RUSSIA'S STRATEGY OF DESTABILIZATION IN MONTENEGRO - HANGING BY A THREAD: FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
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Russia Foreign Policy Papers
Hanging by a Thread:
Russia’s Strategy of Destabilization in
Montenegro
Reuf Bajrović, Vesko Garčević & Richard Kraemer
Foreign Policy Research Institute
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© 2018 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute
COVER: Kotor Bay, Montenegro (Adobe Stock)
June 2018
Foreign Policy Research Institute
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Russia Foreign Policy Papers
Hanging by a Thread:
Russia’s Strategy of Destabilization in Montenegro
By: Reuf Bajrović, Vesko Garčević & Richard Kraemer
Reuf Bajrović is a former Minister of Energy in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
government. Previously, he founded and served as president of the Washington-based civic
advocacy group, the Emerging Democracies Institute. He founded the Civic Alliance party in
Bosnia Herzegovina. He holds an MA in Democracy and Human Rights and an MA in Governance
and Policy of European Integration, both from University of Bologna. He holds a BA in political
science from University of Louisville.
Ambassador Vesko Garčević has been teaching as a Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and
International Relations at the Frederick S.Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University
since July 2016. During his diplomatic career, he held several important positions at the challenging
political time of the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and democratic
transition of Montenegro. From January 2015 through June 2016, Garčević was National
Coordinator for NATO. He had been Ambassador of Montenegro to NATO from 2010 to 2014
as well as the bilateral Montenegrin Ambassador to Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
He served as Ambassador of Serbia and Montenegro, and Montenegro to the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (the OSCE) in Vienna from 2004 to 2008.
Richard Kraemer is a Fellow of FPRI’s Eurasia Program and formerly senior program officer
for Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey at the National Endowment for Democracy. Previously,
he oversaw projects in the aforementioned countries and the Levant at the Center for
International Private Enterprise. Earlier, he further taught and researched at the Jagellonian
University in Poland. He is also an affiliated expert of the Public International Law and
Policy Group, having advised the governments of Georgia and Montenegro. He has a
particular interest in the role that democracy assistance plays in the maintenance of U.S.
national security. He holds a BA from William and Mary and a JD from American University.
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Foreign Policy Research Institute
Executive Summary
In December 2015, Montenegro opted to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), and in doing so categorically rebuffed two years of Russian efforts to secure a port
there for the replenishment and repair of Russian military vessels. Russia then embarked
on a new strategy: stoking political and ethnic divisions to destabilize Montenegro and
preclude further Western integration. In the Kremlin’s best-case scenario, a pro-Russia
government would come to power and reverse Montenegro’s Euro-Atlantic course. To
this end, Russia coordinated with local opposition and Serb ethno-nationalists in an
unsuccessful attempt to topple the democratically elected government of Montenegro
in October 2016.
Despite the coup’s failure, the future of Montenegro’s progress toward Western
integratoin remains uncertain. The institutional actors behind the failed coup attempt
remain largely in place and steadfastly opposed to NATO membership. Should they
come to power, they likely would withdraw Montenegro from the Alliance, retract its
recognition of Kosovo, and potentially reunite with Serbia. Thus, to prevent the reversal
of Montenegro’s Western trajectory, the U.S. and its NATO allies immediately must
work to deepen their engagement with the country. Without undertaking measures to
strengthen military cooperation, facilitate democratic reforms, accelerate the European
Union accession process, and renew financial support for programs in the rule of law,
the West is unprepared to counter Russia’s destabilizing efforts.
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Russia Foreign Policy Papers
engagement in its perceived sphere of influence.
Russia in the Balkans A crucial Russian entry point lies in its exploitation
of ultranationalistic sentiments couched in Pan-
Russia vocally has opposed the expansion of Euro- Slavism. Appealing to a broadly Slavic heritage,
Atlantic institutions into the Balkans, which it common Christian Orthodox faith, and Russia’s
perceives as part of its sphere of influence.1 When historically patriarchical role in the region
the Kremlin feels that its influence is eroding stemming from the mid-to-late 19th century, the
in this region vis-à-vis the West, it becomes a Kremlin works to forge common cause with ethnic
destabilizing force. This is a concern of Moscow’s Serbs. Extreme Serb nationalism, coupled with
throughout the Western Balkans, and in particular, its vision of Greater Serbia (the unification of all
in Montenegro. ethnic Serbs into one state), creates fertile grounds
for recruitment to Russian-backed political and
The Kremlin knows that instability brings paramilitary activities. Montenegro has its share
underperformance in governance and the of groups promoting ethno-nationalist ideologies
economy. It also believes—as demonstrated by the to which a portion of its Serbian population is
wars in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014)—that a sympathetic, if not outright supportive.4
conflict-averse Europe and U.S. will not integrate
states where political instability is chronic. For The primary Serb ethno-nationalist political force
example, NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) is the Democratic Front (DF), a coalition made
is a “NATO programme of advice, assistance up of several Serb nationalist parties known
and practical support tailored to the individual for their pro-Russian affiliation comprising: the
needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance.”2 Democratic People’s Party, New Serb Democracy,
Within this context, fulfilling minimum NATO Democratic Serb Party, and the Yugoslav
membership requirements includes full civilian Communist Party of Montenegro. Russian media
control of military, compatibility of NATO forces, is supportive of the DF and other right-leaning,
democratic governance, and progress towards Serb nationalist political groups in Montenegro,
a market economy.3 These requirements cannot including non-governmental organizations such
be met in a state of chronic political dysfunction as the Movement for Neutrality of Montenegro
where intolerance and acrimony is pervasive and No to War, No to NATO, noteworthy for their
and institutionial corruption is common. To this anti-Western rhetoric and pro-Russian stances.
end, Russia has adopted a strategy of stoking Given Russia’s means of political leverage and
political and ethnic divisions and rewarding crony the geopolitical stakes, Montenegro’s continued
capitalism in target states, aiming to impede Western trajectory remains at risk.
further Euro-Atlantic integration.
Montenegro in a Geopolitical Context
In Montenegro, the placement of a pro-Russian,
anti-Western government in Podgorica is essential Montenegro is a parliamentary republic located on
to Moscow’s strategy to thwart greater Western the east coast of the Adriatic Sea. By the World
Bank’s classification, the country of 642,500
is upper middle-income.5 After the collapse of
1 Reacting to Montenegro’s invitation to join NATO, President
Vladimir Putin’s spokesman stated, “Russia has repeatedly
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
warned that the continuing expansion of NATO . . . cannot fail Montenegro joined its neighbor Serbia to establish
to lead to actions in response . . . from Russia.” See “Montene- the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992. This
gro invited to join NATO,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, state union existed until 2006 when the majority
December 2, 2015, https://www.rferl.org/a/montenegro-na- of Montenegrin citizens voted for independence
to-invite/27401948.html. See, also, warnings made by Ministry
of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Sergei Zelenyak in Belgrade, in a nationwide referendum.
December 26, 2015; and Gordana Knezevic, “Montenegro’s
NATO-Russian Chess Match,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,
January 2, 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/montenegro-nato-rus- 4 For more background on the role of formal and informal ultra-
sia-chess-match/28210094.html. nationalist Serb groups, see, “Bosnia on the Russian Chopping
2 Membership Action Plan (MAP), North Atlantic Treaty Orga- Block: The Potential for Violence and Steps to Prevent It,” For-
nization, https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_37356.htm eign Policy Research Institute, March 16, 2018, pp. 8-10, https://
(accessed May 22, 2018). www.fpri.org/article/2018/03/bosnia-russian-chopping-block-po-
3 “Minimum requirements for NATO membership,” US State tential-violence-steps-prevent/.
Department, https://1997-2001.state.gov/regions/eur/fs_members. 5 Country data, World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/country/
html. montenegro (accessed April 14, 2018).
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Port of Kotor, Montenegro. (Source: Shutterstock)
Under the leadership of Milo Djukanovic,6 against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Montenegro consistently has sought deeper
relations with the North Atlantic Treaty The stakes surrounding Montenegro’s geopolitical
Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). orientation are high. Geographically, its location
However, a considerable minority (approximately on the Adriatic Sea grants deep-water access
35-40%)7 of the population remains skeptical of to the Mediterranean from the ports of Bar and
this path.8 These segments question Montenegro’s Kotor. Politically, its growing alliance with the
Euro-Atlantic partnerships for a variety of reasons, Euro-Atlantic Community thwarts local ambitions
including the historical permeation of Pan-Slavism for a “Greater Serbia”10 and limits Russia’s efforts
with attendant Pan-Orthodox leanings9 and to expand its influence in the Balkans.
resentment of the 1999 NATO bombing campaign
Russia’s interest in Montenegro heightened
several years ago. As the reliability of its naval
6 Milo Djukanovic, re-elected as the country’s president on April
15, 2016, has served either in that office or as prime minister in base in Tartus, Syria became less certain, Russia
several governments from 1991 to the present. began seeking alternatives. In September 2013,
7 See, “Growth in support: 47.3 percent of citizens to join NATO” the Russian government requested a meeting with
[Rast podrske: za ulazak u NATO 47.3 odsto gradana], Crna the Montenegrin Ministry of Defense to discuss
Gora, February 1, 2016, http://crna.gora.me/vijesti/politika/rast- the temporary moorage of Russian warships at
podrske-za-ulazak-u-nato-473-odsto-gradana/.
the ports of Bar and Kotor. By Moscow’s proposal,
8 Levels of skepticism of NATO membership in Montenegro are
not uniquely high in comparison to other NATO states; e.g. 30 Russian ships would dock under a privileged status
percent in Germany and over 40 percent in France. See, “Sup- that would allow for the extensive use of territorial
port for NATO is widespread among member nations,” Pew waters. In sum, it was a request to install a Russian
Research Center, July 6, 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact- naval base in Montenegro. Podgorica rebuked
tank/2016/07/06/support-for-nato-is-widespread-among-member-
nations/.
the request, instead referring Moscow to the UN
9 The Pan-Slavic political movement grew out of the 1848 Spring
Convention on Law of Sea, whereby Russian ships
of Nations, around which time the Slavic peoples of the Hapsburg in need of assistance for refueling or maintenance
Empire convened a congress in Prague. Its aim was to secure would be granted as such accordingly.
more democratic representation for its ethnically Slavic subjects.
By the 1860s, many of its ideas had become popular in Russia; The value to Moscow of an Eastern Mediterranean
however, Russian thinkers reshaping it under the premise that
the West was culturally bankrupt and spiritually bereft, the latter
implying a “redemptive” role for the Orthodox Church. See, also, 10 “Vojislav Seselj: I wanted a ‘Greater Serbia,’” Balkan Insight,
“Pan-Slavism,” Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica. June 10, 2013, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/seselj-s-
com/event/Pan-Slavism (accessed May 22, 2016). goal-was-greater-serbia.
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Evidence (equipment allegedly prepared for the coup) presented by the Montenegrin prosecutor.a
(Source: PR Centar)
military port should not be underestimated. For Eastern Mediterranean remedies that strategic
example, the Russian Naval Facility in Syria’s Tartus limitation. Unable to approach NATO member
is that navy’s only repair-and-replenishment port states, Russia’s remaining options for basing
in the Mediterranean. According to Russia and were less stable North African states and Cyprus,
Middle East expert Anna Borshchevskaya, “A port with the talks with the latter and Egypt failing to
allows a country to project power and support bear fruit. These factors help to explain Russia’s
military operations. Russian naval presence in the 2013-14 drive to secure a deal with Montenegro’s
Eastern Mediterranean helps protect against a government for the usage of ports in Bar and
possible blockade seeking to punish or topple the Kotor.
Bashar al-Assad government in Damascus.”11 The
Russian navy further has an operational role in the Given the strategic significance and consequent
conflict, as demonstrated by the deployment of effort Russia placed on naval presence in
Russia’s sole aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and Montenegro, the Kremlin’s response to NATO’s
its Northern Fleet strike group in October 2016. membership invitation was predictably caustic
Although playing a secondary role in airstrikes, and threatening.13 President Vladimir Putin’s press
40 Russian naval aircraft conducted a sizeable secretary, Dimitry Peskov, stressed that Russia has
number of sorties in Syrian—over 400 in a two- repeatedly warned, “The continuing expansion of
month period, hitting a reported 1,252 targets, NATO and the military infrastructure of NATO to
according to Russian news.12 the east cannot fail to lead to actions in response
from the East - that is, from Russia.”14 Similarly, the
Lacking a reliable port in the Eastern Mediterranean, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs saw NATO’s
Russia’s strategic capability in the region is limited. invitation as openly confrontational, concluding
For example, the Kuznetsov group was denied port that “this new round of the alliance’s expansion
by European NATO member states in its voyage directly affects the interests of the Russian
from its home port of Severomorsk. Absent a
bilateral agreement with a coastal state, the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea does not
obligate states to provide facilities for refueling,
repair, or moorage. Reliable port access in the
13 Montenegro’s candidacy for NATO membership commenced
11 Interview with Anna Borshchevskaya, Ira Weiner Fellow at the with its participation in MAP in 2009; the formal invitation for
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 8, 2018. full membership was extended in December 2015.
12 “Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier’s experience in Syria 14 “Montenegro invited to join NATO,” Radio Free Europe/Radio
included in-training programs,” Tass Russian News Agency, Liberty, December 2, 2015, https://www.rferl.org/a/montene-
8 October 30, 2017, http://tass.com/defense/973134. gro-nato-invite/27401948.html.
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Federation and forces us to respond accordingly.”15
On Montenegro’s signing of the Protocol of
Accession to NATO in May 2016, Russia’s Foreign
Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova said
plainly that, “This latest NATO move undertaken .
. . will definitely affect Russia’s interests and force
us to react.”16 Indeed, the subsequent events of
2016 demonstrated Russia’s commitment to its
word. 17
The Attempted Coup d’Etat of 2016
On the eve of Montenegro’s 2016 parliamentary
elections, police in Podgorica detained former
Serbian gendarmerie commander Bratislav Dikic
and 19 other individuals on charges of forming a
criminal organization with the intent to overthrow Alleged coup plotter Nemanja Ristic with Andrej Kindjakov,
the government. Fourteen indictees are currently Russian military attache to Serbia. (Source: fokuspress.com)
being tried in Podgorica by Special Prosecutor parliament on the night of the election. Meanwhile,
for Organized Crime Milivoje Katnic. With the the Democratic Front would declare victory and
support of testimonies, confessions, and physical call on hundreds of mobilized supporters to storm
evidence, the following is alleged. the building. In response, the group of disguised
police would fire on opposition protestors. The DF
In the months leading up to the parliamentary would then call for nationwide protests, alleging
elections of October 16, 2016, Russian agents, that the violence was an attempt to prevent the
Serbian extremists, and leaders of the Montenegrin “victorious” opposition from seizing the reins
opposition alliance (Democratic Front) prepared to of government. The plotters also planned to
oust the government violently on election night. assassinate Djukanovic. In this manner, opposition
They planned to instigate political violence with leadership envisioned a state of emergency as the
the hope of triggering nationwide protests and springboard to state control.20
toppling the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS)
government led by Milo Djukanovic. According to Montenegrin authorities, however, successfully
officials, Serbian nationals initiated the enterprise prevented the coup attempt. On October 12, four
in early 2016 under the direction of Russian GRU18 days before the elections, former police officer
and FSB operatives.19 Mirko Velimirovic confessed to his involvement as
a gunrunner, giving the Montenegrin authorities
The planned takeover was relatively their initial lead.21 Investigations ensued, leading
straightforward. Under the command of Dikic, to the discovery of encrypted phones among ten
a group of 20 individuals dressed in stolen individuals, including leaders of the Democratic
Montenegrin police uniforms were to occupy Front. Arrests commenced, and officials
confiscated rifles, spiked road barriers, handcuffs,
15 “Comment by the Information and Press Department on batons, and other equipment exclusive to the
Invitation for Montenegro to Start Talks joining NATO,” Ministry state’s special police.
of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation, December 2, 2015, http://
www.mid.ru/en_GB/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/
cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/1963259.
16 “Briefing by Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharo- 20 This plan adheres to the fundamental techniques of a coup
va,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation, May 19, d’etat, i.e., “The planners of the coup must use the power of the
2016, http://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/spokesman/briefings/-/ state against its political masters. This is done by a process of
asset_publisher/D2wHaWMCU6Od/content/id/2287934. infiltration and subversion in which a small but critical part of
17 The pro-Russia political coalition Democratic Front began mo- the security forces are totally subverted, while much of the rest is
bilizing Kremlin-backed, anti-NATO protests in the Montenegrin temporarily neutralized.” Edward Luttawk, Coup d’Etat – A Prac-
capital of Podgorica in September 2015. tical Handbook (New York: Knopf, 1968), preface vii.
18 Russian: Glaynoye razvedyvatel’noye uprawleniye; Russia’s 21 Simon Shuster, “Q&A: Dusko Markovic, the Prime Minister
military intelligence agency. Stuck between Putin and Trump in the Balkans,” Time, February
19 Russian: Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti; Federal Security 16, 2017, http://time.com/4673038/dusko-markovic-montene-
Service. gro-russia-nato/.
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Russia Foreign Policy Papers
As detentions were underway, Montenegrin parties, ultranationalist groups affiliated with
security services reportedly received Russian counterparts, and the Serbian Orthodox
communications from Serbia’s Security Intelligence Church.24
Agency (BIA)22 that 50 Russian GRU special forces
troops had entered Montenegro’s mountainous Montenegro’s Democratic Front is a multi-party
Zlatibor region from Serbia on the night of alliance of Russophile, Serb nationalist, and
October 15. Their aim was first to neutralize a anti-Western political parties. Controlling 18 of
nearby Montenegrin special forces camp and then Montenegro’s 81 parliamentary seats, the DF
to travel to Podgorica to assist Dikic’s group in is Montenegro’s largest opposition bloc.25 As a
the planned post-election clashes. Linked through coalition, its leadership is officially collective.
their encrypted phones to indicted Montenegrin However, the parties commanding the most seats
plotter Milan Knezevic, the specialists terminated naturally wield the greatest influence. The core
their operation in response to his radio silence. of DF leadership comprises Andrija Mandic of
Without further word from BIA, Montenegrin the New Serb Democracy party, Milan Knezevic
authorities believe that the GRU unit fled of the Democratic People’s Party, and Nebojsa
Montenegro through neighboring borders.23 Medojevic of Movement for Changes Party.
Mandic and Knezevic are both indicted in the
Two Russian agents distinct from the group coup attempt case. Their primary role was to
in Zlatibor escaped into Serbia. These GRU coordinate Montenegrin plotters’ activities and to
operatives, Eduard Shishmakov and Vladimir assist in the distribution of funds. Medojevic, on
Popov, had been coordinating coup-related the other hand, recently has been charged with
efforts within Montenegro in the months leading laundering Russian money to finance the 2016 DF
up to the election. As word of the plot’s discovery campaign.26
spread, Shishmakov and Popov successfully made
their way to Belgrade to be extricated back to As in neighboring Serbia and Bosnia’s Republika
Russia by Security Council Secretary and former Srpska (RS), Montenegro boasts its own pan-Serb,
FSB chief Nikolai Patrushev. BIA communications pro-Russian extremist groups. The paramilitary
with Montenegrin counterparts discontinued Balkan Cossacks Army (BKV) is one.27 The purpose
thereafter. of the BKV, which is an affiliate of Russia’s Night
Wolves biker group, is unclear, aside from public
The day following the foiled attempt, Montenegrin statements endorsing pan-Orthodoxy for Slavic
police found discarded weapons including knives, peoples.28 Formed shortly before the election in
sling-shots, and various blunted instruments across Kotor on September 11, 2016, the BKV is led by
the country. Apparently, the protestors mobilized self-styled Cossack General Viktor V. Zaplatin.
for violence concluded that their leaders’ designs A Russian citizen with resident status in Serbia,
had gone to naught. Zaplatin is a longstanding veteran of conflicts in the
post-Soviet space with links to Rossotrudnichestvo’s
The Accused
24 Clouded in some dispute, the Metropolitanate of Montenegro
Responsibility for the attempted coup will be officially was united with other dioceses of the Serbian Orthodox
determined in a Montenegrin court. The identities Church following King Aleksandar Karadjordjevic’s declaration
of those accused and their interrelations are well in 1920. Despite the dissolution of the FRY almost 100 years lat-
documented. Taken together, there is a compelling er, Montenegro has yet to effectively assert its religious indepen-
dence via the establishment of a separate Montenegrin Orthodox
case for a trans-border operation involving agents Church.
with professional ties to state entities, namely, the 25 Djukanovic’s ruling DPS holds 35 seats in the current parlia-
Russian and Serbian governments. ment, distinct from seats of other smaller, pro-Western democratic
parties.
Forces of Montenegrin Opposition 26 Dusica Tomovic, “Montenegrin Opposition Leader Tried
for Money-Laundering,” Balkan Insight, April 18, 2018, http://
www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/montenegro-opposition-lead-
There exists in Montenegro an integrated political
er-tried-for-money-laundering-04-17-2018.
opposition comprising of pro-Russia political
27 Serbian – Balkanska Kozacka Vojska.
28 Jasna Vukicevic and Robert Coalson, “Russia’s Friends Form
22 Serbian: Besbednoso-Informativna Agencija; Serbia’s intelli- New ‘Cossack Army’ in Balkans,” Radio Free Europe/Radio
gence agency. Liberty, October 18, 2016, https://www.rferl.org/a/balkans-rus-
23 Interviews with Montenegrin security and judiciary officials. sias-friends-form-new-cossack-army/28061110.html.
10Foreign Policy Research Institute
Former Russian Institute for Strategic Studies Director Leonid Reshetnikov with Serbian Orthodox Church Bishop
of Montenegro and the Littoral Amfilohije Radovic. (Source: riskmanagementlab.com)
Russian Cultural Center in Belgrade.29 In addition meeting of the coup’s leadership at Montenegro’s
to Zaplatin, key Serbian coup plotters Bratislav famed Ostrog monastery just before the elections.
Dikic and Aleksandar Sindjelic are BKV members. This event suggests the culpability of Amfilohije
Radovic, the Serbian Church’s Metropolitan
The Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC)30 is a Bishop of Montenegro and the Littoral.
significant socio-political force in Montenegro,
where nearly three-quarters of Montenegrins Ethno-nationalist Serbian Actors
identify as Orthodox. With its patriarchal seat
in Serbia, the SPC in Montenegro is an entirely Acting independently of their government,32
extra-legal organization, successfully countering the Serbian citizens on trial for the attempted
any discussion or efforts to change its legal status coup are deeply integrated in the extremist, pro-
following Montenegro’s independence in 2006.31 Russian ecosystem that permeates Serb majority
From its uniquely advantageous position, the SPC lands in the Western Balkans. With Serbia as the
effectively administers political endorsement, fulcrum, pan-Serbists must engage with regional
logistical assistance, and financial support to counterparts to fulfill their ambitions for a Greater
Montenegro’s extremists. For example, while Serbia.
the SPC was not directly implicated in the plot’s
attempted execution, it did host an overnight Of the Serbians indicted, Aleksandr Sindjelic
sits at the top of the scheme. Sindjelic is the co-
29 Ibid. Zaplatin is a Russian army veteran of numerous armed founder of the Serbian chapter of Russia’s Night
conflicts including Bosnia in 1992-93, Abkhazia and South Os- Wolves—Serbian Wolves—and a combat veteran
setia in George, Nagorno-Karabakh in Armenia/Azerbaijan, and of Ukraine’s Donbass.33 He is accused of serving
Transnistria in Moldova. He is described in the pro-Russian press as the key liaison with the GRU operatives,
in Serbia as the official representative of the Union of Volunteers,
a Russian association “to unite the countries volunteers in general Shishmakov and Popov. Locally, Sindjelic was
projects.” Zaplatin is further associated with Russian strategist in tasked with recruiting approximately 300-500
Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, Aleksandr Borodai. volunteers and distributing hundreds of thousands
30 Serbian: Srpska pravoslava crkva.
31 In Montenegro, the Serbian Orthodox Church is an indepen-
dent organization registered and with legal status in Serbia. This 32 Statement of Dusko Markovic, Deputy Prime Minister of
is a consequence of a 1977 law governing religious group and Montenegro, October 17, 2016.
organizations in Montenegro that provides for official recogni- 33 “I am a Serb nationalist, they told me that the authorities in
tion through registration, however exempting those existing in Montenegro should be taken down,” Telegraf, October 26, 2017,
Montenegro prior to 1977. Unwilling to subject itself to the laws http://www.telegraf.rs/english/2906860-i-am-a-serb-nationalist-
of Montenegro for political reasons, the Serbian Orthodox Church they-told-me-that-the-authorities-in-montenegro-should-be-taken-
has effectively resisted previous efforts to legalize its presence down-sindjelic-spoke-at-the-trial-of-the-terrorist-attempt-on-the-
and activities in Montenegro. election-day.
11Russia Foreign Policy Papers
of euros for coup-related efforts. The nature of Ambassador Michael Kirby.39 Ristic is reported to
Sindjelic’s relationship with the GRU officers is have “working relations” with the Russian military
evidenced by a conversation intercepted on Mirko attaché in Belgrade40 and was photographed with
Velimirovic’s phone, confiscated on his voluntary Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov during his
surrender. In it, Shishmakov and Sindjelic discuss 2016 visit to the city.41
Djukanovic’s planned assassination.34
The Russia Hand
Working with Sindjelic was Bratislav Dikic, a
former Serbian gendarmerie commander. A BKV Russian involvement in the scheme’s formulation
member, Dikic was to lead the plotters disguised and execution began from its inception. GRU
as Montenegrin special police in storming the agents Eduard Shishmakov and Vladimir Popov
parliament and later firing on the DF’s assembled currently are being tried in absentia in Podgorica
protestors. He received 15,000 euros from for their alleged leading roles in the coup attempt.42
Sindjelic for his efforts.35 After fleeing from Podgorica to Belgrade, the
agents were flown to Russia one day prior to the
Following their arrests in October 2016, unscheduled arrival of Russian Security Council
Sindjelic and Dikic agreed to cooperate with the Director Patrushev.43 Their current whereabouts
prosecutor’s office in Podgorica.36 They admitted are unknown.
their respective roles in the attempted coup and
provided information about key links between Shishmakov led the GRU efforts, and his
local conspirators, Russian agents, and political chosen interlocutors were Sindjelic and Dikic.44
actors in Montenegro. Each confirmed that the Montenegrin authorities claim that in September
undertaking was fully premeditated and planned 2016 Shishmakov and Popov met with Sindjelic in
in both Serbia and Montenegro.37 Moscow to finalize the plot and provide 200,000
euros for attendant costs.
Currently at large in Serbia is indicted plotter
Nemanja Ristic. A Serbian citizen and BKV member, Evidence of Shishmakov’s involvement is
the Serbian goverment refuses to extridite Ristic, significant. He is recorded in discussion on the
opting instead to keep him under surveillance encrypted network with plotters Velimirovic
despite an outstanding Interpol warrant.38 The High and Knezevic, in addition to Sindjelic. In August
Court in Belgrade ordered he undergo psychiatric
treatement in 2015 following threats of violence
made to members of the media and former U.S. 39 “Suspect in Alleged Montenegrin Coup Plot Pictured with
Lavrov in Belgrade,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Decem-
ber 15, 2016, https://www.rferl.org/a/montenegro-coup-plot-sus-
34 Interview with special prosecutor for criminal organizations, pect-instagram-lavrov-ristic/28176472.html.
prosecutor’s office, Montenegrin ministry of justice, Podgorica, 40 “Nemanja Ristic blizak sa vojnim ataseom u Beogradu”
March 2018. See, also, Ben Farmer, “Russia plotted to overthrow [Nemanja Ristic close to the Russian military attaché in Bel-
Montenegro government by assassinating Prime Minister Milo grade], Fokus, January 8, 2017, http://fokuspress.com/u-foku-
Djukanovic last year, according to senior Whitehall sources,” su/3444-kiev-reporter-nemanja-ristic-blizak-sa-ruskim-vojnim-
The Telegraph, February 19, 2017, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/ ataseom-u-beogradu.
news/2017/02/18/russias-deadly-plot-overthrow-montene- 41 Ibid. RFE, fn 29.
gros-government-assassinating/; and Tomovic, ibid. 42 Ibid. The former’s work in Central Europe precedes him, hav-
35 Dusica Tomovic, “Montenegro opposition slams coup plotter’s ing been expelled from his post as Deputy Military Attaché at the
‘witness’ status in court,” Balkan Insight, November 25, 2016, Russian Embassy in Warsaw on charges of espionage in 2014.
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/strategy-western-bal- 43 Julian Borger and Shaun Walker, “Serbians deport Russians
kans-2018-feb-06_en. suspected of plotting Montenegro coup,” The Guardian, Novem-
36 Sindjelic confessed having a key role in “recruiting oth- ber 11, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/11/
er members of the organization, transferring money between serbia-deports-russians-suspected-of-plotting-montenegro-coup.
the organizers and members of the group, providing weapons, See, also, “Serbia released Shishmakov at Patrushev’s urging,”
phones, buying police equipment, uniforms, shields, batons, body Café de Montenegro, March 31, 2017, https://www.cdm.me/
armours, tear gas, gas masks and other equipment that would be english/serbia-released-shishmakov-patrushevs-urging/. In addi-
used by the group members during the attack on the Parliament.” tion, according to two ranking Montenegrin officials, this plane’s
MEMRI Special Dispatch, November 24, 2016, https://www. passengers included some remnants of the GRU specialist group
memri.org/reports/russias-orbit-part-ii-attempted-coup-montene- that fled from Zlatibor (interviews, Podgorica, March 2018).
gro#_edn5. 44 The State of Montenegro alleges that during the inception
37 Farmer, ibid. phase, both GRU and FSB were pursuing parallel tracks towards
38 https://www.interpol.int/notice/search/wanted/2016-78727 an attempted coup; eventually, the GRU’s was judged to have the
(accessed April 20, 2018). greater chance for success.
12Foreign Policy Research Institute
President Milo Djukanovic meets with Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, June 2018.
(Source: Euinside.eu)
2017, photos of Sindjelic and Shishmakov the DF banner, despite the party’s recent electoral
meeting in a Belgrade park were made public.45 defeats. In Montenegro, ethno-nationalist and
Finally, Patrushev’s presence for the extraction anti-Western sentiments remain strong and
of Shishmakov and Popov not only indicates the were such a party or leader to come to power in
depth of their involvement in the attempted coup, 2020, Montenegro could retract its recognition
but it also suggests—at the very least—official of Kosovo, withdraw from NATO, and possibly
Russian endorsement of the project. The Kremlin even reunify with the Republic of Serbia; in sum,
denied any involvement in the coup attempt.46 to realize ambitions reflecting Pan-Serb and Pan-
Slavic ideologies held and promoted by them
The Aftermath and their regional counterparts. Stuck with a
political system that provides little space for new
Democratic civil society in Montenegro finds itself democratic actors to participate, the country’s
in a difficult place. Despite their Euro-Atlantic politics risk increasing polarization.
orientation and ethnically pluralistic platform,
Djukanovic and his DPS have dominated the Here, the West has an important role to play. Its on-
country’s political space for decades, leaving going political, military, and economic engagement
little space for the emergence of democratic with Montenegro helps to keep this Mediterranean
alternatives. Indeed, after decades of alternating nation on its Western trajectory. The current EU
between the post of president and prime minister, strategy for enlargement in the Western Balkans
Djukanovic would be well advised to gracefully envisions Montenegro’s potential ascension by
exit from Montenegrin politics at his term’s end 2025.47 The EU membership perspective will
in 2023; whether he will do so remains an open require sustained efforts and reforms, requiring
question. Meanwhile, DF opposition bloc’s political will in both Brussels and Podgorica.
ultranationalist platfom is a non-starter for Renewed financial and technical assistance to
democrats desirous of more liberal alternatives. the country’s civil society is needed. Montenegro
has shown progress in fulfilling its EU accession
Opposite Djukanovic is a Russophile, ethno- requirements, as confirmed during a June 2018
nationalist opposition currently agitating under meeting between EU President Donald Tusk
45 Ben Farmer, “Surveillance photos show Russian intelligence
officers plotting Montenegro coup,” The Telegraph, August 28,
2017, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/08/28/surveil- 47 “Strategy for the Western Balkans,” European Commission,
lance-photos-show-russian-intelligence-officers-plotting/. February 6, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/strate-
46 “Kremlin denies involvement in alleged plot against Montene- gy-western-balkans-2018-feb-06_en. See, also, https://ec.europa.
gro’s PM,” Reuters, November 7, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/ eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/six-flagship-initia-
article/us-russia-montenegro-election-idUSKBN132170?il=0. tives-support-transformation-western-balkans_en.pdf.
13Russia Foreign Policy Papers
and Montenegro’s President Milo Djukanovic.48 course, but it would further jeopardize NATO and
For the benefit of its citizens and, indirectly, the EU interests in the Balkans and Mediterranean.
region, it remains on track to EU membership. The October 2016 coup attempt in Montenegro
shows the consequences of insufficient support
With respect to Montenegro’s newly membership for the pro-Western governments in the Western
in the Alliance, NATO should strengthen its political Balkans.
and military cooperation with Montenegro by
increasing the regularity and breadth of joint military
trainings and exercises, boosting the NATO naval
presence in Montenegrin ports on a permanent
or rotational basis, bolstering Golubovci Airbase
and Helicopter Center by transforming it into a
regional NATO helicopter pilot training facility.
Encouraging steps have recently been taken by
the U.S. Congress, by passing the U.S. National
Defence Authorization Act, which acknowledges
the threat of Russian influence in the Western
Balkans and the consequent need for military-to-
military cooperation there.49
Montenegro’s deeper Western integration should
not be taken for granted. Moscow continues
to see Southeast Europe as within its sphere of
interest, whether as the self-appointed protector
of Orthodox Christians under Ottoman rule
through the Cold War and into its relations with
various Serbian and other regional governments
post-1989. Indeed, Russia’s willingness to deploy
clandestine operations in Montenegro underlines
the severity of the threat, demonstrating the
lengths Moscow will go in secure its regional
interests.
As it seeks new tools to influence Montenegrin
politics, Russia will try to cultivate new, less
compromised political actors among several
recently formed, pro-Russian political parties. It
will also continue to cooperate with the Serbian
Orthodox Church in Montenegro to fan anti-
Western and anti-government sentiment. The DF,
together with extremist pro-Russian groups and
the Serbian Orthodox Church, will continue to
support Russian interests in Montenegro. If a pro-
Russian government came to power in Podgorica, it
could not only reverse Montenegro’s Euro-Atlantic
48 Press statement, “Remarks by President Donald Tusk after
meeting with President of Montenegro Milo Djukanovic,”
Council of Europe, June 5, 2018, http://www.consilium.europa.
eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/06/05/remarks-by-president-don-
ald-tusk-after-his-meeting-with-president-of-montenegro-mi-
lo-dukanovic/pdf.
49 “NDAA: Countering Malign Foreign Influence Campaigns,”
House Armed Services Committee, May 22, 2018, https://armed-
services.house.gov/news/defense-drumbeat/ndaa-countering-ma-
lign-foreign-influence-campaigns.
14Russia Foreign Policy Papers
In the early hours of May 10, 2018, a shower of airstrikes struck dozens of Iranian targets in Syria. Israeli officials
claimed the strikes were in response to the 20 Iranian rockets launched at the Golan Heights hours earlier. Iranian
media called the attacks “unprecedented,” yet this episode is just the latest in a series of open clashes between
Israel and Iran in Syria. Less than a week and a half earlier, on April 29, 2018, more than a dozen Iranian soldiers
died from a similar Israeli missile assault. Before that, the most recent military clash occurred in the second week
of April. This mid-April clash was the first time that Israel openly took credit for attacking Iranian forces located in
Syria—the culmination of a clandestine conflict between Israel and Iran. Since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War,
Israel has carried out, without taking credit until April 2018, over one hundred airstrikes against the Hezbollah and
Iranian strategic capabilities in Syria. In the wake of these clashes, it appears that Moscow has been persuaded that
Iranian and Hezbollah forces in Syria must be distanced from the border with Israel—in exchange apparently for Israeli
acquiescence for the return of Bashar al-Assad’s regime forces to these areas. Putin has also called for a removal of
all foreign troops from Syria once the Assad regime is in full control of the country.1
Amidst this tension, the role of the conflict’s third major power—Russia—has come up. Having communications with
both sides, Russia has the potential to act as a mediator. To assess the role that Russia may play in the standoff, it is
important to understand Moscow’s interests in the region and relationships with both sides. While the Russia-Iran
partnership has been covered at great depth, Moscow’s relationship with Israel demands more attention. How have
these relations fared three years into Russia’s entrance in the Syrian Civil War?
Despite their opposing roles in the conflict, Russia and Israel enjoy what one expert calls a “somewhat underrated
special relationship.”2 This relationship steadily has improved since its formal restoration in 1991 (it was cut off after
the Six Day War in 1967). While it is based primarily on shared economic and political ties, shared strategic interests
have grown in recent years. Since Russia’s 2015 intervention in Syria, each side sees the other as a major player
in the region, with the capacity to affect the other’s national security interests. Therefore, both see close strategic
engagement as a must.
This report will begin with an assessment of Russia and Israel’s main interests, which collectively define the contours
of the relationship. It then will proceed to analyze the relationship’s soft components—social, cultural, and historical
ties—and concrete components—political, economic, and military ties. Last, the paper will look at the three main
policy areas where the two countries disagree, but where they also see the bulk of their strategic dialogue: Iran, Syria,
and Palestine.
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Interests
The ties between Russia and Israel have evolved as both states developed their individual post-Cold War strategic
views and policies. They are a function of interests and, only toThe Foreign
a lesser Policy
extent, Research
of values Institute
and history. The is a non-
interests
of the two states are only rarely identical, but often are in sync.partisan,
Even in cases where they
non-profit 501are(c)(3)
opposed, both sides
organization
recognize the importance of the other and make significant efforts to deconflict.
dedicated to bringing the insights of
Russia scholarship to bear on the foreign policy and
national security challenges facing the United
States.
To understand Russia’s interests toward Israel, it is necessary to first grasp It seeks to
Moscow’s educate
broader the
foreign public,
policy teach
objectives,
both regional and global. Russia is a revisionist power: it seeks to redress what
teachers, trainit regards as anand
students, unfair distribution
offer ideas of
to
power in the U.S.-led world order.3 According to Russia expert Dmitri Trenin, Putin’s main foreign policy objective in
advance U.S. national interests based on a
recent years has been to return Russia to the “top level of global politics.”4 The crisis in Syria and the United States’
unwillingness to intervene meaningfully have provided Russia with non-partisan,
an opportunity geopolitical perspective
to advance this objective. that
illuminates contemporary international affairs
through
By injecting itself into an international crisis, Russia heralded its return the
to the lensstage.
global of history, geography,
It prevented what Moscowand
perceives as a U.S. attempt to build influence on its borders through culture.“color revolutions.” A key component of this
Foreign
1 Alexander Fulbright, “Israel, Russia said to Reach Secret Deal on Pushing Iran Policy
Away from Research
Syria’s Institute
Border,” Times of Israel, May 28,
2018; and “Israel Source: Russia to Back Israel Against Iran in Syria,”Middle East Monitor, May 29, 2018.
2 Analyst and former senior diplomat Cliff Kupchan, personal interview with author, April 2018.
1528 Walnut Street, Suite 610
3 Robert Kagan, “Backing into World War III,” Foreign Policy, February 6, 2017.
Philadelphia, PA 19102
4 Dmitri Trenin, What is Russia up to in the Middle East? (Cambridge: Polity, 2018), pp. 135, 52. Some Russian analysts see the Russian
return to the Middle East in a broader geopolitical context. They explain that Russia is disappointed with the West, perceives that the West
215-732-3774
has turned its back on Russia, and understands that it cannot repair relations with it. Therefore, Russiawww.fpri.org
has made a strategic, rather than
tactical, turn to the East, including to the Middle East. (Meetings by the author with Russian officials and analysts in 2016 and 2017).
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