MEASURING REFUGEE INTEGRATION POLICIES IN SWEDEN - Sayaka Osanami Törngren, Henrik Emilsson
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NIEM National Report 2020
A L L I N FO R I N T E G R AT I O N
Sayaka Osanami Törngren, Henrik Emilsson
MEASURING REFUGEE
INTEGRATION
POLICIES IN SWEDEN
RESULTS FROM THE NATIONAL
INTEGRATION EVALUATION
MECHANISM (NIEM)
Dear Sir/Madam,
You hold in your hands a National Report on the implementation of various areas of
integration policy towards beneficiaries of international protection in Sweden. The
report is the result of the evaluation of migration and integration policies in the EU
Member States, implemented as part of the project ‘‘The National Integration
Evaluation Mechanism (NIEM)’’.
NIEM is a six-years long transnational project which aims to prepare key actors in the
integration field in 14 EU Member States to better face the current challenges and
improve the integration outcomes of beneficiaries of international protection.
Representatives of academic centers, non-governmental organizations and think-
tanks were invited to the project.
The main aim of the project is to strengthen the competence of institutions involved
in the integration of people with international protection. Within the research part
of the project, a tool is developed to monitor and comprehensively evaluate the
integration of beneficiaries of international protection and to identify good practices
and obstacles in integration, as well as to assess the impact of legislative and policy
changes. NIEM will establish a mechanism for a biennial, comprehensive assessment
of the integration of beneficiaries of international protection.
The project is based on the assumption that the creating of migration and
integration policy should be based on reliable official data - statistical, legal,
administrative, financial and public policy. It is difficult to shape a rational policy
without such information, therefore it is important to implement the so-called
‘‘evidence based policy’’, i.e. policy based on knowledge and empirical evidences.
NIEM will provide evidences on gaps in integration standards, identify promising
practices and failures in different countries and evaluate the effects of legislative
and policy changes which may provide a basis for further development of an
appropriate integration policy.
This report is the result of the first of three planned evaluation rounds - the so-called
baseline evaluation, which consist of 173 indicators aimed at diagnosing of the
existing situation. The next ones will be carried out periodically every two years. After
each evaluation, it is also planned to issue national reports and a European report
comparing the examined dimensions of integration policies of all participating in the
countries' projects.
The report is addressed to representatives of public administration, academic and
research centers, think-tanks, non-governmental organisations and for all of these
dealing with migration and integration issues. We do hope that the report will meet
Measuring refugee integration policies in Sweden 1
with interest and will be a good basis in creating policies and deepening knowledge
about the integration of beneficiaries of international protection.
1. Introduction
This is a report written for the National Integration Evaluation Mechanism (NIEM)
project. NIEM is a project that develops a method for comparing integration policies
for beneficiaries of international protection, henceforth referred to as refugees.1 All
reports in the project, including comparative and national reports, can be found at
the website http://www.forintegration.eu. The aim of this report is to describe recent
developments in integration policies for refugees in Sweden, with a special focus on
the period between January 1, 2017 and the April 30, 2019 and to examine how
Swedish integration policies compare with the twelve other countries in the project
at a specified point in time, that is April 30, 2019.2
Swedish migration and integration policies are in a state of uncertainty. Deeply
entrenched principles and narratives among many of the political parties have been
discarded in favor of the overall goal of reducing the number of asylum seekers and
family migrants (Emilsson, 2020). The reorientation of policies started during the so-
called refugee crisis. In 2015, a record number of applied for asylum in Sweden,
around 163,000 persons, whereof around 51,000 came from Syria. After initially
promising to keep asylum policies open and generous, the government announced
several changes to the asylum and family migration regulations during the autumn
and winter of 2015 (Emilsson, 2020). After much political debate, a new three-year
temporary law came into force in June of 2016 (Bill 2016:752). Where previously almost
all BIPs received a permanent residence permit, temporary permits are now given.
Persons who are recognized as refugees are granted a three-year temporary
residence permit, while those with subsidiary protection are granted a temporary
permit of thirteen months. Moreover, with the new law, only those who receive
refugee status are entitled to family reunification, and family reunification became
nearly impossible for those granted subsidiary protection. On July 18, 2019, the
parliament extended the temporary migration law for two more years
(2018/19:SfU26), until July 19, 2021. While there is no change in the residence permits
granted for BIPs, amendments to the temporary law mean that those granted
alternative protection now have the same right to family reunification as refugees.
A parliamentary committee is currently investigating the future of Swedish
migration policy (Dir. 2019:32). The proposals are due in August 2020, and we can
1
To make the report more readable, we call all beneficiaries of international protection (whether it be refugee status,
subsidiary protection, humanitarian asylum) refugees. Occasionally, we also use the abbreviation BIP.
2
For some indicators, the cut-off date is June 30, 2019. For statistical data, the reference date is January 1, 2019 (stocks)
and the calendar year 2018 (flows).
Measuring refugee integration policies in Sweden 2
expect several restrictions in the area of asylum, long-term residence permits for BIPs,
and family migration. Another ongoing commission is currently investigating how
language and civics requirements for citizenship should be designed (Dir. 2019:70)
and is due in October 2020. This will lead to the introduction of integration
requirements for naturalization, something that has been absent for decades in
Sweden. As we show in this report, there have been few significant changes in the
migration and integration policies for BIPs between 2017 and 2019, and Sweden still
stands out as a country that provides refugees with good integration opportunities.
The situation may, and probably will, look very different in a few years due to the
ambition of many political parties to reduce the number of asylum seekers to levels
comparable to neighboring countries.
Following this brief introduction, the report consists of four parts. Part 1 describes
the methodology in the NIEM project in relation to previous attempts to compare
and measure integration policies. Part 2 describe the integration policy
developments during the period between January 1,2017 to April 30, 2019. Part 3
provides an overall view of how Swedish integration policy, as of April 30, 2019
compares to the other 12 countries in the project. In Part 4, we compare the
integration policies in Sweden and the Netherlands. Since many of the countries in
the project are very different from Sweden when it comes to the number of refugees
and other factors, we want to compare policies with a similar country to gain an
understanding of the profile of Swedish integration policies for refugees. In Part 5,
we highlight a regional integration measure, NAD, which can be seen as good
practice in integration policy and also works as an example of Sweden’s higher
scores on indicators such as mainstreaming and building bridges and the framework
of implementation and collaboration.
2. Comparing and measuring integration policies
The study of integration policies has come a long way from the grand narratives of
the national models of integration or the dichotomy between civic settler societies
of the new world versus ethnic European nation states (see Alba & Foner, 2015).
Integration policy is not one coherent policy field. Policies tend to differ
dependending on the migration category, and there are several aspects of
integration policies to consider. Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas (2016) identify three
different components in the study of integration policies: frames, measures, and
governance.
Integration policy frames are the ideological/philosophical aspect of integration
policies. A frame involves the problem definition of a policy issue, including the
underlying assumptions of the problem’s causes and remedies. Another aspect of a
Measuring refugee integration policies in Sweden 3
frame is what should be done. Finally, a third aspect is the target group ---- for whom
are integration policies meant? Frame analysis is usually focused on policy
documents and public debate in order to elucidate integration models or integration
discourses. This kind of analysis has been used to identify national philosophies of
integration (Favell, 1998) or models of integration (Koopmans & Statham, 2000). In
recent years, frame analysis has also been used to question these philosophies and
models of integration by re-evaluating them and by showing a policy divergence
between national and local levels of government (Bak Jørgensen, 2012; Duyvendak &
Scholten, 2012).
Integration policy measures refer to the programs in place. What are the main goals
and who do they target? Measures are what is actually done beyond the rhetoric of
political debate. As Dahlström (2004) shows in his dissertation about Swedish
integration policies, frames and measures can develop in different directions
independent of each other, and it is therefore important to take both into account.
When studying policy measures, it is common to make an analytical distinction
between three separate integration policy domains: (i) the legal-political, (ii) the
socio-economic, and (iii) the socio-cultural (Alexander, 2007; Biezeveld & Entzinger,
2003; Freeman, 2004; Penninx & Garcés-Mascareñas, 2016; Samers, 2010). The socio-
economic dimension captures a broad category of policy areas, such as the labor
market, education, housing, healthcare, social security, and policing. The socio-
cultural dimension captures the more subjective and interactive dimension of
migrant integration. This dimension involves various policies that refer to processes
of acculturation on behalf of migrants. The legal-political dimension primarily
captures the civic and political incorporation of migrants into society. The legal part
of this refers, for instance, to access to citizenship, anti-discrimination legislation,
and legal provisions that are specific to migrant groups.
Integration policy governance is about how integration policies are organized and
implemented, which means taking into account a wider range of actors, including
other administrative levels such as regional and local governments. Penninx and
Garcés-Mascareñas (2016) argue that the vertical dimension of integration
policymaking, the relationship between the national, regional, and local levels, is of
particular importance, as both municipalities and the European Union (EU) level have
become increasingly involved in formulating immigrant policies.
Differences in integration policies have often been understood from a national
model perspective where similarities and differences have their origin in historical
experiences. Nation building has created distinct understandings of nationhood and
citizenship that, in turn, influence integration policy responses. Castle and Miller
(1993) classified conceptions of citizenship as either republican, ethnic, or
Measuring refugee integration policies in Sweden 4
multicultural. One influential contribution is Favell´s (2016) classic book Philosophies
of Integration, where he argues that immigrant policies rest on different
philosophies based on contrasting understandings of citizenship and nationality
that are held across political parties. Thus, the national models of integration
connect France with a republican, Britain with a multicultural, and Germany with an
ethnic understanding of citizenship. Other researchers have stressed the importance
of the historical legacy of colonialism (Hansen, 2002) and the timing of
democratization (Howard, 2009). However, many now question whether national
models of integration have any explanatory value. Some suggest that we are
witnessing a local turn in integration policies where the state level has lost
importance due to new forms of local integration policies. In line with this argument,
there has also been strong criticism of methodological nationalism (Wimmer & Glick
Schiller, 2003), which questions the relevance of the state as a unit of analysis.
Typologies of integration policies have also drawn inspiration from political
economy. Countries have different welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990) ---- social
democratic, corporatist-statist, or liberal ---- that influence their policy responses to
migration. Other studies of integration policies find a convergence in policies
through Europeanization and harmonization of policies through the introduction of
civic integration policies (Wallace Goodman, 2010). Hernes (2018) makes an important
contribution to the literature by noting the imprecise measurements on policy
convergence in the academic literature. Hernes argues that we need to distinguish
between three policy dimensions: goals, instruments, and settings, and also
emphasizes the importance of including more than one sub-policy to assess the
overall direction of the national integration policies. Mauritsen et al. (2019) stress
that it is not either-or when it comes to national models of integration and policy
convergence through civic integration policies. They suggest that popular civic
integration notions act in contexts of historically embedded national philosophies of
integration. Another suggestion for integration policy comparisons is provided by
Lutz (2017), who identifies two different mechanisms of policy intervention. He
makes a distinction between two logics for policy interventions: whether they are
based on ideas of capabilities or aspirations. These logics are connected to the
classic distinction between assimilation, where integration outcomes can be
improved by fostering immigrants’ aspirations through incentives and
multiculturalism, whereas integration outcomes can be improved by fostering
immigrants’ capabilities through opportunities.
We believe that comparisons of integration policies should start from an empirical
perspective rather than from typologies about national models. Therefore, we need
to study actual laws, policies, governance, and implementation that collectively
make up the institutional arrangements in receiving states to support refugee
Measuring refugee integration policies in Sweden 5integration. The NIEM project is therefore mapping refugee integration policies in
thirteen policy areas. The indicators are also aggregated into different dimensions
(socio-economic, socio-cultural, legal-political) and categories (legal arrangements,
policies, and implementation).
2.1 Comparing integration policies with indices
In recent decades, we have seen many efforts to compare migration and integration
policies in a systematic way by building databases and indices. However, efforts to
compare policies in a more structured way is more common when it comes to
migration policies (Bjerre et al., 2015). Some of these efforts are the International
Migration Policy and Law Analysis (IMPALA) database (Gest et al., 2014) and the
Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) project (Helbling et al., 2017).
Fewer efforts have been made to compare integration policies, with MIPEX being an
exception. We will return to MIPEX later in the article. Comparisons of integration
haver focused more on explaining integration outcomes than policy outputs. Some
aspects of integration policies that are more closely linked to migration, such as
citizenship policies and civic integration policies, have been rather well explored
(Helbling, 2013). Citizenship policies have been compared over time by Howard (2009)
through the Citizenship Policy Index (CPI), and data collection is ongoing in the
Global Citizenship Observatory (GLOBALCIT). Integration policies related to migration
control are also quite well developed by Goodman's Civic Integration Policy Index
(CIVIX) (Wallace Goodman, 2010). Other contributions have compared specific
provisions for asylum seekers and refugees, for example, the right to work and access
to social welfare (Poptcheva & Stuchlik, 2015) and housing provisions (Mouzourakis,
Polletand & Ott, 2019). Other comparisons of integration policies are based on case
studies in anthologies and textbooks and provide limited information on refugee
integration policies (Alba & Foner, 2015; Geddes & Scholten, 2016).
Our refugee integration index is heavily influenced by the Migrant Integration Policy
Index (MIPEX), which maps migration integration policies in most OECD countries.
The biggest difference between our index and the index used by MIPEX is the target
group. While MIPEX is said to compare integration policies for migrants excluding
refugees (Huddleston, Bilgili, Joki, and Vankova, 2015), the NIEM is especially targeted
at refugees and other persons granted international protection. MIPEX is also more
extensive in scope when it comes to the number of countries covered.
Both NIEM and MIPEX use indicators to measure integration policies. The
measurement of socio-economic participation and integration through indicators
has gradually gained importance in EU policy debates (Huddleston, Niessen & Dag
Tjaden, 2013; UNHRC, 2013). One of the conclusions of the Common Basic Principle for
Immigrant Integration Policy in the EU (2004) says
Measuring refugee integration policies in Sweden 6Developing clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms is necessary to
adjust policy, evaluate progress on integration and to make the exchange of
information more effective.
The European Commission identifies this principle as a ‘‘need for tools and yardsticks
to enhance government’s capacity to evaluate the relevance, efficiency,
effectiveness, sustainability and impact of policies and practices’’ (Huddleston, 2009).
In the report ‘‘Using EU Indicators of Immigrant Integration’’ (Huddleston, Niessen &
Dag Tjaden 2013), three key policy purposes for using integration indicators are
identified: understanding integration contexts and immigrants’ integration
outcomes, evaluating the results of policies, and mainstreaming integration into
general policies. A descriptive analysis of indicators can provide a detailed and
complete picture of the policy diversity in European societies. Aggregated analysis
can identify and test widely-held assumptions about integration outcomes by
determining whether various potential factors are correlated to integration
outcomes in a statistically significant way. Moreover, the use of indicators over time
gives policy actors a new long-term perspective for policy planning. The availability
of indicators is therefore a starting point for more informed communication in the
development of a coherent integration policy within a country but also across the EU.
ϭ͘ϭ The NIEM methodology
Despite the wealth of public discourse on the usefulness of integration indicators for
policy evaluation, the application of accurate and comparable indicators, specifically
on refugee integration in the EU, is still quite rare (UNHCR 2013). The NIEM project
hopes to fill this gap by developing a method for comparing integration policies for
BIPs.
The project has identified 173 indicators based on integration standards for
beneficiaries of international protection.3 The normative framework from which
indicators are derived comprises EU legal standards4, EU policy standards5, and
international legal standards.6 The 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol
(Art. 34) explicitly call on states to facilitate integration and access to citizenship for
refugees. It includes a range of social and economic rights, among them, the right to
gainful employment, public education, housing, social security, and public relief,
which represent fundamental instruments for the integration of refugees. The
European Union enshrined integration standards for beneficiaries of international
protection when it created the stable legal framework of the Common European
3
All indicators are listed in the Appendix.
4
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Qualification Directive, Family Reunification Directive,
Reception Conditions Directive.
5
Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy, Commission Communication on guidance for application
of the Family Reunification Directive
6
Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, European Convention
on Human Rights, UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, European Convention on Nationality.
Measuring refugee integration policies in Sweden 7Asylum System (CEAS). The Asylum Procedures, Reception Conditions, Qualification, and Family Reunification Directives all aim for the full and effective implementation of the Geneva Convention. These binding legislative acts set a series of standards that shape the integration process, starting from the reception phase until full legal, socio-economic, and socio-cultural integration. The EU and its Member States have likewise agreed in their Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the EU, adopted in 2004 and re-affirmed ten years later, to consider integration as a ‘‘dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States.’’ Indicators were defined and selected to represent the quality of integration policies and the state of development. The indicators only assess the integration policies for beneficiaries of international protection established by the central governments. Measures developed and implemented on local or regional levels of government or by civil society are therefore not included in the evaluation. Only in those cases where local/regional and civil society actors implement measures under the framework of a government policy and receive adequate funding for this are such activities considered part of the national policy framework. The NIEM indicators cover four major areas and thirteen dimensions, as listed below. Figure 1. Four areas and thirteen dimensions measured through NIEM The different indicators offer a unique combination of various inputs, ranging from legal and policy indicators to administrative implementation and financial investments, policy coordination efforts, and integration outcomes. All participating countries filled out a standardized questionnaire with a common scoring system. Each indicator is formulated as a specific question relating to a Measuring refugee integration policies in Sweden 8
different aspect of refugee integration. The indicators differentiate between the different categories of beneficiaries of international protection.7 Points are assigned to each indicator from 0 (the least favorable) to 100 (the most favorable). For the indicators that require absolute figures and percentages, special scoring rules have been developed. Calculations of averages are used for the scoring. Because of the data gap that exists in many of the thirteen participating countries, it is currently not possible to draw a meaningful comparison across countries for all the indicators. This report only focuses on the three blocks listed below. Moreover, due to the data gap, we do not aggregate any of the results beyond the level of the three blocks. Figure 2. Three blocks analyzed in the NIEM National Report 7 These categories are: Recognized refugees, beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, resettled refugees, persons under temporary protection, persons under humanitarian protection. Measuring refugee integration policies in Sweden 9
3. Key developments in integration policies 2017-2019
The previous comparative report published in the NIEM project showed the policy
situation up until the December 31, 2016. In this part of the report, we present
significant events that have occurred between that date and April 30 in relation to
policy developments and up until the end of 2019 for key figures.
3.1 Overview of asylum applications and newly arrived refugees
2017-2019
The number of asylum applications has decreased from the record high of 163,000 in
2015 to a stable 21, 000 to 22,000 in 2018 and 2019. The number of decisions is still
higher than the number of applications due to the backlog that has existed since the
‘‘refugee crisis’’ began. However, the average waiting time for a decision has
decreased from about 500 days in 2017 and 2018 to 288 days in 2019. The number of
asylum seekers receiving a positive decision has gone down in recent years.
According to the Migration Agency (2020), this is due to the changing composition of
asylum seekers, with fewer decisions handed down to asylum seekers from countries
with a higher acceptance rate and a growing proportion of citizens from countries
with a high rejection rate.
Table 1. Asylum applications and first-time asylum decisions, 2017-2019.
Average Percent
YEAR Applications Decisions Granted Rejected
time granted
2017 25,666 66,301 27,205 30,802 496 41%
2018 21,502 33,512 11,217 17,908 507 32%
2019 21,958 24,569 6,540 12,186 288 27%
Source: Public statistics from the Migration Agency
In addition to the first-time decisions by the Migration Agency, persons can also be
granted protection at a later stage by the Migration Court of Appeal, through
resettlement, and special legislation. The total number of BIPs is therefore higher
than what the Migration Agency’s figures on asylum decisions suggest. The table
below shows the breakdown of the different categories of BIPs. As we can see, the
number of resettled refugees in 2019 is higher than the number of recognized
refugees for the first time. In connection with the 2016 temporary migration law, the
refugee quota was increased from 2,000 to 5,000 per year. Resettled refugees are also
a privileged group who continue to receive permanent residence permits. The
Measuring refugee integration policies in Sweden 10indicators for refugees, thus, only reflect the situation for recognized refugees. A
large group of the BIPs in 2018 and 2019 fall into the category ‘‘other.’’ A large majority
of them received residence permits through special legislation for previously
rejected unaccompanied asylum seekers (see section 2.2.1 of this report).
Table 2. Persons granted asylum, first-time decisions 2017-2019
2017 2018 2019
Resettled refugees 4,846 5,219 5,253
Recognized
15,366 8,150 5,161
Refugees
Subsidiary
13,778 5,017 2,688
Protection
Other 2,541 6,728 6,099
Total 36,531 25,114 19,201
Source: Public statistics from the Migration Agency
3.2 Policy developments 2017-2019
This section lays out the policy developments between January 1, 2017 and April 30,
2019. In this period, only a few policy changes in the area of migration and
integration policies for BIPs were decided by the government and parliament. The
one-time legislation to provide rejected unaccompanied asylum seekers a new
opportunity to apply for a residence permit was a major decision (3.2.1), but it does
not affect any integration indicator. Additional funds for integration measures for
asylum seekers did move one indicator in a slightly positive direction (3.2.2). New
regulations for the Introduction Program did change the administration of the
program but not the amount of funding or the content of the program (3.2.3). A new
law on the settlement of unaccompanied minors only affected the sharing of
responsibilities between local governments (3.2.4). Lastly, a variety of new measures
to improve labor market integration for newly arrived refugees were launched (3.2.5).
3.2.1 The new law on upper-secondary level studies for rejected unaccompanied
asylum seekers
On the June 7, 2018, a majority of the parliament decided to provide rejected asylum
seekers who had applied as unaccompanied minors a new, one-time opportunity to
Measuring refugee integration policies in Sweden 11receive a 13-month temporary residence permit (Prop. 2017/18:252). This opportunity
was open only during the period between July 1, 2018 and September 30, 2018. In
order to receive this permit, applicants must have:
ͻ applied for asylum for the first time on or before November 24, 2015.
ͻ registered as an unaccompanied minor in the application and been assigned to a
municipality that was to arrange accommodation.
ͻ received a deportation decision at the age of 18 or older.
ͻ waited more than 15 months to receive a decision.
ͻ received the deportation decision on or after July 20, 2016.
ͻ studied and intend to study at the upper-secondary level education or be
currently enrolled in such a program.
ͻ been in Sweden when applying for the permit.
ͻ not committed a crime or shown any indication of being a security risk.
If the applicant’s studies required additional time to be completed, an extended
residence permit may have been granted. When the studies were completed, the
person could then get a six-month residence permit to find employment. If the
person found employment that sustains livelihood, a permanent residence permit
could then be granted.
From these requirements, one gets the impression that few would qualify for the
new temporary residence permit. However, the Migration Agency received a total of
11,776 applications for this residence permit. In the spring of 2019, 6,404 applicants
had been approved, 2,791 had been rejected, and 2,440 cases are yet to be settled,
mainly in the migration courts (Socialstyrelsen, 2019). According to statistics from the
Migration Agency, a total of 4,908 persons received the permit in 2018 and 4,495 in
2019.8
The law on upper-secondary level studies is quite complex, and there are still
uncertainties in the implementation of the law. It is unclear what the responsibilities
the municipalities have for housing and other types of welfare services, what kind of
education is required, and what kind of employment is needed for a permanent
residence permit.
3.2.2 Measures for asylum seekers
In August 2015, new funding for language training and civic orientation for asylum
seekers was allocated. On February 1, 2017, additional grants were put in place
8
https://www.migrationsverket.se/download/18.748d859516793fb65f9ce4/1579524846871/Beviljade_uppeh%C3%A5llstill
st%C3%A5nd_2019.pdf;
https://www.migrationsverket.se/download/18.4cb46070161462db113174/1550131463060/Beviljade_uppeh%C3%A5llstil
lst%C3%A5nd_2018.pdf
Measuring refugee integration policies in Sweden 12for ’’early integration measures for asylum seekers’’ who were staying at the
9
Migration Agency´s reception centers. The state grants are channelled to civil
society organizations and in some cases to municipalities and municipal
associations. The regional county administrative boards were given the task of
coordinating the allocation of the funds and overall responsibility for the work with
early integration measures for asylum seekers throughout the country. The purpose
of these efforts is to speed up the integration process and, at the same time, make
the asylum waiting period more meaningful.
3.2.3 New regulatory framework for the Introduction Program
On January 1, 2018, a new regulatory framework for the Introduction Program came
into force (Prop. 2016/17:175). The content and organization of the program remained
essentially unchanged, but the regulations were changed to make them more similar
to the regulations for unemployment in general. Some of the new features are:
ͻ A larger portion of the regulations are defined through ordinances rather than
laws.
ͻ BIPs will be assigned to a labor market program, i.e. the Introduction Program.
ͻ The individual introduction plan is replaced with an individual action plan.
ͻ A proportionate system of sanctions for non-compliance is introduced, which
includes warnings and termination.
ͻ The handling of economic compensation is transferred from the Public
Employment Service to the Social Insurance Agency (Försäkringskassan).
So, what does this all mean? The fact that regulations are now decided by ordinances
to a greater extent than law means that a harmonization of the Introduction
ProgramIntroduction Program with general labor market policy is needed. When the
2010 Introduction ProgramIntroduction Program was launched, it was emphasized
that it was based on a law which would ensure uniformity. Now, the emphasis has
instead shifted to the importance of creating better conditions for increased
flexibility and efficiency in the introduction assignment. According to the
government (Prop. 2016/17:175, p. 32), regulating the Introduction
ProgramIntroduction Program by law was a ‘‘deviation from how the government
normally regulates labor market policies,’’ which are mainly regulated by ordinances.
The choice of regulatory instrument is important, laws are difficult to change relative
to ordinances, which can be changed by the government without parliamentary
support. The change from an individual introduction plan to an individual action plan,
new sanctions, and the administration of economic compensation also equates to
harmonization with the general labor market policy for the unemployed. This means
little for the newly arrived BIPs but makes the administration within the Public
9
https://www.regeringen.se/artiklar/2017/01/tidiga-insatser-for-asylsokande/
Measuring refugee integration policies in Sweden 13Employment Service easier. However, some believe that the possibilities for
sanctions towards participants has increased, since there was a stronger perspective
on the ‘‘right to an Introduction Program’’ in the previous law compared to general
labor market programs.
As of 2018, an ‘‘education duty’’ for newly arrived BIPs lacking an upper-secondary
education was introduced (idib). This education duty means that all participants in
the Introduction Program who do not have sufficient education and are therefore
assessed as a group that will have difficulty finding gainful employment during the
duration of the two-year Introduction Program are to be enrolled in adult education.
Non-compliance is sanctioned through a reduction of the introduction benefit.
3.2.4 Residential placement of asylum seekers and BIPs
New laws were introduced in 2014 (Prop. 2012/13:162) and in 2016 (Prop. 2015/16:54) to
disperse newly arrived BIPs across municipalities to ‘‘spread the burden’’ and
increase settlement capacity. The laws force municipalities to settle a designated
number of unaccompanied minors and newly arrived refugees. Some municipalities
procured housing and other services in neighboring municipalities, which was
considered a problem that needed to be stopped. As of May 1, 2018, it is not possible
for municipalities to relocate unaccompanied minors to nearby municipalities other
than the originally designated municipalities (Prop. 2017/18:119).
3.2.5 Employment related initiatives
A number of new initiatives for newly arrived refugees have been launched within
the area of labor market policy. On May 1, 2018, a new employment subsidy called
‘‘introductory job’’ was introduced (Prop. 2017/18:1) and replaced the old ‘‘step-in
jobs.’’ The introductory job subsidizes 80 percent of the salary up to SEK 20,000
(approximately 2,000 EURO) a month. In addition to the salary subsidy, the employer
also receives monetary incentives for giving supervisory support. The subsidy is
designed so that it can be combined with educational pursuits, such as Swedish
language education.
Since February of 2017, The Delegation for the Employment of Young People and
Newly Arrived Migrants 10 has been tasked with promoting collaboration between the
Public Employment Service and the municipalities to get BIPs into the workforce
(SOU 2018:12). The objective is to achieve a deeper cooperation on the local and
regional level. Approximately SEK 50 million is allocated each year in support of the
agreements. Other measures include the SEK 910 million investment in green jobs for
newly arrived BIPs between 2018----2020 (Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation, 2018a)
and internships for newly arrived BIPs in state agencies during 2019 and 2020
(Finansdepartementet, 2018).
10
Delegationen för unga och nyanlända till arbete, DUA
Measuring refugee integration policies in Sweden 14The government has also given the Agency for Economic and Regional Growth11
several tasks to work with newly arrived BIPs. One of the biggest initiatives is called
‘‘Simple Jobs,’’ which is intended to ‘‘expand successful initiatives to create easier
paths for jobs in private businesses’’ (Ministry of Enterprise and InnovationMinistry
of Enterprise and Innovation, 2018b). The Agency is expected to spend SEK 50 million
in 2018 and SEK 60 million annually in 2019 and 2020. Another initiative called the ‘‘Job
Leap’’ is an internship program for newly arrived BIPs who have completed higher
education, primarily in engineering, natural sciences, architecture, or economics. The
agency has set aside SEK 15 million per year for this program for the period between
2019-2021. (Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation, 2018c). Moreover, 12.5 million is set
aside in 2019 and 2020 to strengthen the integration perspective in the regional skills
supply work (Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation, 2018d). Finally, the agency has
received two assignments relating to newly arrived female BIPs. SEK 10 million is
allocated annually between 2018-2021 to improve networks and contacts in the labor
market for foreign-born women (Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation, 2018e).
During the same period, SEK 15 million is allocated annually to promote
entrepreneurship among foreign-born women. The target group for the latter
assignment was changed in September 2018 to also include newly arrived men
(Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation, 2018f).
11
Tillväxtverket
Measuring refugee integration policies in Sweden 154. Where do Sweden’s policies stand in 2019? Where do Sweden´s integration policies for persons granted international protection stand in comparison to the other 12 countries? We can conclude that despite policy changes intended to make Sweden a less attractive country for asylum seekers through the temporary law in 2016, the country is viewed as a favorable country for refugees. Sweden scores higher than other countries in the legal framework for refugee integration. This is in line with the country’s integration policies since the 1970s, with a goal of equal rights independent of citizenship or residency status. Welfare services and rights are granted based on residence and domicile, rather than citizenship. The policy changes made in 2016 did affect the legal framework, especially the change from permanent to very short residence permits. While the majority of the other 12 countries are granting a 5-year permit for recognized refugees, Sweden is granting a temporary permit of 3 years. Sweden therefore scores below average when it comes to the indicator on residency. For the other legal indicators, Sweden tends to score more favorably than other countries. When it comes to the policy framework for socio-economic and socio-cultural integration, Sweden stands out even more with its very favorable integration policy. Despite a more negative discourse about asylum seekers and refugees, we have seen no major changes in integration policies, and funding remained the same and even increased. Therefore, socioeconomic and sociocultural integration policies score high on most indicators. Opportunities are quite plentiful through the well- established and well-funded Introduction Program that ensures targeted support for refugees to acquire country-specific human capital. The only area where the score is low is in the impact of reception on integration. This is due to long waiting times for asylum seekers. Lastly, the scores for implementation and collaboration also appear to be very favorable. Over the years, a stable multi-level governance system has been built up to coordinate and fund local Introduction Programs. On the negative side, recent developments have led to certain problems with capacity that could hinder integration. The housing situation is strained, and opportunities in the housing market are not good. There is certainly room for improvement. Waiting times for family reunification and citizenship have increased and do not live up to international norms. Another aspect that reduces Sweden’s scores is the lack of NGOs and refugee involvement. The Swedish model rests on public sector funding and service provision, where other Measuring refugee integration policies in Sweden 16
countries rely more on civil society organizations. As the normative scoring model favors integration policies where refugee organizations are consulted and where civil society organizations are involved in delivering key integration services, Sweden does score low on some indicators. Below are figures showing the average scoring of all 13 countries in comparison to Sweden. Figure 3. Legal Framework E@
Figure 4. Policy Framework (socio-economic & socio-cultural integration) E@
5. Comparison between the Netherlands and Sweden
In this section, we will specifically compare the scores for the Netherlands and
Sweden for 2019. The two countries are final destinations for BIPs and have a
longstanding history of receiving refugees and migrants, which provides a
comparable context.
5.1 Brief description of integration policies in the Netherlands
Migration to the Netherlands in the 1970s mainly concerned guest workers from the
Mediterranean countries. Until the late 1970s, the policy assumption was that the
stay of ’’guest workers’’ would be temporary. The objective at that time was to
address the welfare needs of guest workers and other vulnerable groups, such as
asylum seekers and migrants from former Dutch colonies (Bruquetas-Callejo, M., et al.,
2009). This approach shifted in the 1980s when it became clear that guest workers,
including their families, would not return to their countries of origin. In order to
improve their social and economic participation in Dutch society, a so-
called ’’minority policy’’ was developed with a strong focus on the preservation of
one’s own cultural identity.
It appeared, however, that this group-orientated approach was not a success, and in
the 1990s, the Dutch government therefore focused more on the individual
participation of newcomers in the labor market and education (Commissie Blok,
Bruggen bouwen, Onderzoek Integratiebeleid, Tweede Kamer 2003-2004). In the early
1990s, a number of cities started to offer civic integration courses to newcomers,
which is considered an important first step for immigrants, including refugees, to be
able to participate in Dutch society. These integration courses were later adopted in
the 1998 Civic Integration Act (Wet inburgering nieuwkomers) (Ibid.). In the years that
followed, several events, such as the murder of Pim Fortuyn in 2002 and Theo van
Gogh in 2004, dramatically changed the discourse on migration and integration. With
the introduction of the 2007 Civic Integration Act (Wet inburgering), newcomers
themselves were responsible for seeking out and financing their civic integration
courses and for successfully passing the exam within 3.5 years.
The 2013 Civic Integration Act (Wet inburgering 2013) raised the bar for newcomers.
As of January 1, 2013, all newcomers12 between 16 and retirement age must pass a
civic integration exam within 3 years. The objective of the mandatory civic
integration exam is to ensure that newcomers acquire language skills at the A2 level.
Self-reliance and personal responsibility are important aspects of the current Dutch
integration policy. The refugees themselves are responsible for successfully plotting
their integration trajectory. Furthermore, the Dutch integration policy relies on the
12
Newcomers: persons granted international protection or third-country nationals who are granted a residence permit
for a non-temporary purpose, or persons who are admitted as a religious servant.
Measuring refugee integration policies in Sweden 19private sector. The assumption is that refugees are competent to pay for their own
language courses, which are offered by organizations in the private sector. Since
1998, municipalities were required to offer refugees and religious servants language
courses. However, this changed with the introduction of the Civic Integration Act in
2013. Municipalities no longer have a key role in the integration process. Moreover,
the Dutch integration trajectory is mandatory for all newcomers. Where refugees fail
to pass the civic integration exam within a 3-year period, this may lead to a fine of a
maximum of € 1250, or it may even have consequences for their permanent residence
permit.
A recent study from Statistics Netherlands (CBS) shows that 58 percent of the 2014
cohort have passed the civic integration exam at A2 level after four years, 19 percent
received an exemption, and 21 percent subject to the civic integration requirement
received an extension to pass the exam (CBS).
Since 2017, as part of the civic integration trajectory, newcomers are also required to
participate in the ‘participatieverklaringstraject’ in which they become acquainted
with Dutch core values and are required to sign a participation statement
(‘participatieverklaring’) (Yabasun, D., et al., 2019).
More recently, the Dutch government has announced that it will once again reform
its national policy on integration. The new legislation will reinforce the role of the
municipalities in the integration process. In addition, all newcomers will receive a
more individualized integration plan in which they can learn the language in
combination with work or study. The level of language proficiency required, however,
will increase from A2 to B1. The reform of the national policy on integration is
13
planned to enter into force in 2021.
13
For further information and details on the Dutch integration policy, please read the Dutch National report which can
be found at http://www.forintegration.eu/pl/pub.
Measuring refugee integration policies in Sweden 205.2 Comparison between Sweden and the Netherlands
The following section specifically focus on the dimensions where the indicator
scores in Sweden and the Netherlands differ. With this comparative approach, we
want to highlight the characteristics of Swedish integration policies.
5.2.1 Mainstreaming
Sweden has a national strategy for the integration of beneficiaries of international
protection and a dedicated budget for implementation. The Netherlands has general
policies addressing the integration of third-country nationals which are also applied
to BIPs. There are, however, few specific strategies or funds allocated for refugees.
Local entities are involved in implementation in both countries, but in the
Netherlands, they operate in the absence of a comprehensive and formalized
national policy framework. Also, the Netherlands lacks a focus on social partners,
such as trade unions, employers’ organizations, and professional associations who
are a part of the policy strategy for integration in Sweden.
Sweden has a regular mechanism that allows the ministry responsible for the
integration of BIPs to monitor integration outcomes. Specific orders for reports are
directed to the Public Employment Service which is responsible for the coordination
of the Introduction Program, and Statistics Sweden has a program to follow up on
integration outcomes. In the Netherlands, national monitoring frameworks on
migrant integration exist, but they do not specifically focus on beneficiaries of
international protection.
Chart 1. Mainstreaming
Measuring refugee integration policies in Sweden 215.2.2 Residency
With the introduction of the temporary law on asylum and family migration in 2016,
Sweden went from a favorable score to an unfavourable score on residence. Where
historically almost all beneficiaries of international protection were immediately
granted permanent residence, they now receive a three-year temporary permit. In
almost all countries, including the Netherlands, the state provides refugees with
residence permits that are valid for at least five years. Both countries also require
beneficiaries to reapply for new residence permits. When other regulations for
residence permits are included, both Sweden and the Netherlands score low on
secure residence. Some positives are that neither the Netherlands nor Sweden
charge a s fee for applications.
Chart 2. Residency
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5.2.3 Citizenship
Access to citizenship is one policy area where Sweden and the Netherlands
developed different policies.
The residence requirement of 5 years and 3 years for stateless persons is the same in
both countries. Also, the asylum seeking period is counted as part of the residence
time. Although there are no economic requirements, the Netherlands demands
language and integration requirements for naturalization.
The second generation of asylum seekers born within Dutch territory have the right
to Dutch citizenship through the option procedure, meaning the right to acquire
Dutch citizenship by confirmation of a declaration. This option can be exercised after
having reached the age of majority (18 years). If the person involved was born
stateless, the option can be exercised after having reached the age of three years.
Measuring refugee integration policies in Sweden 22This is different from Sweden where all children under 18 can acquire Swedish citizenship by declaration. In the Netherlands, a single application for naturalization costs EUR 644 for BIPs. A dual request (together with a spouse/partner) costs 884 EUR. The fee in Sweden is EUR 150 per application. Chart 3. Citizenship 5.2.4 Employment Employment is one of the dimensions where Sweden scores much higher and the differences between the countries are the largest. The Swedish Introduction Program includes good access to free language training and labor market preparatory services. These services are privatized in Netherlands with only limited support and funding from the state. With these measures in place, Sweden comes across as very favorable in comparison to all other countries in the study. The reason Sweden does not score higher in employment and some other fields is the limited role assigned to NGOs. In the Netherlands, the recognition of formal degrees is offered for free as part of the civic Introduction Program for BIPs. Asylum seekers and others may apply for this but are required to pay themselves. However, skills assessment (Evaluatie van Competenties - EVC) is not facilitated by the government and costs between EUR 1,000-1,500 Measuring refugee integration policies in Sweden 23
Chart 4. Employment 5.2.5 Language learning and social orientation In this area, Sweden receives a very high score while the Netherlands receives one of the country’s lowest. This can again be explained by the two contrasting systems for refugee integration, i.e., the comprehensive Introduction Program in Sweden compared to the privatized system in the Netherlands. This is clear when we look at the legal framework, where Sweden scores 100 and the Netherlands 0. The lack of publicly funded learning in the Netherlands still comes with many civic integration requirements, while Sweden offers comprehensive training with no requirements. In Sweden, language training courses are taught according to a country-wide standardized curriculum; the courses encourage interaction with the receiving society, are regularly evaluated according to country-wide quality standards, and are complemented by additional information. In the Netherlands, BIPs between 16 and retirement age are obliged to pass the civic integration exam within 3 years of receiving their residence permit. They can take out a loan to pay for the courses (max. EUR 10,000 if they take courses at a certified school), and if they pass within 3 years, the loan then becomes a gift. Asylum seekers are offered Dutch language lessons by volunteers (not qualified teachers) but are not offered access to integration courses, as the government does not want to create the expectation of residency in case the asylum request is later rejected. If BIPs do not pass the integration requirements within 3 years, they may be fined up to EUR 1,250. Extensions are granted for a 3-year period if: the person can demonstrate that they have made a significant effort to pass; the person is illiterate; the person had a baby; or the person was sick for more than 3 months. Language training is not provided as standard in reception centers as integration is assumed to apply only to persons with a right of residence in the Netherlands. Measuring refugee integration policies in Sweden 24
Chart 5. Language and Social Learning 5.2.6 Building bridges Both Sweden and the Netherlands receive their lowest scores on building bridges, although the two countries are ranked the highest among the 13 countries compared. In Sweden, the official policy is that integration is a two-way street and there are measures in place to stimulate participation in refugee associations. The low score again reflects the marginal roles for NGOs in Sweden. There are, for example, few consultation processes involving BIPs and few efforts to encourage voluntary initiatives in the Introduction Program in both countries. Chart 6. Building Bridges Measuring refugee integration policies in Sweden 25
5.2.7 Some conclusions Sweden scores much higher than the Netherlands on most indicators. This is in line with what we can expect from other studies of integration policies and means that the indicators and the index seem to reflect real policy differences between countries. The Swedish model rests on public sector funding and service provision. The Netherlands, on the other hand, has spearheaded civic integration policies and at the same time withdrawn most state funding and service provisions for refugees. Scored against the normative framework we apply, the Netherlands should score much lower than Sweden. Our comparison finds few evidences of a convergence of integration policies. One can argue that the two countries showed more similarities in the mid-90s than they do today. It could be true that integration policy frames are becoming more similar, but huge differences in actual policies and implementation remain (Mouritsen, Kriegbaum Jensen Larin, 2019). The policy differences between the two countries are found in policy frames as well as in measures and governance (Penninx & Garcés- Mascareñas, 2016). Starting with frames, the model in the Netherlands is based on the logic of aspiration through incentives whereas the Swedish model is based on an effort to foster integration by investing in capabilities of refugees (see Lutz, 2017). In line with these logics, access to integration services in the Netherlands is a matter for the individual refugee. Sweden, on the other hand, offers free and state- funded services to increase the human capital (capabilities) of refugees. The role of the state and the governance of integration is therefore also quite different. Measuring refugee integration policies in Sweden 26
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