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BRAZILIAN NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
BOLETIM
GEOCORRENTE March 25th, 2021 ISSN 2446-7014
JOURNAL OF GEOPOLITICS AND OCEAN POLITICS YEAR 7 • Nº 135
What is missing for the Chinese
Navy to be able to project power
globally?
This and a further 13 articles in this edition
BOLETIM
RESEARCHERS OF THE CONJUNCTURE
GEOCORRENTE ASSESSMENT GROUP
Boletim Geocorrente is a fortnightly publication written
by the Conjuncture Assessment Group (NAC), which is part
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
of the Department of Research and Post-Graduation (SPP) at Ariane Dinalli Francisco (Universität Osnabrück)
Bruno Gonçalves (Ufrj)
the Naval War College (EGN). NAC studies the International
Franco Napoleão A. de Alencastro Guimarães (Puc-Rio)
Conjuncture from a geopolitical framework, in order to supply Isadora Jacques de Jesus (Ufrj)
the global demand for information, making it more accessible João Victor Marques Cardoso (Unirio)
for the general public. Moreover, it seeks to intertwine society Vivian de Mattos Marciano (Uerj)
into defense and security issues, and to disseminate updated
knowledge of international conflicts and crisis to meet the Naval SOUTH AMERICA
Staff's demands. Ana Laura Marçal Monsores (Uff)
The research group responsible for this Boletim is Bruna Soares Corrêa de Souza (UniLaSalle)
composed of members from different areas of expertise, whose Carlos Henrique Ferreira da Silva Júnior (Egn)
Matheus Souza Galves Mendes (Egn)
multiple backgrounds and experiences provide a comprehensive
Pedro Emiliano Kilson Ferreira (Univ. de Santiago)
approach to the latest international issues. It seeks to analyse the
major themes, motivational factors and the main actors regarding NORTH & CENTRAL AMERICA
the escalation of conflicts, ongoing crises and its outcomes. Ana Carolina Vaz Farias (Ufrj)
Thus, this journal aims to publish short articles concerning Jéssica Pires Barbosa Barreto (Egn)
current issues about ten macro-regions in the globe: South Rafael Esteves Gomes (Ufrj)
America, North and Central America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Victor Cabral Ribeiro (Puc-Rio)
Middle East and North Africa, Europe, Russia and former Victor Eduardo Kalil Gaspar Filho (Egn)
USSR, South Asia, East Asia, Southeast Asia and Oceania,
Arctic and Antarctic. Furthermore, some editions feature the ARCTIC & ANTARTIC
"Special Topics" section. Ana Carolina Ferreira Lahr (Egn)
Gabriele Marina Molina Hernandez (Uff)
BRAZILIAN NAVAL WAR COLLEGE'S Pedro Allemand Mancebo Silva (Puc-Rio)
DIRECTOR Raphaella da Silva Dias Costa (Ufrj)
Rear Admiral Paulo César Bittencourt Ferreira
EUROPE
RESEARCH AND POST-GRADUATION Marina Autran Caldas Bonny (Ufrj)
SUPERINTENDENT OF THE BRAZILIAN Melissa Rossi (Suffolk University)
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE Nathália Soares de Lima do Vale (Uerj)
Rear Admiral (Retd.) Marcio Magno de Farias Franco e Thaïs Abygaëlle Dedeo (Université de Paris 3)
Silva Victor Magalhães Longo de Carvalho Motta (Ufrj)
EDITORIAL BOARD EAST ASIA
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF João Pedro Ribeiro Grilo Cuquejo (Ibmec)
Captain (RETD) Leonardo Faria de Mattos (Egn) Luís Filipe de Souza Porto (Ufrj)
Marcelle Torres Alves Okuno (Ibmec)
EXECUTIVE EDITOR Philipe Alexandre Junqueira (Uerj)
Captain-Liutenant Bruno de Seixas Carvalho (Egn) Rodrigo Abreu de Barcellos Ribeiro (Ufrj)
SCIENTIFIC EDITOR Vinicius Guimarães Reis Gonçalves (Ufrj)
Captan (RETD) Francisco E. Alves de Almeida (Egn) MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA
ASSISTANT EDITORS Adel Bakkour (Ufrj)
Jéssica Germano de Lima Silva (Egn) Ana Luiza Colares Carneiro (Ufrj)
Noele de Freitas Peigo (Facamp) Dominique Marques de Souza (Ufrj)
Pedro Allemand Mancebo Silva (Puc-Rio) Isadora Novaes dos Santos bohrer (ufrj)
Pedro da Silva Albit Penedo (Ufrj)
GRAPHIC DESIGN
Ana Carolina Vaz Farias (Ufrj)
Bruno Gonçalves (Ufrj) RUSSIA & FORMER USSR
Isadora Novaes dos Santos bohrer (Ufrj) José Gabriel de Melo Pires (Ufrj)
Luiza Gomes Guitarrari (Ufrj)
TRANSLATION AND REVIEW Pedro Mendes Martins (Eceme)
Rodrigo Oliveira Dutra Marcílio (Ufrj) Pérsio Glória de Paula (Uff)
PUBLICATION POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
To publish in the Boletim, the author is required to be a researcher SOUTHEAST ASIA & OCEANIA
of the Current Geopolitics Group of NAC and submit his article Matheus Bruno Ferreira Alves Pereira (Ufrj)
containing a maximum of 400 words to the peer review assessment Thayná Fernandes Alves Ribeiro (Uff)
process. Vinícius de Almeida Costa (Egn)
CONTACT SOUTH ASIA
Brazilian Naval War College – Research and Post-Graduation
Superintendency. Iasmin Gabriele Nascimento dos Santos (ufrj)
Av. Pasteur, 480 - Praia Vermelha – Urca - Postal Code: 22290-255 João Miguel Villas-Boas Barcellos (Ufrj)
- Rio de Janeiro/RJ - Brazil Marina Soares Corrêa (Ufrj)
PHONE.: +55 (21) 2546-9394 | E-mail: geocorrentenac@gmail. Rebeca Vitória Alves Leite (Egn)
com
SPECIAL TOPICS
This and other editions of BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE, in Alessandra Dantas Brito (Egn)
portuguese and english, can be found at the Brazilian Naval War
College Webpage and in our Google Drive Folder .
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BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 135 • March | 2021
BOLETIM
GEOCORRENTE
INDEX
SOUTH AMERICA
What is missing for the Chinese Navy to be able to project power...........................
Colombia and the new courses of its naval industry and power..............................5 globally?................................................................................................................12
Venezuelan structural crisis: border developments and diplomatic..........................
SOUTH ASIA
weakening..............................................................................................................6
New Indian military zone in the Indian Ocean: base at the Agalega.........................
NORTH & CENTRAL AMERICA
Islands...................................................................................................................13
The relations between the United States and Cuba: a new perspective?...............7 SOUTHEAST ASIA & OCEANIA
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Australia: submarine program at risk?...................................................................14
Ghana's energy planning: a model for emerging countries?...................................8
ARCTIC & ANTARTIC
The transformations in the Angolan port sector.......................................................8
Antarctica, China and the coronavirus: how the country moves towards..................
EUROPE the southern continent in times of crisis................................................................14
The consequences of Brexit for Northern Ireland....................................................9
SPECIAL TOPICS
Chinese investments in Greece: the case of the port of Piraeus...........................10
Retraction of globalization of international supply chains......................................15
RUSSIA & FORMER-USSR
Challenges in the integration among EU and Georgia..........................................10
Selected Articles & Defense News........................... 16
EAST ASIA Geocorrente Calendar.............................................. 16
Foreign Policy and Defense at China's Two Sessions of 2021............................. 11 References............................................................... 17
Risk Maps................................................................. 18
TOP GLOBAL RISKS
Disregarding the COVID-19 pandemic
For more information on the criteria used, visit page 18.
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BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 135 • March | 2021
BOLETIM
GEOCORRENTE
THE COUNTRIES WITH THE
MOST CASES
Data according to the "WHO COVID-19 Dashboard", published on March 25 th, 2021.
VACCINE MONITORING
Sources: World Health Organization; The New York Times
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BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 135 • March | 2021
SOUTH AMERICA
Colombia and the new courses of its naval industry and power
Ana Laura Monsores and Bruna Soares Corrêa
N aval power is a relevant factor in maritime control
disputes in areas of international interest. The
return to the maritime discussions involving Colombia
and Santa Catalina Archipelago. Colombia's Ministry of
Defense said the objective of the maneuvers is to defend
its sovereignty over the region.
and Nicaragua, because of the Nicaraguan Biosphere The global economic slowdown of 2020 aggravated
Reserve's creation happens at a time of growth and unemployment, which is a consequence of greater
investment prospects for the Colombian naval industry. exposure to price shocks in Colombian exports, based
For decades, the two countries have been disputing the mainly on commodities. However, the World Bank
maritime delimitation and possession of a set of islands estimates that the country will be among the regional
in the Caribbean Sea, among them: San Andrés and economic recovery leaders due to the concentration of
Providencia, which remained under the possession of national investments in the shipbuilding industry. The
Colombia in the last sentence of the International Court increase in the sector's efforts is explained by Colombia's
of Justice (ICJ), in 2012. The region is strategic due to bioceanic position and proximity to the Panama Canal.
its mineral wealth and proximity to the Panama Canal. It These factors make it possible to increase commercial
is worth analyzing how Colombia has responded to the ties and attract foreign investment. The creation of the
need to increase its naval power and surveillance in the state program PROASTILLEROS stands out for the
Caribbean Sea. promotion of shipbuilding in the commercial and military
In January 2021, the National Assembly of sectors.
Nicaragua created the Caribbean Biosphere Reserve Therefore, Colombia has responded to the region's
for environmental protection, which includes a vast security demands by patrolling and carrying out military
maritime area in conflict with the disputed Colombian exercises in the Caribbean Sea, besides providing
waters, in addition to being outside the international necessary support for the promotion of the naval industry.
standards and procedures regulated by UNESCO. In The importance given to the agenda of naval power in
response to Nicaragua's advances, the Colombian Armed Colombia's political-strategic agenda is presented as
Forces promoted aircraft exercises using aircraft, light a positive factor for the country's prominence in the
class frigates, and a ship with troops for an amphibious Caribbean.
landing on the waters of the San Andrés, Providencia,
Map of the Caribbean Platform and the Seaflower Biosphere
Reserve
Source: Centro Humboldt (adapted)
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n135.p05.
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BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 135 • March | 2021
Venezuelan structural crisis: border developments and diplomatic weakening
Pedro Kilson
T he Venezuelan structural crisis rearranged the
migratory dynamics in South America, representing
a destabilizing variable in the regional political context.
of both states.
Along a border area marked by coca crops, informal
migratory crossings, organized crime, drug, arms, human
In this sense, a sequence of humanitarian, social, and trafficking, poverty, and corruption, competition among
political-economic crises stand out, intensified by the criminal groups is escalating, undermining political
consequences of the pandemic. The sharp drops in regional dialogue attempts. Therefore, the Venezuelan crisis
GDPs, the dismantling of formal employment networks, unfolds in the disintegration of ties between neighboring
extensive bankruptcy of trade and industry, strangulation countries, favoring the borders closure, the execution
of health systems, besides increased crime rates are of intimidating military exercises, and the difficulty in
noteworthy. This reality is capable of highlighting latent establishing effective communication spaces around the
or well-developed socio-political conflicts in the South issue of regional migration.
American continent. It is worth highlighting the current The Venezuelan structural crisis directly affects
moment of the crisis, considering eventual joint solutions bilateral relations with the neighboring country,
at the regional scope. considering Colombian President Iván Duque's assertive
United Nations’ reports indicate 4.7 million stance in favor of removing Nicolás Maduro from office.
Venezuelan migrants or refugees in other South American Consequently, the absence of communication and trust
countries. This represents the hardening of migration channels between both parties incites the risks of a more
policies, exacerbation of xenophobia in the social context, devastating interstate crisis. Considering this perspective,
and the precarious conditions of work, housing, income, the resolution of the crisis must be built around concrete
and social integration. The Colombia-Venezuela border, dialogues focusing on the recovery of the State's border.
which comprehends more than two thousand kilometers, Such a joint effort interlaces with issues such as a
is the location of standoffs between rival guerrillas, resolution mechanism capable of dismantling illicit
armed factions seeking hegemonic power on a regional activities networks and, therefore, the power of armed
scale, and escalating tensions between the Armed Forces groups.
Source: Insight Crime
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n135.p06.
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BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 135 • March | 2021
NORTH & CENTRAL AMERICA
The relations between the United States and Cuba: a new perspective?
Rafael Esteves
A fter its independence in 1898, Cuba developed a
troubled relationship with the United States. The
country is an island located in the northern part of the
face two significant issues in his relationship with the
island. The first one is the close relationship between
Cuba’s government and Maduro in Venezuela, which
Caribbean Sea and next to the Gulf of Mexico, besides undergoes a structural crisis. It is noteworthy that Cuba
the capital Havana being 367 km from Miami. The and Venezuela's closeness is related to the political and
geographical limitations, due to its proximity to the USA ideological proximity of the regimes and the Cuban urge
and physical isolation; and economic hindrances, such for international support to maintain itself.
as dependence on agricultural exports, led the country The second challenge faced by the Biden
to look for a protector to support its development and administration regards the rivalry between the United
security. How does geopolitics influence the challenges States and China. The region is an important gateway
of Joe Biden’s management and the relationship with for international trade to the Panama Canal, besides the
Cuba? island’s position next to the USA, making it important for
Cuba is important for the U.S. foreign policy because Washington to consider a closer relationship with Havana
of its geographical location, providing easy access to to deflect the growing Chinese influence in the region. It
the Gulf of Mexico, which also concentrates large oil is essential to mention that China is an important political
reserves and the busiest port in the region, Veracruz. In and economic partner of the island, with investments in
the 19th century, the United States supported Cuba in its renewable energy.
War of Independence, establishing a military occupation As demonstrated, the geopolitical context defined the
that lasted until 1902. Despite the withdrawal of troops, American relations with Cuba, which was forced to seek
the United States maintained a strong influence on the international support. The attempts at full independence
country's domestic policy until the rise of the Castros in are constantly hindered by Washington, which preserves
1959. an aggressive policy. Although the rivalry between the
Since the Cold War, the United States has been two countries persists, the new U.S. administration needs
imposing economic embargoes on Cuba to weaken the to change the measures adopted to weaken any foreign
regime. The new US President Joe Biden will probably influence in the region.
Source: Geopolitical Futures
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n135.p07.
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BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 135 • March | 2021
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Ghana's energy planning: a model for emerging countries?
Bruno Gonçalves
E nergy is a primary source for a states’ economic
and social development. The 21st century has been
marked by changes in this sector due to the challenges
first hybrid solar-hydro power station, which will reach
almost 30% of the country's total electricity demand, will
help mitigate supply instability, considering the context
imposed by the environmental, infrastructure, and market of unpredictable water levels that will worsen with
conditions. Ghana is ahead of other emerging countries, climate changes.
structuring its energy policy in small-scale development, Furthermore, the floating liquefied natural gas (LNG)
using previous infrastructure and sustainable and import terminal at Tema is expected to be commissioned
diversified solutions. In this sense, how can the country in April 2021, which can supply 33% of the natural gas
be an example for energy security and sustainable demanded by Ghana. Besides transforming Ghana into
development in emerging countries? a gas hub in the Gulf of Guinea, the first terminal of its
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), kind in Sub-Saharan Africa will provide less polluting
Ghana’s electrification rates are among the highest in fuel than oil. Hence, the project will guarantee annual
Sub-Saharan Africa, with 85% of the population having supplies to the power infrastructure, mining, and ceramics
access to electricity. However, Ghanaians struggle with industries, serving as an additional offer to the local gas
an unreliable power supply due to its over-reliance on production and the West African Gas Pipeline, a project
hydro-power. This subordination caused the country to that will link Nigeria to Morocco.
undergo a prolonged crisis in power supply from 2012 Therefore, Ghana's energy planning policies,
until 2015. based on a small, flexible, affordable, sustainable, and
At the end of 2020, in a move to expand the national diversified system in terms of generating sources, can
energy matrix, the government of Ghana, through the be a model. Additionally, energy security combined with
state-owned Bui Power Authority (BPA), launched a economic and social development could support the Gulf
solar farm connected to the Bui hydroelectric, which will of Guinea's security, which suffers from constant pirate
make up the difference in electricity generation when attacks.
the water levels do not support the demand. The world's
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n135.p08.
The transformations in the Angolan port sector
Isadora Jacques
A ngola is a state rich in mineral resources, with oil
exports accounting for more than 50% of its GDP;
its diamond, copper, manganese, and phosphate reserves
of Benguela, Namibe, Zaire and Cabinda, respectively —
form the largest port complexes in the country. According
to Port of Luanda reports, its production from January to
also stand out. Thus, it can be inferred that a good port July 2020 was 14% lower than the same period of 2019
infrastructure is necessary to guarantee the efficiency due to the drop in oil prices aggravated by the COVID-19
of these commodities’ exportation. In early March crisis, which, throughout 2020, caused an estimated 6.5%
2021, the exponent of the port sector, DP World, with drop in Angolan GDP.
headquarters in Dubai, started its activities at the private Like the giants China and India, the United Arab
multi-purpose terminal in the Port of Luanda, located in Emirates stands out as the main Angolan export partners.
the Angolan capital, after receiving a 20-year concession The investment of USD 190 million by DP World
in January 2021. What changes in the sector can from this promises to leverage the Port of Luanda's capacity and
agreement? make it competitive, in addition to its strategic location,
The Port of Luanda is located in the bay of Luanda, in the Central African region, due to the maritime routes
which is separated from the Atlantic Ocean by Luanda's of existing exports. For this project, 30 trucks, five reach
Island, and next to the ports of Lobito, Mozambique, stackers, and four forklifts will be acquired, as well as
Soyo, and Cabinda — located in the Angolan provinces cranes for heavy loads, a pioneering technology in the »
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BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 135 • March | 2021
country's ports. Thus, such applications would increase mineral inputs through the maritime sector. Besides,
the port's capacity to 700,000 containers per year. the presence of the United Arab Emirates as a trading
Therefore, it is inferred that the investments made by partner tends to grow in the region, obtaining significant
the Arab company, which also operates in Mozambique, commercial and technological advantages, especially
Egypt, and other African countries, place Angola at an after the economic crisis and the fall in oil prices.
even more relevant level in relation to the export of
Source: Porto Luanda
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n135.p08-09.
EUROPE
The consequences of Brexit for Northern Ireland
Marina Autran
T he Belfast Agreement is an important peace treaty
responsible for ending decades of conflict between
Catholic nationalists, defenders of the union with
established by the agreement.
The impasses between both international actors affect
the island's political and economic situation. Nationalists
Ireland, and unionist Protestants, supporters of Northern advocate for more comprehensive Protocol negotiations
Ireland's maintenance in the UK. Before the celebrations to avoid such disputes. However, unionists have opposed
of 23 years of the agreement, the impasses regarding the the Northern Ireland Protocol since its ratification, as
Northern Ireland Protocol raised doubts during the peace it effectively created a barrier between the country and
period. Hence, in this piece we question how international the rest of the United Kingdom, and deadlocks have
trade disputes are contributing to the destabilization of increased their dissatisfaction. Unionist paramilitary
Northern Ireland. groups have temporarily withdrawn support for the
The Northern Ireland Protocol is part of the Brexit Belfast Accord because of concerns about Brexit. It is
negotiations. Its main objective is to avoid the hardening worth remembering that these groups were not part of
of the borders between Northern Ireland and Ireland to not the agreement negotiations, instead, they were great
harm the Belfast Agreement. The treaty keeps the country supporters and demobilized their armaments at the time.
as a part of the European Union (EU) single market, The threats concern several countries, including the
creating a frontier for trade within the United Kingdom United States, which have asked the United Kingdom
itself. Currently, the protocol is the main reason for the and the European Union to prioritize negotiations and
erosion of relations between the British and the EU. In avoid conflicts.
January 2021, the bloc threatened to invoke Article 16 In conclusion, disputes between the UK and the
of the Protocol allowing the suspension of the agreement EU are deteriorating the political situation in Northern
in the event of economic, social, and environmental Ireland. The Belfast Agreement is an essential milestone
difficulties due to the dispute over vaccines with the for peacekeeping, and trade disputes are threatening
United Kingdom. In March, there were disagreements it. The continuity of the impasses will contribute to
regarding the unilateral extension, made by the British, instability and may resume old conflicts in the long run.
of the grace period to implement export and import rules
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n135.p09.
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BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 135 • March | 2021Chinese investments in Greece: the case of the port of Piraeus.
Victor Magalhães Longo
Since 2008, Greece has been through a major 2007, to the 4th largest port in Europe in terms of container
economic crisis whose solution is now involving new traffic in 2020, and the largest in the Mediterranean.
international partners. The minor recovery signs from Despite the debate in Greece about an asymmetry in
2017 were hindered by the COVID-19 pandemic, leading relations with China, all signs indicate that such ties will
to an 8.2% drop in GDP in 2020, one of the worst results increase, with new Chinese investments also in the energy
in the European Union. Its economic fragility means that and telecommunications sector. This forecast is aligned
Greece needs foreign direct investment, especially in the to the statement by the Greek Minister of Development
medium and long term. Even though the largest foreign and Investments, Adonis Georgiadis, to the Chinese
direct investments have come from European countries, state-owned news agency Xinhua in early March. In the
China has been gaining ground quickly since the Greek interview, the minister encouraged the strengthening of
crisis. Therefore, it is worth perceiving what the interests commercial relations with China in the post-pandemic,
of the two countries are with this approach. mentioning the port of Piraeus as an example of the
The purchase of part of the port of Piraeus by the China success of those ties until then.
Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) in 2009 directed For China, Piraeus composes the already famous
attention to the emerging Sino-Greek relationship. The Belt and Road Initiative, which, besides giving China
port, which played a central role in the maritime strategy control over foreign countries' infrastructure, increases
of the city-state of Athens in the Classical Era, had become its political influence. Consequently, the government in
a non-productive asset of the modern Greek state. But the Athens has avoided actions that could displease Beijing:
Chinese management and investments made a difference, in 2016, Greece insisted on moderating a joint European
quickly increasing its productivity and capacity. In 2016, Union statement that criticized Chinese actions in the
COSCO took another step and acquired stock control of South China Sea. For the Greeks, the most important
the port. Consequently, the port moved from the 17th, in thing is to ensure that Chinese investments will continue.
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n135.p10.
RUSSIA & FORMER-USSR
Challenges in the integration among EU and Georgia
Luiza Guitarrari and José Gabriel Melo
G eorgia’s current political and social polarization has
incited the debate on democracy and foreign actors'
strategic role. In this sense, it is possible to mention that
recommended a deal with the opposition to reduce the
region's political tension during the 6th meeting of the
EU-Georgia Association Council. Furthermore, as the EU
regional stability is promoted by the balance of power is the leading commercial partner of Georgia, the necessity
among local nations and foreign actors' participation, of a plan to expand the Black Sea interconnectivity was
with the European Union (EU) and the United States highlighted.
(USA) having a significant involvement in Georgia’s In parallel, at the beginning of the month, The
case. These actors envision the Black Sea coastal country Prime Minister of Georgia, Mr. Irakli Garibashvili,
as a good military support spot and potential maritime announced the search for investors for the international
hub in Eurasia. Therefore, considering the national consortium responsible for building the Anaklia Port.
conjuncture, the following question arises: what are the The project intends to be the main transportation hub to
Western interests in building a new Georgian deep-sea the production from Central Asia and China to Europe.
port complex. It also looks forward to operating 10 thousand TEUs
The political conundrum, motivated by Nika Melia's because the Port will be able to berth big ships — with
arrest, the United National Movement leader, the main drafts of until 16m — contributing to the country's goal
opposition party, culminated in protests on February of becoming the hub it desires. The future deep-sea port
23rd. The detention was criticized by the EU and the U.S, will play a fundamental role in the country's economy
which consider the former Soviet country as a democratic because it will enlarge the economic potential of Georgia
transition model. Thus, on March 16th, Brussels and its surroundings. »
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BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 135 • March | 2021Thus, the cooperation on the maritime sector and the democratic process, the EU is still engaged with Georgia
port development will incite Georgia’s transit potential, due to the country’s strategic position in maintaining its
highlighting the country as a maritime and commercial geopolitics interests. Thus, preserving Tbilisi's goal of
interconnectivity spot. Therefore, despite the current pleading a seat in the European bloc in 2024
instability and the reservations about the Georgian
Source: FPRI
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n135.p10-11.
EAST ASIA
Foreign Policy and Defense at China's Two Sessions of 2021
Filipe Porto
T wo Sessions, China's most important legislative
political meetings, took place in March 2021.
They bring together the National People's Congress
The expectation in foreign policy is reflected in the
country's defense. It should be perceived that the budget
is examined and approved by the NPC annually, and
(NPC) and its main political advisory body, the Chinese despite the impact of COVID-19, the Chinese defense
People's Political Consultative Conference. Both serve budget for 2021 will have a 6.8% increase compared
as a valuable depiction of Chinese politics, revealing the to 2020. Attention to defense is necessary due to the
priorities of Beijing’s general political direction for the challenges that China faces: recurrent sending of United
next years. Considering the importance of these events, States warships and warplanes to exercises in regions
what can be learned about China’s future measures in close to the Chinese coast; Taiwan's potential as a buyer
foreign policy and defense? of U.S. weapons and defense systems; in addition to the
It is clear that China will continue to give precedence historical conflict between India and China in the border
to the 14th Five-Year Plan and its areas considered to be region, which resulted in deaths on both sides in 2020.
central to achieving sustainable growth and leading in Besides, under Biden’s administration, the United
innovation. In terms of foreign policy, Beijing expects States is expected to adopt a strategy of approaching
President Joe Biden to seek more pleasant ties than his traditional regional allies that share interests in issues
predecessor, Donald Trump, but not in a different sense. such as the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the
Therefore, the Chinese leadership is prepared for U.S. Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, which highlights the continuity
claims, such as human rights issues, the treatment of of these problems as critical points of maritime security
Uighurs, and political tensions in Hong Kong to remain for China. This would require the commissioning of more
contentious. armaments and new equipment, which need funding. »
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BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 135 • March | 2021Therefore, it is explained the importance of these power and comprehensive combat capability through
sessions, which take as an imperative the requirement more investment and planning to meet China's defense
that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) increase its and foreign policy needs.
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n135.p11-12.
What is missing for the Chinese Navy to be able to project power globally?
Rodrigo Abreu
D riven by the largest shipbuilding industry in the
world, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
has been commissioning around 15 ships per year since
abroad, considering that the country operates only one
naval base in Djibouti, while the United States has a
network of overseas bases worldwide — including in
2013. In early September 2020, the U.S. Department East Asia.
of Defense issued a report recognizing that PLAN had Geography also plays a vital role in China's difficulty
outnumbered the United States Navy (USN) in the total in projecting power. The country's coast is surrounded by
number of ships. However, regarding tonnage and power islands that can be used by enemy powers to deny China's
projection capability, PLAN is still behind USN. In this access to the Pacific Ocean. China’s maritime strategy
article we approach the Chinese capability of projecting is based on the two island chains, and China hopes to
power ashore, vis-à-vis the U.S. Navy. project power out of them by 2049.
Although China recently commissioned the second Therefore, although Beijing can exercise power near
Type 055 large destroyer, considered one of the most its coast, in the South China Sea, and defend its sea lines
powerful warships globally, PLAN still has a huge of communication, the Chinese will need to overcome
qualitative disparity compared to the USN. The biggest the difficulties mentioned previously above to compete
qualitative disproportion is found in the aircraft carrier with the American presence in strategic regions for the
program of both countries. While China has 2 active diesel- country, like the Central Pacific and the Indian Ocean.
-electric-powered aircraft carriers capable of transporting In that sense, China intends to be able to project power
around 40 aircraft, the United States operates 11 globally until 2049. Thus, it will be necessary to observe
nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, with greater the progress of the Chinese shipbuilding industry and
autonomy and the capacity to transport up to 90 aircraft. possible American reactions to the increase in Chinese
Additionally, China lacks more robust naval logistics naval power.
Source: CNN
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n135.p12.
12
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 135 • March | 2021SOUTH ASIA
New Indian military zone in the Indian Ocean: base at the Agalega Islands
Iasmin Gabriele Nascimento
I n 2015, during a visit to Mauritius by India's Prime
Minister, Narendra Modi, an agreement was signed to
update the maritime connections and aerial routes with
that the new Indian base is essential for monitoring the
southwestern part of the Indian Ocean.
Mauritius and other countries in the region constituted
the Agalega Islands, thus allowing India to establish the setting of a great geopolitical dispute between China
strategic positions in the Indian Ocean — what had been and India in the Indian Ocean. Thus, for India, keeping
discussed for years. Recent satellite photos indicated the diplomatic relations with them is crucial. S. Jaishankar,
construction of a naval base and an airbase on the islands. Indian Minister of External Affairs, stressed in a press
Considering these facts, it is important to know: what are release that Mauritius's security is associated with India's
the consequences of Indian military construction for the security. According to the website Money Control,
dynamics of the region? India signed the CECPA — Comprehensive Economic
The Agalega Islands, a territory of Mauritius, are Cooperation and Partnership Agreement — with
a set of two small islands that tally 70 km², and are Mauritius to offer preference for commercial access to
located 1,700 km away from Diego Garcia — the Indian the island products.
strategic outpost would theoretically look like the base India's maritime strategy for the Indian Ocean is part
that the United States and the United Kingdom have of the national project of control and influence of that
in the territory. According to the Australian think tank region. Mauritius composes the strategic environment
Lowy Institute, images show a 3,000 m runway that can and the installation of bases in the country projects power
receive the Indian Navy P-8I maritime patrol aircraft. and contributes to New Delhi to achieve its geopolitical
The Indian project involves the construction of logistics goals. It is necessary to monitor what will be Beijing's
and communication facilities, but India and Mauritius reaction.
keep secret about it. From that, it is possible to infer
Source: Lowy Institute
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n135.p13.
13
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 135 • March | 2021SOUTHEAST ASIA & OCEANIA
Australia: submarine program at risk?
Thayná Fernandes
I n 2016, Australia announced the need to renew
its submarine fleet. At that time, three countries
competed for the project, and the winning model was
there is no other declared partner at this point in time,
and France already has a five-year advantage over the
initiative.
that of the French Naval Group. However, five years Besides the difficulties of the project itself, political
later, what started as a USD 35-billion project, now instability has also contributed to the delays: since
comes close to USD 75 billion and 17 months behind the negotiations began, Australia has had three prime
schedule. According to the estimates, the first submarine ministers, three ministers of Economics, and five
will only be commissioned by the Australian Navy in ministers of Defense. Furthermore, the debate also
the next decade. These delays impact the diplomatic involves the need for nuclearization of submarines
relations between countries, raising speculation about since the French Barracuda model had to be adapted
other possible partners. Hence, in this piece we seek to to the conventional, diesel, because Australia has
analyze the project's issues to understand the country's banned nuclear energy since the 1980s. However, the
future challenges considering three aspects: government environmental commitments assumed by the government,
credibility, Australian domestic policy, and regional the conventional technological obsolescence, and the low
security. rate of indiscretion when active, compel the government
In early March, the Naval Group and Australian to suspend this measure, at least partially.
Prime Minister Scott Morrison agreed that 60% of the Canberra is developing the Defense sector, especially
total contract value should be spent in Australia for in the naval area, and seeking to diversify partnerships
the construction of the submarines. Still, it is cogitated beyond the traditional relations (USA and United
that Morrison asked the Department of Defense to seek Kingdom). However, with the constant clashes in the
new partnerships that could serve as an alternative to South China Sea and the straining of relations with
the French. However, abandoning the project is bad for Beijing, it is increasingly crucial for Australia to have a
the government's credibility, as other defense initiatives strong stance and appropriate planning to the submarines,
have been shelved to give precedence to the submarines, especially with the proximity of the decommissioning of
besides discrediting the several state declarations that the current Collins class. Time is a crucial factor.
everything was succeeding as planned. Furthermore,
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n135.p14.
ARCTIC & ANTARTIC
Antarctica, China and the coronavirus: how the country moves towards the southern continent
in times of crisis.
Gabriele Hernandez
W hile the pandemic delays new geopolitical
developments in most of the world, China emerges
in projects where the country already stood out, such as
China's preference for Antarctica is primarily because
of the precious living and mineral resources in the
continent, which are important to suppress its domestic
Antarctica’s case. In its new 2021-2025 five-year plan, demand; however, due to the Antarctic Treaty and other
Beijing announced the construction of its Polar Silk Road, conservation agreements, mineral exploration on the
an initiative to create new shipping routes exploring both continent has been banned. The solution was to take
the Arctic and Antarctica to facilitate its international advantage of legal provisions and loopholes in the Treaty
trade. The creation of a trade route in the Arctic is not new. to expand the country’s influence in the region. The most
Still, the inclusion of Antarctica reinforces the ambitious significant case is the fishing of Antarctic krill, which
plans for the Southern region and incites the question: causes the country to periodically veto the creation of
how can China accomplish its Antarctic interests in a marine protected areas and lead to a long-lasting dispute
world devastated by the new coronavirus? with other States claiming Antarctic territories, especially »
14
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 135 • March | 2021Australia. Such vetoes serve as an institutional bargain to guarantees new Antarctic policies.
guarantee the Chinese interests in the region. The Chinese actions in Antarctica are not different
However, with the coronavirus crisis, China managed from those practiced by other countries. Still, Beijing's
to gain an advantage over the other states, as the budget ambition on the continent worries other states because
for its investments in the region has not been significantly of its political will, international participation, a large
cut, and the country continues to build its fifth Antarctic allocation of resources, and sophisticated logistics, a
station and a permanent airport (there are only eight such development towards the region that few have conditions
on the continent). While the rest of the countries had to to apply. And all the Antarctic powers know that, at this
constrain the budget destined for the program, due to the rate, China will have an immense advantage over the
focused efforts on combating the pandemic, a project like continent in the future.
the Polar Silk Road is even more distant. By including
the continent in another institutional device, the country
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n135.p14-15.
SPECIAL TOPICS
Retraction of globalization of international supply chains
Victor Gaspar Filho
I n the trade-off between cost reductions through the
globalization of supply chains or the pursuit for
autonomy over the production, States and companies
administration. The securitization scope of supply
chains grew from minerals to other essential goods
and services to be defined from its Executive Order
currently seek to reduce the time to respond to on America’s Supply Chains was expanded. China’s
disruptions, demand changes, or uncertainties. During the five-year plan, in turn, considers the undertaking of a
coronavirus pandemic, the lack of essential products was self-reliant and improved science and technology as a
observed due to the jump in demand; and the just-in-time strategic cornerstone of national development. Despite
manufacturing proved to be particularly risky. The high its advanced industry, China lacks companies that design
demand for personal computers has overwhelmed the or produce tools for chip manufacturing.
semiconductor industry, and even automotive companies Diplomatic, commercial, and informational efforts
are compromised by this shortage today. How can we are currently being adopted to engage allies and strategic
expect supply chains to adapt in the near future? partners to strengthen supply chains. The pandemic
The highest demand for chips in history happened in has accelerated the process of adopting a preemptive
2020, with an 8.4% increase in 2021. The international positioning in research and development. This position
semiconductor industry is concentrated in Taiwan, may avoid events such as health crises, cyber-attacks,
whose share accounts for 54% of the global market. extreme weather events or and other conditions that
International electronics manufacturing leaders try, may reduce critical manufacturing capacity and the
alongside Taiwan, to guarantee the continuous supply of availability of critical goods, products, and services.
chips to protect electronics production. This bottleneck, Transformations can also occur in the sustainability scope
critical for the 4.0 Industry, reveals itself as an obstacle to of supply chains while they become more nationalized.
the progress in segments such as Artificial Intelligence, Not only by introducing the concept of circular economy,
quantum computing, biotechnology, space, deep-sea or recycling products at the end of their life cycle, but also
polar exploration. because the regionalization of production can reduce the
In the United States, the efforts led by President carbon footprint of component transportation.
Donald Trump have been expanded by Joe Biden’s
DOI 10.21544/2446-7014.n135.p15.
15
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 135 • March | 2021SELECTED ARTICLES & DEFENSE NEWS
► China’s Strategic Standpoint
GEOPOLITICAL FUTURES, George Friedman
► The World Still Needs the UN
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Suzanne Nossel
► The Geo-economics and geopolitics of COVID-19: Implications for European Security
IISS, Bastian Giegerich and Fenella McGerty
► The EastMed Gas and Philia Forums: Reimagining Cooperation in the Mediterranean
THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE, Rauf Baker
► Biden’s China Reset Is Already on the Ropes
RAND, Derek Grossman
► The U.S Military Forces in FY 2021: The Last Year of Growth?
CSIS, Mark F. Cancian
► The UK’s Integrated Review: Seeing Through a Glass Darkly
RUSI, Paul O'Neill
► Clarity of Conviction but Harnessing Competition Is Key
CHATHAM HOUSE, Leslie Vinjamuri, Gareth Price and John Nilsson-Wright
GEOCORRENTE CALENDAR
MARCH APRIL
01-31 China’s Month of Military
Exercises (South China Sea) 04 Parliamentary Elections in
Bulgaria
The start of the
15 multinational Exercise
DEFENDER-Europe 21 05-08 IX(videoconference)
Summit of the Americas
(Balkan and Black Sea)
19-29 Sea Shield-21 Exercise
(Black Sea)
09-11 IMF and World Bank
meeting (Washington, EUA)
25-29 European Council Meeting
(videoconference)
11 General Elections in Peru
11 Constitutional
Municipal Elections and
26
Mercosur Meeting and the Conventional
30th anniversary of the bloc in Chile
(videoconference)
11 Presidential Elections in
27
Exercise Desert Flag-VI’s Ecuador (2 round) nd
last day (United Arab
22 Climate
Emirates) Summit
(videoconference)
27-28 (United States)
Federal Reserve Meeting
16
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Cambios en la dinámica criminal apuntan a un violento futuro en la frontera • What is missing for the Chinese Navy to be able to
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FEDIRKA, Allison. Cuba Is on the Clock: The island is in dire need of a new 19th 2021.
patron. Geopolitical Futures, Austin, Feb. 15th 2021. Accessed on:
Mar. 05th 2021. • New Indian military zone in the Indian Ocean: base at the
FRANK, Marc. Chinese exports to Cuba hit lowest level in decade last year: Agaléga Islands
data. Reuters, New York, Jan. 27th 2020. Accessed on: Mar. 18th 2021. BASHFIELD, Samuel. Agalega: A glimpse of India’s remote island military
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MUCHIRA, Njiraini. DP World Takes Over Operations at Angola's Port of GURJAR, Sankalp. How India is stepping up its outreach in the Indian Ocean.
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PORTO DE LUANDA. Homepage - Porto de Luanda. Accessed on: Jan. 22nd • Australia: submarine program at risk?
2021. AUSTIN, Alan. Government submarine contract sunk and unlikely to
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• Ghana's energy planning: a model for emerging Mar. 18th 2021.
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WHITEHOUSE, David. Ghana’s industrialisation to benefit from Tema LNG French submarine deal?. Australian Strategic Policy Institute,
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20th 2021. HOARE, Callum. China sets sights on Antarctica grab as coronavirus fuels
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CAMPBELL, John. Brexit: EU says UK grace period extension breaches
international law. BBC, London, Mar. 03rd 2021. Accessed on: Mar. 03rd • Retraction of globalization of international supply chains
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• Chinese investments in Greece: the case of the port of on: Mar. 19th 2021.
Piraeus LESWING, Kif. Why there's a chip shortage that's hurting everything from
Interview: Greece eager to continue cooperation with China in post-pandemic the PlayStation 5 to the Chevy Malibu. CNBC, Englewood Cliffs, Feb. 10th
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6th Association council meeting between the European Union and Georgia.
17
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 135 • March | 2021RISK MAP
T he map entitled “Top Global Risks” on the 3 rd page
of this Boletim was prepared by the Conjuncture
Assessment Group (NAC) members of the Brazilian
which may become red or orange, depending on the
conflict's aggravation.
Due to the increase in the number of cases
Naval War College (EGN). The appearance of the (infected, hospitalized and dead) of COVID-19, there
international phenomena on the map considers their was an adaptation in the analysis of the scenario.
relevance to Brazil, analyzed through criteria, namely In this way, a separate map was drawn up, with the
the number of Brazilians living in the region, direct countries with the highest number of infected people,
or indirect influence on the Brazilian economy, and according to the latest WHO bulletin released until
their impact on the Brazilian Strategic Surroundings. the publishing date of this bulletin. Thus, the countries
Besides, the interests of the United Nations Security were painted in red or orange according to the number
Council permanent members will be considered. of total cases.
After selecting the phenomena, they are categorized The analyzes are redone at each Boletim edition,
as high risk (red) or medium risk (orange), following aiming to reassess and update the demarcated regions
parameters that reflect the severity of the risk, and the color used in each one. Therefore, the main
namely: number of victims, the relevance of the phenomena are always observed, distributed at
actors involved, impact on the global economy, and high and medium risk. Below are links to the risks
the possibility of tensions escalation. The countries indicated on the map:
painted in gray represent conflicts under analysis,
► HIGH RISK:
• GULF OF GUINEA — Conjunctural maritime insecurity: Record Drug Seizure By The French Navy In
The Gulf Of Guinea. Naval News, Mar. 22nd 2021. Accessed on: Mar. 23rd 2021.
• YEMEN — Civil war and humanitarian crisis: 'Scores' of migrants burned to death from Houthi projectiles
in Yemen: HRW. Al-Monitor, Mar. 16th 2021. Accessed on: Mar. 23rd 2021.
• LEBANON — Structural crisis: How things went from bad to unbearable in Lebanon. Gulf News, Mar.
22 2021. Accessed on: Mar. 23rd 2021.
nd
• VENEZUELA — Structural crisis: Venezuela gas pipeline tract explodes; oil minister blames attack.
Reuters, Mar. 21st 2021. Accessed on: Mar. 23rd 2021.
• ETHIOPIA — Conflict between government and insurgent forces: Biden Eyes Former Top U.N. Official
for Horn of Africa Envoy. Foreing Policy, Mar. 22nd 2021. Accessed on: Mar. 23rd 2021.
• MOZAMBIQUE — Conflict between government and insurgent forces: Mozambique conflict: Why are
US forces there?. BBC News, Mar. 21st 2021. Accessed on: Mar. 23rd 2021.
• MYANMAR — Military coup: Jokowi calls for meeting of ASEAN leaders on Myanmar crisis. Nikkei
Asia, Mar. 19th 2021. Accessed on: Mar. 23rd 2021.
► MEDIUM RISK:
• AFGHANISTAN — Regional instability: US Defense secretary makes surprise visit to Afghanistan.
DW, Mar. 22nd 2021. Accessed on: Mar. 23rd 2021.
• BELARUS — Political crisis and tensions with the European bloc: Lukashenka Holds Up Sanctioned
Ex-Ministers As Possible Sucessors in Belarus. Radio Free Europe. Mar. 19th 2021. Accessed on: Mar. 23rd
2021.
18
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 135 • March | 2021• LYBIA — Civil war escalation: Al-Sarraj hands over power to new Presidential Council, Unity
Government. Lybia Observer, Mar. 16th 2021. Accessed on: Mar. 23rd 2021.
• SOUTH AND EAST CHINA SEA, HONG KONG & TAIWAN — Chinese expansion on regions:
Europe signals opposition against China's intimidation in South China Sea. Business Standart, Mar. 19th 2021.
Accessed on: Mar. 23rd 2021.
• EASTERN MEDITERRANENAN — Increasing tensions between Greece and Turkey and the occupation
of Cyprus: Talks stall in Greece-Turkey maritime dispute. EURACTIV. Mar. 17th 2021. Accessed on: Mar.
23rd 2021.
• SYRIA — Tensions in the Idlib region: UN official: Airstrikes on Turkey-Syria border ‘extremely
worrying’. Times of Israel, Mar. 22nd 2021. Accessed on: Mar. 23rd 2021.
► MONITORING:
• SINO-INDIAN BORDER — LAC standoff: Difficult for India to fall for US pressure over China. Global
Times, Mar. 21st 2021. Accessed on: Mar. 23rd 2021.
• GEORGIA — Opposition protests: EU mediation in Georgia`s political crisis tests Brussel`s clout.
Financial Times, Mar. 18th 2021. Accessed on: Mar. 23rd 2021.
• HAITI — Institutional crisis: El gobierno haitiano declara el estado de emergencia para enfrentar a
bandas criminales. RFI, Mar. 19th 2021. Accessed on: Mar. 23rd 2021.
• PARAGUAY — Political crisis: La subida de casos de coronavirus en Paraguay precipita una crisis
política. El País, Mar. 21st 2021. Accessed on: Mar. 23rd 2021.
• SOMALIA — Political instability: Somalia’s disputed polls is an important lesson in its democratic
journey. The Africa Report, Mar. 22nd 2021. Accessed on: Mar. 23rd 2021.
• UKRAINE — Russia-Ukraine cross-border tensions: While Zelenskyy Promises Peace, Ukraine`s Army
Faces Serious Challenges. Jamestown, Mar. 15th 2021. Accessed on: Mar. 23rd 2021.
• BORDER BETWEEN AZERBAIJAN AND ARMENIA – Armed conflict in the region of Nagorno-
Karabakh: Yerevan Eyes OSCE Role In Final Nagorno-Karabakh Settlement. Radio Free Europe, Mar. 16th
2021. Accessed on: Mar. 23rd 2021.
• SENEGAL — Political instability: Senegal’s Political Crisis. Foreign Policy, Mar. 17th 2021. Accessed
on: Mar. 23rd 2021.
• CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC — Conflict between government and insurgent forces: Families
forced into a deadly spiral in Central African Republic. Aljazeera, Mar. 18th 2021. Accessed on: Mar. 23rd
2021.
• BOLIVIA — Political and juridical crisis: Militares: Tres amenazas acechan a las FFAA por la intromisión
política. Página siete, Mar. 22nd 2021. Accessed on: Mar. 23rd 2021.
• THAILAND — Resumption of protests against the monarchy: Thailand: Police disperse protesters
calling for monarchy reform. Al Jazeera, Mar. 21st 2021. Accessed on: Mar. 23rd 2021.
• NIGER — Escalating of terrorist activity in the region: Death toll from Niger attacks rises to at least 60
- mayor. Sowetan Live, Mar. 22nd 2021. Accessed on: Mar. 23rd 2021.
19
BOLETIM GEOCORRENTE • ISSN 2446-7014 • N. 135 • March | 2021You can also read
