Customs in the Two Congos: A connected history of colonial taxation in Africa (1885-1914)
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Customs in the Two Congos: A connected history of colonial
taxation in Africa (1885–1914)
Bas De Roo
Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History, Volume 19, Number 1, Spring
2018, (Article)
Published by Johns Hopkins University Press
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/cch.2018.0005
For additional information about this article
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/689966
[ This content has been declared free to read by the pubisher during the COVID-19 pandemic. ]Customs in the Two Congos: A connected history of colonial
taxation in Africa (1885–1914)
Bas De Roo
Universität Leipzig
Abstract
Fiscal history is a booming field of research that shines a new light on colonial state
formation, the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized and the political
economy of colonialism in Africa. The fiscal history of colonial Africa has been
interpreted on different levels: local, colonial, imperial and global. This case study on
colonial taxation in the Congo Basin emphasizes the importance of an additional
historical layer. I argue that trans-colonial and trans-imperial connections are essential
to take into account in order to fully understand the fiscal histories of the Congo Free
State and the Belgian Congo, and the French Congo. The two Congos continuously
had to adjust their customs policies to fiscal decision-making across the border.
Introduction
In the past two decades, a growing number of contributions to African colonial history
have demonstrated that a fiscal perspective is essential to understanding colonialism.
Fiscal necessity fundamentally determined colonial state formation and policymaking.
Metropolitan governments were reluctant to spend domestic tax revenue overseas. As
a result, colonial administrations had to collect taxes to finance their activities.
Taxation in its turn required the development of an administration.1 Depending on the
political and economic context colonial administrations taxed specific people, goods or
services. Specific revenue raising strategies required a specific state apparatus to
enforce tax compliance. Taxing international trade, for example, required a customs
service that controlled borders and ports, whereas the taxation of subjects depended
upon a strong colonial presence throughout the colony. Moreover, particular tax
strategies triggered specific spending policies. Most colonial administrations, for
example, tried to boost the performance of those economic sectors that generated
taxable wealth through the development of infrastructure such as railways.2 Taxation
© 2018 Bas De Roo and The Johns Hopkins University Pressalso served the civilizing mission. Paying taxes would transform African subjects into
disciplined, wage-earning, hardworking people.3 From the perspective of the colonized,
colonial rule mainly manifested itself in the form of (forced) labor and cultivation
policies, market intervention on the local and regional level, the imposition of
limitations on personal mobility and the collection of hut, head or poll taxes—activities
that directly and indirectly served colonial revenue raising strategies.4
This article clearly demonstrates how a fiscal perspective adds to our
understanding of colonialism. This rather complex case study on the alignment of
customs tariffs between the French Congo—created in 1882, renamed Middle Congo
in 1903, and incorporated in French Equatorial Africa in 1910—and the Congo Free
State of Leopold II—established in 1885 and annexed by Belgium in 1908—helps us
explain why both colonies implemented extremely violent exploitation systems that
forced Africans to harvest rubber, resulting in the deaths of millions of Africans, a
horrible colonial legacy that France and Belgium still struggle to come to terms with
today.5 As in most African colonies, import and export duties were considered one of
the main sources of colonial revenue on both sides of the Congo and Ubangi Rivers.
Policymakers preferred to tax international trade as this form of taxation required a
relatively small administrative effort. 6 Yet in both Congos the colonial scope to
maximize customs revenue was fundamentally constrained by a deep-rooted conviction
that tariff differences had to be avoided at all cost. Policymakers strongly believed that
higher tariffs on one side of the border stimulated smuggling and the relocation of
commerce to the colony with the lowest tax burden. As a result, customs revenue would
substantially decrease. The fear of the detrimental fiscal and commercial effects of tariff
differences led policymakers in the French Congo and in the Free State and the Belgian
Congo to adjust colonial customs strategies to fiscal decision making across the border.
In combination with other factors such as disappointing commercial outputs,
policymakers’ fear of fiscally fueling smuggling and the relocation of commerce
limited the amount of revenue that could be raised through tariff collection. Because
of disappointing customs receipts France and the Congo Free State had to find
alternative sources of income. Both colonies conceded large parts of their territories to
monopolistic companies and forced Africans to produce rubber, a system that was
characterized by wide-scale abuse against the African population.7
© 2018 Bas De Roo and The Johns Hopkins University PressA growing field of literature has demonstrated that the fiscal aspects of
colonialism are too important to be overlooked. This article adds to the fiscal history of
colonial Africa by demonstrating that it is essential to think outside the traditional
spatial containers of the colonial state and the empire to fully understand colonial
taxation. Some of the existing fiscal histories of colonial Africa have studied taxation
at a scale other than the colonial and the imperial. During the 1990s and 2000s, a group
of scholars has demonstrated that fiscal practice was made and remade locally, through
the interaction between the tax collecting colonial administration and African
communities, mediated by the African elite.8 Moreover, colonial taxation was adapted
to local modes of production and monetary practices. Fiscal practice in turn influenced
the development of local economies. 9 More recent contributions have focused on
colonial taxation from a broader perspective. Some scholars have analyzed how
colonies within the Portuguese, British or French realm tried to collect sufficient tax
revenue to cover the cost of colonization in an attempt to become financially
independent from a metropolitan government that was reluctant to invest in its
colonies. 10 Other publications have compared the fiscal trajectories of African
colonies.11 This second, more recent set of publications does not really expand beyond
the analytical confines of the colony and the empire. However, these authors have
demonstrated that the fiscal fates of African colonies were determined by global
commodity prices to a considerable extent. Economically and hence fiscally, most
colonies depended on the export of a limited set of primary goods. If global demand for
these products faltered, an economic depression could trigger a fiscal crisis.12
Colonial taxation in Africa has been analyzed at a local, colonial, imperial and
global scale. This article focuses on a new layer in the fiscal history of colonial Africa.
Based on reports and correspondence in the archives of the Ministries of Colonies and
Foreign Affairs in France and Belgium I argue that the histories of taxation in the two
Congos can only be fully understood if the close interaction between both colonies is
taken into account.13 Part one of this contribution studies the fiscal race to the bottom
that initially took place between the Free State and the French Congo. Policymakers in
both colonies consecutively lowered customs duties because they feared that exports
would be smuggled across the border—which would force trading companies to
relocate—if the tax burden was higher on their side of the Congo and Ubangi Rivers.
The second and third parts of this article demonstrate that the negotiation and
© 2018 Bas De Roo and The Johns Hopkins University Pressrenegotiation of common tariffs ended the fiscal competition between the two Congos
but required fiscal compromises from both parties. Moreover, the tariff agreement
substantially limited the colonial scope to independently develop customs policies that
best suited the fiscal and commercial needs of the colony, which in the end proved to
be its downfall. This article demonstrates that the fiscal histories of the two Congos
were closely intertwined whether or not their customs departments competed or
cooperated. This important trans-colonial and trans-imperial layer in the fiscal history
of colonialism deserves far more attention from fiscal historians.
The connected history of customs in the two Congos was not exceptional. In
his comparison of British and German fiscal strategies in the Gold Coast and Togoland,
Arthur Knoll briefly mentions a series of customs agreements that were concluded in
West Africa before World War I. In 1887, German Togoland and French Benin
established a customs union. Germany and France deliberately kept import tariffs lower
than in the Gold Coast to divert trade from the British part of the Volta Basin to the
ports of Lomé and Cotonou. In 1890, the French withdrew from the union because it
needed to increase tariffs in Benin to raise more tax revenue. In 1894, the Germans and
the British unified the Volta-borderland in a single customs zone. In 1904, Togoland
backed out of the agreement. The Germans wanted to raise import duties in an attempt
to generate more tax income. Moreover, German policymakers aimed to use their
customs policies to divert trade from the British-controlled Keta port to Lomé.14
This article exclusively studies the interconnected fiscal histories of the two
Congos. This focus reveals only part of the trans-colonial or trans-imperial history of
colonial taxation in the Congo. The French Congo and the Free State and the Belgian
Congo were part of the Congo Free Trade Zone or Bassin Conventionnel du Congo
which encompassed a large part of Central and East Africa. The Berlin Conference
(1885) and the Brussels Convention (1892) substantially limited the colonial
sovereignty to tax international trade in this zone—for example, by imposing maximum
tariffs and prohibiting transit duties or preferential tax policies. The fiscal fates of the
British, French, Portuguese, German and Italian colonies in the Congo Free Trade Zone
and the Free State and Belgian Congo were tied by these two international treaties.
Moreover, some of the signatories of the Berlin Act and the Brussels Convention did
not even possess African colonies. As a signatory of both agreements, the Netherlands
© 2018 Bas De Roo and The Johns Hopkins University Presshad a big influence on the fiscal histories of the French Congo and the Free State and
the Belgian Congo.15 In addition to the multilateral links forged by the Berlin Act and
the Brussels Convention, the customs strategy of each of the two Congos was
determined by the bilateral interaction with other neighbors. Fiscal decision-making in
Angola, for example, affected the customs system in the Free State and vice versa. A
similar connection existed between German Cameroon and the French Congo.
Unfortunately, it is not feasible to provide an all-encompassing oversight of this tangled
web of multilateral and bilateral fiscal interactions in a single article. Therefore, this
contribution focuses on the interconnection between customs in the French Congo and
the Free State and the Belgian Congo.
A Fiscal Race to the Bottom (1886–90)
From the onset tax collection was high on the colonial agenda in the Congo. An
indebted King Leopold could not bear the rising cost of colonization and expected his
colony to become financially self-sufficient as soon as possible. Within weeks after its
creation, the Free State introduced export duties on rubber, ivory and cash crops.
Exports had to be declared in the main ports. Exports from other colonies—transit
goods—could freely be re-exported via the ports of the Free State if a certificate proved
the foreign origin of the products.16 The Berlin Act banned transit duties in the Congo
Free Trade Zone.17 While developing a system to collect export duties, decision makers
realized that the Free State faced a huge problem. The French Congo, the Free State
and Angola had divided the Lower Congo, the coastal region between the Atlantic and
Stanley Pool. 18 Trading firms suddenly found themselves doing business in three
different colonies. 19 The French and the Portuguese had not yet introduced export
duties. As a result, trading posts in Angola, Cabinda and the French Congo could offer
higher prices for African exports than their counterparts in the Congo Free State.
Leopold and his administrators were convinced that the tariff difference stimulated
contraband and reduced customs receipts, the main source of colonial income.20
Initially, the administration of the Free State was predominantly worried about
smuggling to and from Angola. According to the central administration in Brussels and
the Governor General, Congolese products were smuggled to Portuguese trading
centers because the Angolan activities of the trading firms that were active in the Congo
Estuary were not subjected to export duties.21 Contraband was believed to be rampant.
© 2018 Bas De Roo and The Johns Hopkins University PressThe consequences for the colonial treasury appeared devastating. In addition, the Free
State noticed that trading firms abandoned their posts in the Free State. Having posts
in Leopold’s Congo was no longer necessary as the firms bought Congolese exports in
their establishments across the border in Angola. In the eyes of some policymakers,
wide scale smuggling had given rise to a “commercial exodus”.22
© 2018 Bas De Roo and The Johns Hopkins University PressFigure 1: Trade routes and colonial borders in the lower Congo (1885–90).
© 2018 Bas De Roo and The Johns Hopkins University PressIn 1888, Angola introduced the same export tariffs as the Free State. This decision
eliminated smuggling incentives and ended the panic in Leopold’s administration.23 However,
trading firms such as Daumas, Béraud et Compagnie, the Nieuwe Afrikaansche Handels-
Vennootschap and the Société Anonyme Belge steadily ventured deeper into the Upper
Congo—the region upstream from Stanley Pool. These firms used steamers to develop a
network of trading posts along the main Congolese rivers. As a result, exports could be bought
closer to the producer. By circumventing African middlemen trading firms managed to cut
costs considerably.24 As a result of this evolution, smuggling to the French Congo became the
new issue. Contraband and the related commercial exodus to Angola had alarmed Leopold’s
administration. The Free State took drastic steps to prevent history from repeating itself.25
In December 1887, the French introduced export duties in the Congo—France also
expected its colonial administrations to stand on their own feet. Exports were taxed at 5% ad
valorem.26 The Free State and Angola collected a similar export tax. However, France collected
export duties only in its main posts along the coast such as Loango.27 As a result, the Free State
had no other option but to exempt exports from its part of the Upper Congo at the start of 1888.28
Leopold’s administration explained to France why it had exempted exports from the Upper
Congo. Steamers shipped products from the Congolese interior to Stanley Pool. Porters had to
carry the goods from Stanley Pool to the Congo Estuary as rapids and waterfalls blocked the
river between Leopoldville and Yalala. Smuggling was easy. The French Congo and the Free
State taxed exports only along the coast and not in Stanley Pool, and neither state had the
capacity to control the long border that separated both colonies. Merchants and trading houses
had but to drop anchor at Brazzaville instead of Leopoldville with exports from the Free State
and acquire a certificate of origin that falsely stated that the goods were in fact French. This
would allow a firm to export the goods via the Free State without paying customs duties, as the
Berlin Act exempted transit trade. Likewise, trading houses could move French products to
Leopoldville, falsely claim that the exports came from the Free State so as to obtain a certificate
of origin, which would allow them to export the merchandise via Loango without paying
customs duties.29 Shortly after the decision of Leopold’s administration, France also exempted
exports from their part of the Upper Congo.30
The Free State tried to stop the fiscal race to the bottom which substantially reduced its
customs revenue in a time when every franc counted. Leopold’s administration suggested the
following solution to Paris. If both colonies agreed not to hand out certificates of origin in
© 2018 Bas De Roo and The Johns Hopkins University PressBrazzaville and Leopoldville without collecting customs duties, and taxed all exports without
a certificate in their seaports, smuggling between the two colonies would no longer be
lucrative.31 The French did not agree with this solution. The governor-general of the French
Congo, de Brazza, fiercely opposed the deal for a number of reasons. First of all, a tariff treaty
would constrain the French scope to develop a fiscal strategy that best suited their fiscal and
commercial interests. Secondly, French ivory tariffs were slightly higher than in the Free State.
Taxing ivory in Brazzaville would hence create incentives to smuggle French tusks to
Leopold’s colony. Thirdly, the tariff exemption was to promote the commercial development
of the Congolese interior. Fourthly, trade in the Upper Congo was underdeveloped.
Consequently, export duties would not yield much revenue anyway. 32 However, the main
reason why de Brazza blocked any form of customs-related cooperation with the Free State
concerned the race to Stanley Pool that was taking place at that time, at least in his mind.
Having the fastest and cheapest route to the Congolese interior was a key factor in de
Brazza’s development plans. Frustrated, de Brazza had to sit by and watch the steady
materialization of Leopold’s plans to construct a railway between Matadi and Leopoldville,
while French policymakers and investors did not take to his project to develop the route to
Brazzaville so as to turn this outpost into the main commercial hub for Central African trade—
de Brazza wanted to canalize the Kwilu River and construct a railroad to connect this waterway
to Stanley Pool.33 The French governor-general feared that Leopold’s railway would cripple
the economic future of his colony. Leopoldville would become the linchpin of Congolese trade
instead of Brazzaville. Consequently, trading firms would circumvent the French territories,
eroding the colonial tax base. To save his colony from this gloomy prospect, de Brazza linked
any possible customs agreement—a key interest of the Free State—to shared railway access to
the Upper Congo.34
In ever greater financial trouble, Leopold’s administration in Brussels vainly continued
its attempts to convince French policymakers.35 The fiscal race to the bottom ended only with
the appointment of a new minister of colonies in France.36 Contrary to his predecessor, Pièrre
Tirard did not concur with de Brazza. In his view, common tariffs would put an end to a
situation in which trading houses based their decision to use a particular trade route to the coast
on the differences between the customs policies on the left and right bank of the Congo. In
addition, Tirard believed that a tariff agreement would curb smuggling. Moreover, a customs
deal would allow the French to tax trade upstream from Stanley Pool, which would generate
© 2018 Bas De Roo and The Johns Hopkins University Pressmore customs revenue.37 In 1890, both Congos agreed to tax exports from the Upper Congo in
Brazzaville and Leopoldville, ending the fiscal race to the bottom which had deprived both
cash-strapped colonial states of a considerable amount of customs revenue.38
Negotiating Common Tariffs during the Brussels Convention (1889–92)
By 1889, people in Europe and the United States started calling for action against slavery and
liquor abuse in Africa. The measures of the Berlin Act were considered insufficient to curb the
slave and liquor trade. A new international convention was organized in Brussels to deal with
the matter. Desperately looking for additional ways to finance his colonial project, the by then
heavily indebted Leopold II used this opportunity to convince the signatories of the Berlin Act
to allow import duties in the Congo Free Trade Zone. By then his colony was on the verge of
bankruptcy and desperately sought new sources of revenue. Leopold’s argument was simple:
without import duties colonial states could not fund the fight against the slave and liquor trade.39
After long and arduous talks, the Brussels Convention allowed import duties in the Basin
Conventionnel du Congo below the maximum of 10% ad valorem. The United Kingdom,
Germany and Italy were to determine common import duties in the eastern part of the Congo
Free Trade Zone. France, Portugal and the Free State had to settle on common import tariffs in
the western part of the Basin Conventionnel du Congo.40 The two Congos negotiated common
export tariffs at the same time. The Portuguese did not play a very active role in these tariff
negotiations. Lisbon simply agreed with the temporary and final agreements between France
and the Free State without making any important demands of their own.
Contrary to the previous period, France was eager to reach a tariff agreement with
Leopold.41 The new French secretary of colonies stressed the importance of close cooperation
with the Free State: both colonies produced the same exports that were traded by the same
commercial networks and shared a long border, which was also the main waterway that
connected the coast to the Central African interior.42 However, Paris had a set of clear demands
that had to be met by Brussels. As the years went by, the financial troubles of the Free State
and its royal financier had grown. The Free State failed to collect sufficient tax revenue to
cover the considerable annual costs of discovering, occupying and administering its vast
territory.43 Desperate for more revenue, Leopold’s administration had started trading ivory on
its own accord, which meant it competed with European trading firms.44 In addition, Brussels
had increased ivory tariffs and had introduced a patent tax per kilogram of ivory, a liquor license
and a direct tax based on the amount of buildings and boats a company owned and the number
© 2018 Bas De Roo and The Johns Hopkins University Pressof people it employed.45 Paris insisted that Brussels put an end to its commercial activities and
demanded to reduce the tax burden on trading firms. Leopold had to comply with these demands
if he wanted to conclude an agreement on common import and export tariffs.46
It took more than a year of negotiating before Paris and Brussels reached a consensus.
As his colony already experienced great difficulty in balancing its annual budget Leopold II
refused to abolish taxes or stop trading ivory in the Free State. The French government also
stuck to its guns. Paris was heavily influenced by Daumas, Béraud et Compagnie, a French
firm that had been trading Congolese exports since the 1880s. This firm fiercely lobbied and
campaigned against the fiscal policies and commercial activities of the Free State, arguing that
it was no longer possible for trading companies to export Congolese products at a profit.47 This
impasse was resolved only in 1892. Leopold II offered Médard Béraud a settlement to end the
opposition of his firm. The specifics and the exact timing of the deal are unclear but it involved
the merger between the Société Anonyme Belge and Daumas, Béraud et Compagnie, brokered
by Albert Thys, manager of the Belgian trading firm and close confidant of the king. 48 In
addition, Leopold’s diplomats managed to convince their king to reduce some of the taxes on
trading firms. Leopold did refuse to end the commercial activities of the Free State.49 Portugal
also gave its approval to the tariff agreement between the two Congos and that is how the Lisbon
Protocol was born.
On the April 8, 1892, the Free State, Angola and French Congo agreed to levy the same
export and import duties until 1902. Cash crops were taxed at a rate of 5% ad valorem and ivory
and rubber at rate of 10%. These ad valorem rates were converted to fixed tariffs based on the
prices of the respective products in colonial ports. The three colonies also implemented the
same import duties: 6% ad valorem on regular imports (naval, railway-related, agricultural or
scientific imports were exempted); 10% on salt, guns and ammunition; and 15 francs per
hectoliter of liquor with an alcohol percentage of 50%—depending on the alcohol percentage
liquor imports were taxed higher or lower than the rate of 15 francs.50 The Lisbon Protocol
marked the start of a period of cooperation between the two Congos. Common tariffs reduced
the incentives to smuggle and relocate trading posts, and ended the fiscal race to the bottom.
However, both parties had been forced to make fiscal compromises during a long and bumpy
negotiation process. The next section shows that the French Congo and the Free State had to
make new compromises every time the Lisbon Protocol had to be renegotiated. Moreover, the
© 2018 Bas De Roo and The Johns Hopkins University Pressagreement significantly limited the colonial ability to autonomously develop customs policies.
The fiscal histories of both colonies remained closely intertwined.
French Preconditions for the Renewal of the Lisbon Protocol (1892–1914)
The Lisbon Protocol had to be renewed every so often. Each time, France seized the opportunity
to make a set of demands which gave rise to new negotiations with the Free State and the
Belgian Congo. These talks were difficult at times but both parties always managed to come to
terms. Policymakers realized far too well that breaking the agreement would mean a return to
the past, when the two Congos had the choice between reducing tariffs to match those of its
neighbors—this strategy had fueled a fiscal race to the bottom—or tolerate smuggling. Either
way, customs revenue would decrease considerably.
By 1897, Paris was fed up with de Brazza’s fiscal negligence and replaced him. 51 The
French Congo launched a strategy to boost economic growth and to develop a sound fiscal
system, capable of generating sufficient income to cover colonial expenditure. Customs played
a key role in the new fiscal approach. In 1898, the French introduced many reforms to improve
the performance of the customs system, which had been the only source of revenue till then.52
France wanted to increase import duties and reform customs procedures to tax imports more
effectively. When the Lisbon Protocol was up for renewal in 1902, the Quai d’Orsay demanded
a set of changes. First of all, Paris proposed to change import duties from ad valorem taxes to
fixed tariffs. France wanted to impose fixed import tariffs because the customs department of
the French Congo depended completely on the goodwill of colonial firms to honestly declare
the value of their imports.53 Secondly, the French government wanted to increase import tariffs.
Thirdly, France suggested including Spain and Germany in the tariff union. An agreement with
Rio Muni and Cameroon would curb smuggling across the northern borders of the French
territories in Central Africa.54
Leopold’s administration refused to comply with most French demands. 55 Including
Rio Muni and Cameroon in the tariff union did not benefit the Free State. Neither colony
bordered on its territory. Moreover, additional members would complicate future
negotiations. 56 In addition, Leopold’s diplomats convinced the French Congo to drop the
proposed conversion of ad valorem to fixed import tariffs. Brussels was not yet convinced of
the need to improve the efficiency of its customs system.57 Most importantly, the Free State
was hesitant to raise import tariffs. In addition to customs, Leopold’s fiscal system was based
© 2018 Bas De Roo and The Johns Hopkins University Presson rubber exploitation by large concession companies and in-kind taxation.58 The mass violence
that characterized rubber extraction had become the subject of growing criticism in the German
and British press. Leopold’s administrators hesitated to raise the tax burden for fear of further
damaging the reputation of the Free State, which was already widely regarded as a ruthless
exploitation machine owned by a greedy, monopolistic king.59 In the end, France managed to
convince Leopold that the proposed tax raise did not exceed the maximum rate of the Brussels
Convention.60 The Lisbon Protocol was renewed in 1902 and the common import tariffs in
Angola, the French Congo and the Free State were increased from 6% to 10% ad valorem.61
In 1906, the Lisbon Protocol had to be renewed once more. France demanded to
increase rubber tariffs as global rubber prices were skyrocketing at the time. Paris even
considered withdrawing from the tariff union if their request was not complied with. French
policymakers were still convinced of the necessity of common tariffs in the western part of the
Congo Free Trade Zone.62 However, the French Congo was forced to considerably reform its
fiscal system. Following the example of the Free State, the French had also introduced a
concession system in their Central African territories in 1898. 63 Contrary to the initial
“successes” of rubber exploitation in the Free State, the French system was a fiscal and
economic failure. Moreover, in the French Congo coercive rubber exploitation had also resulted
in widespread abuse, which was heavily criticized by the press. As a result, France was forced
to abolish the concession system and find new sources of income.64 As in 1902, the Free State
was reluctant to comply with the French demand to increase the tariff burden. Brussels was
afraid to further antagonize international public opinion. 65 Moreover, the rubber sector
protested against the tariff increase, which reduced their profits.66 In the end, the Free State did
agree to raise rubber tariffs as the measure simply entailed adjusting the fixed export tariffs to
the price surges on the world market. The Lisbon Protocol was renewed in 1907.67 In addition,
the two Congos and Angola decided to automatically renew the Lisbon Protocol every year.68
By 1909, the enthusiasm about the Lisbon Protocol started to waver on both sides of the
Congo and Ubangi Rivers. The growing international criticism against violent rubber
exploitation and the growing unproductiveness of their concession systems forced the French
and the Belgians to radically rethink their fiscal strategies.69 Both colonies felt increasingly
constrained by the Lisbon Protocol and were tempted to back out of the agreement in order to
develop a customs system that best suited their economic and fiscal needs.70 The French were
particularly keen on withdrawing from the Lisbon Protocol. In addition, Paris feared that the
© 2018 Bas De Roo and The Johns Hopkins University Pressnew Belgian government would be less malleable than Leopold’s administration. In 1910, the
French decided to renegotiate the terms of the Lisbon Protocol one last time. Paris stipulated
three conditions: export duties on cash crops had to be abolished to boost the performance of
these sectors, imported fuels and coal had to be exempted to facilitate the development of a
railway and ad valorem import duties had to be replaced by fixed tariffs to curb rampant fraud—
by the end of the 1900s the French and Belgian Congo discovered that falsely declaring import
value to pay less ad valorem tariffs was a common practice among trading and concession
companies in the two Congos. 71 The Belgian response was positive. However, the Lisbon
Protocol was never renewed.
In 1911, France and Belgium informed Portugal of their decision not to renew the
Lisbon Protocol, thus ending twenty years of common tariffs in the western part of the Congo
Free Trade Zone.72 The French and the Belgians wanted to reform their fiscal systems, but felt
their Portuguese partner held them back. A republican coup had brought down the Portuguese
monarchy at the end of 1910. The revolt put the renewal of the Lisbon Protocol on a back
burner.73 In addition, the Angolan administration had been violating the tariff agreement by
exempting imports in the Cabinda enclave, which stimulated contraband traffic with the coastal
areas of the French and Belgian Congo.74
As the Lisbon Protocol was not renewed, the two Congos could independently reform
their tariff policies. However, both the French and the Belgians were eager to continue their
fruitful cooperation. The Belgian Congo suggested waiting until the summer of 1912 to
implement any customs reforms. France took up this offer. In the end, the tariffs of the Lisbon
Protocol unofficially remained in effect in the two Congos until 1913. That year, France decided
to collect fixed import duties instead of ad valorem tariffs and exempted all exports other than
ivory and rubber to boost the cash crop sector in its Central African territories. In addition,
tariffs on imported fuels and coal were reduced in light of the plans to develop the Congo-
Ocean railway from Brazzaville to Loango. 75 The Belgians implemented the exact same
reforms about one year later.76 One could interpret this series of reforms as a return to the past
when Brussels was compelled to adjust its customs policies to French decision-making.
However, both parties had more or less agreed on these three modifications in 1910. Even after
the Lisbon Protocol was abolished, the two Congos continued to cooperate in the field of
customs to curb contraband and prevent a new fiscal race to the bottom which would
substantially reduce customs revenue either way.
© 2018 Bas De Roo and The Johns Hopkins University PressConclusion
Taxation represented a fundamental aspect of colonial rule in Africa. State formation, colonial
policymaking and the interaction between colonizer and colonized cannot be fully understood
without looking at taxes. This fiscal history of colonial Africa has been analyzed at different
scales: local, colonial, imperial and global. This contribution demonstrates the importance of
an additional, often neglected layer. It shows that the fiscal trajectories of the Free Congo State
and the Belgian Congo and the French Congo—neighboring colonies that belonged to different
empires—were closely connected when it comes to customs, one of the main sources of colonial
revenue in Africa aside from “Native” taxation. In the case of the two Congos, the scope to tax
imports and exports was constrained by the fear that tariff differences would stimulate
smuggling and the relocation of trading firms, which in turn would cause a considerable decline
in customs revenues. The Free State and the French Congo dealt with this issue in two ways.
Initially, the two Congos competed commercially through their customs policies. This strategy
triggered a race to the bottom that resulted in the virtual abolishment of export tariffs on both
sides of the Congo and Ubangi Rivers. This was highly problematic for both cash-strapped
colonies. In a second phase, the two regimes decided to cooperate and agreed on common
export and import tariffs. The Lisbon Protocol took away the incentives to smuggle and ended
the fiscal competition between the Free State and the French Congo. However, the negotiation
and renegotiation of these common tariffs required fiscal compromises from both parties.
Moreover, the Lisbon Protocol considerably restricted the fiscal autonomy of the Free State and
Belgian Congo and the French Congo. This is the reason why France and Belgium decided not
to renew the Protocol in 1911. The two Congos wanted to continue their cooperation in the field
of customs but felt the customs deal with Angola hindered their plans for fiscal reform. Both
colonies continued to cooperate after the Protocol. The fiscal histories of the two Congos
remained closely connected.
For correspondence: deroo.bas@gmail.com. Acknowledgements: I would like to thank the
anonymous reviewers and Geert Castryck for their helpful comments on earlier versions of
this article. The research was funded by the Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 1199:
“Processes of Spatialization under the Global Condition”.
© 2018 Bas De Roo and The Johns Hopkins University PressNotes
1 Leigh Gardner, Taxing Colonial Africa: The political economy of British imperialism
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
2
Ewout Frankema, “Colonial Taxation and Government Spending in British Africa, 1880–
1940: Maximizing revenue or minimizing effort?,” Explorations in Economic History 48/1
(2011): 136–49.
3
Barbara Bush and Josephine Maltby, “Taxation in West Africa: Transforming the colonial
subject into the ‘governable person’.” Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15/1 (2004): 5–34.
4
Sean Redding, Sorcery and Sovereignty. Taxation, Power, and Rebellion in South Africa,
1880–1963 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2006).
5
Geert Castryck, “Whose History is History? Singularities and dualities of the public debate
on Belgian colonialism,” in Being a Historian: Opportunities and Responsibilities, Past and
Present, edited by Sven Mörsdorf (Pisa: CLIOHRES, 2006), 1–18; Idesbald Goddeeris,
“Colonial Streets and Statues: Postcolonial Belgium in the public space,” Postcolonial Studies
18/4 (2015): 397–409.
6
Hugues Leclercq, “Un mode de mobilisation des ressources: le système fiscal. Le cas du
Congo pendant la période coloniale,” Cahiers Economiques et Sociaux III (1965); Catherine
Coquery-Vidrovitch, Le Congo au temps des grandes compagnies concessionnaires 1898–
1930 (Paris: Mouton & Co, 1972); Ewout Frankema and Marlous van Waijenburg,
“Metropolitan Blueprints of Colonial Taxation? Lessons from fiscal capacity building in
British and French Africa, c. 1888–1940,” The Journal of African History 55/3 (2014): 371–
400.
7
This article does not deal with the concession systems of both colonies. For more
information see: Coquery-Vidrovitch, Le Congo au temps des grandes compagnies
concessionnaires 1898–1930; Aldwin Roes, “Towards a History of Mass Violence in the Etat
Indépendant du Congo, 1885–1908,” South African Historical Journal 62/4 (2010): 634–70.
8
See for example: Nancy Rose Hunt, “Noise over Camouflaged Polygamy, Colonial Morality
Taxation, and a Woman-Naming Crisis in Belgian Africa,” Journal of African History 32/3
(1991): 471–94; Christian John Makgala, “Taxation in the Tribal Areas of the Bechuanaland
Protectorate, 1899–1957,” The Journal of African History 45/2 (2004): 279–303.
9
See for example: Isaac Tarus, “Peasants, Money and Markets: A century of taxation in
Kenya and its global roots,” in Globalization and its discontents, Revisited, edited by J S
Jomo and Khoo Khay Jin (New Delhi: Tulika, 2003).
© 2018 Bas De Roo and The Johns Hopkins University PressMichael W.C. Tuck, “‘The Rupee Disease’: Taxation, authority, and social conditions in early
colonial Uganda,” The International Journal of African Historical Studies 39/2 (2006).
10
See for example: Philip Havik, “Colonial Administration, Public Accounts and Fiscal
Extraction: Policies and revenues in Portuguese Africa (1900–1960),” African Economic
History 41/1 (2013): 159–221; Elise Huillery, “The Black Man's Burden: The cost of
colonization of French West Africa,” The Journal of Economic History 74/1 (2014): 1–38.
11
See for example: Leigh Gardner, “The Fiscal History of the Belgian Congo in Comparative
Perspective,” in Colonial Exploitation and Economic Development: The Belgian Congo and
the Netherlands Indies compared., edited by Ewout Frankema and Frans Buelens (New York:
Routledge, 2013); Frankema and van Waijenburg, “Metropolitan Blueprints of Colonial
Taxation”; Jens Andersson, “Long-term Dynamics of the State in Francophone West Africa:
Fiscal capacity pathways 1850–2010,” Economic History of Developing Regions 32/1 (2016):
37–70.
12
Leigh Gardner, Taxing Colonial Africa: The political economy of British imperialism
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
13
People often expect numbers, tables and graphs in a contribution about taxation. This
article does not work with quantitative data. Fiscal policymaking in the two Congos—and in
colonial Africa in general—was not always based on measurable facts. In this case, decision
makers on both sides of the Congo and Ubangi Rivers assumed that tariff differences
stimulated smuggling and commercial relocation and acted accordingly. Whether this was
actually the—quantitatively verifiable—case did not matter. For annual data on taxation and
international trade in the Congo Free State, Belgian Congo and French Congo, see: Coquery-
Vidrovitch, Le Congo au temps des grandes compagnies concessionnaires 1898–1930;
Gardner, “The Fiscal History of the Belgian Congo in Comparative Perspective”; Bas De
Roo, “Taxation in the Congo Free State, an exceptional case?,” Economic History of
Developing Regions 32/2 (2017): 97–126.
14
Arthur Knoll, “Taxation in the Gold Coast Colony and in Togo: A study in early
administration,” in Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial rivalry and colonial rule, edited
by Prosser Gifford and Alison Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967).
15
Herman Obdeijn, “The New Africa Trading Company and the Struggle for Import Duties in
the Congo Free State, 1886–1894,” African Economic History, no. 12 (1983): 195–212.
16
Droits de sortie (15–12–1885), BOEIC, 1885, pp. 40–42.
17
Protocoles et Acte Général de la Conférence de Berlin, 1884–1885 (Bremen: Übersee-
Museum, 1885).
© 2018 Bas De Roo and The Johns Hopkins University Press18
Jan Vansina, Paths in the Rainforest (Madison: University of Wisconsin University Press,
1990).
19
Samuel Henry Nelson, Colonialism in the Congo Basin 1880–1940 (Athens: Ohio
University Press, 1994).
20
Bas De Roo, “Taxation in the Congo Free State, An Exceptional Case?”
21
Archives de l’Etat Belge (AEB).Archive Hubert Droogmans (AHD).2 – l’Administrateur
Général des Finances à l’Administrateur-Général au Congo (23-7-1886).
22
AMAEB.AA.Classement Provisoire (CP).2571 – Le Gouverneur Général à
l’Administrateur Général des Finances (8-7-1887) ; AMAEB.AA.CP.2571 – l’Administrateur
Général des Finances au Gouverneur Général (22-8-1887).
23
AEB.AHD.3 – l’Administrateur Général des Finances au Gouverneur Général (29-3-1888).
AEB. Archive Edmond Van Eetvelde (AEVE).71 – Note au Roi (1888).
24
Valérie Gelade, “Les débuts de la navigation à vapeur sur le Haut-Congo (1882–1898),”
Belgisch Tijdschrift voor de Nieuwste Geschiedenis 32/3–4 (2002): 383–418; Jelmer Vos,
“The Kingdom of Kongo and Its Borderlands, 1880–1915,” (PhD diss., University of London,
2005), 120–22.
25
AEB. Archives du Palais Royal (APR). Cabinet du Roi Léopold II (CRL). Développement
Extérieur de la Belgique (DEB). Correspondances Diverses (CD).65 – Janssen au Roi (1890).
26
“Ad valorem” tariffs consist of a proportional levy on the declared value of imported or
exported goods.
27
Bulletin Officiel Administratif du Gabon-Congo (BOAGC), 1887, p. 200, 201 – Décret
portant création des droits à l’exportation au sud de la colonie (22-10-1887); BOAGC, 1887,
p. 243 – Arrêté local promulguant le décret du 22 octobre 1887, portant création de droits de
sortie au Sud (28-11-1887); BOAGC, 1887, pp. 245, 246 – Décision locale. Mise en
application du décret du 22 octobre 1887, portant création de droits de sortie au Sud (29-11-
1887).
28
Bulletin Officiel de l’Etat Indépendant du Congo (BOEIC), 1888, p. 1–4 – Droits de sortie
(19-10-1887).
29
AMAEB.AA. Etat Indépendant du Congo (EIC). Affaires Etrangères (AE).326.458 –
l’Administrateur Général des Affaires Etrangères à la Légation de France en Belgique (19-10-
1888); Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer (ANOM). Fonds Ministériels (FM). Séries
Géographiques (SG). Afrique (AFR).VI.80a – Note de Van Eetvelde (20-12-1888).
30
BOAGC, 1888, p. 21 – Arrêté local portant dégrèvement des droits d’exportation en faveur
des produits venant de Brazzaville et du Congo (10-1-1888).
© 2018 Bas De Roo and The Johns Hopkins University Press31
AMAEB.AA.EIC.AE.326.458 – l’Administrateur Général des Affaires Etrangères à la
Légation de France en Belgique (19-10-1888); ANOM.FM.SG.AFR.VI.80a – Note de Van
Eetvelde (20-12-1888).
32
ANOM.FM.SG. Gabon Congo (GCOG).VI.15a – Le Commissaire Général du Congo
français au Sous-secrétaire d’Etat au Ministère de la Marine et des Colonies de la France (10-
9-1888).
33
Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, “Les idées économiques de Brazza et les premières
tentatives de compagnies de colonisation au Congo Français—1885–1898,” Cahiers d'études
africaines 5/17 (1965): 57–82.
34
ANOM.FM.SG.GCOG.VI.15a – Le Commissaire Général du Congo français au Sous-
secrétaire d’Etat au Ministère de la Marine et des Colonies de la France (11-1-1889).
35
AMAEB.AA.EIC.AE.326.458 – l’Administrateur Général des Affaires Etrangères au
Gouverneur Général (28-5-1889); AMAEB.AA.EIC.AE.326.458 – l’Administrateur Général
des Affaires Etrangères à la Légation de France en Belgique (3-12-1889).
36
François Berge, “Le Sous-secrétariat et les Sous-secrétaires d’État aux Colonies : histoire
de l’émancipation de l’administration coloniale,” Revue française d’histoire d’outre-mer
47/168 (1960): 301–86.
37
ANOM.FM.SG.GCOG.VI.15e – Note du Sous-Secrétaire des Colonies de la France (1889);
ANOM.FM.SG.AFR.VI.80a – Note du Sous-Secrétaire des Colonies de la France (4-12-
1889).
38
AMAEB.AA.EIC.AE.326.458 – l’Administrateur Général des Affaires Etrangères à la
Légation de France en Belgique (21-5-1890).
AEB.APR.CRL.DEB.CD.65 – Janssen au Roi (6-1890?).
39
ANOM.FM.SG.AFR.VI.80a – Proposition relative à l’établissement d’un droit d’entrée
dans le bassin conventionnel du Congo (10-5-1890)
40
Emile Banning. L'acte général de la conférence de Bruxelles devant les chambres
françaises : réflexions d'un homme politique (Saint-Cloud: Imprimerie Belin Frères, 1891).
41
ANOM.FM.SG.AFR.VI.80a – Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la France à La
Légation de France en Belgique (11-11-1890).
42
ANOM.FM.SG.AFR.VI.80a – Le Sous-Secrétaire des Colonies de la France au Ministre
des Affaires Etrangères de la France (26-3-1890).
43
Jean Stengers, “La dette publique de l'Etat Indépendant du Congo,” in La dette publique
aux 18e et 19e siècles: son développement sur le plan local, régional et national (Bruxelles:
Crédit communal de Belgique, 1980).
© 2018 Bas De Roo and The Johns Hopkins University Press44
Ruth Slade, King Leopold's Congo: Aspects of the development of race relations in the
Congo Independent State (London: Oxford University Press, 1962).
45
BOEIC, 1890, p. 113–14 – Impositions directes et personnelles (16-7-1890).
46
AEB.APR.CRL.DEB.CD.65 – Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la France à la
Légation de Belgique en France (13-12-1890).
47
ANOM.FM.SG.AFR.VI.94a –Daumas-Béraud et Compagnie au Sous-Secrétaire des
Colonies de la France (28-1-1891); Médard Béraud. Les intérêts du commerce français au
Congo belge considérés dans leurs rapports avec la convention franco-congolaise du 9
février 1891 (Paris: Imprimerie Chaix, 1891); Nationaal Archief van Nederland (NA).
Buitenlandse Zaken (BZ).A.215 – Adresse de Daumas et Cie à MM. les Sénateurs et MM. les
Députés (25-4-1891).
48
Musée Royal de l’Afrique Central (MRAC). Papiers Albert Thys (PAT).1. Cahier 30. Lettre
n° 40 – Le Roi à Thys (25-4-1891); AEB. Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et
l’Industrie (CCCI).483 – Comité permanent. Procés-verbaux des réunions (24–3-1892).
AMAEB.AA. Ministère des Colonies (MC). Statuts (ST) – Statuts du société Daumas-Béraud
et Compagnie (1887–1892); Emile Banning. Mémoires, politiques et diplomatiques :
Comment fut fondé le Congo Belge (Paris-Bruxelles: La Renaissance du livre, 1927), 280–85,
338.
49
AEB.APR.CRL.DEB.CD.106 – Thys au Roi (6-6-1891).
AEB.APR.CRL.DEB.CD.65 – Janssen au Roi (6-1890?).
50
BOEIC, 1892, pp. 111, 112 – Protocol signé à Lisbonne, le 8 avril 1892, entre les
gouvernements de l’Etat Indépendant du Congo, de la France et du Portugal, et réglant les
tarifs des droits d’entrée et de sortie dans la zone occidentale du bassin conventionnel du
Congo (8-4-1892).
51
Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, “French Congo and Gabon,” in The Cambridge History of
Africa, edited by J.D. Fage and Roland Oliver (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1985).
52
See: BOACF, 1898; Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, Le Congo au temps des grandes
compagnies concessionnaires 1898–1930 (Paris: Ed. de l'Ecole des hautes études en sciences
sociales, 2001).
53
AMAEB.AA.EIC.AE.326.459 – La Légation de France en Belgique au Secrétaire Général
des Affaires Etrangères (4–8-1896).
54
Archives Diplomatiques de la France (AD). Correspondance Politique et Commerciale
(CPC). Afrique Equatorial (AE).1 – Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la France au
© 2018 Bas De Roo and The Johns Hopkins University PressMinistre des Colonies de la France (12-12-1901); AD.CPC.AE.1 – Le Ministre des Colonies
de la France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la France (30-12-1901).
55
AD.CPC.AE.1 – La Légation de France en Belgique au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de
la France (3-2-1902); AD.CPC.AE.1 – Le Ministre des Colonies de la France au Ministre des
Affaires Etrangères de la France (21-2-1902); AMAEB.AA.CP.617.3 – Le Secrétaire d’Etat à
la Légation de France en Belgique (15-3-1902); AD.CPC.AE.1 – La Légation de France en
Belgique au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la France (16-3-1902).
56
AD.CPC.AE.1 – La Légation de France en Belgique au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de
la France (3-2-1902); AD.CPC.AE.1 – Le Ministre des Colonies de la France au Ministre des
Affaires Etrangères de la France (21-2-1902); AMAEB.AA.CP.617.3 – Note sur la lettre de la
Légation de France en Belgique (1902).
57
AMAEB.AA.EIC.AE.326.459 – Examen de la note de la Légation de France en Belgique
(4-8-1896); AMAEB.AA.EIC.AE.326.459 – La Légation de France en Belgique au Secrétaire
d’Etat (08–02–1897); AD.CPC.AE.1 – La Légation de France en Belgique au Ministre des
Affaires Etrangères de la France (26-3-1902).
58
Leclercq, “Un mode de mobilisation des ressources.”
59
AD.CPC.AE.1 – La Légation de France en Belgique au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de
la France (26-3-1902); AMAEB.AA.CP.617.3 – Roi Leopold II au Ministre des Affaires
Etrangères de la France (26-6-1902).
60
AD.CPC.AE.1 – La Légation de France en Belgique au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de
la France (20-4-1902); AD.CPC.AE.1 – La Légation de France en Belgique au Ministre des
Affaires Etrangères de la France (26-4-1902); AD.CPC.AE.1 – La Légation de France en
Belgique au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la France (2-5-1902).
61
BOEIC, 1902, pp. 135, 136 – Droits d’entrée (28-6-1902).
62
AD.CPC.AE.3 – Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la France au Ministre des Colonies
de la France (1-3-1907); AD.CPC.AE.3 – Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la France au
Ministre des Colonies de la France (28-3-1907).
63
Coquery-Vidrovitch, Le Congo au temps des grandes compagnies concessionnaires 1898–
1930; Daniël Vangroenweghe, “The ‘Leopold II’ concession system exported to French
Congo with as example the Mpoko Company,” Belgisch Tijdschrift voor de Nieuwste
Geschiedenis 36/3–4 (2006): 323–72.
64
Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, Le rapport Brazza. Mission d'enquête du Congo: rapport et
documents (1905–1907) (Neuvy-en-Champagne: Le passager clandestin, 2014).
© 2018 Bas De Roo and The Johns Hopkins University Press65
AMAEB.AA.CP.617.3 – Le Secrétaire Général des Finances au Secrétaire Général des
Affaires Etrangères (10-4-1907); AD.CPC.AE.3 – La Légation de France en Belgique au
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la France (20-4-1907); AMAEB.AA.CP.617.3 – Le Vice-
Gouverneur Général au Secrétaire d’Etat (18-9-1907).
66
AMAEB.AA.CP.617.3 – Président du Chambre de Commerce de Boma au Vice-
Gouverneur Général (31-8-1907).
67
BOEIC, 1907, pp. 384, 385 – Droits de sortie (2-7-1907).
68
AD.CPC.AE.3 – La Légation de France en Belgique au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de
la France (19-6-1906).
69
Robert Harms, “The End of Red Rubber: A reassessment,” The Journal of African History
16/1 (1975): 73–88.
70
AD.CPC.AE.3 – Le Ministre des Colonies de la France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères
de la France (13-3-1911).
71
AD.CPC.AE.3 – Note de la Direction des affaires politiques et commerciales du Ministère
des Affaires Etrangères de la France (30-8-1909); AMAEB.AA.CP.543.20.1-I.B1 - Rapport
sur le service des douanes de la colonie par le Directeur des Finances a.i. Périer (18-9-1912).
72
AD.CPC.AE.3 – Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la France au Ministre des Affaires
Etrangères (22-3-1911); AD.CPC.AE.3 – La Légation de France en Belgique au Ministre des
Affaires Etrangères de la France (26-3-1911).
73
AD.CPC.AE.3 – La Légation de France en Belgique au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de
la France (16-1-1911); AD.CPC.AE.3 – Le Ministre des Colonies de la France au Ministre
des Affaires Etrangères de la France (13-3-1911).
74
AMAEB.AA.CP.617.3 – Le Secrétaire Général des Affaires Etrangères au Secrétaire
Général des Finances (21-9-1907).
75
Journal Officiel de l’Afrique Equatoriale Française (JOAEF), 1912, pp. 547–49 – Arrêté
promulguant le décret du 11 octobre 1912, fixant les droits d’entrée à percevoir en A.E.F., à
l’exception des territoires du Gabon, soumis à la loi du 11 janvier 1892, et les droits de sortie
à percevoir dans le l’ensemble des territoires de l’AEF (21-11-1912).
76
Bulletin Officiel du Congo Belge (BOCB), 1913, p. 1023, 1024 – Droits d’entrée sur la
houille, etc. – modifications (11-12-1913); BOCB, 1914, pp. 315–24 – Tarif des douanes. –
Conversion de droits “ad valorem” en droits spécifiques équivalents (2-3-1914); BOCB, 1914,
pp. 774, 775 – Droits de sortie sur les arachides, l’huile de palme, les noix palmistes, le
sésame et le café – suppression (3-4-1914).
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