Bertrand Badie, Le temps des humiliés. Pathologie des Relations Internationales
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Book Reviews
Bertrand Badie, Le temps des humiliés. Pathologie des Relations
Internationales
(The Era of the Humiliated. A Pathology of International Relations)1
(Paris: Odile Jacob, 2014), pp. 249, ISBN 978-2-7381-3090-7
Reviewed by Esther Barbé
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB) – Institut Barcelona d’Estudis
Internacionals (IBEI)
Le temps des humiliés. Pathologie des Relations Internationales falls within the set
of literature that brings colonial history and the postcolonial school of thought in
to International Relations (IR). It does so through the notion of humiliation that,
according to the book, has been neglected by the triumphant realist thinking focused
on the Westphalian system that only takes into consideration Nietzsche’s ‘cold
monsters’ and neglects societies. For Bertrand Badie the category of humiliation
is indispensable for the understanding of the current deadlocks of international life.
The book begins with an image since “l’image est forte” (p. 7) (the image is
strong) according to the author. The image is the picture taken in January 1998 in
Jakarta when Suharto was signing the Diktat inflicted by the IMF due to the financial
crisis in the country. Michael Camdesus was standing behind him and looking over
his shoulder. The humiliation symbolised in this picture is just one among the many
cases narrated in the book.
Bertrand Badie is a distinguished French scholar who entered the discipline of
International Relations with a previous expertise in Political Sociology, focusing
on nation-state building mostly in the Arab World. He has been characterised as a
“developer of debates and an introducer of ideas” that “uses sociological concepts to
make sense of historical trajectories”.2 There is no doubt that this book follows that
path since Badie approaches the current international system with the novel category
of humiliation. This category is culturally and historically informed all through
the book, showing that he is well acquainted with the conception and practice
of politics in the non-Western world and the kind of effects that those different
perceptions can have on the international system. So, the book draws on historical
sociology, linking the colonial past with the current international system, but also
on social psychology, linking the degrading individual experiences to the collective
1 All translations are the reviewer’s own.
2 eander, Anna, ‘Bertrand Badie: Cultural Diversity Changing International Relations’, in Iver B. Neumann,
L
Ole Waever (eds.), The Future of International Relations. Masters in the Making?, (London: Routledge, 1997),
pp. 173 and 158.
Barbé: Review of “Le temps des humiliés“, ERIS Vol. 2, Issue 2/2015, pp. 123–126124 European Review of International Studies, Volume 2/2015
perception of humiliation. Biographies of many outstanding political leaders of the
de-colonisation period illustrate the individual processes of humiliation. The book
draws on the cases of Ben Bella, Gandhi, Sukarno, Nkrumah or Samora Machel, just
to name a few.
The assumption of the book is that humiliation is a pathology of the current
international system and we can observe it regularly through diplomatic practices
that become trivial. Throughout the book there are many examples of those trivial
practices. Already in the very introduction Bertrand Badie recalls the recent case of
the French president, François Hollande, announcing in Paris the date of the next
elections to take place in Mali, thus violating the sovereign state’s prerogative.
This kind of behaviour becomes normal and takes place in an international system
that pretends to be universal and egalitarian and, at the same time, is globally
interconnected making possible for distant people to be aware of any humiliating
behaviour of a foreign power vis-à-vis their leaders, their culture or the country
as such. As a reaction, humiliation can result in violence coming from the, what is
called in the book, ‘plebeian states.’ Therefore, Badie assumes that humiliation is a
“ferment des conflits violents” (p. 16) (source of violent conflicts).
Building on the author’s assumptions the book is neatly divided into three parts.
The first one deals with humiliation in historical terms. The second part deals with
the inequality of the post-bipolar system and proposes a typology of practices of
humiliation exercised by major Powers. Those practices entail reactive diplomacies
assumed nowadays by periphery countries to address the humiliating effects of the
international system. The following part focuses on the likely backlash coming from
the periphery paying attention to the combination of social frustration, reactive
diplomacy and violence. The book concludes prescribing how to re-formulate the
global governance in terms of ‘globequalisation’ (globalisation + equality) to remove
humiliation, from one side, and the danger of violence, from the other.
In the first part and building on history the book traces the trajectory from balance
of power, as the name of the game among the great Powers, to strategic humiliation.
Bertrand Badie identifies the Versailles Treaty as the outstanding case of how Diktat
replaces agreement among the great Powers and since then humiliation becomes a
pathology of the international system in the 20th century. Diktat means exclusion. If
the international game is a competition for recognition, humiliation means basically
not being recognised as an equal and also, in the case of great Powers, loosing the
status or being expelled from the Club. Integration and status are fundamental for
the members of the international system. Nowadays Putin’s policies stand out in the
book as a way for recuperation of status.
The diplomacy of humiliation comes as a result of three historical factors that
disturb the classical construction of power among the ‘cold monsters’: the notion of
just war, the increasing linkage between domestic societies and international life and
the progressive discovery of the ‘distant other’ (l’autre lointain). As regards practices
of humiliation of the European Powers vis-à-vis the ‘distant other’, aside from the
colonial and post-colonial history, the book underlines the case of the Ottoman
Empire, since the 16th century, and the Chinese case in the 19th-20th centuries. It is not
insignificant that China has qualified the 18th century as the ‘Century of Humiliation’.
Indeed humiliation is part of the present Chinese narrative in international relations.
Every year China celebrates ‘Humiliation Day’ on 18 September in remembrance of
the Mukden incident, leading to the Japanese occupation of Manchuria.Esther Barbé: Review of “Le temps des humiliés. Pathologie des Relations Internationales“ 125
Assuming that being refused integration and status constitutes the basis for
humiliation the book designs a typology of four kinds of humiliation practices,
illustrated by historical examples. Humiliation par rabaisssement (humiliation
through belittlement) comes as humiliation after a military victory and entails a
significant reduction of the state’s status (e.g. conditions of the Versailles Treaty for
Germany). Humiliation par déni d’égalité (humiliation through denial of equality)
entails refusing equal rights to the other state or society (e.g. Françafrique policies).
Humiliation par relégation (humiliation through denigration) means denying
the other any role in the global governance mechanisms (e.g. restrictions of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty). Humiliation par stigmatisation (humiliation through
stigmatisation) focuses on the slanderous denunciation of the other as different
and dangerous (e.g. being designated as a rogue states). This typology of practices
of humiliation results in a set of reactive diplomacies. Therefore we can find four
reactive diplomacies that correlate with the previous practices of humiliation:
retaliation (revancharde), sovereignism (souverainisme), contestation (contestation)
and deviance (déviance), or how “to obtain advantages in the international system by
transgressing its rules” (p. 89).
The second part of the book focuses on the post-bipolar international system,
permeated by the humiliation (malade d’humiliation) inflicted by the winners of
the Cold War on the others. Badie endorses the celebrated dictum “the West against
the rest”. This part of the book focuses on the effects of the colonial past and
the current re-colonisation on a system operating on a basis of inequality. Three
kinds of inequalities underpin the system: a constitutive inequality as a result
of the decolonisation process that still divides the world in hierarchical terms; a
structuring inequality that leaves most of the countries out of the elite groups, such
as the Security Council or the G-7/G-20, and, finally, the functional inequality that
associates effectiveness with reduced groups, so that the inclusive multilateralism
turns into minilateralism, favouring club diplomacy.
According to Badie in the postbipolar world the fact that the Western Powers
“reduce the status of most of the others becomes an increasingly trivial diplomatic
game” (p. 166). As a result, the oligarchy reproduces the international system
encompassing humiliation while favouring the emergence of an alternative system
based on “the reactive ambitions of the victims of humiliation” (p. 167). Since
Bandung in 1955, considered by Badie the Council of the plebeian states, reactive
diplomacy is ubiquitous.
The third part of the book focuses on those reactive diplomacies coming as
a response to the humiliation practices recurrent in the post-bipolar international
system. Badie upholds the existence of an anti-system movement “opposed to
the recognised international system” (p. 171). The rise of the current anti-system
movement has been facilitated by the convergence of three levels of reaction in
the face of feelings of humiliation: society, diplomacy and violent conflicts. Badie
illustrates the linkage between the perception of humiliation and each of these three
levels, without disregarding contradictions and complexity. The Arab spring serves
as a good example for the social reaction against local rulers and, at the same time,
against their international supporters. The reactive diplomacy, either contestation or
deviance, is illustrated by the diplomatic practices of Venezuela and Iran. The book
depicts how new kinds of violence are linked to feelings of frustration and humiliation
in many societies, that involve local rulers and their international supporters. Badie126 European Review of International Studies, Volume 2/2015
illustrates this point, once more, referring to individual trajectories of frustration and
a lack of integration, beginning with that of social and political integration at home.
Therefore the book addresses this new kind of violence, like jihadism, as a new
pathology of the system (anti-system in this case) that goes side by side with the
pathology of humiliation. The author confronts the Western world’s policies to deal
with this violence in normative terms, criticising the traditional approach that opposes
military instruments to violent terrorist acts, arguing that “the wrong treatment makes
the remedy worse than the disease” (p. 229) and indicates the feedback process
that the Western military options, such as the use of drones, is producing in distant
countries where society feels maltreated and humiliated once more.
The conclusion of the book follows a prescriptive path. It must be understood
as a passage from Le Temps des Humiliés, depicted in the book, to Le Temps des
Cerises, symbolism of a hopeful future. At the beginning of the book Bertrand Badie
quotes Evelin Lindner to point out that the current post-Westphalian world must aim
towards a real globequalisation if we want to get over perceptions of humiliation, on
one side, and fear of violence, on the other. At the end of the book, the author outlines
his proposal advocating a “new foreign policy” (une nouvelle politique étrangère).
This new foreign policy should be based on three conditions to be effective. It has
to be a policy of alterity, accepting the other as a partner: “no more tutors” (p. 233).
It also has to be an international social policy: working for the social integration
of seven billion human beings will generate more security than outdated military
agendas. Finally, the new foreign policy has to be based on inclusive multilateralism.
It is the only way to address global problems in a legitimate way. To sum up, Badie’s
book is a plea in favour of global governance that forces us to rethink the topic from
a novel perception of the world, le monde des humiliés.Caterina Carta and Jean-Frédéric Morin (eds.): EU Foreign Policy
through the Lens of Discourse Analysis
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2014), pp. 272, ISBN 978-1-4094-6376-4
Reviewed by Inez V. Weitershausen
London School of Economics and Political Science
Bringing together some of the most renowned scholars and leading experts on
EU foreign policy and discourse analysis, Caterina Carta and Jean-Frédéric
Morin’s edited volume EU Foreign Policy through the Lens of Discourse Analysis
demonstrates the versatility of methods and approaches in the field of discourse
analysis and links these with empirical evidence of the EU’s international discourse.
Their timely contribution which includes analyses rooted in poststructuralist,
interpretative constitutionalist, discursive institutionalist, and critical discourse
analysis approaches thus demonstrates in an impressive way that the EU’s linguistic
diversity is in fact mirrored by a discursive one.
Empirically, the volume draws on articulations of discourse and evidence from
political processes within different member states and EU institutions, and contributes
to the most prominent debates in EU foreign policy in recent years. With case
studies on topics as diverse as International Terrorism, the Constitutional Treaty and
the Eurozone crisis, EU Foreign Policy through the Lens of Discourse Analysis thus
offers insights into a wide variety of topics and engages with them from a multitude
of ontological and epistemological perspectives and analytical and methodological
angles. While thus a very successful project overall, each chapter is also itself well
worth reading. As such Carta and Morin’s introductory chapter provides not only a
useful overview of the books’ content, but also successfully reminds the reader of
the main tenets of the four major theoretical approaches under which the following
thirteen chapters can roughly be subsumed, while elaborating on the ever-contested
question of ‘who speaks for Europe?’.
Thomas Diez’ chapter then constitutes an ideal starting point for the contributions
rooted in the post-structuralist tradition. Building on his earlier finding that so-called
‘European’ values and norms are in fact not uncontested, and elaborating on the
argument that EU foreign policy is in itself “part of broader discursive struggles
over what the limits of our ‘European-ness’ are”1 (p. 39), he sees discourse first
and foremost as a critical exercise which problematises prevailing understandings in
politics. At the same time, however, Diez does not reject categorically the explanatory
hypothesis either, but argues that explanation, when seen as constitutive rather than
1 homas Diez, ‘Not quite “sui generis” enough: Interrogating European values’, European Societies,
T
(Taylor&Francis Online, Vol. 14, Issue 4, 2012), pp. 522‒39.
Weitershausen: Review of “EU Foreign Policy“, ERIS Vol. 2, Issue 2/2015, pp. 127–130128 European Review of International Studies, Volume 2/2015
causal, provides substantive meaning which can then lead to particular policies.
Using the Normative Power Europe (NPE) debate as an example, he demonstrates
convincingly the delimiting function of discourse and the struggle about its borders.
Ben Rosamond’s chapter, too, draws on the NPE discussion and argues that
greater attention has to be paid to forms of liberalism which do not focus exclusively
or predominantly on norms and values that are “associated with liberal-cosmopolitan
expressions of positive freedom” but take into account the fact that “a significant
portion of the EU’s normative influence in world politics consists of the propagation
of economic liberal norms” (p. 212). As such he identifies three ideal-typical forms
of liberalism which he sees as both constitutive of the EU and reflected in its external
policies. In this context Rosamond underlines in particular the role of economic
liberalism and contrasts its features with republicanism and ‘liberalism as a
cosmopolitan duty’. He thus takes a critical and highly relevant look at the argument
that the EU first and foremost aspires to promote peace and human rights universally
and combines it with findings regarding the more pragmatic side of liberalism.
But not only the post-structuralist and discursive-institutionalist approaches find
strong representatives on a theoretical and empirical level in this comprehensive
volume. For example, Aydin-Düzgit’s essay constitutes an important contribution
when suggesting that Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and in particular its variant,
the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA), can serve as “a wider methodological
tool that can be utilized in both social constructivist and poststructuralist works on
EU foreign policy” (p. 136). A practical example of CDA is then provided by Amelie
Kutter who analyses no less than 4526 articles to demonstrate inter alia how the
construction of the EU as a civilising power served the purpose of repositioning the
latter after the Cold War. Bringing together the concepts of ‘polity-construction’,
‘discursive legitimisation’ and the ‘recontextualisation’ of discourse in national
media, her methodology and findings are thus likely to appeal to linguists as well as
social scientists, while her considerations regarding the role of the United States as
a temporal external reference will be much appreciated by everyone interested in the
relevance of the ‘other’ in shaping and (re-)constructing European identity.
Slightly less ambitious in its linguistic scope but overall no less convincing is
Henrik Larsen’s article on discursive articulations of the national ‘we’ within the EU
foreign policy system. Drawing on data from Denmark since 2009, he investigates
how member states perceive of themselves as foreign policy actors when they are
at once embedded in EU structures but also capable of acting outside them. Readers
familiar with Larsen’s earlier work2 will find a few changes to his previously developed
framework and learn that also after Lisbon “the EU was still the most common
multilateral actor with which Danish foreign policy actorness was articulated”
(p. 57). As he thus does not arrive at any ground-breaking new developments
regarding the articulation of Danish national identity, Larsen’s main contribution is
first and foremost the improvement of an already convincing framework. Appearing
now to be even more comprehensive and parsimonious, it might serve as a useful
starting point and inspiration for the work of other scholars and a valuable basis
for further reflection and empirical study. Furthermore, as Larsen’s research proves
2 Henrik Larsen, Analysing the Foreign Policy of Small Member States in the EU: The Case of Denmark,
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Henrik Larsen, ‘A distinct foreign policy for EU member states?
Towards a comprehensive framework for analyzing national foreign policy in the EU’ , European Journal of
International Relations, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2009), pp.537‒66.Inez V. Weitershausen: Review of “EU Foreign Policy“ 129
wrong voices which have either suggested or refused the idea that the Treaty of
Lisbon constituted a major shift in the discursively constructed state identities in
foreign policy, he breaks with a number of myths and stereotypes about EU foreign
policy since 2009 and thus provides a refreshing ‘reality check’.
Particularly interesting due to its empirical relevance is furthermore the chapter
by Barbé, Heranz-Surallés and Natorski who focus on ‘effective multilateralism’
in political speeches in order to identify which metaphors are particularly relevant
within specific policy fields. While they identify with regard to the EU’s involvement
in the UN processes on small arms and light weapons and the right of women in
conflicts that in particular the metaphor of the ‘EU as a model’ is highly relevant, the
practical effects of this finding remain rather vague in the chapter at hand. Against
this background, the curious reader will thus be pleased to read that the authors’
forthcoming publication3 promises to elaborate precisely on this aspect and provide
further insights into the EU’s activity as a rule-setter, rule-negotiator and rule-
facilitator.
A very successful last chapter to an overall convincing volume is then provided
by Vivien A. Schmidt. In her essay she engages with EU leaders’ ideas and discourse
during the Eurozone crisis, thus demonstrating again that scholars working on EU
foreign policy are not limited to the analysis of questions of security and defence.
Drawing on a wider range of methodological approaches and taking into consideration
the interplay between member states’ representative and institutional leaders, the
chapter breaks with some dominant perceptions which have incorrectly shaped
European discourse. As such it deconstructs the perception of the Commission as
a particularly powerful actor, and demonstrates in turn how Germany and France
acted as the main generators of discourses, albeit drawing on contrasting narratives
and ideas. Schmidt further unveils how the countries’ respective discourses during
the crisis were in fact anchored in more general preferences for ordoliberal or neo-
Keynesian approaches respectively and thereby contributes to a more thorough
understanding of particular choices. Overall, Schmidt’s analysis provides convincing
answers not only to the question why leaders often found it difficult to agree and
communicate common solutions which at once “satisfy the markets, persuade the
people, make the case to the media and convince one another” (p. 260), but also
demonstrates the extent to which the national discourses on the EU are shaped and
informed by domestic politics considerations.
Given Carta and Morin’s initial reflections on agency and actorness in the EU,
Schmidt’s findings hence provide an interesting conclusion to an overall enlightening
volume and consoles for the fact that the editors refrain from summarising the
major findings in a concluding chapter. This choice is however justified against the
background of their concise introduction and the fact that the different contributors
make reference to and build on the findings of each other throughout the book.
Moreover, Carta’s chapter on the use of metaphors from the “Western European
cultural heritage” (p. 194) makes an excellent contribution in this regard. Her use
of concepts from Voltaire’s Candide and Mozart’s Don Giovanni furthermore
demonstrate again the versatility of the Discourse Analysis toolkit and constitutes in
itself a celebration of academic diversity and creativity.
3 sther Barbé, Anna Heranz-Surallés and Michal Natorski, ‘Contending metaphors of the European Union as
E
a global actor: Norms and power in the European discourse on multilateralism’ . Journal of Language and
Politics (forthcoming, 2015).130 European Review of International Studies, Volume 2/2015
Overall a work which addresses an audience with some understanding of discourse
analysis, European foreign policy and a background in IR theory, EU Foreign Policy
through the Lens of Discourse Analysis may not suggest itself to readers who are
completely new to the field. Yet to those who are looking for innovative and creative
theoretical contributions or new insights into the empirical analysis of EU foreign
policy by means of Discourse Analysis, Carta and Marin’s remarkable volume
constitutes an essential reading which is likely to receive much scholarly attention.Katarina Engberg: The EU and Military Operations –
A Comparative analysis
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), pp. 232, ISBN 0415821363
Reviewed by Kolja Raube
University of Leuven
Katarina Engberg has written a remarkable insider’s analysis about EU military
operations. The book itself focuses on an EU military operation which Engberg,
currently Deputy Director-General in the Swedish Ministry of Defence, has vividly
experienced and dealt with while serving as minister for defence questions at the
Swedish representation to the EU and the Swedish delegation to NATO in Brussels
in the middle of the 2000s. An object of limited public scrutiny and transparency,
Engberg is thus able to focus on the making and implementation of EU missions from
an insider’s perspective. Of course, much information in this book is thus derived
from participant observation, but Engberg – who has a Ph.D. in Peace and Conflict
Research from Uppsala University – is indeed able to put her findings in an academic
perspective. The remarkable story of this book is, hence, partially related to the
combination of an academically-informed monograph and the detailed practitioner’s
information on the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). While
Engberg has done many interviews herself in the context of this book, the present
volume is overwhelmingly based on notes which she took while acting for Sweden
in the respective decision-making circles.
Engberg’s first purpose is to look into EU interventions, that is, CSDP military
missions, from a comparative point of view. Claiming that too many analyses
on CSDP missions are single case studies, this work looks into several early
missions from 2003 until today. Engberg’s main research question is ‘Under which
circumstances does the EU undertake military operations?’ (p. 3) The various cases
provided in the book do enable her to shed light on some of the answers, especially
by bringing forward a methodology which checks against various possible factors
that can have an impact on the circumstances which may, or may not have led to
operations. That being said, it was indeed necessary to include ‘non-cases’ in the
case selection, that is, those missions which never became EU missions. In other
words, in Engberg’s study we also learn about circumstances that influence the EU’s
decision not to undertake military operations.
Under which circumstances then does the EU undertake military operations?
Focusing on missions ranging from the Western Balkans, Lebanon, Libya, Congo,
Sahel and the Horn of Africa, Engberg’s analysis concludes that “the EU can be
expected to undertake autonomous military operations when a conflict can be
Raube: Review of “The EU and Military Operations“, ERIS Vol. 2, Issue 2/2015, pp. 131–132132 European Review of International Studies, Volume 2/2015
identified as an opportunity rather than a challenge both in terms of the interests at
stake and with regard to the tasks and missions defined for the operation” (p. 182).
It is interesting to read in the analysis of the various EU military missions of the
2000s, including those which finally were never launched, that not only do factors
external to the EU, but also factors internal to the EU need to be taken into account.
Engberg’s study emphasises time and again throughout the various cases the effect of
influential local actors in determining the EU’s willingness to launch and implement
a mission, or not. Engberg hence concludes, amongst other external factors, that
“the EU is likely to undertake military operations when the consent of some of the
influential local actors can be secured” (p. 183). Still, the driving factors leading to an
EU military mission are much related to internal interests of the EU: Member State
values and interests, existing precedents, the particular mandate of the mission and
resources. Previous colonial ties with countries in which operations are taking place
or already undertaken operations in the region, can condition the EU to intervene.
As other studies before Engberg have pointed out, emphasis is placed on CSDP as
being driven by major EU powers: “it takes the cooperation between at least one
of the three major powers of the EU” (p. 183). Engberg’s descriptive overview of
each of the analysed missions hence places considerable weight on the influence of
France, Germany and the UK. Equally important, resources and command structures
matter and, in the case of so-called ‘non-missions’ of the EU concerning Libya,
France and the UK preferred to operate in the framework of the UN or NATO. For
each of the case studies covered in the book, Engberg has developed a mapping
of the various internal and external factors that lead to the enabling or disabling
of an EU military mission. Moreover, Engberg has introduced each planning and
implementation exercise of a given military mission with a detailed description built
upon her rich observation notes and interviews. Referring to multiple enabling or
disabling factors at the same time, further research may be required to find out which
sets or individual factors did finally trigger or prevent an EU mission from taking
place. In short, do certain internal factors weigh more than external? Do certain
disabling factors weigh more than enabling ones?
Overall, Engberg’s book is a very useful and recommended read for all scholars
who are interested in the planning and implementation exercises of CSDP missions.
This monograph will provide them with a profound analysis and previously
unknown information, which is important in the understanding and explanation of
the Brussels-based politics of EU military missions.Jeffrey A. Engel, Mark Atwood Lawrence, Andrew Preston (eds.),
America in the World: a History in Documents from the War with Spain
to the War on Terror
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), pp. 416, ISBN 9-780-0-691-16175-4
and 978-0-691-13335-5
Reviewed by Mario Del Pero
Centre d’Histoire, SciencesPo, Paris
Three of the best scholars in the field of US Diplomatic history have joined forces
in editing a new anthology of primary sources on the foreign relations of the
United States. America in the World offers an extremely rich and well organised
collection on what the authors, in the introduction, call the ‘long American Century’,
namely the period that goes from the expansionist and imperialist drive of the late
19th century to the very contemporary war on terror.
The book is divided into 15 documentary sections, each introduced by a brief
preface. Every section contains between ten and twenty documents. After a rapid
foray into the main drivers of the late 19th century expansionism, the book follows a
fairly established, and somehow conventional, chronology, covering US Imperialism
and the War with Spain, Wilsonianism and the First World War, the interwar period
and the Second World War, the various phases of the Cold War (origins, Korea and
the 1950s, Vietnam and the 60s, détente, the rise and collapse of the second Cold
War) and its aftermath. Decidedly less orthodox and often surprising is the selection
of documents where, along with the usual and unavoidable suspects, readers will
find many unexpected materials. Among the former are classic landmark documents,
which one would find more or less in any collection of this kind: from Frederick
Jackson Turner’s reflection on the end of the American Frontier to Kipling’s White
Man’s Burden; from Wilson’s Fourteen Points to Roosevelt’s Quarantine Speech;
from the Truman Doctrine to Reagan’s speech at Westminster. The latter, however,
make for an unusual, intelligent and entertaining mix, that includes political (and,
one must admit, very funny and illustrative) cartoons, songs (Bob Dylan’s Masters
of War and Jesus Jones’s Right Here; Right Now) and literature (which could have
been used and exploited somewhat more).
The objective, the authors claim, is to “highlight the voices of academics,
activists, clergymen, novelists, poets, and songwriters in addition to presidents,
cabinet secretaries, and military officers” in order to “capture a fuller, richer, and
more nuanced interpretation of U.S. diplomatic history than is sometimes conveyed in
textbooks or documentary collections surveying the history of American diplomacy”
(p. 3). This goal has largely been achieved and this collection of documents will
Del Pero: Review of “America in the World“, ERIS Vol. 2, Issue 2/2015, pp. 133–135134 European Review of International Studies, Volume 2/2015
be, for years to come, the standard textbook in the classroom and a perfect tool for
teachers of the history of US foreign relations or, as the politically correct jargon
nowadays goes, ‘the United States in the World’.
The documents selected for this volume lead the readers through more than
a century of US engagement with (and, not rarely, refusal of) the outer world. In
so doing, they highlight the many paradoxes that have characterised this tension
between engagement and rejection: between calls (mainly from the country’s elites)
to join and transform such world and opposite invocations to leave it to its destiny,
avoiding dangerous and ultimately contaminating interactions.
The story narrated through these primary sources documents the almost irresistible
American ascendancy to global power, from the controversial, and yet very limited,
spatially and temporally, imperial phase to the post-Cold War unipolar moment. But
this story of the ‘long American century’ is also the story of a power – unprecedented,
global, ‘hyper’ in its absolute and relative dimensions – that becomes more and more
embroiled in, and constrained by, that very world it has finally decided to join and,
when possible, redeem and transform. The aptly chosen title reveals, in its simplicity,
this inner duality. Being in the world has meant, for the United States, both projecting
its influence and will on this world and accepting the constrictions that this imposes.
No other country has played a greater role in constructing and institutionalising the
web of multiple forms of interdependence – legal, diplomatic, economic, cultural –
that have come to define and discipline the modern international system. No country
had been as able as the United States in using and exploiting this web to advance its
interests, expand its influence and impose its will. No country, not even the hyper-
puissance américaine, has been able (or, for that matter, can) escape the constraints
and checks that such a system imposes on its members. Finally, the last paradox is
offered by a further, constant tension that seems to have marked each single phase of
America’s rise to global power: the dialectics between the cheerleaders of such a rise
and its many critics and foes. Becoming fully part of the world, bringing America
in to the world, has taken a significant toll – political, cultural, one might say even
psychological – on a country that prided itself on its uniqueness, exceptionalism,
distance and separation. Foreign relations have often deep implications for the
national identity. This has been particularly true for the United States that has lived,
and presented, its relations with the world as confirmation of its diversity: as a tool
of the never-ending process of identity, and indeed nation-building and imagining.
In the view of this reviewer, three main threads run throughout this anthology of
documents and confer upon it both admirable solidity and narrative coherence. The
first is represented by the different drivers of US expansionism and rise to global
pre-eminence, being from time to time (or simultaneously) ideology, geopolitics or
economics. While invariably challenged and contested, the idea of a natural destiny
of greatness and leadership seems to have informed and often hegemonised the
discourse of US foreign relations and the debates on whether (and how) America
should be in and of the world. The second thread is represented by the interplay
between the foreign and the domestic. Politics, often parochial in outlook and
objectives, has been a variable, and often the key variable, in the equation defining
US foreign policy choices and actions. Public rhetoric and pundits’ stereotypes
notwithstanding, there has rarely been a ‘water’s edge’ when it came to foreign
affairs. Constantly invoked and celebrated, consensus, bipartisanship and political
convergence in the name of the national interest have rarely been sought or attainedMario Del Pero: Review of “America in the World“ 135
even in what should be their realm par excellence – foreign relations. The third
and last thread regards the very world the United States entered, became part of,
and finally shaped and dominated. Seen from Washington, and through many of
the documents contained in this volume, that world seems, from time to time, to be
a tabula rasa or a terra incognita: an easily mouldable piece of clay or something
extremely remote and alien, frequently misinterpreted and misunderstood.
What criticisms can one offer when faced with an almost impeccable anthology
like this one? The easiest, and certainly most unfair, would be to question the
selection of documents or lament the absence of specific sources. 223 documents
covering almost 150 years of history make for hard, and therefore contestable,
choices: why is Obama’s speech in Canberra included but not the one, symbolically
more relevant, in Cairo? Why Carter’s commencement at Notre Dame and not the
Malaise Speech? How can the voices of Borah, Debs, La Follette and many other
critics be absent? More substantial is, however, a second objection to the choice of
documents. The three editors have made a laudable effort to include non-American
materials, coming primarily – but not exclusively – from the Soviet bloc. These
sources comprise approximately a quarter of the 223 documents. Here, however,
the selection appears very partial and certainly conditioned by the availability of
English translations. In a collection which aims also at offering testimonies of how
the United States – its power, model, contradictions, daily presence – was received
and perceived abroad, the paucity of documents on the European reaction to the
twentieth century ‘arrival’ of America, in its multiple and mutable forms, is quite
surprising. De Gaulle’s February 1965 speech against the hegemony of the dollar or
the many recent German Marshall Fund surveys on the image of the US in Europe,
to offer two very banal examples, deserve a place in the collection.
A more thorough historiographical commentary would have also enriched the
book, complementing the rich documentary apparatus. The brief introduction and
the prefaces to the sections are very well crafted, but they could have been integrated
with a short description of the historiography and its debates, which would have
rendered the book even more useful for (and palatable to) teachers and students.
Finally, at the end of an anthology like this one, the reader is left wondering
whether the printed book was the best format. The publisher is to be praised for
offering an affordable, paperback edition, and not those library-only, hardcover
volumes costing 100 euros/pounds/dollars or more, that seem to have invaded the
market today. However, collections of documents, fragmented and patchy as they
inevitably are, seem to be perfectly suited for electronic on-line publication. The
reader of these collections tends to adopt a cherry-picking approach, jumping from
one document (and section) to the other (which is what I will certainly do when using
this book ‒ as I plan to do ‒ with my students). An online format would probably
be more user-friendly and, of course, offer the great advantage of periodical updates
and revisions.
Such minor reservations notwithstanding, this documentary collection is in
many regards outstanding and the editors are to be commended for deftly crafting an
anthology we shall all use for many years to come.Michel Foucher (ed.), L’Arctique: La nouvelle frontière
(Paris: CNRS Editions, 2014), pp. 182, ISBN 978-2-271-08147-6
Reviewed by Alyson JK Bailes
University of Iceland
The growing international interest in the Arctic – as the ice melts, habitats change,
and resources become newly accessible ‒ calls for good analytical literature in
more than one world language. Materials in French can offer added value in serving
the needs of some 7 million French Canadians in one of the nations closest to the
Arctic, as well as readers in France itself and the other 55 members of the global
‘Francophonie’. With a long history of Arctic exploration, fishing and whaling, and
a current interest in hydrocarbon exploration through its company Total, France has
been an Observer at the Arctic Council since its inauguration in 1996 and is close to
publishing its first official Arctic Strategy.
This last development seems not unconnected with the appearance, in 2014, of
an Arctic volume in the ‘Biblis’ collection of the Paris publishing house CNRS ‒
a series that includes popular academic titles on topics from history and art to
religion and philosophy. One of the later chapters in the multi-author ‘L’Arctique:
La nouvelle frontière’ (The Arctic: The new frontier) is written by Laurent Mayet,
the assistant to former Prime Minister Michel Rocard who has been working since
2009 as France’s Arctic Ambassador. Through travels, consultations, conferences
and research, the Rocard/Mayet duo have been collecting and testing elements for
a French Arctic policy document to match those already issued by the circumpolar
states and (in 2014) by the UK and Germany. The European affairs committee of the
French Sénat, meanwhile, has prepared itself to assess the government’s conclusions
by commissioning a 187-page report on the Arctic from Senator André Gattolin
(published as Sénat Report No. 687 of 2 July 2014 and available online).
Even if the introduction by Michel Foucher to his ‘Biblis’ volume does not overtly
channel French interests, Mayet very much does so in his chapter where he critically
analyses the dominance of local states’ sovereignty in present Arctic governance,
arguing for a stronger role for the wider European and international community.
The final chapter by Vice-Admiral Patrick Hébrard also considers France’s case
for intervening, concluding that it would best do so through promoting a stronger
collective European Union (EU) approach. It seems reasonable to conclude that the
book’s publication, at this time, is designed to inform both the general French public
and the decision-makers who will frame French Arctic policy. How well does it rise
to the task?
First, the volume’s length at just 173 pages makes clear that it cannot lay claim
to comprehensiveness. That might not matter if its chapters were selected to focus
Bailes: Review of “L‘ Arctique: La nouvelle frontière“, ERIS Vol. 2, Issue 2/2015, pp. 136–139Alyson JK Bailes: Review of “L‘ Arctique: La nouvelle frontière“ 137
on the issues most important for French interests, or for general comprehension of
Arctic affairs. In fact, no such clear organising principle can be traced in the text, and
one is tempted to guess that the choice of topics was driven rather by the availability
of authors (nine of them based at French institutions and two in Canada). Thus we
find a predominantly historical (pre-1990) account of Russian strategic policies in
the Nordic region juxtaposed with a lengthy study of Arctic territorial claims and
Law of the Sea provisions, which is excellent in quality but hard going for a general
reader. The element of policy relevance is clearer in the chapters that deal with
Arctic navigation, China’s Arctic interests, and the range of cooperative institutions,
respectively. A strong chapter explaining the effects of climatic warming – which
incidentally is the only one to mention indigenous peoples – is placed right at the end
of the volume, whereas it would have made more sense as a scene-setter at the start.
Also somewhat disappointing is the apparently relaxed approach taken to
editing. For a start, there is no index. Perhaps more seriously, there are uncorrected
contradictions and inconsistencies in the chapters that risk leaving an uninformed
reader confused. Two chapters erroneously refer to observer states in the Arctic
Council as ‘permanent’ Observers – admittedly a common mistake – while Jean-
Paul Pancracio in his chapter on shipping suggests that the new Observers admitted
in 2013 have a status closer to that of full members. That is a baseless and surprising
remark, as the conditions applying to Observers have been available in an Arctic
Council text since 2011 and hold good equally for all. Hélène de Pooter’s scholarly
chapter on Arctic territorial and marine law refers to the UN Convention of the Law
of the Sea throughout as the ‘Convention de Montego Bay’ while two of the other
chapters use its French acronym CNUDM: both usages are legitimate, but added
notes would have assured readers that one and the same document is meant.
This said, the most serious problems of accuracy arise in the short introductory
texts by Michel Foucher himself and Professor Jean-Pierre Quéneudec. These partly
serve to summarise the detailed chapters’ findings, but some of the points they
pick up from them are inaccurately relayed. Foucher states on page 11 that ‘the
European Union’ [sic] wishes to negotiate an overall Arctic Treaty, having on page
9 more accurately attributed this position to (a previous statement by) the European
Parliament. Somehow one expects a French author to be less likely to slip up on such
matters. Quéneudec in his turn says there is little scope for commercial fisheries ‘in
the Arctic Ocean’ – which in fact accounts for 18% of the world’s catch at present –
while Hélène de Pooter more correctly notes that there is little incentive for fishing
in the limited areas of international ‘high seas’ around the Pole.
Such points aside, the volume is far from lacking in merit. On some of the
contemporary Arctic issues where misunderstandings and over-dramatisation
are most rife in the media, the authors show common sense and a well-informed
judgement. They correctly note the obstacles to early large-scale exploitation of
Arctic oil and gas, and the serious risks of accident and pollution that will need to
be overcome. Cyril Maré’s environmental chapter highlights the serious disruption
to be expected from permafrost melting. Laurent Mayet makes an important but
often overlooked point when he asks where the huge sums necessary for building a
safe and supportive Arctic infrastructure are going to come from – especially if the
local states insist on cold-shouldering outsiders. Pancracio’s chapter on shipping
clearly explains why the Northern Sea Route over Russia is attracting and likely
to go on attracting much more commercial shipping than the North-West Passage138 European Review of International Studies, Volume 2/2015
over Canada. The two Canadian authors’ analysis on China avoids scare-mongering
and attributes Beijing’s interest more to its general ambition to engage as a Power
than to short-term economic goals, although they sustain this judgement by skipping
rather too fast over Chinese (actual or attempted) investments in the circumpolar
states. Vice-Admiral Hébrard draws the right conclusion from this nuanced and
prudent vision of Arctic development: ‘nous avons encore un peu de temps pour
nous organiser’ (we still have a little time to organise ourselves).
All authors expressly play down the risk of military conflict in the High North,
noting that current plans for local force increases are limited and that military
assets are needed for ‘peaceful’ tasks like civil emergency response. Georges-
Henri Soutou’s history of Russian Arctic strategy is more pertinent in this context
than it might seem, and it is a shame that no attempt is made in the book’s opening
or concluding summaries to reflect on its lessons. On the one hand it may seem
to undermine peaceful predictions by stressing how crucial Russia’s Northern
sea outlet has always been for its overall strategy. On the other hand, it correctly
stresses that Russian efforts must be seen in the context of overall confrontation
and balancing with the West, including the dictates of nuclear policy. Still today, not
every gesture that Russia makes in the Arctic is aimed at the Arctic, or at its closest
Arctic neighbours.
When discussing Arctic institutions and governance the volume does not so much
get things wrong, as present an incomplete and sometimes contradictory picture.
The aspects best documented and explained are the Arctic Council’s progress in
reaching a legally binding Search and Rescue agreement among its members, and the
International Maritime Organization’s work on a polar shipping code. Beyond this,
Laurent Mayet is right in his chapter to claim that the more sensitive areas of Arctic
politics are still handled more on a basis of sovereignty and through old-fashioned
diplomacy than in anything like the post-modern methods of European integration.
He discusses future options, however, as if the Arctic Council were the only place
in which more cooperative and multilateral approaches could be developed. Antoine
Dubreuil’s chapter on cooperation more correctly emphasises the wide range of
sub-regional organisations that are helping to manage Arctic affairs at least in the
European/North Atlantic segment, and points out that all the states involved also
interact with each other through NATO and its partnerships, OSCE, the Council of
Europe, the global financial institutions and others. Unfortunately, he does not go
beyond his factual account to discuss the (in)adequacy, or future prospects, of this
multi-layered, multi-institutional architecture. In the volume as a whole, moreover,
such important parts of the institutional scenery as the detailed development and
substance of EU policies, and the question of exactly what role NATO plays or
should play, are nowhere to be found.
It is perhaps not fair, in a book of this length, to cite further cases of omission;
but there are some that do limit its adequacy as a foundation for French strategy-
making. Aside from Soutou’s chapter and some good questions posed in Vice-
Admiral Hébrard’s conclusions, it says rather little about Russia’s central role
in the Arctic and the implications for present and future governance solutions.
Even if publication came too early to take account of the Ukraine crisis, Mayet’s
arguments over sovereignty and the rights of outsiders would have benefited from
noting the importance and difficulty of working around Russia’s more old-fashioned
attitudes. Further, the volume provides relatively little information about the actualAlyson JK Bailes: Review of “L‘ Arctique: La nouvelle frontière“ 139
developments in and dynamics of oil, gas and mineral production, fisheries, and
Arctic tourism. Some politically interesting points such as the future of Greenland
are left to be raised in Hébrard’s very last pages, with no factual priming earlier in
the work.
What guidance emerges from the book for future French policy? There is no
section that tries to summarise recommendations, and the writers who approach the
question most closely –Mayet and Hébrard – spend most time analysing the wider
context or issues of general rather than national interest. The two clearest political
judgements that emerge are on other people’s affairs: two chapters express sympathy
for Iceland’s wish to be considered a ‘littoral’ (coastal) state of the Arctic, and two
others deprecate Canada’s legal claims to treat the North-West Passage as an area
of internal waters. The main signals that remain for French policy-makers are an
emphasis on the importance of scientific contributions; support for tough policies to
mitigate climate change; and the value of working through the EU.
It is indeed probable that these last points will feature in the official strategy
when it issues, but it seems less likely that the strategy-drafters will look to the
‘Biblis’ volume for help. The above-mentioned report to the French Senate has more
obvious strengths, including a logical sequence of contents, full information on
the policies of other Arctic Powers, and explicit recommendations on the timing,
contents and style of a strategy. What Michel Foucher and his authors provide is
ultimately more suited to the general public, for whom they can offer some lively
writing and many passages of sound expert analysis. Most of the critical points made
above would neither be noticed by, nor do much harm to, readers looking for their
first introduction to Arctic affairs. The ‘Biblis’ volume’s limitations will be even less
important if it can help to stimulate further literature in French on this increasingly
compelling subject.Christopher Hood, Desmond King, and Gillian Peele (Eds.), Forging a
Discipline. A Critical Assessment of Oxford’s Development of the Study
of Politics and International Relations in Comparative Perspective
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 290, ISBN 978-0-19-968221-8
Reviewed by Félix Grenier
University of Ottawa
In this book, Christopher Hood, Desmond King, and Gillian Peele propose to
examine how the academic study of Politics has developed over the last century by
providing perspectives on one specific institution, the University of Oxford. This time
frame is justified, as Alan Ryan underlines in chapter 5, because the book “marks a
century since the first academic appointment in ‘Politics’ at Oxford” (p. 101). The
editors advance Oxford as a critical case for understanding the development of the
discipline of Politics based on three specific features: The university’s federal (or
highly decentralised) institutional structure, the lack of “relational distance” with the
British ruling elite (i.e. Politics’ scholars main subject of study), and the institution’s
focus on undergraduate teaching. It is suggested that these three features should be
expected to be a strong impediment to new disciplinary developments.
Beyond the editors’ introduction and conclusion, the book is divided in two
main sections. The first section contains five chapters that assess the origins and
development of the academic study of Politics in Oxford. This section could be
of significant interest to students of the history and sociology of Political Science.
Within this section, the two first chapters discuss the emergence, from the end
of the 19th to the mid-20th century, of the study of Politics in Oxford. Notably,
Rodney Barker (chapter 2) provides an interesting comparison of Oxford with
universities in London and Manchester on the basis that these represent three
ideal-typical constituencies or ways of developing the study of Politics. The three
following chapters discuss the development of the study of Politics in Oxford. More
precisely, Laurence Whitehead (chapter 4) makes a detailed assessment of the role
of the two graduate specialised colleges that contributed to the study of Politics
at Oxford (Nuffield and St Antony’s) and of the influence of the external (British
and international) and internal (institutional) context in their development during the
second half of the 20th century. In the following chapter, Alan Ryan also brilliantly
explains Thomas Kuhn’s concepts of ‘paradigm’ and ‘normal science’, its (mis)use
in Social and especially American Political Science in the 1960s and 1970s, and why
the Oxford study of Politics appeared untouched by these arguments. In the final
chapter of this section, Robert E. Goodin explains the conditions by which a ‘tight-
knit department of scholars’ working collaboratively can be organised using an
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