EU: The criminalisation of competition law breaches - Another attempt to square the circle?
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Concurrences REVUE DES DROITS DE LA CONCURRENCE | COMPETITION LAW REVIEW EU: The criminalisation of competition law breaches – Another attempt to square the circle? International l Concurrences N° 1-2020 www.concurrences.com Kane Abry-Diaw de Baye kane.r.abrydiawdebaye@ed.ac.uk PhD Candidate and Articled Barrister-at-Law University of Edinburgh
International
Kane Abry-Diaw
EU: The
constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle and DRM protection.
de Baye
Ce document est protégé au titre du droit d'auteur par les conventions internationales en vigueur et le Code de la propriété intellectuelle du 1er juillet 1992. Toute utilisation non autorisée constitue une contrefaçon, délit pénalement sanctionné jusqu'à 3 ans d'emprisonnement et 300 000 € d'amende (art.
L. 335-2 CPI). L’utilisation personnelle est strictement autorisée dans les limites de l’article L. 122 5 CPI et des mesures techniques de protection pouvant accompagner ce document. This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document
kane.r.abrydiawdebaye@ed.ac.uk
criminalisation
PhD Candidate and
Articled Barrister-at-Law
University of Edinburgh
of competition
law breaches –
Another attempt
to square the circle?
I. Introduction
1. The criminalisation of competition law breaches denotes the criminal
proceedings that national competition authorities may launch against individuals
ABSTRACT who have agreed on market divisions or quantity restrictions which have had
This article explores the mechanisms that for their effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within
some Member States of the European Union a market (i.e., hardcore cartels). Currently, few EU Member States criminalise
have put in place to criminalise the competition law breaches. While the objectives of retribution, deterrence,
enforcement of competition law. It highlights
the rationale behind the criminalisation of
incapacitation, rehabilitation, and restoration that criminal law embodies deserve
competition law breaches in those few praise in that they afford (i) the sanction of advantages improperly taken or
European countries that have chosen unfair detriment inflicted upon other undertakings, and (ii) reparation, through
to implement it. It accounts for the limitations
state authority, of competition harms caused to others operating within a single
that this policy faces and the impact it has on
the efficient sanction of market conducts that market, the criminalisation of competition law breaches faces two major obstacles
are inconsistent with the requirements of free questioning its efficacy and desirability. The first relates to the limited ability
and fair competition within the single market. of criminal law to produce the desired or intended result for want of proof of
A particular emphasis is placed on the
approaches adopted by the British and Irish intent to hamper competition. Hence the limited success of criminal proceedings
national competition authorities which provide launched to sanction hardcore cartelists in some countries. Meanwhile, the second
two archetypical, yet competing approaches obstacle that the criminalisation of competition law enforcement faces concerns
to the criminalisation of competition law
enforcement in the European Union.
the juxtaposition that it entails of two competing sanctions systems. Regulatory
or administrative sanctions imposed by national competition authorities without
Cet article explore les mécanismes que
intervention by a court or tribunal, on the one hand, and criminal sanctions
certains États membres de l’Union
européenne ont mis en place pour criminaliser imposed by courts or tribunals to provide incentives for obedience with the law
l’application du droit de la concurrence. or with rules and regulations, on the other. As a result, the criminalisation of
Il met en évidence les raisons qui competition law breaches appears to fall foul of one of the most basic principles
sous-tendent la criminalisation des infractions
au droit de la concurrence dans les quelques of justice: the prohibition of double jeopardy, also known as ne bis in idem.
pays européens qui ont choisi de l’appliquer.
Il rend compte des limites auxquelles cette 2. Against the foregoing background, this paper examines the criminalisation
politique est confrontée et de l’impact qu’elle
a sur la sanction efficace des comportements of competition law enforcement in those few EU Member States that apply it.
sur le marché qui sont incompatibles avec It focuses primarily on the criminalisation of competition law enforcement in the
les exigences d’une concurrence libre et loyale United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. They provide two very typical—
au sein du marché unique. Un accent
particulier est mis sur les approches adoptées
yet competing—illustrations of the criminal enforcement of competition law
par les autorités nationales de concurrence breaches within the European Union (II). The comparison of these two regimes
britanniques et irlandaises qui fournissent will lead to the exploration of the limitations that they face particularly regarding
deux approches archétypiques, the inadequacy of the test used, the issues of competence, and the gainsaying of
mais concurrentes, de la criminalisation
de l’application du droit de la concurrence the principle whereby, by general rule, a defendant shall not be prosecuted twice
dans l’Union européenne. on the basis of the same offence, act or facts (III).
Concurrences N° 1-2020 I International I Kane Abry-Diaw de Baye I EU: The criminalisation of competition law breaches in the European Union 1II. The criminalisation Hungary, Austria, Italy,5 Belgium6 and Croatia,7 where
constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle and DRM protection.
the standard administrative procedure is paired with
Ce document est protégé au titre du droit d'auteur par les conventions internationales en vigueur et le Code de la propriété intellectuelle du 1er juillet 1992. Toute utilisation non autorisée constitue une contrefaçon, délit pénalement sanctionné jusqu'à 3 ans d'emprisonnement et 300 000 € d'amende (art.
L. 335-2 CPI). L’utilisation personnelle est strictement autorisée dans les limites de l’article L. 122 5 CPI et des mesures techniques de protection pouvant accompagner ce document. This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document
a criminal sanction intended for individuals who have
of competition law committed specific offences proscribed by law such as bid-
rigging. Added to these are those countries that narrow
breaches down, significantly, the criminalisation of competition law
enforcement to specific instances of breach where it can
be found that the practice that hindered competition was
1. A European overview also accompanied by reprovable acts assimilable to fraud
or undue influence (dolus)8 (e.g. France9 and Romania10)
3. Article 23(5) of Regulation No. 1/2003 is the main or even thievery (e.g. Czechia11 and Slovakia).12 Lastly,
dictum guiding the enforcement of the European there are those for whom any competition breach is
competition policy under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, tantamount to a criminal offence in and of itself, e.g.,
formerly Articles 81 and 82 EC. It laid the foundations Ireland,13 United Kingdom,14 Estonia,15 Denmark,16
of the promotion and maintenance of fair competition Greece,17 and Slovenia.18 The attending consequence is
in markets. It is implemented through public enforcement immediately graspable. Namely, while the criminalisation
within the territory of the Union against undertakings or of competition law enforcement is seldom likely to be
associations of undertakings.
4. While the Regulation provides that the sanction of
competition law breaches “shall not be of a criminal 5 K. Cseres, in I. Lianos, D. Geradin (2013), pp. 539–557; K. Jones, F. Harrison, Criminal Sanctions:
law nature,” Recital 8 of the same Regulation does not An overview of EU and national case law (2014), e-Competitions Bulletin, Art. No. 64713, accessed
on 23 August 2019, available at http://awa2015.concurrences.com/IMG/pdf/keith_jones.pdf.
disallow the criminalisation of competition law breaches
and the introduction of derogating measures extending 6 J. De Fauw, V. Wellens, P. Peeters, H. Speyart, Belgian Competition Authority Publishes
Guide on Bid Rigging (2017), Lexology, accessed on 23 August 2019, available at https://
the sanction to natural persons under domestic law www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8c950d2f-ecad-49f5-84cb-80735544fb9c.
“except to the extent that such sanctions are the means
7 International Competition Network, Anti-Cartel Enforcement Template, Croatian
whereby competition rules applying to undertakings Competition Agency (2017) at [2.E.], accessed on 23 August 2019, available at http://www.
are enforced.” Looking across the legal systems of the aztn.hr/ea/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Cartel_Template-2017RH2.pdf.
EU Member States, it appears that the prohibition of 8 K. Jones, F. Harrison (2014), Art. No. 64713 cited above.
practices tending to suppress economic competition 9 Code de commerce (French Commercial Code), Article L. 420-6, accessed on 23 August
is a principle to which few controvert. It is established 2019, available in French and English respectivelyathttps://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
by a resolute set of laws governing what is acceptable affichCodeArticle.
do?cidTexte= LEGITEXT000005634379&idArticle=LEGIARTI000006232
business practice.1 The criminalisation of competition 003&dateTexte=&categorieLien=cid and https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=
law breaches does not, however, command support from j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&ved=2ahUKEwiV2NC7wpnkAhWLWx
all Member States. While all concur that competition law UIHfydBHwQFjADegQIAxAC&url=https %3A%2F%2Fwww.legifrance.gouv.
fr%2Fcontent%2Fdownload%2F1951%2F13685%2Fversion%2F5%2Ffile%2FCode_32.
breaches can be sanctioned administratively through a pdf&usg=AOvVaw2MBtQfwYCiFIs 66NAqsIXm.
system of penalties imposed by a regulator established
10 Lege nr. 21 din 10 aprilie 1996, A concurenţei – Republicare, Articol 60 (Romanian Compe-
by them in the form of a competition authority without tition Law No. 21/1996, Article 60), accessed on 23 August 2019, available in French, Ro-
intervention by a court or tribunal, they are few those manian and English respectively at http://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/uploads/docs/items/
bucket8/id8047/lege_nr21_1996_actualizata_20160303.pdf and http://www.consiliulcon-
who support the action of turning competition breaches curentei.ro/en/official-documents/competition/legislation/competition-law-21-1996.html.
into a criminal offence by making it illegal. Even then
11 Trestní zákoník, § 248 (Czech Criminal Code, Article 248), accessed on 23 August 2019,
arises an irreducible difference in opinions and interests available in Czech and English respectively at http://www.trestnizakonik.cz/cast-II/hlava-6/
between those states for whom competition law breaches dil-3 and https://www.legislationline.org/documents/section/criminal-codes/country/35/
are tantamount to a crime in and of themselves, and Czech%20Republic/show.
those states who limit the criminalisation of competition 12 Trestný zákon, § 250 (Slovak Criminal Code, Article 250), accessed on 23 August 2019,
breaches to specific offences restrictedly described by available in Czech, Slovak and English respectively at https://www.zakonypreludi.sk/
zz/2005-300 and https://www.legislationline.org/documents/section/criminal-codes/
law. So much is illustrated by the examples of Bulgaria, country/4/Slovakia/show.
Finland, Netherlands, Sweden,2 and Latvia,3 where
13 See below section II.3.
competition law enforcement is only administrative in
nature as opposed to Luxembourg,4 Germany, Poland, 14 See below section II.2.
15 Karistusseadustik (Estonian Penal Code) 2001, § 400, accessed on 23 August 2019, available
in Estonian and English at https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/522012015002/consolide.
16 Konkurrenceloven Lovbekendtgørelse nr. 869 af 8. juli 2015 (The Danish Competition Act
(Consolidation Act No. 869 of 8 July 2015), Kapitel (Chapter) 8, § 23, accessed on 23 August
2019, available in Danish and English respectively at https://www.retsinformation.dk/
1 See, for instance, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Articles 101–106. Forms/r0710.aspx?id=199825#id2c2e1a30-7ef3-4109-9e49-92f2eb5e06b6 and https://
www.en.kfst.dk/media/1351/competition-act-8692015.pdf.
2 K. Cseres, Relationship between EU Competition Law and national competition laws, in I.
Lianos, D. Geradin, Handbook on European Competition Law: Enforcement and Procedure 17 Νομοσ υπ΄ αριθμ. 3959 φεκ α΄93/20.4.2011, Άρθρο 44 (Law 3959/2011 prohibiting
(2013), pp. 539–557. the abuse of dominance of 20 April 2011, Article 44), accessed on 23 August 2019,
available in Greek and English respectively at https://www.kodiko.gr/nomologia/document_
3 International Competition Network, Anti-Cartel Enforcement Template, Latvian navigation/59552/nomos-3959-2011 and https://www.scribd.com/document/249168797/
Competition Agency (2013) at [2.E], accessed on 23 August 2019, available at https://www. Law-3959-2011.
kp.gov.lv/oldfiles/23/dazadi%2Ficn_latvia_cartel_template.pdf.
18 Kazenskizakonik, 225. člen (Slovenian Penal Code) 2008, accessed on 23 August 2019,
4 W. P. J. Wils, Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the Answer? in K. Cseres, available in Slovenian and English respectively at https://www.uradni-list.si/glasilo-uradni-list-
M. P. Schinkel, F. O. W. Vogelaar, Criminalization of Competition Law Enforcement: Economic rs/vsebina?urlurid=20082296 and https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/si/si045en.
and Legal Implications for the EU Member States (2006), pp. 60–75. pdf.
2 Concurrences N° 1-2020 I International I Kane Abry-Diaw de Baye I EU: The criminalisation of competition law breaches in the European Unionsuccessful in those countries that have chosen to subject
2. The criminalisation
constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle and DRM protection.
the criminalisation of competition law breaches to a strict
of competition law enforcement
Ce document est protégé au titre du droit d'auteur par les conventions internationales en vigueur et le Code de la propriété intellectuelle du 1er juillet 1992. Toute utilisation non autorisée constitue une contrefaçon, délit pénalement sanctionné jusqu'à 3 ans d'emprisonnement et 300 000 € d'amende (art.
L. 335-2 CPI). L’utilisation personnelle est strictement autorisée dans les limites de l’article L. 122 5 CPI et des mesures techniques de protection pouvant accompagner ce document. This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document
test of criminality requiring proof of fraud or intent to
deceive that may not always be met easily (e.g., Slovakia,19
Greece20, France,21 and Romania),22 the unrelenting
in the United Kingdom
criminalisation of every competition breach applied 6. Beside the administrative sanction of undertakings or
in Ireland, United Kingdom, Estonia,23 Denmark,24 associations of undertakings for abuse of dominance,
Greece,25 and Slovenia26 denies the rogue an easily monopolies, and other forms of anticompetitive practice
loophole to avoid criminal liability even absent proof liable to fetter competition by preventing, restricting or
of mens rea. This, in turn, introduces unfairness in the distorting the free play of the market without any objective
enforcement of competition law since a wrongdoer can be reasons consistently with Articles 101 and 102 TFEU,
criminally sanctioned absent the intention or knowledge Sections 188 and subsequent of the Enterprise Act 200227
of wrongdoing that constitutes part of a crime. By sanction individuals who have “dishonestly agree[d] with
contrast, the sanction of the actual action or conduct of one or more other persons to make or implement, or to
the accused that others have chosen to sanction civilly cause to be made or implemented, [cartel] arrangements
or criminally subject to proof of fraud or intentionality (…) relating to at least two undertakings.”
seems to be an appropriate measure taken to prevent
injustice and unfairness. The study of the limitations 7. This is achieved by the award of an advantage to the
that the criminalisation of competition enforcement claimant or aggrieved competitor and the sentencing of
faces must, however, be prefaced by the examination of convicted or indicted defendants to a term of imprisonment
the rationale that actuated its sedimentation in those of up to five years or a fine as appropriate.28 In turn,
countries that have opted for it. undertakings are subject only to administrative sanctions
without intervention by a court or tribunal29 given their
5. For reasons of space and clarity, the examination of special nature and their insusceptibility to be detained
the rationale behind the outright criminalisation of at Her Majesty’s pleasure. This, in turn, precludes any
competition law breaches will focus on the instances of European interference into UK affairs. To counterbalance
Ireland and the United Kingdom. It will leave out the the effects of a policy that so generally sanctions every
criminalisation of competition law enforcement pursuant arrangement between individuals that has for its object or
to non-cooperation with or disobedience to the rulings of effect the distortion of competition even absent intention
any national or European competition authority. or knowledge of wrongdoing that constitutes part of a
crime for it is likely to resolve into nothing more than a
brilliant mistake whose sudden flash resembles that of a
thunderbolt which strikes the very spot it illuminates by
hindering the free play of the market, HM Government’s
Department for Business Innovation & Skills introduced a
requirement for dishonesty tantamount to a requirement
for actus reus or mens rea. The rationale was “to ensure that
the offence did not apply to agreements that would be lawful
under the Civil antitrust prohibitions (…) to reduce the
likelihood that conviction would depend on judgments taken
on detailed economic evidence (…) to provide juries with a
test that they would recognise and to signal the seriousness
of the offence and correspondingly weighty penalties—so as
to enable the offence to have maximum deterrent effect.”30
8. The attending consequence of the introduction of this
test of dishonesty is that it curtails the circumstances in
which an undertaking and its executives can be prosecuted
for joining together to fix prices, limit production or share
markets or customers between them. Consequently,
the Office of Fair Trading was only able to launch five
criminal proceedings31 between 2002 and 2014, that is,
between the moment when the Enterprise Act 2002 came
into force and its supersession by the Competition and
Markets Authority in 2014. These resulted in four cases
being dismissed for insufficient evidence32 including one
31 For further information see the Competition and Markets Authority cases accessed on 23 August
2019, available at https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases?keywords=&case_type%5B%5D=criminal-
cartels&closed_date%5Bfrom%5D=&closed_date%5Bto%5D.
32 Same as above.
Concurrences N° 1-2020 I International I Kane Abry-Diaw de Baye I EU: The criminalisation of competition law breaches in the European Union 3by the Court of Appeal33 while the fifth case resolved Like the UK Enterprise Act 2002, the Irish Competition
constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle and DRM protection.
alone in a served custodial sentence.34 The decision of Amendment Act subjects cartelists to criminal liability
Ce document est protégé au titre du droit d'auteur par les conventions internationales en vigueur et le Code de la propriété intellectuelle du 1er juillet 1992. Toute utilisation non autorisée constitue une contrefaçon, délit pénalement sanctionné jusqu'à 3 ans d'emprisonnement et 300 000 € d'amende (art.
L. 335-2 CPI). L’utilisation personnelle est strictement autorisée dans les limites de l’article L. 122 5 CPI et des mesures techniques de protection pouvant accompagner ce document. This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document
the criminal division of the appellate court in R v. George, if they are found to have contrived an arrangement
Burns, Burnett and Crawley and Regina v. Peter Whittle, incompatible with an applicable competition policy.40
Bryan Allison, David Brammar is particularly interesting However, the Irish and British competition policies do
in that the defendants pleaded nolo contendere in both not coincide in all respects. While the criminalisation of
instances as part of a plea bargain conceded by the US competition law enforcement in the UK is an additional
Department of Justice to allow them to be taken into procedure intended to individuals that derogates from
custody and adjudged by the relevant British competition the general procedure whereby decisions taken by
authorities rather than the American.35 It is all the more undertakings or associations of undertakings that have
interesting than the failure of the Office of Fair Trading for their object or effect the distortion of competition are
to disclose potentially relevant material to the defendants sanctioned administratively absent any intervention from
in the case of R v. George, Burns, Burnett and Crawley a court or tribunal, the criminalisation of competition
constituted a plea in bar that not only prevented the case law enforcement in Éire under the Irish Competition
from being heard, but also defeated the whole purpose of Amendment Act merges the European policy with
the plea bargain under which the defendant had agreed to the Irish competition policy. The latter subjects all
escape the yoke of the US competition authorities only to competition breaches to criminal liability. These mixed
be tried under the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom. objectives coalesce to ensure that competition is not
Specifically, the Office of Fair Trading was estopped restricted or undermined in ways that are detrimental to
from taking the defendants to trial because, acting both the economy and society. The inadequacy of the act to
as judge and jury in breach of the most basic principle deter and sanction anticompetitive practices given the
of justice whereby nemo judex in causa sua, “much of the limited competence of the Irish Competition Authority
evidence [that it] brought against the defendants had been in investigating cartels, the conflicts of jurisdictions
provided by the only other party to the alleged cartel (…), between competent authorities, and the inefficacy of
an immunity applicant with strong incentives to confess, and the sentences passed in deterring cartel practices soon
perhaps even exaggerate.”36 questioned its ability to produce the desired or intended
result.41 This shortfall was, however, overcome by the
9. In response to that and following the supersession of the Oireachtas’ and Rialtas na hÉirean’s adoption of the Irish
Competition Commission and the Office of Fair Trading Competition Act 2002. The latter actuated an appreciable
by the Competition and Markets Authority in 2014,37 HM change consisting in the increase of the penalties that
Government, disgruntled that its policies were kept in check the Competition Amendment Act 1996 provided, the
by the courts, showed strength in repealing the reasonableness creation of a single competition authority vested with
or rather dishonesty test38 that it had introduced. The more powers,42 and the aggravation of the sanctions that
reason given was to improve the enforceability of the spirit convicted cartelists could incur under Articles 4 to 8 of the
of the policy and increase deterrence. Otherwise, the whole Irish Competition Act 2002. This resulted in six domestic
purpose of the policy would have been defeated given the cartel prosecutions consisting of two unsuccessful trials43
determination of what is honest behaviour is a difficult test and four successful prosecutions resulting, in turn, in nine
to meet in a business environment.39 suspended custodial sentences paired with the imposition
of a mulct, three suspended custodial sentences absent
any mulct, the imposition of twenty-four fines, and three
3. The criminalisation acquittals.44
of competition law breaches 11. Offhand, the Irish criminalisation of competition
in the Republic of Ireland law enforcement seems more successful than its UK
counterpart regarding the number of convictions
10. The criminalisation of competition law enforcement enforced considering its more modest economy. But the
in the Republic of Ireland dates back to the Oireachtas’ effectivity of a policy is not measured by the number of
adoption of the Irish Competition Amendment Act 1996. decisions rendered under it but by the enforceability and
meaningfulness of the sanctions imposed. In this context,
33 R v. George, Burns, Burnett and Crawley [2010] Lloyd’s Rep. FC 495.
34 Regina v. Peter Whittle, Bryan Allison, David Brammar [2008] EWCA Crim 2560. 40 Competition Amendment Act 1996.
35 Same as above, para. 23, 25–28. 41 P. Massey, Criminal Sanctions for Criminal Law: A Review of Irish Experience (2004), The
Competition Law Review, Vol. 1, Issue 1, pp. 23–27.
36 P. Gilbert, Changes to the UK Cartel Offence—Be Careful What You Wish For (2015),
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Vol. 6, Issue 3, pp. 192–193. 42 A&L Goodbody, Ireland’s New Competition and Consumer Protection Law: Competition
and Consumer Protection Act 2014, A guide by A&L Goodbody (2014), pp. 3–13,
37 Competition and Market Authority cases, Supply of galvanised steel tanks for water storage: criminal accessed on 23 August 2019, available at https://www.algoodbody.com/media/
investigation (2014–2015) and Supply of precast concrete drainage products: criminal investigation ALGoodbodyGuideIrelandsNewCompetitionandConsumerProtectionLaw1.pdf.
(2013–2017), accessed on 23 August 2019, available at https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases?keywords=&case_
type%5B%5D=criminal-cartels&closed_date%5Bfrom%5D=&closed_date%5Bto%5D. 43 M. Furse (2012), p. 177.
38 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act (2013) s. 47. 44 Competition and Consumer Protection Commission cases, Commercial Flooring Cartel
Conviction (2002–2003), Members of Home Heating Oil Cartel convicted of price fixing
39 HM Government’s Department for Business Innovation & Skills, Growth, Competition and the (2001–2012), Members of Citroën Dealers Association cartel convicted of price fixing
Competition Regime–Government Response to Consultation (2012), para. 7.7. and 7.8., accessed on 23 (2007–2008), and Ford Dealer cartel conviction (2004–2017), accessed on 23 August 2019,
August 2019, available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ available at https://www.ccpc.ie/business/enforcement/criminal-enforcement/criminal-court-
attachment_data/file/192722/12-512-growth-and-competition-regime-government-response.pdf. cases.
4 Concurrences N° 1-2020 I International I Kane Abry-Diaw de Baye I EU: The criminalisation of competition law breaches in the European Unionit is clear that the Irish instance of criminalisation of
1. Inadequacy of the test
constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle and DRM protection.
competition law breaches is perhaps not that successful.
Ce document est protégé au titre du droit d'auteur par les conventions internationales en vigueur et le Code de la propriété intellectuelle du 1er juillet 1992. Toute utilisation non autorisée constitue une contrefaçon, délit pénalement sanctionné jusqu'à 3 ans d'emprisonnement et 300 000 € d'amende (art.
L. 335-2 CPI). L’utilisation personnelle est strictement autorisée dans les limites de l’article L. 122 5 CPI et des mesures techniques de protection pouvant accompagner ce document. This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document
It is mostly limited to domestic instances of breach and, 14. Irrespective of whether the criminalisation of
thus, fails to apprehend international anticompetitive competition law enforcement operates upon the mere
practices that hinder competition. Besides, it has only breach of a competition rule or provided it is also
given cause to the sanction of six domestic undertakings paired with another conduct reprovable under the
since its implementation in 2002. In turn they were subject domestic criminal provisions applicable, there is a lack
to ridiculously small or inadequate fines. Meanwhile, the of consensus in both instances as to the nature of the
number of sanction taken again individuals that were breach that can be incriminated. While some argue
effectively served remained scarce.45 More, while the UK that any association of manufacturers or suppliers with
Enterprise Act 2002 was designed to prevent the EU from the purpose of maintaining prices at a high level and
meddling with the enforcement of the UK competition restricting competition constitutes an offence punishable
policy, the Irish Competition Act 2002 takes to the word under criminal law (e.g., United Kingdom), others
Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning argue that not only cartels should be sanctioned, but
of the European Union. Consistently, unlike the UK also every vertical arrangement between undertakings
Enterprise Act 2002, the Irish Competition Act 2002 or association of undertakings that has for its effect the
also accounts for vertical agreements and the cases of distortion of competition (e.g., Ireland).
abuse of dominance which the UK Enterprise Act 2002
animadvert questionably. Accordingly, legal and 15. Likewise, doctrinists bicker over whether natural
natural persons are subject to the same penalty system persons should also fall under the yoke of penal sanction
whereas HM Government has opted, by contrast, for or should be protected by the corporate veil, thereby
two competing sanctions systems applicable either to arguing as to whether the imposition of a mulct onto
undertakings or individuals restrictively. a convicted undertaking is sufficient to instil deterrence
not only vis-à-vis undertakings but also vis-à-vis their
12. Last but not least, the Irish Constitution vesting the directors. One of the most common arguments proffered
Irish courts only with the authority to adjudicate on is notably that the incriminated arrangements at stake
competition breaches and impose ad hoc fines, the Irish are not made by the undertakings sanctioned which,
Competition and Consumer Protection Commission is although they have legal personality, lack the attributes
only competent to investigate civil cases and competition of personhood allowing human beings to act. More
misdemeanours as opposed to crimes that are regarded so, the sanction of the undertaking only penalises
as more serious and punishable under the criminal law stakeholders, not liable decision-makers given the real
of Ireland.46 This is in stark relief to what was customary beneficiary of the arrangement is seldom the corporation
practice under the Office of Fair Trading which, until but rather the natural persons who constitute it and
its dissolution in 2013, acted both as judge and jury in obtain, thereby, significant indirect benefits such as higher
contravention of the principle nemo judex in causa sua. wages, severance pay, stock options, bonuses, improved
The differences between the UK and Irish competition career prospects and suchlike. The inadequacy of the
policies should not detract, however, from the legal and test that consists essentially in identifying who made the
moral limitations that the criminalisation of competition arrangement fettering competition instead of identifying
law enforcement faces in both these countries and beyond and sanctioning the conduct of the real beneficiaries who
within the European Union. contrived this arrangement culminates in the well-known
“principle-agent problem”47 which begets harmful effects.
III. Critique 16. In fact, fined undertakings could either leave their
consumers48 or/and employees49 pick up the pieces
by making them bear the “cost of doing business”50
13. Amongst the twenty-eight Member States of the
or worse face bankruptcy. This, in turn, defeats the
European Union – soon to be twenty-seven after
whole purpose of competition law enforcement.51 The
the United Kingdom’s eventual withdrawal from the
European Union on 31 January 2020 – only ten Member
States criminalise the enforcement of competition law
whether the offence is established by the mere breach 47 P. Massey (2004), pp. 23–31; T. Calvani, Cartel penalties and damages in Ireland:
of a competition rule or must be accompanied by Criminalization and the case for custodial sentences, in K. Cseres, M. P. Schinkel, F. O. W.
the demonstration of the violation of a criminal rule Vogelaar (2006), pp. 270–273; OECD, Cartel Sanctions against Individuals (2003), p. 17;
W. P. J. Wils in K. Cseres, M. P. Schinkel, F. O. W. Vogelaar (2006), pp. 60–80.
requiring the intention or knowledge of wrongdoing
that constitutes part of a crime. In either case, the 48 T. Calvani in K. Cseres, M. P. Schinkel, F. O. W. Vogelaar (2006), pp. 270–273; W. P. J. Wils
in K. Cseres, M. P. Schinkel, F. O. W. Vogelaar (2006), pp. 60–81.
criminalisation of competition law enforcement is subject
to practical, competency, and moral limitations indicative 49 W. P. J. Wils in K. Cseres, M. P. Schinkel, F. O. W. Vogelaar (2006), pp. 60–81.
of reluctance or failures which must be explored in turn. 50 P. Massey (2004), pp. 23–31.
51 P. Massey (2004), pp. 23–31; F. Wagner-von Papp, Kriminalisierung von Kartellen (2010),
Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb, Vol. 60, pp. 268–272; J. Biermann, Neubestimmung des
deutschen und europäischen Kartellsanktionenrechts: Reformüberlegungen, Determinanten
und Perspektiven einer Kriminalisierung von Verstößen gegen das Kartellrecht (2007),
45 M. Furse (2012), pp. 169, 176–178, 186–187. Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrecht, Vol. 1, p. 14; P. Whelan, A Principled Argument for Personal
Criminal Sanctions as Punishment Under EC Cartel Law (2007), The Competition Law
46 P. Massey (2004), pp. 23–25. Review, Vol. 4, Issue 1, pp. 7, 31–32.
Concurrences N° 1-2020 I International I Kane Abry-Diaw de Baye I EU: The criminalisation of competition law breaches in the European Union 5latter aims to protect consumers notably by ensuring criminalisation of competition law enforcement faces
constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle and DRM protection.
their access to differentiated products and brands many criticisms whose examination is not undeserving.
Ce document est protégé au titre du droit d'auteur par les conventions internationales en vigueur et le Code de la propriété intellectuelle du 1er juillet 1992. Toute utilisation non autorisée constitue une contrefaçon, délit pénalement sanctionné jusqu'à 3 ans d'emprisonnement et 300 000 € d'amende (art.
L. 335-2 CPI). L’utilisation personnelle est strictement autorisée dans les limites de l’article L. 122 5 CPI et des mesures techniques de protection pouvant accompagner ce document. This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document
while protecting the free play of the market. However, In fact, it is questionable whether the violation of the
the extension of the penalty system imposed upon duty not to hamper “free and fair competition” on the
undertakings to natural persons faces an irreducible European market is such an important legally protected
difficulty in that what may appear to be a ridiculous interest (Rechtsgut) that it must be sanctioned by
mulct to a company may be more significant to a natural such an infamous punishment as imprisonment, the
person52 whose inability to settle up the fine defeats the German jurisprudence argues.64 The main rationale
whole purpose of the sanction if it cannot be enforced. behind criminalisation is that criminal sanctions
More still, if the individual who comes up with the funds can help decrease crime through deterrence, penalty,
is repaid by the convicted undertaking ex ante or ex rehabilitation, and incapacitation. Variable according
post53 or is covered by an insurance policy54 protecting to the philosophical, political, social, and cultural
against this possible eventuality.55 Perhaps a better way ideologies prevailing in a given society, these universal
to instil deterrence while sanctioning the real beneficiary justifications for criminal sanctions are not exempt from
and persons responsible for the arrangement would unintended consequences that may beget failures and
be to sentence them to custodial sentences. After all, have a dreadful impact on offenders, offenders’ families,
criminal convictions are nothing else but the expression and communities. It is notably so when individuals
of public and social opprobrium56 which, combined and undertakings are punished absent the intention or
with the threat of imprisonment and the constitution of knowledge of wrongdoing that constitutes part of a crime
a criminal record upon which society places significant or else when undertakings and individuals can elude
weight, “could especially deter white-collar workers57 liability (Strafwürdigkeit) either because the arrangement
and draw public attention58 to the seriousness of the only hindered competition indirectly or because the
crime”59 at the behest of the lawmaker60 as proceeding violation of a primary legal interest other than free and
from a thoughtful self-reflection and balance between fair competition cannot be established65 such as fraud66
the benefits accruable under an arrangement and the or theft.67
consequences that might be suffered if caught.61 This,
in turn, might cause a decrease in cartel activity as 18. Another criticism is that the action of turning
evidenced by the criminalisation of antitrust enforcement competition law breaches into a criminal offence by
in the US. It correlates with an increase in the efficiency making it illegal as the last possible means of sanctioning
of the criminalisation of antitrust enforcement62 and the competition law breaches is disproportionate. The reason
deterrence of global cartels from expanding their activity is that criminalisation inflicts an infamous penalty
to the US.63 on convicts while its aims (i.e., deterrence, penalty,
rehabilitation, and incapacitation) are already and
17. Despite the prevailing circumstances, the can be better achieved by a combination of civil68
and administrative69 sanctions capable of operating
as sufficient deterrent (e.g., forfeiture, dismissal,
incapacitation, and suchlike). Another reason is that
52 T. Calvani in K. Cseres, M. P. Schinkel, F. O. W. Vogelaar (2006), pp. 270–273; OECD the efficacy of the criminalisation of competition law
(2003), p. 17; W. P. J. Wils in K. Cseres, M. P. Schinkel, F. O. W. Vogelaar (2006), pp. 60–80.
enforcement to deter individuals and undertakings or
53 P. Massey (2004), pp. 23–31; OECD (2003), p. 17; W. P. J. Wils in K. Cseres, M. P. Schinkel, associations of undertakings from hampering the free
F. O. W. Vogelaar (2006), pp. 60, 85–86; J. Biermann (2007), pp. 1–14.
play of the market is not at all established contrary to what
54 Monopolkommission Deutschland, Eine Wettbewerbsordnung für die Finanzmärkte the US competition authorities argue. The statistics often
(2012/2013), Zwanzigstes Hauptgutachten der Monopolkommission, gemäß § 44 Abs. 1
Satz 1 GWB, p. 96, para. 153.
presented rely more on intuition and personal perceptions
than they do on empirical evidence.70 In fact, the figures
55 P. Massey (2004), pp. 23–31; T. Calvani in K. Cseres, M. P. Schinkel, F. O. W. Vogelaar
(2006), pp. 270–273; Monopolkommission Deutschland (2012/2013), p. 96, para. 152;
often showed and manipulated do not prove a correlation
OECD (2003), p. 17. between the criminalisation of competition law breaches71
56 Monopolkommission Deutschland (2012/2013), pp. 97, 99, para. 156, 160; OECD (2003),
p. 18; W. P. J. Wils in K. Cseres, M. P. Schinkel, F. O. W. Vogelaar (2006), pp. 60, 84, 86; F.
Wagner-von Papp (2010), pp. 268, 272; J. Biermann (2007), pp. 1–17; P. Whelan (2007),
64 P. König, Neues Strafrecht gegen die Korruption (1997), Juristische Runschau, pp. 397, 402.
pp. 7, 30, 33.
65 A. Bräunig, Wider die Strafbarkeit von “Hardcore-Kartellen” de lege ferenda (2011),
57 P. Massey (2004), pp. 23–31; Monopolkommission Deutschland (2012/2013), p. 97, para.
Höchstrichterliche Rechtsprechung zum Strafrecht, pp. 425, 429–432.
156; OECD (2003), p. 18; W. P. J. Wils in K. Cseres, M. P. Schinkel, F. O. W. Vogelaar (2006),
pp. 60, 84; J. Biermann (2007), pp. 1, 17–18. 66 See, for instance, Code de commerce (French Commercial Code), Article L. 420-6, cited
above, and Lege nr. 21 din 10 aprilie 1996, A concurenţei – Republicare, Articol 60
58 P. Massey (2004), pp. 23–31; T. Calvani in K. Cseres, M. P. Schinkel, F. O. W. Vogelaar
(Romanian Competition Law No. 21/1996, Article 60), cited above.
(2006), pp. 270, 271, 276; HM Government’s Department of Trade and Industry, A World
Class Competition Regime (2001), Annex A, at A3.2; P. Whelan, Cartel Criminalization and
67 Trestní zákoník, § 248 (Czech Criminal Code, Article 248), cited above, and Trestný zákon,
the Challenge of “Moral Wrongfulness” (2013), Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 33,
Issue 3, pp. 535, 544–550. § 250 (Slovak Criminal Code, Article 250), cited above.
59 K. Cseres, M. P. Schinkel, F. O. W. Vogelaar (2006), pp. 1–9; J. Biermann (2007), pp. 1–18. 68 Gewerbeordnung (German Industrial Code) § 35.
60 F. Wagner-von Papp (2010), pp. 268, 274–275. 69 C. Schlößer, Strafrechtliche Sanktionen bei Wettbewerbsverstößen im internationalen
Vergleich (2016), Kölner Schrift zum Wirtschaftsrecht, Vol. 7, Issue 4, pp. 294–295, 298–299.
61 P. Massey (2004), pp. 23, 33; K. Cseres, M. P. Schinkel, F. O. W. Vogelaar (2006), pp. 1–7.
70 A. P. Reindl, How Strong is the Case for Criminal Sanctions in Cartel Cases?, in K. Cseres,
62 T. Calvani in K. Cseres, M. P. Schinkel, F. O. W. Vogelaar (2006), pp. 270, 274–275; M. P. Schinkel, F. O. W. Vogelaar (2006), pp. 110, 116.
P. Whelan (2007), pp. 7, 33–34.
71 R. H. Lande, J. P. Davis, Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement and Criminal
63 US Department of Justice, Cornerstones of an Effective Leniency Program (2004). Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws (2010), BYU Law Review, Issue 2, pp. 315–387;
6 Concurrences N° 1-2020 I International I Kane Abry-Diaw de Baye I EU: The criminalisation of competition law breaches in the European Unionand the decrease in the number of cartels operating on legal uncertainty80 that promotes further the rejection of
constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle and DRM protection.
the American market construed as more effective than the criminalisation of competition law enforcement.
Ce document est protégé au titre du droit d'auteur par les conventions internationales en vigueur et le Code de la propriété intellectuelle du 1er juillet 1992. Toute utilisation non autorisée constitue une contrefaçon, délit pénalement sanctionné jusqu'à 3 ans d'emprisonnement et 300 000 € d'amende (art.
L. 335-2 CPI). L’utilisation personnelle est strictement autorisée dans les limites de l’article L. 122 5 CPI et des mesures techniques de protection pouvant accompagner ce document. This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document
other types of sanction such as civil or administrative
penalties.72 The number of cartel arrangements on the 20. Further, it is reasonable to doubt the validity of
American market remains particularly high despite the the statistical analyses promoting the effectiveness
high number of prosecutions.73 While the criminalisation of criminalisation in curtailing cartels and bringing
of competition law enforcement on either side of benefits to the consumer. The benefits of crime reduction
the Atlantic cannot be equated given that enormous obtained through retribution, deterrence, incapacitation,
differences persist between the US and the European rehabilitation, and restoration strategies do not outweigh
approaches74 – whose examination is not the purpose of the costs of them for society given their increase of public
this paper – the US example reveals the mistaken and costs. This is poorly compensated by insufficient fines81
simplistic belief that so generally consists in propounding whose amount and enforceability depend, moreover,
that the criminalisation of competition law enforcement on the system of ideas and ideals that forms the basis
deters more efficiently individuals and undertakings or of economic or political theory and policy in a given
associations of undertakings from constituting cartel jurisdiction.82
arrangements. It is notably so since its underpinnings are
dubious. The same applies to the thought whereby the 21. Moreover, the criminalisation of competition law
decrease of anti-cartel sanctions correlates undeniably breaches is inevitably a source of legal and procedural
with the criminalisation of competition law enforcement. problems since it juxtaposes two different systems of
The paucity or large number of criminal sanctions sanctions. Criminal law, on the one hand, and competition
imposed can never be a telltale of the effectivity of a law, on the other. While the former aims to sanction
policy, especially as a number of cartels may remain harms caused to society on its behalf, the latter purports
inconspicuous. to sanction economic harms caused to businesses and
restricted segments of society. Leaving aside for now
19. Besides, the lack of public support for the the issues of compatibility of the criminalisation of
criminalisation of competition law enforcement75 defeats competition law breaches with the European competition
the whole purpose of criminalisation which consists in policy and the infringement of the general rule whereby
punishing conducts whereby individuals have taken one should not be prosecuted or punished twice for
improper advantage, or inflicted unfair detriment, upon the same conduct under different penalty systems, the
others, and balancing the scales on behalf of society. criminalisation of competition law enforcement within
As such, the resort to criminalisation may result from legal national jurisdictions raises the following procedural
bigotry and overcautiousness76 and must be reconsidered problem. First, it is unclear who has competence between
all the more so since it is not always possible to identify, the national competition authority and the national
deftly, who the instigators of the breach are77 and even prosecution services to investigate and sanction alleged
less so to prove their personal misconduct as individuals. breaches of competition.83 Second, the criminalisation
It is notably so given undertakings resort to ever more of competition law enforcement defeats the domestic
sly dissimulation techniques78 and strict “internal cartel and European leniency programmes which become
discipline and punishment” to leave themselves a way meaningless since undertakings that have participated in
out while committing other criminal offences in the illegal cartels will be less likely to self-report a cartel to
same breath such as personal threats against leniency avoid or reduce a fine if they remain liable to a criminal
applicants, whistle-blowers, judges, and prosecutors.79 sanction that is worse still than the mere payment of a
More so, the indeterminacy of the nature of the offence mulct.
sanctionable under criminal law (i.e. vertical agreements
or/and horizontal agreements) is also a source of great
M. Dreher, Wider die Kriminalisierung des Kartellrechts (2011), Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb,
Vol. 61, pp. 232, 238.
72 C. Schlößer (2016), pp. 294, 298; F. Wagner-von Papp (2010), pp. 268, 273 note 39; A. P.
Reindl in K. Cseres, M. P. Schinkel, F. O. W. Vogelaar (2006), pp. 110, 117.
73 C. Schlößer (2016), pp. 294, 298; A. P. Reindl in K. Cseres, M. P. Schinkel, F. O. W. Vogelaar
(2006), pp. 110, 117.
74 M. Dreher (2011), pp. 232, 238; A. P. Reindl in K. Cseres, M. P. Schinkel, F. O. W. Vogelaar
(2006), pp. 110, 118–119.
75 A. Stephan, Survey of Public Attitudes to Price-Fixing and Cartel Enforcement in Britain
(2008), CCP Working Paper 07-12, pp. 2–31; C. Beaton-Wells, C. Parker, Justifying Criminal
Sanctions for Cartel Conduct: A Hard Case (2013), Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, Vol. 1,
Issue 1, pp. 198–219.
76 K. Cseres, M. P. Schinkel, F. O. W. Vogelaar (2006), pp. 1, 10; F. Wagner-von Papp (2010), 80 M. Dreher (2011), pp. 232, 241.
pp. 268, 277; M. Dreher (2011), pp. 232, 241.
81 R. A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals (1980), American Criminal Law
77 K. Cseres, M. P. Schinkel, F. O. W. Vogelaar (2006), pp. 1, 9. Review, Vol. 17, pp. 409–418; OECD (2003), p. 21.
78 OECD (2003), p. 22; K. Cseres, M. P. Schinkel, F. O. W. Vogelaar (2006), p. 1. 82 K. Cseres, M. P. Schinkel, F. O. W. Vogelaar (2006), pp. 1, 10.
79 K. Cseres, M. P. Schinkel, F. O. W. Vogelaar (2006), pp. 1, 11, 12. 83 OECD (2003), pp. 23–24.
Concurrences N° 1-2020 I International I Kane Abry-Diaw de Baye I EU: The criminalisation of competition law breaches in the European Union 722. By contrast, a more inclusive leniency programme84 authorities of the Member States shall have the power to
constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle and DRM protection.
accounting for both the criminal and civil sanctions to apply Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty in individual cases.
Ce document est protégé au titre du droit d'auteur par les conventions internationales en vigueur et le Code de la propriété intellectuelle du 1er juillet 1992. Toute utilisation non autorisée constitue une contrefaçon, délit pénalement sanctionné jusqu'à 3 ans d'emprisonnement et 300 000 € d'amende (art.
L. 335-2 CPI). L’utilisation personnelle est strictement autorisée dans les limites de l’article L. 122 5 CPI et des mesures techniques de protection pouvant accompagner ce document. This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document
which individuals and undertakings may be liable85 would For this purpose, acting on their own initiative or on a
be far more efficacious to fight cartels than cooperation complaint, they may take the following decisions:
between national competition authorities.86 It is so
given the disparities between Member States regarding – requiring that an infringement be brought to an
the sanction of practices fettering competition and the end,
discrepancies between the standards of proof required
– ordering interim measures,
to sanction illegal cartels. But, in turn, the juxtaposition
of criminal law and civil law and the equation of – accepting commitments,
criminal and civil procedure that the criminalisation of
– imposing fines, periodic penalty payments or any
competition law enforcements abets have the potential
other penalty provided for in their national law.
to (i) lengthen proceedings regarding the demonstration
of liability and culpability under two different evidence
Where on the basis of the information in their possession
systems, (ii) increase trial costs, and (iii) obfuscate the
the conditions for prohibition are not met, they may likewise
clear-cut distinction between criminal procedure and
decide that there are no grounds for action on their part.
civil and administrative procedure, thus rendering less
efficient the enforcement of competition law.87
(…)
23. Regardless, the criminalisation of competition law
Information exchanged pursuant to paragraph 1 can only
enforcement in those European countries that have
be used in evidence to impose sanctions on natural persons
chosen to sanction it results from a long-term benefit
(…).”
analysis88 contingent on their admitted bias for a system
of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation,
and restoration as opposed to a system of civil or 25. Differently, the Office of Fair Trading contended
administrative wrongs purporting to award compensation in the case of the United Kingdom that92 “The cartel
of injury rather than to inflict punishment.89 offence under the Enterprise Act and Article 81 [EC]
and the Chapter I prohibition are aimed at different legal
persons. The cartel offence is aimed at dishonest activity by
2. Issues of competence individuals whereas Article 81 and the Chapter I prohibition
are aimed at anti-competitive activity by undertakings. The
24. Beyond the inadequacy of the test applied and its Modernisation Regulation does not apply to national laws
implications, another objection to the criminalisation of which impose criminal sanctions on natural persons, except
competition law enforcement is its inconsistency with the to the extent that such sanctions are the means whereby
European competition policy. Articles 101, 102, and 103 competition rules applying to undertakings are enforced.
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union The OFT considers that the cartel offence is not a means
do not criminalise competition law breaches but merely whereby competition rules applying to undertakings are
provide for administrative sanctions through a system enforced. (…) The OFT, therefore, considers that the
of fines and periodic penalty payments. Consequently, investigation or prosecution of an individual under the
some commentators argue that the criminalisation of cartel offence would not require the OFT to apply Article 81
competition law enforcement in those Member States as well.”
that have opted for it is inconsistent with the European
competition policy and shall be proscribed excepting
where the breach falls foul of a domestic competition
rule that falls within the scope of Article 3 of Council
Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the
implementation of the rules on competition laid down
in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty.90 This argument is,
however, untenable since Article 3(2) of the Council
Regulation does entitle Member States to adopt and apply
“on their territory stricter national laws which prohibit or
sanction unilateral conduct engaged in by undertakings”
without proscribing the subjection of individuals to
custodial sentences Articles 5 and 12(3) of the Council
Regulation 1/200391 providing that “The competition
84 Monopolkommission Deutschland (2012/2013), pp. 104–105, para. 179–181.
90 W. Frenz, Ausreichendes Kartellbußgeldsystem – keine Notwendigkeit von Haftstrafen (2014), pp. 333, 354; P. Whelan (2013), Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, Vol. 64, Issue 2,
(2014), Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis, Issue 4, pp. 367, 372. pp. 143, 145–146; P. Massey (2004), pp. 23, 33.
91 W. P. J. Wils in K. Cseres, M. P. Schinkel, F. O. W. Vogelaar (2006), pp. 60, 70; M. Furse 92 Office of Fair Trading, Modernisation – Understanding Competition Law (2004), p. 13,
(2012), p. 121; Monopolkommission Deutschland (2012/2013), p. 88, para. 126; K. Cseres, para. 4.21–4.22, accessed on 23 August 2019, available at http://www.gov.uk/government/
M. P. Schinkel, F. O. W. Vogelaar (2006), pp. 1, 15; J. Biermann (2007), pp. 1, 20; A. Stephan uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284432/oft442.pdf.
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