EUROPEAN NON-PROLIFERATION DIPLOMACY IN THE SHADOW OF SECONDARY SANCTIONS - Sipri
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SIPRI Policy Brief
August 2020
EUROPEAN NON- SUMMARY
w This policy brief describes
PROLIFERATION DIPLOMACY European responses to
secondary sanctions that the
IN THE SHADOW OF United States imposed on Iran
after withdrawing from the
SECONDARY SANCTIONS 2015 nuclear agreement, or the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA). In particular,
tytti erästö it looks at the Instrument in
Support of Trade Exchanges
(INSTEX), which was
established by France,
After withdrawing from the Iran undermined Iranian people’s access
Germany and the United
nuclear agreement, or the Joint to basic humanitarian goods.
Kingdom in 2019 to facilitate
Comprehensive Plan of Action This policy brief describes European–Iranian trade,
(JCPOA), in May 2018, the United European responses to US President initially focusing on the
States imposed unprecedentedly Donald J. Trump’s administration’s humanitarian sector. While
harsh sanctions on Iran. Iran secondary sanctions on Iran. In falling short of the kind of
responded to this ‘maximum particular, it looks at the Instrument comprehensive economic
pressure’ campaign by reducing its in Support of Trade Exchanges normalization that was
JCPOA commitments. While the (INSTEX), which was developed expected under the JCPOA,
USA assumes that more pressure by the E3 in 2019 to facilitate INSTEX could help maintain
can lead to a ‘better deal’ with Iran, European–Iranian trade. It is the ailing nuclear agreement in
European non-proliferation policy is argued that while falling short of addition to addressing some of
the negative humanitarian
based on preserving the JCPOA. the kind of economic normalization
consequences of sanctions in
The impact of US sanctions that was expected under the
Iran. INSTEX can also be seen
mainly derives from penalizing JCPOA, INSTEX has the potential as a test case for a more
third parties for engaging with Iran. to alleviate human suffering and independent European foreign
Such secondary sanctions make free some European–Iranian trade policy that could better
foreign banks reluctant to process from secondary sanctions. The withstand future
Iran-related transactions—even instrument can also be seen as an disagreements with major
when they fall outside the scope experimental step towards a more powers.
of US sanctions. Such sanction independent European policy that
overcompliance makes it difficult could better withstand future
for those European companies that disagreements with major powers.
still want to trade with Iran to do
so. This has also meant that the BACKGROUND
European Union (EU) and the E3—
In the mid-1990s when the USA first
France, Germany and the United
imposed extraterritorial sanctions
Kingdom—have been unable to meet
on Iran as part of the Iran and Libya
previous expectations regarding
Sanctions Act (ILSA), the European
lifting of sanctions under the
Council pushed back with the
JCPOA. In addition to contributing
so-called ‘Blocking Regulation’.1
to a deep socio-economic crisis
within Iran, the sanctions have
1 US Congress, Iran and Libya Sanctions Act
of 1996, Public Law 104–172, 5 Aug. 1996.2 sipri policy brief
In addition to prohibiting EU or lifted. 5 Under the compromise
companies from complying with agreement Iran could continue
secondary sanctions, the 1996 uranium enrichment under strict
regulation gave them the right to limits and intrusive International
recover related damages. 2 The EU Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
also threatened to take the dispute inspections. 6 For Iran the most
to the World Trade Organization significant benefit of the JCPOA
(WTO). These measures contributed was economic normalization from
to the 1997 decision by President the lifting of sanctions. However,
Bill Clinton’s administration not to the most important factor enabling
enforce the ILSA. 3 the agreement had arguably been
However, the crisis over Iran’s new US flexibility on uranium
nuclear programme in the following enrichment in Iran, based on secret
decade created transatlantic bilateral negotiations in 2012–13.7
solidarity on the need for non- Yet, the diplomatic success was
proliferation sanctions, in which commonly explained as a result of
context the EU also accepted US sanctions. 8
secondary sanctions on Iran. In By withdrawing from the JCPOA
addition to United Nations Security the Trump administration rejected
Council sanctions in 2006–10, in the underlying compromise,
2012 the EU and the USA jointly assuming that more coercive
imposed an oil embargo on Iran pressure could lead to more Iranian
in an effort to end its uranium concessions on the nuclear issue
enrichment activities. They also as well as regional and missile
targeted Iran’s central bank and policies. While the resulting
took measures leading to the maximum pressure strategy—by
exclusion of several Iranian banks which the USA unilaterally
from the Belgian-based Society for imposed a near-total oil embargo
Worldwide Interbank Financial on Iran—has demonstrated
Telecommunication (SWIFT) unparalleled US power over the
system.4 global financial system, it has
After conclusion of the JCPOA failed to reach its policy objectives.
in 2015, previous UN Security Instead, Iran responded by
Council sanctions on Iran were ceasing the implementation of key
terminated with Resolution 2231, JCPOA commitments between
and the transatlantic financial and May 2019 and January 2020,
banking sanctions were waived and Iranian hardliners opposing
engagement with the West have
2 European Council, Regulation No 2271/96
of 22 November 1996 protecting against the 5 UN Security Council Resolution 2231
effects of the extra-territorial application of (2015), 20 July 2015.
legislation adopted by a third country, and 6 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
actions based thereon or resulting therefrom, (JCPOA), Vienna, 14 July 2015, reproduced as
22 Nov. 1996. Annex A of UN Security Council Resolution
3 Katzman, K., ‘The Iran Sanctions Act 2231, 20 July 2015.
(ISA)’, Congressional Research Service Report 7 Rozen, L., ‘Inside the secret US–Iran
for Congress, updated 12 Oct. 2007. diplomacy that sealed nuke deal’, Al-Monitor,
4 Gladstone, R. and Castle, S., ‘Global 11 Aug. 2015.
network expels as many as 30 of Iran’s banks in 8 See e.g. The White House, ‘The Iran
move to isolate its economy’, New York Times, nuclear deal: What you need to know about the
15 Mar. 2012. JCPOA’, 14 July 2015.european non-prolifer ation diplomacy 3
been empowered.9 While distancing The EU also failed to prevent the
themselves from US policy, the decision—taken by SWIFT under US
E3/EU have condemned Iranian pressure—to exclude Iranian banks
actions, calling for full compliance from its payment system.14 Even the
with the JCPOA.10 European Investment Bank—whose
mandate was extended to Iran
INITIAL EFFORTS TO COUNTER as an additional response to US
SECONDARY SANCTIONS measures—considered investing in
Iran too risky.15
To defend the JCPOA, in June 2018
the EU included the upcoming SHIFTING FOCUS TO SANCTION
US secondary sanctions on OVERCOMPLIANCE
Iran within the 1996 Blocking
Regulation.11 However, the Trump In September 2018 the E3/EU
administration’s obliviousness to announced a plan to develop
the measure exposed the lack of a special trade instrument to
an effective mechanism to enforce ‘facilitate payments related to Iran’s
the legislation.12 In contrast the exports (including oil) and imports’
US Treasury Department’s Office to ‘assist and reassure economic
for Foreign Asset Control (OFAC)— operators pursuing legitimate
whose powers to enforce secondary business with Iran’.16 However,
sanctions were significantly by the time of its establishment in
broadened in the 2000s—has January 2019, the mission of the
effectively deterred the private instrument—which
sector from Iran-related activities.13 was then named
Although it fell short of Iranian
INSTEX—had
been reduced, expectations, the mission of INSTEX
9 Press TV, ‘Iran announces decision to take
fifth step to scale back JCPOA commitments’, at least initially, addresses a critical area of sanction
5 Jan. 2020; and Geranmayeh, E., ‘Reviving to trade in overcompliance
the revolutionaries: How Trump’s maximum humanitarian
pressure is shifting Iran’s domestic politics’,
European Council on Foreign Relations Policy
goods.17
Brief, 23 June 2020. Although it fell short of Iranian
10 Erästö, T. and Cronberg, C., ‘Will
expectations, the limited mission of
Europe’s latest move lead to the demise of
the Iran nuclear deal?’, SIPRI Commentary,
21 Jan. 2020; and IAEA, ‘NPT safeguards sanctions dilemma’, Washington Quarterly,
agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran’, vol. 42, no. 3 (2019), pp. 57–71.
Resolution adopted by the Board of Governors, 14 Reuters, ‘SWIFT says suspending some
GOV/2020/34, 19 June 2020. Iranian banks’ access to messaging system’,
11 European Commission, Commission 5 Nov. 2018.
Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/1100 of 15 Emmott, R. and de Carbonnel, A.,
6 June 2018 amending the Annex to Council ‘European Investment Bank casts doubt on EU
Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 protecting against plan to salvage nuclear deal’, Reuters, 18 July
the effects of extra-territorial application of 2018.
legislation adopted by a third country, and 16 European Union External Action Service,
actions based thereon or resulting therefrom, ‘Implementation of the Joint Comprehensive
6 June 2018. Plan of Action: Joint ministerial statement’,
12 Batmanghelidj, E. and Hellman, A., Joint statements, 24 Sep. 2018.
‘Europe, Iran and economic sovereignty: A 17 French Ministry for Europe and Foreign
new banking architecture in response to US Affairs, ‘Joint statement on the creation of
sanctions’, European Leadership Network, INSTEX, the special purpose vehicle aimed at
June 2018. facilitating legitimate trade with Iran in the
13 See e.g. Sandberg-Zakian, E., ‘Insight: framework of the efforts to preserve the Joint
OFAC $7.8M settlement with Swiss company Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)’, Joint
expands tech enforcement’, Bloomberg Law, statement by the E3 foreign ministers, 31 Jan.
16 Apr. 2020; and Arnold, A., ‘A financial 2019.4 sipri policy brief
INSTEX addresses a critical area they have hindered timely delivery
of sanction overcompliance. In of international aid to Iran. 22
principle, humanitarian trade is
exempt from sanctions, but the lack HOW THE INSTRUMENT IN
SUPPORT OF TRADE
of specific reassurances from the
EXCHANGES SHOULD WORK
USA has meant a failure to apply
this exemption in practice.18 As INSTEX is a cross-border clearing
noted in a 2019 UN mechanism based on exchange
Governmental ownership raises the report, the sanctions of goods or services that does not
threshold for the USA to impose sanctions on Iran ‘unduly involve the transfer of currency
affect food security between Europe and Iran. It
on INSTEX plays the role of an intermediary
and the availability
and distribution of medicines, between companies, together with
pharmaceutical equipment and its Iranian counterpart, the Special
supplies’.19 Iran produces most Trade and Finance Instrument
of its pharmaceutical products (STFI). The goal is to compensate
European exporters with funds
domestically, but international
located in Europe, based on the
banking restrictions have hampered
value commensurate with the value
domestic production by limiting
of imports from Iran. The STFI
imports of raw materials and
is similarly tasked to coordinate
undermined Iran’s access to payments to Iranian exporters
specialized medicines needed to in accordance with the value of
treat cancer and other chronic or imports from Europe. 23
rare diseases. 20 INSTEX can reassure banks
While the pre-2015 and companies through its
comprehensive sanctions joint ownership by three major
regime on Iran also had negative European states (E3). 24 In addition
humanitarian consequences, the to providing a high level of trust
severity of current US sanctions, in the instrument’s due diligence
alongside their counterproductive procedures, governmental
non-proliferation impact, has drawn ownership raises the threshold for
renewed attention to the problem. 21 the USA to impose sanctions on
Criticism towards sanctions has INSTEX. In addition to the E3, four
other European states—Belgium,
increased with the coronavirus
Denmark, the Netherlands and
disease 2019 (COVID-19) crisis, as
Norway—have joined INSTEX
18 Borger, J. and Kamali Dehghan, S., as shareholders, and two more—
‘US rebuffs Europeans over ensuring Iran
sanctions exempt food and medicine’, The 22 Human Rights Watch, ‘US: Ease sanctions
Guardian, 2 Nov. 2018. on Iran in COVID-19 crisis: Ensure access
19 UN General Assembly, ‘Situation of to essential resources’, 6 Apr. 2020; and
human rights in the Islamic Republic of Chadwick, V., ‘EU aid official slams banks’
Iran’, Report of the Special Rapporteur on overzealous sanctions strategy’, Devex, 18 June
the situation of human rights in the Islamic 2020.
Republic of Iran, A/74/188, 18 July 2019. 23 Batmanghelidj, E., ‘INSTEX develops new
20 Kebriaeezadeh, A., ‘US sanctions are service in bid to fast-track Iran transactions’,
killing cancer patients in Iran’, Foreign Policy, Bourse & Bazaar, 30 July 2019.
14 Aug. 2019. 24 Geranmayeh, E. and Batmanghelidj, E.,
21 Erdbrink, T., ‘Iran sanctions take ‘Trading with Iran via the special purpose
unexpected toll on medical imports’, New York vehicle: How it can work’, European Council on
Times, 2 Nov. 2012. Foreign Relations, 7 Feb. 2019.european non-prolifer ation diplomacy 5
Finland and Sweden—are expected pay European exporters using Iran’s
to join soon. 25 Expanded ownership revenues currently frozen in foreign
further contributes to risk and cost banks. 31 While banks are reluctant
sharing and enforces the ‘sovereign to transfer Iranian funds due to
shield’ around the instrument. 26 fear of US sanctions, this option has
After a delayed start the first already been applied by South Korea
INSTEX transaction took place to allow a medicine delivery to
on 31 March 2020, with a German Iran. 32 Switzerland has negotiated a
company exporting blood treatment similar arrangement with the USA
equipment to Iran. 27 Several as part of the Swiss Humanitarian
European companies have indicated Trade Agreement (SHTA). 33
an interest in the mechanism, which However, these bilateral channels
they can use even if not domiciled are dependent on OFAC permission,
in shareholder countries. 28 The E3 requiring lengthy negotiations
has said that INSTEX might later and intrusive information sharing
also be opened to non-European with the US Government. 34 A
operators, and suggested that its similar route would hardly be an
scope could be extended beyond option for INSTEX, which operates
humanitarian trade. 29 However, under EU law and data protection
INSTEX still needs to overcome requirements. 35
major obstacles to function as Alternatively, Iran could be
intended. offered a loan to buy humanitarian
goods. The COVID-19 crisis
THE TRADE DEFICIT prompted the country to apply
CHALLENGE for a $5 billion loan from the
International Monetary Fund
One key challenge facing INSTEX is
(IMF). The head of Iran’s central
that the value of European exports
bank suggested that the money
to Iran far exceeds the value of
could be channelled through
Iranian exports to Europe. This
INSTEX and SHTA. 36 Although
imbalance is largely due to the US
the USA is seeking to block this
sanctions on Iranian oil exports. 30
option, the loan could be granted,
Without a balance, INSTEX is not
depending on IMF support. 37
sustainable, as European exporters
Finally, the chances of striking a
cannot get due compensation based
functioning trade balance could be
on European imports from Iran.
One potential solution being 31 Mallard, G. et al., ‘The humanitarian
explored by INSTEX would be to gap in the global sanctions regime: Assessing
causes, effects, and solutions’, Global
25 Telephone interview with Michael Bock, Governance, vol. 26 (2020), pp. 121–53.
8 June 2020; and Batmanghelidh, E., ‘Europe 32 Financial Tribune, ‘S. Korea sending first
still needs INSTEX to help solve the Iran humanitarian cargo’, 29 May 2020.
crisis’, Bourse & Bazaar, 26 Feb. 2020. 33 Ackerman, S., ‘Iran has gotten nothing
26 Geranmayeh and Batmanghelidj from US “humanitarian” channel’, Daily Beast,
(note 24). 8 May 2020.
27 Norman, L., ‘EU ramps up trade system 34 Mallard et al. (note 31).
with Iran despite US threats’, Wall Street 35 Telephone interview with Michael Bock
Journal, 31 Mar. 2020. (note 25).
28 Batmanghelidh (note 25). 36 Motevalli, G., ‘Q&A: Iran’s Central Bank
29 French Ministry for Europe and Foreign governor comments on IMF loan request’,
Affairs (note 17). Bloomberg, 19 Apr. 2020.
30 European Commission, ‘Countries and 37 Atwood, K., ‘US ready to block Iran’s
regions: Iran’, updated 23 Apr. 2020, accessed requests for coronavirus aid from the IMF,
1 June 2020. officials say’, CNN Politics, 9 Apr. 2020.6 sipri policy brief
increased through the expansion remained elusive. Hence, the
of INSTEX to non-European re-election of Trump might
companies importing goods from mean continuation of the current
Iran, and extension of the INSTEX situation—or it could be the
mandate beyond humanitarian breaking point. That point might
goods. be reached even earlier due to the
recent US plan to either extend the
LOOKING AHEAD arms embargo under Resolution
2231 or trigger a ‘snapback’ of
While Iranian–US relations and
previous UN Security Council
the fate of the
Its mission of countering the negative sanctions on Iran.41
JCPOA will affect
The collapse of the JCPOA would
effects of secondary sanctions remains INSTEX, its mission
likely reduce European commitment
relevant irrespective of political of countering the
to INSTEX. Yet, the instrument’s
negative effects
developments humanitarian mission should
of secondary
be viewed as a matter of ethical
sanctions remains
necessity, rather than a nuclear-
relevant irrespective of political
related concession. Therefore,
developments. In addition to making
INSTEX would be important even
INSTEX fully functional, European
without the JCPOA.42
governments might also decide
to take further steps to counter Beyond humanitarian trade?
secondary sanctions.
As E3 foreign ministers said in
Impact of Iranian–United States January 2019, ‘INSTEX will
relations support legitimate European
trade with Iran, focusing initially
Democratic Party victory in the
on the [humanitarian] sectors
November 2020 US presidential
most essential to the Iranian
elections could open the door to
population’.43 This seemed to
Iranian–US diplomacy—provided
suggest a potential future expansion
the political developments within
beyond humanitarian trade.
Iran allow this. 38 However,
The current INSTEX president,
diplomacy would depend on the
Michael Bock, confirmed that the
lifting of sanctions, which would
instrument could cover other areas
be particularly difficult given the
once humanitarian trade runs more
private sector’s disillusionment
smoothly. From a legal perspective
with the Obama administration’s
the instrument could even include
previous assurances about the safety
oil trade, but in practice it cannot be
of engaging with Iran. 39 INSTEX
expected to go against US sanctions,
could help address this problem by
as this would mean withdrawal
providing additional reassurance to
of European bank cooperation.44
risk-averse banks and companies.40
While INSTEX cannot undo the
A deal between Iran and the
current US administration has
41 Masterson, J., ‘US aims to extend Iran
embargo’, Arms Control Association, June
38 Geranmayeh (note 9). 2020.
39 Treanor, J., ‘HSBC criticises John Kerry 42 Batmanghelidh (note 25).
over business with Iran request’, The Guardian, 43 French Ministry for Europe and Foreign
13 May 2016. Affairs (note 17).
40 Online interview with Esfandyar 44 Telephone interview with Michael Bock
Batmanghelidj, 12 June 2020. (note 25).european non-prolifer ation diplomacy 7
de facto primacy of US law, it could Other proposals include: taking
be extended to non-humanitarian sanctions disputes to the WTO;
trade that is not targeted by the involving European central banks
USA but is impeded by fear of US in Iran-related transactions;
secondary sanctions, including threatening retaliatory measures
tourism and trade on various in response to arbitrary inclusion
consumer goods.45 of European entities in OFAC’s
Specially Designated Nationals list;
Potential further steps towards and in the long term, strengthening
European economic sovereignty the role of the euro as a global
currency.49 Other developments—
Since 2018 the EU approach
notably the recent US sanctions
has shifted from attempts at
on the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline
persuading the USA and seeking
project—might be seen to warrant
to counter secondary sanctions to
similar measures. 50 Indeed, from
addressing the problem of sanction
the Iranian perspective Europe’s
overcompliance. This moderation
assertive response
of goals can be understood in
to the pipeline The prospect of INSTEX being targeted
light of the constraints that a
sanctions contrasts with US sanctions might still push the E3/
dollar-dominated world economy
with its position
imposes on European autonomy,
on Iran-related
EU to take further steps
as well as reluctance to engage in
sanctions,
open confrontation with the USA.
suggesting that Europeans could
However, the prospect of INSTEX
have done more to safeguard the
being targeted with US sanctions
JCPOA. 51
might still push the E3/EU to take
further steps. Arms control as part of regional
Based on previous proposals, one security arrangements
such step could be a coordinated
approach to enforcing the Blocking The transatlantic approach to the
Regulation through a new European Iran nuclear issue has relied heavily
enforcement authority.46 Instead on sanctions, and survival of the
of penalizing companies for non- JCPOA depends on the lifting of
compliance with EU law, such an sanctions. Yet, it can hardly be
authority could provide them with concluded that sanctions are an
advice on due diligence and on effective non-proliferation tool.
seeking reparation from damage Academic literature suggests that
caused by secondary sanctions.47 sanctions rarely work, and the
The E3/EU could also establish Iranian case is not necessarily an
a fund to compensate for such exception. 52 As noted above the
damage.48 JCPOA involved a major concession
45 German–Iranian Chamber of Industry 49 Geranmayeh and Lafont Rapnouil
and Commerce, ‘Ich appelliere an alle Seiten, (note 46).
Vertrauen in uns zu setzen’, Interview with 50 RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty,
Michael Bock, 6 Feb. 2020. ‘Germany says further US sanctions over Nord
46 Geranmayeh, E. and Lafont Rapnouil, M., Stream 2 would interfere with EU energy
‘Meeting the challenge of secondary sanctions’, security’, 14 June 2020.
European Council on Foreign Relations Policy 51 Online interview with Bijan Khajehpour,
Brief, 25 June 2019. 5 June 2020.
47 Batmanghelidh and Hellman (note 12). 52 Morgan, T. C. and Schwebach, V. L.,
48 Online interview with Jonathan ‘Economic sanctions as an instrument of
Hackenbroich, 25 June 2020. foreign policy: The role of domestic politics’,SIPRI is an independent on uranium enrichment also on the arrangements, possibly including
international institute US side, which, if tried earlier, might arms control. 53
dedicated to research into have allowed a diplomatic solution
conflict, armaments, arms even without sanctions. From this CONCLUDING REMARKS
control and disarmament.
perspective, the maximum pressure
Established in 1966, SIPRI The current US strategy has
policy can be seen as reflecting
provides data, analysis and undermined the perceived utility of
the unlearned lessons about the
recommendations, based on non-proliferation sanctions, making
open sources, to policymakers, importance of mutual compromise
them appear as a pitfall, rather than
researchers, media and the for the JCPOA. At the same time,
a tool, of non-proliferation in Iran.
interested public. the policy has undermined the
Reflective of this view, INSTEX
credibility of promises of sanction
seeks to alleviate the negative
GOVERNING BOARD lifting in future diplomatic
effects of secondary sanctions.
negotiations.
Ambassador Jan Eliasson, While its impact on European–
Chair (Sweden)
The E3/EU would therefore do
Iranian trade remains minimal,
Dr Vladimir Baranovsky well to explore non-proliferation
INSTEX demonstrates European
(Russia) approaches that are less reliant on
solidarity on the JCPOA, and can
Espen Barth Eide (Norway) sanctions. One alternative could
help maintain the agreement until
Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France) be a regional arms control strategy
diplomatic solutions are found.
Dr Radha Kumar (India) in the Middle East, as the need for
INSTEX can also be seen as a
Ambassador Ramtane nuclear confidence building also
Lamamra (Algeria) test case of a more independent
applies to Iran’s neighbours. Europe
Dr Patricia Lewis (Ireland/ European foreign policy, which is
could promote regional dialogue
United Kingdom) needed to develop sustainable non-
as part of this effort. In addition to
Dr Jessica Tuchman Mathews proliferation approaches and reduce
helping to remove political obstacles
(United States) the humanitarian harm caused by
to Iranian–US diplomacy, improved
sanctions.
DIRECTOR
relations among Middle Eastern
states could, in the long term, pave
Dan Smith (United Kingdom) the way for cooperative security 53 Erästö, T., ‘The arms control–regional
security nexus in the Middle East’, EU Non-
International Interactions, vol. 21, no. 3 (1995), proliferation and Disarmament Papers No. 68,
pp. 247–63. Apr. 2020.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Dr Tytti Erästö (Finland) is a Senior Researcher in the SIPRI Nuclear Disarmament,
Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme. Her research focuses on nuclear arms
control treaties and agreements. Previously, she has worked at the Ploughshares Fund,
Washington, DC, the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, and
Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
Signalistgatan 9
SE-169 72 Solna, Sweden
Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00
Email: sipri@sipri.org
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