CORRECTING THE COURSE: HOW THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION SHOULD COMPETE FOR INFLUENCE IN THE INDO-PACIFIC - ASHLEY TOWNSHEND, SUSANNAH PATTON, TOM ...
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CORRECTING THE COURSE:
HOW THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION
SHOULD COMPETE FOR
INFLUENCE IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
ASHLEY TOWNSHEND, SUSANNAH PATTON, TOM CORBEN AND TOBY WARDEN | AUGUST 2021
The United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney is a university-based research centre, dedicated to the rigorous analysis of American foreign policy, economics, politics and culture. The Centre is a national resource, that builds Australia’s awareness of the dynamics shaping America — and critically — their implications for Australia. The Foreign Policy and Defence Program is committed to providing policy-oriented research and analysis on American strategic policy and the United States-Australia alliance, with a focus on developments in the Indo-Pacific. Drawing on the expertise and networks of its researchers, the Program delivers insights and recommendations to a range of stakeholders through policy reports, dialogues, simulations, and outreach. It aims to deepen Australians’ understanding of American policy, analyse the alliance in an evolving strategic order, and shape Australian, allied, and partner responses to shared regional challenges. The Foreign Policy and Defence Program receives funding from the following partners: UNITED STATES STUDIES CENTRE Institute Building (H03), City Rd The University of Sydney NSW 2006 Australia +61 2 9351 7249 us-studies@sydney.edu.au USSC.EDU.AU Research conclusions are derived independently and authors represent their own view, not those of the United States Studies Centre. Reports published by the United States Studies Centre are anonymously peer-reviewed by both internal and external experts.
TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive summary 02 Introduction 04 1. Competing with China 07 2. Revitalising alliances and partnerships 10 3. The democracy agenda 13 4. Slow moving in Southeast Asia 16 5. No regional economic strategy 19 6. Lacking urgency on defence 21 Recommendations for the Biden administration 24 Endnotes 28 About the authors 44 This publication may be cited as: Ashley Townshend, Susannah Patton, Tom Corben and Toby Warden, “Correcting the course: How the Biden administration should compete for influence in the Indo-Pacific,” United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, August 2021. Cover photo: President Joe Biden, joined by Vice President Kamala Harris and Secretary of State Antony Blinken, delivers remarks at the US State Department in Washington, DC, 4 February 2021 (White House Flickr)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Key judgements
1. The Biden administration’s approach to the Indo-Pacific has so far lacked focus and urgency.
Despite its deep regional expertise and the region’s high expectations, it has failed to articulate a
comprehensive regional strategy or treat the Indo-Pacific as its decisive priority.
2. The Biden administration’s focus on bringing normalcy back to US regional policy has restored
the status quo, but not advanced its standing in the Indo-Pacific.
3. The Biden administration’s approach to competition with China has focused on the domestic and
global arenas, rather than on competing for influence within the Indo-Pacific.
4. The Biden administration’s focus on long-term systems competition with China overlooks the
urgency of near-term competition in the Indo-Pacific.
5. The Biden administration has placed strategic competition with China at the top of its foreign and
security policy agenda. It has sought to balance US-China rivalry with opportunities for cooper-
ation and efforts to stabilise the regional order.
6. The Biden administration views its Indo-Pacific allies as regional and international “force multi-
pliers.” It has largely trained these alliances on global order issues, with few new initiatives at the
regional level and insufficient focus on empowering allies to meet their own security needs.
7. The Biden administration sees the United States as being in a “systems competition” between
democracy and autocracy. By making ideological competition with China an organising principle
for US foreign policy, Washington risks undermining its attractiveness as a partner for politically
diverse Indo-Pacific countries.
8. The Biden administration cannot compete against China effectively in the Indo-Pacific without
prioritising engagement with Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia. It has recognised the need
to do more in Southeast Asia, but its success may be limited by its approach to competition with
China and lack of an economic strategy.
9. The Biden administration, like its predecessors, lacks an economic strategy for the Indo-Pacific
region. This major weakness in regional policy is driven by US protectionist trade preferences at
home. Proposed initiatives on digital trade and infrastructure cannot compensate for the absence
of a comprehensive trade-based economic approach.
10. The Biden administration views China as a predominantly long-term military challenge. Its efforts
to minimise spending on US forward posture in the region suggest it may be less committed to a
strategy of deterrence by denial to prevent Chinese aggression.
UNITED STATES STUDIES CENTRE | FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENCE PROGRAM
2 CORRECTING THE COURSE: HOW THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION SHOULD COMPETE FOR INFLUENCE IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
Recommendations for the Biden administration
To compete for influence in the Indo-Pacific, the Biden administration should:
1. Clearly identify the Indo-Pacific region as its foreign and defence policy priority and marshal
resources accordingly.
2. Articulate clear goals for its relationship with China and its strategic position in the Indo-Pacific
region.
3. Avoid emphasising ideological competition with China and instead focus on maximising its influ-
ence by responding to regional needs.
4. Signal its commitment to a strategy of deterrence by denial to prevent Chinese aggression and
bolster its investments in Western Pacific military posture to reinforce its credibility.
5. Empower its allies to assume greater responsibility for their own defence requirements by reduc-
ing legislative and political obstacles to allied self-strengthening.
6. Pay special attention to Southeast Asia as a region of strategic importance, given its geography,
size and the fluidity of its alignment dynamics.
7. Clearly signal that it is committed to mutually beneficial economic engagement with the Indo-Pa-
cific and adopt trade and investment strategies that reinforce its role as an indispensable resident
economic power.
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3
INTRODUCTION
In his first major foreign policy speech in Febru- Biden’s Indo-Pacific pitfalls to date
ary 2021, President Joe Biden vowed “America is
back,” setting out a plan to correct the course of No administration could craft a perfect strategy
its role in the world.1 But in the Indo-Pacific region after six months in office. But based on the Biden
— where competition with China is sharpest — administration’s approach to the Indo-Pacific so
the Biden administration has lacked focus and far, there are three reasons to doubt its strategy
urgency. Despite restoring a sense of normalcy is heading in the right direction.
to US regional policy after four years of Presi-
dent Donald Trump, the administration has so 1. The Biden administration’s focus
far failed to articulate a comprehensive regional on bringing normalcy back to
strategy or treat the Indo-Pacific as its decisive US regional policy has restored
international priority. the status quo, but not advanced
its standing in the region.
The stakes could not be higher. China’s military
power, economic weight and assertive foreign By embracing the traditional pillars and
policy agenda are reshaping the Indo-Pacific processes of US foreign policy, the adminis-
order — undercutting US tration has restored trust and predictability in
pre-eminence and risking a its regional relationships. Biden’s foreign policy
BUT THESE WORDS Chinese sphere of influence. team has reaffirmed the value of US Indo-Pacific
ALONE WILL NOT
Close security partners are allies and partners, engaged with ASEAN and
SAFEGUARD THE UNITED
STATES’ STRATEGIC openly questioning the United returned the United States to the forefront of the
POSITION. REGIONAL States’ capacity to maintain a region’s COVID-19 response. The administra-
COUNTRIES ARE favourable regional balance tion has shown diplomatic dexterity by choreo-
LOOKING TO THE BIDEN of power and deter Chinese graphing early meetings with allies to apply pres-
ADMINISTRATION TO aggression. Many more are sure on China and moved away from pushing
FINALLY DELIVER ON THE
questioning the United States’ regional countries to choose between Beijing
INDO-PACIFIC PIVOT
THAT WASHINGTON willingness to resuscitate its and Washington. With the important exception
HAS PROMISED role as a leading trade and of its adoption of ideological competition with
FOR A DECADE. investment partner in the China — a worrying decision that will complicate
Indo-Pacific. Coupled with US regional strategy — the Biden team’s approach
Washington’s patchy diplomacy, especially in to China marks a return towards balancing rivalry
Southeast Asia, these uncertainties about US with cooperation and efforts to stabilise the
regional strategy are eroding its influence. regional order.
Against this backdrop, President Biden’s recom- While these are positive developments for the
mitment to strong Indo-Pacific relationships is Indo-Pacific, none of them break new ground
welcome, as is his signal that competition with for US regional strategy. On the contrary, most
China will be the top priority for US foreign simply restore key features of US policy as it
policy. But these words alone will not safeguard stood before Donald Trump’s presidency. Even
the United States’ strategic position. Regional the administration’s specific gains — such as
countries are looking to the Biden administra- restoring the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)
tion to finally deliver on the Indo-Pacific pivot that with the Philippines and concluding new host
Washington has promised for a decade. agreements for US forces in Japan and South
Korea — are really a return to the status quo ante.
UNITED STATES STUDIES CENTRE | FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENCE PROGRAM
4 CORRECTING THE COURSE: HOW THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION SHOULD COMPETE FOR INFLUENCE IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
Secretary of State
Antony Blinken
meets with CCP
Director of the
Office of the Central
Commission for
Foreign Affairs Yang
Jiechi and State
Councilor Wang Yi
(US Department
of State)
The main exception to this trend is the adminis- globalise strategic competition with China aims
tration’s elevation of the Quad to a leaders’ level to leverage the United States’ major democratic
summit which, though impressive, will take time coalitions — NATO, the G7, the European Union
to pay strategic dividends. The Biden adminis- and the Quad — to increase pressure on China,
tration needs to recognise that this restorationist promote democratic values and take collective
agenda alone will not improve its regional posi- action on issues such as technology standards
tion. and multilateral governance reform.
But investment in US competitiveness and global
2. The Biden administration’s approach partnerships is not enough. While both efforts
to competition with China has will yield some advantages, neither has a direct
focused on the domestic and global bearing on the United States’ competition for
arenas, rather than on competing for influence within the Indo-Pacific. Success on the
influence within the Indo-Pacific. regional front requires Washington to prioritise
The administration has identified competition regional economic engagement, military posture
with China as its top foreign policy priority. But and capacity building, and substantial invest-
its primary mode for competition has so far been ments in regional resilience and institutions. But
through domestic self-strengthening and global the administration has largely overlooked these
coalition-building, rather than specific regional priorities: Biden has no trade or investment strat-
initiatives. At home, its focus on rebuilding the egy for the region, he has not prioritised region-
economic and technological foundations of US ally focused defence spending and his team have
power involves major investments in science, been slow to engage Southeast Asia on meaning-
innovation, research and 21st-century infrastruc- ful priorities. These, admittedly, are hard asks. But
ture, intended, in part, to out-innovate China and the fact that the administration has not prioritised
secure the United States’ military-technologi- them to date suggests a lack of urgency in Wash-
cal edge. Abroad, the administration’s push to ington about regional competition.
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3. The administration’s focus on long- Correcting the course
term systems competition with China
overlooks the urgency of near-term The Biden administration still has an opportu-
competition in the Indo-Pacific. nity to correct the course of US strategy in the
Indo-Pacific region. Above all, this is a question
Insofar as the Biden administration is prepar- of political will and international priorities — and
ing for competition in the Indo-Pacific region, it the extent to which Washington is serious about
has largely adopted a long-term horizon. On the competing for influence with China in the world’s
military front, the administration’s first defence most dynamic region. Yet, how effectively the
budget request depicted China as a primarily Biden team can reorient its approach will be
future threat — minimising funding for short-term shaped, in part, by its diagnosis of the problem
deterrence priorities in the Western Pacific to pay and understanding of regional perspectives.
for long-term military preparations for high-in-
tensity conflict in the 2030s. This has raised The following report provides one such perspec-
concerns among US allies and partners — and US tive. It lays out where the administration has
Indo-Pacific Command — that the United States succeeded and failed in the Indo-Pacific during
may not be well-postured its first six months in office, focusing on six priority
ABOVE ALL, THIS to deter Chinese aggression issues: competition with China; allies and part-
IS A QUESTION OF in regional flashpoints like ners; ideological competition; engagement with
POLITICAL WILL AND Taiwan or the South China Southeast Asia; regional economic strategy; and
INTERNATIONAL Sea this decade. defence policy. It concludes with a set of high-
PRIORITIES — AND THE level recommendations intended as a guide for
EXTENT TO WHICH Similarly, in terms of
WASHINGTON IS SERIOUS the Biden administration as it further develops its
economic strategy, the Biden Indo-Pacific strategy. By far the most important
ABOUT COMPETING FOR
INFLUENCE WITH CHINA administration’s signature of these from a regional perspective harks back
IN THE WORLD’S MOST Build Back Better World to the original promise of the pivot: the United
DYNAMIC REGION. infrastructure initiative — a States should clearly identify the Indo-Pacific
partnership with G7 coun- region as its foreign and defence policy priority
tries — aims to compete with China’s Belt and and marshal the necessary resources accord-
Road Initiative around the world. But infrastruc- ingly.
ture delivery takes years if not decades — a prob-
lem, given the United States lacks a trade-based
strategy in the meantime. The same is true for
Biden’s grander diplomatic aspirations to win the
21st-century competition between democracy
and autocracy. Not only is this agenda unlikely
to produce a winning coalition in the Indo-Pacific
— owing to regional countries’ aversion to values-
based strategies — but any genuine progress
made on bolstering democratic values would
take considerable time. While the administra-
tion is right to invest now in aspects of long-term
competition, this should not come at the expense
of urgent investments in the present.
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6 CORRECTING THE COURSE: HOW THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION SHOULD COMPETE FOR INFLUENCE IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
1. COMPETING WITH CHINA
The Biden administration has placed strategic administration’s strategy documents, justified
competition with China at the top of its foreign this approach in balance-of-power terms, warn-
and security policy agenda. Although largely ing: “[China] is the only competitor potentially
consistent with the Trump administration’s capable of combining its economic, diplomatic,
approach, President Biden has departed from military, and technological power to mount a
his predecessor’s erratic and unilateral tactics. sustained challenge to a stable and open interna-
His foreign policy team has indicated it seeks tional system.”4 The Biden administration has also
to balance US-China rivalry with opportunities advanced the case for strategic competition in
for bilateral cooperation while competing more starkly ideological terms. In speeches and policy
effectively by leveraging America’s domes- documents reminiscent of the Cold War, Biden
tic strengths and international partnerships. As has claimed the world is “at an inflection point” in
Secretary of State Antony Blinken has repeatedly the struggle between autocracy and democracy
stressed, the administration’s overall aim in both that puts “[America] in competition with China…
competition and cooperation is “to engage China to win the 21st Century.”5
from a position of strength.”2
The combination of a balance-of-power and
A focus on managed and multilateral competi- values-based approach to competition has
tion with China is in the interests of the United distinct pros and cons for the Indo-Pacific. For
States’ Indo-Pacific allies and partners. But the US allies and partners that harboured concerns
Biden administration has prioritised domestic Biden might return to excessively lenient
self-strengthening and global coalition-building Obama-era policies on China, the administra-
ahead of initiatives to compete in the Indo-Pa- tion’s commitment to geostrategic competition
cific region — a far more immediate priority. This is a reassuring signal. Coupled with its positive
imbalance in Washington’s China policy must emphasis on defending international rules and
be redressed if it is to succeed in establishing norms — such as sovereignty, maritime rights and
the regional conditions necessary to collectively peaceful dispute resolution — and its commit-
constrain Chinese influence. This requires the ment to working collaboratively with allies and
administration to articulate clear aims for its partners, the Biden administration can strike the
China policy — rather than treating competition right rhetorical balance between competing with
as an end in itself — and integrate these into a China and strengthening the regional order.6
comprehensive Indo-Pacific strategy.
By contrast, Biden’s elevation of ideological
considerations to the forefront of US-China
Power vs ideological competition competition is a divisive move that chafes with the
Indo-Pacific’s political diversity and preference
President Biden revealed his competitive
for peaceful coexistence with China. Taken to its
approach to China early and with surprising
logical conclusion, the democracy vs autocracy
intensity. Less than a month after taking office,
framework implies an existential confrontation
Biden foreshadowed “extreme competition” with
that goes far beyond what most regional coun-
Beijing, vowing to address the “China challenge”
tries are willing and able to support. Whether this
through “whole of government effort, biparti-
is the administration’s intent remains uncertain
san cooperation in Congress, and strong alli-
— reinforcing the need for a clearly articulated
ances and partnerships.”3 His Interim National
China policy and a statement of the United States’
Security Strategic Guidance, like the Trump
vision for the end-state of strategic competition.
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7
Chinese Vice
Foreign Minister
Xie Feng holds talks
with US Deputy
Secretary of State
Wendy Sherman in
Tianjin, China,
26 July 2021 (Getty)
Domestic rebuilding and its way through Congress — appears set to deliver
global coalitions substantial funding for 5G, artificial intelligence,
semiconductors, quantum computing and other
The administration has largely pursued strategic critical technologies;11 and the Biden-backed
competition with China on two fronts — neither US$1.2 trillion bipartisan infrastructure pack-
of which is directly focused on the Indo-Pacific age will, if passed, provide for major upgrades
region. First, it has invested heavily in Biden’s to renewable energy, port facilities, broadband,
signature push to revitalise the economic and roads and bridges, and other critical infrastruc-
technological foundations of American power — ture.12
a domestic agenda that forms part of the admin-
istration’s commitment to rebuilding American Second, the administration has spent signifi-
jobs and delivering a “foreign policy for the cant diplomatic capital on globalising strate-
middle class.”7 In contrast to Trump’s approach gic competition with China — an agenda that is
— which focused on mitigating the risks posed closely related to its prioritisation of ideological
by China’s technological rise — Biden has laid considerations. Speaking at the Munich Secu-
out a more positive agenda to “develop and rity Conference in February, Biden appealed
dominate the technologies of the future” in an to European partners “to prepare together for
effort to out-innovate China and secure Ameri- a long-term strategic competition with China,”
ca’s competitive edge.8 This has prompted major contending: “How the United States, Europe,
investments in science, technology, research and and Asia work together to secure the peace
development and manufacturing.9 In response to and defend our shared values and advance our
the 100-day Supply Chain Review, for instance, prosperity across the Pacific will be among the
the administration took measures to strengthen most consequential efforts we undertake.”13 To
battery, critical mineral and semiconductor date, the administration has brought multilat-
supply chains, while maintaining Trump-era eral pressure to bear on Beijing across a range of
restrictions on China through tariffs, entity list- issues — including China’s human rights abuses
ings and enhanced foreign investment screen- in Xinjiang, cyber espionage and non-market
ing.10 Crucially, the Innovation and Competition economic activities — and sought to elevate
Act — a US$250 billion legislative package making China as a trans-Atlantic priority within NATO, the
UNITED STATES STUDIES CENTRE | FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENCE PROGRAM
8 CORRECTING THE COURSE: HOW THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION SHOULD COMPETE FOR INFLUENCE IN THE INDO-PACIFICG7 and the European Union (EU).14 Even regional partners — these efforts have not been enough
security partnerships, such as the Quad, have to meet regional needs or expectations.18 A more
become more focused on the global aspects of active, present and ambitious US strategy would
competition since Biden assumed office, work- reassure Indo-Pacific countries that Washington
ing towards common positions on issues such is committed to investing in the region, incen-
as critical technologies, setting emerging tech- tivising more effective regional push back and
nology standards and multilateral governance collective action on China.
reform.15
The United States’ Indo-Pacific allies and partners
are also looking for reassurance that competition
Insufficient focus on the region with China will not escalate to conflict. Although
the Biden team shares the region’s preference
The administration’s focus on the domestic and
for enhanced strategic stability, US-China rivalry
global aspects of competition will yield some
has made progress difficult. Efforts by Secretary
strategic payoffs. Rebuilding the United States’
of Defense Lloyd Austin to reinstate high-level
economic, technological and industrial base is
military dialogues and crisis management mech-
critical to the long-term trajectory of its power
anisms have been rebuffed by Chinese officials.19
vis-à-vis China — making this a necessary, if insuf-
Moreover, while the administration has returned
ficient, pillar of strategic competition.16 Multi-
to a policy of “strategic ambiguity” in its relation-
lateral action on some global challenges, such
ship with Taiwan — which is viewed as a stabilis-
as technology competition and standards, is a
ing measure — the cycle of escalating Chinese
useful way to shape Chinese actions where a
coercion and growing US and allied support for
consensus can be forged.17 However, the globali-
Taiwan could jeopardise the relative stability this
sation of competition with China is not certain to
brings. Clarifying the United States’ objectives for
deliver results — owing to the fact that European
strategic competition with China may be the best
partners are not all willing to endorse Wash-
way to defuse these tensions in the short term.
ington’s approach to intense competition with
China, or devote substantial resources to the
Indo-Pacific.
But for Indo-Pacific countries worried about
China’s expanding influence and coercive state-
craft, investment in the United States’ long-term
competitiveness and global partnerships is not
enough. Competing with China from an Indo-Pa-
cific perspective requires Washington to prior-
itise regional economic engagement, military
deterrence and capacity building and substantial
investment in regional resilience and institutions.
On this front, the Biden team has lacked focus.
Although the administration has delivered on
aspects of this agenda — delivering 40 million
COVID-19 vaccines to the region, providing US$4
billion to the global COVAX initiative and clearly
reiterating its support for Indo-Pacific allies and
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92. REVITALISING ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS
As part of its global agenda to strengthen the Going global, not regional
United States’ network of allies and partners,
the Biden administration is reinvigorating its key President Biden has elevated the Quad arrange-
democratic alliances and partnerships in the ment between Australia, India, Japan and the
Indo-Pacific.20 Following four years of turbulent United States into the centrepiece of an Indo-Pa-
ties under Trump, Biden’s foreign policy team cific strategy.24 The inaugural Quad leaders’
has performed exceptionally to deliver timely meeting in March 2021 marked a welcome
and effective relationship repair, with the eleva- consolidation of years of diplomatic effort and
tion of the Quad to a leaders’ level summit as its converging strategic interests on the part of all
signature achievement. four members. That it was convened so early in
Biden’s tenure points to the skilful diplomacy of
The Biden administration regards allies and his foreign policy team and the importance they
partners as indispensable “force multipliers” for accord the Quad as a driver of collective strategic
strengthening the liberal international order and objectives.
addressing a long list of global concerns, ranging
from competition with China to climate change Several ambitious commitments arose from
and the COVID-19 recovery.21 Yet these global the summit. Decisions to deepen cooperation
priorities are not directly relevant to compet- on health security and infrastructure develop-
ing for influence within the ment, and to set up working groups on climate
Indo-Pacific, and the hard change and critical technologies signalled a will-
THE INAUGURAL QUAD ingness by all four participants to step up collec-
LEADERS’ MEETING work of transforming alli-
ances to address regional tive efforts to provide regional and global public
IN MARCH 2021
MARKED A WELCOME security challenges remains goods beyond the maritime security realm.25 The
CONSOLIDATION OF ahead. announcement of a Quad Vaccine Partnership to
YEARS OF DIPLOMATIC “strengthen and assist” Indo-Pacific countries in
EFFORT AND Efforts to modernise and meeting their health security requirements was
CONVERGING STRATEGIC network alliances and part- an early demonstration of the regional dimension
INTERESTS ON THE PART nerships are not new. The of this agenda.26 In addition to driving a major
OF ALL FOUR MEMBERS.
Obama administration sought health initiative, it also provided a way to compete
to refashion the United States’ with China — and counteract Beijing’s “vaccine
Indo-Pacific partnerships into “global order diplomacy” — by demonstrating the Quad can
enhancers” with a focus on issues such as inter- deliver tangible regional goods and leverage its
national security, climate policy, global govern- members’ unique strengths.27
ance, human rights and more.22 While the Trump
administration narrowed the focus of key alli- In parallel to working with the Quad, the Biden
ances and partnerships to place greater empha- administration has sought to refocus key
sis on security, it nonetheless aimed to encour- Indo-Pacific alliances and partnerships on global
age a networked strategic policy agenda in the challenges. Washington used early engage-
Indo-Pacific region.23 Biden has picked up these ments with Seoul and Tokyo to reaffirm its treaty
efforts and is working to widen the international commitments, reiterate ongoing defence coop-
policy aperture of these relationships once more. eration priorities and explore new opportunities
But sharper focus on strengthening their regional for cooperation on clean energy, supply chains
order-defending agendas and on empowering and critical technologies.28 The joint statements
allies and partners is needed. emerging from the US-Japan and US-Korea
leaders’ summits elevated the global scope of
UNITED STATES STUDIES CENTRE | FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENCE PROGRAM
10 CORRECTING THE COURSE: HOW THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION SHOULD COMPETE FOR INFLUENCE IN THE INDO-PACIFICthese alliances, resolving in both cases to estab- Looking for the regional payoff
lish new bilateral mechanisms on climate change,
health security and technology challenges.29 But there has been comparatively little progress
on new regional initiatives from the Biden admin-
The Biden administration has sought to bolster istration engagement with major Indo-Pacific
the global focus of the US-India partnership, alliances and partnerships. With the exception
emphasising cooperation on climate change, of the Quad Vaccine Partnership, new projects
health, supply chain security and technology designed to have a positive impact in the region —
issues; and flagging expanded policy coordina- such as the US-Korea Global Vaccine Partnership
tion in the Indo-Pacific, Africa and the Middle and US-Japan Competitiveness and Resilience
East.30 While there have been few high-level Partnership — have been slow-moving, a missed
interactions between the United States and opportunity for the administration’s alliance revi-
Australia to date, the Biden team has highlighted talisation agenda.33
existing regional and global priorities for the alli-
ance31 and sought Canberra’s cooperation on Moreover, the effort that Biden’s team has
health security initiatives and the promotion of invested in marshalling European support for
democratic values through multilateral groupings competition with China is only likely to have a
like the G7+ and Five Eyes arrangement.32 The marginal impact on the Indo-Pacific strategic
United States’ Indo-Pacific allies have also been environment.34 Although some EU members
enlisted to support major multilateral initiatives have joined Washington in criticising Beijing’s
proposed by the Biden administration, such as human rights abuses and cyber malpractices35 or
the Leaders’ Summit on Climate as well as the deployed naval forces to show the flag in regional
Build Back Better World partnership — a G7 initi- flashpoints,36 such actions are largely symbolic
ative to compete with China by mobilising private to date. From the perspective of economic and
sector capital for infrastructure projects in low- security interests, there is little overlap between
and middle-income countries. the global concerns of extra-regional partners
The United States,
Japan, India
and Australia
participate in
the virtual Quad
Summit, 12 March
2021 (White
House Flickr)
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11and the acute geopolitical challenges facing The Biden administration must also do more
Indo-Pacific countries.37 While it may be rela- to empower Indo-Pacific allies and partners to
tively easy for the Biden administration, with its strengthen their own defence capabilities. This
very close ties in Europe, to incentivise trans-At- means overcoming Washington’s preference for
lantic participation in a global order agenda, tightly controlling the flow of defence technol-
Washington’s attention would be better spent ogy and technical know-how to close allies and
on working with allies and partners on more partners.41 On this score, the Biden administra-
concrete Indo-Pacific priorities. tion’s record is mixed. Its landmark decision to
scrap the US-Korea Missile Guidelines in May
removed decades-old restrictions on Seoul’s
Empowering allies and partners
ballistic missile capabilities, enabling South Korea
Unlike their North Atlantic equivalents, US alli- to produce and field longer-range systems that
ances in the Indo-Pacific have not been equipped provide it operational advantages vis-à-vis China
to deliver on the kind of industrial and techno- and North Korea.42
logical integration now being envisioned by the
By contrast, the administration is still refusing to
Biden administration.38 Protectionist instincts on
endorse India’s decision to purchase S-400 air
both sides of US politics make this unlikely to
defence systems from Russia on the grounds it
quickly change. For instance, efforts to improve
could jeopardise future arms sales, interoper-
US-Australia defence industry integration by
ability and technology cooperation.43 It is also
incorporating Australia into the US National
moving slowly on Canberra’s interest in acquiring
Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB) continue
US technical information to facilitate the estab-
to encounter legislative and political roadblocks
lishment of a sovereign guided weapons capa-
despite their sound strategic logic.39 Of greater
bility on Australian soil that could see it manu-
concern is that the Biden administration is tight-
facture long-range missiles for allied use.44 By
ening the Trump administration’s “Buy American”
increasing the ability of US allies and partners
regulations in ways that could further complicate
to defend themselves and contribute to collec-
industrial cooperation with close security part-
tive defence efforts, such initiatives offer mutual
ners.40 These and other impediments to integra-
strategic advantages. These self-strengthening
tion must be removed if Biden is to successfully
efforts should be embraced by the administra-
modernise US alliances in the Indo-Pacific.
tion as part of its alliance modernisation agenda.
UNITED STATES STUDIES CENTRE | FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENCE PROGRAM
12 CORRECTING THE COURSE: HOW THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION SHOULD COMPETE FOR INFLUENCE IN THE INDO-PACIFIC3. THE DEMOCRACY AGENDA
President Biden’s ambition to rally a global alli- An emphasis on democratic values is not new
ance of democracies to counter Russian and in US foreign policy. Yet, Biden’s worldview is
Chinese autocracies has re-emerged as a key distinct for its focus on democratic renewal
organising principle in US foreign policy. In a at home and abroad, an approach that fuses
major speech at the Munich Security Conference foreign and domestic policymaking to an unusual
in February, Biden laid out this vision in Mani- degree. By emphasising democratic renewal,
chean terms, describing the world as being at Biden is signalling a sharp departure from his
an “inflection point” between those who viewed predecessor who encouraged authoritarian lead-
autocracy as the best way forward and those ers abroad and undermined democratic norms
who understood that democracy was essential.45 at home, including by refusing to acknowledge
defeat in the 2020 election and fuelling the 6
Rather than being purely rhetorical, Biden’s
January Capitol riot.50 In contrast to the neo-con-
values-based foreign policy risks having a direct
servative approach to democracy promotion in
bearing on the United States’ Indo-Pacific strat-
the early 2000s51 — which stressed “America’s
egy. While the administration has shown it will
exceptional role as a promoter of the principles
deploy a different narrative in Southeast Asia, a
of liberty and democracy”52 — the Biden adminis-
confrontational and ideological approach to stra-
tration and Democratic Party regard US democ-
tegic competition with China may yet prove an
racy itself as being under threat from “without as
obstacle to deepening ties with a broader range
well as within.”53
of smaller countries who will be concerned by
the potential for this approach to contribute to
regional tensions and divisions. Managing rhetoric and reality
Although the administration has prominently
Ideology as a driving force broadcast its democracy agenda in domestic
and global forums, it has tried to use a softer
In Biden’s worldview, the United States is
narrative in the Indo-Pacific. Speaking at the IISS
engaged in a systems competition with China
Fullerton Forum in Singapore in July, Secretary
that will determine whether democracy or
of Defense Lloyd Austin did not resile from the
autocracy triumphs in a 21st-century struggle for
United States’ democratic values, but acknowl-
global order.”46 His belief that democracy is the
edged its recent “painful lapses,” confessing
United States’ most important strategic asset and
“When a democracy stumbles, everyone can
the “wellspring” of its power has made demo-
see and hear it.”54 This humble tone resonated
cratic strengthening a domestic and foreign
with Southeast Asian audiences and comple-
policy imperative.47 The administration’s Interim
mented a less confrontational approach towards
National Security Strategic Guidance articulates
China in his address. The Biden team has also
democracy revitalisation at home and abroad
tried to defuse concerns its values-based foreign
as an organising principle for US foreign policy
policy will undermine strategic ties with non-de-
and part of an ideological agenda that will allow
mocracies. It has signalled it will remain willing to
it to prevail in strategic competition with China.48
engage diplomatically and even improve ties with
The interim guidance defines Biden’s democracy
countries that have poor human rights records,
renewal agenda as encompassing many contem-
such as Vietnam.
porary priorities, including combating cross-bor-
der aggression, cyberattacks, disinformation
and digital authoritarianism, infrastructure and
energy coercion, and taking aim at corruption.49
UNITED STATES STUDIES CENTRE | FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENCE PROGRAM
CORRECTING THE COURSE: HOW THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION SHOULD COMPETE FOR INFLUENCE IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
13NATO leaders pose
for a group photo
in Brussels, 14
June 2021 (White
House Flickr)
Nonetheless, given the centrality of democratic four reasons. First, it misdiagnoses the nature
values to Biden’s domestic and foreign policy of US-China competition. As Chinese foreign
agenda, they will likely play a substantive — and policy experts have argued, the “true sources of
not merely rhetorical — role in US foreign policy. China’s foreign policy influence are transactional
Demonstrating the ability of democracies to meet and coercive, not ideological.”58 China’s influence
global challenges and deter autocratic threats building in the Indo-Pacific, for example, relies
was the central theme of Biden’s engagement more on its ability to benefit local elites and meet
with European partners at NATO, the G7 and the development needs than on the attractiveness
EU this year.55 For instance, Biden’s unveiling of of its political system.59 Beijing seeks a regional
the Build Back Better World Partnership at the order in which countries defer to its interests, but
G7 summit in Cornwall defined this signature it has proven equally adept at cultivating defer-
infrastructure initiative as one to be delivered by ence in flawed democracies such as Malaysia
“major democracies” as part of their competition and the Philippines as in non-democracies such
with China.56 More is likely to be revealed about as Thailand.60 If the United States and its allies
Biden’s agenda when he hosts a virtual Leaders’ fail to appreciate that China builds influence by
Summit for Democracy in December 2021, deliv- extending significant material benefits, especially
ering a pre-election commitment to “renew the to elites, they will continue to fail in delivering a
spirit and shared purpose of the nations of the competitive strategy for the region.
free world.”57
Second, despite the intuitive appeal in the West
of rallying the world’s democracies to check
The pitfalls of a values-based China’s power, this agenda can only unite a
strategy narrow coalition in the region. Unlike Western
Europe in the 1950s, Indo-Pacific political regimes
The Biden administration’s ideological foreign
are highly diverse with few liberal democracies
policy risks limiting its ability to compete effec-
in the mix.61 Indeed, many of the United States’
tively with China in the Indo-Pacific for at least
most important regional partners when it comes
UNITED STATES STUDIES CENTRE | FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENCE PROGRAM
14 CORRECTING THE COURSE: HOW THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION SHOULD COMPETE FOR INFLUENCE IN THE INDO-PACIFICto competition with China — such as the Philip- Finally, the administration’s ideological approach
pines, Singapore, Vietnam and, increasingly, India to competition with China may prove coun-
— fall outside the liberal democracy club, even as terproductive for Washington’s standing in
they share deep concerns about the nature and the Indo-Pacific. Even regional countries that
purpose of Chinese power.62 As such, explic- share US democratic values will be unsettled
itly defining strategic competition in ideological by a perception that US-China competition is
terms is likely to create distance between the developing along primarily ideological lines. As
world’s democracies and the regional countries Singaporean Prime Minister
Washington wants to assist. Lee Hsien Loong said in June, DESPITE THE INTUITIVE
working with China is a fact APPEAL IN THE WEST
Third, Biden’s prioritisation of global cooper-
of life for regional countries, OF RALLYING THE
ation with leading democracies could lead the WORLD’S DEMOCRACIES
adding that “you don’t have
administration to emphasise European allies over TO CHECK CHINA’S
to become like them, neither
emerging partners in the Indo-Pacific, which POWER, THIS AGENDA
can you hope to make them
are less likely to share US political values.63 This CAN ONLY UNITE A
become like you.”65 This prag- NARROW COALITION
may already be happening. Biden’s high-profile
matic attitude is characteristic IN THE REGION.
attendance at G7, NATO and EU summits were
of a region in which China is
important opportunities to show democracies
the economic heavyweight.66 Framing regional
can work together on global priorities.64 But simi-
strategy in terms of a struggle between democ-
lar forums of like-minded nations do not exist
racy and autocracy — or “freedom and tyranny”
in the Indo-Pacific. The Biden team must move
as former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo put
beyond its democracy renewal agenda when
it67 — suggests deeper and more permanent
engaging in regional architecture and should
divisions between opposing blocs. This makes
spend equal time and attention on its summits
Indo-Pacific countries worried they will lose their
with Asian partners, such as APEC and the
strategic autonomy and room for manoeuvre,
East Asia Summit, and with the G20’s broader
reducing the likelihood that they will support US
membership of Indo-Pacific countries.
policy objectives.
UNITED STATES STUDIES CENTRE | FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENCE PROGRAM
CORRECTING THE COURSE: HOW THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION SHOULD COMPETE FOR INFLUENCE IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
154. SLOW MOVING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Owing to its size, strategic geography and the security ties with Vietnam, many Southeast Asian
fluidity of countries’ alignment decisions, South- countries saw strident anti-China rhetoric from
east Asia is an important nexus of strategic key figures like Secretary Pompeo as contributing
competition in the Indo-Pacific.68 It is also where to regional tensions.75 Coming from this low base,
China’s expanding strategic influence is having most respondents to a late 2020 ISEAS survey of
the most immediate impact on the regional order, respondents from the ten ASEAN member states
both on land and at sea. Viewed from the region, expected US engagement with Southeast Asia to
the United States cannot increase in 2021 under Biden’s presidency.76
OVERSIGHTS LIKE THESE achieve its Indo-Pacific goal
PROMPTED CRITICISM Despite relative US inattention, China, Japan,
of maintaining a favourable
FROM REGIONAL regional balance of power
India and Australia have all recognised South-
COMMENTATORS THAT east Asia’s strategic importance and stepped-up
THE UNITED STATES without competing effectively
diplomatic activity over the past four years.
RISKED “LOSING” TO in Southeast Asia.
China’s face-to-face diplomacy with the region
CHINA AND NEEDED
TO ACT FAST TO Yet the Biden administration has maintained momentum throughout the
REDRESS A NARRATIVE showed a lack of urgency in pandemic. Since October 2020, Chinese Foreign
OF “NEGLECT.” its approach to Southeast Asia Minister Wang Yi has visited every ASEAN coun-
in its first six months in office. try except Vietnam77 and hosted the ASEAN
Moreover, the administration’s broader priorities foreign ministers for a meeting in Chongqing.78
— which emphasise working with major part- Likewise, Japan has treated Southeast Asia as an
ners and fellow democracies to counter China urgent foreign policy priority, as shown by Prime
globally, and do not include a strong economic Minister Yoshihide Suga’s decision to make his
agenda for the region — suggest a growing stra- first overseas trip as prime minister to Indonesia
tegic divergence between Southeast Asian and and Vietnam last October.79 In late 2020, Australia
US interests which may prove challenging for announced more than A$550 million in devel-
Washington to address. opment assistance for the region,80 redressing
criticism that it has focused on the Pacific at the
expense of Southeast Asia.81
A legacy of neglect
Yet the Biden administration was slow to engage
Allegations of neglect have characterised the
with Southeast Asia. While Deputy Secretary
United States’ engagement with Southeast Asia
of State Wendy Sherman visited three regional
since at least the 1970s,69 but President Biden
countries in May, no cabinet-level official visited
inherited a particularly troubled legacy from his
until Secretary Austin went to Singapore, Vietnam
predecessor.70 The Trump administration left
and the Philippines in July. President Biden failed
ambassador posts such as Singapore vacant for
to make introductory phone calls with Southeast
the entirety of its administration71 and consist-
Asian counterparts,82 and an important meet-
ently snubbed the key regional meeting, the East
ing between Secretary Blinken and his ASEAN
Asia Summit.72 More importantly, following its
counterparts was repeatedly delayed.83 Biden
withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership
has not nominated ambassadors to its South-
(TPP) in 2017, the United States never imple-
east Asian alliance partners the Philippines or
mented a positive economic strategy for the
Thailand84 — both of whom took note when
region.73 Such missteps contributed to a regional
they were not mentioned in the administration’s
perception of declining US influence.74 While the
Interim National Security Strategic Guidance.85
Trump administration successfully strengthened
UNITED STATES STUDIES CENTRE | FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENCE PROGRAM
16 CORRECTING THE COURSE: HOW THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION SHOULD COMPETE FOR INFLUENCE IN THE INDO-PACIFICOversights like these prompted criticism from
regional commentators that the United States
risked “losing” to China and needed to act fast to
redress a narrative of “neglect.”86
Signs of improvement
Since early July, the Biden administration
has made substantial efforts to address these
criticisms, which National Security Coun-
cil Indo-Pacific Coordinator Kurt Campbell
implicitly acknowledged when he signalled the
administration’s intention to step up its game
in Southeast Asia.87 In mid-July, Blinken held a
Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Executive Director of the
long-postponed meeting with ASEAN foreign International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) James Crabtree at an
ministers.88 Two weeks later, Secretary Austin IISS event in Singapore, 27 July 2021 (US Secretary of Defense Flickr)
made a well-received visit to the region. His
speech to the IISS Fullerton Forum in Singapore nam in August,92 helping to maintain momentum
— which he was originally due to deliver at the from the positive outcomes of the Austin visit.
cancelled Shangri-La Dialogue in May — empha-
Washington’s tardiness in engaging Southeast
sised the importance of partnerships to address
Asia suggests the benefits of doing so were not
the COVID-19 recovery and regional security
front of mind for an administration more focused
challenges. Austin’s remarks about China were
on major traditional allies in Europe and North-
well-calibrated to Southeast Asian sensitivities.
east Asia. The United States needed to be pushed
Specifically, the secretary said he was committed
through public criticism, and perhaps through
to a “constructive, stable” relationship with China
private representations from partners, to focus
and endorsed Singaporean Prime Minister Lee’s
on the region. Yet, the administration’s ability to
influential view that the United States should not
course-correct suggests a willingness to adapt
ask regional countries to choose between it and
to changing circumstances which will help the
China. Austin’s measured tone was welcomed
United States succeed. And the warm recep-
by Southeast Asian expert commentators as
tion that Austin received in Southeast Asia93 may
evidence that the Biden team was listening to
help encourage further administration attention,
regional concerns.89
creating a positive foundation for personal rela-
Austin’s subsequent visits to Vietnam and the tionships and trust to grow.
Philippines were also well received. In Hanoi, he
signed an agreement to cooperate on the loca-
Challenges ahead
tion and identification of war remains,90 while in
Manila he secured a crucial outcome — an agree- Notwithstanding these improvements, the Biden
ment by President Rodrigo Duterte not to abro- administration still has much work to do if it is
gate the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), a vital to improve the United States’ position in South-
framework enabling the US military presence in east Asia. By laying out a vision for US-South-
the Philippines.91 The US announced Vice Pres- east Asia cooperation in Singapore, Austin estab-
ident Kamala Harris’ visit to Singapore and Viet- lished a foundation for further engagement
UNITED STATES STUDIES CENTRE | FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENCE PROGRAM
CORRECTING THE COURSE: HOW THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION SHOULD COMPETE FOR INFLUENCE IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
17with ASEAN and individual countries. But even Biden’s emphasis on revitalising democracy
signature achievements — like the agreement around the world does not naturally lend itself
by Duterte to maintain the VFA — restore, rather to a focus on a region that is home to only one
than advance, the United States’ position. The full democracy.98 Pragmatically, Austin’s Singa-
US-Philippines alliance must now address chal- pore speech did not repeat the administra-
lenging issues in the South China Sea and tackle tion’s rhetoric defining competition with China
the implementation of the Enhanced Defense as one between democracy and autocracy —
Cooperation Agreement, a 2014 deal that has the an implicit concession that this framing will not
potential to strengthen US military presence in work in Southeast Asia. The administration has
the Philippines, including by rotating US forces also shown pragmatism in other aspects of its
and upgrading bases for joint use.94 Progress on engagement. For example, in responding to the
these fronts requires sustained investment. February 2021 coup in Myanmar, Washington
supported the ASEAN-led response99 and has
The Biden administration’s lack of an economic
not allowed the presence of Myanmar junta
strategy for the region also poses challenges.
representatives to deter it from participating
The Obama administration’s pivot to Asia —
in ASEAN meetings.100 A visit to Cambodia by
which was designed to make Southeast Asia the
Deputy Secretary Sherman, the highest-level
primary beneficiary — was driven by an under-
visit to that country in a decade,101 may also indi-
standing that the United States would benefit
cate the Biden team’s intention to engage rather
from deeper integration with growing economies
than isolate countries with poor human rights
in the Indo-Pacific, a belief that found its expres-
records. For the time being, the administration
sion in the TPP.95 Although it failed to deliver, this
has managed the tension between its ideological
was the right approach. In a region that tends to
framing of the China challenge and the prefer-
value economic cooperation more highly than
ences of Southeast Asian countries. But this will
security cooperation,96 the absence of a shared
continue to be a tightrope for the United States
prosperity agenda makes it difficult for Washing-
to walk. If the Biden team does not come to see
ton to approach Southeast Asia in a positive way
Southeast Asia as sufficiently supportive of its
— rather than as a “derivative of strategic compe-
global priorities, it is likely to focus its efforts
tition with China.”97 The Biden administration has
elsewhere — leaving the region once again as a
not set its sights on the TPP, lowering its ambi-
second-order task for US foreign policy.
tion to explore a digital trade agreement instead.
Even if it comes to fruition, Southeast Asia will
see this as a weak substitute for a comprehensive
approach to economic cooperation, especially
to promote recovery from COVID-19.
UNITED STATES STUDIES CENTRE | FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENCE PROGRAM
18 CORRECTING THE COURSE: HOW THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION SHOULD COMPETE FOR INFLUENCE IN THE INDO-PACIFICYou can also read
