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Municipal elections
in northern Kosovo:
towards a new balance?
Filip Ejdus, Leon Malazogu and Milan Nič
www.cepolicy.org
DAV4 Full Report | 1Municipal elections in northern Kosovo:
towards a new balance?
By Filip Ejdus, Leon Malazogu and Milan Nič1
Executive summary
The municipal elections in Kosovo on While the northern politicians have
3 November will be a litmus test for embraced a passive boycott, several
the Brussels Agreement and for the violent incidents herald a climate of
normalisation of relations between active intimidation that could seriously
Serbia and Kosovo, but also an omen reduce turnout or potentially halt the
for the EU’s ability to impose stability electoral process altogether. The EU
in its backyard. This paper aims to seems willing to accept a fairly low
assist all stakeholders to the Brussels turnout as a sufficient legal basis for the
Agreement to work effectively new municipal institutions. However, it
toward a positive outcome in is hard to see any serious contingency
northern Kosovo (as differently as this preparations – a Plan B – to put things
outcome may be assessed by each back on track in case of derailment.
of them), but also to prepare for The paper looks at the challenges
contingencies. ahead and analyses the latest
The voter turnout in the four Serb- developments among the north
majority northern municipalities is as Kosovo Serb political elite and the roles
important as their relations with played by Belgrade and Prishtina. It
Prishtina afterwards. ends with a consideration of four
scenarios for the elections and their
aftermath (summarised on the next
page).
1
Filip Ejdus is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences/University of Belgrade and member of the Management
Board of the Belgrade Centre of Security Policy. Leon Malazogu is Director of the Democracy for Development Institute in
Prishtina. Milan Nič is Senior Fellow at the Central European Policy Institute, a regional think tank based in Bratislava. This paper
is the first in a series of research papers published within the project “Visegrad Support for Dialogue between Serbia and
Kosovo”, and is supported by the International Visegrad Fund.
2More desired outcome
The optimistic scenario The realistic scenario
§ More than 30% of K/Serbs vote § The turnout hovers around 15-30%
§ Undisputed electoral process § The election process is disputed by
§ The joint list must form coalitions with limited violence but is not derailed
other K/Serb parties, also in the § The joint list dominates the
south Association of Serb Municipalities
§ The Association of Serb § The new municipal structures
Municipalities smoothly established maintain distance from Prishtina
§ Interim Assembly fades into § K/Albanian majority increasingly
irrelevance nervous about state dysfunctionality
§ The EU sponsored Belgrade-Prishtina § Belgrade-Prishtina negotiations
negotiations move into the next continue at slower pace
phase, tackling new issues
More likely
Less likely
The disastrous scenario The pessimistic scenario
§ Active boycott results in a turnout § Security incidents, active boycott,
below 5% turnout at 5%-15%
§ Violent incidents lead to the § Prishtina rejects high by-mail turnout
withdrawal of OSCE staff from § K/Albanians acquire significant
polling stations in northern Kosovo share in northern municipalities
§ Prishtina appoints provisional § Interim Assembly steps up resistance
structures (with or without consent and grows in importance
of Belgrade) § Inter-ethnic tensions increase and
§ New barricades, KFOR use of force, Belgrade-Prishtina normalisation is in
new cycle of violence jeopardy
§ Fall of Serbian government
§ Deadlock in Belgrade-Prishtina talks,
stalemate in Serbia’s EU accession
Less desired outcome
3Introduction outcome (as differently as this outcome
may be assessed by each of the
On 19 April 2013, Serbia and Kosovo stakeholders), but also to prepare for
signed an agreement which has the contingencies. The paper starts with a
potential to be historic, if fully reflection on the preparations for the
implemented. 2 Mediated by the EU, it municipal elections, analyses the roles
was designed to defuse the last conflict and preferences of Belgrade and
in the Western Balkans, and remove one Prishtina, and then zooms in on the latest
of the main logjams on the paths of developments in northern Kosovo. Lastly,
Serbia and Kosovo towards EU the paper considers four scenarios for
membership. The Brussels Agreement, the the elections themselves and their
moniker it quickly acquired, could thus aftermath. Delineating an optimistic,
be a harbinger of a new era in the realistic, pessimistic as well as a disastrous
relationship between Belgrade and scenario, the paper also explores the
Prishtina, as well as for their European forces that could push developments in
transformation. one way or another.
The agreement provided for the inclusion
of the four northernmost Serb-majority
municipalities into Kosovo's legal system. 1. Preparations for
The establishment of an the elections
Association/Community of Serb-majority
municipalities is to further grant them As with the Agreement itself,
significant self-governance (some say preparations for the elections have been
autonomy). The process is to be set in fraught with tensions and ambiguities.
motion after municipal elections which Belgrade and Prishtina have maintained
are scheduled to take place on 3 their declaratory commitment, but have
November. As only legal and legitimate not done all they could to smooth
municipal authorities may establish the transition on the ground. The mayors and
Association (through the delegation of most political representatives of the
councillors upwards), the participation of northern Kosovo Serbs have mounted a
Serbs in the upcoming elections is boycott against elections, while recent
crucial. The elections will be a litmus test violence in the north raises serious
for the Brussels Agreement, but also a security concerns that could potentially
portent for the EU’s ability to impose undermine the entire process.
stability in its backyard.
The Brussels Agreement foresees that
This paper aims to analyse the “municipal elections shall be organised
challenges ahead and to assist all in the northern municipalities in 2013 with
stakeholders to the Brussels Agreement the facilitation of the OSCE in
to work effectively toward a positive accordance with Kosovo law and
international standards”. 3 The OSCE will
2The First Agreement of Principles Governing the
practically organise the elections in
Normalisation of Relations, full text available here:
http://www.rts.rs/upload/storyBoxFileData/2013/04/20/
3224154/Originalni%20tekst%20sporazuma.pdf 3 Point 12 of the Brussels Agreement.
4northern Kosovo, on behalf of Kosovo’s and leave the name and logo of the
Central Election Commission (CEC). The CEC, under clear pressure from the
OSCE is to place two observers in each political top brass.
polling station and potentially in sites in
Serbia. The most important election-related
deadline was 4 September for the
The uncertainty stems not only from the registration of political entities and the
complexities on the ground, but also certification of candidate lists. While
from the 15 vaguely defined points of the negotiations continued until days before
agreement itself, which leave ample the deadline, Kosovo Serbs submitted 18
wiggle room for different interpretations. lists, competing in 24 (out of 38)
For Prishtina, the Agreement is an municipalities including the four northern
important step towards full normalisation ones. Two lists (one of them openly
between two sovereign countries and supported by Serbia’s Government)
will eventually lead to Serbia’s were instructed by the CEC to remove
recognition of Kosovo as an the word “Serbia” from the name. 4 The
independent state. Belgrade insists that deadline for the registration of voters
the Agreement is status-neutral and that living outside of Kosovo was first
elections are intended to bring more of scheduled for 11 September but was
Serbia into Kosovo. During the then extended to 17 September.
negotiations, the ambiguity of the text Belgrade hastily submitted to the OSCE
served constructively to reach around 40,000 applications of displaced
agreement and mask the remaining Kosovo Serbs who wanted to register to
disagreements. However, if such vote in Kosovo’s municipal elections.
nebulous wording was the maximum Some 6,600 applications were accepted
compromise that could be reached, while all others were rejected as
differences were ultimately bound to incomplete – mainly due to the absence
clash on the ground. of a present or former address in Kosovo
or other proof of residence. An
One of the points of disagreement was additional number of around 12,000
the appearance of “Republic of Kosova” Serbs were added to the Voters List
on the ballot paper. From Serbia’s point during negotiations in Brussels. 5 Prishtina
of view, no symbols of Kosovo’s has, in the meantime, prepared for
statehood were acceptable on the elections, and it has gone out of its way
ballot given that the Brussels Agreement
is status-neutral. At the same time, 4 The Government of Serbia which proposed the list
Civil Initiative Serbia changed the name into Serbian
Kosovo refers to the wording that
Civic Initiative (Ser. Građanska inicijativa srpska). The
elections are organised “in accordance other problematic list was initially entitled Serbia,
with Kosovo law” (point 11), hence its Democracy, Justice Oliver Ivanović. It changed its
name into SDJ-Oliver Ivanović (Ser. Građanska
insistence to maintain the same
inicijativa SDP –Oliver Ivanović).
appearance as in previous elections. The 5 Tanjug. 1 October 2013. “Jos 12.000 ce upisati za
issue was finally resolved in early izbore.”
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2013&
September when Kosovo’s CEC decided
mm=10&dd=01&nav_id=760235&utm_source=twitterfe
to remove the reference to the republic ed&utm_medium=twitter
5to accommodate Serb requests. The Government of Serbia invited the
Considering the strategic importance of Serbs from Kosovo as well as those
northern participation, senior political eligible to vote from Serbia to participate
leadership has weighed in to get the in the elections, as did the Serbian
CEC to violate its rules and extend the Orthodox Church. It also sponsored a
deadline for voter registration in Serbia, joint list in the shape of a civic initiative in
drop mention of the Republic, and the north as well as in the south. The
accept the recruitment in its senior argument put forward by Belgrade is
echelons of a Serb from the north. that the joint list reduces wasted votes,
increases the representation of Serbs,
2. Serbia’s storylines and as such is the best way for the north
Kosovo Serbs to speak with one voice,
and strategies stand jointly for their interests and enjoy
Belgrade has maintained a three- Serbia’s official support. While the joint list
pronged discourse regarding the makes sense in the municipalities where
Agreement in general and elections in Serbs are a numerical minority, it makes
particular. The first storyline is aimed at little sense in the four northernmost
Brussels and can be summarised as municipalities where Serbs have an
“Serbia is giving up effective control over overwhelming majority. In effect, the
the north of Kosovo, but will not, at least single list could easily take virtually all the
for the time being, recognise Kosovo”. councillors, leaving no opposition.
Tailored for the domestic audience, the Prishtina fears that the real aim behind
second storyline interprets the Brussels the single list is to ensure that the
Agreement as a “victory over Prishtina” Association remains firmly in Belgrade’s
and “the maximum Belgrade could get hands, an interpretation strengthened by
at this point”. According to this narrative, provocative statements from the Serbian
Kosovo Serbs will obtain legitimate Minister for Kosovo Aleksandar Vulin.
institutions, while Serbia has not swerved
from its pledge “never to recognise Looming early elections in Serbia may
Kosovo’s unilateral independence”. The also be adding to a tendency not to
third storyline aims to mobilise north implement the dialogue as agreed
Kosovo Serbs, to whom the Agreement upon. Most recently, after being denied
was presented as a vehicle to retain entry into Kosovo by Prishtina during the
Serbia’s presence and disrupt electoral campaign, Serbia’s Prime
independent Kosovo from within. Minister Ivica Dacic threatened to leave
Prishtina is especially concerned with this all future negotiations if the decision
narrative, fearing that the Association of were not revoked. Although Dacic was
Serb Municipalities could become officially supposed to travel to Kosovo to
Belgrade’s Trojan Horse within a start the campaign in favour of the
gradually Daytonised and dysfunctional Belgrade- sponsored joint list (in the
Kosovo. southern municipality, not in the north!),
his pompous reaction may also mark the
beginning of the electoral campaign for
6the next parliamentary elections in Belgrade and, as such, is easier to
Serbia. control. This is the main concern for
Prishtina, and may be a reason for
One of the reasons why the Government Kosovo Albanian parties to forge a
of Serbia chose to set up a joint list broad coalition along ethnic lines in
(registered as a civic initiative) was to return.
avoid the registration of Belgrade-based
parties with authorities in Prishtina. If the 3. Northern Kosovo
governing parties from Belgrade (SNS
and SPS) had registered their Kosovo Serbs: anxiety and
branches with the CEC as fully fledged fragmentation
new parties (and new acronyms), they
would have been more vulnerable to In spite of the policy shift in Belgrade,
criticism by the extreme right for treason. many Serbs in northern Kosovo have
Indeed, up until recently, Belgrade had refused to accept the Brussels
tried to keep the municipal elections low Agreement, although resistance is
on the domestic agenda, in order to gradually wearing away. Over the past
shield itself from Kosovo-related criticism 14 years, northern Serbs were mobilised
at home. primarily by the desire to remain part of
Serbia and have often consciously
A significant by-product of the joint civic withdrawn themselves from decision-
list option (or possibly one of the main making, leaving responsibility squarely in
objectives) has been the marginalisation the hands of the Belgrade authorities.
of Serb parties which already participate
in Kosovo’s institutional life. At the same
Since they were not present at EU-
time, the Government of Serbia has
sponsored negotiations, northern Serbs
failed to gain the support for elections of
were taken aback by the swiftness of the
the most influential mayors and political
Agreement. Accusing Belgrade of a sell-
leaders in the four northern-most
out, the political establishment in the
municipalities, who remain adamantly
north established an Interim Assembly as
opposed to the Agreement. It is no
a vehicle to undermine the efforts to
surprise that they could not persuade the
elect new municipalities.6 The most vocal
officials of the Democratic Party of
opponents of the Agreement believe
Serbia (DSS), in opposition in Serbia, to
that, without electoral legitimacy, Serbia
participate. However, Belgrade was also
would be unable to close its institutions
unable to gain the support of most of the
and transfer its financial support to
northern leaders who belong to
Kosovo Serbs through the newly formed
branches of Serbia’s ruling parties, with
Association, as planned. The new
the notable exception of Krstimir Pantic,
institutions would then eventually
former Municipal President of northern (in
collapse. In the meantime, they hope
Serbia referred to as Kosovska) Mitrovica.
Crowding out other groupings paves the 6At the meeting held on 16 August the Assembly
declared that the municipal elections were
way for Belgrade to ensure the
unacceptable because they violate both the
Association reflects the government in constitution of Serbia and the UNSC resolution 1244.
7global power shifts could bring a more The real challenge is that northern Serbs
auspicious resolution of the situation in face not only the fear of abandonment
Kosovo’s north. In their view, a cold by Serbia, but also a sudden transition to
peace must lead to a new dialogue a free-market economy, which has been
between them and Prishtina for either delayed for political reasons. Apart from
partition or at least full-fledged smugglers and the political class, those
autonomy for the north. dependent on state salaries may feel the
main impact. While the well-connected
It is difficult for the Serbs from northern smugglers may find ways to tap into the
Kosovo to accept the transition, for they fresh funding that will flow to the north,
lived relatively well during the 14 years of targeted social assistance programmes
political limbo, with state salaries coming should be among the priorities to assist
from both capitals. People in northern ordinary citizens struggling with the
Kosovo are concerned that essential sudden transition.
services could be cut as they abandon
one system for the other. A rough Very few Serbs from the north express
estimate indicates that around 85% of all readiness to participate in the elections.
income in the north depends on the The main lingering question is
public sector, about three-quarters of consequently how active the boycott is
which is from Serbia and a quarter from likely to be. While northern politicians
Kosovo. The planned closure of the have embraced a passive boycott,
Serbia-financed institutions and their several incidents, one of them deadly,
reintegration into Kosovo’s legal herald a climate of more active
framework will result in significantly lower intimidation that may reduce turnout to
salaries and jobs (for example in local a trickle or could stop polling altogether.7
administration and hospitals).
In spite of those widely shared concerns,
Left with few allies, northern Serbs have opinion polls suggest that opposition to
developed a siege mentality which has the Brussels Agreement may not be as
actively nurtured the fear of a “silent unanimous as it seems. According to
exodus”, further worsened by the polls conducted in June and July 2013,
looming shut-down of Belgrade’s the expected turnout is 17% in Northern
institutions. Without state-run institutions, Mitrovica, 21% in Zubin Potok, 24% in
the fear is that local elites (teachers, Zve an/Zveçan and 38% in
doctors, judges) will leave and the rest of Leposavi /Leposaviq. 8 Given that
the population may follow. The discourse Belgrade has certified its joint list in the
of the “silent exodus” may be an meantime, the turnout is likely to be
instrument of political pressure or a sign higher, as long as the security and
of desperation. But in reality, any exodus political environment does not
is more likely to happen as a result of
lack of salaries than the emotional pain 7 The killing of a EULEX customs officer from Lithuania
of being part of Kosovo. was among a number of violent incidents that
occurred in September.
8 http://m.mondo.rs/cs/a599581/Info/Srbija/Na-izbore-
na-Kosovu-bi-izaslo-do-38-odsto-gradjana.html
8deteriorate. Many Serbs in the north may Association. This is not only a political
also be driven to vote by the narrative dilemma – joining requires the blessing of
that the Association of the Serb mayors who will lose real competences
Municipalities is the vehicle for Serbia’s to this supra-municipal body. Other Serb-
continued presence in Kosovo. majority municipalities may not be able
Nevertheless, even if a larger-than- to muster the two-thirds of the vote in the
expected percentage of the population Assembly required to join the Association.
cast their ballot, most northern Serbs will But given that all assistance from Serbia is
boycott the elections. Given the likely to come through the Association,
circumstances, the EU and the rest of the staying away may be a difficult choice.
international community is probably In addition, southern Serbs fear that the
willing to accept a fairly low turnout as a constant political focus on the north
sufficient legal basis to establish sidelines their more serious problems,
municipal government. which the Association may exacerbate.
The campaign in northern Kosovo is likely Prior to the Brussels Agreement, the Serb
to be a low-key affair without political scene in Kosovo was effectively
enthusiasm. Northern mayoral divided into two camps: the Belgrade
candidates are unlikely to focus on Serbs following Serbia’s official position
concrete projects, and may use sombre and Thaci’s Serbs, as the SLS and its
messages such as “we had to do this”, supporters, who have been willing to
“we will try to change terms as we go work with Kosovo institutions, were often
along” and “we have to live with this labelled by their critics. Although
legal framework, but we will resist and will Belgrade proposed the joint list with the
never accept independence”. Such a aim of unifying the Serb electorate in
tepid campaign environment is unlikely Kosovo around its platform, in practice it
to boost spirits and lead to a high has only led to its further fragmentation.
turnout, since voters expect visionary Now two more camps are emerging. The
leaders who can project optimism into third camp is nobody’s Serbs, coalescing
the future. around DSS and SRS, as continual spoilers
of the peace process who enjoy limited
The situation becomes further backing. The fourth camp emerging is
complicated when southern Serbs are composed of a number of local
factored into the equation. While all Serb groupings, for virtually every municipality
parties should be in principle enthusiastic has at least one Serb local civic initiative
about the Association, they may be less which supports integration, but sees an
so given Serbia’s insistence of its full interest in distancing themselves from
control. In their view, Serbia is now mainstream groupings.
advocating the same policy for which it
had criticised the SLS in 2009 when it had 4. Four scenarios
the courage to participate in elections,
then against Serbia’s will. If the SLS wins Given the complexity and volatility of the
several municipalities in the South, as situation in northern Kosovo, it is clear
expected, it is unclear if it will join the that there is a wide range of possible
9outcomes both on 3 November and in its with representation from several
aftermath. Voter turnout aside, which groupings. The electoral process is seen
scenario unfolds in the north will also be as largely free, fair and transparent. The
determined by the dismantling and opponents undertake a passive boycott
reintegration of parallel institutions, of the elections, but due to the intensive
especially the police and courts. Talks on campaign by Belgrade, their campaign
both counts have stalled with serious rings hollow. In this scenario, the few
disagreements, and if there is no success violations of the code of conduct and
by early November, it could have serious polling procedures are insufficient to risk
implications. Security on election day the integrity of the process. The local
can hardly be guaranteed if the careers assemblies of the four municipalities
of hundreds of security officials are in convene and elect mayors who accept
question. Similarly, if judges are not in Prishtina as the source of their legal
place, it is unclear who will address the framework. Given the relatively high
complaints and appeals that emerge as turnout of other groupings too, the
a result of the electoral process. Belgrade-sponsored joint list is unable to
form a mirror-image executive authority
On the basis of our analysis, we have composed of Serbian Progressive Party
developed four distinct scenarios: (SNS) and Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS)
optimistic, realistic, pessimistic and cadre only. A pluralistic majority has to
disastrous. The scenario planning is negotiate across several political
intended to serve as a basis for all the groupings, enabling the necessary
stakeholders to work more effectively starting point for democratic deliberation
toward their most desired outcomes, but and pluralism that, over time, relegates
also to cooperate to avoid the more ethno-politics to a matter of secondary
calamitous scenarios. The scenarios priority. The Association of Serbian
should not be seen as a forecast, but Municipalities is established, composed
rather as an analytical exercise. In reality, of other groupings as well and
elements of different scenarios will cooperates closely with Prishtina. Left
probably be combined in a fashion that without financial resources and
is impossible to predict at the present legitimacy, the Interim Assembly fades
time. Moreover, the scenarios aim to into irrelevance together with other
help decision-makers to imagine the full spoilers. Ordinary Serbs seek to secure
horizon of the possible electoral their prosperity in the new environment
outcomes and to help them better and successful elections encourage all
prepare for the aftermath. The following the stakeholders to move the agenda
section is, therefore, not an exercise in forward. The EU gains enough credibility
futurology but an intervention into the to conclude an overarching agreement
present. between Belgrade and Prishtina to
mediate in post-conflict situations further
1. The optimistic scenario (highly unlikely) afield.
More than 30% of Serbs in the north cast
their ballot to elect municipal assemblies,
102. The disastrous scenario (unlikely but 3. The pessimistic scenario (quite likely)
possible)
Turnout is less than 15%, but higher than
Polling stations close due to violent 5% due to intimidation and security
incidents which prompt the OSCE to incidents. Despite low turnout, local
withdraw its staff. A variation of the same structures are established, although
scenario can also unfold if turnout is probably of a temporary nature. The
below 5%. An active boycott and Albanian minority in the north
intimidation create a climate of fear commands a disproportionately large
sufficiently effective to deter most Serbs share in the local assemblies. Turnout
from voting. In short, elections are largely among displaced Serbs is suspiciously
contested or seen as a sheer failure. high: Prishtina rejects a significant
number of by-mail ballots, and Belgrade
This is the scenario that is in dire need of calls for another round of technical
the seemingly missing Plan B. If it unfolds, discussions in Brussels. The representatives
the new municipal institutions in northern of the Interim Assembly feel encouraged
Kosovo will not be established, creating to step up their active opposition to the
a dangerous political (and legal) Brussels Agreement, creating an
vacuum. Prishtina would find it difficult to environment where security incidents
appoint provisional structures, and if it receive indirect political cover. Northern
were to do so, they would need to be Kosovo ends up having two parallel
supported by Belgrade (it would be structures, one whose legitimacy is
Belgrade de facto appointing them challenged by the local population and
anyway, which returns northern Kosovo the other whose legitimacy is challenged
back to the pre-election status quo). by everybody else – not too dissimilar
Whether the solution is negotiated or from the current situation. This would
simply imposed, it would not be cement current uncertainties,
implementable without the use of maintaining and potentially even
coercive force, which KFOR is reluctant increasing inter-ethnic tension in the
to deploy. This, in turn would mobilise north. The rejectionist attitude and the
northern Serbs back to the barricades, lack of legitimate and legal leaders in
maintain low-tension conflict and northern Kosovo would reduce the
potentially lead to a new cycle of space for further dialogue between
violence. The barricade on the main Belgrade and Prishtina.
bridge in Mitrovica is unlikely to be
removed, foregoing the chance to 4. The realistic scenario (most likely)
reintroduce some normality. The
explosive situation in northern Kosovo Turnout is low at between 15 and 30%,
might lead to the fall of the Government but enough to meet the low
in Belgrade followed by new elections, expectations of minimum legitimacy. The
stalemate in Serbia’s EU accession joint list wins the majority of votes, which
process and interim deadlock in reduces the presence of an opposition
Belgrade-Prishtina negotiations. that could promote good governance
and necessary checks and balances.
11The legislative and executive structures
of the four municipalities in the north
reflect the party structure of the Serbian
government continuing the rhetoric that
they will defend Serbia’s presence in
Kosovo. Their dominance chokes
democratic deliberation and stifles the
development of pluralist democracy in
the municipalities and in the Association.
On a strategic level, the newly
established local assemblies dominated
by the joint-list representatives in northern
Kosovo might feel the need to compete
for patriotic credentials and adopt an
even more combative stance towards
Prishtina than Belgrade. While Serbia
continues to talk to Prishtina, the northern
mayors hesitate, which upholds fears of a
two-pronged strategy, especially if
serious haggling continues to follow the
implementation of the Brussels
Agreement. The Association accepts its
role within Prishtina’s legal framework,
but also enjoys legal status in Serbia’s
system, effectively treated as a Serbian
state institution too.
The major risk in this scenario is that the
Kosovo-Albanian majority sees the
developments as a major threat to the
new state’s functionality. The semi-
rejectionist attitude of the northern Serbs
demonstrates Belgrade’s powerlessness
and could increase calls for up to three
parallel dialogue processes: (a) northern
municipalities with Kosovo institutions, (b)
a tri-partite dialogue for the Association,
and (c) on further normalisation between
Prishtina and Belgrade.
12Conclusions deterioration could drive southern Serbs
to move to the north, which some
Neither the EU nor the broader conspiracy theories argue is Belgrade’s
international community seem to be real plan. Effectively abandoning the
prepared for the possibility of failed south could provide the basis for a
elections in northern Kosovo, or for renewed push to partition the north, or at
unintended outcomes in their aftermath. least cement territorial autonomy for the
The existence of an overarching four northern municipalities.
international consensus may deter
rejectionist spoilers, but the impotence of The momentous change taking place in
the international stakeholders vis-à-vis the north, a de facto transfer of
deadly attacks may test whether they sovereignty after 14 years, is no easy feat
are capable of disciplining wrongdoers. and should be gradual. The future of the
Indeed, the seeming absence of a back- Kosovo Serb community in the north is
up plan may further encourage spoilers. primarily at stake and it is important to
Given the challenges, it is vital that there recognise and manage the anxiety this
be some serious contingency planning brings. Elections will bring the northern
by the EU in advance of 3 November on Serbs within Kosovo’s fold in terms of
how to put things back on track in case legal sovereignty, but it will also insulate
of derailment. As we describe above, them with the kind of protection that few
some derailment is to be anticipated communities of this size enjoy elsewhere.
and cannot be perceived as an For Prishtina, it will be essential not to
unexpected outcome. make tactical mistakes that could instill
fear and lead to needless northern Serb
One of the indicators of successful migration. The EU should ensure that both
elections is the development of the Prishtina and Belgrade behave
Association of Serbian Municipalities. In responsibly in the pre- and post-election
variations of our realistic scenario, a period.
powerful Association under Belgrade’s
heavy control may spur ethnic The municipal elections are an important
mobilisation among Kosovo Albanians,
step in the integration of northern Serbs
leading to broad coalitions that leave into Kosovo’s legal system – but they are
ethnic Serbs and nationalist
the beginning of the process, not the
Vetëvendosje in the opposition (in mixed end. Overseeing the elections, will not be
southern municipalities and potentially in
the last balancing act that the EU will
the next national parliament). This could need to undertake to see the process
have harmful effects not only on inter-
through to the end.
ethnic relations across Kosovo, but also
on the few checks and balances on the
Prishtina government already in place.
Another indicator of successful elections
is the improvement/deterioration of the
inter-ethnic climate in Kosovo. A serious
13© Central European Policy Institute - A think-tank by the Slovak Atlantic Commission - October 8, 2013
This report was published with the support of the International Visegrad Fund.
CENTRAL EUROPEAN POLICY INSTITUTE
Klariská 14, 811 03 Bratislava, Slovak Republic, +421 2 544 106 09
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