Boko Haram and the Crisis of Governance in Nigeria

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                Boko Haram and the Crisis of Governance in Nigeria
                                                By
                                        Ajayi, Femi, PhD1
                                                &
                                      Nwogwugwu, Ngozi2
                        Correspondent email address: nwogwugwun@babcock.edu.ng

                                             Abstract

Boko Haram terrorist group has gained ascendancy in Nigeria’s political sphere in recent years,
leading to the branding of Nigeria as a terrorist state by the international community.
Governments (past and present) lack the political will to effectively tackle various breaches of
security and to put in place the right national security policies and strategies. The paper assesses
the rise of Boko Haram insurgency in Northern part of the country, examines the ability of
security agencies to meet emerging security challenges and evaluates the capability of political
leadership to provide good governance in the country. The paper adopts frustration-aggression,
political economy and game theories as platform to build a treatise to pro-actively tackle Boko
Haram insurgency and other possible terrorist threats, and entrench a new regime of good
governance. The paper argues that years of bad governance resulting in massive poverty in the
midst of enormous resources led to exploitation of the frustrated youths by some disgruntled
members of the political class who had been denied direct access to state resources. The paper
concludes that to effectively tackle Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, there is need to adopt a
new strategy that is anchored on delivery of good governance by the political leadership; creation
of the enabling environment for private businesses to thrive leading to massive job creation; and
ability of government to provide deterrent measures towards breach of national security. Those
who contravene national security either directly or through proxy must be made to face the full
wrath of the law regardless of their social status.
Keywords: Boko Haram, Crisis, Governance, National security

       1
         Ajayi, Femi, is Professor of Management & Conflict Resolution, Department of
       Political Science & Public Administration, Babcock University, Ilishan-Remo, Nigeria.

       2
        Nwogwugwu, Ngozi, PhD, is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science & Public
       Administration, Babcock University, Ilishan-Remo, Nigeria.

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Introduction
Nigeria operates a unique type of democracy, which quite distinct from that practiced by other
representative democracies in the world. International Crisis Group (2014) writes that there is an
intricate link between politics, governance, corruption, poverty and violence in Nigeria. Politics
is highly monetized, as many see politics as an easy means to achieve wealth. Elected officials
are practically not held accountable by citizens. Since the return of democratic governance in
1999, elected government officials have toed the line of the former military dictators in engaging
in wanton looting of public funds and abandoning the mandate of providing good governance for
the people.
Okonkwo (2009) in his catalogue of conflicts and insecurity in Nigeria since independence in 1960,
traces the conflicts which result in insecurity, to the enthronement of an antagonistic ruling class
along ethnic and religious line by departing colonialists at the nation’s independence. Ogbonnaya &
Ehigiamusoe (2013) write that the unfortunate colonial contraption is the primary cause of northern
part of Nigeria having a long history of security challenges, communal and ethno-religious crises.
Walker (2012) and Azizi (2012) on the other hand, see insecurity in Northern Nigeria as going
beyond ethno – religious forces and the legacy of the colonialists. They see politics, especially the
struggle to control government patronage as the primary cause of many of the conflicts that have led
to insecurity in the North. However, the Boko Haram insurgency which gained national attention in
2009 with bombing attacks and killings which led to the death of about 16,000 Policemen, soldiers
and civilians including politicians (Nigerian Crime News, 2011; UNCIRF, 2012) remains most
devastating security challenge that Nigeria has faced.
Adetoro (2012) writes that before 2009, the aim of the Boko Haram group was not to overthrow
the government violently but its leader often criticized the northern Nigerian Muslims for
participating in what he saw as an illegitimate, non-islamic state and preached a doctrine of
withdrawal. As the then group’s leader, Yusuf continued to criticize bad governance exemplified
by police – brutality and political corruption with harsh government treatment, the group gained
more followers (Johnson, 2011 quoting an Al-Jazeera report). The sect taking up of arms and
commencement of terrorist attacks against the Nigerian state followed the extra judicial murder
of Yusuf in 2009 by men of the Nigerian Police and emergence of Shekau as the leader of the
sect.
The federal government seems to have been incapacitated by self-seeking ethnic sentiments
championed by members of the government and those at the corridors of power who do not
support outright crushing of the terrorist group. President Jonathan openly declared that some
members of his government have links with boko haram. The security agencies despite the
marshalling of Joint Task Force in the affected states, have not achieved the target of halting the
terrorist group. There are reports of the military and other security agencies being compromised
(a position also held by the special forces from United states of America who came to Nigeria to
assist in rescuing the abducted Chibok School girls), which has resulted in several efforts being
sabotaged, making the security agencies look incapable of curbing the insurgency.
The level of poverty in the affected states is higher than other geo-political zones of the country
(NBS, 2012) as there is little evidence of the utilization of the funds derived from statutory
allocations to these states as critical infrastructure are non-existent, public schools are not
funded, rate of youth unemployment is very high, as most of young men and women in the zone
are uneducated and unemployable.
The questions which we seek to answer in this paper are: Does the nature of governance in
Nigeria have any links with the emergence and continuing existence of the boko haram terrorist

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group? Are there ways that the crisis of governance has affected the funding and operations of
security agencies in the country? Does the crisis of governance in anyway affect the
methodology adopted and ability of the security agencies to curb the insurgency? How can the
government effectively tackle the boko haram insurgency?
The paper is sub-divided into eight sections, introduction, conceptual clarifications, theoretical
framework, overview of boko haram insurgency, the link between crisis of governance and
terrorist activities, Ineffective approach to combating insurgency by government and security
agencies, conclusion and recommendations.

Conceptual Clarifications
Boko Haram
Boko Haram is a terrorist group operating mainly in the North Eastern States, of Nigeria. There
exists conflicting data about the group; such as its origin, the real founder, etc. Some reports
suggest that the group was first formed in the 1990s under various names (Aghedo & Osumah,
2012; Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012). Boko Haram’s origin seems to lie in a group of radical
Islamist youths who worshipped at the Alhaji Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri a
decade ago hence in 2002, an offshoot of this youth group (not yet known as Boko Haram)
declared the city and the Islamic establishment to be intolerably corrupt and irredeemable
(Anyadike, 2013). Madike (cited in Anaydike, 2013), traces the group to 1995, and argues that,
one Lawan Abubakar, who later left for further studies at the University of Medina, Saudi
Arabia, actually founded the Boko Haram sect.

The Hausa name Boko Haram has become popularised, but the group calls itself by the Arabic
name Jama’atu Ahlis Sunnah Ladda’awati wal-Jihad (“people committed to the propagation of
the Sunnah and Jihad” (Onuoha, 2012). The Boko Haram epithet, broadly conveying “Western
civilisation is forbidden”, was evidently conferred by outside observers in an attempt to capture
the group’s anti-Western ideology (Onuoha, 2012). The group’s agitations are political, religious
as well as economic. They claim they want to enthrench the practice of sharia in a secular
Nigeria, they are fighting marginalization of the North in the political leadership of Nigeria, as
well as high level poverty which is prevalent in their part of the country.

Accounts of the factors that led to the metamorphosis of Boko Haram from a religious sect to a
terrorist group with political and economic agitations are not clear. However, the claim of Boko
Haram which has gained acceptance in the Northern part of Nigeria is that around 2002, Yusuf
was co-opted by the then Borno state gubernatorial candidate, Ali Modu Sheriff, for the support
of his large youth movement. The group was to ensure that he “wins the election” in exchange
for full implementation of Sharia and appointment of Yusuf’s followers into government
positions. Though Sheriff has continued to deny going into strategic alliance with the group, the
fact that state resources were made available to Yusuf by his government and that members of
the group received government protection during his tenure, point in the opposite direction. The
government never implemented full sharia, and that has become one of the agitations of the Boko
Haram (International Crisis Group, 2014; Ajayi, 2012).

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The Boko Haram group alleges that Northern political leaders, past and present do not live in
line with the tenets of Islam. Contrary to Islamic injunctions, the political leaders, have resorted
to barbaric accummulation of wealth, indecent personal life styles which are offensive to Islamic
culture, without regard to the needs and sensibilities of the masses. They have come to see
terrorist activities as their way of getting back to the system, which has refused to care for the
needs of the less privileged, rather choosing to administer over unlimited corruption, without fear
of God. (Dearn, 2011 cited in Abimbola & Adesote, 2012).
Governance and Good governance

Governance, like other social science concepts has been given divergent interpretation by
scholars. Ogundiya (2010) writes that governance can be defined as the process that is employed
to achieve the noble end of the state. Thus, governance simply implies the art of governing a
people within a given territory or a state. It consists of two essential elements of the state, namely
the structure of the state and the procedures of the legislative, judicial, and those of the executive
and administrative bodies at all the tiers of government. Ogundiya’s proposition fails to state in
concrete terms what governance is supposed to achieve in a given society. This shortcoming is
taken care of by Adelegan (2009) who writes that:
                       Governance is a very complex issue, which to all intents and purposes, gives
                       authority to some people to legally control a country and its people, and
                       be responsible for introducing new laws administering justice, organizing
                       public services, fashioning regulatory policies, and generally overseeing the
                       conduct of the general populace (Adelegan, 2009, p.1).

Adeyeye (2009, p. 169), provides further elaboration stating that, “as a concept, governance is
used when discussing the achievement of various development goals such as poverty reduction,
improvement of health and education services, or natural resource management.” Ogundiya
(2010) writes that governance is better conceived from Lasswell’s traditional definition of
politics as who gets what, when, and how and perhaps how much. Thus governance has a lot to
do with the allocation of values in the society, which, to a large extent, is political in nature.
An exposition, covering new developments in governance that have emerged as a consequence
of accommodating various actors in ensuring effective governance of society, is provided by
UNESCAP (2006) in their description of governance. The Organization sees governance as:
                       the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are (or are
                       not) implemented. An analysis of governance focuses on the formal and
                       informal actors involved in decision-making and implementing the decisions
                       made and the formal and informal structures that have been set in place to arrive
                       at and implement the decision. Government is one of the actors in governance.
                       Other actors involved in governance vary depending on the level of government
                       that is under discussion (UNESCAP, 2006, p. 9).

This uniqueness of this definition is that it covers both the traditional government structures as
well as the new trend of involvement of private sector participants in the provision of public
services through public private sector participation
Good governance has been defined and explained in various ways by scholars and institutions.
Sanusi & Martadha (2011) write that good governance is composed of the mechanisms,
processes and institutions through which citizens and groups can articulate their interests,

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exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences to promote
effective governance, including corporate governance, law, and civil society and managing the
public sector. This definition brings to the fore, some major ingredients of good governance,
such as active citizens participation in the policy formulation process, responsive governance,
adherence to rule of law, and accountability.
According to United Nations Development Program (UNDP) cited in Adeyeye (2009) good
governance is, among other things, participatory, transparent and accountable. It is also effective
and equitable. And it promotes the rule of law. Good governance ensures that political, social
and economic priorities are based on broad consensus in society and that the voices of the
poorest and the most vulnerable are heard in the various processes that lead to decision making
over the allocation of resources.
To the UNDP, governance has three legs: economic, political and administrative. Economic
governance includes decision-making processes that affect a country’s economic activities and
its relationships with other economies. It clearly has major implications for equity, poverty and
quality of life (UNDP cited in Adeyeye, 2009).
Terrorism

Terrorism is not a modern day phenomenon. Its history goes as far as the first century AD.
Abimbola & Adesote (2012) write that terrorism has existed for at least 2,000 years. The
scholars trace the history of what is referred to as terrorism in modern day. Historically, the first
known acts of what we now call terrorism were perpetrated by a radical offshoot of the Zealots, a
Jewish sect active in Judea during the 1st century AD.
During the 1920s and 1930s, terrorism became associated more with the repressive practices
employed by dictatorial states than with the violence of non-state groups like the anarchists. The
word terrorism was used to describe the wanton violence and intimidation inflicted by the Nazi,
fascist, and totalitarian regimes that respectively came to power in Germany, Italy, and the Soviet
Union. The repressive means these governments employed against their citizens involved beatings,
unlawful detentions, torture, so-called death squads (often consisting of off-duty or plain-clothes
security or police officers), and other forms of intimidation (Abimbola & Adesote, 2012).

Terrorism like most concepts in social science defies any single universally accepted definition.
The US State Department defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetuated against non-combatant targets but sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually
intended to influence an audience” (Whittaker 2007, p. 3; Kaarbo & Ray, 2011, p. 240). The
definition however raises the question of what amounts to non-combatant targets. Could the
September 11, attack on the pentagon be classified as non-combatant or the 1983 terrorist attack
that killed 241 U.S. Marines in Beirut be classified as such?
Birch (2007, p. 69), ignores the question of non-combatant nature of the targets, in defining
terrorism as “the infliction of grievous harm on one or more members of an identifiable group or
category of people with the aim of frightening other members of that group or category into
changing their intended behaviour”. Whether pursued for political or religious reasons, most
civilized people regard it as being morally repugnant because “it involves the infliction of
grievous harm on innocent and defenceless people, irrespective of whether the observer happens

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to approve or disapprove of the policy objectives of the terrorists” (Birch 2007, p. 68). Going by
the various dimensions of the concept of terrorism, it is not difficult to conclude that by their
nature and methods of operation, Boko Haram, is indeed a terrorist group.
National security
Idowu (2013) views security from a political perspective as meaning all forms of precautions
taken by governments and their agencies to guide against crime, violence, accidents, attacks,
conspiracy, sabotage, and espionage. It is a protection or precaution taken to ward off any action
of individuals or groups likely to endanger the peace and harmony of a section or the whole
nation. Security can equally be regarded as a device for ensuring proper custody and prevent
escape or losses of anything of value.

Kronenberg (1973, p. 36 cited in Asamu 2006, p.126) defines national security as “that part of
government policy having as its objective the creation of national and international political
conditions favourable to the protection or extension of vital national values against existing and
potential adversaries.” Imobighe (1990) describes national security as freedom from danger, or
from threats to a nation’s ability to protect and defend itself, promote its cherished values and
legitimate interests, and enhance the well being of its people. Louwi (1978 cited in Asamu, 2006)
argues that national security includes traditional defence policy and capacity to survive as a
political entity in order to exert influence and to carry out its internal and international
objectives. These are the traditional pre 1990’s conception of national security, which focuses
predominantly on territorial protection against external and internal aggression
In the post 1990s era, new perspective to national security has been adopted by scholars, which
encompasses human security as a whole. According to this school of thought national security
entails a condition, in which citizens of a country enjoy a free, peaceful, and safe environment,
and have access to resources which will enable them to enjoy the basic necessities of life
(Enahoro, 2004). Aliyu (2009) elaborates further by providing a description of national interest
as going beyond military preparedness to defend the nation to the issue of provision of good life
for the citizenry. It is the ability of a country to maintain its sovereignty, protect its political,
economic, social and other interests in a sovereign manner and both internally and in relations
with other states. It is not only about the security of national territory and infrastructure but also,
about the good life, the basic values which keep the community together and advancement in the
quality of life available to the individual regardless of their social status.

Theoretical Framework
The paper adopts political economy, frustration-aggression and game theories as theoretical
constructs.
Political economy
The Marxist political economy approach holds that the economy is the sub-structure on which all
other super-structure such as the political, the legal and social are built. Ake (1981) argues that a
proper understanding of the economic system will bring about an appreciation of the general
character of other aspects of the social system. The position a person or group occupies in the
production process determines the class which the person or group belongs. The interaction

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between the forces of production and the social relations of production is the determinant of the
economic development and progress in human society (Otite, 2008). Karl Marx in his
interpretation of the dialectical method postulated that there are two classes in the society, the
class which controls the means of production and that which does not.

In the present context, the privileged bourgeoisie (ruling class, political elite and business men),
control the means of production and utilize it to determine the fate of the less privileged. The
majority of the population that fall within the less privileged are frustrated by lack of good
governance and the exposure to poverty in the midst of enormous resources without tangible
efforts to its alleviation by the government. In Nigeria, the bourgeoisie (politicians and their god
fathers) use the less privileged especially the youths as tools to either rig elections or destabilize
the government in power when they are denied direct access to control of government; through
funding of violent activities by the youths. The purpose of the bourgeoisie is not provision of
good life for the less privileged youths, but rather to provide the enabling environment for them
to have direct access to state resources which provides for the maintenance of the bourgeoisie.
They are known to turn their backs on these youth groups after the youths have facilitated their
access to government offices, without keeping their promises to the youth groups. Unfortunately,
they are not able to disarm the youth groups who they have armed to aid the rigging of elections,
and these frustrated youths become out of the control of their political contractors.
Frustration-Aggression
Dollard et al (1939) argue that people are motivated to act aggressively by a drive induced by
frustration. “The concept of frustration denotes condition that arises when goal attainment is
blocked, while aggression constitutes actions aimed at harming perceived stumbling blocks”
(Jegede & Ajayi, 2008: 147). It is implied that frustration will inevitably lead to some form of
aggression. When the aggrieved do not have easy access to the stumbling block, they take out
their violent response on “symbolic representation of the imagined enemy and expressed in an
indirect way” (Hewstone & Stroebe, 2001 cited in Jegede & Ajayi, 2008: 147). In this case, the
stumbling block is the government which has failed to provide the means of self-actualization for
majority of the population (over 70%) that is regarded as poor; living on less than $2 per day and
with no access to basic social infrastructure. The symbolic representation include, innocent
unprotected civilians, expatriates, government officials (including police & military officials)
public property; perceived as agents of the state.
Northern Nigeria is about the most poverty stricken part of the country. Unfortunately, most of
the countries past leaders, military and civilian have been from the north, and they failed to
utilize the national resources in developing the region, as they preferred to engage in wanton
looting of public funds. The northern leaders possess enormous personal wealth, leaving the
young people with no hope and no future, as critical infrastructure are non-existent, public
schools are underfunded and abandoned. The youth are frustrated as they see the past and present
political leaders live lives of affluence, while they are jobless, uneducated, and poverty stricken
with no hope. They become easy prey to be mobilized the terrorist group, who claim to be
fighting injustice meted to them by corrupt leaders, who have been corrupted from the true tenets
of Islam by their exposure to western education. They take out their frustration on government
institutions and those who do not join in their fight against the “evil” system.

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 Game theory
 Game theory is a branch of mathematics that has been applied to politics with increasing
 frequency since 1960 (Mbah, 2006: 316). Game theory is “a body of thought dealing with
 rational decision strategies in situations of conflict and competition, when each participant or
 player seeks to maximize gains and minimize losses” (Plano & Riggs 1973 cited in Varma, 2004:
 286). Shubik (1968 cited in Varma, 2004: 287) defines game theory as “a mathematical model
 for the study of some aspects of conscious decision-making in situations involving the
 possibilities of conflict and or cooperation. It deals with processes in which the individual
 decision unit has only partial control over the strategic factors affecting its environment.”
 Originally developed in the 1920s by Emil Borel it was made popular by John Von Neumann
 and Oskar Morgenstein in 1944. R. Duncan Luce & Howard Raiffa, Martin Shubik & Anatol
 Rapoport are credited with the application of the theory to political science. The major concepts
 in game theory are players, rule of the game, outcome, pay-off, with strategy being the core
 concept (Varma, 2004: 288-289). The assumption behind the game theory, however is that each
 player is not only thoroughly rational, but completely self aware about the priorities among his
 purposes and has complete knowledge about the strategies available to him in pursuit of the pay-
 off, and is invariably engaged in the attempt to maximize his pay-off, in a manner consistent with
 his own pay-off formation or ranking preferences (Varma, 2004: 289).
 Figure 1 below, shows our model of interaction of the theories that will lead to effective curbing
 of boko haram insurgency. There has been massive exploitation of the public resources and
 common wealth by the political class the rulership both military and civilian over the years,
 which has led to frustration of the largely unemployed youths across the country. When some
 members of the bourgeoisie class who control the means of production and by extension the
 economy, are deprived of direct access to political power or state resources, they provide the
 funding that is required for the frustrated aggressive youths to express their frustration in terms
 of violent actions meant to undermine the operations of government. Adoption of Game theory
 provides the platform for adoption of viable multi-faceted counter-terrorism measures that make
 the nation in-conducive for the terrorists to operate in. These measures would include the
 entrenchment of good governance at all levels of government, especially in the affected states,
 where the level of poverty and unemployment is very high; equipping of the security agencies,
 training them on counter terrorism measures, including effective intelligence gathering
 mechanisms to ensure that they proactively forestall any terror threats in the bud; strategic
 alliances with nations that have developed competence in combating terrorism over the years,
 such as United States of America, Britain, Germany and Israel, so as to share from their wealth
 of experience; effective community policing through massive national re-orientation.
 Fig 1: Interaction of the theories and the to provide lasting solution to boko haram insurgency
                                                                                                   Good governance
                                                                                                   Effective counter
Political                         Frustration -                        Game                        terrorism programs;
Economy                           Aggression                           theory                      effective border
                                                                                                   control; control of
                                                                                                   proliferation of small
                                                                                                   & light weapons;
                                                                                                   poverty reduction &
                                                                                                   provision social
                                                                                                   infrastructure

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Overview of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria
Boko Haram violent attacks have been on the ascendancy since 2009. In June 2011 Boko Haram
bombed the national police headquarters in Abuja as a suicide bomber drove a car laden with
explosives into the compound of Louis Edet House. In August 2011, a man drove a car into the
UN compound in Abuja and detonated a massive bomb, killing twenty-three people and
wounding scores (Bekoe, 2011). Other major attacks have included: the Christmas Day 2011
bombings that involved three states, Niger Plateau, and Yobe, killing forty-five people; the
January 2012 coordinated simultaneous bombing of three government buildings in Kano, the
police headquarters, the office of the immigration service, and the State Security Service. Table 1
below, provides record of major Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria from January 2010 to 2013.

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Table 1: Boko Haram attacks on the Nigerian state from 2010 to January 2013

Source: The Punch, Tuesday, March 19th, 2013

In 2014, Boko Haram insurgency has become so rampant in the North Eastern part of Nigeria,
that it has practically become a daily affair, with the group choosing where and when to operate
unhindered, killing thousands of innocent civilians in their daily walks of life. On the night of
April 14 – 15, 2014, Boko Haram shocked the world with the abduction of over 200 school girls
from Government secondary school, Chibok, Bornu State. The massive outcry that trailed the

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action from across the globe, and the offer of assistance by USA, Britain and France, have not
resulted in the release of the girls over two months after.

The terrorist tactics undertaken by Boko Haram has succeeded in undermining the authority of
political leadership and the Nigerian security apparati; goals that the group has continually cited
since 2009. The violent campaign has increased fears and insecurity across the entire country as
such that one could actually say that the fear of Boko Haram is the beginning of wisdom for most
of Nigerians, especially those residing not only in the North Eastern part of the country, but also
North Central and North West.

The link between crisis of governance and terrorist activities
The level of public sector corruption in Nigeria is alarming, as Nigeria has continued to be
classified as one of the most corrupt countries in the world by transparency international, since
the return to democratic governance in 1999. There is evidence from across the country that a
large majority of public officials indulge in corrupt practices, instead of providing for the
common good (HRW, 2007, Aluko, 2007). Elected public officials engage in flagrant display of
their ill-gotten wealth to the chagrin and dismay of the populace who voted them into power (for
those who were really voted into power). A situation where Nigerian politicians only associated
with barbaric acquisition of wealth and property through public corruption and to the chagrin of
the impoverished Nigerians is now part of the violent reaction by the people. Undoubtedly, this
flagrant and wanton display of this ill gotten wealth relatively induces some weak-minded
citizens to take to criminality and violence as means of survival in a society that does not have
any plan for them. As a result, at any slightest provocation, people resort to violent crimes as an
alternative means of complaint (Abimbola & Adesote, 2012).

Poverty in Nigeria is a direct output of bad governance, including bloated and inefficient
administrations at federal and state levels. A larger proportion of the annual budgets of the
federal and state governments in Nigeria go to recurrent expenditure, instead of capital
expenditure which is supposed to engender development. Over the last few years the Nigerian
government has been borrowing to finance recurrent expenditure, which is an ill wind that
portends continual underdevelopment for the country (Effanga, 2014; Punch, 2012; Thisday
2011). Poverty and malnutrition rates are to be worse in the Boko Haram dominated states of
North East and North West at over 75 per cent of the population surviving on less than one USD
per day (Copeland, 2013).

In the face of high level of poverty in the North East geo-political zones, some of the governors
have acquired personal private jets and mansions in major cities of the world, arguable from
funds looted from the public treasury. Their children and family members attend schools outside
Nigeria while the public schools are not properly funded. There have been allegations that some
of the governors of the affected states lack the moral and political will to fight the menace as
some of them had in the past contracted members of the group to facilitate their “winning” of
elections, while some are figured as sponsors of the terrorist group (Ajayi, 2012).

There is equally the issue of perceived political marginalization of the Northern elites and their
alienation from access to public resources with the emergence of the Jonathan presidency in

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2011. The Jonathan presidency scuttled the zoning formula adopted by the Peoples Democratic
Party (PDP) adopted in 1999 they led to the emergence of Obasanjo from the South as President,
even without the support of his home geo political zone. The expectation of the North was that a
Northern would have been elected in 2011 following the death of Yar Adua who was from the
North (Adetoro, 2012). The removal of Aziza as security adviser and appointment of Sambo, a
northerner, was believed to have connections to above scenario.

There have also been reports of seditious statements by some Northern elites including former
military head of state, Buhari, Lawal Keita, and Atiku Abubakar to the effect that the future
election must not be rigged, and that the presidency must return to the North in 2015. This had
elicited reactions from Edwin K. Clark and counter reactions from governors of the North
(Alechenu, Fabiyi, Odesola and Adetayo, 2012; Binniyat, 2012; Umoru, 2012: Attah and
Ubabukoh, 2012). However, the government has failed to either arrest those who make seditious
remarks, or make sure they as well as other citizens desist from making such remarks.

There have equally been arguments that the ruling Peoples’ Democratic Party reached a
gentleman’s agreement that Jonathan would not seek a second term in 2015, which the
proponents claim, the president has gone against by making arrangements to contest in 2015.
Some of the Northern elites believe they cannot wait till 2019 to contest after the president’s
second term as they would be too old to contest elections at the time. However, the President has
not done anything to pacify them, as what they want is for the president not to contest for re-
election in 2015. Many of these Northern elites see the Boko Haram insurgency as a way of
protesting the political marginalization of the North, with suspicion that some of them are
funding the terrorist group. None of them has openly acknowledged funding the organization,
however, the fact that they have not openly condemned the group, as an indication that they
know more than they are telling Nigerians and the world.

Ineffective approach to combating insurgency by government and security agencies
The approach of the federal government in tackling the boko haram insurgency has been
predominantly military. Joint Military Task force (JTF) has been deployment to the effected
Northern States for several years running. Interestingly, one of the agitations of the boko haram
group has been that the government must withdraw the JTF from the Northern states. The
government has equally invested heavily on provision of modern and sophisticated equipment
for effective communication, fighting violence and insurgency in the country.
Security commanded the largest portion of the 2013 budget leading to the installation of CCTV
across Abuja the federal capita. Several officers and men of the Police and armed forces have
undergone training in bomb detection and antiterrorism warfare outside Nigeria.
The federal government equally ordered the trial of security officers involved in the extra-
judicial killing of Mallam Muhammad Yusuf, the former leader of the Boko Haram Sect (The
Nation, 2011a). However, as at June 2014, the trials have not taken off, revealing a lack of
political will to carry out government intentions. The federal government has not acceded to the
request of some traditional rulers and the Arewa Consultative Forum that JTF troops be
withdrawn from the North Eastern states as a result of continuing insurgency by the terrorist
group (The Nation, 2011b). The position of the government remains that the troops would be
withdrawn when the group is completely subdued or surrenders. Unfortunately there has not
been significant inroads in achieving any of the two.

13

The government set up an eight-member committee to probe all incidents of insecurity in all the
affected States (National Mirror, 2011). However, nothing noteworthy has emanated from the
committee since its establishment. The Federal Government instituted a Team to negotiate Boko
Haram Sect April 2012 which the Sect boycotted. Further, efforts at granting them amnesty
which the government proclaimed following the prompting of the Northern elite and some
traditional rulers, was rebuffed by the group who claimed they were the ones to grant the
government amnesty. The federal government equally relieved the Ministers of Defence,
National Security Adviser, and some Military Service Chiefs of their appointments, (Vanguard,
2012). At the appointment of their replacements, President Jonathan promised Nigerians that the
government was poised to ground the terrorist group. Unfortunately, the insurgency has gotten
worse two years after. The security agencies seem to be clueless as the boko haram terrorist
group has become increasing diffused and able to attack the federal capital territory Abuja at
will. As at June 2014, the group had carried out two attacks in Nyanya, in the outskirts of Abuja,
and Wuse 2 (25th June) the very heart of the federal capital, an attack at a privately owned
shopping mall that left twenty one people dead and seventeen injured (Channel News, 2014).

Unconfirmed reports in the media has been to the effect that the Boko Haram group possess
military hardware that are more sophisticated that those of the Nigerian army. The claims seem
to have some semblance of credibility with the inability of the army to overpower the terrorists
for years now. The Nigerian military and security agencies are under-funded, ill-equipped and ill
motivated to secure the nation. It is not enough to budget large sum of money for security, which
end up in private pockets or being used to award spurious contracts for low quality CCTV in
Abuja alone.

Nigeria’s borders are not effectively controlled. The immigration service like other security
agencies is under staffed, underfunded and ill-equipped to effectively man the borders. Nigeria
has about 4, 084 illegal entry routes across the borders with its neighboring West and Central
African countries, and only about ninety (90) entry routes are officially recognized (information
provided by an officer, May 2014). Imobighe (2003) identified 1, 500 illegal entry points along
Nigeria’s border with Benin and Niger alone. This makes it possible for terrorists to move
through the borders and launch attacks and slip out of the country before the security agencies
can react. This has happened several times especially in Borno state, where Boko Haram has
concentrated its activities attacking from Cameroun unhindered.

Residents of border communities have been reported to be hostile to immigration officials and
other security agencies. They see the agencies as components of a government that has no regard
for their existence. Basic infrastructure such; as electricity, portable drinking water, good road
network, health-centres/hospitals, primary and secondary schools, among others are lacking in
most border communities in Nigeria. As a result, the residents prefer to harbor and aid those who
claim to be businessmen using the illegal routes to enter the country. such atmosphere frustrates
efforts of immigration and security agencies to effectively man the borders.

14

Conclusion
The political leadership in Nigeria has been abysmal in their approach to governance. This has
translated in the high rate of poverty in a country that is the seventh largest exporter of crude oil
in the world. Past and present leaders have failed to utilize massive public resources in
development of the country, as most of them military and civilian have engaged in wanton
looting of public funds. Some of them who have felt marginalized by being denied access to state
resources have utilized their illegitimate wealth to engage the unemployed youths either in
facilitating the rigging of elections or to cause breaches of security.
Lack of good governance has also affected the operations of the various security agencies, some
seen as epitome of the corrupt nature of Nigeria’s public sector, are seen as lacking adequate
training, ill equipped, underfunded, under staffed, ill motivated. They lack the capacity to
effectively combat breaches of security, especially in terms of combating insurgency by a group
that is believed to better armed, more motivated and has an unlimited capacity to recruit willing
hands from among the large number of unemployed frustrated and poverty ridden youths in the
region. The culture of impunity and flagrant display of ill gotten wealth by political functionaries
have exacerbated the rate at which the Boko Harm sect is able to recruit youths, who see in their
political leaders the proof of the claim of Boko Haram that they have no fear of Allah, and are
looting the public treasury for their selfish ends.
High level of public sector corruption has also led to the military and security agencies being
compromised, as such incapable of combating the terrorist insurgency in the country. Military
action alone cannot end the insurgency. As a result, the federal government must adopt a multi-
faceted approach, which would address the various agitations, along with the military action. A
new regime of good governance must be enthrenched, public sector corruption tackled, critical
infrastructure provided and sponsors of the Boko haram group prosecuted.

Recommendations
Federal and state governments must ensure that a culture of good governance at all levels of
government in the country is enthrenched. There should be transparency and accountability in
the use of public resources.
The government should focus on provision of critical social infrastructure; good motorable
roads, well equipped public hospitals, public school system that is well funded and functional,
adequate and constant supply of electricity and portable drinking water in the rural
areas/hinterlands.

The government must increase the funding of security agencies and equally ensure that such
funds are properly utilized in equipping the agencies, and training personnel on counter terrorism
strategies. The agencies personnel should be well motivated, through enhanced remuneration in
line with the kind of risks they are exposed to in their lines of duty.

Government must go beyond policy pronouncement, and ensure complete eradication of public
sector corruption. Corrupt public officials past and present must be prosecuted and their loot
confiscated regardless of the power that they wield.

15

The government must cut off the funding sources of the boko haram terrorist group, by arresting,
prosecuting and jailing those who are identified as their sponsors regardless of the social status
or public office held, either past or present. Such individuals’ property should be confiscated as a
deterrent to future sponsors of dissident or terrorist groups.

The government should create a separate department or ministry charged with the responsibility
to ensuring domestic security, just as the United States government created the Department of
Homeland security in the wake of September 11, 2001 attacks. Such a department or ministry
should be populated with large army of current unemployed university/polytechnic graduates and
highly trained security and military officers.
The federal government should engage in massive recruitment into the immigration services to
enhance the capability of the service to man the thousands of entry routes into the country that
are presently being used by illegal immigrants including terrorists. Funding for the agency
should also to be increased to ensure it discharges it responsibilities effectively.
All border communities should be given special attention in terms of provision of infrastructure,
to show governments presence. The government should equally put in place mechanism for very
cordial relations between border communities – immigration services and the police to ensure
that residents of the border communities cooperate with the immigration and security agencies in
checking illegal entries into the country.

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