Deference/Defiance: Southeast Asia, China and the South China Sea

Deference/Defiance: Southeast Asia,
   China and the South China Sea
                  Carlyle A. Thayer

Paper to the Workshop, The Deer and the Dragon: Southeast Asia
  and China in the 21st Century, co‐sponsored by Southeast Asia
   Forum, Shorenstein Asia‐Pacific Research Center, Stanford
 University and the China Programme, Institute of Defence and
 Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies,
          Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
                       November 15‐16, 2012

2

          Deference/Defiance: Southeast Asia, China,
                  and the South China Sea
                                        Carlyle A. Thayer

Introduction
Southeast Asian states have had to contend with South China Sea issues involving
China/Taiwan since the 1950s. In the contemporary period, Southeast Asian states grouped
in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) issued their first formal statement on
the South China Sea in 1992 in response to tensions arising from China’s occupation of
features claimed by Vietnam.1 In 1995, when China occupied Mischief Reef, a maritime
feature claimed by the Philippines, ASEAN foreign ministers issued their second statement
on the South China Sea. It expressed their “serious concern” and urged the concerned
(unnamed) parties “to refrain from taking actions that de‐stabilize the situation.”2 These
singular events occurred before China’s economic rise began to take hold and become
perhaps the single more important driver in relations between China and Southeast Asia.

China and the ASEAN stated have been engaged in diplomatic discussions of South China
Sea issues since the Mischief Reef incident. Although both ASEAN and China drew up their
own codes of conduct for the South China Sea they were unable to reach agreement on a
common text. This resulted in the 2002 Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China
Sea (DOC). Negotiations continued until mid‐2011 when ASEAN and China agreed on
Guidelines to Implement the DOC. These are still under discussion.3

1
 ASEAN Declaration On The South China Sea, Manila, Philippines, 22 July 1992.
http://www.aseansec.org/1196.htm.
2
 Statement by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the Recent Developments in the South China Sea 18 March
1995; http://www.aseansec.org/2089.htm.
3
 For background consult: Carlyle A. Thayer, "ASEAN’S Code of Conduct in the South China Sea: A Litmus Test
for Community‐Building?," The Asia‐Pacific Journal, Vol. 10, Issue 34, No. 4, August 20, 2012.

3

In 2007 and continuing up to the present, China began to become more assertive in pushing
its sovereignty claims.4 Chinese assertiveness involved putting foreign oil companies under
diplomatic pressure not to assist Vietnam in developing its hydrocarbon resources in
contested maters and increasing aggressive action against Vietnamese boats in waters
surrounding the Paracel Islands. The year 2009 marked a turning point. China responded to
submissions by Malaysia and Vietnam to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf by officially tabling for the first time a u‐shaped map containing nine
dash lines claiming over eighty percent of the South China Sea. Chinese civilian agencies
then became active in attempting to assert jurisdiction over these waters. This resulted in
numerous incidents between China and the Philippines and Vietnam including Chinese
actions in driving off an oil exploration vessel in waters claimed by the Philippines and
cutting the cables on two vessels conducting seismic tests in Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ).

4
   For background see: Ian Storey and Carlyle A. Thayer, “The South China Sea Dispute: A Review of
Developments and Their Implications since the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties,” in K. V. Kesavan
and Daljit Singh, eds., South and Southeast Asia: Responding to Changing Geo‐Political and Security Challenges
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and New Delhi: KW Publishers Pvt Ltd, 2010), 57‐72; .Carlyle
A. Thayer, “Recent Developments in the South China Sea: Implications for Peace, Stability and Cooperation in
the Region,” in Tran Truong Thuy, ed., The South China Sea: Cooperation for Regional Security and
Development: Proceedings of the International Workshop co‐organized by the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam
and the Vietnam Lawyers’ Association, 26‐27 November 2009, Hanoi, Vietnam (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban The Gioi,
2010), 125‐138; Carlyle A. Thayer, Recent Developments in the South China Sea: Grounds for Cautious
Optimism?, RSIS Working Paper No. 220 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang
Technological University, Singapore, December 14, 2010; Carlyle A. Thayer, “Security Cooperation in the South
China Sea: An Assessment of Recent Trends,” in, National Security Review special edition, The South China Sea
Reader, Papers and Proceedings of the Manila Conference on the South China Sea: Toward A Region of Peace,
Cooperation and Progress, July 5‐6, 2011, Manila, Philippines (Manila: National Defense College of the
Philippines, Foreign Service Institute and Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, 2011), 13‐40; Carlyle A. Thayer,
“Recent Developments in the South China Sea: Implications for Regional Security,” in Tran Truong Thuy, ed.,
The South China Sea: Towards a Region of Peace, Security and Cooperation (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban The Gioi,
2011), 117‐140; Carlyle A. Thayer, “Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea and Southeast Asian
Responses,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 30(2), 2011, 77‐104 and Carlyle A. Thayer, “China’s
New Wave of Aggressive Assertiveness in the South China Sea,” The International Journal of China Studies
[Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya], 2(3), December 2011, 555‐583.

4

Six countries lay claim to the islands, features and waters in the South China Sea: China,
Taiwan (Republic of China), Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. This paper offers
a preliminary analysis of how Southeast Asian states have responded to China’s growing
assertiveness of sovereignty in the South China Sea. The paper argues that Southeast Asian
responses lie along the spectrum from defiance to deference and often involve a mixture of
the two approaches. The paper begins with China’s two main protagonists ‐ the Philippines
and Vietnam ‐ and then moves to the middle of the spectrum with a focus on Singapore,
Indonesia and Malaysia ‐ before moving to the end of the spectrum ‐ Thailand and
Cambodia.

The Philippines

The Philippines expelled the United States from military bases in the early 1990s. The Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) have been involved overwhelmingly in domestically focused
missions. The AFP navy and air force are badly run down and are unable to contribute
meaningfully to external defence. At first glance the Philippines is an unlikely candidate to
show defiance in the face of Chinese sovereignty claims to the South China Sea.

President Benigno Aquino III assumed office in June 30, 2010 and quickly had to confront
increased Chinese naval activities in the Philippines’ EEZ. There was a marked step up in
Chinese naval and paramilitary activities in the fourth quarter of 2010 and at least six major
incidents involving violations of Philippine sovereignty took place in the first half of 2011. In
2012 a major six‐week standoff at Scarborough Shoal occurred.5

Of all the Southeast Asian claimants to the South China Sea the Philippines has been the
most vociferous in responding to Chinese assertiveness through diplomatic protests,
bilateral discussions, assertions of sovereignty, revitalization of its alliance with the United
States, force modernization, and regionalizing and internationalizing the dispute.

Diplomatic Protests. The Philippines’ Department of Foreign Affairs has vigorously protested
each and every Chinese intrusion into its waters and airspace by delivering Notes Verbales
to the Chinese Embassy in Manila. The contents of these diplomatic notes have been made
5
 Carlyle A. Thayer, “Is the Philippines an Orphan?,” The Diplomat, May 2, 2012. http://the‐
diplomat.com/2012/05/02/is‐the‐philippines‐an‐orphan/.

5

public via the press.

Bilateral Discussions. Filipino officials have repeatedly raised their concerns about incidents
in the South China Sea through diplomatic channels with Chinese officials. For example,
Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin raised South China Sea issues when China’s Defence
Minister, General Liang Guanglie paid an official visit to the Philippines in May 2011.6

President Aquino paid an official visit to China from August 30‐September 3, 2011. After
discussions with his counterpart, President Hu Jintao, they issued a Joint Statement that
revealed that economic matters featured prominently. It appears that President Aquino
played the South China Sea issue “softly, softly” and the only reference to the South China
Sea came in point 15 (of 17) in the Joint Statement:

       Both leaders exchanged views on the maritime disputes and agreed not to let the maritime
       disputes affect the broader picture of friendship and cooperation between the two countries.
       The two leaders reiterated their commitment to addressing the disputes through peaceful
       dialogue, to maintain continued regional peace, security, stability and an environment conducive
       to economic progress. Both leaders reaffirmed their commitments to respect and abide by the
       Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea signed by China and the ASEAN
       member countries in 2002.7

This same pattern of tip toeing around the South China Sea issue was evident during the
18th Foreign Ministry Consultations held in Manila on October 19, 2012. China was
represented by it Deputy Foreign Minister Fu Ying. A statement issued by Department of
Foreign Affairs on the consultations did not mention the South China Sea specifically as one of
the issues discussed. It may have been included in the sentence, “Both sides discussed issues
of concern and agreed to continue the dialogue.”8

Assertions of Sovereignty. The Philippines continues to assert its sovereignty in the South
China Sea by granting offshore oil and gas exploration licenses in areas claimed by China,

6
    ABS‐CBN News, “China, PH agree to hold regular talks on Spratlys,” May 23, 2011.
7
 “Joint Statement of the Philippines and China, Beijing, September 1, 2011,” reprinted in Inquirer Global
Nation, September 7, 2011.
8
 “Secretary del Rosario receives Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying,” Department of Foreign Affairs Press
Release, October 19, 2012. http://www.gov.ph/2012/10/19/secretary‐del‐rosario‐receives‐chinese‐vice‐
foreign‐minister‐fu‐ying/.

6

such as Area 3 and Area 4 in waters off Palawan.9 The Philippines also continues to
modernize facilities on features in the South China Sea. In March 2012, for example, the
Philippines announced it would upgrade facilities on Pagasa Island by building a roll‐on roll‐
off dock for ferryboats.10 The Philippines has also officially designated the South China Sea
as the “West Philippines Sea” to emphasis its sovereignty claims.

The Philippines also has taken action against what it regards a illegal poaching by Chinese
fishermen. For example, on April 10, 2012, the Philippines Navy dispatched the frigate BRP
Gregorio del Pilar to Scarborough Shoal to investigate the presence of eight Chinese fishing
boats.11 An armed boarding party from the frigate discovered that the fishing boats were in
possession of a large illegal catch of coral, giant clams and live sharks. China intervened by
interposing two China Marine Surveillance vessels between the fishermen and the frigate.
The Philippines withdrew the frigate and replaced it with a Coast Guard cutter. This led to a
six‐week standoff. At one point China deployed nearly one hundred surveillance ships,
fishing boats, and utility craft in the lagoon at Scarborough Shoal.12 Efforts to resolve this
incident though diplomatic means foundered as both parties claimed that Scarborough
Shoal was an integral part of their national territory.

Revitalization of the U.S. Alliance. Chinese assertiveness in waters claimed by the Philippines
led to President Aquino to take steps to revitalize its alliance with the United States and to
seek clarification of whether or not their 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) would apply in
the case of conflict with China in the South China Sea.

The Philippines’ policy of revitalizing its alliance with the U.S. has been reinforced by the
Obama Administration’s new defence policy of rebalancing towards the Asia‐Pacific. This
has already resulted in a step up in U.S. access to the Philippines. For example, between
May and October 2012, four U.S. Navy nuclear submarines (SSNs) have made port calls: USS

9
  Thomas Hogue, “Philippines set to award offshore oil, gas blocks despite China claims: report,” Platts,
February 28, 2012; Associated Press, “Philippines reignites row with China over oil exploration rights,” The
Guardian, February 29, 2012.
10
  Pia Lee‐Brago, “China hits plan for Pag‐asa dev’t,” The Philippine Star, March 27, 2012 and “Philippines to
build dock on South China Sea island,” People’s Daily, March 23, 2012.
11
  Carlyle A. Thayer, “Standoff in the South China Sea: Scarborough Shoal standoff reveals blunt edge of China’s
peaceful rise,” Yale Global Online, June 12, 2012. http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/standoff‐south‐china‐sea.
12
     Manuel Mogato, Reuters, “Philippines pulls ships from disputed shoal due to weather,” June 16, 2012.

7

North Carolina (May), USS Louisville (June), USS Hawaii (September) and USS Olympia
(October).

Force Modernization. In 2011, in response to Chinese assertiveness the Philippines drew up
a new defence strategy with a new emphasis on external territorial defence. In September
2011, for example, immediately after President Aquino’s state visit to Beijing, he announced
that 4.95 billion pesos (US $118 million) would be allocated to top up the defence budget.13
These funds were earmarked for the purchase a naval patrol vessel, six helicopters and
other military equipment in order to secure the Malampaya project located in disputed
waters off the coast of Palawan. In 2012 the Philippines began funding a five‐year AFP
modernization program totalling P40 billion (or P8 billion annually).

The Philippines has taken delivery of two former U.S. Coast Guard Weather Endurance
Cutters (the first was rechristened Gregario del Pilar) and assigned them the mission of
protecting the Philippines’ EEZ. The Philippines also expects to take delivery of three new
Taiwan‐manufactured Multi‐Purpose Attack Craft and procure two additional U.S. Coast
Guard Cutters.14 Philippines officials have floated a wish list’of new equipment including:
coastal radar, long‐range patrol aircraft, strategic sea lift vessels, off‐shore patrol boats,
naval helicopters, air defence radar, jet trainers, surface attack aircraft, anti‐ship missiles,
and a submarine.15 In addition to assistance from the United States, the Philippines has
approached both Japan and South Korea for help in force modernisation.

Regionalizing and Internationalizing the Dispute. The Philippines sought to regionalize its
dispute with China by launching a new initiative calling for the South China Sea to become a
Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation (ZOPFF/C). Aquino explained, “what is
ours is ours, and with what is disputed, we can work towards joint cooperation.”16 The
ZOPFF/C proposal was formally presented to the 44th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July
2011. The 19th ASEAN Summit took note of these discussions and recommended “that
further study on the proposal is required, in particular, its legal, technical and political

13
     Agence France‐Presse, “Philippines Ups Spending To Guard South China Sea,” September 7, 2011.
14
  Reuters, “Philippines says will spend $255 min on military helicopters, boats,” April 13, 2011 and Agence
France Presse, “Philippines hopes sea dispute with China should ease,” September 3, 2011.
15
     Alexis Romero, “Submarine for Navy? Noy bares AFP shop list,” The Philippine Star, August 24, 2011.
16
  Albert F. Del Rosario, “A Rules‐Based Regime in The South China Sea By: Secretary of Foreign Affairs,” Public
Information Service Unit, June 7, 2011.

8

feasibility.”17 In January 2012 the Philippines submitted a draft Code of Conduct to ASEAN
senior officials for consideration. When ASEAN senior officials finally reached agreement on
the key elements of the ASEAN draft COC it was evident that the Philippines had to
compromise as key elements of the ZOPFF/C were dropped.18

The Philippines has also sought to internationalize its territorial dispute with China by raising
the matter at the United Nations. For example, on April 5, 2011 the Philippines submitted a
letter to the UN formally restating its claim to sovereignty over the Kalayaan Island Group
(KIG), adjacent waters and geological features, including relevant waters, seabed and
subsoil.19

In June 2011 President Aquino threatened to raise Chinese intrusions into its waters with
the United Nations.20 The following month Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario proposed to
his Chinese counterpart Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi in Beijing that their territorial dispute
should be taken to the UN’s International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea for arbitration.21

Vietnam
In 1992, after China and Vietnam normalized diplomatic relations after more than a decade
of estrangement over Cambodia, the South China Sea emerged as a growing irritant in their
relationship. In February China promulgated a law on territorial waters that reiterated its
sovereignty over the South China Sea. At the same time China occupied Three Headed Rock,
a feature claimed by Vietnam. In May, China granted the American Crestone Energy
Corporation exploration rights in Tu Chinh bank and in July 1992 China planted a territorial
marker on Dac Lac reef, both features in waters claimed by Vietnam.22

17                               th
     “Chair’s Statement of the 19 ASEAN Summit Bali, 17 November 2011,” Point 149.
18   Thayer, "ASEAN’S Code of Conduct in the South China Sea: A Litmus Test for Community‐Building?."
19
   Philippine Mission to the United Nations, Letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations, 11‐00494,
No. 000228, New York, April 5, 2011. The KIG contains nine geological features: Balagtas (Irving Reef), Kota
(Loaita), Lawak (Nanshan), Likas (West York), Pag‐asa (Thitu),, Panata (Lankiam), Parola (Northeast Cay), Patag
Island (Flat Island is also considered a part of the Spratlys) and Rizal (Commodore Reef).
20
   Johanna Paola Poblete, “Philippines preparing issues for UN about China “intrusions’,” Business World, June
2, 2011.
21
     Bloomberg News, “U.S. Joint Navy Drills “Inappropriate’: China,” July 11, 2011.
22
  Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam: Coping with China,” in Daljit Singh, ed., Southeast Asian Affairs 1994 (Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 356‐357.

9

In June 1992, the third plenum of the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) Central Committee
grappled with the ideological implications of tension and potential conflict between socialist
states. The plenum concluded that in its relations with the major powers Vietnam could
both cooperate and struggle (hop tac va dau tranh) while maintaining relations of peaceful
coexistence.23 In July 2003, the VCP Central Committee’s eighth plenum redefined its
ideological approach to interstate relations by adopting the concepts doi tac (object of
cooperation) and doi tuong (object of struggle). In other words, Vietnam had come to view
its relations with China and the United States as containing elements of both cooperation
and struggle when either state adopted policies that affected Vietnam’s nation interests.24

Deference/Cooperation

In March 1999, a summit meeting of the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and
the VCP adopted a sixteen‐character guideline calling for “long‐term, stable, future‐
orientated, good‐neighborly and all‐round cooperative relations.” In 2000, a summit
meeting of state presidents from China and Vietnam codified their bilateral relations in a
Joint Statement for Comprehensive Cooperation in the New Century. This document has
served as the framework for long‐term state‐to‐state relations up to the present. In June
2008, following another summit of party leaders in Beijing, bilateral relations were officially
raised to that of strategic partners, and a year later this was upgraded to a strategic
cooperative partnership.

Vietnam utilizes its strategic partnership with China to show deference through a dense
network of party, state, defence and multilateral mechanisms with the aim of enmeshing
China in a web of bilateral cooperation in the hopes of making Chinese behaviour more
predictable.25 Nevertheless, the South China Sea has proved an intractable issue. Vietnam

23
     Hong Ha, “Tinh hinh the gioi va chinh sach doi ngoai cua Nuoc ta,” Tap Chi Cong San, 1992, 12, pp. 11‐12.
24
  Carlyle A. Thayer, “The Tyranny of Geography: Vietnamese Strategies to Constrain China in the South China
Sea,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 33(3), 2011, 348‐369.
25
   Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam and Rising China: The Structural Dynamics of Mature Asymmetry,” in Daljit
Singh, ed., Southeast Asian Affairs 2010 Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 392‐409 and
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam on the Road to Global Integration: Forging Strategic Partnerships Through
International Security Cooperation,” Paper to the 4th Vietnam Studies Conference, International Relations
Panel, co‐sponsored by the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences and Vietnam National University, Hanoi,
Vietnam, November 26‐30, 2012, forthcoming.

10

has sought to compartmentalize this dispute from damaging other aspects of the broader
bilateral relationship. In sum, Vietnam promotes cooperation with China while
defying/struggling with China over competing sovereignty claims in the South China Sea.

The sub‐sections below illustrate how Vietnam has attempted to apply this strategy in its
relations with China through party‐to‐party ties, state‐to‐state relations and military‐to‐
military dialogue.

Party‐to‐Party Ties. Party‐to‐party ties form an integral part of the bilateral relationship and
provide a conduit for Vietnam to further its national interests by promoting cooperation
with China. For example, in February 2011, immediately after Eleventh National Congress of
the VCP, in a gesture to show deference to China, the new Secretary General, Nguyen Phu
Trong, dispatched a special envoy, Hoang Binh Quan, to Beijing. Quan met with Hu Jintao,
President and General Secretary of the CCP, and briefed him on the outcome of the
Vietnam’s party congress. Quan also extended an invitation to Hu and other Chinese party
and state leaders to visit Vietnam. In return, Hu extended an invitation to Secretary General
Trong to visit China.26 In deference to China, and in light of continued Chinese assertiveness
in the South China Sea, VCP Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong made the first visit in
October 2011. The two parties leaders agreed to step up party‐to‐party ties.

Most recently, To Huy Rua, VCP Politburo member, Secretary of the VCP Central Committee,
and head of the Central Committee’s Organization Department paid an official visit to China
from February 14‐20, 2012 for discussions with his counterpart on personnel work, cadre
training and planning. They agreed to step up cooperation between their party Organisation
Departments and share experience in human resource training “to further strengthen the
Vietnam‐China comprehensive partnership.”27 Rua’s visit illustrates the effort by Vietnam to
prevent the South China Sea issues for spilling over and affecting bilateral relations
generally.

State‐to‐State relations. Vietnam and China conduct normal state‐to‐state relations through
their foreign ministries and regular high‐level exchanges at deputy minister and minister

26
   “Chinese president vows to further ties with Vietnam,” Xinhua, 18 February 2011 and “China’s Hu Jintao
invites Nguyen Pho Trong,” Voice of Vietnam News, 19 February 2011.
27
     Xinhua, “China, Vietnam agree to further cooperation,” People’s Daily, February 15, 2012

11

level. In 2006, in a major development, Vietnam and China set up a Joint Steering
Committee on Bilateral Cooperation at deputy prime ministerial level to coordinate all
aspects of their relationship. The Steering Committee now meets on an annual basis
alternating between capital cities.28

In December 2008, China and Vietnam agreed to commence bilateral discussions on
maritime issues between their foreign ministries with first priority given to developing a set
of “fundamental guiding principles” as a framework for settling specific issues. These
confidential discussions began in early 2010 and seven sessions were held up to July 2011.

During the first half of 2011 Chinese paramilitary ships were involved in at least two cable‐
cutting incidents involving exploration vessels operating within Vietnam’s EEZ. After the
incident, Vietnam dispatched deputy foreign minister Ho Xuan Son to Beijing as special
envoy for discussions with his counterpart. According to a joint press release issued on 25
June:

     The two sides emphasized the necessity to actively implement the common perceptions of the
     two countries’ leaders, peacefully solving the two countries’ disputes at sea through negotiation
     and friendly consultation; employing effective measures and working together to maintain
     peace and stability in the East Sea [sic].
     They also laid stress on the need to steer public opinions along the correct direction, avoiding
     comments and deeds that harm the friendship and trust of the people of the two countries.
     The two sides agreed to speed up the tempo of negotiations so as to early sign an “Agreement
     on basic principles guiding the settlement of sea issues between Vietnam and China,” and boost
     the implementation of the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the East Sea (DOC) and follow‐up
     activities so that substantial progress will soon be achieved.29
Vietnam and China then convened the eighth and final session of their government‐to‐
government discussions on maritime issue. In October 2011, when VCP Secretary General
and General Secretary Hu Jintao met in Beijing, they witnessed the signing the Agreement
on Fundamental Principles to Guide the Settlement of Sea Disputes. The agreement
committed both parties “to seek mutually acceptable fundamental and lasting solutions to
sea‐related disputes.” In the interim, the two sides “shall actively discuss provisional and
temporary measures without affecting each side’s positions and policies, including the

28
  The first meeting was held in November 2006, the second in January 2008, the third in March 2009 and the
fourth in June‐July 2010.
29
  Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Viet Nam‐China joint press release,” June 26,
2011. http://www.mofa.vn/en.

12

active consideration and discussion on cooperation for mutual development [hop tac cung
phat trien]…” The two parties also agreed to speed up negotiations to demarcate the waters
forming the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin “and actively discuss cooperation for mutual
development in these waters” (emphasis added). The agreement also specified “if the
disputes involve other countries, the consultations shall include all other parties
concerned.”30

In September 2011, China and Vietnam held the fifth annual meeting of their Joint Steering
Committee in Hanoi. China was represented by State Councilor Dai Bingguo who met with
his counter‐part Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Thien Nhan.

In December 2011, Vice President Xi Jinping made an official visit to Hanoi and met with all
of Vietnam’s top party and state leaders. Xi’s visit was primarily “a get to know you” visit as
Xi is expected to replace Hu Jintao as both party leader and state president. Both sides
stressed the importance of the comprehensive nature of their bilateral relationship and
focused on such major issues as trade, educational and youth cooperation, and party‐to‐
party ties. As for the South China Sea, the two leaders reaffirmed past commitments to
refrain from the use of force, respect each other’s interests and settle the dispute through
international law.

The first high‐level visit in 2012 was undertaken by Vietnam’s new Foreign Minister, Pham
Binh Minh, who led an official dlegation to Beijing from February 12‐15. Minh met with his
counterpart, Yang Jiechi, and held separate meetings with Zhou Yongkang, a member of the
Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee and Stare Counsellor Di
Bingquo.31 The South China Sea was discussed. According to China Foreign Ministry
spokesperson, “China is ready to consider exploring solutions to the South China Sea
disputes with all relevant parties under reasonable conditions [emphasis added].”32

In September 2012, Presidents Truong Tan Sang and Hu Jintao met on the sidelines of the
20th APEC Summit in Vladivostok. Also that same month, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung
and Vice Premier Xi Jinping took the opportunity of their attendance at the 9th ASEAN‐China

30
     “Vietnam, China talk border‐related issues,” Vietnam News Agency, April 18, 2011.
31
     Xinhua, “Senior Official Expects Stronger China‐Vietnam Ties,” February 14, 2012.
32
     Cheng Guangjin, “Better ties hold key to S China Sea disputes,” China Daily, February 14, 2012

13

Expo and the China‐ASEAN Business‐Investment Summit in Naning, Guangxi to meet. Xi
stated, “the Chinese Party, State and people attach great importance to the relations with
Vietnam and are ready together with Vietnam to deepen their comprehensive strategic
partnership.” Dung invited Xi to visit Vietnam after the conclusion of the 18th national
congress of the CCP.

Military‐to‐Military Dialogue. In 2005, China and Vietnam commenced annual bilateral
defence consultations. These discussions were raised to deputy minister of defence level in
November 2010.

Vietnam’s Defense Minister General Phung Quang Thanh made an official visit to China in
April 2010. In October 2010, the China’s Defence Minister General Minister Liang Guanglie
attended the inaugural ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) meeting in
Hanoi and held separate discussions with his counterpart. At the ADMM Plus, China and
Vietnam agreed to co‐chair of the ADMM Plus Expert Working Group on Humanitarian
Assistance and Disaster Relief. The Political Commissar of the VPA Navy, Tran Thanh Huyen,
visited Beijing in November 2010.33

Vietnam and China held their first Strategic Defence and Security Dialogue in Hanoi on
November 27, 2010.34 Vietnam was represented by Deputy Defence Minister Lt. Gen.
Nguyen Chi Vinh who hosted Senior Lt. Gen. Ma Xiaotian, PLA Deputy Chief of the General
Staff. At the conclusion of the meeting both sides agreed to increase cooperation between
their navies and border guards, promote military science research and training. They also
agreed to set up a hot line between their respective defence ministries.35

In April 2011, Vietnam received Senior Lieutenant General Guo Boxiong, Vice Chairman of
China’s Central Military Commission, who came at the invitation of Defence Minister
General Thanh. General Guo’s visit was primarily concerned with long‐standing joint patrols
between their respective navies. In April 2006, the navies of both countries commenced

33
  “China, Vietnam Need to Enhance Cooperation: Senior Chinese Military Officer,” Xinhua, November 23,
2010.
34
   “China‐Vietnam boost defence cooperation.” Voice of Vietnam News, November 28, 2010; “Vietnamese
party, army senior officials meet with Chinese military delegation,” Xinhua, November 28, 2010; and “Defence
officials meet in dialogue with China,” Viet Nam News, November 29 2010.
35
  Vietnam News Agency, “China‐Vietnam boost defence cooperation,” Voice of Vietnam News, November 28,
2010.

14

joint patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin following agreements in 2000 to delimit the Gulf of Tonkin
and joint fisheries. A total of thirteen naval patrols have been conducted between then and
June 2012.36 The most recent joint patrols also included a Search and Rescue Exercise
(SAREX) between China and Vietnam and anti‐piracy exercises. In November 2008, the
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) resumed goodwill port calls to Vietnam after a hiatus
of seventeen years. PLAN ships called in again in August 2009, December 2010 and April
2012. In June 2009, in an historic first, two Vietnamese naval ships made a goodwill visit to
Zhanjiang port, Guangdong province. Vietnamese ships made their second port call to
Zhanjiang in June 2011.37

The first high‐level defence meeting took place in June 2011 on the sidelines of the Shangri‐
la Dialogue just after the first May cable‐cutting incident. It involved an informal meeting of
defence ministers Phung Quang Thanh and Liang Guanglie. General Thanh pointedly raised
the incident and General Liang assured him there would be no repetition.

On August 29, 2011, Vietnam and China held their 2nd Strategic Defence and Security
Dialogue at vice ministerial level. The discussions reviewed recent cooperative activities and
agreed to step up military exchanges at various levels and establish a hot line between
defence ministries. China agreed to share its experiences in UN peacekeeping with Vietnam.
Lt. Gen. Ma confirmed that the South China Sea was “the most sensitive disagreement”
between the two sides. With reference to the June 25, 2011 press release (see above), Lt.
Gen Vinh detailed Vietnam’s plans to curb public protests in Vietnam that he claimed were
aimed at undermining Sino‐Vietnamese relations. Both sides agreed not to use force or
threaten to use force to settle their territorial disputes.38

China hosted a visit by General Ngo Xuan Lich, head of the VPA’s General Political
Department and member of the Central Military Party Committee, from September 14‐19,

36
  Margie Mason, “Vietnam and China hold joint naval patrol amid spat,” Associated Press, June 21, 2011 and
Agence France Presse, “China, Vietnam hold joint sea patrols near disputed Spratlys,” June 23, 2011. China and
Vietnam have also conducted seven joint fishery patrols between 2007 and April 2012
37
   “Vietnamese naval ships on friendly visit to China,” Quan Doi Nhan Dan Online, June 22, 2011; “China,
Vietnam engage in Joint naval patrols,” People’s Daily Online, June 22, 2011 and “Vietnamese naval ships wrap
up visit to China,” Quan Doi Nhan Dan Online, June 27, 2011.
38
  PANO, “The second Vietnam‐China Strategic Defence and Security Dialogue concluded successfully,” August
28, 2011 reproduced by Consulate General of Vietnam, Sydney, Australia. www.vietnamconsulate‐
sydney.org/en/news. Accessed February 21, 2012.

15

2011.39 General Lich held discussions with his counterpart, Li Jinai, who is also a member of
China’s Central Military Commission. Their meeting focused on developing ties between the
two militaries. Significantly General Lich was also received by Vice President Xi Jinping, the
vice chairman of the Central Military Commission40 and heir apparent to the post of state
president on the retirement of Hu Jintao in 2013.

As discussed above, the leaders of the VCP and CCP met in Beijing in October 2011. Their
Joint Statement included a clause on defence cooperation:

       Fourthly, to promote in‐depth cooperation between the two armies, increase contact between
       high‐ranking army leaders of the two countries; continue to organise good strategic dialogues at
       deputy ministerial level; accelerate the establishment of a direct telephone line between the
       two defence ministries; increase cooperation in personnel training and exchanges between
       junior officers; conduct trial joint patrols along the land border at a convenient time; continue to
       hold joint naval patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin; increase cooperation in such fields as mutual visits
       by the two countries’ naval ships.41
Defence Minister General Phung Quang Thanh accompanied his party leader to Beijing.
General Thanh met with his counterpart, Senior Lt. General Liang Guanglie, to review
bilateral defence relations. They noted that since 2003 the two sides signed five documents
that provided the legal basis for defence cooperation. They noted that relations between
the PLA and VPA “have become a pillar of the comprehensive strategic cooperative
partnership,” and agreed that their two armies should “exercise restraint and caution in
speech and action to avoid escalating the [South China Sea] issue…”

In April 2012, Senior Lt. Gen. Do Ba Ty, Deputy Minister of National Defence and VPA Chief
of Staff, led a high‐level delegation to China at the invitation of Senior Lt. Gen. Chen Bingde,
PLA Chief of Staff, to discuss future defence cooperation activities. General Ty proposed
opening direct communication between their two defence ministries and effectively using
the existing direct line between their two navies. The two generals noted that bilateral
defence relations have become a pillar of their comprehensive strategic partnership.
General Ty was also received by Vice President Xi Jinping; both are members of their

39
  “Doan can bo chinh tri quan su cap cao nuoc ta tham Trung Quoc,” Vietnam TV, September 18, 2011 and
Zhous Feng, “Chinese defence official holds talks with Vietnamese counterpart,” PLA Daily, September 16,
2011.
40
  “Pho chu tich Trung Quoc tiep doan quan su cap cao Viet Nam,” Thanh Nien Online, September 18, 2011;
“Chinese vice president eyes enhanced relations with Vietnam,” Xinhua, Beijing, September 16, 2011 and
“China, Vietnam pledge to enhance ties amid row in S China sea,” Press Trust of India, September 17, 2011.
41
     “Tuyen bo chung hai nuoc Viet Nam va Trung Quoc,” Vietnam News Agency, October 15, 2011, point 4(iv).

16

country’s respective Central Military Commissions. Finally, General Ty visited the Shanghai
Naval Base (East Sea Fleet) and Shanghai Garrison.

The third Vietnam‐China strategic defence dialogue took place in Hanoi on September 3,
2012 under the co‐chairmanship of Vietnamese Deputy Minister of National Defence Senior
Lt. Gen. Nguyen Chi Vinh and Chinese Senior Lt. Gen. Ma Xiaotian. According to a
Vietnamese media report:

       During the dialogue, both sides discussed regional and global issues that affect their respective
       countries’ national security and defence, as well as plots by hostile forces that threaten their
       revolutionary causes.

       They also discussed measures to boost mutual understanding and promote defence ties to
       reaffirm the fine traditional relationship between Vietnam and China, despite the dispute in the
       East Sea, and dispel distorted arguments that threaten the relationship between the two
       countries.42

The exchange of party, state and military delegations were designed by Vietnam to show a
respectful and deferential attitude to China. The exchange of delegations also served to
compartmentalise the South China Sea dispute and prevent it from spilling over and
negatively affecting the broad‐based bilateral relationship. More specifically, Vietnam used
these exchange to continually seek reassurance from China that neither force nor the threat
of force would be used to settle territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

Defiance/Struggle

Vietnam and China confront an intractable dispute in the South China Sea over both
sovereignty claims to islands and rocks and sovereign jurisdiction over maritime resources.
Their dispute not only includes the features generally thought to comprise the Spratly
Islands but the Paracel Islands as well. This is strictly a bilateral matter between
China/Taiwan and Vietnam.

Since 2007, China has become more assertive in advancing its claims. China has applied
pressure on foreign oil companies to stop assisting Vietnam in the development of offshore
oil and gas deposits. China has also been assertive in imposing its annual fishing ban in
waters north of twelve degrees north latitude. In 2010, Chinese paramilitary ships twice cut

42
     Voice of Vietnam News, September 3, 2012.

17

the cables of foreign ships conducting seismic surveys within Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic
Zone.

Vietnam responded to Chinese assertiveness with calculated acts of defiance/struggle.
These may be grouped into five categories: routine diplomatic protests, internationalizing
the dispute through multilateral forums, public reaffirmations of sovereignty, defence self‐
help modernization, and calibrated defence interaction with the United States.

Routine Diplomatic Protests. The spokesperson for Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
consistently issues public protests against any and all acts by China in the South China Sea to
assert its sovereignty claims. In 2012, for example, Vietnam protested China’s imposition of
its unilateral fishing ban from May 16‐August 1,43 China’s promotion of tourism to the
Paracel islands,44 and China National Offshore Oil Corporation’s (CNOOC) opening nineteen
oil exploration blocks near the Paracels for bidding.

Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs routinely lodges formal diplomatic protests with the
Chinese Embassy in Hanoi in particularly serious matters. For example, Vietnam lodged a
formal protest over an incident on February 22 when, it is alleged, a China Marine
Surveillance (CMS) vessel attempted to board and rob a Vietnamese fishing boat seeking
shelter from a storm near the Parael Islands. Crew from the CMS vessel reportedly fired on
and damaged the Vietnamese boat. Vietnam’s protest note demanded compensation and a
halt to Chinese harassment. Vietnam also lodged a formal diplomatic protest over an
incident near the Paracel Islands on March 3, 2012 involving the detention of twenty‐one
Vietnamese fishermen, the confiscation of their two boats, and the imposition of fine of
70,000 yuan (US $11,000).45

Internationalization of the Dispute. In 2010, when Vietnam served as ASEAN Chair, it
actively lobbied the international community to internationalise its South China Sea dispute
43
  Deutsche Press‐Agentur, “Chinese fishing ban stokes protest from Vietnam amid sea dispute,” January 20,
2012.
44
  UCA News, “China, Vietnam In Sovereignty Spat In South China Sea,” Eurasia Review, March 16, 2012; He
Dan, “Xisha tourism to be developed,” China Daily, March 10 2012 and “Vietnam condemns China for tourism
activity on archipelago,” Thanh Nien News, November 25, 2011.
45
   Xinhua, “China denies shooting at Vietnamese boat,” February 27, 2012; “Vietnam blasts China for assault
on fishermen,” Tuoi Tre, March 1, 2012; Jeremy Page, “Beijing in Fresh Sea Row With Hanoi,” The Wall Street
Journal, March 1, 2012; Associated Press, “Vietnam protests to China over alleged assault on fishermen in
disputed waters,” The Washington Post, March 1, 2012; and Reuters, “China justifies expulsion of “illegal’
Vietnam fishermen,” March 1, 2012;

18

with China. In particular, Vietnam succeeded in having the South China Sea raised at the
ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in July and at the inaugural meeting of the ASEAN Defence
Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) in October. Vietnam has consistently raised the South
China Sea issue at ASEAN ministerial meetings and in 2011 raised the issue at the East Asia
Summit.

For example, Vietnam hosted the inaugural meeting of the ADMM Plus in October 2010. The
meeting was attended by eighteen defence ministers, ten from the ASEAN states and their
eight dialogue partners: Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Russian
Federation and the United States.46 Prior to the ADMM Plus meeting, ASEAN Defence
Ministers reached consensus that issues related to the South China Sea would not be part of
the formal agenda and that no reference to the South China Sea would be included in the
final joint declaration.47 But no restrictions or pre‐conditions were put on the eight non‐
ASEAN ministers.

Seven participants, including the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Malaysia,
Singapore and Vietnam, raised concerns about territorial disputes in the South China Sea.48
Predictably the final Joint Statement omitted any reference to the South China Sea. But
Vietnam used its role as Chair to issue a final statement that declared:

     The meeting noted that the member states are interested in maritime security cooperation and
     agreed that the collective efforts are required to address the challenges of piracy, human
     trafficking and disasters at sea. Some delegates touched upon traditional security challenges,
     such as disputes in the East Sea [sic]. The meeting welcomed efforts by concerned parties to
     address the issue by peaceful means in conformity with the spirit of the Declaration on the
     Conduct of Parties in the East Sea (DOC) of 2002 [sic] and recognized principles of international
     law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982).49

46
   The Defence Minister from Russia did not attend; Russia was represented by the Deputy Chief of Staff
(Valery Gerasiov). The US delegation was the largest with thirty‐five officials out of fifty delegates in
attendance. China withheld the titles and areas of responsibility of its delegation but analysts who poured over
their names were quick to spot that all were important experts involved in South China Sea affairs.
47
  Kazuto Tsukamoto, Yusuke Murayama and Kenji Minemura, “At key meet, Beijing tones down stance on
South China Sea,” The Asahi Shibun, October 14, 2010.
48
   Kazuto Tsukamoto, Yusuke Murayama and Kenji Minemura, “At key meet, Beijing tones down stance on
South China Sea,” The Asahi Shibun, October 14, 2010 and Lt. Gen. Nguyen Chi Vinh quoted in Deutsche
Presse‐Agentur, “Defence meeting in Hanoi calms South China Sea Disputes,” October 12, 2010. Some reports
claims eight ministers spoke on the South China Sea.
49
  Full text of ASEAN official statement: “First ADMM+ Chairman’s Statement,” Vietnam News Agency website,
Hanoi, in English, October 13, 2010.

19

Public Reaffirmations of Sovereignty. On June 9, 2011, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung
responded to growing domestic pressure by making an unusually robust public statement in
defence of national sovereignty in the South China Sea. Dung said: “We continue to affirm
strongly and to manifest the strongest determination of all the Party, of all the people and
of all the army in protecting Vietnamese sovereignty in maritime zones of the country.”
Dung also reaffirmed Vietnam’s “incontestable maritime sovereignty” over the Paracel and
Spratly archipelagos.50 On the same day, President Nguyen Minh Triet, visiting Co To island
off Quang Ninh province near the China border, stated that “we are ready to sacrifice
everything to protect our homeland, our sea and island sovereignty.”51

Vietnam has always been extremely circumspect in its public commentary on relations with
China. The public statements by Prime Minister Dung and President Triet were virtually
unheard of. But no act of defiance/struggle was more calculated than Vietnam’s
unprecedented public announcement that it would conduct live‐fire naval exercises on June
13, 2011 in the waters near Hon Ong Island.52 Hon Ong Island is located approximately forty
kilometres off Quang Nam province in central Vietnam roughly opposite the Paracel Islands
and removed from the two cable‐cutting incidents. The first phase of the exercise involved
coastal artillery, while the second part of the exercise involved missile corvettes firing their
deck guns. Reportedly, anti‐ship missiles were also fired from Sukhoi jet aircraft.53

Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry characterized these exercises as “a routine annual training
activity of the Vietnam navy.”54 Whatever the gloss by government officials, Vietnam’s live‐
fire exercises were undoubtedly conducted to signal Vietnam’s resolve to defend its
sovereignty against further Chinese interference. The live‐firing exercises were also widely
viewed by diplomatic observers as a response to China’s conduct of a massive naval exercise
in the northern reaches of the South China Sea earlier that month.

50
     Agence France Presse, “Vietnam PM says sea sovereignty “incontestable’,” June 9, 2011.
51
     Deutche Presse‐Agentur, “Vietnam’s top leaders add fire to South China Sea dispute,” June 9, 2011.
52
  Bao Dam An Toan Hang Hai Mien Bac [Northern Maritime Safety Corporation], “Ve viec ban dan that tren
vung bien Quang Nam,” So 107/TBHH‐CT.BDATHHMB, June 9, 2011, http://www.vms‐north.vn.
53
     Reported by a confidential Vietnamese military source to the author.
54
     Margie Mason, “Vietnam plans live‐fire drill after China dispute,” Associated Press, June 10, 2011.

20

On the same day that the live‐firing exercises were announced, Prime Minister Dung
underscored the seriousness of Vietnam’s resolve by issuing a decree on emergency military
service that included provisions for the conscription of persons with special skills needed by
the military.55 The decree served two purposes: it assuaged growing domestic pressure on
the government to stiffen its response to China, and it was another demonstration of
resolve in response to Chinese assertiveness.56 On June 15, 2012, in another calculated
demonstration of resolve, two Vietnamese air force Su‐27 jet fighters conducted a two‐hour
patrol over the Spratly Islands. Vietnamese military sources stated that the patrols were
routine and would continue.57

On June 21, 2012, Vietnam’s National Assembly formally adopted the Law of the Sea of Viet
Nam (Luat Bien Viet Nam), asserting sovereignty and sovereign jurisdiction over Vietnam’s
territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ, continental shelf, islands, the Paracel and Spratly
archipelagos and “other archipelagos under the sovereignty, sovereign rights and
jurisdiction of Viet Nam.”58

Vietnam’s Law of the Sea had been under consideration for several years.59 It was due to be
adopted in 2011 as an assertion of Vietnam’s legal claims under international law at a time
of rising tensions in the South China Sea. The law was withheld so as not to undermine the
visit of party Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong to China in October, and the return visit
to Vietnam by Vice Premier Xi Jinping in December.

According to Vietnamese sources, Chinese Embassy officials were aware that Vietnam was
drafting the Law on the Sea and made representations urging Vietnam not to proceed.
Chinese officials were duly informed that Vietnam intended to proceed and it came as no

55
   Agence France‐Presse, “Vietnam signs military order amid tensions,” June 15, 2011. The Decree also listed
eight categories of exemptions.
56
     BBC News Asia‐Pacific, “Vietnam bolsters military stance amid China marine row,” June 14, 2011.
57
     Thanh Nien, June 17, 2012.
58
  “Luat Bien Viet Nam,” Article 1. The official text in Vietnamese and an unofficial translation prepared by
Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs may be found at: Carlyle A. Thayer, “Viet Nam Law of the Sea,” Thayer
Consultancy Background Brief, August 5, 2012. http://www.scribd.com/doc/101998223/Thayer‐Vietnam‐s‐
Law‐on‐the‐Sea. The law will take effect from January 1, 2013.
59
  It should be noted that in December 2009 the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress
passed a Law on Sea Island Protection to protect the marine eco‐system and promote sustainable
development. This law entrenched China’s sovereignty claims and strengthened the role of the State Oceanic
Administration in monitoring compliance.

21

surprise when Vietnam’s National Assembly adopted the law. China’s Vice Foreign Minister
Zhang Zhijun immediately summoned Vietnam’s Ambassador in Beijing, Nguyen Van Tho, to
lodge a strong protest.60 On the same day, CNOOC issued bids for oil exploration in blocs all
located to the seaward side of its nine‐dash line but also entirely within Vietnam’s EEZ.

Defence Self‐Help and Modernization. In contrast to the Philippines, Vietnam has embarked
on a more robust program of modernizing its armed forces. Vietnam has given priority to
the modernisation of its navy and the development of a modest anti‐access/area denial
deterrent capability. For example, in 2009, Vietnam announced it would procure six
conventional diesel powered Kilo‐class submarines from Russia. The submarines are
expected to be equipped with sea skimming 3M‐54 Klub anti‐ship missiles with a range of
300 kilometres.61

In 2011, Vietnam took delivery of four Su‐30MK2 multi‐role jet fighters that are expected to
be equipped with the Kh‐59MK anti‐ship cruise missile with a range of 115 km. Vietnam
currently has on order sixteen more Su‐30MK2 jet fighters.62 Vietnam also took delivery of
two Gephard‐class guided missile stealth frigates armed with Kh‐35E anti‐ship missiles with
a range of 130 km and two Svetlyak class missile Patrol Boats.63 Vietnam also officially
launched its first indigenously built Offshore Patrol Vessel.64 In October, while on a tour of
the Netherlands, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung reportedly gave his approval for the
purchase of four Sigma‐class corvettes, two of which are slated for construction in
Vietnam.65

Vietnam has beefed up it land‐based coastal defences by acquiring its second Bastion land‐
based anti‐ship ballistic missile system and Extended Range Artillery Munitions ‐ a ballistic
missile effective beyond 150 km ‐ from Israel. In October 2011, during President Truong Tan

60
  Jane Perlez, “Vietnam Law on Contested Islands Craws China’s Ire,” The New York Times, June 21, 2012 and
Reuters, “China says Vietnam claims to islands “null and void’,” June 21, 2012.
61
  Robert Karniol, “Vietnam prepares to better protect its S. China Sea claims,” The Straits Times, reprinted in
The China Post, January 10, 2012.
62
     “Russia to supply Vietnam six submarines in 2014,” Thanh Nien News, July 3, 2011.
63
  “Russia exports aircraft to Vietnam,” The Voice of Russia, June 22, 2011; BBC, “Hai quan Viet Nam nhan tau
chien Nga,” August 24, 2011; “Russia delivers second coastal missile system to Vietnam,” Interfax‐AVN military
news agency, October 11, 2011; and BBC, “Nga giao tiep hai tau tuan tra cho VN,” October 25, 2011.
64
     BBC, “Viet Nam tu dong tau chien,” October 3, 2011.
65
     BBC, “VN dam phan mua 4 tau chien cua Ha Lan,” October 18, 2011.

22

Sang’s visit to New Delhi, the local media reported that India was prepared to sell Vietnam
its BrahMos supersonic cruise missile.66 President Sang requested Indian assistance in four
areas: submarine training, conversion training for pilots to fly Sukhoi‐30s, transfer of
medium sized patrol boats, and modernization of port facilities at Nha Trang.67

Calibrated Defence Interaction with the United States. In 2003, Vietnam and the United
States agreed to exchange official visits by their defence ministers at three yearly intervals.
Vietnam also gave permission for the U.S. Navy to make one goodwill port visit annually. In
2010 Vietnam and the United States began to conduct naval exchange activities as an
adjunct to the annual ship visits. Naval activities do not involve the exchange of combat
skills.

In 2004, the United States and Vietnam began conducting an annual defence that has
evolved over time. In 2008, for example, the dialogue was raised to a Political, Security and
Defense dialogue involving officials from their respective foreign affairs and defense
ministries. The 5th U.S.‐Vietnam Political, Security, and Defense Dialogue was held in Hanoi
on June 20, 2012. In August 2010, the US‐Vietnam defense dialogue was upgraded to a
Defense Policy Dialogue between officials at deputy minister level. The first meeting was
held in Hanoi. Vietnam was represented by Deputy Minister of National Defence Lt. Gen.
Nguyen Chi Vinh and the U.S. was represented by Robert Scher, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defence for South and Southeast Asia. The two sides agreed to cooperate in military
exchanges and training and collaboration in search and rescue and humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief.68

In 2009, Vietnamese defence officials began making high‐publicity fly outs to U.S. aircraft
carriers transiting the South China Sea off Vietnam’s eastern seaboard. The first took place
in April 2009 when Vietnamese officials landed on the USS John D. Stennis. This was
followed by fly‐outs to the USS George Washington in August 2010 and October 2012. In
addition, in December 2009 Vietnam’s Defence Minister stopped off in Hawii enroute to
Washington, D.C. He was photographed peering through the periscope of the USS Florida
66
  “India to sell BrahMos missile to Vietnam,” The Asian Age, September 20, 2011 and Robert Johnson, “India is
Preparing To Sell BahMos Supersonic Cruise Missiles to Vietnam,” Business Insider, September 20, 2011.
67
     Sandeep Dikshit, “Vietnam’s plea put South Block in a predicament,” The Hindu, November 9, 2011.
68
  In August 2011, the United States and Vietnam signed their first bilateral defence agreement, a Statement of
Intent to cooperate in health, and a precursor for exchanges and research collaboration in military medicine.