside the West Bank and Israel is likely to continue, but heavy
deployment of anti-riot police reduces likelihood of damage to commercial assets. Inside Israel, riots by
Arabs, prompting pushback by Jewish vigilante groups, have occurred especially in mixed cities such as Lod,
Akko, Haifa, Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Ramle, but also in more homogeneous cities such as Bat Yam, Tiberias,
and Taibe. Rioters sought to lynch individuals and vandalise residences, businesses, and religious sites
belonging to the other community (especially in Lod), and Arab rioters also confronted Israeli police. After
some inertia, Israel’s police force, reinforced by the Shin Bet/Shabak Security Services, has now more forcibly
deployed to enforce order and to prosecute rioters from both communities, leading to riots subsiding to some
extent, but further confrontation between police and Israeli Arabs are likely if arrests and subsequent charges
are seen to disproportionately punish Arab Israeli citizens. Riots would be more likely to derail the ceasefire if
there was heavy deployment of Israeli police around the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Inside the West Bank,
Hamas has also managed to encourage protests and increasing incidences of attacks against Israeli security
forces and civilians involving stabbings, firearms, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and car-rammings.
The Palestinian Authority (PA), Hamas’ domestic rival, called for a general strike on 18 May (which Israel’s
Arab citizens also observed in solidarity), seeking, with mixed results so far, to be perceived as taking back
control of the anti-Israel protests from Hamas. There is a moderate to high risk of civil violence inside Israel
and Hamas-incited unrest inside the West Bank persisting for several weeks after the end of the military
conflict. In addition, the ongoing military conflict has made it more difficult for Netanyahu’s political rival, Yair
Lapid, to establish an alternative governing coalition by the start of June, especially since Lapid’s potential
allies among the right-wing and Arab parties refuse to be seen as allying themselves with the other amid the
ongoing conflict.
Indicators of changing risk environment
Increasing risk
• Israel continues with forced evictions of Palestinian communities in Sheikh Jarrah and East Jerusalem,
provoking Hamas to resume rocket fire into central Israel.
• Militant groups not affiliated with Hamas launch mortar or shooting attacks at Israeli troops manning the re-
opened border crossings between Israel and Gaza.
• Gaza-based militants intensify their rocket salvos towards Tel Aviv metropolitan area, increasing the likelihood
of projectiles bypassing the Iron Dome Defence System and causing significant numbers of civilian casualties
and major property damage.
• During riots including inside Israel, Israeli security forces or armed civilians respond with lethal force, causing
additional Arab casualties and further stoking riots and retaliatory attacks on Israelis.
Decreasing risk
• The conditions of the ceasefire hold beyond 21 May, with no sporadic launches of single rockets from Gaza
into Israel.
|9Analysis selection for JCC - June 2021
Greek government tables labour law introducing greater operating flexibility,
but further strikes and protests likely
19 May 2021 - Country Risk | Headline Analysis
Greek Labour and Social Affairs Minister Kostis Hatzidakis said on 16 May that a draft labour law tabled by
the centre-right New Democracy (Néa Dimokratía: ND) government on 12 May would address issues such as
undeclared work and unpaid overtime. The proposed law’s provisions introduce greater work flexibility,
allowing employees to work up to 10 hours daily, including Sundays, in exchange for fewer hours on another
day, ending the prior eight-hour maximum, although the 40-hour weekly limit is unchanged. The bill also
increases legal overtime from 120 hours (96 in manufacturing) to 150 hours a year for all sectors. A case-
specific employee-employer agreement would be required before working arrangements could be changed.
Independent labour inspections would check under-declared labour, while a "digital work card" would monitor
working hours. Trade unions in major public utilities, including the Athens metro, would be obliged to ensure
that at least one-third of employees work during strikes. The bill has triggered criticism from opposition parties,
including the Coalition of the Radical Left (Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás: SYRIZA), and protests and
strikes by labour unions, which have already disrupted public transport for a few days. The Confederation of
Civil Servants (ADEDY) claims that the changes would undermine workers’ rights and collective bargaining
agreements. The draft bill is open for public consultation until 27 May before parliamentary review.
Significance: Adoption of this bill is likely by July, given the ruling ND’s stable parliamentary majority.
Protests organised by SYRIZA and other opposition parties and trade unions are likely during its
parliamentary passage, particularly in Athens, attracting up to 10,000 people, and Thessaloniki, causing
transport disruption in these city centres. The likelihood of labour strikes in the public sector affecting rail,
ferry, and Athens’ public transport services is also elevated both before and after the bill is presented for
parliamentary approval. If protests were to consolidate to involve 50–60,000 people in Athens repeatedly, IHS
Markit assesses that the government would be likely to adjust the labour law to acknowledge broad public
opposition, while potentially facing dissenting voices from within ND. This could lead to withdrawing provisions
such as the digital labour card and features reducing trade unions’ power to ease social disorder.
Risks: Policy instability; Labour strikes; Protests and riots
Sectors or assets affected: Public sector; Energy; Transport
Limited foreign military support unlikely to improve Mozambican army’s
counter-terrorism efficiency, increases collateral damage risk to assets
17 May 2021 - Country Risk | Headline Analysis
Mozambique on 11 May signed a five-year defence agreement with Portugal involving the training of several
army units near Maputo for three to four months over three years, deploying a total of 240 Portuguese special-
forces personnel, and the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for intelligence gathering.
• The European Union has also announced that it is considering sending a training mission to
Mozambique by 2022 to reinforce and integrate with the Portuguese personnel. These offers follow the
conclusion on 7 May of US special forces’ two-months training of Mozambican marines. The United States
announced that further training is to take place in July. This comes after the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) offered to deploy a 3,000-strong stand-by force (SADCSF), including air, ground, and
maritime components. This SADCSF would be primarily based in Nacala port in the northern Nampula
province. The SADC, however, also offered a second option entailing logistical support only, and a third option
which would represent a compromise between the first two options.
| 10Analysis selection for JCC - June 2021
• President Felipe Nyusi has repeatedly stated that he is against a foreign deployment in the country,
reflecting the pressure he has been under from his ruling party, the Mozambique Liberation Front
(Frente de Libertação de Moçambique: FRELIMO). An IHS Markit source reports that all factions of
FRELIMO (see diagram below), for various reasons, are against an SADC deployment. FRELIMO has
reportedly had various alleged links to illicit networks transiting through Nacala port, which would likely be
negatively impacted by an SADCSF mission there. Former president Armando Guebuza spearheads the
opposition to an SADCSF, citing the government’s alleged mismanagement to weaken Nyusi, and favours
using domestic military capability instead. Former defence minister Alberto Chipande favours the use of
private military contractors.
• IHS Markit assesses that FRELIMO is likely to accept a combination of SADC and EU training and
logistical support only. Mozambique is likely to accept further aviation support, such as surveillance UAVs,
armed helicopters, and ground attack aircraft. This support is likely to be provided by Zimbabwe and/or
Angola, the only SADC power with significant air capability. South Africa would traditionally be the lead actor
in aviation operations, but critical underfunding for more than a decade has eroded its capability to negligible
levels. Mozambique is undergoing a rapid rearming by South African defence contractor Paramount
International. The addition of armoured vehicles and properly trained gunship pilots would provide some
firepower without reliance on external military support, but this is unlikely to materially change our assessment
that insurgent attacks will still occur.
• The newly trained and equipped Mozambican forces will likely lessen the frequency of efficient attacks
by insurgents in cities in 2022, but remain unlikely to secure cities not yet under the insurgents’
control. The improvement in intelligence capabilities thanks to UAVs will help to detect insurgents’
movements on roads currently inaccessible to government forces, and detect fires started by insurgents
during raids on small villages. This, combined with newly purchased armoured vehicles and helicopters and
transport and attack aircraft, will very probably allow Mozambican security forces to circulate on roads at high
risk of small-arms attacks and which they have been avoiding thus far. Therefore, security forces’ increased
presence will likely lessen the frequency of efficient insurgent attacks in cities such as Pemba and Montepuez
in the northern Cabo Delgado province in 2022. However, it remains unlikely that the security forces will
successfully prevent the expansion of the territory under the insurgents’ control because underlying co-
ordination issues will almost certainly remain unaddressed in the next 12 months. Insurgents will likely
continue their daily small-arms attacks on rural areas in Cabo Delgado province, extending to Niassa
province, throughout the rest 2021, disrupting road cargo, thereby posing prolonged business interruption. In
rural areas, the security forces’ newly purchased armed helicopters and aircraft carrying out airstrikes against
insurgents are likely to pose a direct risk of damage to assets.
| 11Analysis selection for JCC - June 2021
Indicators of changing risk environment
Increasing risk
• FRELIMO does not announce a decision on the accepting or rejecting of an SADC deployment offer after its
party meeting on 22–23 May, increasing the delay in setting up a more-efficient security response in Cabo
Delgado province.
Decreasing risk
• The newly trained and equipped Mozambican security forces are able to deploy more efficiently in Pemba city,
decreasing the likelihood of a successful large-scale assault from the insurgents.
• The Portuguese and/or US forces are able to successfully deliver training, increasing the likelihood of cities
being better protected and newly trained units being better co-ordinated and effective.
© 2021 IHS Markit. No portion of this report may be reproduced, reused, or otherwise distributed in any form without prior written consent, with the exception
of any internal client distribution as may be permitted in the license agreement between client and IHS. Content reproduced or redistributed with IHS
permission must display IHS legal notices and attributions of authorship. The information contained herein is from sources considered reliable but its
accuracy and completeness are not warranted, nor are the opinions and analyses which are based upon it, and to the extent permitted by law, IHS shall not
be liable for any errors or omissions or any loss, damage or expense incurred by reliance on information or any statement contained herein.
| 12You can also read
