Making Multilateralism Work: How the G-20 Can Help the United Nations
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Making Multilateralism Work:
April 2010
How the G-20 Can Help the United Nations
Bruce Jones
Dr. Bruce Jones is Director and Senior Fellow of the New York University Center on International Cooperation and Senior
Fellow at The Brookings Institution, where he directs the Managing Global Insecurity project that produced the recent coedit-
ed volume, Power and Responsibility: Building International Order in an Era of Transnational Threats (Brookings Press,
2009). Dr. Jones previously served in several capacities at the United Nations, including as Senior Advisor in the Office of the
Secretary-General during the 2004-05 UN reform effort and Deputy Research Director of the High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change leading into the push for reform.
The moves in 2008-09, prompted by the global different starting point. It regards the universality
financial crisis, to convene the G-20 at the level of of the United Nations, apart from certain opera-
heads of state constituted the first major adapta- tional weaknesses, as an enduring political
tion of global arrangements to better fit with the strength of the organization. It also assumes that
fact of the emerging powers. Clearly it will not be the G-20 (like the G-8 before it) will have mini-
the last. G-20 negotiations have already given a mal operational or actionable roles and will
critical impetus to governance reforms at the depend on the formal institutions to implement
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and The most, if not all, of its major initiatives. Given their
World Bank. nature, then, there is a necessary relationship
between the G-20 and similar bodies and formal,
Predictably, if somewhat ironically, the expansion inclusive institutions. An important factor for the
of the G-8 to include a wider range of countries G-20/UN relationship, in particular, is the struggle
including from the “Global South” drew angry to maintain UN legitimacy and effectiveness,
cries of exclusion, illegitimacy, and preemption at given the world body’s recent overstretch and
the United Nations. Early G-20 decisions also underperformance, as well as stalled reforms. A
provoked a new bout of tensions between the better way to think about the relationship
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the between the two entities is to ask if the G-20
international financial institutions. helps the United Nations perform and reform.
Criticisms of the G-20 from within the UN focus Taking the idea even further, this paper asks
on its illegitimacy (defined in UN-centric terms) whether the G-20 could play useful roles in broader
and its potential usurpation of functions formally institutional reform. The contemporary internation-
tasked to UN bodies by the Charter. The funda- al system confronts a wide range of transnational
mental problem with the nascent rivalry between and global problems. It also has a broad panoply of
the G-bodies and the UN bodies is an underlying international and regional institutions—technical,
misconception of their comparative advantages political, and operational—geared to solving these
and of the potential relationship between them. problems. Yet these two realities don’t add up.
Gaps, overlaps, incoherence and underperformance
Rather than viewing the G-20 as a threatened are chronic to the world of multilateral institutions.
usurper of the United Nations, this paper takes a Can the G-20 help drive improved performance?
Policy Analysis Briefs are thought-provoking contributions to the public debate over peace and security issues. The views expressed in this brief are
those of the author and not necessarily those of the Stanley Foundation. The author’s affiliation is listed for identification purposes only.2 Background: Globalization and Global security” challenges.2 The flurry of activities
Arrangements and innovations in peacekeeping, mediation,
The pertinent context for any discussion of humanitarian assistance, and international
evolving global arrangements is the inter- justice were a reflection not of great power
linked phenomena of economic and political politics, but of middle power activism.
globalization. These two currents, and the
backlashes against them, have been the dom- Second, the 9/11 attacks on the United
inant forces shaping global life in the post- States intensified multilateral cooperation,
Cold War era. Three major effects of both through formal and informal institu-
globalization are: tions, to tackle a range of transnational
threats.3 The extent of adaptation of institu-
• Widening and deepening interdependence, tions to this transnational agenda has varied
in economic, health, climate, and even by issue and institution, but every major
(partially) in security terms. multilateral body has undertaken reform
measures related to transnational threats.
• Rising salience of transnational threats, This line of reform continues, the next point
and of “global issues.” notwithstanding.
• The growth of the emerging economies and After the 2003 launch of the Iraq War, insti-
global financial centers—i.e., a shift in the tutional evolution has aimed toward a rather
economic balance of power. different goal, namely to constrain or frus-
trate US power.4 These reforms have been
The basic arguments about the nature of spread across the entire international system.
globalization and interdependence are by Some have taken place within existing insti-
now well understood, and need not be tutions—as in South Africa’s efforts in 2004
rehearsed. So, too, are the issues of transna- to kick-start UN Security Council member-
tional threats and global issues, particularly ship expansion and drives for voting reform
in the setting of the United Nations.1 And the at the International Financial Institutions
question of the emerging powers—more (IFIs). In other cases, the point was to
specifically the adaptation of the United upgrade existing institutions, most signifi-
Nations to the changed balance of power— cantly China’s elevation of the Shanghai
has likewise loomed over the United Nations Cooperation Organization, but also the
since the backlash against the Iraq War and French/German focus on European Union
the failure of UN Security Council (UNSC) military planning capacity separate from
reform in 2005. NATO. Still other initiatives focused on cre-
ating new institutions in which the United
That said, international institutions have not States does not participate, especially in
completely failed to adapt. Indeed, there has Latin America.5
been far more adaptation of international
(and, increasingly, regional) institutions than Currently, in the aftermath of the financial
is generally understood. The evolution has crisis, we are, arguably, in a fourth phase of
taken place in three mini phases. reform. Based on a change in approach by
the US administration and the underlying
First, after the end of the Cold War, a set of mutual interests among the major and rising
enterprising states—primarily the western powers, the new phase emphasizes issue-
middle powers, with underlying support based clubs of major powers—for instance,
from the United States—worked with inter- the G-20 for global finance, the Major
national organization secretariats to craft Economies Forum (MEF) for energy/climate,
new tools to deal with a range of “human and the upcoming Nuclear Summit for
nuclear safety.Now that informal “leadership clubs” have Congo in the 1960s), they were confined to 3
become the chief means of bringing together force-separation and operating under Chapter
established and emerging powers, important VI mandates. The United Nations currently
questions arise regarding the future of global has over 110,000 troops in the field alongside
arrangements. Will power be concentrated a similar number from NATO. Traditionally,
within these informal great power mecha- neither the UN Development Programme
nisms, or will they instead be used to spur (UNDP) nor The World Bank had any major
decision making in other formal institutions? roles in post-conflict peacebuilding; now they
Will these informal forums acquire greater are part of an alphabet soup of organizations
institutionalized trappings—e.g., a secretari- and literally thousands of nongovernmental
at to the G-20? (Unlikely.) Most important: organizations (NGOs) working in post-conflict
will they develop implementation capacities, settings. Two decades ago, the Comprehensive
or will implementation remain in the hands Test Ban Treaty Organization did not exist,
of governments and other intergovernmental nor did the Organization for the Prohibition of
organizations? If so, how will the major Chemical Weapons. By 2008, the Yearbook of
power clubs relate to the formal institutions? International Organizations listed 246 formal
international institutions, and when the tally
A Changing and Challenging includes subsidiary bodies, treaty bodies,
Institutional Landscape regional organizations, and technical agencies,
To see where the G-20 countries could make the number tops 6,000.6
a difference in multilateral institutions, we
have also to review (briefly) the evolution of Then ask which of the following is more
the institutional landscape itself. The post- astonishing: the massive expansion of the
Cold War era has seen a profusion of inter- machinery of international cooperation, or
national, regional, and nongovernmental the fact that during this era of multilateral
organizations arrayed to deal with state and growth, not one formal international institu-
human security challenges, economic and tion has been closed down due to anachro-
social development goals, and human rights nism? Either way, these twin facts have
and humanitarian agendas. inevitably led to incoherence, coordination
problems, and perverse competition (over
Much of the innovation has taken place with- turf, not performance).
in the formal institutions themselves. To illus-
trate the point, just recall that twenty years But gaps and overlaps between traditional
ago, neither the UN Department for intergovernmental organizations are only part
Peacekeeping Operations nor the Office for of the problem. New regional arrangements
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and evolving roles for existing ones add not
existed. Humanitarian operations were large- only to the solution set, but also to the coor-
ly conducted by the UN High Commissioner dination challenge. The proliferation of
for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International NGOs has had the same effect. And in some
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and areas, private corporations and foundations
operated with a small fraction of the person- now play roles that are at least as large as
nel, funds, and caseload of today’s multilater- those of official multilateral instruments.
al humanitarian system. Now there are
dozens of humanitarian agencies responding Looking across the wide range of sectors,
to crises in more than thirty countries, at a net some common phenomena can be observed:
annual cost of several billion dollars. For
most of the United Nations history, peace- Coordination Challenges. As institutional
keeping operations were few and far between and NGO proliferation gained momentum
and, with occasional exceptions (e.g., in in the 1990s, it sparked a number of efforts
at coordination. Initiatives to tame institu-4 tional incoherence in particular sectors the policing of shipping lanes. But outside
(Peacebuilding Commission [PBC] in peace- the financial realm, the G-7 often missed a
building, the Secretary-General’s Counter- trick in failing to set up links between these
Terrorism Implementation Task Force, and gap-filling mechanisms and other key multi-
the Inter-Agency Standing Committee for lateral bodies, adding to problems of dupli-
humanitarian actors) have either dealt only cation and coordination.
with part of the given problem or met with
only partial success. In some cases, the All this matters for three reasons. First,
coordinating entities, lacking the power to many transnational problems are intercon-
actually fix gaps and overlaps in mandates, nected in nature, and so the solutions must
have become actors in their own right— also be. Yet opportunities for collaboration
adding to, rather than minimizing, coordi- are frequently undermined by turf wars
nation problems. between secretariats or theological disputes
within governing boards. Basic lack of policy
Hybridity. A newer mode of operation is coordination within governments about the
“hybridity,” whereby two or more organiza- positions they take in the governing boards
tions coengage in a given response, some- of institutions compounds the problem.
times in parallel structures, sometimes under (Governing boards blame secretariats; secre-
unified command (United Nations Interim tariats blame governing boards; the truth is a
Administration Mission in Kosovo pattern of mutually reinforcing codepen-
[UNMIK], United Nations Mission in Sudan dence with each using the other to block
[UNMIS]). This term is best known in the serious efforts at collaboration.) The recent
realm of peacekeeping operations but, institutional bickering over who would
arguably, also describes aptly the relation- “own” the fund for donor responses in Haiti
ship between UN political missions and the is only the latest dispiriting evidence that
NATO operation in Afghanistan as well as proliferation of agencies and mandates fre-
the informal links among the United quently overshadows performance, to say
Nations, the Elders, and the Centre for nothing of basic purpose.
Humanitarian Dialogue for their cosupport-
ed mediation efforts in Kenya. In the public Second, tackling global problems is expen-
health sector, the Joint United Nations sive, and we’ve only begun to tally the costs
Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) is a of the financial crisis, fragile states, or the
formally integrated structure between multi- transition to a low-carbon world. Yet money
ple institutions, and the Global Partnership and talent are being wasted in duplication
was set up as a semi-formal hybrid arrange- and anachronistic approaches to problems.
ment between the United Nations, the Bill &
Melinda Gates Foundation, and NGOs. Third, and most important, a mounting
backlash against globalization is mingling
Filling Gaps. Even after multilateralism’s with widespread loss of faith in the multilat-
economic boom times, institutional prolifer- eral system—with the conspicuous gap
ation has left important gaps in the interna- between expectations and outcomes in
tional response to transnational threats. In Copenhagen being merely the latest example.
many such instances, ad hoc policy initia- This matters a great deal, because if publics
tives—best described as “gap filling” meas- believe that cooperation doesn’t work, gov-
ures—have served as an alternative to ernments will have greater difficulty mar-
permanent formal mechanisms. Indeed, the shaling the political will or financial
G-7 showed particular agility in occasionally resources to carry out multilateral solutions.
filling such gaps when formal organizations Governments’ domestic political incentive
moved too slowly, for example, in tackling then is to withhold needed funding and even
terrorist financing or proliferation through publicly criticize institutions—fueling ratherthan fixing the problem. We thus end up in a incentives standpoint, the opportunity to 5
negative cycle of underinvestment and bring issues before leaders of twenty of the
underperformance that, arguably, character- most powerful countries in the world can
izes the United Nations’ core problem in serve as a serious spur to performance. For
contemporary international politics. example, the United Nations’ most creative
response to the financial crisis came not
And then the establishment of several new from ECOSOC or the General Assembly
major power groupings has the potential to (GA) but from the Secretariat’s proposals to
add to the problem of institutional prolifera- the G-20 for a trillion dollars in spending to
tion—as the G-7 did. However, there are non- prevent instability in small and medium
trivial reasons to believe that the G-20 can economies, and a tool for monitoring social
do better. vulnerability. By making room on the agenda
of G-20 sessions for different multilateral
Can the G-20 Help? bodies to present their ideas, the G-20 can
Many of the thousands of international and help drive such creative approaches.
regional organizations that make up the
multilateral system were designed for a dif- The G-20 can also use such invitations to
ferent age. There are myriad overlaps and stimulate collaboration. For instance, it could
redundancies in international capacity—for ask The World Bank and the UN secretary-
example, in the mushrooming network of general to conduct a shared analysis of the
agencies and departments involved in post- likely impact of the financial crisis on renewed
conflict stabilization and peacebuilding, to internal conflict or ask the World Trade
say nothing of NGOs. Yet gaps remain in Organization (WTO) and the United Nations
other important areas, such as managing to conduct a joint study of the impact of trade
resource scarcity or building preventive liberalization on the risk of violent conflict.
defenses against biological threats.7 Theoretically, nothing stops different interna-
tional institutions from collaborating in this
The G-20 can help. This may sound sur- way without the spur of powerful govern-
prising, because the issue of UN/G-20 rela- ments; in reality, that spur is highly useful to
tions is usually cast in terms of the G-20 shape incentives and prioritization.
stealing the United Nations’ thunder. But
this misunderstands the nature of the G-20, Where the issue is not overlap but gaps in
the purposes and strengths of the United the response, the G-20 may well be in a bet-
Nations, and the potential relationship ter position than the G-7 to fill gaps in ways
between the two. that build connections to existing arrange-
ments rather than simply piling one multilat-
Because the G-20 meets at the heads of eral mechanism on top of another.
state level, it has the ability to range across
different policy sectors. Heads of state do G-20 decisions have already given life to
not face the same constraints of institution- IMF and The World Bank governance
al prerogative and can override turf defens- reforms that were long discussed and long
es. Indeed, their job is to make trade-offs delayed. It now seems set that the major
among priorities, see connections, and gal- “emerging” economies—specifically China,
vanize bureaucratic action—all areas where India, and Brazil—will gain greater voice in
the governing boards of formal institutions the management of the international finan-
often come up short. cial system, just as the move from the G-8 to
the G-20 boosted their influence.
Optimally, the G-20 could extract excellence
from other multilateral institutions. From an Although the expansion of the G-8 to the
G-20 prompted concerns at the United6 Nations over lack of representation and As with everything, there are times and
lack of connection to the formal multilater- places where this will work well, and times
al system, the emerging power members and places where it won’t. At the United
may actually be more motivated than the Nations, for example, a G-20 “position”
original G-8 would to forge links to the on peacekeeping could alienate several
United Nations. On climate, China and leading troop contributors that are not rep-
India have both resisted efforts by some to resented in the G-20. But if approached
move negotiations from the UN Framework with some skill and sensitivity, concerns
Convention on Climate Change to the could be assuaged through preconsulta-
Major Economies Forum (basically a G-20 tions and/or careful wording—in other
for global warming). Brazilian and Indian words, effective diplomacy.
foreign policies have emphasized the United
Nations as well as aspirations for increased Why Should the G-20 Care?
roles there; they will thus have national Clearly the biggest source of controversy
interests in finding ways to connect the G- regarding G-20 (like the G-8) is its perceived
20’s work to broader institutions. Middle lack of legitimacy. True, if the concept is
powers like Australia and Indonesia have taken narrowly. On the other hand, the
likewise made a point of highlighting the frank fact of the 2008 financial crisis is that
United Nations’ roles in a wide range of no formal institution could have mounted a
issue areas. collective global response the way the G-20
did, and there is a certain legitimacy that
Of course, the decisions of the G-20 coun- comes from successfully averting a catastro-
tries do not automatically translate into phe of historic proportions. Add in the fact
action within any formal multilateral organi- that the G-20 represents 80 percent of the
zations, and there is no international institu- world’s population and 90 percent of the
tion (except perhaps the IMF) where world’s finance, and the “no legitimacy”
consensus among the G-20 even constitutes argument seems a little hollow. Here, of
enough votes for a decision. But neither is course, an important philosophical differ-
there any institution in which a G-20 con- ence arises: between the one-state, one-vote
sensus would not be a powerful position system on which the state system of sover-
around which other states could rally and eign equality is predicated, and the counter-
which could form a firm basis for negotia- claim that other metrics such as population
tions. Most global deals on any subject are (i.e., weighted voting) should hold sway—by
prebrokered by a “green room” of 15-25 which measure the G-20 is vastly more rep-
leading countries plus representatives of other resentative than the United Nations.
groupings. The G-20 process—or a G-20 cau-
cus of permanent representatives—could play But legitimacy, or the lack thereof, is not
similar roles, especially if tentacles were even even the main reason the G-20 should worry
further extended via informal consultation about the connection to global institutions.
with five or six others representing broader Put aside ethical/legitimacy/democracy argu-
clusters of states. ments for a moment. The real reason for the
G-20 to care about its relationship to the
The way in which the G-20 (and similar United Nations lies in the pervasive nature
major power groupings) relate to formal of interdependence today and the fact that
institutions will differ from issue to issue. the problems we are confronting both
But when it comes to global and transna- affect and can be affected by most nations.
tional problems such as climate change and The G-20 nations may, for instance, pos-
fragile states, the G-20 can hardly ignore the sess the bulk of the financial resources that
longstanding structures and efforts of for- can be devoted to fragile states, but Africa
mal, inclusive institutions.provides a critical quantum of troops for Can the G-20 Help the United Nations? 7
peacekeeping in those states. The G-20 More important than the above arguments is
may emit most carbon, but if a carbon deal the basic point that the United Nations
does not have global political buy-in, works when its most powerful members can
investors will likely game the system by cooperate; when North and South see past
shifting to less restricted markets. The G- their (diminishing) differences; when rising
20 nations may have tremendous assets to powers and established powers see a shared
throw at the counterterrorism fight, but interest either in direct cooperation, or in
any counterterrorism strategy that is limit- using the good offices of the United Nations
ed to 20 countries is bound to fail. The G- to help them find common ground.
20 countries can coordinate their responses
to pandemic outbreaks, but if there is an In the coming period, this will not be easy.
outbreak of a deadly infectious disease in In the Human Rights Council, the disjunc-
the 21st country, or in the 192nd, gaps in tions of interests are likely to contribute
th e re sp o n se will aid in its sprea d. toward still nastier and more dysfunctional
However much influence the 20 have, politics in that body.8 The climate change
many of the problems they confront are the fight will remain contentious, even if
kind where the weakest link can break the Mexico succeeds in devising a productive
chain. Therefore, inclusive collective action new relationship between G-group negotia-
is absolutely critical, not just coordination tions (through the MEF) and UN negotia-
among the biggest players. This is precisely tions—which, after all, eluded the process
what the United Nations has to offer. leading to Copenhagen. The major and ris-
ing powers will also be in competition over
Even in the realm of finance, the G-20 energy and strategic resources, in the
should spare a thought for the simple point process ignoring established norms about
that the basic structure of the international good governance or good investor/donor
system is sovereign equality among nation- behavior. (And lest the point be missed: the
states. Odd though it is that a tiny nation West is every bit as abusive of democratic
has the same vote in the United Nations as norms in its own ways and in its own
China, that’s the rule on which internation- regions of dominance—notably, the Middle
al order is built, and we abuse it at some East—as China is in Africa.)
risk. The G-20 can blow past the structure
of sovereign equality in a crisis (thankfully), While it is not likely that these various sources
but if it operates against that system over of tension will escalate into a great power con-
time, it will sow the seeds of instability in flict, that possibility cannot be entirely
other elements of the international system. ignored. Had John McCain been president in
Denying some states a voice in the basic 2008, for example, and acted on his cam-
structures of international order only cre- paign’s stated policy on the Russia/Georgia cri-
ates incentives for them to behave as if they sis, it may have spiked not just tension but
have no responsibility to uphold or comply actual, if limited, confrontation. The US and
with the order’s norms and expectations. Chinese navies are engaged in a dangerous
Given the number of issues that depend on game of cat and mouse in the South China
broad cooperation, that is an unwise Sea. Border tensions between India and China
course. By contrast, the decision of the are mounting. And if Brazil goes ahead with
United States’ G-20 sherpa to make repeat- nuclear cooperation with Iran, its relations
ed trips to New York to consult with with the West will deteriorate.
ECOSOC and least developed UN member
states about the G-20’s agenda is both good Ironically, the possible beneficiary of any
politics and good substance. great power tensions could be the UN itself,8 within limits of course. After all, peace- and the United States in Iraq, in this
keeping was born in the Middle East when decade, repeat all the same mistakes that
the two superpowers of the day needed a the United Nations made and internalized
UN solution to avoid direct confrontation in the early 1990s, is a reminder of the
when war between their respective allies fact that institutions are capable of learn-
escalated. 9 The United Nations likewise ing and are vital repositories of best prac-
played a major role in Kosovo in the late tice. Granted, of late, the United Nations
1990s, not because the great powers saw has sometimes slipped and seemed to for-
eye to eye, but precisely because they did get those lessons, but this deterioration
not. But such a world of endless tensions often stems directly from pressure by
would make the United Nations useful in member states.
an entirely negative sense—as a tool of cri-
sis avoidance rather than progress in • Universality breeds consent. The inclusivity
achieving the ideals of the Charter. of the United Nations, as well as regional
organizations in their own geographical
In conjunction with the United Nations, the sphere, often proves extremely helpful in
G-20 is an essential tool in avoiding this sce- giving an option for a member government
nario. And here comes the good news. The to invite the organization to play a role.
place where the major and rising powers Time and again political leaders have
have the most deeply shared interests, and shown they find it easier to welcome, and
also where they most need cooperation from explain to citizens, an external presence of
others, is precisely in the area where the a body of which their nation is a member.
United Nations (and the wider panoply of The fact that even the smallest member
multilateral instruments) is best structured to state has an equal voice in fora such as the
respond: in confronting transnational General Assembly gives that state, domesti-
threats; areas of civil and regional conflict cally, a credible storyline with which to
and fragile states; public health and infec- defend its sovereignty while simultaneously
tious disease; climate change; poverty; pira- seeking external assistance, peacekeepers,
cy; and even terrorism. This is where etc. This is the essence of the legitimacy of
multilateral institutions already play impor- the United Nations when present on the
tant roles, with the potential to become even ground. Those who eschewed the opera-
more effective. tional implications of sovereignty and legit-
imacy concerns have been learning the
No small grouping of member states, no hard way in Iraq and Afghanistan.
matter how powerful collectively, can
replace the geographic or political reach of • Geographical breadth. The fact that the
the multilateral system, with the United United Nations operates globally can be
Nations at its core. The United Nations has a hindrance given the sensitivities at play
the following comparative advantages in whenever staff need to be assembled for a
dealing with transnational threats: political department or mediation team.
But it is a huge advantage in both policy
• Long experience. Much as its critics would and political terms, in the ability of the
like to denigrate UN performance, the fact United Nations (and other global organi-
is that the United Nations has spent most zations like The World Bank) to mobilize
of the post-Cold War era dealing with governments on a global level, and to
transnational threats of a wide variety— mix-and-match expertise from different
especially those related to internal state regions and income categories. Think of
weakness and conflict—and, in so doing, Lakhdar Brahimi’s unique credibility
gained invaluable experience. Watching with Afghans, or the ability to deploy
European institutions in the south Balkans neutral Scandinavians into politicaldebate in Africa (or to select from within one established, rising, or regional power’s 9
a region to draw on regional networks security improves if nuclear weapons spread.
and relationships). The United Nations plays critical roles in
combating each of those threats; the G-20
• Substantive breadth. The more we learn members have deep interests in seeing the
about transnational threats, the more we United Nations succeed.
see the powerful interconnections among
different issues. Freestanding, single-issue Not all on its own, of course. The United
organizations may have greater depth in Nations will work ever more in hybrid and
comparison with a UN counterpart. But coordinated responses with regional organi-
the United Nations has unique breadth and zations and other multilateral actors. And
the ability to pull disparate elements of its here again, the fact that G-20 members wield
portfolio together in integrated responses. substantial influence not just in the United
That the United Nations frequently fails to Nations but across that wider set of institu-
make use of this comparative advantage is tions, means that they can, if willing, help
a source of frustration—but as noted ensure that those integrated responses work
above, this is where the G-20 can offer more smoothly than they have to date.
some assistance.
Conclusion
The United Nations needs to continue G-20 members can play important roles in
strengthening its performance in several of unblocking two major obstacles to improved
these areas, including peacekeeping and UN performance. The first is gaps between
counterterrorism. In other areas, like com- governing mechanisms of the Secretariat and
bating poverty, the need is for a serious the governing mechanisms of agencies,
policy shift. And the evidence is mounting already discussed. The second are gaps
that in such areas as development in post- between security and economic governing
conflict and fragile states, both radical pol- bodies. Across a wide range of issue areas,
icy change and radical institutional surgery the United Nations is caught between mech-
are necessary. anisms that are largely the purview of the
UN Security Council and thus the P-5, on
Whatever the appropriate strategy and the one hand, and the ECOSOC and the
reform path, the United Nations will need General Assembly on the other. Cleverly
the G-20 countries on board. Support from used, a G-20 caucus or informal consulta-
the G-20 is not a sufficient condition of UN tion mechanism could bridge this gap and
action—but it is a necessary one. Gone are infuse the UN with political dynamics that
the days when a coalition of western states are more representative of today’s power
with nominal support from African members configuration. Related concerns that this
could drive a forward agenda at the United would undermine progress to Security
Nations. The rising powers are flexing their Council reform should not be heeded. First
institutional muscles and have the ability to of all, right now there is no progress to UN
block or frustrate reforms where those Security Council reform, so little is being
reforms don’t serve their interests.10 But this risked. Second, if G-20 collaboration, how-
is not necessarily a recipe for gridlock, ever informal, works toward greater interna-
because in broad terms, the rising powers tional consensus, effective channels to
share interests with the West on transnation- resolve differences, and spurring improved
al threats. Not one member of the G-20 has UN effectiveness, it will only help ease the
an interest in letting terrorists wreak havoc way to UNSC reform. If instead, more wide-
or seeing a proliferation of fragile states. Not ranging informal G-20 consultations within
one profits from the breakdown of regional the United Nations reveal serious divisions,
security in the Middle East or elsewhere; not10 we are surely better off knowing this before compared to the bigger picture—i.e., a stable
we lock in membership or voting reform at global order in which the United Nations’
the UNSC. members can pursue their wider goals.
If the G-20 succeeds in buttressing a stable For truly transnational problems, only glob-
international financial system and, thereby, al institutions can marshal the broad collec-
reducing tension and conflict between the tive responses needed. Despite current fears,
major and rising powers, it will have made a the G-20 will not replace the United Nations
major contribution to a healthy global order. or other global institutions, but it can—and
Sometimes, it may appear to usurp UN roles, should—help mobilize those organizations
or rough a UN process out of the way. But to do their jobs better.
these are incomparably minor frustrations
Endnotes 7
Jones, Pascual and Stedman 2009, pp. 139-169. See
1
For one reference, see A More Secure World: Our also, Alex Evans, Bruce Jones and David Steven,
Shared Responsibility. Rxeport of the Secretary- “Confronting the Long Crisis of Globalization: Risk,
General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, Resilience and International Order,” Paper for the
and Change. New York: December 2004. Joint Brookings Institution/Center on International
Cooperation Project on Managing Global Insecurity,
2
See for example, Abby Stoddard, “International January 2010, available at: http://www.cic.nyu.edu
Humanitarian Cooperation: Aiding War’s Victims in /internationalsecurity/docs/01_globalization_evans_j
a Shifting Strategic Environment,” in Bruce D. ones_steven.pdf.
Jones, Shepard Forman, and Richard Gowan (eds.)
Cooperation for Peace and Security: Evolving
8
For a recent survey of the structure of interests in the
Institutions and Arrangements in a Context of Human Rights Council (HRC) see Richard Gowan
Changing U.S. Security Policy (Cambridge: and Franziska Brantner, “A Global Force for Human
Cambridge University Press, 2010): 247-268. Rights: An Audit of European Power at the UN,”
European Council on Foreign Relations Policy Paper
3
Eric Rosand and Sebastian von Einsiedel, “9/11, the (Fall 2008).
War on Terror, and the Evolution of Multilateral
Institutions,” in Bruce D. Jones, Shepard Forman,
and Richard Gowan (eds.) 2010: 143-165. 9
Bruce D. Jones, “The Security Council and the Arab-
4
This trend is frequently seen as “soft balancing” Israeli Wars: Responsibility without Power,” in
efforts. See, Robert Anthony Pape, “Soft Balancing Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh and
Against the United States,” International Security Dominik Zaum (eds.) The United Nations Security
30, no. 1: 7-45; T. V. Paul, “Soft Balancing in an Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and
Age of U.S. Primacy,” International Security 30, Practice Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University
no. 1: 46-71. Press, 2008): 298-323.
5
The recent Rio Summit in Cancun, Mexico, saw
10
Jones, Stedman and Pascual 2009: pg. 23; Bruce D.
the announcement of the Community of Latin Jones and Andrew F. Hart, “Building, Bargaining or
American and Caribbean States, which excludes Blocking,” Discussion Paper Prepared for the
the United States. Conference on Emerging Powers, Global Security,
and the Middle East, February 8-10, 2010 (New
6
Yearbook of International Organizations 2008- York: NYU Press, forthcoming).
2009: Revised Edition (Union of International
Associations, 2009).The Stanley Foundation Stanley Foundation reports, publications, pro- 11
The Stanley Foundation is a nonpartisan, private grams, and a wealth of other information are
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