Identity and Citizenship - Brill
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
part 2
Identity and Citizenship
⸪
Laurens Bakker - 9789004329669
Downloaded from Brill.com10/07/2021 11:48:52AM
via free accessLaurens Bakker - 9789004329669
Downloaded from Brill.com10/07/2021 11:48:52AM
via free accesschapter 6
Militias, Security and Citizenship in Indonesia
Laurens Bakker
The first of June is Indonesia’s annual Pancasila Day. It is celebrated in com-
memoration of Soekarno’s presentation on 1 June 1954 of Pancasila, the philo-
sophical foundation of the unity of the Indonesian state, embodying ideals of
its society and citizenry.1 The day, generally, has dignitaries delivering speeches
on the state of Indonesia and the nature of Pancasila. Speaking at a meeting
at the People’s Constitutive Assembly (mpr) on Pancasila Day 2012, Vice-
President Boediono reminded his audience that, for the continued existence
of Indonesia as a nation, creating unity in diversity and finding ways to live
together harmoniously were crucial. Ethnic and religious differences should
not stand in the way of Indonesian unity as exemplified, Boediono suggested,
by the friendship of Soekarno – a Muslim – with Catholic priests during his
exile in Flores in 1938. Religious fanaticism, Boediono warned, is a threat to the
nation and to the peace of religious minorities (Aritonang, 1 and 2 June 2012).
Pancasila’s emphasis on unity is Indonesia’s ultimate ideological source of
authority and, as such, is supposed to guide and pervade all legislation. In the
preamble of the constitution, the elements of Pancasila are given as (1) belief
in the one and only God, (2) a just and civilized humanity, (3) the unity of In-
donesia, (4) democratic rule that is guided by the power of wisdom resulting
from deliberation and representation and (5) social justice for all the people
of Indonesia.2 These elements, clearly, have strong links to more well-known
aspects of citizenship (such as protection by the state, a say in government and
the sustaining relationship of community), but Pancasila is nevertheless hit by
1 This chapter is based on research conducted as part of the research project State of Anxiety:
A Comparative Ethnography of Security Groups in Indonesia which was supported by the
Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (grant number 463-08-003). Fieldwork and
interviews were carried out between 2007 and 2013. Groups involved were Brigade Manguni,
Komando Pertahanan Adat Dayak Kalimantan (kpadk, Dayak Customary Defence Com-
mand), Gerakan Pemuda Asli Kalimantan (gepak), Movement of Indigenous Youth of Kali-
mantan), Pemuda Pancasila, (Pancasila Youth) Garda Pemuda Nasional Demokrat (gp Nas-
Dem, National Democrats Youth Guard) and, to a lesser extent, Front Pembela Islam (Islamic
Defenders Front) and Front Betawi Rempug (Betawi Brotherhood Front).
2 Based on a certified English translation available at the website of the Asian Human Rights
Commission at http://www.humanrights.asia/countries/indonesia/countries/indonesia/
laws/uud1945_en.
© Laurens Bakker, ���7 | doi 10.1163/9789004329669_007
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC-BY-NC-ND License.
Laurens Bakker - 9789004329669
Downloaded from Brill.com10/07/2021 11:48:52AM
via free access126 Bakker
the persistent critique that its formulation is open to multiple interpretations
and explanations along different political lines (see, for example, Wahyudi
2006). When Soekarno’s successor, Suharto, imposed Pancasila as the nation’s
sole ideological basis, it was found that others were prevented from using
the philosophy as an umbrella under which to maintain diverging ideologies
(Ward 2010:30–31). This usage of Pancasila, therefore, served as a strong means
to curb opposition, substantiate the regime’s view on national and societal sta-
bility and legitimate control over the economy. These were then enforced by
political, administrative and, where necessary, violent means.
The sudden end of Suharto’s New Order regime in 1998, and the ensuing ref-
ormation politics, sparked a critical debate on the sources, applications and le-
gitimations of public power. These debates centred on the (il)legitimate usage
of government authority by state officials, and the state’s weakness in uphold-
ing the rule of law in prosecuting abuses of government authority (Sakai 2002;
Aspinalland Fealy 2003; Kingsbury and Aveling 2003; Schulte Nordholt and Van
Klinken 2007; Aspinall and Mietzer 2010). A shared finding was the notion that
there was little reason to assume that the weakening of the authoritarian cen-
tral state would naturally result in democratic rule or increased civil awareness.
In fact, factions of the regime, headed by powerful and wealthy individuals,
managed to reorganize in the face of reform and continued their hold on eco-
nomic and political influence (Robison and Hadiz 2004:18–252). Schulte Nord-
holt and Van Klinken (2007:24–25) referred to such regime patrons controlling
the law and government agencies as a ‘shadow state’ of authority that exists
beyond the institutions of government proper. The confrontation between
these established power structures and the decentralization, democratization
and advancement of civil society gave rise to a ‘renegotiation of boundaries of
authority’ (Schulte Nordholt and Van Klinken 2007) between these established
power holders and the new ones emerging as a result of democratic elections.
This struggle, between patronage and clientelism on the one side and dem-
ocratic reforms on the other, predates 1998. Almost from independence on-
wards, attempts to establish parliamentary democracy as Indonesia’s system
of government were seriously hampered by corruption, patrimonialism and
client-patronage networks. Schulte Nordholt (2014) analyses this development
using a longue durée perspective, which leads him to identify the current situ-
ation in Indonesia as a patronage democracy. Chandra (2004:6) defines this as
a system ‘in which the state has a relative monopoly on jobs and services, and
in which elected officials enjoy significant discretion in the implementation of
laws allocating the jobs and services at the disposal of the state’. Van Klinken
(2009) and Aspinall (2013) note the manifestation of patronage democracy in
different capacities – from the leaders who derive their power from the state
Laurens Bakker - 9789004329669
Downloaded from Brill.com10/07/2021 11:48:52AM
via free accessMilitias, Security And Citizenship In Indonesia 127
while distributing clientelistic favours along economic, cultural and social
lines, to the followers who identify themselves in local, ethnic or communal
terms. Thus, a leader’s authority is established by the democratic process and
affirmed by their proven capacity to deliver.
An eye-catching element in the current phase of renegotiation is the in-
creased social prominence of civil, militant organizations. These are organized,
disciplined and uniformed bodies that generally represent specific religious or
ethnic groups or are affiliated to political parties as dedicated security forces.
They fall under the broad category of organisasi kemasyarakatan (societal or-
ganizations; abbreviated to ormas).3 Most of these organizations state their
goals as specifically protecting the interests of the groups they represent, while
simultaneously striving for a peaceful and united Indonesia. They generally
proclaim Pancasila and the unity of the Indonesian state to govern their ac-
tivities, thus nominally placing themselves within the ideological order of the
state.4 Offering protection to the needy, ensuring peace and order, respecting
the wishes of the local population and ousting bad influences are ormas activi-
ties that can be linked directly to the national philosophy. ‘We work with all for
the good of Indonesia and Pancasila, and strive to eradicate threats to the na-
tion and the people,’ Fary Malunda, a senior leader of the ormas Brigade Man-
guni told me, adding that Indonesia’s famous diversity needs to be protected.
While such statements could be seen as mere lip service to the national state
and as ‘cover-ups’ of what amounts to the appropriation of state authority, it
is very hard for such organizations to get anywhere without the support of the
population, whose good Malunda proclaimed to have at heart.
In this chapter, I seek to come to terms with the role of ormas, particularly as
forces that balance reactionary and pro-democracy interests as well as (often)
furthering their own agendas. What is the role of ormas in the development of
citizenship in Indonesia today? As will be made clear below, New O rder-era
3 As a legal category ormas refers to all sorts of societal organizations: from aid foundations
and health providers to Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund. Clearly, these are not in-
tended here. The exact number of ormas is hard to establish. Nugroho (2013:16) found a stag-
gering 83,727 civil society organizations registered with various ministries, but suspects that
there is an overlap among those. Moreover, many of these groups will not be focused on
security provision, nor will all security-providing groups have registered. Based on my own
interviews with academics and government officials, estimates of ‘security-providing ormas’
in Indonesia range between 400 and 2,000 groups. These are spread throughout Indonesia
but mostly active in urban areas.
4 A notable exception is Front Pembela Islam, whose drive to turn Indonesia into an Islamic
state puts it at loggerheads with Pancasila’s principles. FPI spokespersons have frequently
expressed their discontent with the ‘un-Islamic’ Pancasila.
Laurens Bakker - 9789004329669
Downloaded from Brill.com10/07/2021 11:48:52AM
via free access128 Bakker
history sees ormas as strongly associated with crime, lawlessness and patri-
monialism, which would make them a disturbing and outright undesirable
element in a democratic society governed by the rule of law. Increasingly, how-
ever, post-Suharto ormas – such as Brigade Manguni – maintain a strong fo-
cus on improving local welfare and aiding the community, which gains them
popularity and credibility as socially engaged organizations willing to help the
needy. On the other hand, as we shall see below, the criminal element has cer-
tainly not disappeared. One particular issue that will be scrutinized further is
the crucial question: can crime actually serve the community?
The issue that I explore is the position of ormas in the relationship between
the individual and the political community. This relationship, as argued in the
introduction (Berenschot et al. 2017), is the central pillar of citizenship. It is
shaped by ‘particular conceptions and practices of rights, reciprocity and rep-
resentation…’ that ‘…are related to [postcolonial countries’] political economy
and a particular history of state formation’ (see also this volume’s Introduc-
tion). As such, the daily practices of citizens’ rights and duties in Indonesia
have a history of personal relations at odds with the anonymity and account-
ability essential to Western ideals of state – citizen relations. In the follow-
ing paragraphs, I discuss several examples of ormas’ activities and strategies
in order to come to an understanding of their functioning. I will explore their
position in society – as serving patrons, or championing the masses – their ef-
fect in furthering or hampering the rights and duties of citizenship, and their
recourse to violence and crime in doing so.
Security versus Violence
Most ormas manifest their power and obtain their support by providing secu-
rity and protection in specific territories. On the street, they maintain a public
presence through guard posts and patrols in ‘their’ neighbourhoods, for which
the locals generally contribute a small monthly fee. They beat up and chase
out thieves and burglars or, if they turn out to be locals, incorporate them into
the organization – thus providing them with a job while enlisting their knowl-
edge and muscle. Outside of the neighbourhoods ormas manifest themselves
through rallies, parades or protests, the latter generally against ‘bad’ influ-
ences in public life. These can include media that published ‘wrong’ stories,
politicians who are corrupt or take ‘wrong’ decisions, entrepreneurs compet-
ing with the ormas’ supporters, or protesters, land occupiers or other critical
voices that go against the interests or principles defended by the organizations.
Some ormas, specifically Front Pembela Islam, also target artists whose music,
Laurens Bakker - 9789004329669
Downloaded from Brill.com10/07/2021 11:48:52AM
via free accessMilitias, Security And Citizenship In Indonesia 129
erformance or writings are ‘disapproved of’ by the organization. At times, this
p
puts one ormas against another, both for ideological reasons (notwithstanding
Pancasila) and in turf wars.5 Yet, within their areas, ormas usually undertake a
wide range of security-providing activities and neighbourhood assistance, of
which Table 6.1 gives an overview.
It is striking that, in most theories of state-building, the provision of secu-
rity (as well as several of the other tasks listed above) are considered to be
functions of the state. In carrying out these tasks, ormas thus display state-like
qualities through their appropriation of the mutually constitutive processes of
territorial control, authority and citizenship (Lund and Boone 2013:2). Ormas
claim territory by providing security, and other services as listed in Table 6.1, to
Table 6.1 Overview of ormas community activities and services as observed and reported in
Jakarta, East Kalimantan and the Minahasa
Front Brigade Front Pemuda GEPAK
Betawi Manguni Pembela Pancasila
Rempug Islam
Guard posts and patrols X X X X X
Security firm for companies X X X X
Orphanages and schools X X
Financial aid to the poor X X X X X
Sport events X
Prayer meetings X X X X
Funeral assistance X X X
Emergency relief (fires, X X X X X
floods, mud slides, etc.)
5 Front Pembela Islam aims to defend Islam and Muslims against anti-Islamic dangers. The or-
ganization is known for smashing up bars and stores selling alcohol, destroying churches and
for a drive to oust Ahmadiyahs from Indonesia, all of which it considers social vices. Ansor
(in parts of Java) and Brigade Manguni (East Kalimantan and the Minahasa) actively work at
keeping Front Pembela Islam out of their areas, as they regard the organization to be a vice in
Indonesian society (personal communication by East Kalimantan’s Brigade Manguni leader).
An example of a turf war are the fights between Front Betawi Rempug and Pemuda Pancasila
in Jakarta, which appeared to have gained impetus by the arrests of John Kei (in 2012) and
Hercules (in 2013), both established Jakartan crime bosses, and the ensuing weakening of
their respective gangs.
Laurens Bakker - 9789004329669
Downloaded from Brill.com10/07/2021 11:48:52AM
via free access130 Bakker
its inhabitants and entrepreneurs. In exchange, they require monthly contri-
butions from the households and businesses in the area. These contributions
are generally fairly low, but monthly payments by several blocks of households
provide substantial revenue for the ormas.6 Their regulatory activities provide
ormas with influence in property transactions and in managing (new) entre-
preneurs’ access to the area. They can also arrange employment and practical
training for those in need of it (motor mechanics, motor taxi drivers, shop staff,
night watchmen, et cetera) and provide mass manpower when government,
the neighbourhood, local entrepreneurs or others require it.
Usually, an area’s inhabitants are reasonably positive about such local or-
mas activities. The presence of ormas guarantees less crime and assistance to
the local poor in obtaining work and securing incomes. But this relation with
members of ormas can turn sour quickly if the sales staff recommended by the
local ormas head is not performing well and is fired. Likewise, a friend living in
an upscale part of town in Samarinda (East Kalimantan) told me how the local
ormas contacted him when he was extending his house and asked for an extra
contribution of 10% of the building materials’ costs. This was, as the ormas
declared, because of the extra work the guarding of the building site would
require. They settled on 5%. When I asked him whether he felt cheated as he
already paid monthly contributions, he replied that this was all part of democ-
racy as the poor were just asking for a share of the wealth. Two days later, he
asked passing ormas members to help shift a few stacks of roof tiles, to which
they complied without fuss.
Ormas need local supporters in order to gain leverage with local power hold-
ers. Their position between the population and the established patrons means
that they maintain their influence by engaging with and balancing the needs
of both groups. For the common people in the cities and villages, ormas repre-
sent local and accessible providers of order and security, who, moreover, can
communicate the peoples’ needs to those in power, and, if necessary, put pres-
sure on the local administration. For patrons, they are a source of votes, popu-
lar support and informal muscle. As such, ormas straddle the balance between
democracy and patrimonialism by being accountable to their supporters on
both sides for their activities and results. Failure to protect the needs of society
6 Protection fees in the upper middle-class Jakartan area of North Cikini, protected by the eth-
nic Betawi Forkabi ormas, stood at 50,000 rupiah per month per household in January 2014.
Upon payment, which is generally made by the house staff as part of the monthly returning
payments for electricity, laundry services and suchlike, Forkabi personnel provide a receipt
stating that the contribution to neighbourhood security was paid for that month, as well as
the name and signature of the collecting Forkabi member.
Laurens Bakker - 9789004329669
Downloaded from Brill.com10/07/2021 11:48:52AM
via free accessMilitias, Security And Citizenship In Indonesia 131
will result in a loss of popular backing and greater dependency on patrons,
thus severely limiting an ormas’ credibility as a societal movement champion-
ing reform and democracy.
These two themes – reform and democracy – are essential elements in or-
mas’ legitimization discourses. In a series of interviews I conducted, various or-
mas leaders and ormas lawyers explained to me that the provision of security,
the monopoly on violence and the authority of the state should not be consid-
ered as exclusive domains of the government but rather as tasks with which
the government is entrusted by society. If the government fails to do its job, it
is up to society to step in and correct the faulty officials and that, these leaders
maintained, is what ormas do. Lawyers connected to ormas emphasized that
the Indonesian constitution allows Indonesia’s citizens to do this (see Bakker
2015:88). It is in the latter framework that ormas spokespersons have presented
themselves as the embodiment of the relationship between the political com-
munity and the individual. This relationship, defined by mutual rights and ob-
ligations – as argued in the Introduction – constitutes the central element of
citizenship.
This position is perhaps best appreciated when considered through Abrams’
(1988) distinction between the state as a system (the state’s tangible institu-
tions) and the state as an idea (that what is expected to make up the state).
Ormas are not part of the official state system, which consists of the govern-
ment apparatus and institutions. Yet, their capacity to act independent from
government while legitimizing their actions through appeals to social circum-
stances, customs and religion, as well as the state, implies that the exercising
of public authority in Indonesia is subject to a constant process of contestation
and repositioning of institutions, in which new ones come to the fore as oth-
ers lose influence and disappear (Olivier de Sardan 2005:16). Whereas Soek-
arno introduced Pancasila as a broad philosophy aimed at promoting national
unity, Suharto’s imposition of Pancasila as a national philosophy was used as a
means to justify state control. Today, the national philosophy is therefore seen
as a symbol of unity by some and detested as a means of repression by others.
Balancing both democracy and patronage, ormas make use of such ambigui-
ties in Indonesia’s unity and reform to legitimize their own authority in guard-
ing the interests of the population.
Herein lies their greatest challenge. Whereas the capacity for violence can be
a means to provide security, it is also what security protects citizens from. We-
ber’s observation – that the rise of European cities was closely connected to the
combination of a marketplace and the presence of a self-equipped, armed citi-
zenry capable of withstanding the overlord knights (Barbalet 2010:205–206) –
resonates in ormas’ discourse of resisting the power of established elites in the
Laurens Bakker - 9789004329669
Downloaded from Brill.com10/07/2021 11:48:52AM
via free access132 Bakker
name of the population. Yet how do the interests of the population and those
of patrons balance out in ormas’ provision of security to Indonesia’s citizens at
large? To answer this question, I will first address the ormas – patron relations
from a socio-historical perspective in order to gain a better understanding of
the established position of civil violence within the state. This is followed by
a paragraph that considers ormas’ functioning from the perspective of civil
responsibility, public support and embedding in local society. I then continue
to look specifically at the evolution of ormas in terms of societal and economic
relevance for local society, before offering some concluding thoughts on how
ormas’ activities relate to citizenship in Indonesia.
Return to Pancasila Day
On the third of June 2012, a few blocks removed from the mpr Building, anoth-
er Pancasila Day celebration took place at the National Monument (Monumen
Nasional, or Monas). At the event, a two-hour mass rally was held by members
and sympathizers of the National Democrat Party (Partai Nasional Demokrat).
In his speech, party leader Surya Paloh, a business tycoon and national media
owner, emphasized the need for change. He felt that any current social wrong
was largely due to the fact that Pancasila was still not the basis of national life
(Koran Bali Tribune, 4 June 2012).7 Watching the rally on television in a hotel
room, I was struck by the large number of uniformed personnel that were pres-
ent. Row upon row of people clad in black and dark blue uniforms stood to
attention in disciplined ranks, their blue berets forming a colourful contrast
against the dark background of the uniforms. In the wide-open space around
Monas, they presented an image of massed ranks at the ready – to be deployed
for a common goal. According to newspaper reports, 25,000 out of the 50,000
people attending belonged to the Garda Pemuda Nasional Demokrat (National
Democrat Youth Guard, popularly known as gp NasDem), which was affiliated
to the National Democrat Party. Members of the gp NasDem are young, as only
the young have – according to the organization’s website, that is – the drive
and passion to change society. Therefore, the website reads, the young should
be courageous and militant in striving for their goal, which is the restoration of
the good elements from the past and the rekindling of the reform that started
7 Paloh emphasized the usage of Pancasila for the unity of the nation, as a moral code, as the
main source of statehood and as a vision inspiring governance (see Aditya 2012:70–81 for a
written-out speech of Paloh that addresses his thoughts on Pancasila along largely similar
lines).
Laurens Bakker - 9789004329669
Downloaded from Brill.com10/07/2021 11:48:52AM
via free accessMilitias, Security And Citizenship In Indonesia 133
upon the end of dictatorship, but that currently lacks direction and goals.8 The
Garda’s manifesto states that the organization is to be a vanguard for citizen-
based democracy, and that its members should exert themselves to the utmost
to seize the bright future of a welfare state – bringing liberty, solidarity and
equality.9
A specific group within the gp NasDem is formed by its rapid reaction
force (barisan reaksi cepat) known as baret: a semi-military unit that can
be deployed for the defence of the country and that has been trained by for-
mer military (Metrotvnews.com, 15 August 2013). In his Pancasila Day speech,
Paloh described baret’s role as pioneers who lead the Indonesian people in
guarding Pancasila and in putting a stop to the distortion and demoralization
that engulfs the nation (Surya Paloh, cited in Media Indonesia, 4 June 2012).
These goals appear fairly abstract, but are in line with the general ormas task
of the provision of security. However, baret members have also been trained
in communicating the National Democrat Party’s plans and visions. They car-
ried out an ongoing grassroots campaign to mobilize support for the party in
anticipation of the 2014 general elections. Furthermore, during the election
period, baret personnel were present at polling stations in order to observe
the voting procedures (Metrotvnews.com 2013).
The notion of baret carrying out a grassroots vote-mobilizing campaign
and surveying at polling stations can be understood in two ways. First, one
can see baret as an instrument for intimidating voters on behalf of baret’s
patron. Or as a civil organization that initially engages in vote mobilizing, but
later moves on to survey procedures at polling stations. The latter task is a task
carried out by numerous civil society organizations worldwide.
The image of the mass of ranked and uniformed people present at the Na-
tional Democrat’s Pancasila Day celebration, together with the speech that
was delivered at that occasion, reminded me of Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila
Youth), possibly the best known ormas in Indonesia. Clad in distinctive brown-
orange camouflage uniforms, its members formed a highly visible element of
many official occasions during the New Order. Officially, Pemuda Pancasila
aims to defend Pancasila and to improve of the moral and economic welfare
of marginalized youths, who otherwise eke out a living in the informal econ-
omy or in crime. Bringing these youngsters into the fold of the organization,
Pemuda Pancasila argues, gives them a chance to better themselves morally
8 http://www.gardapemudanasdem.or.id/suara-muda/207-karakter-pemuda-pelopor-yang
-progresif. Last accessed 7 July 2015.
9 See http://www.gardapemudanasdem.org/tentang-kami/manifesto. Last accessed 7 July 2015.
Laurens Bakker - 9789004329669
Downloaded from Brill.com10/07/2021 11:48:52AM
via free access134 Bakker
and to improve their ties with nationalism (Ryter 1998:47). The organization
thus combines a rank-and-file of urban poor and petty criminals with visible
and moral adherence to the highest ideals of the nation (Ryter 1998:47). The
result is a disciplined group of hardened muscle that is willing to act, violently
if necessary, for the goals as expressed by the leaders of this ormas.
During the New Order, Pemuda Pancasila developed a working relation with
Golkar, the then-dominant political party and Suharto’s vehicle. The organiza-
tion became the embodiment of Suharto’s usage of Pancasila as a legitimiza-
tion of state control. Opponents of the regime were threatened or attacked
by Pemuda Pancasila members who were objecting to their ‘anti-Pancasila at-
titude’, or repeatedly harassed. Pemuda Pancasila members carried out their
patrons’ dirty handwork by beating up competitors or clearing inhabitants
from new project sites through intimidation, violence and arson. The organi-
zation also provided security to businesses, upon the latter’s request or forced,
as a way of extortion. Members were engaged in theft, prostitution, drug trade
and the protection of illegal bars and casinos, yet were largely above the law
through their alliances the ruling elite. This relationship normalized Pemuda
Pancasila’s practices as violence and crime were associated with the regime
(see Ryter 1998:48–53; Wilson 2006:266). As protesters marched the streets,
calling for Suharto’s resignation in 1998, Pemuda Pancasila organized counter-
demonstrations and actively contributed to the chaotic violence in Jakarta
that was intended to destabilize the capital and the opposition’s support.
Pemuda Pancasila is, in the words of Ian Wilson (2010:199), the ‘granddaddy’
of organized preman groups. ‘Preman’ derived from the Dutch for ‘free man’,
denotes gangsters or thugs, usually of the street-level variety, whose main
modes of income generation are extortion, debt collecting, the vehicle-parking
business and the provision of security to local shops and vendors. Indonesia
has a history of organized territorial criminal groups (jawara) which are con-
trolled by local strongmen (jago) who act as ‘go-betweens’ with non-criminal
members of society (see Schulte Nordholt 1991). The New Order cracked down
heavily on premanism through Pemuda Pancasila as well as through intimi-
dation and the slaughter of thousands of preman by mysterious killers who
turned out to be affiliated with the police and the military (see Van der Kroef
1985 and Barker 1998). The one way for preman gangs to operate safely was
to ensure beking (backing) from among the higher circles of the regime –
particularly the police or the army. Patrons would protect ‘their’ preman in
exchange for a percentage of its profits and physical assistance when needed.
Such established groups, with Pemuda Pancasila as the best-known example,
were both feared and respected in society. Virtually invulnerable to the legal
system through their beking, occasional show trails would see preman leaders
Laurens Bakker - 9789004329669
Downloaded from Brill.com10/07/2021 11:48:52AM
via free accessMilitias, Security And Citizenship In Indonesia 135
convicted to serving jail terms whenever the regime needed a sterner law and
order image, but their sentences were usually drastically shortened as time
progressed.
The nationwide mushrooming of security-providing ormas from 1998 on-
wards is shaped by this recent history. Political parties, with the regime’s usage
of preman for violent actions in mind, set up task forces (satuan tugas or sat-
gas) such as the NasDem’s baret discussed above, that were charged with the
provision of security and order at party events and for party members. Almost
all militant ethnic and religious organizations that came into being through-
out the nation declared that they were organizations aimed at protecting their
supporters: from the greedy elites that had been plundering the country during
the New Order, criminals, ethnic violence as well as religious fanatics. These
groups were active under a wide variety of names which frequently contained
martial terms such as laskar (army), brigade, front or komando, followed by a
reference to a religion, an ethnic group, Pancasila or the Indonesian nation.
These ormas argue that they exist to provide the much-needed security to
ward off the threat of other groups, which makes them reminiscent of the vol-
unteer neighbourhood watches (ronda) and civilian security groups (such as
linmas, hansip and satgas) that have existed in association with the govern-
ment or the military for most of Indonesia’s history as an independent state (see
Barker 1999; Kristiansen and Trijono 2005:238–241). This argument also brings
Indonesia’s long war for independence to mind, which was waged against the
Dutch colonial forces by numerous regional militias rather than by a nation-
wide Indonesian army. In fact, the idea that Indonesia’s security is the domain
of (local) society as much as of the state is an integral part of the nation’s his-
tory. It has been made official through the national concepts of sishankamrata
(total people’s defence and security) and, more recently, sishanrata (universal
people’s defence), which propagates that the population should join the army,
police and government with all possible means to defend the nation. The prin-
ciple of local civilians who know each other and organize themselves in order
to maintain security is thus an established practice ingrained in society as well
as in the national defence strategy. The ready availability of trained civilians
and the reform-driven withdrawal of military and police influence from civil-
ian affairs makes security very much an issue of local concern. Siegel (1986),
writing on the Javanese city of Solo, found that security rather than shared
economic interests or kinship ties, was the most active expression of commu-
nity in the cities’ neighbourhoods. Moreover, as regional autonomy turned the
region into the locus of political and economic identity, locals were presented
with a scale of operation they could take up without government, state, patron,
or regime assistance.
Laurens Bakker - 9789004329669
Downloaded from Brill.com10/07/2021 11:48:52AM
via free access136 Bakker
In a 2005 interview, Barnabas Sebilang, then head of the Dayak Custom-
ary Council of Kalimantan (Dewan Adat Dayak seKalimantan) to which the
Dayak Customary Defence Command (Komando Pertahanan Adat Dayak Ka-
limantan) serves as a security force, told me how local bands of fighters had
fought against the Dutch colonial forces to liberate Indonesia, only to lose con-
trol over the development and governance of their areas once the nation was
independent and its president established. That control needed to be taken
back. Sebilang phrased it thus: ‘We have been liberated from the Dutch, now
we need to liberate ourselves from the control of Jakarta, from the Javanese.’
Surprised, I asked him whether he intended for Kalimantan to become an in-
dependent state. He laughed, and told me that such a measure was not neces-
sary at that moment, but that Javanese businessmen supported by the national
bureaucracy were plundering the island’s natural resources without regard
for the national law. His organization was established to ensure that the new
political climate would make it possible that Kalimantan’s indigenous Dayak
population would benefit from the island’s resources. The actions of the Kom-
ando, he suggested, were nothing less than a fight for the liberation and eman-
cipation of repressed citizens who needed protection of their rights as well as
political guidance. This would be achieved by the proper implementation of
Pancasila and the Indonesian constitution. Both of those legal sources, he felt,
legally entitled the Komando to protect and enforce the rights of the province’s
Dayak population. I have discussed some of these actions by the Komando in
other articles (see Bakker 2009, 2015). They involved issuing threats, applying
violence, reclaiming land appropriated from local farmers by plantation com-
panies, and the provision of security to the latter, many of which are, in fact,
owned by Javanese businessmen.
Groups like the Komando Pertahanan Adat Dayak Kalimantan exist
throughout Indonesia and combine a practical mix of relations to officialdom,
a discursive emphasis on ethnic identity, the protection of local society and a
dedication to the Indonesian nation with what their opponents claim is ‘crimi-
nal activism’ (such as illegal land re-appropriations). For such groups, societal
support rather than patrons is the main source of beking. Massed members and
supporters, whose opinions will translate into votes at the next elections, draw
governmental attention and therefore affirm such organizations’ relevance.
The practice of violence, the level of criminality, the professed goals and the
ideological underpinnings differ per group, but many groups appear to limit
crime and violence as their following grows and become increasingly non-
preman and diverse. As Wilson (2010:201) points out: ‘These organizations can
simultaneously be violent defenders of reactionary and hegemonic interests
and proactive vehicles for the social and cultural advancement of politically
Laurens Bakker - 9789004329669
Downloaded from Brill.com10/07/2021 11:48:52AM
via free accessMilitias, Security And Citizenship In Indonesia 137
and socially marginalized communities’ (italics in the original). The protection
and provision of security to some, sustained by discourses of nationalism, civil
rights and democracy, is combined with the threat of violence to others (see
Bakker 2016). Popular opinion plays an important role in balancing protec-
tion and threat and, as we shall see below, is strongly influenced by the way in
which ormas propose to put their muscle to the service of the public interest.
Civil Responsibility, Violence and the Public Gaze
As I was speaking to a group of Indonesian academics about the National
Democrats’ Pancasila Day rally a few days after it took place, several of them
pointed out that my comparison to Pemuda Pancasila was not fair to the Na-
tional Democrats’ intentions. Surya Paloh, they felt, was one of the ‘good guys’
of contemporary Indonesian politics. As a long-term member of Golkar, Paloh
ran for the position of party presidential candidate for the 2004 presidential
elections but lost to New Order strongman army general Wiranto. Although
part of the New Order establishment, Paloh was liked by the reformists: he
had not been a member of the regime’s in-crowd and was not associated with
corruption, violence or similar vices. The social involvement of his National
Democrat movement – not yet a party in 2004 – further indicated the differ-
ence between him and Golkar. In 2011, the National Democrat movement de-
cided to form a political party in order to bring their aspirations into national
politics, and Golkar asked Paloh to choose between them and the Democrats.
Paloh left Golkar as he felt that the party’s decreasing percentage of national
votes indicated its failure to effectively engage with the desires of society (see
Margianto 2011). In the running-up to the 2014 presidential elections, Paloh re-
peated his disappointment with Golkar, stating that the party lacked idealism,
political rationality and common sense, whereas each cadre of the National
Democrat Party was driven by his heart, morality and human compassion
(Rosarians 2013). Many of the people with whom I spoke about Paloh positively
emphasized his genuine concern, his clean past and his potential for bringing
about change.
During interviews people also pointed out that although the baret rapid
reaction force was indeed useful to protect party rallies from attacks by thugs
sent by Paloh’s enemies, as a trained organization it left much to be desired.
baret could hardly be considered an ormas of Pemuda Pancasila standards,
they felt. They had witnessed how the parade by members of baret on the
third of June had lacked in uniformity of movement and speed. This only
showed, they argued, how difficult it is to discipline and train civilians. This
Laurens Bakker - 9789004329669
Downloaded from Brill.com10/07/2021 11:48:52AM
via free access138 Bakker
did not, though, lead them to doubt Paloh’s capacity for organizing defence
and security. In the eighties, Paloh had been among the founders of fkppi
(Forum Komunikasi Putra-Putri Purnawirawan Indonesia, Communication
Forum for Sons and Daughters of Retired Army Personnel), a preman organi-
zation closely connected to the military and committing extra-legal violence
on its orders. From 1984 to 1987, Paloh was chair of the advisory council, with
Pemuda Pancasila leader Yapto Soerjosoemarno as its secretary.10 Paloh’s past
involvement with preman was seen as mostly irrelevant by his 2013 supporters
since, as one person put it: ‘that was in the past, when he was young’. Others
saw it as an asset, for the experience would surely have taught Paloh how to
run a security force while at the same time being aware of the dangers an or-
mas could come to pose to ordinary citizens. Moreover, this aspect of his past
was considered as proof that he was a ‘tough guy’ who would not hesitate to
take action should the National Democrats’ ideals or the security of Indonesia
become in jeopardy.
Globe Asia (Zainuddin 2012:46) ranked Paloh as the one hundred and sec-
ond richest Indonesian in 2012, with a net worth of 220 million us dollars. As
owner of the Media Indonesia Group and Metro tv, he has a substantial ve-
hicle to spread the party’s ideas and ambitions. Paloh’s assets are his relatively
new arrival on the political stage, his past involvement with a violent preman
organization, his limited role in the New Order, his public distancing from
Golkar and his passionate and socially driven speeches. He combines several
of the characteristics that made New Order patrons liked and feared at the
same time; Paloh is strong, powerful, not afraid to use violence and he pas-
sionately pleas for a more social and just Indonesian society. Also, his control
over television channels assists him in getting his message across, although
other parties – notably Golkar – have begun enlisting other media tycoons for
the same purpose.11 The formation of baret as a security force to the National
10 See fkppi’s website at http://www.fkppi.or.id/index.php/pengurus/fkppi/periode-ke-2.
Last accessed 7 July 2015.
11 Golkar chairman Aburizal Bakrie owns station tv One through his Bakrie Group, while
Chairul Tanjung, the owner of Trans tv and Trans7, is a close friend of incumbent presi-
dent Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Hary Tanoesoedibjo, the owner of pt Rajawali Citra
Televisi Indonesia, Indonesia’s most popular television network, and pt mnc Skyvision,
the country’s largest pay-tv network, accepted a position as chairman of the board of
experts of Paloh’s National Democrat Party in 2012, but left again after a few months due
to ‘internal conflicts’ (Sufa 2013) and moved to Golkar. With objective representation a
rising concern (see Nazeer 2012), a parliamentary commission has started work on a draft
amendment to the Broadcasting Law in order to severe political-media links ahead of the
2014 presidential elections (Jakarta Post 2013).
Laurens Bakker - 9789004329669
Downloaded from Brill.com10/07/2021 11:48:52AM
via free accessMilitias, Security And Citizenship In Indonesia 139
Democrat Party appears to have been more of a side project – an element re-
quired to complete the full spectrum of forces a powerful leader should have
at his disposal – than the creation of an organization aimed at violence and
intimidation.
A rather different example of the effects of violence combined with a repu-
tation for toughness is found in the development of Pemuda Pancasila’s politi-
cal aspirations. Following the fall of Suharto in 1998, this organization decided
to end its collaboration with Golkar on the grounds that its support for the
party did not result in appropriate returns. Pemuda Pancasila declared its own
party, Partai Patriot Pancasila, on Pancasila Day 2001 and was registered in Au-
gust 2003. The chair, Yapto Soerjosoemarno, explained that the cadre wanted
to form an independent party to be able to benefit from its own supporters and
their votes (see Dewanto 2003). They expected to gain many votes from young
people who would be charmed by Pemuda Pancasila’s toughness, while the
inclusion of well-known singers and other artists on the candidate list would
attract the workers and fishermen whom the party intended to target. The par-
ty secretary ventured the estimate that, with the votes of Pemuda Pancasila’s
large membership included, they would obtain 5% of the national vote (Lipu-
tan6.com 2004).
In the 2004 national elections, however, Partai Patriot Pancasila obtained
1,073,139 votes, or slightly below one percent, which meant that the party failed
to gain any seats in parliament (Ananta et al., 2005:22). Partai Patriot Pancasila
did not manage to convince its intended electorate, possibly because of de-
cades of doing the ‘dirty work’ for the freshly removed New Order regime, and
the strong competition presented by parties headed by known critics of Su-
harto and Golkar. Due to this election result, the party had to officially dissolve
before registering again and, for the 2009 national elections, it registered as
Partai Patriot, losing Pancasila, perhaps because public opinion had decidedly
turned against the New Order usage of the concept. Nevertheless, these results
were even worse: 547,351 votes or 0.53% (Komisi Pemilihan Umum 2009:41).
Wilson (2010:209) wondered whether the low number of votes indicated
that the party had made the same mistake that Pemuda Pancasila gave as its
reason for leaving Golkar: failing to accommodate and articulate the aspira-
tions of its supporters. Pemuda Pancasila members in East Kalimantan, who
had not voted for Partai Patriot, suggested two further explanations to me. A
first reason lay in the distinctive ‘Jakartan’ or ‘Javanese’ character of the candi-
dates on the list, and a second in their desire to vote strategically rather than to
support a small party that would almost certainly fail to obtain sufficient mass
to become of national importance. Former or still serving Pemuda Pancasila
members can be found throughout Indonesia’s large parties and continue to
Laurens Bakker - 9789004329669
Downloaded from Brill.com10/07/2021 11:48:52AM
via free access140 Bakker
take the organization’s interest at heart. In a 2013 interview, former Pemuda
Pancasila chair and current Golkar parliamentarian Yorrys Raweyai pointed
out that, of the 560 Members of Parliament, about thirty were former Pemuda
Pancasila members (Munawwaroh 2013a). Interestingly, Raweyai also stressed
that he considered himself stigmatized by people calling him a preman, as he
felt that he had never violated the law during his years in the organization
(Munawwaroh 2013b).
Raweyai’s notion of Pemuda Pancasila members as law-abiding, stigmatized
citizens contrasts with the findings of a September 2013 report of a Pemuda
Pancasila attack on a court of law dealing with a land dispute:
Hundreds of members of an organization notorious for its thuggery at-
tacked the Depok District Court in West Java on Tuesday morning, threat-
ening the chairman of the court over a disputed land case. Members of
Pemuda Pancasila, dressed in the organization’s military-style uniforms,
rammed motorbikes into the court’s glass entry door, smashing their way
into the building as they headed to chairman Prim Haryadi’s office. ‘At
about 8:30a.m., I was receiving some guests [in my office], when all of a
sudden hundreds of pp members came breaking into the building with
motorbikes,’ Prim said later on Tuesday.
Upon noticing the chaos on cctv, the judge immediately dismissed his
guests just as dozens of angry pp members broke the door and windows
in his office. The group reportedly launched a chair in Prim’s direction
in addition to threatening to kill him over a court decision to delay the
execution of a previous verdict. ‘They just came in, more than 10 people
were in my room wearing pp uniforms, including the leader, Rudi Samin,
who refused to accept the court’s decision to postpone a land eviction
order. They threatened to kill me,’ he said’.
Jakarta Globe 2013
According to the article, the group came to the court house on behalf of Rudi
Samin, the local Pemuda Pancasila leader, who had recently won a dispute
over thirty-three hectares of land and had been informed by the court that
the verdict would be executed on 17 September. Yet as the opposing party had
filed an appeal, the court was held to stall the execution until after the appeal
would be heard. In the attack on the seventeenth, the chairman of the court
was forced to immediately sign the verdict, thereby allowing the eviction to
commence. Rudi Samin confirmed the attack and took responsibility for the
damage done to the building. Samin stated:
Laurens Bakker - 9789004329669
Downloaded from Brill.com10/07/2021 11:48:52AM
via free accessMilitias, Security And Citizenship In Indonesia 141
‘If the court would like to report us to the police, then go ahead. Pemuda
Pancasila will take responsibility,’ he said. Explaining their motive behind
the violence, Rudi said the attacks had been conducted to express their
disappointment and distrust of the court. The pp would like to teach the
district court a lesson. ‘This is how you implement the law,’ Rudi said.
Jakarta Globe 2013
Samin, and two of his helpers, were arrested for vandalizing state property and
transferred to regional police headquarters in Jakarta. As the case was exam-
ined further, various inconsistencies started to come to the fore. The first was
that Samin was continuing legal procedures on behalf of other claimants who
had never given him permission to act as their representative or put the claim
in his name. The other claimants maintained that Samin owned about one and
a half hectares of the contested land (which he inherited from his parents),
and that the rest belonged to a group of some one and a half thousand other
people (Virdhani 2013). The one reason they dared to speak up, a spokesperson
stated, was because of Samin’s removal by the police. Samin’s urgency in get-
ting the verdict executed, as a legal scholar following the case explained to me,
was that the continuation of procedures would make both the appeal and the
objections of the other claimants much harder for the judiciary to address.
Samin’s detention was short-lived and does not appear to have resulted in
further charges. In Depok’s Pemuda Pancasila 2014 meeting, he emphasized that
members should not fear arrest or, if they did, should not become Pemuda Pan-
casila members. Arrests are part of the process of Pemuda Pancasila activities, he
felt, and he pointed out that he himself had been detained twice since he started
his term as Depok’s Pemuda Pancasila leader (Maulana 2014). At the time of writ-
ing, Samin was running in the 2014 general elections as a parliamentary candi-
date for the Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (pkpi), a split-off from Golkar
which so far has failed to make the electoral threshold for national parliament.
Yet, in other contexts, Pemuda Pancasila is appreciated and liked by the
population at large. A striking example is the discussion instigated by the 2012
movie The Act of Killing, directed by Joshua Oppenheimer, which sees aged
Pemuda Pancasila members in Medan re-enact the killings of communists that
were carried out in 1965. Indonesian history depicts this killing of hundreds of
thousands to millions of people nationwide as an act that saved the country
from a communist coup, and declares those who carried them out as national-
ists or even heroes. The film provides a much more critical picture and asks
how the killings benefitted those in power, whether those killed were indeed
guilty and who, in the end, actually profited from the killings. While the film
Laurens Bakker - 9789004329669
Downloaded from Brill.com10/07/2021 11:48:52AM
via free access142 Bakker
provided intellectuals and activists with a platform to debate the killings as
genocide and a human rights crime, others argue that the film is a foreign-
produced narrative intended to tar Indonesia’s reputation (e.g. Arham 2014)
and presents a caricatured and one-sided view of events (Maullana 2014). The
movie seems unlikely to bring about a new perspective on Pemuda Pancasila
among the Indonesian population at large, and may even inadvertedly become
a vehicle rallying support for the group’s past acts.
Less bloody is the present day position of the organization in the East Ka-
limantese business town of Balikpapan. Here Pemuda Pancasila is headed by
Syahrir Taher, a man in his sixties, who has been a Pemuda Pancasila member
for decades. Locally, he is known as Pak Ketua (‘Mr chairman’) as he is the chair-
man of the local Pemuda Pancasila chapter, the chairman of the Partai Patriot
faction in Balikpapan’s parliament, and the chairman of Persiba, Balikpapan’s
football club. In a series of interviews in 2013, he told me how, in the fifties, his
parents had migrated to Balikpapan from Makassar and brought him along as
a little boy. He had little opportunity to go to school, but worked in the market
and the harbour: first as a porter and wage labourer, and later as a provider of
security. In that position, he had to fight and sometimes stab people, for which
he went to jail a few times. He had no choice, he felt. He had agreed to guard
his clients’ properties, and had he run off, his reputation as a trustworthy guard
would be gone. His violence and consequent prison sentences established his
credentials as a tough guy who would not back down from his given word and
was not afraid to draw blood or spill his own. There were other positives, too:
he worked his way up from sleeping under market stalls to being able to buy
his first house.
Contrary to Raweyai, Taher readily agreed that he is a preman and is happy
to be known as such. As a member, and later a leader in Pemuda Pancasila,
he put a lot of emphasis on helping his fellow members whenever needed.
He was able to start a construction business, which flourished because of his
ability to obtain government projects through his connections, and he became
an affluent citizen. Taher used his funds to send his children to study overseas
(religion in Bagdad before the invasion of Iraq and business studies in New
Zealand afterwards), as well as for sponsoring Persiba, which, thanks to his
support, sports at least three foreign players in the team each season. Taher is
famous throughout East Kalimantan for his lavish handouts of food, favours
and funds during the breaking of the fast each evening of Ramadan, at which
time hundreds flock to his house, barring the traffic in the street (see Alami-
jaya 2013 for an on-site report). He takes great pride in helping anyone who
requests his help and has a reputation for being generous. Yet, he is also known
for asking people who request his assistance for a second time, what they have
Laurens Bakker - 9789004329669
Downloaded from Brill.com10/07/2021 11:48:52AM
via free accessMilitias, Security And Citizenship In Indonesia 143
done to improve their position themselves. And this is, according to several
market labourers with whom I discussed Taher’s generosity, quite embarrass-
ing. It makes people think twice before they knock again on Taher’s door and
ask for help.
Pemuda Pancasila and Taher are well established in the city. Taher maintains
that the organization saved his life because he used to lack discipline when he
joined. If Pemuda Pancasila had not taught him to think first and control his
temper, he believes that he would have been long dead, stabbed or cut up by
a rival in the protection business. Through his position in city parliament, Ta-
her is involved in much of the city government’s contracting, through which
Pemuda Pancasila obtained numerous security contracts, including building
projects, mining operations, employee housing areas, shopping centres and
parts of the port. Pemuda Pancasila maintains a cordial relationship with East
Kalimantan’s police and army commanders, which ensures that major security
deals are divided among these three groups.
As the chairman of soccer club Persiba, Taher is popular among Balikpa-
pan’s soccer enthusiasts. He arranges that the team gets good equipment,
substantial sponsor deals and a steady stream of international players. In this
position, he also holds an important role in the local election campaigns, as
candidates vie for fifteen minutes of speaking time to address the audience
ahead of a Persiba home match. Taher’s control over this opportunity makes
him highly influential in local politics.
Finally, Taher is a respected member of Balikpapan’s Bugis community, after
the Javanese the largest ethnic group of the city and one that is well-organized
through the Kerukunan Keluarga Sulawesi Selatan (Harmonious Family of
South Sulawesi, kkss) – an organization that unites, connects and organizes
the Bugis and Makassarese groups in the city. As Bugis are a major group of
Pemuda Pancasila’s members, there is a certain amount of overlap between
the two organizations. In Balikpapan, Pemuda Pancasila have steadily retract-
ed from the street work of security provision, rent-seeking and the parking
business. Part of the more criminal elements of this business – gambling, pros-
titution, alcohol and drug smuggling – are now controlled by young preman
who pay fees to Pemuda Pancasila through the kkss (if they are Bugis) or other
street groups. This way, Pemuda Pancasila is able to disassociate itself from
criminal activities to a certain degree. But it is generally known that the orga-
nization does have considerable influence in the city and control over events,
not in the least because of their links with preman.
An illustration of this control is the 2011 conflict over the Bugis ormas La
Galigo. A group of Bugis, from within kkss and led by city parliamentarian
Dahrimama, intended to set up their own ormas, which would go by the name
Laurens Bakker - 9789004329669
Downloaded from Brill.com10/07/2021 11:48:52AM
via free accessYou can also read
