Civil Defense and Homeland Security: A Short History of National Preparedness Efforts - September 2006
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Civil Defense and Homeland
Security: A Short History of
National Preparedness Efforts
September 2006
Homeland Security
National Preparedness Task Force
1
Civil Defense and Homeland Security:
A Short History of National Preparedness
Efforts
September 2006
Homeland Security
National Preparedness Task Force
2
ABOUT THIS REPORT
This report is the result of a requirement by the Director of the Department of Homeland Security’s
National Preparedness Task Force to examine the history of national preparedness efforts in the
United States. The report provides a concise and accessible historical overview of U.S. national
preparedness efforts since World War I, identifying and analyzing key policy efforts, drivers of
change, and lessons learned. While the report provides much critical information, it is not meant to
be a substitute for more comprehensive historical and analytical treatments. It is hoped that the
report will be an informative and useful resource for policymakers, those individuals interested in
the history of what is today known as homeland security, and homeland security stakeholders
responsible for the development and implementation of effective national preparedness policies and
programs.
3
Introduction the Nation’s diverse communities, be carefully
planned, capable of quickly providing
From the air raid warning and plane spotting pertinent information to the populace about
activities of the Office of Civil Defense in the imminent threats, and able to convey risk
1940s, to the Duck and Cover film strips and without creating unnecessary alarm.
backyard shelters of the 1950s, to today’s all-
hazards preparedness programs led by the The following narrative identifies some of the
Department of Homeland Security, Federal key trends, drivers of change, and lessons
strategies to enhance the nation’s learned in the history of U.S. national
preparedness for disaster and attack have preparedness programs. A review of the
evolved over the course of the 20th century history of these programs will assist the
and into the 21st. Federal government in its efforts to develop
and implement effective homeland security
Presidential administrations can have a policy and better understand previous national
powerful impact on both national and citizen preparedness initiatives.
preparedness. By recommending funding
levels, creating new policies, and
implementing new programs; successive Pre-Cold War Period (1917-1945)
administrations have adapted preparedness
efforts to align with changing domestic World War I introduced a new type of attack:
priorities and foreign policy goals. They have the use of strategic aerial strikes against an
also instituted administrative reorganizations enemy’s population to degrade its ability and
that reflected their preference for will to wage war. German aerial
consolidated or dispersed civil defense and bombardment of towns in countries such as
homeland security responsibilities within the France, Belgium, and Poland began in August
Federal government. 1914, and in the following year Kaiser
Wilhelm authorized sustained bombing
Programs were seldom able to get ahead of campaigns against military and civilian targets,
world events, and were ultimately challenged particularly against England.1 From May
in their ability to answer the public’s need for through October of 1915, Germany launched
protection from threats due to bureaucratic seven air strikes against London alone.2
turbulence created by frequent reorganization, England, like most other nations at the time,
shifting funding priorities, and varying levels did not have an organized civil defense
of support by senior policymakers. This in program to aid citizens during such attacks.
turn has had an effect on the public’s Individuals were forced to find their own way
perception of national preparedness. Public to safety, often taking refuge in the city’s
awareness and support have waxed and waned underground subway stations.3 By all
over the years, as the government’s emphasis assessments, the damage and casualty figures
on national preparedness has shifted. that resulted from these early bombing
operations were comparatively insignificant,
An analysis of the history of civil defense and but they exerted a psychological toll on the
homeland security programs in the United British public.4 It became clear that civilian
States clearly indicates that to be considered defense, involving a range of actions to
successful, national preparedness programs protect the general public in the event of
must be long in their reach yet cost effective. attack, would become a major fixture in future
They must also be appropriately tailored to warfare.
4
among all agencies involved in national
Though the Axis and Allied powers continued preparedness.13
to employ strategic bombing throughout
World War I, leaders in the United States did As World War II ignited in Europe, Roosevelt
not feel that the country was vulnerable to reestablished the Council of National Defense
attack. They concentrated their public in 1940.14 Once again States were asked to
outreach on rallying support for the war establish local counterpart councils. Tensions
effort.5 Much of this task was coordinated by among Federal, State and local governments
the Council of National Defense, began to rise about authority and resources.
established on August 29, 1916 with the
passage of an Army appropriations bill.6 The The states claimed they were not given
Council was a presidential advisory board that enough power to manage civil defense tasks in
included the Secretaries of War, Navy, their own jurisdictions, and local governments
Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor; asserted that State governments did not give
assisted by an Advisory Committee appointed urban areas proper consideration and
by the President.7 Its responsibilities included resources.15 Non-attack disaster preparedness
“coordinating resources and industries for remained almost entirely the responsibility of
national defense” and “stimulating civilian States, while federal funding was reserved
morale.”8 primarily for attack preparedness.
The work of the Council escalated when the Because of extensive civilian bombing
United States entered the war in 1917. In the campaigns in Europe, concerns about
same year, the Federal government asked possible attacks against the U.S. homeland
State governors to create their own local increased. Mayor Fiorello La Guardia of New
councils of defense to support the National York City wrote a letter to President
effort.9 However, the Council’s activities Roosevelt stating:
continued to focus more on facilitating
mobilization for the war than on protecting “There is a need for a strong Federal
civilian resources. When hostilities ended, the Department to coordinate activities,
Council shifted its efforts toward and not only to coordinate but to
demobilization. Its operations were initiate and get things going. Please
suspended in June, 1921.10 bear in mind that up to this war and
never in our history, has the civilian
population been exposed to attack.
For the remainder of the 1920s, the Federal The new technique of war has created
government undertook little public outreach the necessity for developing new
related to defense and security. However, the techniques of civilian defense”.16
1930s saw a revival of civil defense efforts,
when aggressive actions and arms stockpiling President Roosevelt responded to the
in Europe fueled international concern.11 In increasing concern of the public and local
1933, President Franklin Roosevelt created by officials by creating the Office of Civilian
executive order the National Emergency Defense (OCD) in 1941.17 The President
Council (NEC) which consisted of the delegated a number of responsibilities to the
President, his Cabinet members, and the head OCD by broadly interpreting civilian
of nearly every major Federal agency, protection to include morale maintenance,
commission, and board.12 The mission of the promotion of volunteer involvement, and
NEC included a variety of programs unrelated nutrition and physical education.18 The OCD
to civil defense; however, its duties also oversaw unprecedented federal involvement
included coordination of emergency programs
5in attack preparedness. As with the Council Truman Administration (1945-1953)
of National Defense, the OCD created
corresponding defense councils at the local Soon after taking office, Harry Truman did
level.19 follow Landis’ advice and abolished the OCD,
reflecting the widely held belief that the
The issue of whether the OCD should immediate threat of war had receded. 26
emphasize protective services, typically done Initially, civil defense was not a high priority
at that time by men, or social welfare services, in the Truman Administration, as troops
typically undertaken at that time by women, began to return home and other war time
created tension from the office’s inception.20 offices were diminished in scale or disbanded
Director Fiorello LaGuardia referred to altogether. The development of the atomic
“nonprotective” activities as “sissy stuff” and bomb, however, had opened up previously
saw opportunities to build neighborhood unthinkable risks. Increasing hostilities with
militias. Pressured to focus on other the Soviet Union and their pursuit of a
nonprotective areas such as neighborhood nuclear bomb threatened the United States.
support, he appointed Eleanor Roosevelt to
expand volunteer activities.21 The two leaders, In this context, Truman began to reexamine
with their radically divergent points of view, the national defense structure, reviewing the
exemplified a conflict over the meaning and results of a set of commissions.27 In 1946, the
purpose of civil defense that would continue U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey published its
well into the cold war era. report evaluating the results of strategic
bombing campaigns by imperial Germany and
OCD received criticism from Congress and Japan against enemy civilian populations. The
the public on several fronts. It was called report indicated that civil defense plans could
“pink” by influential politicians who disliked significantly mitigate the effects of strategic
the program’s broad reach and social bombing.28 Specifically, mass evacuation
development programs. Some believed the plans for urban areas and shelters for those
organization’s tasks were better undertaken by unable to leave the area could form
the Department of War.22 One of OCD’s components of a viable civil defense plan.29
early leaders, James Landis, recommended In 1947, the War Department’s Civil Defense
that the organization be abolished, since the Board, led by Major General Harold Bull,
threat of an attack on U.S. civilians had released a second report.30 The so-called Bull
receded.23 Report stated that civil defense is the
responsibility of civilians, and the military
With the end of World War II, most U.S. should not be expected to get involved in
officials agreed that the risk of an attack on such matters.31 According to the report, civil
the U.S. homeland was minimal. Roosevelt defense was best implemented locally, a
did not take Landis’ suggestion, and the OCD concept referred to as “self-help”. Still, the
continued to operate.24 While the OCD did document did concede that the Federal
not fulfill all of its ambitious goals, it did government could provide the majority of
begin the development of concrete civil necessary resources.32 Additionally, Congress
defense plans, including air raid drills, black passed the National Security Act of 1947.
outs, and sand bag stockpiling.25 Best known for the creation of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Act also created the
National Security Resources Board
(NSRB), which was initially responsible for
mobilizing civilian and military support, as
6well as maintaining adequate reserves and result, the Board was moved to the
effective resource use in the event of war.33 Department of Defense (DOD), then shifted
to the Executive Office of the President, and
Neither report resulted in substantial reforms finally had its responsibilities transferred to
to the Truman Administration’s policies the Office of Defense Mobilization in
because civil defense continued to remain a December of 1950.
low priority. 34 However, as U.S.-Soviet
relations became increasingly strained, The climate of civil defense changed
President Truman began to implement civil dramatically with the successful Soviet test of
defense policy reforms. These changes a nuclear weapon in August of 1949. The
resulted, in part, from the strong United States lost its monopoly on nuclear
recommendation of Colonel Burnet Beers, weapons and the corresponding negotiating
who was responsible for directing a study on power that this entailed. Local officials began
future civil defense planning and operations to demand from the Federal government a
to establish a civil defense unit in the Office clear outline of what they were to do in crisis
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).35 Truman situations.43 The Truman Administration
acted promptly on this advice, establishing the received criticism from local officials, a
Office of Civil Defense Planning (OCDP), worried American public, and Congress for
whose purpose was to recommend a course not taking firm action.44 In response, in 1950,
for the creation of a permanent civil defense the NSRB generated a new proposal called the
agency.36 After six months, the OCDP Blue Book, which outlined a set of civil defense
released its 300-page Hopley Report,37 which functions and how they should be
called for the creation of a Federal office of implemented at each level of government.45
civil defense directly under the President or The Blue Book also recommended the creation
Secretary of Defense. The report additionally of an independent Federal civil defense
recommended that the Federal government organization.46
provide civil defense guidance and assistance,
but that State and local governments handle Truman agreed with many of the Blue Book
most of the operational responsibilities.38 recommendations, but held firm to his belief
that civil defense responsibilities should fall
Reactions to the Hopley Report inside and mostly on the shoulders of the State and local
outside government were generally negative. governments.47 In response, Congress
There were concerns about the cost and scope enacted the Federal Civil Defense Act of
of civil defense. Many people feared its 1950, which placed most of the civil defense
recommendations were too far-reaching and burden on the States and created the Federal
made unrealistic demands on the public and Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) to
government.39 And there were concerns formulate national policy to guide the States’
about military control. Some civilian groups efforts.48
thought the report called for transferring what
should be a civilian responsibility to the As planning began, policymakers struggled to
military, which could lead to a “garrison define what was meant by national security. A
state.”40 key question was the appropriate level of
readiness to be attained. At what readiness
Truman ultimately chose to address the latter level would people have to surrender personal
concern by assigning civil defense planning to freedoms to state control? At what level of
the NSRB, a civilian agency.41 However, the security would civil defense metamorphose
NSRB did not receive the necessary resources into a garrison state, undermining the
or authority to carry out its mandate.42 As a underlying purpose of protecting individual
7rights?49 The decision to assign civil defense film was seen by millions of schoolchildren
responsibility to States and localities was during the 1950s.58 The public education
intended partly as a safeguard against the campaign throughout the decade promoted
garrison state. the idea that with preparation, a nuclear attack
could be survivable.59
Planners also struggled with a difficult
political question: just how much support
should government provide? Congressional
resistance to paying for a comprehensive
program, and concerns about establishing
public dependency on government, led to
adoption of a doctrine of “self help”:
individual responsibility for preparedness to
minimize (not eliminate) risk.50 The idea of
decentralized, locally controlled, volunteer-
based civil defense was not new; in fact it was
the foundation of the successful British civil
defense effort in World War II. However, the
decision to make self-help the basis of civil
defense was also a political compromise, a
way to balance conflicting views over the size, Duck and Cover promotional material
power, and priorities of the emerging postwar
nation.51 An examination of the FCDA-led shelter-
building initiative underscores some of the
The FCDA led shelter building programs, civil defense program’s internal
sought to improve Federal and State inconsistencies. The Federal Civil Defense
coordination, established an attack warning Act of 1950 allocated significant funding to a
system, stockpiled supplies, and started a well shelter initiative. The law allowed the FCDA
known national civic education campaign. In to develop shelter designs and make financial
1952, the FCDA joined with the Ad Council contributions to shelter programs. However,
to release Korean War advertising to boost Congress stipulated that the Federal
national morale.52 The FCDA specifically government could not finance the
aimed to teach schoolchildren about construction of new shelters.60 In
preparedness, primarily through civil defense communities across the country there was
drills.53 In order to effectively educate the great debate over the necessity of the shelters,
entire youth population, the FCDA and Truman himself was not eager to spend
commissioned a movie studio to produce nine government money on the program.61
civil defense movies that would be shown in Moreover, FCDA Administrator Millard
classrooms across the nation – among them Caldwell initiated a public relations fiasco
Duck and Cover.54 The movie, through its main when he misconstrued the shelter program as
character Bert the Turtle, showed children a means to protect every person in the
what to do when they saw “the flash of an country. A program that expansive was
atomic bomb.”55 Newspapers and experts deemed to be too costly to receive sufficient
generally heralded the film as a positive and political support; as a result, it never left the
optimistic step toward preparedness.56 The planning stages during the Truman
New York Herald Tribune, for example, called Administration.62
the film “very instructive” and “not too
frightening for children.”57 Ultimately, the
8Contrary to the outlook offered by Duck and Truman, actual appropriations were virtually
Cover and the other educational campaigns, identical to appropriations under Truman.68
early media reports about the possibility of
nuclear war offered grim predictions In addition to economic concerns, world
concerning the aftermath of an attack. The events contributed to Eisenhower’s decision
scenarios were horrific, and the association of to support a mass evacuation policy, instead
civil defense with death and destruction made of the shelter program initiated under
not only home preparedness and sheltering, Truman. In 1953, the Soviets detonated a
but the whole self-help preparedness concept, hydrogen nuclear bomb; and shortly
a tough sell.63 thereafter, the effects of the initial U.S.
hydrogen explosion were released to the
The political, fiscal, and emotional cross- American public.69 The blast and thermal
currents were reflected in civil defense effects of these new fusion nuclear weapons
funding. Despite ambitious funding requests, were so destructive that many experts argued
actual appropriations to civil defense that American cities would be doomed in the
remained low throughout the Truman event of a nuclear attack, regardless of
Administration, and throughout the 1950s. sheltering efforts.70 As a result, new FCDA
For example, from 1951 to 1953 Truman Administrator Frederick Peterson urged
requested $1.5 billion for civil defense, but Congress to scale back or completely
appropriations totaled only $153 million – 90 eliminate the shelter program.71
percent less than requested64.
In strongly supporting mass evacuation,
Despite these practical setbacks, the concept Peterson noted that successful execution
of civil defense as a purposeful approach to would depend on sufficient warning time,
the protection of citizens from threats outside proper training for civil defense officials, and
the Nation’s borders began to take shape regular public drills.72 Many of the
during Truman’s presidency.65 Though each responsibilities for evacuation would be borne
leader who followed would focus on different at the State and local level, which appealed to
programs and approaches, civil defense Eisenhower’s belief that the Federal
remained an important initiative during the government should not shoulder the entire
coming decades. burden for civil defense programs.73 Congress
also was in favor of the shift in attention from
shelters to evacuation.74 Yet some members,
Eisenhower Administration (1953- especially Congressman Chet Holifield of
California, were adamantly opposed to
1961)
reducing the shelter system.75 Holifield was
the ranking member of the Joint Committee
President Dwight Eisenhower’s approach to
on Atomic Energy and later the chairman of
civil defense was quite different from his
the Military Operations Subcommittee.76 In
predecessor’s. Eisenhower identified the
support of a federally funded shelter system,
enormous economic commitment required
he likened the idea of family built shelters to
for military development as one reason not to
creating “an army or a navy or an air force by
undertake expensive civil defense programs.66
advising each one to buy himself a jet
Additionally, Republicans in Congress were
plane.”77 As a well publicized champion for
eager to curtail spending, as the party had
shelter building, Congressman Holifield
publicly promised to balance the budget when
consistently and persuasively articulated the
Eisenhower took office.67 Though
benefits of shelter building to the American
Eisenhower requested less funding than
public.
9In March of 1954, The FCDA received extensive criticism over
the United States the next few years for not developing a
detonated another feasible plan for evacuating major cities.87
thermonuclear Congressman Holifield called FCDA efforts
bomb, called Bravo, only a façade of civil defense programs.88 He
on Bikini Atoll in also chastised the President for not taking
the Marshall more responsibility.89 At Holifield’s request, in
Islands.78 Due to a 1956 the House Committee on Government
major wind shift, a The 1954 Bravo test Operations held a series of hearings to discuss
large amount of the viability of the FCDA.90 The “Holifield
radioactive fallout was unexpectedly released Hearings” constituted the largest examination
over a 7000 square mile area, ultimately of the civil defense program in U.S. history.91
poisoning the crew of a Japanese fishing boat
in the area and even injuring personnel
involved in the test.79 It did not take long for
Congress and the public to turn their
attention to the need for shelters to protect
the citizenry from such lethal effects.80 The
FCDA was in a tough position. They had just
fought for evacuation policies, at the expense
of the shelter option, and the Eisenhower
Administration continued to support
evacuation as the chief civil defense
objective.81 Faced with this dilemma, FCDA
Long Island shelter, circa 1955
Administrator Peterson redirected his policy
toward an “evacuation to shelter” approach,
whereby individuals would be evacuated from Holifield and his Committee concluded that
affected areas to shelters.82 He even proposed the FCDA had been myopically focused on
digging ditches along roadsides for those who evacuation, which they termed “a cheap
could not get to shelters in time.83 substitute for atomic shelter.”92 The FCDA
responded by presenting a National Shelter
The Eisenhower Administration had just Policy, which proposed a $32 billion program
begun work on its massive federal highway for “federally subsidized self-help” (e.g. tax
program, connecting major cities and in the incentives or special mortgage rates to shelter-
process providing a means for evacuation.84 owning families).93 Taken aback by the cost
Peterson clashed with the President on the of the proposal, Eisenhower convened the
program, arguing that Congress should divert Gaither Committee (named for its first
some of the highway funding to support civil chairman, H. Rowan Gaither) composed of
defense programs. He believed that the leading scientific, military, and business
highways should be designed to lead only 30 experts. The committee evaluated military
to 40 miles outside of major cities to rural readiness and concluded that the United
“reception areas.”85 However, Peterson’s States could not defend itself from a Soviet
clout did not match the President’s, and thus surprise attack on the homeland. 94 While its
no money was diverted from the highway report, released in 1957, emphasized funding
program.86 anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense systems, it
also acknowledged that a fallout shelter
system occupied a secondary position in
10deterrence, and to that end recommended the middle of his tenure Eisenhower secretly
adopting the FCDA shelter proposal.95 commissioned the building of an underground
Two subsequent reports advanced similar bunker in West Virginia that would serve as a
ideas.96 In 1958, the Rockefeller Report, safe haven for top members of Congress, in
compiled by a board of experts and the event of a catastrophe.106 The project was
practitioners directed by Henry Kissinger, similar in scope and intent to one initiated by
stated that civil defense was one aspect of a President Truman in 1951. Called “Site R,”
robust deterrent that should also include more that effort involved construction of an
investment in offensive military capabilities.97 Alternate Joint Communications Center in
That same year, a report published by the Raven Rock Mountain, Pennsylvania, to be
RAND Corporation emphasized the used in case existing centers in Washington,
importance of civil defense as a powerful DC were destroyed by an attack.107 Like his
component of deterrence.98 predecessor, Eisenhower believed it was vital
for the government to ensure continuity of
Despite these supporting reports, the FCDA operations following an attack on the
shelter proposal continued to run counter to homeland. The West Virginia bunker was
the views of top officials in the Eisenhower built under the five-star Greenbrier resort and
Administration. Secretary of State John was only placed on full alert once, during the
Foster Dulles argued that the nation should Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.108 The public
focus resources on retaliation capabilities and remained completely unaware of the
curtail the shelter program.99 Military leaders operation until 1992 when the Washington Post
also opposed the shelter program, fearing it broke the story.109
would cut into defense spending.100
Eisenhower himself remained opposed to the
massive shelter program.101 Instead of Kennedy Administration (1961-1963)
pursuing the National Shelter Policy, he
instructed the FCDA to initiate much more During the first year of his presidency, John
limited actions, including research on fallout F. Kennedy made civil defense more of a
shelters, a survey of existing structures, and priority than at any previous time in U.S.
informing the public about shelters.102 history.110 He was also the first President to
discuss civil defense publicly, issuing an
Holifield and other legislators were outraged appeal in the September 7, 1961 issue of
that the President would disregard the LIFE magazine to all Americans to protect
findings of three separate committees.103 themselves “and in doing so strengthen [the]
Supporters of the shelter system publicly nation.”111 Kennedy continued the approach
expressed disappointment with the of his predecessors of including civil defense
Eisenhower administration, and Holifield in deterrence calculations, and he believed
commented that civil defense was in a that the only effective deterrent was a strong
“deplorable” state during this period.104 retaliatory capability. 112 However, he also
Finally, in the face of strong criticism, believed that deterrence could fail in the event
Eisenhower largely dissolved the FCDA to one faced an irrational enemy, and thus a
make way for the short-lived Office of Civil strong and coordinated approach to civil
and Defense Mobilization (OCDM), which defense was required. As he stated to
began the bulk of its work during the Congress on May 25, 1961:
Kennedy presidency.105
[Civil defense] can be readily
It bears noting that for all of his public justifiable…as insurance for the civilian
opposition to massive sheltering programs, in population in case of an enemy
11miscalculation. It is insurance we trust President emphasized the importance of
will never be needed – but insurance fallout shelters as a means to save lives.
which we could never forgive ourselves
for foregoing in the event of He stressed that identifying and stocking
catastrophe.113 existing shelters with food and medicine
should be made a priority.117 McNamara
He concluded by proposing “a nationwide explained that this approach was not a major
long-range program of identifying present departure from the Eisenhower shelter
fallout shelter capacity and providing shelter program; however, the scope was larger and
in new and existing structures.”114 thus required more money.118 The goal was to
provide maximum protection through cost
effective means by utilizing existing buildings.
Some members of Congress, notably the
ranking Republican of the House
Appropriations Committee, John Taber,
worked hard to limit funding to the shelter
project. However, most underscored the
importance of the shelter program as a
rational response to the growing threat of a
nuclear attack.119 Congress ultimately
approved more than $200 million that
Kennedy asked for the project, which was
The October 7, 1961 issue of
twice as much as Eisenhower had ever
LIFE Magazine requested for civil defense.120
With the appropriated funds, OCD began a
To accomplish these goals, Kennedy issued nationwide survey of all existing shelters.121 In
Executive Order 10952 on July 20, 1961, order to be designated a public shelter, a
which divided the Office of Civil Defense facility had to have enough space for at least
and Mobilization into two new 50 people, include one cubic foot of storage
organizations: the Office of Emergency space per person, and have a radiation
Planning (OEP) and the Office of Civil protection factor of at least 100.122 The
Defense. OEP was part of the President’s materials division of DOD, called the Defense
Executive Office and tasked with advising Supply Agency, furnished shelter supplies to
and assisting the President in determining local governments, which were then
policy for all nonmilitary emergency responsible for stocking all shelters in their
preparedness, including civil defense. regions.123 By 1963, 104 million individual
OCD was part of the Office of the shelter spaces had been identified;124 and of
Secretary of Defense, and was tasked with those 47 million had been licensed, 46 million
overseeing the nation’s civil defense marked, and 9 million individual spaces had
program. The responsibility for carrying been stocked with supplies.125
out the fallout shelter program was among
the program operations assigned to The President also decided to distribute
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.115 booklets to the populace that would outline
the purpose of the shelter program and the
The 1961 Berlin crisis gave Kennedy renewed steps that every American should take during
urgency to improve US civil defense.116 The an attack. The booklet, created by a team of
Madison Avenue writers, was to be sent to
12every household in the nation.126 In an The topic began to fall slowly off the public
unintended twist, the booklets themselves radar, and President Lyndon B. Johnson
created new controversy. Some presidential allowed it to slip further by not pressuring
aides felt that the pictures used were too Congress to pass the Shelter Incentive
graphic, while others felt that they indicated Program bill,132 which proposed to give every
the booklet was meant only for the upper non-profit institution financial compensation
class.127 Ultimately the Kennedy for each shelter it built.133
Administration decided to tone down the
content, so as not to cause unnecessary Earlier in the decade, Secretary McNamara
alarm.128 The booklets were then sent to post had begun to describe the concept of “mutual
offices throughout the nation, so people could assured destruction” (MAD), which essentially
pick up copies. meant that the Soviet Union and the United
States had the capacity to effectively annihilate
The means of one another with the weapons in their
communicating the arsenals, such that this constituted an effective
Administration’s civil deterrent to offensive action.134 Congress and
defense message to the public began to accept the doctrine of
the public was not the MAD. As a result, a growing percentage of
only target of the population began to wonder if civil
controversy during defense programs could adequately protect
this time. Reviving a citizens from a large scale nuclear attack.135
long-standing debate, However, when the U.S. military began
expanding its ABM defense system,
some prominent The fallout shelter sign was
McNamara re-emphasized the importance of
members of Congress, introduced by DOD in
December 1961 to indicate a shelter system because he questioned the
including Albert Federally-approved shelter
wisdom of relying solely on an ABM
space
Thomas, the defense.136 He argued that “the effectiveness
Chairman of the of an ABM defense system in saving lives
House Appropriations Subcommittee in depends in large part upon the availability of
charge of civil defense, felt that the Federal adequate fallout shelters for the
government should not be undertaking such a population.”137 The belief was that the ABM
massive sheltering project when civil defense defense system could be beaten by detonating
responsibility belonged to State and local nuclear weapons upwind of large
governments.129 Kennedy convened a metropolitan areas and outside the range of
meeting with eighteen of his top advisors at the defensive missiles. The result would be
Hyannis Port, Massachusetts, on the day after radioactive fallout spreading across America’s
Thanksgiving in 1961 to discuss the cities.138 Large numbers of people would die
appropriate next steps for civil defense.130 from the exposure to the fallout, unless there
There, consensus evolved that the Federal were a sufficient number of shelters.
government’s primary role was to provide Congress opposed financing a shelter system,
community shelters.131 and McNamara continued to be pessimistic
about an ABM defense system saying,
“Whether we will ever be able to advance the
Johnson Administration (1963-1969) art of defense as rapidly as the art of offensive
developments…I don’t know. At the
Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963 moment it doesn’t look at all likely.”139
marked the beginning of a drastic cutback in
funding of the Nation’s civil defense program.
13In an ironic twist, attention to civil defense Nixon Administration (1969-1974)
was also undermined by a series of major
natural disasters that rattled the Nation. By the time President Nixon entered office,
Hurricanes Hilda and Betsy devastated the public and government interest in civil
Southeast, an Alaskan earthquake caused a defense had fallen precipitously from its peak
damaging tidal wave in California, and a lethal in the early 1960s. According to the New York
tornado swept through Indiana on Palm Times Index, in 1968, only four articles on civil
Sunday in 1965.140 Senator Birch Bayh of defense appeared in that publication
Indiana sponsored legislation that granted compared to 72 in 1963.145 However, the new
emergency Federal loan assistance to disaster administration did make a major contribution
victims.141 The bill passed in 1966, and Bayh to civil defense by redefining civil defense
urged Congress over the next few years to policy to include preparedness for natural
provide even more disaster assistance to disasters. In no small measure, the President’s
citizens. The concept of all-hazards assistance thinking resulted from the Federal
was gaining adherents, at the expense of civil government’s lack of preparedness to handle
preparedness for attack.142 the horrific damage wrought by Hurricane
Camille (see discussion below). Upon
The Vietnam War struck a further blow to entering office, Nixon immediately tasked the
civil defense during the Johnson years. As the OEP to complete a broad review of the
war progressed, it required increasing Nation’s civil defense programs.146
amounts of time, money, and resources.143
Although civil defense efforts continued to In June 1970, the OEP released the results of
receive modest funding, and would for the its comprehensive assessment in National
next twelve years, no major steps were taken Security Study Memorandum 57. 147 The
to enhance overall capabilities.144 A study concluded that the Nation’s
transformation in the way the Federal preparedness for natural disasters was
government viewed the task of protecting the minimal to nonexistent.148 The
public had begun. Administration responded by introducing two
of its most significant domestic policy changes
in National Security Decision Memorandum
(NSDM) 184. NSDM 184 recommended the
establishment of a “dual-use approach” to
Federal citizen preparedness programs and
the replacement of the Office of Civil
Defense with the Defense Civil
Preparedness Agency (DCPA).149 President
Nixon would later implement these
recommendations, placing the new DCPA
under the umbrella of the Department of
Defense.
In Time of Emergency was quietly released For the first time in the history of civil
in March of 1968, when the Vietnam defense, Federal funds previously allocated
War and domestic unrest effectively
overshadowed civil defense planning. for the exclusive purpose of preparing for
military attacks could be shared with State and
local governments for natural disaster
preparedness. This dual-use initiative
14subscribed to the philosophy that U.S. foreign policy considerations. In order
preparations for evacuation, communications, to reinforce the doctrine of MAD, Nixon was
and survival are common to both natural deeply involved in negotiations with the
disasters and enemy military strikes on the Soviet Union to limit defensive weapon
homeland. From a practical perspective, the capabilities. 155 The first Strategic Arms
dual-use approach allowed more efficient Limitation Talks treaty (SALT I), signed on
utilization of limited resources, so planners May 26, 1972, froze the number of strategic
could address a larger number of scenarios. 150 ballistic missile launchers and allowed the
Given that civil defense funding during addition of new submarine ballistic missile
Nixon’s first term barely exceeded the low launchers only as replacements for dismantled
$80 million per year level of the Eisenhower older launchers. 156 Perhaps most significantly,
Administration (when adjusted for inflation), SALT I limited the superpowers to only two
scarce resources likely played a part in the ABM defense deployment sites. 157 Advocates
decision to adopt the new approach.151 of SALT argued that such agreements were
necessary because any increase in defense
A series of natural disasters during Nixon’s capabilities would spur another arms race for
tenure also increased the pressure to expand improved offensive capabilities. 158 The Nixon
civil defense to include preparation and Administration felt that the SALT I advances
response to natural disasters. Several major would be jeopardized if either side continued
hurricanes and earthquakes exposed to build up nuclear attack-related civil defense
significant flaws in natural disaster programs. This concern helped justify the
preparedness at a time when no centralized decision to turn more attention toward civil
system for disaster relief existed.152 Perhaps preparedness for natural disasters.159
most significantly, in August 1969 Hurricane
Camille wreaked havoc in the greater Gulf The dual use approach was attractive to State
Coast region, highlighting major problems and local authorities. While in the past State
with disaster response.153 In response, and local officials had been reluctant to
Congress passed the Disaster Relief Act of participate in nuclear attack planning, the
1969, which created the concept of a Federal ability to deal with attack preparedness in the
Coordinating Officer (FCO). The FCO was context of a particular hazard in a specific area
an individual appointed by the President, who (e.g. floods in coastal or riverine areas,
would manage federal disaster assistance on- hurricanes in coastal areas, tornadoes in the
the-spot at a given disaster area.154 Midwest and Plains States, and civil unrest in
urban areas) encouraged new coordination
and participation.160
The change of focus also garnered public
support. The interest of the American public
in attack planning had waned considerably.
There was little enthusiasm for ambitious
shelter building projects or evacuation drills.161
A number of historians attribute this lack of
interest to a diminished perception of risk,
In 1972, the United States and the Soviet
psychological numbing to the destruction of
Union signed the SALT I treaty, an nuclear weapons, and a growing belief that
important arms control measure.
civil defense measures would not ultimately be
The President’s decision to increase focus on effective in the event of nuclear war.162
natural disaster preparedness also aligned with Planning for natural disasters was perceived to
15be more effective, less resource intensive, and Ford Administration (1974-1977)
able to deliver tangible benefits at the State
and local level. At first, the Ford Administration supported
its predecessor’s approach to dual-use
Nixon’s broad policy changes were preparedness. In March 1975 President Ford
accompanied by equally sweeping strongly endorsed the policy, stating: “I am
organizational changes. Following the particularly pleased that civil defense planning
replacement of the OCD with the DCPA, today emphasizes the dual use of
another major reorganization took place. In resources…we are improving our ability to
1970 and 1973, Reorganization Plans 1 and 2 respond…to national disasters…”170
abolished the Office of Emergency Planning However, less than a year later, the Office of
and delegated its functions to various Management and Budget (OMB) rescinded
agencies.163 Executive Order 11725 of 1973 DOD’s use of civil defense funding for
solidified the new organizational structure by natural disaster mitigation and
distributing preparedness tasks to a wide preparedness.171 Civil defense was returned to
variety of new agencies including the the original orientation of nuclear attack
Department of Housing and Urban preparedness, as seen during the Truman and
Development (HUD), the General Services Eisenhower years.
Administration, and the Departments of the
Treasury and Commerce.164 In total, the new There were several motivations for this policy
bureaucratic structure placed responsibility for change. Perhaps most importantly, the
disaster relief with more than 100 federal United States had just resumed its intelligence
agencies.165 Not surprisingly, this observations of Soviet civil defense after a
reorganization is perhaps best known for its five year break.172 Reports from these
ineffectiveness.166 operations detailed significant Soviet progress
in civil defense, compared to relatively small
Despite the suggestion of great activity, real U.S. efforts. Massive Soviet expenditures
progress on civil defense, both in the (estimated at $1 billion per year in 1977) on
traditional sense and its new dual-use preparedness initiatives, such as evacuation
direction, was limited during the Nixon plans, contributed to a growing concern that
Administration. One illustrative example is the United States was falling behind.173
the signing into law of the Disaster Relief Act Whereas in the United States, civil defense
of 1974 (Public Law 93-288). While the was considered “an insurance policy,” the
Disaster Relief Act sought to remedy Soviets considered it a “factor of great
bureaucratic inefficiencies and provide direct strategic significance.”174 The most alarmist
assistance to individuals and families American commentators concluded that the
following a disaster,167 funding remained low, entire U.S. nuclear arsenal could not inflict
with levels comparable to spending in the pre- significant damage on the Soviet Union, due
Kennedy years. The Act did succeed in in large part to its increased civil
involving State and local governments in all preparedness.175
hazards preparedness activities168 and
provided matching funds for their Developments in Cold War diplomacy likely
programs.169 However, soon the federal also contributed to the temporary end of all-
government’s emphasis on all-hazards hazards planning. Gradually the doctrine of
preparedness would lessen. MAD was replaced with new ideas, such as
limited nuclear strikes against strategically
important military and industrial targets,
16rather than population centers. As early as support for relocation, food distribution, and
January 10, 1974 Secretary of Defense James medical care.181 Under the CRP, urban
Schlesinger stated during a press conference residents would be relocated to rural host
that “the old policy [of MAD]…was no counties, with a target ratio of “5 immigrants
longer adequate for deterrence” and should be for every native.”182 The focus on
replaced by “a set of selective options against preparedness through the CRP was continued
different sets of targets.”176 Over the next throughout the Ford Administration by
decade, these ideas of flexible targeting and incoming Secretary of Defense Donald
limited retaliation developed into the policy of Rumsfeld, who strongly opposed the dual-use
“flexible response.”177 Flexible response was approach. Rumsfeld believed that the Federal
based on the idea that both the Soviet Union government should address only attack
and the United States had the capability for preparedness, while peacetime disasters were a
small-scale nuclear attacks that could be State and local responsibility.183
answered by similarly-sized acts of retaliation
by the other side.178 Theoretically, instead of Though Administration officials and
massive retaliation against population centers, policymakers defended the CRP as a set of
targets would be specific, highly-strategic simple and highly effective procedures, the
sites.179 Since some of these sites could be program suffered widespread criticism.184 The
civilian in nature, some level of civil defense Plan’s reliance on a relatively long warning
and nuclear attack preparedness was deemed time (1 to 2 days), compared to the shorter
necessary. Thus, U.S. policy makers renewed notice necessary for sheltering, meant it could
their attention on civil defense, as a means of only be effective in a situation of rising
protecting against targeted highly-strategic tensions in which the launch of missiles
attacks.180 against the country could be predicted.
Additionally, vocal critics from Congress and
the public doubted the feasibility of such
large-scale evacuations through bottlenecked
transportation routes.
Organizationally, the fragmentation of civil
defense responsibilities begun under Nixon
became increasingly apparent. Nixon’s
reorganization plans prescribed that the bulk
of the responsibility for civil defense fall to
three different agencies: the OEP would
advise the President, HUD’s Federal
Public relations officer
Disaster Assistance Agency would manage
presenting a crisis disaster relief, and the DCPA would
relocation plan.
coordinate State and local preparedness
efforts.185 Though these bureaucratic changes
One result was a new initiative called the were not complete until the Carter
Crisis Relocation Plan (CRP). Begun in Administration, some Congressional
1974 by Secretary of Defense James committees were already beginning to
Schlesinger, the CRP favored a strategy of investigate the problem of disjointed civil
evacuation rather than sheltering. Directed by defense. In 1976, the House Armed Services
the DCPA, CRP evacuation planning was Committee recommended that an office
conducted at the State level with Federal within the Executive Office of the President
funds and encompassed all of the necessary (EOP) be tasked to manage civil defense,
17while the Joint Committee on Defense combined into one coherent agency in direct
Production recommended combining the contact with the White House.191 In response,
three agencies into one body.186 These Carter issued Presidential Directive (PD) 41 in
recommendations, coming during the final September of 1978, which sought to clarify
months of the Ford Administration, were the Administration’s view of civil defense.
evaluated in the subsequent Carter However, it did not offer any particular plan
Administration. for implementation.192 According to PD 41,
civil defense was an element in the strategy to
Overall civil defense funding during Ford’s “enhance deterrence and stability”. Civil
tenure did not change significantly from the defense still did not become a priority for the
Nixon years. With the implementation of the Administration, which concluded that it was
CRP, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger made not necessary to pursue “equivalent
modest increases in the 1975 budget to survivability” with the Soviet Union.193
develop city evacuation plans and implement
population defenses.187 However, as in Meanwhile, in the midst of a lengthy debate
previous Administrations, civil defense still regarding the creation of a single disaster
competed for funding against more traditional preparedness agency, an unprecedented
military expenditures, and the 1975 increases civilian nuclear accident unfolded on March
were nullified the following year in favor of 28, 1979 at the nuclear energy plant on Three
spending on offensive military capabilities.188 Mile Island, near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.194
By highlighting the slow response, poor local-
In sum, despite ambitious claims of progress Federal coordination, and miscommunications
by the Ford Administration, civil defense that occurred; the accident dramatically
programs within the United States remained demonstrated the need for more effective
less than effective. U.S. nuclear deterrence disaster coordination and planning.195
plans still emphasized offensive capabilities. Partially in response to the near nuclear
In its evaluation of the state of civil defense in disaster, on July 20, 1979 the Administration
1976, the Congressional Research Service issued Executive Order 12148, which
unconditionally labeled the efforts “a established the Federal Emergency
charade.”189 It would be another five years Management Agency (FEMA) as the lead
before significant progress was made. agency for coordinating Federal disaster relief
efforts. FEMA absorbed the Federal
Insurance Administration, the National Fire
Carter Administration (1977-1981) Prevention and Control Administration, the
National Weather Service Community
Upon taking office, President Carter Preparedness Program, the Federal
immediately began a review of the disjointed Preparedness Agency of the General Services
system of bureaucracies that managed civil Administration, and the Federal Disaster
defense. An interagency study led to Assistance Administration activities from
Presidential Review Memorandum 32 in HUD, and combined them into a single
September of 1977.190 The study concurred independent agency. At the time, the creation
with the 1976 recommendations of the House of FEMA represented the single largest
Armed Services Committee and Joint consolidation of civil defense efforts in U.S.
Committee on Defense Production that the history.
various civil defense agencies must be
18It is likely that the Carter Administration’s
focus on evacuation was also affected by Cold
War diplomacy. The continuing SALT
negotiations created a conflict between the
desire to advance U.S. civil defense, and the
desire to avoid upsetting the delicate strategic
balance required for successful threat
reduction negotiations. With this balance in
mind, maintaining the status quo by
continuing to support evacuation policies may
have been deemed the best option.201
Though the creation of FEMA and the goals
Conflicting official statements, skepticism of PD 41 signaled renewed interest in civil
about the nuclear industry, and even
unfamiliar terminology fed the
defense, funding throughout the Carter
sensationalist media frenzy surrounding Administration remained historically low.
the Three Mile Island accident.
The 1980 request for $108 million was less
than adequate for implementing the new
Despite the reorganization and move toward plans.202 In the following year, Congress did
greater mission clarity, civil defense planning not meet a higher request for funding, instead
on the ground did not change dramatically. choosing to allocate funds to other
Practical plans continued to reflect traditional priorities.203 As had been the case many times
civil defense programs and did not adopt the before, funding levels did not match the
dual-use approach, though Carter did urge ambitious plans for program improvement.
FEMA to direct more of its efforts to coping
with peacetime disasters.196 Evacuation In keeping civil defense funding low,
continued to be the focus of Federal planners, Congressional leaders had little public
and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown opposition to fear. In contrast to generally
reaffirmed his predecessor’s crisis relocation widespread public participation and
strategies.197 When FEMA assumed acceptance in the peak years of civil defense
responsibility for citizen preparedness, the during the early stages of the Cold War, most
agency called on civil defense planners people by this time had little faith that any
nationwide to create area-specific CRPs. 198 government civil defense planning could
lessen the impact of nuclear war.204 Some
The decision to continue to pursue evacuation local communities refused outright to
as the primary civil defense policy was cooperate with Federal civil defense mandates
influenced by several factors. Well-funded because they did not believe the CRPs would
and extensive Soviet evacuation programs be effective if a nuclear attack were to
continued to worry key U.S. decision makers, occur.205 This public attitude would continue
including Brown.199 Evacuation also made throughout the remainder of the Cold War
sense in the context of continued resource period.
limitations. According to a 1979 FEMA
report, since effective and cost-efficient
sheltering in large cities had proven difficult,
“the U.S. nuclear civil defense program
developed into an evacuation program…as a
low-cost survival alternative.”200
19Reagan Administration (1981-1989) the primary strategy for civil defense. During
this period nuclear preparedness became a top
It would appear that Ronald Reagan entered priority for FEMA.212
office with the intention of building upon the
civil defense foundations set by his Congress and the Administration came into
predecessors. In December 1981, Congress conflict in February 1982, when the President
acted dramatically in favor of the dual-use requested $4.2 billion for a seven-year plan to
approach by amending the 1950 Civil Defense massively boost civil defense programs.213
Act. In this milestone decision, all future civil Congress did not react positively to this
defense funds would be allotted for natural request, particularly because it seemed to be
disasters, as well as attacks on the part of Reagan’s hawkish stance on Cold War
homeland.206 The amendment did stipulate diplomacy.214 For example, the House
that funding and planning for peacetime Committee on Appropriations criticized
disasters could not overtly detract from attack FEMA’s dependence on evacuation planning
preparedness programs. Nevertheless, dual- at the expense of other preparedness
use preparedness was promoted with much of programs and suggested that more attention
the same language and reasoning as it was be paid to peacetime disaster preparation.
during the Nixon Administration. 207 Expressing their disagreement with FEMA’s
plans, Congress allocated only $147.9 million
Though Reagan was in favor of the dual-use to cover FEMA’s 1983 budget, about 58% of
approach, his civil defense strategy was largely what the agency had requested.215 In 1984
a continuation of Carter’s. In the midst of and 1985, Congress again blocked requests for
deliberations regarding the 1982 budget, the funding increases.216
National Security Council (NSC) compiled
National Security Division Directive (NSDD) In 1983, FEMA responded to the
26, which spelled out the objectives of Congressional push for more peacetime
Carter’s Presidential Directive 41 and was disaster preparation with plans for an
designed to promote deterrence, improve Integrated Emergency Management System
natural disaster preparedness, and reduce the (IEMS) to develop full all-hazard
possibility of coercion by enemy forces.208 preparedness plans at the Federal level.217
The unclassified version of NSDD 26 states: Under the IEMS, State civil defense planners
“it is a matter of national priority that the would facilitate the development of multi-
United States have a Civil Defense program hazard preparedness plans based on threats
which provides for the survival of the U.S. faced by specific localities.218 According to
population.”209 However, NSDD 26 went the IEMS, this all-hazards approach included
further than PD 41 by stipulating a concrete “direction, control and warning systems which
deadline in 1989 for plans to protect the are common to the full range of emergencies
population, and it mandated that civil defense from small isolated events to the ultimate
leaders investigate and enhance protection emergency – war.”219 Despite this innovative
measures for critical industries in case of attempt to integrate civil defense and disaster
attack.210 Furthermore, NSDD 26 for the first preparedness concerns, Congress was not
time supported research into the development sufficiently convinced that the IEMS would
of strategies to ensure economic survival in effectively address the management of all-
the event of a nuclear attack.211 However, hazard preparedness, and therefore never met
drawing upon the CRPs of his predecessors, requested FEMA funding levels.
Reagan continued to promote evacuation as
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