FRAGILE STATES STRATEGY - January 2005 PD-ACA-999
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
FRAGILE STATES STRATEGY January 2005 PD-ACA-999
Cover photo: Gjakova, Kosovo, 2000. The community celebrates in a ceremony to kick off the rebuilding of the historic old town, which burned down during the war. USAID, Office of Transition Initiatives.
FRAGILE STATES STRATEGY U.S. Agency for International Development
Contents
Foreword. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
A New Vision for Strengthening Fragile States . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A Strategic Approach to Fragile States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Analyzing and Monitoring Fragile States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Strategic Priorities in Fragile States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Strategic Programming in Fragile States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
A Fragile States Business Model: From Vision to Action . . . . . . 9
Integrate and Sharpen USAID Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Exercise Leadership and Advance Partnerships in the
U.S. Government and Donor Community . . . . . . . . . . 10
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Annex 1. USAID Experience in Fragile States . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Annex 2. Lessons and Current Gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
FRAGILE STATES STRATEGY iiiForeword
E
vents of the last few years have gage in a coordinated and strategic man-
tragically brought home the ner to address the core issues of poverty
reality that situations unfolding and underdevelopment.
on the other side of the world—gov-
The United States has a long history of
ernments collapsing, criminal and
providing assistance to other nations
terrorist networks, humanitarian crises,
and advancing development. Fragile
and grinding poverty—can have global
states, however, pose a particularly
ramifications. Weak states tend to be
thorny development challenge due to
the vector for these destabilizing forces,
their overall weaknesses, particularly of
manifesting the dark side of globaliza-
their governance institutions. For devel-
tion, and pose a very difficult kind of
opment to succeed—in almost any con-
national security challenge.
text—we know we need to take the long
view and stay engaged for the long haul.
“When development and governance fail in a country, There are no quick fixes to strengthen
the consequences engulf entire regions and leap around governance or build a country’s ability
to improve the lives of its citizens.
the world.”
While USAID has had a long and suc-
USAID, Foreign Aid in the National Interest, 2002 cessful record of responding to humani-
tarian crises, postconflict situations, and
The phenomenon of weak or fragile advancing long-term development, we
states is not new, but the need to ad- can and must do better. This strategy
dress their weakness is more critical than outlines our vision of how the Agency
can more effectively respond to the
ever. The President’s 2002 National Se-
far-reaching challenges posed by fragile
curity Strategy made that clear when he
states in the 21st century. It is guided by
elevated development to be the “third
the overarching principle that we need
pillar” of our foreign policy—on a par
to engage carefully and selectively. It
with defense and diplomacy. The strat-
recognizes that there are countries where
egy recognizes that a root of the national
our assistance may not be able to make
security threat to the United States and
a difference, and it directs us to focus
the broader international community
our efforts on those countries where will
is the lack of development, which can’t
be able to have the greatest impact.
be addressed by military or diplomatic
means alone. In countries that lack the The strategy also clearly recognizes that
ability, or will, to provide basic services we are only part of the U.S. Govern-
or protection, we can no longer choose ment and that effective response will
to look the other way. We need to en- require close coordination between
FRAGILE STATES STRATEGY va broad range of agencies and actors. are not revolutionary ideas, but taken
The recent creation of the Office of the together they have the potential to revo-
Coordinator for Reconstruction and lutionize USAID’s work on the ground.
Stabilization at the State Department,
Much has been learned over the past
and its mandate to improve and coor-
50 years of foreign assistance, but we
dinate the civilian response, is a strong
need to adapt and tailor those lessons to
step in the right direction.
today’s challenges. Fortunately, there is
USAID’s strategy outlines four major great momentum now focused on the
elements to meet the unique demands challenges of fragile states, both within
of fragile states: better monitoring and the United States and internationally.
analysis, priorities responding to the re- I hope that USAID’s strategy contrib-
alities on the ground, programs focused utes to the critical debate as we move to
on the sources of fragility, and stream- making development—including the
lined operational procedures to support stabilization and development of fragile
rapid and effective response. Achieving states—a central component of our
success in fragile states requires a clear national security strategy.
understanding of the problems which,
in turn, points to priorities—such as
stability, security, reform, and institu-
tional capacity—and programs more Andrew Natsios
closely targeted on the causes of the fra- USAID Administrator
gility rather than the symptoms. These December 2004
vi FRAGILE STATES STRATEGYA New Vision for Strengthening
Fragile States
F
ragile states have posed a grow- and humanitarian challenge. As a
ing problem since the end of result, the overall level of assistance to
the Cold War, but they are now fragile states has increased since the
recognized as a source of our nation’s end of the Cold War so that in 2003,
most pressing security threats. There is excluding Iraq, almost one-fifth of
perhaps no more urgent matter facing USAID’s overall resources were spent
USAID than fragile states, yet no set of in such settings.
problems is more difficult and intrac-
Driven by several key factors, the imper-
table. Twenty-first century realities
ative to improve our response in fragile
demonstrate that ignoring these states
states has taken on a new urgency:
can pose great risks and increase the
likelihood of terrorism taking root. At • First, the events of September 11,
least a third of the world’s population 2001, profoundly demonstrated
now lives in areas that are unstable or the global reach of state failure and
fragile. This poses not only a national focused attention on their drivers and
security challenge but a development products—weak governance, poverty,
and violent conflict. USAID’s Foreign
Aid in the National Interest summa-
Definitions
rized this dynamic: “When develop-
• USAID uses the term fragile states to refer generally to a broad range of
ment and governance fail in a coun-
failing, failed, and recovering states. However, the distinction among them is try, the consequences engulf entire
not always clear in practice, as fragile states rarely travel a predictable path of regions and leap around the world.”
failure and recovery, and the labels may mask substate and regional conditions The September 11 events prompted
(insurgencies, factions, etc.) that may be important factors in conflict and a reassessment of the role of develop-
fragility. It is more important to understand how far and quickly a country is ment which, along with diplomacy
moving from or toward stability than it is to categorize a state as failed or not.
Therefore, the strategy distinguishes between fragile states that are vulnerable
and defense, is now recognized as a
from those that are already in crisis. core U.S. national security objective.1
• USAID is using vulnerable to refer to those states unable or unwilling to • Second, the United States has an
adequately assure the provision of security and basic services to significant interest in reducing poverty and
portions of their populations and where the legitimacy of the government is in advancing development. Fragile states
question. This includes states that are failing or recovering from crisis. pose a special challenge because they
• USAID is using crisis to refer to those states where the central government are frequently unable to achieve any
does not exert effective control over its own territory or is unable or unwilling forward development momentum
to assure the provision of vital services to significant parts of its territory, and can generate enormous human
where legitimacy of the government is weak or nonexistent, and where violent
conflict is a reality or a great risk.
1 The National Security Strategy of the United States
of America (The White House: Washington, D.C.,
2002).
FRAGILE STATES STRATEGY 1suffering. The most significant short-
falls in meeting the widely supported The strategy’s overall goal is to guide USAID’s efforts
Development Goals of the Millen-
in reversing decline in fragile states and advancing their
nium Declaration will likely be in
fragile states. recovery to a stage where transformational development
progress is possible.
• Third, there is a clear recognition
that foreign assistance in the twenty-
first century needs to be more effec- policies to address conflict and in- support the new office with staff and
tively tailored to the context in which ternally displaced persons (IDPs). technical expertise; the Agency is likely
it is being used, and that maximizing Although conflict is not limited to to serve as a principal operational arm
effectiveness of assistance in fragile fragile states, the propensity for a fragile for the office and is also providing input
states is an urgent challenge.2 state to experience violent conflict is to its monitoring efforts. However,
This strategy lays out a vision for how high. For that reason, the new conflict USAID will continue to focus on a
USAID can most effectively respond to policy, and its accompanying tools, much broader spectrum of fragile states.
fragile states. The strategy’s overall goal is will be a critical part of this effort.
In addition to stronger U.S. Govern-
to guide USAID’s efforts in reversing de- ment coordination, close partnerships
Effectively addressing the complex
cline in fragile states and advancing their and coordination with other donors and
challenges of fragile states clearly goes
recovery to a stage where transformational international organizations are essential
far beyond USAID. It will require a co-
development progress is possible. for successfully responding to fragile
ordinated U.S. Government approach,
The strategy identifies the ways that particularly in conflict situations, to states. The United Nations and its spe-
fragile states differ from those that are ensure that diplomatic, security, and cialized agencies, the World Bank, other
stable and able to pursue long-term military efforts are mutually reinforcing international organizations, and donors
development. It also identifies strategic and that USAID’s assets are integrated all bring critical resources and perspec-
priorities for fragile states and initial with those of the departments of State, tives to bear on the challenges facing
directions for USAID programming. Defense, Treasury, Justice, and others. fragile states. When paired with the
Finally, the strategy focuses on man- The recent creation of the Office of the commitment of local actors to address
agement and administrative changes Coordinator for Reconstruction and the sources of fragility, this coordinated
needed and outlines a new business Stabilization (S/CRS) at the Depart- approach stands the greatest chance of
model for USAID’s operations in ment of State is a strong indicator of the moving states forward and improving
fragile states. increased understanding of the need for prospects for long-term development.
a more coordinated U.S. Government
Due to the increasing importance of
response to postconflict and stabiliza-
improving our approach to fragile
tion efforts.
states, USAID is issuing two related
S/CRS was established to coordinate
the U.S. civilian response to countries
2 See USAID’s White Paper: U.S. Foreign Aid:
Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century in conflict or civil strife. The office will
(Washington, D.C., 2004). PD-ABZ-322. This focus on improving civilian response
paper identifies five core operational goals for
foreign aid: promote transformational develop- capability and leading interagency teams
ment, strengthen fragile states, provide humani- to initiate planning and response efforts
tarian relief, support strategic states, and address
global and transnational issues and other special, in a limited number of crisis and post-
self-standing concerns. It calls for resources, conflict countries of national strategic
results, and measures of aid effectiveness to be
differentiated for each of these goals. interest. USAID is working closely to
2 FRAGILE STATES STRATEGYA Strategic Approach to Fragile States
T
o guide USAID in its efforts design programs for optimal impact in
to move fragile states to a stage both vulnerable and crisis situations.
where transformational de-
Research indicates that the instability
velopment is possible, the Agency can
associated with fragile states is the product
turn to its extensive experience—and
of ineffective and illegitimate governance.3
that of other donors—in crisis, con- Effectiveness refers to the capability of
flict-ridden and postconflict situations the government to work with society
(see Annexes 1 and 2). Analysis of that to assure the provision of order and
experience and identification of gaps public goods and services. Legitimacy
in current responses to the large and refers to the perception by important
complex challenges posed by fragile segments of society that the government
states make clear that a different and is exercising state power in ways that
more strategic approach is needed and are reasonably fair and in the interests
will require of the nation as a whole.4 Where both
effectiveness and legitimacy are weak,
• analysis and monitoring of the inter-
conflict or state failure is likely to result.
nal dynamics of fragile states
Legitimacy and effectiveness are most
• priorities reflecting the realities of affected by perceptions of governance
fragile states in the security, political, economic, and
• programs focused on those priorities social domains. The criteria of effective-
and the sources of fragility ness and legitimacy and their relation-
• an Agency business model that al- 3 USAID’s research experts include Jack Gold-
lows for timely, rapid, and effective stone, George Mason University; Robert Bates,
Harvard University; Jonathan Haughton, Suffolk
response University; and Karol Sultan, Clifford Zinnes,
and Dennis Woods, University of Maryland.
The work was conducted with the support of
USAID/PPC under the University of Maryland’s
Analyzing and Monitoring IDEAS contract and was summarized in A Strategy
Framework for the Assessment and Treatment of
Fragile States Fragile States.
Timely, strategic, and integrated analy- 4 The use of the term legitimacy in this document
sis is vital in responding to fragile states. is in no way intended to imply any conclusions
with regard to the question of whether the
It enables an informed assessment of United States recognizes a particular govern-
ment as the legitimate government of a country.
risk, strategic priority-setting among That conclusion is made by the Department of
and within countries, and targeting as- State, as warranted by facts and circumstances
in a particular country, and the president offers
sistance on the sources of fragility. Such diplomatic recognition of and to a government
analysis also improves USAID’s ability according to certain well-developed criteria of
public international law that are not addressed in
to respond early to vulnerability and this document.
FRAGILE STATES STRATEGY 3Table 1. Analyzing Governance in Fragile States: The Fragility Framework
Effectiveness Legitimacy
Security Military and police services that secure borders and Military and police services that are provided reason-
limit crime ably, equitably, and without major violation of human
rights
Political Political institutions and processes that adequately Political processes, norms, and leaders that are ac-
ensure response to citizen needs ceptable to the citizenry
Economic Economic and financial institutions and infrastructure Economic institutions, financial services, and income-
that support economic growth (including jobs), adapt generating opportunities that are widely accessible
to economic change, and manage natural resources and reasonably transparent, particularly related to
access to and governance of natural resources
Social Provision of basic services that generally meet Tolerance of diverse customs, cultures, and beliefs
demand, including that of vulnerable and minority
groups, is assured
Note. The illustrations of effectiveness and legitimacy are indicative and will be refined based on pilot testing in the field.
ship to these four areas are presented in education. Domestic triggering events • democratic collapse (e.g., Nigeria
a “Fragility Framework” (table 1). include succession crises and contested in 1983)
elections. Externally generated shocks,
In addition, a number of other im- • succession or reform crisis in authori-
such as a sudden fall in primary com- tarian states (e.g., Soviet Union in
portant factors need to be monitored.
Of particular concern is anticipating modity prices or a natural disaster, can 1991)
and ameliorating economic instability, be equally culpable in undermining
stability. Ironically, the sudden inflow • high levels of state-sponsored corrup-
food insecurity, and violent conflict, all
of external revenues that distorts market tion (e.g., Philippines in 1996)
of which are usually symptoms of the
failure of governance in fragile states. signals can be just as unsettling, unless • regional or guerilla rebellion (e.g.,
Likewise, differentiating the impact of actions are taken to manage and invest Colombia in 2000)
fragility on women and men is central these windfalls wisely.
• violent ethnic conflict or genocide
to our understanding, as data show a
When deterioration in effectiveness (e.g., Rwanda in 1994)
strong correlation between state fragility
and legitimacy combine with violent
and inequitable treatment of women. • economic collapse (e.g., Zaire in the
conflict, protracted state failure is
early 1990s) or hyperinflation (e.g.,
Other areas to examine include the highly likely. Avoiding this scenario is a Argentina in the early 1980s)
degree of trust and social capital in high priority because these states often
society, demographics (such as the become trapped in a deadly cycle of USAID will continue to refine its un-
size of the youth population), regional repeated failure and recovery. derstanding of fragile states through im-
and substate conflict, polarization and proved analytical frameworks that pro-
splintering of societies, environmental While in many fragile states more than vide integrated analysis across sectors,
degradation, limited or exclusive access one pathway of failure is evident, com- including further development of the
to natural resources, and extremist mon pathways include Fragility Framework. Relevant elements
4 FRAGILE STATES STRATEGYfrom other assessment frameworks— the political, economic, and social of the specific situation to determine the
e.g., those for conflict and democracy spheres. In some cases, lack of politi- most appropriate combination of strate-
and governance—will be integrated cal will to foster greater effectiveness gies for averting crisis and mitigating the
in this process. The analysis will aid and legitimacy of government institu- impact of conflict and crisis.
in identifying fragile states, sources of tions may be driving fragility. Sup-
fragility and recovery, and strategic porting reformers outside the gov-
and program priorities. It will also ernment may contribute to political Strategic Programming in
assist in evaluating the effectiveness of instability in the short term, but may, Fragile States
in the medium to long term, avoid Programming in fragile states will
response. USAID’s Conflict Mitiga-
tion and Management Office (CMM)5 violent conflict and state failure. be governed by the following four
will be integral to this initiative. In Support for economic activities that principles:
each instance, external sources of lead to job creation, improved fam- • Engage strategically. Not all fragile
information will guide this analysis. ily incomes, and better functioning states provide opportunities for con-
markets can, in most cases, contribute structive USAID engagement. This
To improve monitoring, USAID/CMM to greater economic stability.
is also developing a strategic tracking is particularly true of those regimes
system for fragile states that will provide • Improve security, providing an en- that lack international legitimacy.
for the timely identification of states: 1) vironment that enhances personal Outsiders are far better equipped to
showing initial signs of vulnerability to safety, but also establishes the condi- address effectiveness deficits than to
failure; 2) transitioning between vulner- tions under which serious outbreaks promote legitimacy. The decision to
able and crisis stages; and 3) exhibiting of generalized violence are averted. engage will be based upon a country’s
susceptibility to violent conflict, food importance to U.S. foreign policy,
• Encourage reform related to the condi- as well as the ability of assistance to
insecurity, and other particularly perni-
tions that are driving fragility and affect constructive change. Strong
cious symptoms of fragility. While the
that will increase the likelihood of donor coordination is particularly
system will be grounded in the Fragil-
long-term stability. While governance critical in these situations. Multilat-
ity Framework, it will rely on multiple
is clearly a linchpin to recovery, eral or other bilateral agencies may be
sources. USAID’s strategic tracking
reforms may well be required early on better positioned to advance stabili-
system will also provide results that can
in multiple sectors, such as the critical zation or governance reforms in the
be shared with other agencies within
social and economic areas. early stages. Once USAID is engaged
the U.S. Government and the broader
NGO and donor community. As such, • Develop the capacity of institutions that in a fragile state, assistance must be
it can serve as the foundation for more are fundamental to lasting recovery strategic in terms of sequencing and
effective coordination of activities in and transformational development. programmatic mix.
fragile states. Building the capacity of institutions
• Focus on sources of fragility. To the
that serve key social and economic
extent possible, programming in
sectors—such as those providing
Strategic Priorities in fragile states should focus on the
healthcare, education, and finan-
Fragile States cial services—will reduce stress and
underlying sources of fragility—the
USAID will pursue four interrelated governing arrangements that lack
vulnerability, especially among poorer
priorities to strengthen fragile states: effectiveness and legitimacy—rather
populations. Viable institutions will
than the symptoms. It is important
• Enhance stability, addressing the also speed recovery from conflict.
to take into account issues such as
sources of stress and conflict in Given the uniqueness and inherent ethnic and religious tensions that
5 See . fragile state will require careful analysis only by addressing these dysfunc-
FRAGILE STATES STRATEGY 5tional arrangements that conditions with related U.S. Government policy effective diplomatic initiatives and
will be established for stable, long- and program initiatives. donor coordination will be essential
term growth. The different impact to send unified messages and coor-
• Opportunities will likely be great-
of fragility on women and men dinate approaches.
est where effectiveness deficits are
should also be taken into account.
paramount. In many cases, USAID Table 2 presents illustrative pro-
• Seek short-term impact linked to may want to focus on bolstering grammatic options for responding
longer-term structural reform. Expe- institutions, providing essential to effectiveness and legitimacy is-
rience demonstrates that without social services, security,6 and the sues in states that are vulnerable and
short-term, visible impact, a fragile rule of law. Strengthening health highlights political, economic, social,
situation is likely to continue to and education systems, expanding and security priorities. Because these
deteriorate. Because those living in markets and economic opportuni- states are not yet in crisis, the range
fragile states cope with instability and ties, and improving legal systems of program options may look similar
uncertainty by focusing on the near are examples of areas where USAID to those applied in transformational
term, short-term measures are critical has significant experience. Security development situations. However,
to meeting their immediate needs deficits require engaging a broad these programs are clearly directed to
and promoting an environment of range of host-country government the sources of fragility and preventing
security. At the same time, the urgent institutions—including the executive, a slide into crisis.
need for short-term measures should legislative, and judicial branches—as
also be considered in the context well as civil society actors and, in When a state is in crisis, if USAID de-
of longer-term efforts required to some cases, the security forces. cides to engage, the strategic focus will
advance stability, reform, and institu- be on stabilizing the situation, miti-
• Where legitimacy is an issue, options gating the impact of conflict where it
tional capacity.
generally narrow, and programs often exists, and targeting key local actors
• Establish appropriate measurement shift to nongovernmental and private to support reforms oriented to what
systems. Expectations are often set sector actors. Indeed, efforts at boost-
is driving the crisis. Many postconflict
too high for what can be accom- ing effectiveness are unlikely to suc-
countries are within the crisis range, due
plished in fragile states, and are ceed without legitimacy. Where local
to their likelihood for returning to con-
geared more toward traditional political will to address legitimacy
flict. When appropriate, USAID will
development situations. Accurate problems is lacking, assertive and
coordinate closely with S/CRS in these
assessment of progress and effective- settings. If U.S. military forces are
ness in fragile states must be based
engaged, close coordination between
on appropriate goals and targets, 6 The security sector includes the armed forces,
the police, judicial and penal institutions, civil ser- civilian and military actors is essential.
reflecting realities on the ground. vants, and elected and appointed civil authorities
with responsibility for control and oversight (e.g., Lack of security plays a particularly
These principles will take different legislative bodies, the executive branch, and civil
servants). The sector also includes civil society critical role in crisis and postconflict
shapes, depending on whether a state is actors engaged in security issues—such as the settings. Achieving some basic level
vulnerable or in crisis. media, watchdog groups, academia, special com-
missions, community policing, and human rights of stability is often a prerequisite to
groups and research institutes. Security sector
When a state is vulnerable, the strategic reform describes the transformation of the
further stabilization and reconstruc-
focus will be to prevent crisis and ad- security sector to include all these actors work- tion efforts and requires coordina-
ing together to manage and operate the sector
vance recovery to a stage where trans- in a manner more consistent with democratic tion among all relevant parts of the
formational development is possible. norms and sound principles of good governance. U.S. Government. USAID will work
This contributes to a well-functioning security
Addressing effectiveness and legitimacy framework. The definition is taken primarily from within the broader U.S. Govern-
issues will be a priority. These ap- the OECD/DAC’s Security System Reform and ment effort, focusing particularly
Governance: Policy and Good Practice . on supporting community policing
6 FRAGILE STATES STRATEGYTable 2. Illustrative Programmatic Options for Vulnerable States
Political • Where possible, support reforms within government institutions, particularly those responsible for the
rule of law, core social services, and food security.
• Support reformers outside government, particularly those advocating improvements in security,
human rights, core services, food security, natural resource management, and anticorruption.
• Strengthen oversight institutions, such as legislative and parliamentary committees.
• Encourage formal means of political competition, for example, by supporting free and fair elections
and other political processes.
• Encourage private sector/NGO/political party reform alliances that include the perspectives of tradi-
tional identity groups.
• Develop the professionalism of the media, particularly in investigative journalism, and expand access to
information.
Economic • Foster institutional and policy development that promotes economic growth and effective manage-
ment of natural resources.
• Improve revenue generation/tax systems and expenditure.
Social • Reform and build the technical and administrative capacity of those parts of the civil service respon-
sible for economic management, core services, and food security.
• Assist the government to ensure the provision of public health and basic education.
Security • Develop and strengthen civilian control of the military.
• Establish a capable police force, particularly at the community level.*
• Strengthen courts and other forums for resolving disputes.
* According to FAA Sec. 660 (b) (6), USAID may only do this type of work in a postconflict environment for the restoration of host-nation
infrastructure. Other exceptions to 660 are fairly limited.
and building local institutions with • In postconflict settings, USAID may Key elements affecting successful state
a role in promoting security, such as implement concurrently a broad recovery from crisis, particularly due
strengthening civilian oversight of the range of humanitarian, transition, to armed conflict either before or after
military and working with legislative and development interventions. Spe- complete failure, include the following:
and executive branches, media out- cific program choices will be made
• The nature and length of the fail-
lets, and civil society organizations. based on what is driving fragility
ure and the degree of physical and
and conflict. As in vulnerable states,
• In crisis and conflict cases, programs institutional damage, for example, the
rapid response and short-term, visible
will focus on providing basic humani- extent of ethnoreligious partitioning
impacts will be central.
tarian assistance, establishing security, or cleansing, exodus of the educated
supporting rapid job creation and Table 3 presents illustrative program- citizenry and middle class, and exist-
income generation, and returning matic options for states in crisis and in ing resources from which local actors
children to school. postconflict situations. can currently draw. Perceptions of
FRAGILE STATES STRATEGY 7Table 3. Illustrative Programmatic Options for States in Crisis
In crisis and • Deliver humanitarian assistance that responds to basic needs, focuses aid on victims, and does not
conflict undercut local capacity or distort the local economy.
• Establish basic security and protect human rights.
• Support job creation, income generation, and school enrollment where possible, but with a special
focus on underserved populations and IDPs.
• Increase governance and peacemaking capacity within key groups to strengthen the likelihood of a
shorter, more lasting recovery period.
In early recovery Political
and postconflict* • Support transitional justice and transitional governance arrangements at all levels, as well as transi-
tional elections and political processes.
• Advance a national dialogue and tangible progress toward the country’s future, the reconstitution
of society, and implications for the future (new constitutions, legal reform, structure of government,
symbols of national unity).
• Support the establishment of a functional national government, as well as subnational and local-level
governance entities.
• Assist independent indigenous media outlets to provide unbiased reporting, expand access to infor-
mation, and reinforce messages of peace and reconciliation.
Economic
• Focus on reviving the economy, with particular attention to basic infrastructure, job creation, income
generation, early market reform, natural resource management, independent central banks, and tax
codes.
• Distribute seeds, fertilizers, and tools, provide related training, and rehabilitate farm-to-market roads.
• Advance transparency of resources, particularly in countries rich in natural resources and where prof-
its from these resources are used to fuel conflict.
Social
• Reintegrate or resettle IDPs into viable communities, provide protection and care for children sepa-
rated from their families, and reunite such families.
• Establish basic health and education services, with particular attention to previously underserved
populations.
Security
• Focus on the establishment of public security and security sector reform, including demobilizing and
reintegrating ex-combatants and establishing civilian oversight and community-level policing.
• Monitor respect for human rights and support abuse-prevention initiatives.
* The Center for Strategic International Studies’ publication Winning the Peace provides a comprehensive framework of programmatic priorities
and options for postconflict reconstruction. Robert C. Orr, ed., Winning the Peace : An American Strategy for Post-conflict Reconstruction (Washing-
ton, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2004).
8 FRAGILE STATES STRATEGYIntegrate and Sharpen USAID
Responses
For lasting recovery to take hold, a number of key
Responding effectively to fragile states
factors must be in place, which, in turn, have important will require concerted, coordinated,
implications for how to sequence assistance. and sustained efforts by all parts of
the Agency. This will necessitate inte-
grating analysis, strategy development,
unfair control of natural resources are natural resources, are integral to eco- and implementation perspectives; and
often an exacerbating factor. ensuring that the broadest range of
nomic recovery.
flexible instruments is made available
• In postconflict situations, the na- to USAID staff implementing programs
ture of the settlement is pivotal, for A Fragile States Business in fragile states.
example, whether there is a victor, Model: From Vision to As an important first step, the Agency
stalemate, or formal peace accord. Action has created a Fragile States Council,
• The influence of neighboring coun- To bring this vision to reality and chaired by the Agency counselor and
tries and other international actors achieve greater strategic coherence and composed of senior managers from all
(e.g., the level of international com- precision in USAID’s response will bureaus. The council will play a facili-
mitment to speed recovery). require important operational changes. tative role, reviewing and monitoring
While USAID has substantial experi- the strategic tracking system, provid-
• Potentially volatile recovery issues ing recommendations on the Agency’s
ence in complex emergencies and post-
(e.g., treatment of past crimes and response in fragile states, identifying
abuses and access to natural resource conflict response that will inform these
resources, and ensuring that implemen-
wealth and commodities). changes, the Agency will need to expand
tation is timely and well coordinated.
its capabilities to engage with fragile
For lasting recovery to take hold, a The council will also provide a critical
states and with other U.S. Government coordination link to broader interagency
number of key factors must be in place, agencies and the donor community. efforts on fragile states.
which, in turn, have important implica-
tions for how to sequence assistance. At the core of this strategy is a new For strategic planning, reporting, and
The central factor is physical security Agency business model for fragile budgeting, some of the key steps re-
that allows for movement of people and states response, which will be further quired to increase flexibility include the
commerce. A sufficiently acceptable elaborated in subsequent guidance. Its following:
form of national government must also main features include better integrating • Adopting strategic priorities con-
be in place, one that includes a work- and sharpening USAID’s response in sistent with the situation in crisis
ing relationship between civilian and strategic planning, reporting, budgeting, countries.
military leadership. There must also be
operational response, and administrative
agreement on a process that will result • Encouraging shorter planning
procedures; as well as exercising greater
in the formulation and ratification of horizons and adapting programs to
leadership within the U.S. Government
a basic law or constitution. A certain changing environments and targets of
level of economic predictability is also and broader donor community. A few opportunity.7
important, including a central banking elements of the strategy are already un-
authority, government agencies able derway. Ultimately, the business model
to collect and distribute revenue, and will ensure that all Agency functions are 7 While current USAID interim strategic guidance
macroeconomic stability. Clear rights appropriate to the realities and chal- does not require specific planning timeframes,
there remains a tendency to adopt longer-term
to property, including land and other lenges of operating in fragile states. traditional development planning horizons.
FRAGILE STATES STRATEGY 9• Modifying reporting requirements so lish an immediate and robust field Exercise Leadership and
they are appropriate for conditions in presence in response to a major crisis, Advance Partnerships in the
crisis countries. and 2) missions require additional U.S. Government and Donor
support to respond to fragility. These Community
• Increasing flexibility within the
teams would ensure that situations Within the U.S. Government, a system-
overall budget to move funds to
are analyzed and strategies developed atic plan and processes for monitor-
respond to changing priorities within
to address the political, security, ing fragility and developing effective
and across countries. Consistent with
economic, and social deficiencies that strategies are currently being developed
the goal of aligning funding sources
contribute to a state’s fragility. by S/CRS. USAID is a key participant
with foreign assistance goals as a
in these interagency efforts focused on
country shifts from being a trans- Critical reforms are also needed in the
monitoring and contingency planning.
formational development country Agency’s management and administrative
In addition, USAID will also likely
to a more fragile status, the Agency functions, especially procurement and
play a major operational role for S/CRS
could shift to funds designated human resources. Options include
once it actively engages in coordinat-
for fragile states. USAID will seek
• tailoring procurement systems such ing postconflict response in a limited
both to improve the use of exist-
as contracting mechanisms to the number of high-priority countries.
ing resources in fragile states and
demands of fragile state environments USAID is also exploring the use of the
greater flexibility for those funds,
and enhancing the flexibility to con- Joint State-USAID Policy Council as a
for example, removing restrictions
tract regionally and locally forum for coordinating assistance in the
such as earmarks and expanding the
broader range of countries where S/CRS
timeframe available to obligate funds. • seeking “notwithstanding” authority
is not engaged. More broadly, USAID
in specific, limited cases to expedite
To improve the implementation of is working closely with the Department
implementation
programs overseas, actions include the of State on the reform agenda for fragile
following: Within the personnel system, a number states, and with both the departments
of initiatives are currently underway: of State and Defense on security sector
• Increasing the capacity of regional
matters. USAID will also consult more
missions to service nearby fragile • USAID has just established a new
closely with the Department of Trea-
states, especially those with diffi- foreign service backstop for work
sury on fragile states concerns related
cult environments. These regional in conflict situations, and will need
to trade, debt relief, and international
platforms would allow staff to get to aggressively expand its efforts to
financial institutions.
closer to problem areas without being recruit, assign, and promote officers
subjected to the hardships of living in working in these challenging situa- Within the donor community, a clear
insecure environments fulltime. tions. Providing appropriate training consensus has emerged around the
and incentives for working in fragile necessity to respond more effectively to
• Developing the capacity to deploy
states will be critical to this effort. fragile states. Doing so requires donors
and support Fragile States Quick Re-
sponse Teams8 for those few instances to better understand what is required
• The Agency is expanding its on-call
when 1) USAID will need to estab- to arrest negative trends, the limits of
reserve capacity of experts on con-
absorptive capacity, and the necessity
tract to bring the requisite technical,
of harmonizing policies and sequencing
8 Fragile States Quick Response Teams are not country, and language skills necessary
intended to supplant Disaster Assistance Teams interventions. The Development As-
(DARTs) or other mechanisms designed to
for both rapid and effective response.
sistance Committee of the Organisation
respond to humanitarian crises. Of course, there
may be occasions when a fragile state is also • USAID is examining means for for Economic Co-operation and De-
facing a humanitarian crisis. In those instances, it deploying its talented foreign service velopment (OECD/DAC) has played a
is expected that these teams will work together
closely, if not merge. national staff to fragile states. lead role in bringing together interested
10 FRAGILE STATES STRATEGYbilateral and multilateral donors, includ-
ing the United Nations and World This new strategy responds to the challenge posed to U.S.
Bank, to develop better policies and
responses to fragile states. The DAC national security by acknowledging the importance and
has also been leading an effort to forge difficulties of addressing the problems posed by fragile
international consensus on an approach states and offering a vision for meeting those challenges.
to security sector reform. USAID has
been closely involved in these efforts,
and will continue to seek partnerships sources of fragility and for setting pri-
and position itself to provide leadership orities—stability, security reform, and
among donors to accelerate research on capacity— appropriate to the realities
assistance strategies to advance lasting of fragile states. It calls for early action
recovery in fragile states. when fragile states show vulnerabil-
ity. It also calls for a focused response
with programs strategically oriented to
Conclusion the sources and symptoms of fragility.
Fragile states have long posed a prob- Finally, the strategy offers an opera-
lem for the United States and are now tional approach—a fragile states busi-
recognized as a source of our nation’s ness model—that provides for rational
most pressing security threats. Driven strategic planning, budgetary flexibility,
by a dramatically changed landscape, responsive administrative systems, and
responding more effectively to fragile greater staff expertise. Guided by com-
states has moved to the center of the mitted leadership, the strategy provides
foreign aid agenda. a roadmap for USAID, as part of a
USAID has extensive experience in broader U.S. Government effort, to re-
fragile states, but clearly a more strategic spond more effectively to the enormous
approach is necessary. This strategy sets challenges posed by fragile states.
out a vision for USAID’s response to
fragile states, including those in post-
conflict situations where conditions do
not provide sufficient foundation for
long-term development. Given their
clear differences from stable develop-
ing countries, fragile states require new
ways of conceptualizing, delivering, and
evaluating the impact of assistance.
This new strategy responds to the chal-
lenge posed to U.S. national security
by acknowledging the importance and
difficulty of addressing the problems
posed by fragile states and offering a
vision for meeting those challenges. It
calls for a better understanding of the
FRAGILE STATES STRATEGY 1112 FRAGILE STATES STRATEGY
Annex 1. USAID Experience
in Fragile States
S
ince its inception, USAID has running civil war has been the
worked in fragile states. The north-south divide, but this conflict
Agency has been a leader in hu- has, over time, fueled a series of
manitarian and postconflict response, ethnic and racial conflicts. USAID
and has drawn from the lessons of continues to be at the forefront
this work to innovate programmati- of sustained international engage-
cally and, in particular, fill the breach ment to end Sudan’s long civil
between relief and development. The war. Notably, USAID has worked
overall level of assistance to fragile intensively with the Department of
states has increased since the end of State, other donors, and the United
the Cold War so that in 2003, exclud- Nations to bring an immediate
ing Iraq, almost one-fifth of USAID’s humanitarian ceasefire and politi-
cal solution to the new conflict in
western Sudan. With a north-south
The Agency has been a leader in humanitarian and
peace agreement concluded, USAID
postconflict response, and has drawn from the lessons of and other donors are poised to help
this work to innovate programmatically and, in particular, southern Sudan begin the recovery
fill the breach between relief and development. process with programs that build on
many years of USAID humanitar-
ian assistance and capacity building
overall resources were spent in such initiatives in conflict resolution, gov-
settings. Recent examples of USAID ernance, and social service delivery.
programs include support to Indonesia • Afghanistan. Approximately 35 per-
and Peru, as they moved through vul- cent of Afghanistan’s population—
nerable political transitions; to Sudan, much of it agrarian and rural—lives
with ongoing crisis; and to Afghanistan within 50 km of the Kabul to Kanda-
and Iraq, as they embark on highly har highway. USAID’s signal achieve-
fragile recoveries. While these are ment in 2003 was the rebuilding
promising examples, significant chal- of the 389 km road. Plans are now
lenges remain. being implemented to extend the
highway to Herat, where it will then
Illustrative Cases arc back and reconnect with Kabul
in one complete circuit. Restoration
Crisis States of the road has been one of President
• Sudan. Sudan has been torn by Harmid Karzai’s overriding priori-
conflict for all but 10 of its years as an ties. Without it, Afghanistan’s civil
independent nation. The longest- society and economy would remain
FRAGILE STATES STRATEGY 13moribund. The internal development Republic of Congo, and Angola. strikes, the Asia-wide economic crisis,
of the country that the road makes Smuggling these diamonds drains and the highest levels of ethnic and
possible will contribute to unity and a significant revenue stream from religious strife in decades. Against this
security in Afghanistan. governments that could be used to backdrop, the P.L. 480 Title II food
finance development programs. It aid-supported Transitional Authority
• El Salvador. The Government of El
also encourages and feeds widespread Program (TAP) served as an effec-
Salvador and the representatives of
corruption. In 1998, USAID’s Of- tive entry point for promoting peace,
the Farabundo Marti National Lib-
fice of Transition Initiatives and the especially among Indonesia’s urban
eration Front signed comprehensive
Department of State developed a poor, who are often recruited by
peace accords in January 1992, end-
strategy for dealing with this scenario extremist groups using cash payments
ing 12 years of civil war that caused
in Sierra Leone. The strategy called to encourage participation in street
enormous loss of life, destroyed a
for USAID to provide technical assis- protests. The TAP undermined ef-
significant portion of the country’s
tance to the government to evaluate forts to recruit for radical purposes by
infrastructure, and halted productive
activity in and substantially depopu- its mineral resources (particularly dia- providing job opportunities for the
lated a major portion of the country’s monds, gold, and rutile) and improve unemployed through food-for-work
land area. USAID helped sow the systems for gaining maximum fiscal projects. In Java, in an area prone to
seeds of future growth by reconstruct- benefit for the government from the sectarian conflict, interfaith commit-
ing damaged infrastructure, financing legitimate exploitation of minerals. tees used the project’s resources to
land and titling for ex-combatants In late 1999, USAID began working rehabilitate markets, athletic centers,
and civilian refugees, providing with the Government of Sierra Leone and other community sites.
training and credit, increasing civic to develop new diamond policies and
• Macedonia. Fighting broke out be-
participation in the identification of establish new mining and exporting
tween the Macedonian military and
priority infrastructure needs, broad- operations, with special attention
a newly formed Albanian insurgent
ening the role of NGOs in service paid to the problem of conflict dia-
group in late February 2001. Six
delivery to rural communities, and monds. The two primary objectives
months later, an estimated 30,000
attending to the special medical of USAID diamond-related activities
civilians were displaced, a once ex-
needs of the war disabled. In addi- in Sierra Leone have remained fairly
panding economy was in decline, and
tion, USAID was engaged in a wide constant over the years: 1) bring
ethnic tensions remained high. In
range of other programs—promoting diamonds (and other valuable min-
August 2001, parties signed a peace
macroeconomic reforms; strengthen- eral resources) under Government
agreement, ending hostilities and
ing municipal governments; reform- of Sierra Leone control so that the
promising political reform. However,
ing the judicial system, electoral government and people could benefit
socioeconomic pressures for violence
processes, and institutions—that from the revenues that a greater legal
persisted, with unemployed youth
played an important and comple- trade would generate, and 2) cut the
part of the problem. USAID created
mentary role in supporting the trade in conflict diamonds to dimin-
short-term employment opportuni-
reconstruction process. This support ish the financing of warfare.
ties for 2,000 of Macedonia’s youth
is broadly credited with playing a
that focused on repairing public
critical role in assisting the success-
Vulnerable States works in all 124 municipalities. The
ful transition from war to peace.
• Indonesia. In May 1998, Indonesia’s program increased economic security
• Sierra Leone. It has been well docu- prospects for a peaceful transition for returnees, the internally displaced,
mented that illegal diamonds have to democratic rule appeared tenu- and others affected by conflict. Eth-
helped finance warfare in Sierra ous in the face of widespread rioting, nic tensions were reduced, and confi-
Leone, Liberia, the Democratic divisions among opposition groups, dence in the peace process was raised.
14 FRAGILE STATES STRATEGY• Serbia-Montenegro. Former President and other fledgling organizations en-
Slobodan Milosevic’s policies of stir- abled them to contest rigged election
ring ethnic hatred, and his assault on results, forcing Milosevic from office
Kosovo and failure to submit to the and handing him over to the UN
terms of the Rambouillet Accords led War Crimes Tribunal. Moreover,
to NATO air strikes that lasted until Milosevic’s allies were increasingly
mid-June 1999. Even though USAID marginalized by the broadly inclusive
had to evacuate, high-impact activi- 18-party coalition of the Democratic
ties oriented to the November 2000 Opposition of Serbia.
elections were still supported from
outside the country. Massive get-out-
the-vote campaigns, an independent
parallel vote count, and support
to parties and independent media
helped check the election’s massive
fraud. Critical USAID assistance pro-
vided to student youth group Otpor
FRAGILE STATES STRATEGY 1516 FRAGILE STATES STRATEGY
Annex 2. Lessons and Current Gaps
O
ver the years of working in from one political system to another
fragile states, USAID recog- (e.g., autocracy to democracy), is usu-
nized that its traditional ways ally at the heart of fragility.9 Howev-
of doing business were not adequate er, Agency resources going to fragile
to the challenges and needs of frag- states mostly address the symptoms of
ile states. The Agency implemented fragility (such as famine and humani-
important internal reforms, including tarian crises), instead of the sources
1) creating the Office of Transition (such as weak governance).
Initiatives and the Office of Conflict
• Weak institutions with limited capac-
Management and Mitigation and inte-
ity to perform their core functions
grating them (along with the Agency’s
contribute to weak governance in
disaster and food assistance opera-
many fragile states. USAID’s gov-
tions and democracy and governance
ernance work, however, tends to be
programs) into one cohesive bureau;
oriented to policy reform rather than
and 2) setting up, as needed, field and
institution building.10
Washington multidisciplinary response
teams to integrate USAID’s response • More needs to be understood about
to crisis. strategies for arresting negative trends
in these contexts.11 USAID should
Despite these reforms, the magnitude lead the call for more thorough
and complexity of fragile states, les- analysis of what advances turnaround
sons from past experience, and analysis in fragile states and the most catalytic
of remaining gaps in USAID’s current role for donors in this process.
response make clear that a different ap-
proach is needed. Key lessons and gaps 9 Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, and
include the following: Jay Ulfelder, It’s All about State Structure—New
Findings on Revolutionary Origins from Global Data
(Arlington, Va.: George Mason University Insti-
• Security is a sine qua non for progress tute for Humane Studies, 2004) and Robert
Bates, Prosperity and Violence (New York: W.W.
Currently, USAID is constrained in Norton, 2001).
working on a range of security-related 10 Limited institutional capacity, within as well as
issues that are central to fragile states. outside government, is a key issue. There are
areas, however, where only government can be
These issues include demobilization, responsible, such as defense, provision of internal
protection and reintegration of IDPs, security, certain legal functions, and the enabling
environment for economic stability.
community-level policing, and civil-
11 It is known that assistance effectiveness is
ian oversight of the military. dependent upon commitment of interest groups
within fragile states, better targeting of assistance
• Weak governance, particularly in the programs at these groups, and integration of poli-
cies within the U.S. Government and across the
context of a country in transition donor community aimed at these concerns.
FRAGILE STATES STRATEGY 17You can also read
