Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq
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031-054_Bellamy.qxd 7/6/05 10:00 AM Page 31
Responsibility to Protect or Trojan
Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and
Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq
Alex J. Bellamy*
T
he world’s failure to prevent or halt unanimous vote by the U.S. Congress in July
the Rwandan genocide was described 2004, Colin Powell took the unprecedented
as a “sin of omission” by UN secre- step of labeling the violence “genocide.”
tary-general Kofi Annan.1 British prime min-
ister Tony Blair promised that “if Rwanda *
I would like to thank Paige Arthur, Mark Beeson, Ian
happens again we would not walk away as the Clark, Nicholas J. Wheeler, Paul D. Williams, Ramesh
outside has done many times before,” and Thakur, the two anonymous reviewers, and especially
Sara Davies for their help and advice on this article.
insisted that international society had a 1
“UN Chief ’s Rwanda Genocide Regret,” BBC News
“moral duty” to provide military and World Edition, March 26, 2004; available at news.
humanitarian assistance to Africa whenever bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3573229.stm.
2
it was needed.2 The United States labeled as Tony Blair, speech given to the Labour Party Confer-
ence, Brighton, U.K., October 2, 2001. I am grateful to
“rogues” states that “brutalize their own peo- Nick Wheeler for bringing this to my attention.
3
ple and squander their natural resources for “The National Security Strategy of the United States of
the personal gain of their rulers.”3 Since 2003, America” (September 2002), sec. V; available at www.
whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
the Sudanese government and its notorious 4
According to Alex de Waal, the government of Sudan
Janjaweed militia have conducted a brutal has “consistently franchised its counter-insurgency
campaign of mass killing and ethnic cleans- operations to militia,” in this case the Janjaweed. The
government provides the militia with arms, intelli-
ing in response to an uprising by the
gence, and air support and allows them to operate with
Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the complete impunity, creating an “ethics-free zone.” Alex
Justice and Equality Movement, who have de Waal, “Briefing: Darfur, Sudan: Prospects for Peace,”
themselves attacked civilians in the Darfur African Affairs 104, no. 414 (2005), p. 129.
5
These figures were offered in a detailed study by Jan
region, though on a much smaller scale.4 Coebergh, “Sudan: Genocide Has Killed More Than the
Recent surveys place the number of deaths Tsunami,” Parliamentary Brief 9, no. 7 (2005), pp. 5–6.
caused by direct violence between 73,700 and The lower figure is extrapolated from an MSF survey
and the upper one from a U.S. State Department report.
172,154.5 Deaths from malnutrition and pre- 6
Ibid. These figures are extrapolated from data pro-
ventable disease in internally displaced per- vided by USAID and the World Health Organization.
7
sons camps stood at 108,588 in January 2005, House of Commons International Development
Committee, Darfur, Sudan: The Responsibility to Protect,
with approximately 25,000 more having died
fifth report of session 2004–05, vol. 1 (HC 67-1), March
in inaccessible regions.6 The British Parlia- 30, 2005, p. 3; available at www.publications.parlia
ment’s International Development Commit- ment.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmintdev/67/67i.pdf.
8
tee put the total casualty figure at around UN News Centre, “UN Refugee Agency Withdraws
Staff from South Darfur Over Sudanese Restrictions,”
300,000.7 At least 1.8 million more had been New York, November 11, 2004; available at www.un.org/
forced to flee their homes.8 Following a apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=12510.
31031-054_Bellamy.qxd 7/6/05 10:00 AM Page 32
Despite professed commitments to pre- armed responses to “supreme humanitarian
vent future man-made humanitarian catas- emergencies”?12 My response proceeds in
trophes, the world’s response to the Darfur two parts. The first provides a brief overview
crisis has been muted. At the time of writing, of the norm of humanitarian intervention,
a small, underfunded and understaffed focusing on The Responsibility to Protect and
African Union mission (AMIS) is deployed on debates about the impact of the “war on
in Darfur. Although it has a mandated size of terror” and the war in Iraq on it. The second
approximately 3,300, there are fewer than offers a detailed study of the international
1,500 AMIS peacekeepers on the ground. response to Darfur.
The force has proven unable to halt sporadic I argue that the situation in Darfur
escalations of violence or prevent the reveals two subtle changes to the humani-
humanitarian situation from deteriorating.9 tarian intervention norm. First, although
The UN Security Council has taken an the level of consensus about humanitarian
ambivalent position. On the one hand, it has intervention has not perceptively shifted,
to date failed to impose serious sanctions on the debates on Darfur lend credence to the
Sudanese officials and has not contemplated thesis that the Iraq war has undermined
using force to protect civilians or humani- the standing of the United States and the
tarian aid. On the other hand, while it has U.K. as norm carriers. 13 According to
yet to decide whether the UN Mission to Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink,
Sudan (UNMIS), created recently to sup- new norms only replace old ones after a
port, monitor, and verify the comprehensive period of contestation between advocates
peace agreement between the government of the old and the new.14 If the credibility
of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation of those most associated with the new
Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in the south,
will play an active role in Darfur, there is a
distinct possibility that it could.10 Moreover, 9
See Thalif Deen, “New UN Force for Sudan Will Skirt
on March 31, 2005, the council took the Darfur Crisis,” Inter Press Service, February 9, 2005;
momentous step of referring the Darfur case available at globalpolicy.igc.org/security/issues/sudan/
2005/0208unskirts.htm. It is widely recognized that
to the International Criminal Court (ICC).11
after an initial respite, the humanitarian situation has
This article explores what international actually deteriorated despite AMIS.
10
engagement with Darfur tells us about the UNSC Res. 1590 (March 24, 2005).
11
norm of humanitarian intervention since UNSC Res. 1593 (March 31, 2005). Passed with eleven
in favor and four abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, China,
the 2003 war in Iraq. Do states and regional and the United States).
12
organizations recognize that they have a This is Wheeler’s term. Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving
“responsibility to protect” civilians at risk, as Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International
Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 34.
the International Commission on Interven- 13
See also Nicholas J. Wheeler and Justin Morris, “Justi-
tion and State Sovereignty (ICISS) argued? fying Iraq as a Humanitarian Intervention: The Cure Is
Or is humanitarian intervention perceived Worse Than the Disease,” in W. P. S. Sidhu and Ramesh
Thakur, eds., The Iraq Crisis and World Order: Structural
as a “Trojan horse” used by the powerful to
and Normative Challenges (Tokyo: United Nations Uni-
legitimize their interference in the affairs of versity Press, forthcoming). I owe the “norm carriers”
the weak? I examine whether the Iraq war idea to them.
14
has shifted the balance between these two A process they describe as “norm cascade.” See
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Interna-
positions, posing the question: Is there more tional Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” Interna-
or less likelihood of global consensus on tional Organization 52, no. 4 (1998), pp. 887–918.
32 Alex J. Bellamy031-054_Bellamy.qxd 7/6/05 10:00 AM Page 33
norm is undermined by perceptions that more compelling when the absence of
they have abused it or raised it for prima- plausible arguments against intervention is
rily self-serving purposes, the process of set against the global consensus that hor-
normative change is likely to be slowed or rors such as the Rwandan genocide should
reversed. 15 Traditional advocates of the not have been permitted.16 In the Darfur
new norm will find that their arguments case, as I will show, “responsibility to pro-
have less resonance among skeptics. The tect” language has now enabled anti-
problem is compounded by military over- interventionists to legitimize arguments
stretch on the part of key advocates of against action by claiming that primary
humanitarian intervention, in particular responsibility in certain contested cases
the United States and the U.K. In short, it still lies with the state, and not (yet) with an
has become harder for these states to per- international body. Given the credibility
suade others to act decisively in humanitar- crisis confronting some of the leading
ian emergencies at precisely the moment advocates of humanitarian intervention,
when those states themselves are less able to there is a real danger that appeals to a
bear the costs of acting outside the world’s responsibility to protect will evaporate
institutional framework. From the Ameri- amid disputes about where that responsi-
can and British perspectives there is no fea- bility lies.
sible alternative to collective action
through the UN or AU in addressing the THE NORM OF
situation in Darfur, but they have been HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
unable to build consensus about collective
action at least in part, I would suggest, It is widely accepted that the Security Coun-
because of their diminished credibility as cil has a legal right to authorize humanitar-
norm carriers. ian intervention under Chapter VII of the
Second, the Darfur debates have been UN Charter.17 There is also a partial con-
deeply infused with the language of a sensus among some liberal states that there
“responsibility to protect.” The meaning of
that language, however, has been hotly con-
tested. Changing the language of the inter- 15
Ward Thomas, for instance, argues that a new norm’s
vention debate has done little to forge vitality depends on its advocates being seen to practice
consensus or overcome the struggle it in good faith. Ward Thomas, The Ethics of Destruction:
Norms and Force in International Relations (Ithaca: Cor-
between sovereignty and human rights. In nell University Press, 2001), pp. 34–35.
16
the debates I examine, “responsibility to The idea of “acquiescence” to the West’s humanitar-
protect” talk was used to oppose interna- ian agenda is taken from Wheeler and Morris, “Justify-
ing Iraq as a Humanitarian Intervention,” p. 15. My
tional activism as much as to support it. If argument draws on Quentin Skinner,“Analysis of Polit-
we accept Quentin Skinner’s argument that ical Thought and Action,” in James Tully, ed., Meaning
actors will not act in ways that they cannot and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics (Cam-
bridge: Polity Press, 1988), pp. 116–17. I am grateful to
justify by reference to the prevailing nor-
Nick Wheeler for suggesting this.
mative context, it could be claimed that the 17
Nicholas J. Wheeler, “The Humanitarian Responsibil-
brief period of acquiescence to humanitar- ities of Sovereignty: Explaining the Development of a
ian interventions in the 1990s was at least New Norm of Military Intervention for Humanitarian
Purposes in International Society,” in Jennifer M. Welsh,
partly due to the absence of plausible argu- ed., Humanitarian Intervention and International Rela-
ments against them. This claim is made tions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 32–41.
responsibility to protect or trojan horse? 33031-054_Bellamy.qxd 7/6/05 10:00 AM Page 34
is a moral right to intervene without coun- but legitimate,” meaning that while it did
cil authorization in extreme cases.18 It is not satisfy international society’s legal rules,
highly unlikely that the Security Council it was “sanctioned by its compelling moral
would have objected had others used force purpose.”22 This finding implies a degree of
to halt the 1994 Rwandan genocide.19 consensus around the idea that states have a
Throughout the Security Council’s deliber- moral right to intervene to save strangers in
ations about Rwanda, no state publicly supreme humanitarian emergencies. A
argued that either the ban on force (Article Russian draft Security Council resolution
2(4)) or the nonintervention rule (Article condemning the intervention was rejected
2(7)) ought to prohibit armed action to halt by twelve votes to three (Russia, China, and
the bloodshed.20 Moreover, as Simon Namibia).23 While the failure of the Russian
Chesterman has argued, there is little evi- draft did not constitute retrospective
dence to suggest that sovereignty concerns authorization, it does add credence to the
inhibit states from saving strangers when idea that there is a moral consensus among
they have the means and desire to do so.21 liberal states and some others about the
Throughout the 1990s, the Security Council right of intervention in supreme humani-
expanded its interpretation of “interna- tarian emergencies.24 The claim that the
tional peace and security,” authorizing inter-
ventions to protect civilians in so-called safe 18
The debates among liberal states about whether to
areas (Bosnia), maintain law and order, pro- intervene in Kosovo provide the best demonstration of
tect aid supplies (Somalia), and restore an this moral consensus. See Alex J. Bellamy, Kosovo and
elected government toppled by a coup International Society (London: Palgrave Macmillan,
2002). The best theoretical expression of this liberal
(Haiti). However, two questions remain consensus can be found in Michael Walzer, “The Poli-
hotly contested: First, who has the authority tics of Rescue,” in Arguing about War (New Haven: Yale
to sanction humanitarian intervention University Press, 2004), pp. 67–81.
19
It is important to note, however, that five states
when the Security Council is blocked by the abstained when France requested a Security Council
veto? Second, when should a humanitarian mandate to launch Operation Turquoise in Rwanda,
crisis trigger potential armed intervention? I most citing concerns about France’s motives. See
Wheeler, Saving Strangers, p. 232.
argue in the following sections that 20
See Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The
although a partial consensus on these ques- United Nations and Rwanda (Ithaca: Cornell University
tions was established during the 1990s, there Press, 2002); and Wheeler, Saving Strangers, pp. 231–41.
21
is now deep division about how to interpret Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humani-
tarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford:
the effects of the “war on terror” and the Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 231.
22
invasion of Iraq on that consensus. Independent International Commission on Kosovo,
Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons
Learned (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 4;
The Partial Consensus on and Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society
Humanitarian Intervention (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 212.
23
As mentioned earlier, in the past few years It is remarkable that even traditionally conservative
states such as Malaysia chose to side with NATO rather
many liberal states have begun to accept the
than to abstain. UNSC 3989th meeting, S/PV.3989,
proposition that intervention not author- March 26, 1999; available at www.un.org/Depts/dhl/
ized by the Security Council could be legiti- resguide/scact1999.htm.
24
mate. NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was a Nicholas J. Wheeler, “The Legality of NATO’s Inter-
vention in Kosovo,” in Ken Booth, ed., The Kosovo
watershed in this regard. A commission of Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimensions (London:
experts found the intervention to be “illegal Frank Cass, 2001), p. 156.
34 Alex J. Bellamy031-054_Bellamy.qxd 7/6/05 10:00 AM Page 35
consensus extended beyond Western liberal problem from the victim’s point of view. It
states in the Kosovo case is further demon- insisted that the primary responsibility to
strated by the Organization of the Islamic protect civilians lay with the host state and
Conference’s support for the intervention, that outside intervention could only be con-
which was communicated to the Security templated if the host state proved either
Council in a letter stating, “A decisive inter- unwilling or unable to fulfill its responsibil-
national action was necessary to prevent ities.31
humanitarian catastrophe and further vio- On the question of when to intervene, the
lations of human rights” in Kosovo.25 This is ICISS adopted the commonly held view that
a partial consensus, however, because many, intervention should be limited to “extreme”
if not most, of the world’s states do not sub- cases—in other words, Wheeler’s “supreme
scribe to the view that in exceptional cir- humanitarian emergencies” and Tom Farer’s
cumstances unauthorized intervention may “spikes.”32 Outside intervention, it argued,
be legitimate. In addition to the well- was warranted in cases in which there was
recorded hostility of Russia, China, and large-scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing,
India, the Non-Aligned Movement whether deliberately caused by the state or
responded to Kosovo by declaring its rejec- facilitated by neglect or incapacity. The
tion of “the so-called right of humanitarian question of authority proved thornier. The
intervention, which has no legal basis.”26
Further evidence of a developing moral
25
consensus about humanitarian intervention S/1999/363, March 31, 1999, annex.
26
in supreme humanitarian emergencies has See Final Document of the XIII Ministerial Conference
of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (Cartagena,
emerged since Kosovo. Article 4(h) of the Colombia, April 8–9, 2000), pp. 41–42; available at
AU’s Constitutive Act, signed on July 11, www.nam.gov.za/xiiiminconf/index.html. It should be
2000, awarded the new organization “the noted that the Non-Aligned Movement itself did not
achieve a consensus on this position.
right . . . to intervene in a Member State pur- 27
Constitutive Act of the African Union; available at
suant to a decision by the Assembly in www.africa-union.org/About_AU/AbConstitutive
respect of grave circumstances, namely: war _Act.htm.
28
Kofi Annan, speech given to the Nobel Foundation,
crimes, genocide and crimes against
Oslo, Norway, December 10, 2001; available at
humanity.”27 And in 2001, Kofi Annan used www.nobel.se/peace/laureates/2001/annanlecture.html.
29
his Nobel lecture to argue, “The sovereignty Most of the unauthorized interventions were con-
of states must no longer be used as a shield ducted with host nation consent, sometimes coerced.
For a definitive list of these operations (up to February
for gross violations of human rights.”28 In 2005), see tables 1 and 2 in Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D.
the same period there were myriad author- Williams, “Who’s Keeping the Peace? Regionalization
ized and unauthorized interventions.29 and Contemporary Peace Operations,” International
Security 29, no. 4 (2005), pp. 35–36.
In 2001, the Canadian government gave 30
Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, “Foreword,”
the high-profile ICISS the task of establish- in International Commission on Intervention and State
ing common ground on the question of Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa:
IDRC, 2001), p. viii.
humanitarian intervention.30 The ICISS 31
ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, p. 17.
recommended replacing the atavistic termi- 32
“Supreme humanitarian emergencies” and “spikes”
nology of humanitarian intervention (sov- refer to the idea that mass killing is either ongoing or
ereignty vs. human rights) with the new imminent at the time of the intervention. See Wheeler,
Saving Strangers, p. 34; and Tom Farer, “Cosmopolitan
language of the “responsibility to protect.” It Humanitarian Intervention: A Five-Part Test,” Interna-
called for an approach that looked at the tional Relations 19, no. 2 (2005), pp. 216–17.
responsibility to protect or trojan horse? 35031-054_Bellamy.qxd 7/6/05 10:00 AM Page 36
ICISS proposed a three-layered distribution of dissent. It was received most favorably by
of responsibility. Primary responsibility lay states, such as Canada, Japan, Germany, and
with the host state. Secondary responsibility (to a lesser extent) the U.K., that had, since
lay with the domestic authorities working in the intervention in Kosovo, been exploring
partnership with outside agencies. If the pri- the potential for developing criteria to guide
mary and secondary levels failed to amelio- global decision-making about humanitarian
rate the humanitarian emergency, inter- intervention.35 When the Security Council
national organizations would assume re- discussed the report at its annual informal
sponsibility. At this third level of responsibil- retreat in May 2002, almost all of the perma-
ity, the ICISS accepted the view that primary nent members expressed disquiet with the
legal authority for action was vested in the idea of formalizing criteria for intervention.
Security Council. If the Security Council was The United States rejected them on the
deadlocked, it argued that potential inter- grounds that it could not offer precommit-
veners should approach the General Assem- ments to engage its military forces where it
bly under the Uniting for Peace mechanism had no national interests, and that it would
and, if that failed, work through regional not bind itself to criteria that would restrain
organizations. In an attempt to increase the its right to decide when and where to use
chances of consensus in the council, the force.36 China had opposed the idea
ICISS recommended that its permanent throughout the ICISS process, and while
members commit themselves to a series of Russia was generally supportive, it insisted
criteria relating to the use of force in human- that no action should be taken without Secu-
itarian emergencies. It was suggested that rity Council approval, a position that was
states always seek Security Council authori- unacceptable to the United States, the U.K.,
zation before using force; that the council and France.37 For their part, the U.K. and
commit itself to dealing promptly with France, two advocates of the ICISS principles
humanitarian emergencies involving large- among the Permanent Five, expressed con-
scale loss of life; that the permanent mem- cern that formulating criteria to govern
bers should commit themselves to not humanitarian intervention would not pro-
casting a veto to obstruct humanitarian duce the missing ingredients of political will
action unless their vital national interests are and consensus.38
involved; and that Security Council mem-
bers should recognize that if they fail to ful-
fill their responsibility to protect, other states
33
and organizations may take it upon them- ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, paras. 4.19, 6.11,
selves to act.33 The commission insisted that 6.29–40, and pp. xii–xiii.
34
Ibid., p. xii.
the question of military intervention should 35
See Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Legitimating Humanitarian
be placed firmly on the Security Council’s Intervention: Principles and Procedures,” Melbourne
agenda if two “just cause thresholds” (large- Journal of International Law 2, no. 2 (2001), pp. 552–54.
36
Jennifer M. Welsh,“Conclusion: Humanitarian Inter-
scale loss of life and ethnic cleansing) and
vention after 11 September,” in Welsh, ed., Humanitar-
four “precautionary principles” (right inten- ian Intervention, p. 180.
37
tion, last resort, proportional means, and Ian Williams, “Writing the Wrongs of Past Interven-
reasonable prospects) were satisfied.34 tions: A Review of the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty,” International Jour-
Reactions to the ICISS report were gener- nal of Human Rights 6, no. 3 (2002), p. 103.
38
ally positive, though there were notable signs Welsh, “Conclusion,” p. 204, n. 4.
36 Alex J. Bellamy031-054_Bellamy.qxd 7/6/05 10:00 AM Page 37
The U.S. intervention in Afghanistan strategic imperative to prevent terrorism
seemed to support the idea of a partial therefore entails a humanitarian imperative
moral consensus on the importance of to prevent state failure. As such, Western
humanitarianism in war. The U.S. adminis- states are potentially more likely to respond
tration felt obliged to argue that Operation decisively to humanitarian crises than they
Enduring Freedom would improve human- were prior to September 11.44 On the other
itarian conditions inside Afghanistan, even hand, the U.S. response to September 11,
though it was widely recognized as a legiti- especially the so-called Bush doctrine of
mate act of self-defense.39 The 2003 invasion preemption, has reduced the normative sig-
of Iraq, however, proved much more prob- nificance of sovereignty. This, Farer argues,
lematic. In this case, the political leaders of should lead us to expect more rather than
all the major troop contributors (the United fewer interventions.45 The post–September
States, the U.K., and Australia) gave consid-
erable weight to the humanitarian case for
39
war in their public justifications, though the See Colin McInnes, “A Different Kind of War? Sep-
tember 11 and the United States’ Afghan War,” Review of
formal legal justification was based on the International Studies 29, no. 2 (2003), pp. 165–84;
enforcement of existing Security Council Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Humanitarian Intervention after
resolutions.40 Although the humanitarian September 11, 2001,” in Anthony F. Lang, Jr., ed., Just
Intervention (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Univer-
argument received support in some quar-
sity Press, 2003), pp. 192–216; and Simon Chesterman,
ters, it was widely rejected.41 Whereas in the “Humanitarian Intervention and Afghanistan,” in
Kosovo case NATO could point to a moral Welsh, ed., Humanitarian Intervention, pp. 163–75.
40
consensus among liberal states and some See Adam Roberts, “Law and the Use of Force after
Iraq,” Survival 45, no. 2 (2003), p. 48.
others about the need to act, there was a 41
Michael Ignatieff, an ICISS commissioner, was an
much smaller consensus in the Iraq case, early supporter; see Ignatieff, “Why Are We in Iraq?
with many liberal states (such as Canada, (And Liberia? And Afghanistan?),” New York Times
Magazine, September 7, 2003, pp. 38ff. Kenneth Roth
Germany, and France) opposing the war. wrote one of the most detailed rejections in Ken Roth,
“War in Iraq: Not a Humanitarian Intervention,”
The Effect of the “War on Terror” and Human Rights Watch World Report 2004; available at
hrw.org/wr2k4/3.htm; see also David Vesel,“The Lonely
the Invasion of Iraq Pragmatist: Humanitarian Intervention in an Imper-
What impact has the so-called war on terror fect World,” BYU Journal of Public Law 18, no. 1 (2004),
and the invasion of Iraq had on the partial p. 56. It is also worth noting that the humanitarian
consensus on the norm of humanitarian argument was not raised in the Security Council’s for-
mal proceedings.
intervention? There are, broadly, three posi- 42
This terminology is drawn from Nicholas J. Wheeler
tions. The first group can be described as and Alex J. Bellamy, “Humanitarian Intervention in
“optimists.”42 This view accepts that states World Politics,” in John Baylis and Steve Smith, eds.,
The Globalization of World Politics, 3rd ed. (Oxford:
will only intervene in humanitarian emer- Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 572.
gencies when vital national interests are at 43
I am grateful to Nick Wheeler for this formulation.
44
stake; it makes a virtue of this, however, by See Chesterman, “Humanitarian Intervention in
Afghanistan,” in Welsh, ed., Humanitarian Intervention;
arguing that since September 11 interests and
and Wheeler, “Humanitarian Intervention after Sep-
humanitarianism have merged for many tember 11, 2001,” in Lang, Jr., ed., Just Intervention.
Western states.43 Two factors contributed to 45
Tom Farer, “Humanitarian Intervention before and
this merger. On the one hand, Afghanistan after 9/11: Legality and Legitimacy,” in J. L. Holzgrefe
and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Humanitarian Interven-
demonstrates all too clearly the linkage tion: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge:
between terrorism and state failure. The Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 80.
responsibility to protect or trojan horse? 37031-054_Bellamy.qxd 7/6/05 10:00 AM Page 38
11 record does not fully support these hoping was an emerging new norm justify-
claims. For instance, the West’s contribution ing intervention on the basis of the principle
to UN peace operations remains paltry, the of ‘responsibility to protect.’”50 This view is
United States has not made a significant widely held among critics: Ian Williams
troop contribution to reconstruction efforts argued that the Iraq war brought “humani-
in Afghanistan, and it played only a mar- tarian intervention into disrepute”; Richard
ginal role in alleviating the crises in Liberia Falk lamented that the war risked undermin-
and Haiti.46 ing consensus at the UN; Karl Kaiser insisted
The second perspective, shared by some that “Washington has lowered [consensus
involved with the ICISS, is that the “sun has on] the humanitarian intervention approach
set” on the humanitarian intervention to an unprecedented level”; John Kampfner
agenda. This claim is arrived at from two suggested that “there has been no better time
directions. Thomas Weiss, the commission’s for dictators to act with impunity”; and
director of research, argued that the United The Fund for Peace project collating regional
States and the UN’s political will to act in responses to humanitarian intervention
humanitarian emergencies has “evapo- found that in the one consultation conducted
rated” because of their obsession with immediately before the Iraq war, in Europe,
Afghanistan, Iraq, and the war on terror.47 participants were reluctant to support
This position is helpful inasmuch as it high- humanitarian intervention for fear of tacit-
lights the fact that the overstretched Amer- ly legitimizing the invasion of Iraq.51 David
ican and British militaries are unlikely to be
used in frontline roles, and that strategic 46
See Richard Bruneau, “Selfishness in Service of the
considerations related to the “war on ter- Common Good: Why States Participate in UN Peace-
ror” are likely to trump humanitarian con- keeping” (unpublished ms.), p. 3.
47
cerns when the two collide. On the other Thomas G. Weiss, “The Sunset of Humanitarian
Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipo-
hand, it overstates the extent of humanitar- lar Era,” Security Dialogue 35, no. 2 (2004), p. 135; and
ian interventionism prior to September 11. James Traub, “Never Again, No Longer?” New York
In the 1990s, the world failed to “save Times, July 18, 2004, p. 12.
48
See Wheeler, Saving Strangers, p. 295.
strangers” in the Balkans, Rwanda, and else- 49
A point developed in Paul D. Williams and Alex J.
where, and the legitimacy of humanitarian Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis
intervention remained hotly contested.48 in Darfur,” Security Dialogue 36, no. 1 (2005), p. 41.
50
Indeed, the Security Council has yet to Gareth Evans, “When Is It Right to Fight?” Survival
46, no. 3 (2004), pp. 59–82.
authorize humanitarian intervention 51
Respectively, Ian Williams, “Intervene with Caution,”
against a fully functioning state without the In These Times, July 28, 2003, p. 7; Richard Falk,
latter’s consent.49 “Humanitarian Intervention: A Forum,” Nation, July
14, 2003, available at www.thenation.com/doc. mhtml8i
The second way of arriving at the conclu- =2003071485=forum; Karl Kaiser,“A European Perspec-
sion that the “sun has set” on humanitarian tive on the Post Iraq New International Order,” paper
intervention suggests that the use of human- presented at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Jakarta, Indonesia, July 29, 2003; available at
itarian justifications to defend the invasion
www.csis.or.id/events_past_view.asp?id=5&tab=0;
of Iraq was widely perceived as “abuse.” John Kampfner interviewed by Tim Dunne, available at
ICISS cochair Gareth Evans argued that the www.ex.ac.uk/shipss/news/kampfner.htm; and The
“poorly and inconsistently” argued human- Fund for Peace, Neighbors on Alert: Regional Views on
Humanitarian Intervention, Summary Report of the
itarian justification for the war in Iraq Regional Responses to Internal War Program, October
“almost choked at birth what many were 2003, p. 6.
38 Alex J. Bellamy031-054_Bellamy.qxd 7/6/05 10:00 AM Page 39
Clark, a former special advisor to the tance to support humanitarian interven-
British Foreign Office, argued that “Iraq tion per se. Sudan may have adopted its
has wrecked our case for humanitarian strategy regardless of events in Iraq, while
wars. As long as U.S. power remains in the Germany’s position was directed more
hands of the Republican right, it will be against the potential uses of criteria for
impossible to build a consensus on the intervention than against the idea of
left behind the idea that it can be a power humanitarian intervention itself.
for good. Those who continue to insist A subtle variation on this theme holds
that it can, risk discrediting the concept of that while the Iraq war has not directly
humanitarian intervention.” 52 The key affected the norm of humanitarian inter-
question, however, is whether states share vention, it has impacted negatively on the
this view. ability of the United States and its allies to
The answer to this is difficult to gauge act as norm carriers. According to one
precisely. Of course, as noted earlier, analyst, the U.S. administration sacrificed
many states opposed the ICISS agenda its international credibility over Iraq and
before Iraq. There is evidence, however, is therefore not well placed to lead in Dar-
that some states that were initially sup- fur and elsewhere.55 Similarly, at least one
portive of humanitarian intervention article in the British press suggested that
have become less so as a result of per- were Prime Minister Blair to advocate
ceived abuse in the Iraq case. Immediately intervention in the Sudan, “oil [would] be
after the Iraq war, a forum of social- the driving factor.” 56 Such skepticism is
democratic political leaders rejected sec- what led Kenneth Roth of Human Rights
tions of a draft communiqué proposed by Watch to predict that one of the most
Prime Minister Blair supporting the idea troubling consequences of the attempts to
that the “responsibility to protect” ought justify the Iraq war in humanitarian terms
to override sovereignty in supreme was that “it will be more difficult next
humanitarian emergencies. At least one of
these states, Germany, had previously 52
David Clark, “Iraq Has Wrecked Our Case for
supported the ICISS agenda. German
Humanitarian Wars,” Guardian, August 12, 2003, p. 16;
chancellor Gerhard Schroeder reportedly available at www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/
rejected the communiqué because he 0,,1016573,00.html.
53
feared that any doctrine of unauthorized See Agence France-Presse, “British PM Urges
Tougher Stance against Brutal Regimes,” July 14, 2003;
humanitarian intervention would be used and Kevin Ward, “Process Needed so Countries Know
by the United States and the U.K. to jus- When to Intervene to Protect Human Rights,” CBS
tify the Iraq war.53 There is also clear evi- News (Canada), July 13, 2003; available at www.global
policy.org/empire/humanint/2003/0713canada.htm.
dence that in the Darfur case the 54
Cheryl O. Igiri and Princeton N. Lyman, “Giving
Sudanese government linked American Meaning to ‘Never Again’: Seeking an Effective
activism in Darfur with its actions in Iraq, Response to the Crisis in Darfur and Beyond,” CSR no.
5 (Council on Foreign Relations, New York, N.Y., Sep-
portraying it both as oil-oriented and
tember 2004), p. 21.
anti-Islamic, and that this strategy helped 55
Scott Straus, “Darfur and the Genocide Debate,” For-
to reinforce African and Middle Eastern eign Affairs 84, no. 1 (2005), p. 128.
56
hostility to the idea of Western enforce- John Laughland,“The Mask of Altruism Disguising a
Colonial War,” Guardian, August 2, 2004; available at
ment. 54 Importantly, neither of these www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,1273982,0
cases clearly indicates an increased reluc- 0.html.
responsibility to protect or trojan horse? 39031-054_Bellamy.qxd 7/6/05 10:00 AM Page 40
time for us to call on military action INITIAL ENGAGEMENT TO THE
when we need it to save potentially hun- DEPLOYMENT OF AMIS
dreds of thousands of lives.” 57
A third perspective suggests that the For much of 2003, the international
ICISS criteria for intervention should be response to the Darfur crisis was limited
viewed as constraints that will limit states’ to the delivery of humanitarian aid. The
ability to abuse humanitarian justifica- main political effort during this period
tions rather than as enablers for interven- focused on the Naivasha process aimed at
tion. Ramesh Thakur, another ICISS resolving the civil war between the
commissioner, argues that the moral con- Sudanese government and the SPLM/A.
sensus about the “responsibility to pro- In early 2004, Mukesh Kapila, the UN’s
tect” is likely to be strengthened in the coordinator for Sudan, accused Arab
wake of Iraq as states come to realize that militia backed by the government of “eth-
it provides a language that can be used to nic cleansing” and warned that if left
oppose legitimate intervention. Accord- unchecked the humanitarian catastrophe
ing to Thakur, consensus on criteria will in Darfur would be comparable to that in
make it more, not less, difficult for states Rwanda.59 Secretary-General Annan used
to claim a humanitarian mantle for their a Rwandan anniversary speech to the UN
interventions.58 Human Rights Commission to observe
The impact of the “war on terror” and that unfolding events in Darfur “leave me
the war in Iraq on the norm of humani- with a deep sense of foreboding.” He con-
tarian intervention is therefore hotly con- tinued:
tested. There is certainly evidence that
prior to the war in Iraq there was a gen- Whatever term it uses to describe the situa-
eral consensus about the necessity of tion, the international community cannot
stand idle. . . .The international community
intervention in supreme humanitarian
must be prepared to take swift and appro-
emergencies when authorized by the priate action. By “action” in such situations
Security Council, and a consensus among I mean a continuum of steps, which may
some liberal states that unauthorized include military action.60
intervention may be legitimate if the
council is deadlocked. However, there are
at least three plausible explanations for 57
Kenneth Roth, “The War in Iraq: Justified as Human-
the direction the norm has taken since the itarian Intervention?” Kroc Institute Occasional Paper
Iraq war. As I will demonstrate in the No. 25 (The Joan B. Kroc Institute, Notre Dame, Ind.,
remainder of the article, the Darfur case 2004), pp. 2–3.
58
Ramesh Thakur, “Iraq and the Responsibility to Pro-
lends support to the idea that the human- tect,” Behind the Headlines 62, no. 1 (2004), pp. 1–16; and
itarian intervention norm has subtly Ramesh Thakur, “Developing Countries and the Inter-
changed in two ways. First, the credibility vention-Sovereignty Debate,” in Richard M. Price and
Mark W. Zacher, eds., The United Nations and Global
of the United States and the U.K. as norm
Security (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp.
carriers has diminished. Second, “respon- 194–208.
59
sibility to protect” language can be mobi- Cited in “Mass Rape Atrocity in West Sudan,” BBC
lized to legitimate opposition to News World Edition, March 19, 2004; available at
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3549325.stm.
intervention in humanitarian emergen- 60
SG/SM/9197 AFR/893 HR/CN/1077, April 7, 2004;
cies as well as to support it. available at www.un.org/events/rwanda.
40 Alex J. Bellamy031-054_Bellamy.qxd 7/6/05 10:00 AM Page 41
In May 2004, Germany informally pro- sive peace agreement in Sudan’s south.
posed the deployment of UN peacekeep- Although the resolution did not relate to
ers to Darfur, and it was widely rumored Darfur, some council members nevertheless
that Norway had offered to command reaffirmed Sudanese sovereignty and
such a force.61 The New York Times ran a expressed deep skepticism about humani-
series of articles exposing the massive tarian intervention. Pakistan reminded the
human rights abuses there and calling for council:
U.S. action, earning criticism from the
The Sudan is an important member of the
Sudanese embassy. 62 Human Rights African Union, the Organization of the
Watch, Amnesty International, and the Islamic Conference and the United Nations.
International Crisis Group also actively As a United Nations Member State, the Sudan
lobbied for action in Darfur. has all the rights and privileges incumbent
In April 2004, the UN Human Rights under the United Nations Charter, including
to sovereignty, political independence, unity
Commission dispatched a fact-finding team
and territorial integrity—the principles that
to Darfur. The team found “a disturbing pat- form the basis of international relations.66
tern of disregard for basic principles of
human rights and humanitarian law, which That this was not the view of an isolated
is taking place in Darfur for which the minority in the council was demonstrated
armed forces of the Sudan and the Jan- by the fact that the resolution’s drafters felt
jaweed are responsible.” It concluded that “it it necessary to doff their caps to Sudanese
is clear that there is a reign of terror in Dar- sovereignty by inserting a passage “reaffirm-
fur,” and that the government and its prox- ing its commitment to the sovereignty, inde-
ies were almost certainly guilty of pendence and unity of Sudan.”67 Pakistan,
widespread crimes.63 Before the commis- China, and Russia believed that the scale of
sion could vote on a resolution based on the human suffering in Darfur was insufficient
draft report, its content was leaked to the to provoke serious reflection on whether
press. Pakistan and Sudan condemned the
leak and called for an immediate inquiry.64
Unwilling to force the issue, and concerned 61
See Human Rights Watch, “Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic
that a strongly worded resolution would be Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in West-
rejected by the commission’s African and ern Sudan” (New York: Human Rights Watch, May
Asian members, the EU members watered 2004), pp. 56–57; available at hrw.org/reports/2004/
sudan0504; and Afrol News,“UN Peacekeeping Mission
down a draft resolution they were prepar- for Sudan Prepared,” May 28, 2004; available at
ing. The redrafted resolution neither con- www.afrol.com/articles/12789.
62
demned Sudan nor mentioned its crimes. It See, e.g., John Prendergast, “Sudan’s Ravines of
Death,” New York Times, July 15, 2004, p. A23; and
was passed with fifty votes in favor and only Embassy of the Republic of Sudan, “The New York
three against (the United States, Australia, Times Faulted Sudan,” April 13, 2004; available at
and Ukraine).65 sudanembassy.org/default.asp?page=viewstory&id
=262.
The underlying dynamics of the Security 63
E/CN.4/2005/3, May 7, 2004, p. 3; available at
Council’s attitude to Darfur became appar- www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf.
64
ent when it met on June 11, 2004, to pass Human Rights Watch, “Darfur Destroyed,” p. 55.
65
unanimously Resolution 1547, expressing E/CN.4/2004.L11/Add7, April 23, 2004.
66
UNSC 4988th meeting, S/PV.4988, June 11, 2004, p. 4.
the council’s willingness to authorize a 67
UNSC Res. 1547 (2004), June 11, 2004; emphasis in
peace operation to oversee the comprehen- original.
responsibility to protect or trojan horse? 41031-054_Bellamy.qxd 7/6/05 10:00 AM Page 42
Sudan was fulfilling its responsibilities to its . . . Sudan was advisable.”71 The Sudanese gov-
citizens, and the United States, the U.K., and ernment itself made a classic “Trojan horse”
France were reluctant to force them to do so. argument, even referring to the Greek legend.
All three of the Western democracies that The ambassador wondered,
contributed to the June 11, 2004, debate made
if the Sudan would have been safe from the
pointed remarks about the Darfur emer- hammer of the Security Council even if there
gency and tacitly referred to the commission had been no crisis in Darfur, and whether the
of crimes against humanity and war crimes, Darfur humanitarian crisis might not be a
yet none cast doubts on Sudanese sover- Trojan horse? Has this lofty humanitarian
eignty. Germany, for instance, noted that objective been adopted and embraced by other
people who are advocating a hidden agenda?72
peace in Sudan was indivisible and required
“an end to the sweeping and widespread The resolution’s sponsors and their sup-
human rights violations” without suggesting porters adopted a line between these two
how this might be achieved. Similarly, the positions. The United States, the U.K., Ger-
United States pointed toward a litany of many, Chile, and Spain invoked the lan-
human rights abuses in Darfur but simply guage of the “responsibility to protect”
confirmed its support for AU initiatives.68 without suggesting that the responsibility
This pattern was repeated on July 30, ought to pass from the Sudanese govern-
2004, when the council met to pass Resolu- ment to the Security Council. They referred
tion 1556.69 Three positions were put for- to the AU as bearing the primary responsi-
ward during the council’s deliberations, bility for action should Sudan fail in its
which saw the first injection of “responsibil- responsibilities. This tension between, on
ity to protect” language into the debate. The the one hand, a genuine concern for human
first view, put forward by the Philippines, suffering in Darfur and, on the other hand,
was that Sudan had failed in its duty to pro- a reluctance to press for action was most
tect its citizens and that international action clearly expressed by the United States:
was warranted. The reference to the ICISS Many people who are concerned about Darfur
could not have been clearer: would say that this resolution does not go far
enough. Last week, the Congress of the United
Sovereignty also entails the responsibility of a States passed resolutions referring to the
State to protect its people. If it is unable or atrocities in Darfur as genocide. Many people
unwilling to do so, the international commu- would want the Security Council to do the
nity has the responsibility to help that State same. Perhaps they are right. But it is impor-
achieve such capacity and such will and, in tant that we not become bogged down over
extreme necessity, to assume such responsibil- words. It is essential that the Security Council
ity itself.70 act quickly, decisively and with unity. We need
to fix this humanitarian problem now.73
At the other end of the spectrum, China,
Pakistan, and Sudan all rejected talk of inter-
vention, while Brazil and Russia exhibited 68
UNSC 4988th meeting, S/PV.4988, June 11, 2004, p. 4.
reluctance to even contemplate the question. 69
Passed with thirteen affirmative votes and two
China abstained in the vote, complaining that abstentions (China and Pakistan).
70
the resolution alluded to “mandatory meas- UNSC 5015th meeting, S/PV.5015, July 30, 2004, pp.
ures”against the Sudanese government, while 10–11.
71
Ibid., p. 10.
Pakistan argued that it “did not believe that 72
Ibid., p. 13.
73
the threat or imposition of sanctions against Ibid., p. 4; emphasis added.
42 Alex J. Bellamy031-054_Bellamy.qxd 7/6/05 10:00 AM Page 43
This debate produced an understandably ond returns to the Security Council debates
Janus-faced resolution that invoked Chapter about intervention.
VII and condemned human rights abuses,
but stopped short of sanctioning or even African Union Mission in Sudan
condemning the Sudanese government. In July 2004, the AU began to discuss the
Resolution 1556 gave the government thirty possibility of deploying a small force to
days to disarm the Janjaweed and punish protect its civilian monitors in Darfur, who
human rights abusers, threatening economic had been sent to El Fashir to monitor the
sanctions if it failed to do so. For some, such cease-fire agreement of June 9, 2004. At the
as China and Pakistan, the resolution went same time, the Sudanese government
too far; for others, it did not go far enough.74 stated that it would “strongly resist all [UN
The initial international response to Security Council] resolutions calling for
events in Darfur was therefore characterized dispatching international forces to Darfur”
by three contradictory trends. First, there and threatened to use force against peace-
was clear recognition on the part of Western keepers.75 Initially, an AU force of approxi-
journalists, human rights organizations, and mately 3,000 troops drawn from nine states
some states of a responsibility to protect the was envisaged.76 In mid-August, Rwanda
people of Darfur. Second, however, there deployed an advance party of 154 troops,
were significant doubts about which organ- and President Kagame insisted that they
ization should bear that responsibility (the would use force to protect civilians if nec-
UN, AU, or Sudan?), and a deep reluctance essary.77 Although the AU indicated in a
on the part of key Western states to assume communiqué to the Security Council that
responsibility by arguing that the Sudanese its troops would indeed fulfill this role,
government was either unable or unwilling some AU members expressed reservations.
to protect Darfurians. Third, many states The Sudanese government itself rejected
expressed deep disquiet at any potential vio- Kagame’s interpretation of the mandate.
lation of Sudanese sovereignty. Foreign affairs minister Abdelwahad Najeb
insisted, “The mission for those forces is
FROM AMIS TO UNMIS very clear: protection of the monitors. As
The intervention debate crystallized
74
around the question of who had the respon- Simon Tisdall described it as a “dark study in disillu-
sion.” Simon Tisdall, “Brave Talk but No Action: Darfur
sibility to protect Darfurians. Embedded in Gets a Familiar Response from the West,” Guardian,
this debate were concerns about the deploy- August 3, 2004; available at www.guardian.co.uk/inter
ment of AMIS and its relationship with the national/story/0,3604,1274670,00.html. I am grateful to
Paul Williams for bringing this to my attention.
UN, the question of whether sanctions 75
“Australia May Join Darfur Mission,” Daily Telegraph,
should be imposed on Sudan, the prosecu- July 28, 2004, p. 8. I am grateful to Sara Davies for bring-
tion of war criminals, and the composition ing this to my attention.
76
CBC News,“African Union Sending Military Force to
and mandate of a UN force (UNMIS) to
Darfur,” July 6, 2004; available at www.cbc.ca/sto
oversee the peace agreement in the south of ries/2004/07/05/world/janjaweed040705; and Reuters,
Sudan. “African Union to Send Troops to Darfur,” July 5, 2004.
77
This section is divided into two parts. Human Rights News, “Darfur: Rwandan Troops to
Protect Civilians,” Human Rights Watch, New York,
The first focuses on the AU’s involvement August 17, 2004; available at hrw.org/english/docs/
in Darfur. Against this backdrop, the sec- 2004/08/17/darfur9241.htm.
responsibility to protect or trojan horse? 43031-054_Bellamy.qxd 7/6/05 10:00 AM Page 44
far as the civilians, this is the clear respon- to do much more than report cease-fire
sibility of the government of Sudan.” 78 breaches. On December 20, Nigeria’s Gen-
When Nigeria deployed the first 153 of an eral Okonkwo reported that government
intended 1,500 troops, President Obasanjo forces had attacked villages using aircraft.85
of Nigeria insisted that his forces would only Days later, Secretary-General Annan com-
protect AU observers and operate with the plained that the world’s peacekeeping strat-
consent of the Sudanese government.79 egy in Darfur was “not working,” and that
With Sudan refusing to consent to a broad AMIS had failed to protect civilians or pre-
civilian protection mandate, a compromise vent the crisis from deteriorating because it
was found whereby AMIS troops would only “has not been able to put in as many (mili-
protect vulnerable civilians in their vicin- tary) forces as we had hoped.”86 The situa-
ity.80 The compromise mandate, to which tion did not improve in 2005. In February,
the government of Sudan consented, Jan Pronk, the secretary-general’s special
insisted that AMIS would “protect civilians representative for Sudan (who was
whom it encounters under imminent threat appointed in June 2004), complained that
and in the immediate vicinity, within AMIS was too small and its deployment too
resources and capability, it being under-
stood that the protection of the civilian pop-
ulation is the responsibility of the 78
Quoted in Eric Reeves, “The Deployment of New
[government of Sudan].”81 African Union Forces to Darfur: What It Does and
It soon became clear, however, that the Doesn’t Mean,” October 25, 2004; available at
AU lacked the necessary financial and logis- www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=6168.
79
Human Rights News, “Darfur: African Union Must
tical resources to deploy even the modest Insist on More Troops,” Human Rights Watch, New
3,000 peacekeepers originally intended. In York, August 20, 2004; available at hrw.org/english/
late September 2004, with still only 300 docs/2004/08/20/darfur9251.htm.
80
Duncan Woodside, “Mandate Unclear as AU Troops
troops deployed, Secretary-General Annan Head for Darfur,” Business Day (South Africa), October
called for international assistance to expand 29, 2004, p. 12.
81
AMIS, and President Obasanjo lamented African Union Peace and Security Council Commu-
niqué PSC/PR/Comm. (XVII), Peace and Security
that although the AU was willing to deploy
Council, 17th meeting, October 20, 2004, Addis Ababa,
more peacekeepers, it was unable to do so Ethiopia, para. 6, p. 2; available at www.africa
without international assistance.82 On the union.org/News_Events/Communiqu%C3%A9s/Com
ground, AMIS was constrained by the muniqu%C3%A9%20_Eng%2020%20oct%202004.pdf.
82
UN News Centre, “World is Responsible for Ending
Sudanese government, which, among other ‘Terrible Violence’ in Sudan, Annan Says,” New York,
things, prevented AU helicopters from flying September 24, 2004; available at www.un.org/apps
by denying them fuel as well as repeatedly /news/storyAr.asp?NewsID=12044.
83
“Thousands More Troops for Darfur,” BBC News
insisting that AMIS troops were monitors, U.K. Edition, October 1, 2004; available at news.bbc.
not peacekeepers.83 co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3706340.stm.
84
On October 20, the AU’s Peace and Secu- S/2004/881, November 2, 2004, para. 57.
85
Reuters, “Troops Attack in Darfur as a Deadline
rity Council announced its intention to
Passes,” December 20, 2004.
increase the overall size of its mission to 86
Quoted in Thalif Deen, “UN Admits Sudan Policies
3,320, including some 2,341 troops.84 A week Failing,” Inter Press Service, December 22, 2004; avail-
later, Rwandan and Nigerian reinforcements able at www.ipsnews.net/africa/interna.asp?idnews
=26779. Also see Leslie Lefkow, “No Justice for Sudan,”
began arriving in Darfur, assisted by the U.S. Guardian, January 10, 2005; available at www.
Air Force. However, AMIS remained unable guardian.co.uk/sudan/story/0,,1387074,00.html.
44 Alex J. BellamyYou can also read
