Croatia's Presidency of the European Union and the Western Balkans . A New Momentum or a Missed Opportunity? - De Gruyter

Südosteuropa 68 (2020), no. 4, pp. 554–568

                                     COMMENTARY

                                    TIHOMIR CIPEK

 Croatia’s Presidency of the European Union and the Western
   Balkans. A New Momentum or a Missed Opportunity?

Abstract. This text will reconstruct the main determinants of Croatia’s foreign policy to the
European Union (EU) and the Western Balkans. It will demonstrate why, after joining the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the EU, Croatia needs a new foreign policy
goal. I will advocate a thesis that Croatia is looking for a place of its own within the EU,
but that it has not yet managed to find it due to its dual foreign policies approach—the
government’s, which was pro-European, and that of the previous president of the country,
which was pro-American. The election of the new president and the presidency of the EU
has given Croatia a chance to set a new goal for its foreign policy. Specifically, in its focus
on Europe, could Croatia’s new role be found in guiding the enlargement process in the
Western Balkans?

Tihomir Cipekis a Professor of Croatian and Comparative Politics in the Faculty of Political
Sciences at the University of Zagreb, Croatia.

                  Croatia’s Accession to the European Union
After the coalition of left-liberal parties won the election in 2000, the main for-
eign policy goal of Croatian political elites was to join the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). This was understood as
the project that would definitely set Croatia apart from the Balkans, ‘bring it
back to Europe’, and guarantee its safety and economic development. This was
the goal over which the two leading Croatian parties—the centre-right Chris-
tian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ) and the centre-left
Social Democratic Party of Croatia (Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske, SDP)—
managed to reach a consensus. Consequently, the Republic of Croatia signed
the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU in 2001. It ap-
plied to become an EU member in 2003 and was officially granted candidate
status by the EU institutions in 2004. Accession negotiations began in 2005
and were successfully finalised on 30 June 2011 despite an initial blockade by
Slovenia, which used its position to resolve a border issue with Croatia—On
9 December of the same year, Croatia signed the Treaty of Accession.

Croatia’s Presidency of the European Union and the Western Balkans            555

   Once negotiations were finally concluded after ten years, Croatia’s reason for
entering the EU was not as clear anymore, especially since the Eurozone was
experiencing a substantial debt crisis. Many Croats feared Croatia would lose
its sovereignty and once again become part of a supranational entity.1Political
elites became aware of a growing Euroscepticism and decided to change the
constitutional provision that mandated a referendum before entering into an
alliance with other countries. A study from November 2010 (i. e. a year before
the referendum) predicted the referendum turnout would be around 50 %, with
64 % voting in favour of EU membership and 29 % against it. In response, the
Croatian Parliament changed the rules for referendum validity and eliminated
the regulation that at least 50 % of all registered voters must vote in the referen-
dum in July 2011. ‘The referendum on EU accession was held on 22 January
2012; the turnout was 43.5 %, of which 66 % voted in favour of joining the Un-
ion, and 33.1 % was against it.’2 The referendum turnout was 11 % lower than
the turnout for the parliamentary elections held a month and a half earlier,
on 4 December 2011. With this low turnout, Croatian citizens broke the previ-
ous lowest referendum turnout for EU membership held by Hungary in April
2003, in which only 45.6 % of the electorate took part.3 Croatia’s low turnout
happened despite the political elite’s narrative that joining the EU would sig-
nify a return to its ‘natural surroundings’, or rather a final departure from the
Balkans. This discourse was clearly meant to flatter the Croatian public and
convince them that Croatia’s accession to the EU is a process of recognising
the European characteristics that the country always had, instead of a process
in which Croatian state institutions are fulfilling prescribed economic, legal
and political requirements. In other words, a process of building effective state
institutions based on liberal-democratic values. Considering the attitude of a
large part of the Croatian public was indifferent towards EU membership, the
political and economic elites were forced to construct a reality and change stat-
utory provisions. Without the change to the constitutional provisions regarding
referendum turnout, Croatia’s referendum on joining the EU would not have
been a success. However, this does not mean that Croats are big Euro-sceptics.
When it comes to the EU, Croatian citizens are actually quite indifferent.

   1 Božo Skoko, Percepcija EU u hrvatskoj javnosti. Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva 3, 1,
(2006), 349–368, https://hrcak.srce.hr/38277. All internet references were accessed on 20 Au-
gust 2020.
   2 Tihomir Cipek, European Elections in Croatia, Political Preferences, no. 9 (2014), 21–38,
26, https://journals.us.edu.pl/index.php/PP/article/view/4259.
   3 Dieter Nohlen / Philip Stöver, Elections in Europe. A Data Handbook, Baden-Baden
2010, 912.

556                                     Tihomir Cipek

                            Euro-Indifference in Croatia
A good description of the Croatian public’s attitude towards the EU, but also
that of other nations in Southeastern Europe, was provided by Dejan Jović who
defined it as ‘Euro-indifference’.4 The term implies that the majority of the pub-
lic is neither for nor against the EU, but considers their country’s accession to
be an unavoidable process that they cannot do anything about. ‘Results of the
referendum on the EU show that Croatia is primarily a Euro-indifferent, and
not an especially Euro-sceptic or Euro-enthusiastic country. In this, it increas-
ingly resembles current EU member states, as well as many other candidate and
potential candidate countries.’5 Many citizens are aware that their respective
countries are not—nor can they be—active players in international politics as
such. That is why EU accession is simply accepted as a process that is entirely in
the EU’s hands. Croatian accession to the EU in 2013 was primarily experienced
emotionally, not rationally. This stemmed from an understanding of national
identity and not of material interests.6 Such attitude of Croatian citizens was
explained by the features of the government’s campaign for joining the EU
aimed at their emotions, but failed to highlight Croatia’s interest in joining up.
Also counterproductive were the messages that Croatia would face an econom-
ic collapse unless it became an EU member. Today, the Croatian public thinks
that the EU is divided into a core that profits from the Union, and a periphery
that must abide by the interest of the core.7 This attitude was also revealed by
the 2019 European elections in Croatia. The consensus was that Croatian mem-
bership to the EU was good, and the magic words—European funds—were
especially convincing. It is namely clear that Croatia received more funds than
it invests in the budget.8 Of course, other indicators such as foreign investments
and the GDP growth are not so unambiguous. “After six long years of recession,
in 2015 Croatia managed to realise real GDP growth of 2.4 percent. Economic
recovery continued in 2016 and 2017. Despite this fact, it should be noted that

    4 Dejan Jović, Hrvatski referendum o članstvu u Europskoj uniji i njegove posljedice za
smanjeni Zapadni Balkana, Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva 9, no. 1 (2013), 163–182, https://
hrcak.srce.hr/99808.
    5 Jović, Hrvatski referendum, 165.
    6 Senada Šelo-Šabić, Croatian Fast-Forward Foreign Policy. From Yugoslavia to the EU, in:
Soeren Keil / Bernhard Stahl, eds, The Foreign Policies of Post-Yugoslav States, Basingstoke
2014, 69–93.
    7 Ana Brakuš, U Hrvatskoj je euroskepticizam veći nego u ostatku Europske unije, Fakto-
graf, 26 April 2019, https://faktograf.hr/2019/04/26/u-hrvatskoj-je-euroskepticizam-veci-neg
o-u-ostatku-europske-unije/.
    8 Koliko Hrvatska daje, a koliko dobiva iz proračuna Europske unije?, Faktograf,
30 April 2019, https://faktograf.hr/2019/04/30/koliko-hrvatska-daje-a-koliko-dobiva-iz-pro​
ra​cuna-europske-unije/; Pet godina u EU. Hrvatska u EU, 2018, http://www.mvep.hr/files/
file/2018/181022-pet-godina-clanstva-hrvatske-u-europskoj-uniji.pdf.

Croatia’s Presidency of the European Union and the Western Balkans               557

real production (GDP) in 2017 is still lower compared to the 2008 level”.9 There
is also a demographic deficit caused by massive emigration from the country,
as well as a trade deficit. But, despite all of this, the majority of Croatian citi-
zens support EU membership. For one, this can be deduced from the election
results for the European Parliament, in which Eurosceptic parties did not do
well.10 However, it is also a fact that a new wave of Croatian nationalism is
gaining strength; by chasing the ghost of the past—‘commies’, ‘Yugoslavs’,
and ‘Serbs’—it is actually protesting against the basic values of the Enlighten-
ment and liberalism.11 But so far, this nationalism has not succeeded in form-
ing a strong party of the radical anti-European right. What has become clear
is that radically-Catholic and nationalist civil society organisations are grow-
ing stronger. But even those organisations do not generally deny the need for
Croatia to be part of the EU; they just ask that the Union returns to ‘Christian
roots’ and becomes antiliberal. They are trying to tear down the achievements
of Croatian republicanism and, more broadly, deny the contemporary attain-
ments of the Enlightenment and the social consensus that has been achieved by
the centre-right and centre-left parties in Europe. What is actually happening is
that populist parties, and not only Croatian ones, are attacking the ideological
core of the EU. Namely, not just the economic community that is the EU, but
as a community of ideas and political values.

                           Two Croatian Foreign Policies
According to the Croatian constitution, foreign policy is led by the government
and the president of the country. Of course, the assumption is that they would
work in close cooperation and in mutual agreement. What is interesting is that,
in spite of being from the same party, the prime minister Andrej Plenković
(since 2016) and the president Kolinda Grabar Kitarović (from 2015 to 2020)
have led quite different foreign policies. The president was the candidate of the
radically-right part of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), led by Tomislav
Karamarko. She conducted a policy of catering to the right-wing of Croatian
politics, supporting the conservative referenda of the organisation U ime obitelji
(In the name of the family) and the radically-right politics of nationality and
security. Typically for Croatian radically-conservative politics, she supported
the US and president Trump, singling them out as a role model to be followed.

   9 Goran Buturac, Gospodarski rast, konvergencija i članstvo u EU: Empirijski dokazi iz
Hrvatske, Ekonomski pregled, 70, 2 (2019), 178.
   10 Cipek, European Elections in Croatia, 33.
   11 Tihomir Cipek, The Spectre of Communism Is Haunting Croatia. The Croatian Right’s
Image of the Enemy, Politička misao. Croatian Political Science Review 54, no.1–2 (2017), 150–169,
http://hrcak.srce.hr/183304.

558                                     Tihomir Cipek

In internal affairs she pushed for the privatisation of all public goods, including
the healthcare system, and in foreign policy she clearly followed US interests.
First of all, she constantly highlighted the Three Seas Initiative (Baltic, Black
and Adriatic Sea), whose realisation would have effectuated some sort of a
new wall towards Russia and turned the involved countries into permanent
border guards of Europe. Secondly, she supported the idea of ‘new sovereign-
ty’, which was code for US protectionism and renouncement of support for
global institutions. his policy has manifested for example in the US cutting ties
with the World Health Organisation. Thirdly, she fully followed US policy in
the region. When the United States decided to support Aleksandar Vučić, the
president of Serbia who was seen as the politician to accomplish an agreement
between Serbia and Kosovo, Grabar Kitarović invited him for an official visit
without squaring it first with the government, or rather with the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Some coordination did occur later, but the public was left with
a strong impression that the country was leading different politics.12 Fourth,
despite organising the visit of the Serbian president, in her public appearances
she emphasised that Croatia should not have anything to do with the countries
in the region, and that it should form stronger ties with the countries of the
Visegrad Group.
   On the other side, prime minister Andrej Plenković led an unambiguously
pro-European government. As current president of HDZ, he politically came
of age in EU institutions and used to be a representative in the European Par-
liament. The EU was considered to be the proper institutional space in which
Croatia should operate. Firstly, the government has tried to follow the Europe-
an Commission’s policies related to development funds. Secondly, the impor-
tance of all European declarations have been highlighted, especially those that
repeated the inane mantra about two equivalent totalitarianisms.13 Thirdly, the
government constantly tried to demonstrate that Euro-scepticism has no real
foundation in Croatia, emphasised by rightly pointed out that Croatia received
more money from EU funds than it paid into them. The fourth point is that the
government could not openly oppose the US plan for the Three Seas, but it also
did not support it. Lastly, as far as the EU’s enlargement policy, the government
stood firmly by it. Joining the Schengen area is in Croatia’s interest, and the
enlargement policy assist in achieving that.

   12 Davor Ivanović, Dvije hrvatske vanjske politike, Večernji list, 25 January 2017, https://
www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/ima-li-hrvatska-dvije-vanjske-politike-1144682; Hrvatska je
opet čuđenje u svijetu. Jedna država dvije vanjske politike, Slobodna Dalmacija, 8 ­October
2015, https://slobodnadalmacija.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/hrvatska-je-opet-cudenje-u-svijetu-​
jedna-drzava-dvije-vanjske-politike-288965.
   13 Zoran Pusić, The importance of European remembrance for the future of Europe,
Peščanik, 12 December 2019, https://pescanik.net/the-importance-of-european-remembrance-​
for-the-future-of-europe/.

Croatia’s Presidency of the European Union and the Western Balkans              559

   Due to a lack of foreign policy coordination between the president and the
prime minister, Croatia has usually opted for a policy of silence, or rather of
non-antagonisation. This has gone so far that the public often claimed that
Croatia had no foreign policy of its own.14 It seems that, since joining the NATO
in 2009 and the EU in 2013, Croatia has not managed to find a clear foreign
policy goal.
   The situation changed after Grabar Kitarović, as HDZ’s candidate, lost the
presidential election at the end of 2019. The winner was the candidate with
backing from the Social Democratic Party and other centre-left parties, Zoran
Milanović. He has promised to run a foreign policy in coordination with the
EU, spoke critically about the previous president’s policies including the Tree
Seas initiative, and was also decidedly critical of Serbia’s politics as well as
those of other countries in the region. It seems that Milanović will pursue a
policy of trying to find a niche in which Croatia could be affirmed as a capable
member of the EU. In their basic outline, the policies of the president and the
prime minister do not really differ. Both think the emphasis of Croatia’s foreign
policy should be on work within the institutions of the EU. A chance to develop
a policy that would show Croatia affirming itself as an expert for the countries
of the Western Balkan, and thus also for EU enlargement in the region, was pro-
vided by the Croatian presidency of the EU. Paradoxically, it seems that, while
still part of the Western Balkans, Croatia was qualified to understand it. Now
that it left the Balkans to join the EU, its foreign policy is struggling to find its
place in what it likes to call its ‘natural’ environment—Central Europe and the
Mediterranean. But it is not succeeding. Member states of the Visegrad Group
remain cold towards Croatia’s occasionally exhibited desires at rapprochement,
which reaffirms the impression that Croatia is lost in its own foreign policy.

               Expert for the Western Balkans. A New Goal of
                           Croatia’s Foreign Policy?
Croatia was thus left to focus on the same thing that it did before it entered the
EU—the Western Balkans—even though its entry into the EU was supposed to
mean that it was ‘leaving the Balkans’. It found itself in a paradoxical situation
of wanting to have influence in the region it had left. Paradoxically, but true,
Croatia lost a part of its influence in the Western Balkans precisely because it
no longer belonged to this group of countries, and was thus forced to come up
with a different strategy towards the region—this time, in coordination with

    14 Željko Trkanjec, Zašto je hrvatska vanjska politika nevidljiva. Zato što je nema!, Jutarnji
list, 25 May 2018, https://www.jutarnji.hr/komentari/zasto-je-hrvatska-vanjska-politi​ka-nev​
id​ljiva-zato-sto-je-nema-zbog-niza-pogresaka-i-promasaja-mogli-bismo-izdati-priruc​nik-​
kako-ne-postupati/7394187/.

560                                       Tihomir Cipek

other EU countries.15 In forming its new foreign policy goal, Croatia can em-
brace one of the foreign policy strategies available to small countries, ‘which do
not have the instruments to shape the international environment’.16
   Croatian political scientist Dejan Jović firmly points to Hill’s theses.17 He
quotes Hill’s theory that, when it comes to foreign policy, small countries have
the following possibilities: 1) foreign policy that is focused on preservation, or
rather survival; 2) multilateralism as a form of shelter in international relations;
3) foreign policy focused on one specific task, meaning specialisation or a niche;
and 4) foreign policy of silence (quietism).18 Seeing how Croatia definitely be-
longs to the group of small countries, the most appropriate political strategies
in the current circumstances seem to have been the strategy of silence, or now
turning towards finding a foreign policy niche in which it can affirm itself.
   After achieving its foreign policy goals of joining the NATO (1 April 2009)
and the EU (1 July 2013), Croatia has not manage to find a new goal for its for-
eign policy, which has led it to the strategy of silence. Happy to be ‘out of the
Balkans’, it initially did not consider the possibility of specialising precisely in
the region of Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Mac-
edonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia). Today, Croatian foreign policy is
facing the following question: can it, and does it want to, specialise in a specific
area? Can it become the EU member specialised in the enlargement into the
Western Balkans, or rather for the development of cooperation in this region?
Of course, this decision is also a matter of Croatia’s internal affairs. Parties of
the centre-right and left are disposed to pro-European policies and the devel-
opment of regional cooperation, while the radical-right has built its politics on
fomenting conflict in the region, particularly with Serbia.
   Croatian presidency of the EU (from 1 January 2020 to 30 June 2020) has
posed new challenges for its politics. At the forefront was further enlargement
of the EU to the region. This is an issue that is strongly connected with the EU’s
global ambitions and its place in the system of international relations in which
an increasingly important part is played by China.19 The new system of interna-
tional relations is also reflected in the situation of the region. In addition to the
EU and the US, the Western Balkans are increasingly marked by the presence
of Russia, China and Turkey. This has also affected the attitude of Croatia’s
foreign policy towards EU enlargement into the Western Balkans. Croatia has

    15 Dejan Jović, Hrvatska vanjska politika pred izazovima članstva u Europskoj Uni-
ji, Politička misao. Croatian Political Science Review 48, no. 2, (2011), 7–36, https://hrcak.srce.
hr/72011.
    16 Christopher Hill, What Is to Be Done? Foreign Policy as a Site for Political Action, Inter-
national Affairs 79, no. 2 (2003), 233–255, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3095819.
    17 Jović, Hrvatska vanjska politika, 12.
    18 Hill, What Is to Be Done?, 247.
    19 Kishore Mahbubani, Has the West Lost It? A Provocation, London 2018.

Croatia’s Presidency of the European Union and the Western Balkans   561

decided to stand firmly behind the enlargement process, leading to trying to
find its niche as a country that understands the circumstances in the region.

                   The Goals of the Croatian EU Presidency
Almost all the priorities of Croatia’s EU presidency—‘Europe that develops,
Europe that connects, Europe that protects, and Influential Europe’—received
heavy blows on a daily basis, perhaps the heaviest in the history of the EU.
Already in its early days of the coronavirus pandemic, the EU’s most important
achievements were overturned. Overnight member states independently and
without agreement at the European level closed the Schengen borders to pro-
tect their territories and their citizens. States have limited or banned the export
of medical equipment to other member states in order to secure enough medi-
cal supplies for their own citizens. Some states have initiated overt campaigns
of buying and selling only domestic products, while the free market has been
put on hold. In the eyes of millions of Europeans, the ‘Influential Europe’ disap-
peared overnight while anticipating any kind of reaction from its institutions.
A similar fate was suffered by the key goals set by Croatia at the beginning of
its EU presidency. ‘As well as its basic priorities, the Republic of Croatia will
be placing focus on the following issues during its upcoming Presidency: a) An
ambitious, sustainable and balanced Multiannual Financial Framework for the
period 2021–2027, b) Implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights,
c) Stopping negative demographic trends Connectivity: the Trans-European
Transport Network and the CEF (Connecting Europe Facility), d) Implementa-
tion of the European Pillar of Social Rights, f) Security, strategic guidelines for
free, safe and just European Union, g) Enlargement policy and the EU-Western
Balkans summit, h) Green Europe and a ‘Green Deal’, i) New job markets, the
importance of knowledge, education, innovation and lifelong learning, j) Con-
necting the EU with the public, particularly young people, k) Democratisation,
the fundamental values of the Union, the fight against fake news, intolerance
and disinformation on digital platforms.’20 This turned out to be a mere recital
of all the challenges facing the EU today, without any particularly original
contribution from Croatia.
   Still, as the central event of its presidency, the Croatian government planned
a summit in Zagreb, May 2020, inviting all EU heads of governments and states.
The purpose was to use this meeting to highlight the need for the countries
of the Western Balkans—North Macedonia and Albania in particular—to be-
come members of the EU. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the meeting was
held online and its conclusions were disappointing for the Western Balkan

  20   EU 2020 HR, Program and Priorities, https://eu2020.hr/Home/Custom?code=Topics.

562                                  Tihomir Cipek

states. In fact, the 2000 EU summit held in Zagreb was much more forthright
in promising to enlarge and accept Western Balkan countries as its members
than this one, held twenty years later. ‘The European Union confirms its wish to
contribute to the consolidation of democracy and to give its resolute support to
the process of reconciliation and cooperation between the countries concerned.
It reaffirms the European perspective of the countries participating in the sta-
bilization and association process and their status as potential candidates for
membership in accordance with the Feira conclusions.’21 Even more clearly:
‘This stabilization and association process is at the heart of the Union’s policy
towards the five countries concerned. It takes account of the situation of each
country and is based on respect for the conditions defined by the Council on
29 April 1997 concerning democratic, economic and institutional reforms. On
the basis of these criteria, the Union proposes an individualized approach to
each of these countries, the content of which appears in the Annex. The pros-
pect of accession is offered on the basis of the provision of the Treaty on EU,
respect for the criteria defined at the Copenhagen European Council in June
1993 and the progress made in implementing the stabilization and association
agreements, in particular on regional cooperation.’22 Namely, it has become
clear that the enthusiasm around EU enlargement emerged precisely at the
time when the region came under the increasing influence of Russia, China
and Turkey.
   Besides the hesitation and reluctance on the part of France and the Nether-
lands regarding the opening of accession talks voiced in October 2019, another
obstacle to EU enlargement to the Western Balkans is the state of democracy
in those countries.23 What is especially interesting is that, unlike the previous
situations when the process of negotiating and meeting conditions for join-
ing the EU also brought the development of democracy in member states, the
Western Balkans went through a reverse process. For example, according to
the Freedom House study Nations in Transit 2020, the level of democracy in
the Western Balkans even regressed.24 It appears that Montenegro, which has
been negotiating for admission since 2012 and has opened 32 negotiating chap-
ters—meaning all but the one on competition policy—did not experience any
development of democracy. The situation is similar in Serbia, which began

   21 European Commission, Zagreb Summit 24 November 2000. Final Declaration, https://
www.esiweb.org/pdf/bridges/bosnia/ZagrebSummit24Nov2000.pdf.
   22 European Commission, Zagreb Summit 24 November 2000. Final Declaration.
   23 Michael Peel, France Objects to North Macedonia and Albania EU Accession
Talks, Financial Times, 15 October 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/fce9e9a0-ef36-11e9-
ad1e-4367d8281195; EU Blocks Albania and North Macedonia membership bids, BBC, 18 Oc-
tober 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50100201.
   24 Zselyke Csaky, Nations in Transit 2020, Freedom House, 6 May 2020, https://freedom-
house.org/report/nations-transit/2020/dropping-democratic-facade.

Croatia’s Presidency of the European Union and the Western Balkans            563

Table 1. State of democracy in the Western Balkans and Croatia in 2020

 Country                    Total Score                           Democracy        Democracy
                                                                  Percentage         Score
 Albania                    47 Transitional or Hybrid Regime         47.02           3.82
 Bosnia and H
            ­ erzegovina    39 Transitional or Hybrid Regime         38.69           3.32
 Kosovo                     36 Transitional or Hybrid Regime         36.31           3.18
 Montenegro                 48 Transitional or Hybrid Regime         47.62           3.86
 North Macedonia            46 Transitional or Hybrid Regime         45.83           3.75
 Serbia                     49 Transitional or Hybrid Regime         49.40           3.96
 Croatia                    54 Semi-Consolidated Democracy           54.17           4.25
Source: Zselyke Csaky, Nations in Transit 2020. Dropping the Democratic Facade, Freedom House,
6 May 2020, 24–25, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-04/05062020_FH_NIT2020_vfi​
nal.pdf.

membership negotiations in 2014. According to the Freedom House report,
these countries were semi-consolidated democracies but ‘recently dropped into
the Transitional/Hybrid Regime category’. Furthermore, ‘Montenegro joined
Serbia in leaving the group of democracies in the 2019 report, after hovering
above the threshold for a decade. Both countries registered further declines.’25
  Paradoxically, studies have shown that countries that did not open member-
ship negotiations achieved more progress in terms of democracy than those
that met the conditions for accession. ‘Positive news emerged elsewhere in
the Balkans, as Kosovo and North Macedonia earned multiple score improve-
ments. Kosovo is the only country in the report’s coverage area to secure gains
in each of the last five years. Still, recent developments in both countries have
cast doubt on future progress.’26
  It should be noted that transitional/hybrid regimes have a democracy score
between 3.01 and 4.00 on the Freedom House scale. Countries with this score
are electoral democracies, but their democratic institutions are fragile and there
are significant challenges in protecting political rights and civil liberties. It is
interesting that Slovenia, as a consolidated democracy with a score of 5.93, is
included in the same group as the democratic countries of Western Europe. Ac-
cording to the same study, Russia had a score of 1.39, and was grouped in with
the consolidated authoritarian regimes. The report also stated that Hungary,
an EU member state with the level of a consolidated democracy and a score of

  25  Csaky, Nations in Transit 2020.
  26  Freedom House, New Report: Nations in Transit 2020 Finds Weakened Institutions in
Europe and Eurasia as Politicians Flout Democratic Norms, 6 May 2020, https://freedom-
house.org/article/new-report-nations-transit-2020-finds-weakened-institutions-europe-and-
eur​asia-politicians.

564                                    Tihomir Cipek

5.61, has fallen to the level of a transitional/hybrid regime with a 3.96 score.27
These Freedom House studies thus show that EU membership does not in itself
guarantee a development of democracy. Despite years-long membership in
the Union, part of the public in Eastern European countries is having trouble
accepting the liberal features of democracy.28
   The process of accepting new members into the EU is plagued by challenges.
It seems that there is at least some truth to the thesis that we are witnessing a
play in which the EU is pretending to want to spread to the Western Balkans,
while those countries are pretending to want to introduce reforms. However,
not all countries in the region, or rather their general public, have the same at-
titude toward the EU.29 The biggest enthusiasm for joining the EU is displayed
by Albania and Kosovo, while Slavic countries in the region are showing less
and less ambition. The attitude that prevails among the general public in these
countries, especially in Serbia, is Euro-indifference. There is no great opposition
to accession, but not much enthusiasm either. The accession is viewed as a pro-
cess which cannot and should not be resisted, but one which depends entirely
on the decisions of the EU central states. This opinion is not baseless, but it does
not account for individual responsibility of democratic and economic develop-
ment. A possible solution can be found in renewing the process of negotiation
and a long-term strengthening of democratic values through civil society, but
also through the respective political institutions.
   Croatia’s EU presidency remained in the shadow of the crisis caused by the
coronavirus, but there is no doubt that Croatia tried to prove itself as an ex-
pert for EU enlargement to the region. This is where it saw its foreign policy
niche. Croatian diplomacy considers the opening of accession negotiations
with North Macedonia and Albania in March 2020 to be the great success of
its presidency.30 On 24 March 2020, EU ministers in charge of European is-
sues reached a political agreement on opening accession talks with Albania

    27 Csaky, Nations in Transit 2020. It should be noted that the concept of hybrid regimes
in not indisputable, Leonardo Morlino, Are There Hybrid Regimes? Or Are They Just an
Optical Illusion?, European Political Science Review 1, no. 2, (2009), 273–296, DOI: 10.1017/
S1755773909000198.
    28 Ivan Krastev / Stephen Holmes, The Light That Failed. Why the West Is Losing the Fight
for Democracy, New York 2020.
    29 Western Balkans Between East and West. Public Opinion Research in Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, November 2018, https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/
files/Download%20Report_0.pdf.
    30 Vlada Republike Hrvatske, Otvaranjem pristupnih pregovora sa Sjevernom Makedoni-
jom i Albanijom ispunjen jedan od prioriteta hrvatskog predsjedanja, 25 March 2020, https://
vlada.gov.hr/vijesti/otvaranjem-pristupnih-pregovora-sa-sjevernom-makedonijom-i-alba​
nijom-ispunjen-jedan-od-prioriteta-hrvatskog-predsjedanja/29079.

Croatia’s Presidency of the European Union and the Western Balkans        565

and North Macedonia.31 Another thing that Croatian diplomacy counts to its
success is the revised methodology for EU membership negotiation.32 It was
emphasised that, with these new rules, the European Commission is trying to
open up new prospects for the Western Balkans. Another accomplishment is
the establishment of an EU fund for helping the Western Balkan countries fight
against the crisis caused by the pandemic. The EU has earmarked a financial aid
package of more than 3.3 billion euros. It was stressed that the way in which
the EU and the Western Balkans have been dealing with the pandemic is proof
that challenges are easier to overcome together.33
   Despite the disappointing conclusions for the Western Balkan states, the Za-
greb Declaration of 6 May 2020 states that the EU is also a community of values.
In particular, item 7 of the Declaration emphasises the importance of democra-
cy and the rule of law.34 Another important issue is the need to respect human
rights, gender equality and the rights of national minorities. This shows that
the EU’s enlargement policy depends not only on economic interests, but also
on the adherence to European values, i. e. ideology.

          The EU’s Ideological Core and Its Global Ambitions?
The process of European integration was the answer to political conflicts within
and between European countries. This process began even before the Cold War
between the West and the East, which offered very different types of political
orders and ideologies. In standing up for its own other world of ‘real social-
ism’, the EU developed strategies of economic and political integration that
were based on the ideology of liberal democracy. Initially established as the
European Coal and Steel Community, the process of integration then brought
about the European Economic Community, a customs union and finally the
EU became a common market. So, at the beginning it was an alliance between
economic and financial interests. In the end, economic integration also turned
into political integration. Throughout, it has become clear that should economic
integration be effective, the development of political institutions are required

   31 Council of the European Union, Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Process.
The Republic of North Macedonia and the Republic of Albania. Council Conclusion, Brussels,
25 March 2020, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7002-2020-INIT/en/pdf.
   32 European Commission, Remarks by Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi at the Press Con-
ference on the Revised Enlargement Methodology, 5 February 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_20_208.
   33 European Council, Infographic. COVID-19: €3.3 Billion EU Package for The Western Bal-
kans, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/economic-support-to-western-bal​
kans/.
   34 European Council, Zagreb Declaration, 6 May 2020, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/
media/43776/zagreb-declaration-en-06052020.pdf.

566                                 Tihomir Cipek

on which it can depend. The prevailing formula was that free market economy
(meaning capitalism) and liberal democracy were irreversibly tied. It is precise-
ly because it questions this formula regarding the ties between capitalism and
democracy that China currently presents such an important phenomenon. To
wit, the Chinese example has shown that capitalist economy can also develop
in a one-party dictatorship. It turned out that market economy does not require
a liberal-democratic order. This Chinese combination of a dictatorship and mar-
ket economy has fired up the imagination of the European radical-right, which
had already wanted to tear down liberal ideology and its political institutions.
   These circumstances represent new challenges for the EU’s goals that are based
on the principles of the Enlightenment and liberal democracy. Until recently,
the Union was successful in ensuring peace for its member states, enabling the
development of human rights and the freedom of individuals, ensuring eco-
nomic development based on a market economy, and establishing mechanisms
for some sort of solidarity between members and the preservation of the social
state. These are clearly not just material, but also ideological values. The EU
can be effective and influential only if it is an ideological community. The un-
dermining of its fundamental, liberal-democratic ideological paradigm would
lead to its breakup, just like the collapse of the communist ideology resulted in
the collapse of the Warsaw military-political pact. But today, liberal democracy
does not only face threats from outside, but also from the illiberal systems that
are taking shape within the EU itself. The 2008 global financial crisis proved that
the Eurozone’s debt crisis was very difficult to resolve because the appropriate
political institutions did not exist. Hence the crisis was not just economic, but also
political. The crisis in the Ukraine, caused by the coup d’état and Russia’s military
aggression, revealed that the Union is also facing a new geopolitical challenge, or
rather that, at least when it comes to the Ukraine, the boundaries of EU enlarge-
ment have been set for the unforeseeable future. The next challenge is from the
US which, under Trump’s leadership, is challenging the current rules of interna-
tional cooperation. President Trump overturned the TTIP free trade agreement
(Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership), and effectively started a trade
conflict with the EU. This conflict is also spreading to the understanding of ener-
gy politics. The controversy related to the construction of the Nord Stream 2, for
example, clearly shows that. Furthermore, China is emerging as an ever-growing
competitor of the EU. Global challenges facing the EU are thus getting bigger
every day, and Croatian politics is often unaware of them. Admittedly, as a small
country, it cannot have a significant influence on international relations. Up to
now, Croatia’s foreign policy did not manage to realise its intention of becoming
the expert for EU enlargement to Southeast Europe, often due to circumstances
that were outside its control. The mentioned challenges are still unresolved, wait-
ing for Germany’s presidency of the EU.

Croatia’s Presidency of the European Union and the Western Balkans   567

   Actually, the key question is whether the EU wants to, and can it assert itself
as an independent and influential subject of global politics, a new global play-
er. Of course, this ambition requires a new policy toward the US, China and
Russia. Germany’s presidency will reveal the EU’s position on this matter. The
first test will be talks on establishing a fund for the recovery from the economic
crisis caused by the corona pandemics; this will show to what extent the EU
really is a community of solidarity.

                                    Conclusion
With the election of the new president Zoran Milanović, Croatia has the op-
portunity to streamline its previously two-pronged foreign policies and rather
significantly improve the coordination between the government and the pres-
ident regarding a coherent foreign policy. Both leaders of Croatia’s foreign
policy—the prime minister and the president—are oriented toward the EU. The
government believes that it can find a foreign policy niche in which to establish
itself as an effective player in the EU enlargement of the Western Balkans. It
has been shown that Croatia’s role in EU enlargement to the Western Balkans
depends on the will of France and the Netherlands, where the first retained
and then approved negotiations with Northern Macedonia and Albania. Of
course, the activity of Croatian foreign policy contributed to that, but again it
turned out that due to the need to reach a consensus, decisions in the EU are
difficult to make. . It is interesting that their scepticism has persevered despite
the obvious strengthening of Chinese and Russian influence in the Western
Balkans. It is also obvious that there is a lack of coordination between US and
EU politics toward this region, and that each is acting alone and is governed
only by their own interest. Another issue lies in the fact that the Western Balkan
countries that are already in accession talks—Montenegro and Serbia—have
not improved the state of their democracy, despite the fact that they succeeded
in meeting some of the conditions for accession. On the contrary, they have
even regressed, and turned from half-democracies into hybrid regimes. Rela-
tions between Kosovo and Serbia are another issue, or rather Kosovo’s intro-
duction of tariffs on products from Serbia, which violates the principles of a
free trade zone between the countries of Western Balkans. Naturally, there is
also the fact that five EU members do not recognise Kosovo as an independent
country. But, these problems notwithstanding, it seems important that Croa-
tia has unambiguously decided to support the EU enlargement process to the
Western Balkans. It has thus demonstrated that it has accepted its geopolitical
position, as well as its political and economic interests. Croatian prime min-
ister Andrej Plenković has strongly supported the idea of EU enlargement to
the Western Balkans, and thus opened an opportunity for Croatia to find its

568                                       Tihomir Cipek

foreign policy niche in which it can affirm itself as a successful player of Eu-
ropean politics in the region. Despite the fact that the Zagreb summit did not
unambiguously declare EU enlargement in this region as its political goal, and
only discussed the process, Croatia succeeded in proving that it was interested
in the enlargement policy. From their part, the countries of Western Balkans
have clearly stated their desire to join the EU. Of course, this is not a process
in which they are the dominant subjects. A much greater challenge for the EU
is its attitude to the idea of being affirmed as an independent global political
subject. And it is precisely the attitude to this idea and to the establishment of
adequate European institutions that dictates the Union’s policy of enlargement
in the Western Balkans.

CORRESPONDING AUTHOR
Tihomir CipekFaculty of Political Sciences of the University of Zagreb, Lepušićeva 6, 10000 Zagreb,
Croatia. E-mail: tcipek@fpzg.hr