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EUROPEAN UNION
Directorate General for Competition
B-1049 Brussels, Belgium
Tel: +32 2 29 91111 (switchboard, European Commission)
Fax: +32 2 29 55437 (for general questions, DG Competition)
infocomp@ec.europa.eu (for general questions, DG Competition)
For queries relating to the response to this questionnaire:
Jonathan Todd
Tel: +32 2 29 94107
jonathan.todd@ec.europa.eu
Contacts
Margrethe Vestager Andrea Bomhoff Jose Maria Carpi Badia
Commissioner responsible for Assistant to the director general Deputy Head of Unit A-2:
competition policy with special responsibility for Merger Case support and policy
http://ec.europa.eu/ state aid
commission/2014-2019/vestager_en Tel: +32 2 29 87100 Barbara Brandtner
Head of Unit A-3:
Johannes Laitenberger Rainer Wessely State Aid Policy and Scrutiny
Director general Assistant to the director general
Tel: +32 2 29 65745 with special responsibility for Anna Vernet
mergers and antitrust Head of Unit A-4:
Gert-Jan Koopman Tel: +32 2 29 92596 European Competition Network
Deputy director general with and Private Enforcement
special responsibility for state aid Jonathan Todd
Tel: +32 2 29 93381 Head of Unit 01: Eddy De Smijter
Communications Policy and Head of Unit A-5:
Cecilio Madero Villarejo Inter-Institutional Relations International Relations
Deputy director general with Tel: +32 2 29 94107
special responsibility for antitrust Directorate B
Tel: +32 2 29 60949 Koen Van de Casteele Céline Gauer
Head of Unit 03: Director, Directorate B,
Carles Esteva Mosso State Aid Case Support Markets and Cases I Energy and
Deputy director general with Tel: +32 2 29 69419 Environment
special responsibility for mergers Tel: +32 2 29 63919
Tel: +32 2 29 69721 Tea Broms
Head of Unit 04: Johannes Lübking
Tommaso Valletti Strategy and Delivery Head of Unit B-1:
Chief Competition Economist Tel: +32 2 29 54436 Antitrust Energy, Environment
Tel: +32 2 29 64270
Directorate A Brigitta Renner-Loquenz
Giulio FEDERICO Kris Dekeyser Head of Unit B-2:
Head of Unit CE.1: Chief Director, directorate A: State Aid Energy, Environment I
Economist Team: Mergers Policy and Strategy
Tel: +32 2 29 97954 Tel: +32 2 29 54206 Christof Lessenich
Head of Unit B-3:
Fabienne ILZKOVITZ Rainer Becker State Aid Energy, Environment II
Principal Adviser Acting head of Unit A-1:
Tel: +32 2 2993379 Antitrust Case Support and Policy
www.globalcompetitionreview.com 117EUROPEAN UNION
Hanna Anttilainen Jean Bergevin Philippe Chauve
Head of Unit B-4: Head of Unit D-2: Head of Task Force Food
Mergers Energy, Environment Antitrust, Financial Services
Directorate F
Directorate C Peer Ritter Henrik Mørch
Guillaume Loriot Head of Unit D-3: Director, Directorate F:
Director, Directorate C: State Aid I, Task Force Financial Markets and Cases V, Transport,
Markets And Cases II, Information, Crisis Post And Other Services
Communication And Media Tel: +32 2 29 50766
Tel: +32 2 29 84988 Anna Jarosz-Friis
Head of Unit D-4: Hubert De Broca
Rita Wezenbeek State Aid II, Task Force Financial Head of Unit F-1:
Head of Unit C-1: Crisis Antitrust, Transport, Post and
Antitrust,Telecoms Other Services
Christophe Galand
Krzysztof Kuik Head of Unit D-5: Sophie Moonen
Head of Unit C-2: State Aid III, Task Force Financial Head of Unit F-2:
Antitrust, Media Crisis State Aid, Transport
Nicholas Banasevic Alberto Bacchiega Monique Negenman
Head of Unit C-3: Head of Unit D-6: Head of Unit F-3:
Antitrust, IT, Internet and Mergers, Financial Services State Aid, Post and Other Services
Consumer Electronics
Directorate E Daniel Boeshertz
Ewoud Sakkers Paul Csiszar Head of Unit F-4:
Head of Unit C-4: Director, Directorate E: Mergers, Transport, Post and
State Aid, Information, Markets and Cases IV, Basic Other Services
Communication and Media Industries, Manufacturing and
Agriculture Directorate G
Michele Piergiovanni Tel: +32 2 29 84669 Eric Van Ginderachter
Head of Unit C-5: Director, Directorate G:
Mergers, Information, Dirk Van Erps Cartels
Communication and Media Head of Unit E-1: Tel: +32 2 29 54427
Antitrust, Pharma and Health
Thomas Kramler Services Gerald Miersch
Head of Sector C-TF Head of Unit G-1:
Task Force Digital Single Market Natalia Lazarova Cartels I
Head of Unit E-2:
Directorate D Antitrust, Consumer Goods, Basic Maria Jaspers
Maria Velentza Industries, Agriculture And Head of Unit G-2:
Director, Directorate D: manufacturing Cartels II
Markets and Cases II, Financial
Services; Head of Task Force Eduardo Martinez Rivero Zsuzsanna Jambor
Financial Crisis Head of Unit E-3: Head of Unit G-3:
Tel: +32 2 29 51723 State Aid, Industrial Restructuring Cartels III
Sari Suurnakki Thomas Deisenhofer Corinne Dussart-Lefret
Head of Unit D-1: Head of Unit E-4: Head of Unit G-4:
Antitrust, Payment Systems Mergers, Basic Industries, Cartels IV
Manufacturing and Agriculture
118 The Handbook of Competition Enforcement Agencies 2017EUROPEAN UNION
Flavio Laina Miek Van der Wee Christina Siaterli
Acting head of Unit G-5: Head of Unit H-1: Head of Unit H-3:
Cartels V Infrastructure and Regional aid Fiscal Aid
Directorate H Demos Spatharis Kristine Liljeberg
Karl Soukup Head of Unit H-2: Head of Unit H-4: Enforcement
Director, Directorate H: Access to finance, R&D&I and and Monitoring
State Aid, General Scrutiny and Environment
Enforcement Max Lienemeyer
Tel: +32 2 29 67442 Head of H5: Tax planning practices
Questions and answers
How long is the head of agency’s term of office? If so, how do these relate to your agency’s role?
The European Commission (the Commission) is made Not applicable.
up of a College of Commissioners, the members of
which are appointed for five years. Renewal of appoint May politicians overrule or disregard authority’s
ment as a member is possible. decisions? If they have ever exercised this right,
describe the most recent example.
When is he or she due for reappointment? No. Final decisions are made by the College of
The term of the current College of Commissioners Commissioners, appointed as set out above. Neither
(including the commissioner responsible for compe the Council of Ministers nor the European Parliament
tition matters) expires in October 2019. can overrule or disregard Commission decisions.
Which posts within the organisation are political Does the law allow non-competition aims to be
appointments? considered when your agency takes decisions?
The commissioner responsible for competition matters When acting under the antitrust and merger rules,
is a political appointment: like all Commissioners, he the Commission applies only competition criteria.
or she is nominated by the president of the European In the field of state aid, when examining whether a
Commission and appointed by the Council of the EU measure constitutes aid, the Commission only assesses
after confirmation by the European Parliament. the effects of the measure on competition and trade
between member states. However, when assessing
What is the agency’s annual budget? the compatibility of a given aid with the Treaty, the
The budget for 2017 is €108.4 million. Commission takes into consideration other common
interest objectives, such as the creation of jobs, environ
How many staff are employed by the agency? mental protection, cohesion policy or the development
On 31 December 2016, the Directorate General of small and medium enterprises. The Commission
for Competition employed 748 permanent staff carries out a balancing test to determine whether these
(officials). This excludes staff on fixed-term contracts positive effects outweigh the possible distortions of
and vacancies. competition created by the state aid measure.
To whom does the head of the agency report? Which body hears appeals against the agency’s
The competition commissioner is a member of the decisions? Is there any form of judicial review
College of Commissioners making up the European beyond that mentioned above? If so, which body
Commission. The Commission is an independent conducts this? Has any competition decision by
institution. Its decisions in the area of competition are the agency been overturned?
subject to judicial review by the EU courts. The European Courts (General Court and Court of
Justice) in Luxembourg. General Court rulings may
Do any industry-specific regulators have be appealed on points of law to the European Court
competition powers? of Justice.
Not at EU level.
www.globalcompetitionreview.com 119EUROPEAN UNION
Has the authority ever blocked a proposed Has the authority conducted a Phase II
merger? If yes, please provide the most recent investigation in any of its merger filings? If yes,
instances. please provide the most recent instances.
The Commission has blocked 25 transactions since In addition to the six cases that required remedies
1989. This represents less than 0.5 per cent of the following an in-depth Phase II investigation, in 2016,
number of cases notified. the Commission cleared one case unconditionally
The most recent prohibition concerned the after an in-depth Phase II investigation: Fedex/TNT
UK telecommunications market. In July 2016, the Express (M.7630). In one other case, the parties aban
Commission blocked the proposed acquisition of O2 doned a transaction during the in-depth investigation
by Hutchison (M.7612 Hutchison 3G UK/Telefonica (Halliburton/Baker Hughes M.7477). Moreover, the
UK). The Commission had strong concerns that UK Commission, after an in-depth investigation, prohib
mobile customers would have had less choice and paid ited the acquisition of Telefonica UK by Hutchison
higher prices as a result of the takeover, and that the 3G UK (M.7612). Finally, four of the Phase II inves
deal would have harmed innovation in the mobile sec tigations opened in 2016 are still ongoing: M.7878
tor. The Commission rejected the remedies proposed HeidelbergCement/Schwenk/Cemex Hungary/Cemex
by the merging companies as it deemed them inad Croatia; M.7995 Deutsche Börse/LSE; M.7932 Dow/
equate to prevent the likely negative impact on prices, Dupont and M.7962 Chemchina/Syngenta.
quality of service and network innovation in the UK
mobile sector. Has the authority ever pursued a company based
outside your jurisdiction for a cartel offence? If
Has the authority ever imposed conditions on yes, please provide the most recent instances.
a proposed merger? If yes, please provide the Yes, the Commission has pursued companies based
most recent instances. outside the EU in several cases.
The Commission has imposed conditions in 393 cases Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of
since 1989. This represents around 6 per cent of the the European Union (TFEU) prohibits cartels or other
number of cases notified. anticompetitive agreements, which have as their object
In 2016, 25 cases were approved subject to or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
remedies. 19 of them were approved within Phase I competition within the EU. The Commission therefore
proceedings: Danone/The Whitewave Foods Company may fine companies that are based outside the EU, if
(M.8150); Microsoft/LinkedIn (M.8124); Abbott the anticompetitive behaviour is either implemented
Laboratories/St Jude Medical (M.8060); Hapag-Lloyd/ inside the EU or produces effects inside the EU, or
United Araab Shipping Company (M.8120); Boehringer when a parent company outside the EU is liable for the
Ingelheim/Sanofi Animal Health Business (M.7917); conduct of an EU subsidiary.
Imerys/Alteo Certain Assets (M.8130); Coherent/ Recent cases include a cartel in the market for
Rofin-Sinar Technologies (M.8055); Vodafone/Liberty Alternators & Starters in 2016 (all three companies
Global/Dutch JV(M.7978); Konecranes/Terex MHPS were Japanese) and a cartel in the market for Optical
(M.7792); Sanofi/Boehringer Ingelheim Consumer Disk Drives in the final quarter of 2015 (seven out of
Healthcare Business (M.7919); Mylan/Meda (M.7975); eight companies were headquartered in Asia).
Plastic Omnium/Faurecia Exterior Automotive Business
(M.7893); HeidelbergCement/Italcementi (M.7744); Do you operate an immunity and leniency
AB Inbev/SabMiller (M.7881); CMA CGM/NOL programme? Whom should potential applicants
(M.7908); Worldline/Equens/Paysquare (M.7873); contact? What discounts are available
Statoil Fuel And Retail/Dansk Fuels (M.7603); Teva/ to companies that cooperate with cartel
Allergan Generics (M.7746); and Dentsply/Sirona investigations?
(M.7822). Yes, the European Commission operates a leniency
An additional six cases were approved subject to programme for cartels. If a company wishes to
remedies following an in-depth Phase II investigation: discuss a potential application under the European
Wabtec/Faiveley Transport (M.7801); Hutchison 3G Commission’s leniency programme, it can call: +32 2
Italy/Wind/JV (M.7758); ASL/Arianespace (M.7724); 298 41 90 or +32 2 298 41 91 (telephones are monitored
Staples/Office Depot (M.7555); Liberty Global/Base from 9am to 5pm on working days (in Brussels)). If a
Belgium (M.7637); and Ball/Rexam (M.7567). company wants to submit an application, it can do so
through the dedicated email address comp-leniency@
120 The Handbook of Competition Enforcement Agencies 2017EUROPEAN UNION
ec.europa.eu. Applications can also be made orally competitive effects in the EEA but remain below the
by appointment. turnover thresholds that would trigger a review under
The first company to provide sufficient evidence the EU Merger Regulation. Against this background,
of a cartel to allow the Commission to pursue the the ongoing evaluation focuses on whether the cur
case can receive full immunity from fines. Subsequent rent purely turnover-based thresholds of the Merger
companies which bring significant added value to the Regulation capture all transactions which could
investigation receive reductions within bands accord potentially have an impact on the internal market and,
ing to the order in which they qualify: second applicant if not, whether the introduction of complementary
50-30 per cent; third applicant 30-20 per cent; and jurisdictional thresholds, based for instance on the
subsequent applicants up to 20 per cent. The precise transaction value, should be considered. The evalu
reduction within the band is determined by the extent ation also seeks to explore the potential for further
of the added value brought by the company. The grant simplification of EU merger control and streamlining
of immunity or reduction is always subject to the com of the referral system.
pany complying with its duty to fully cooperate with
the Commission throughout the investigation. State aid
A major overhaul of EU state aid rules, known as State
Is there a criminal enforcement track? If so, who Aid Modernisation, was undertaken from 2012 to
is responsible for it? Does the authority conduct 2014. The new rules are currently being implemented.
criminal investigations and prosecutions for Most of them will expire at the end of 2020 and a revi
cartel activity? If not, is there another authority sion process will start in due course. First, the rules will
in the country that does? be evaluated in order to see what has worked properly
No, not at European level. However, some EU Member and what has not worked; member states and stake
States have criminal sanctions available (see indi holders will be duly involved in this process. Second,
vidual sections). the Commission will carry out an impact assessment
of the envisaged changes. On the basis of the evaluation
Are there any plans to reform the competition results and when necessary in light of impact assess
law? ments, DG Competition will propose to extend, revise
Antitrust or overhaul the existing rules.
The Commission Work Programme 2017 envisages
potential EU legislative action to empower the national When did the last review of the law occur?
competition authorities to be more effective enforcers. Antitrust
Directive on damages actions
Mergers In November 2014 the Directive on damages actions
The Commission continuously evaluates the substan was adopted. The Directive has two primary objec
tive and procedural rules that make up the legal frame tives: to ensure the effective exercise of the EU right
work in force for merger control. Experience, as well to compensation; and to regulate some key aspects of
as a number of public consultations carried out since the interaction between public and private enforce
the last reform of the EU Merger Regulation in 2004, ment of EU competition law. It includes rules on the
show that in general the merger rules work well and no disclosure of evidence, the evidential value of decisions
fundamental overhaul is needed. However, there may of national competition authorities, limitation periods,
be room for improvement in certain areas. In 2016, joint and several liability, the passing-on of overcharges
the Commission launched a public consultation in the and the quantification of harm. Member states had
context of the evaluation of selected procedural and until 27 December 2016 to incorporate the Directive
jurisdictional aspects of EU merger control. This ongo into their national law. Eight member states have
ing evaluation builds notably upon the results of the communicated to the Commission that they have fully
2014 public consultation on the white paper ‘Towards transposed the Directive (updated to 31 January 2017).
more effective EU merger control’. The Commission expects that the majority of member
Meanwhile, a debate has emerged on the effective states will complete the transposition of the Directive
ness of jurisdiction based on turnover thresholds in in the coming weeks and months.
EU merger control when it comes to some high-valued In August 2015, the Commission adopted amend
transactions involving target companies with limited ments to Commission Regulation 773/2004 and the
or no turnover. Such transactions may have significant Notices on Access to the File, Leniency, Settlements
www.globalcompetitionreview.com 121EUROPEAN UNION
and Cooperation with national courts in order to bring measures faster and with reduced administrative
these acts in line with the rules in the Directive on burden. The changes brought to the procedural regula
disclosure of evidence. tion allow the Commission to conduct state aid sector
inquiries, which was previously only possible as part of
Insurance Block Exemption Regulation antitrust and merger control. State aid sector inquiries
The Commission is finalising its review of the can be launched in situations where state aid measures
Insurance Block Exemption Regulation (IBER) for may distort competition in several member states, or
certain types of agreements between insurers, which where existing aid measures are no longer compatible
is due to expire on 31 March 2017. The categories of with the regulatory framework.
agreements currently still exempted by the IBER are: The Commission also adopted new rules for envi
agreements on the exchange of information necessary ronmental aid and energy in order to steer member
for the computation of risks by joint compilations, states to design more efficient public support measures
tables and studies and agreements on common cover that reflect market conditions, in a gradual and prag
age of certain types of risks (co(re)-insurance pools). matic way.
In March 2016, the Commission presented an evalua In 2016, the Commission adopted one of the last
tion of the functioning of the IBER to Parliament and cornerstones of the state aid modernisation initiative:
Council, accompanied by a staff working document. the notice on the Notion of State Aid. It gives guidance
The Commission’s preliminary conclusion was that the on which measures involve state aid in the meaning of
strict conditions for the IBER no longer seem to be met the EU rules (article 107 (1) TFEU). The Commission
and that there seems to be no necessity to extend the has also launched a review of its regulation exempting
duration of the IBER. certain categories of unproblematic measures from
prior state aid scrutiny (the General Block Exemption
Mergers Regulation). Among other issues, the Commission
The main legislative texts for merger decisions are proposed to extend the scope of the exemption to ports
the EU Merger Regulation and the Implementing and airports.
Regulation. The Merger Regulation contains the main
rules for the assessment of concentrations, whereas the Do you have a separate economics team? If so,
Implementing Regulation concerns procedural issues please give details.
(such as notification, deadlines and right to be heard). The chief economist of DG Competition has a team of
The last legislative reform of the EU Merger 28 economists, most with PhDs in industrial organi
Regulation was in 2004. However, as explained in the sation. The current chief economist is Tommaso
answer to the previous question, a number of public Valletti, who is professor of economics at Imperial
consultations has been carried out since then. In 2013, College Business School, as well as professor of
the Commission adopted a Simplification Package in economics at the University of Rome Tor Vergata. He
order to further streamline procedures. The current previously taught at the London School of Economics,
evaluation of specific aspects of the Merger Regulation Telecom ParisTech/Ecole Polytechnique, and Turin.
seeks to explore the possibility for a broader simplifi He has a magna cum laude degree in engineering from
cation exercise. Turin and holds an MSc and a PhD in economics from
the London School of Economics. His mandate expires
State aid on 31 August 2019.
In 2014, the Commission modernised the rules to
focus state aid control on measures that genuinely Has the authority conducted a dawn raid?
affect competition in the single market, while simpli Yes, inspections are regularly conducted. The
fying and streamlining rules and procedures. This has Commission has the power to enter any business
reduced red tape and facilitated public investment by premises, examine books and other records, take or
empowering member states to grant public support obtain copies or extracts, to seal any business premises
without prior scrutiny by the Commission. The revised and to ask for on the spot explanations of facts or docu
General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER), which ments. The Commission also has the power to conduct
was adopted in June 2014, gives granting authorities searches of private premises.
much wider margins to design and implement aid
122 The Handbook of Competition Enforcement Agencies 2017EUROPEAN UNION
Has the authority imposed penalties on officers within one and the same member state. The transaction
or directors of companies for offences committed will be notifiable instead to the competition authority
by the company? If yes, please provide the most of that country.
recent instances. Mergers that do not have an EU dimension may fall
No. instead under the remit of member states’ competition
authorities. There is a referral mechanism in place that
What are the pre-merger notification thresholds, allows the member states and the Commission to trans
if any, for the buyer and seller involved in a fer cases to each other, both at the request of the com
merger? panies involved and of the member states. This allows
The Commission has jurisdiction to review transactions companies to benefit from a one-stop-shop review and
that qualify as concentrations within the meaning of to allocate cases to the most appropriate authority.
the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR) and that have an Finally, as explained above, the Commission is
EU dimension, meaning that the merging firms reach currently evaluating whether purely turnover-based
certain turnover thresholds. There are two alternative thresholds capture all transactions that could poten
ways to reach turnover thresholds for an EU dimen tially have an impact on the EU internal market. If
sion. The first way requires: the answer is no, the Commission may put forward a
• a combined worldwide turnover of all the merging proposal to introduce complementary jurisdictional
firms over €5,000 million; and thresholds, based for instance on the transaction value.
• an EU-wide turnover for each of at least two of the
firms over €250 million. Are there any restrictions on investments that
involve less than a majority stake in the business?
The second way requires: Acquisitions of non-controlling minority shareholdings
(i) a worldwide turnover of all the merging firms over (ie, transactions that do not bring about an acquisition
€2,500 million; of control) do not fall under the scope of application of
(ii) a combined turnover of all the merging firms over the EU Merger Regulation.
€100 million in each of at least three member states; One of the main proposals of the 2014 white paper
(iii) a turnover of over €25 million for each of at least concerned the possible introduction of a system for the
two of the firms in each of the three member states review of certain categories of non-controlling m
inority
included under (ii); and shareholdings that may be problematic from a competi
(iv) EU-wide turnover of each of at least two firms of tion point of view. However, the results of the public
more than €100 million. consultation on the white paper expressed concerns on
the proportionality of this measure. The Commission’s
However, even if these turnover thresholds are met, competition services therefore published a follow-up
the transaction will not be notifiable to the European study in October 2016, which gathers additional infor
Commission if each of the parties to the transaction mation from the point of view of both competition and
achieves more than two-thirds of their EEA turnover corporate law and practice in different jurisdictions.
www.globalcompetitionreview.com 123You can also read
