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Center for Security Studies
STRATEGIC
TRENDS 2018
Key Developments in Global Affairs
Editors: Oliver Thränert, Martin Zapfe
Series Editor: Andreas Wenger
Authors: Brian Carlson, Severin Fischer,
Tim Prior, Jack Thompson
CSS
ETH ZurichSTRATEGIC TRENDS 2018 is also electronically available at: www.css.ethz.ch/publications/strategic-trends Editors STRATEGIC TRENDS 2018: Oliver Thränert, Martin Zapfe Series Editor STRATEGIC TRENDS: Andreas Wenger Contact: Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich Haldeneggsteig 4, IFW CH-8092 Zurich Switzerland This publication covers events up to 5 March 2018. © 2018, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich Images © by Reuters ISSN 1664-0667 ISBN 978-3-905696-62-2
CHAPTER 2
Room for Maneuver: China and Russia
Strengthen Their Relations
Brian G. Carlson
At a time of turmoil in the West, China and Russia pose growing challenges
to the liberal international order. The China-Russia relationship has grown
stronger in recent years, as the two countries have increased coordination
on North Korea and other issues. China and Russia are not about to form
an alliance, but neither are they likely to drift apart in the near future. Their
shared concerns about US power and resistance to liberal norms provide a
strong basis for a continued close relationship, albeit one increasingly tilted
in China’s favor.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping shake hands during a meeting
in Danang, Vietnam, 10 November 2017. Sputnik, Konstantin; Zavrazhin, Kremlin / Reuters
29STRATEG I C TR EN DS 201 8
As US President Donald J. Trump’s interference in the 2016 presidential
first year in office drew to a close, his election, hindered Trump’s ability to
administration increasingly pointed to conduct diplomatic outreach toward
the national security challenges posed Russia. Regardless of domestic po-
by China and Russia. The new Na- litical constraints, however, attempts
tional Security Strategy of the Unit- to pry Russia away from China were
ed States, issued in December 2017, never likely to succeed. The Cold War
named China and Russia as “revision- context that gave rise to Kissinger’s
ist powers” that “challenge American strategy is long gone. Russian leaders,
power, influence, and interests, at- having absorbed the painful lessons of
tempting to erode American security the Sino-Soviet split, recognize that
and prosperity.”1 The summary of the their country’s security and prosper-
2018 National Defense Strategy, un- ity depend on maintaining friendly
veiled in January 2018, identified the relations with their increasingly pow-
“central challenge to U.S. prosperity erful neighbor, regardless of the state
and security as the reemergence of long- of relations with the US. For its part,
term, strategic competition” by these re- China needs friendly relations with
visionist powers.2 Russia in order to assure itself of a
“strategic rear” to the north, given
These policy declarations represented its tense relations with several other
a shift from one year earlier, when neighboring countries. Moreover, the
Trump entered office amid specu- common positions that China and
lation that he would pursue a rap- Russia hold on many international is-
prochement with Russia. One of the sues, including their discomfort with
purported goals of such a policy was US power, objections to an interna-
to wrest Russia away from China’s em- tional order reflecting liberal norms
brace, using a strengthened US-Russia and values, and shared desire to resist
relationship as leverage over China. perceived threats to their forms of
Such an attempt at triangular diplo- domestic governance, provide ample
macy would have been straight out reason for them to maintain close
of the playbook of former secretary of relations.
state Henry Kissinger, with the roles
of Moscow and Beijing reversed this As Jack Thompson argues in this vol-
time.3 ume, a series of factors both foreign
and domestic are placing US foreign
Bipartisan domestic opposition, based policy under stress. In the coming
partly on concerns about Russia’s years, the challenge that China and
30RO OM FOR M AN E UVE R
Russia pose to the liberal interna- Russia sought both an economic
tional order will be one such factor. lifeline and a diplomatic partner to
For both the US and Europe, the ex- reduce its isolation. China was the
tent of coordination between China obvious candidate. Subsequent de-
and Russia deserves close watching. velopments, including the contin-
In recent years, this coordination has ued stalemate in Ukraine, Russia’s
grown stronger. A think tank report intervention in the Syrian civil war,
published in 2016, co-authored by and allegations of Russian meddling
Russian and Chinese experts, argued in US and European elections have
that “Russia-China rapprochement ensured continued friction in rela-
in security is special in that the two tions between Russia and the West.
countries have come close to the line China, meanwhile, perceives grow-
that distinguishes partnership from a ing pressure from the US as its rise to
military and political alliance,” though power gathers force. These tensions,
neither state wished to cross this line.4 in turn, lay the groundwork for sus-
That same year, in an article aimed at tained cooperation between China
Western audiences, a former vice for- and Russia.
eign minister of China argued that the
two countries, despite having no in- The growing strength of the China-
tention to form an alliance, neverthe- Russia relationship has belied the ex-
less shared sufficiently close interests pectations of many Western analysts.
and values to ensure that their partner- The two countries remain unlikely to
ship would remain durable.5 form an alliance, partly because nei-
ther wishes to be dragged into the
China and Russia have gradually other’s regional conflicts. Moreover,
strengthened their relationship over the balance of power within the rela-
the past quarter-century. Vladimir tionship is shifting rapidly in China’s
Putin’s return to the Russian presi- favor, which could eventually become
dency in 2012 and Xi Jinping’s ac- a major concern for Russia. To date,
cession to power in China that same however, the two countries have set
year were important stimulants to the aside their differences in order to
bilateral relationship. The onset of the pursue common interests. Their “stra-
Ukraine crisis strengthened relations tegic partnership”, though subject
further by driving Russia into China’s to limitations, is not likely to break
arms. Facing Western sanctions for its down in the near future. Under this
annexation of Crimea and its support arrangement, which is looser than an
for insurgents in eastern Ukraine, alliance, the two countries offer each
31STRATEG I C TR EN DS 201 8
other a measure of diplomatic sup- China-Russia relationship through-
port on a range of issues and at least out the post-Soviet era. The volume
“friendly neutrality” in each other’s re- of bilateral trade consistently pales in
gional disputes. In 2018 and beyond, comparison to China-US, China-EU,
the China-Russia relationship will and Russia-EU bilateral trade vol-
continue to exert significant influence umes. Russia has also relied primarily
on issues of international concern, un- on Western financial markets for ac-
folding at the bilateral, regional, and cess to credit.
global levels.
In 2014, the year that the West began
The Bilateral Level: Economics, to impose sanctions, the volume of
Energy, and Arms China-Russia bilateral trade reached
In the face of Western sanctions fol- an all-time high of 95 billion USD.
lowing the onset of the Ukraine crisis, However, this figure fell to 68 bil-
Russia attempted a pivot to China in lion USD in 2015, largely because of
order to compensate, at least partially, a sharp drop in energy prices.6 The
for the resulting economic losses. The trade volume remained flat in 2016
chief result, however, was that China and remains well short of the 2014
increased its bargaining leverage in the peak. Some Russian critics concluded
two strongest sectors of the bilateral that Russia’s attempted pivot to Asia,
economic relationship, namely energy which in practice focused heavily on
and arms sales. In both sectors, nego- China, had been largely a failure in
tiations on important deals had begun economic terms.7 The most signifi-
before the Ukraine crisis but had failed cant results of bilateral economic di-
to reach conclusion. After the out- plomacy have been major agreements
break of the crisis, the two countries on natural gas and weapons sales.
achieved important breakthroughs
in these negotiations, with results During Putin’s visit to China in May
that were especially advantageous for 2014, China and Russia struck a 400
China. billion USD gas supply deal, with
Russia’s Gazprom agreeing to supply
The benefits that Russia hoped to the China National Petroleum Cor-
achieve from its economic outreach to poration (CNPC) with up to 38 bil-
China have been slow to materialize. lion cubic meters of gas per year for 30
This should not have been surprising, years, starting in 2018. Analysts esti-
considering that bilateral economic mated that the price China would pay
ties have been a weak link in the for the gas, which was not disclosed
32RO OM FOR M AN E UVE R
Economic Ties between Russia, China, the US and the EU in 2016
Volume of trade (in billion USD)
Russian
Federation
8.4 30.1
12 37.9
131
125.8
United China
States (Mainland)
426.3
74.8
274.6 198.1
409.5 362.5
European
Union
Note: When a disparity existed between data reporting the same movement of trade in a different way – for example, US exports
to China versus Chinese imports from the US – this graphic uses the average of the two figures.
Source: IMF Data, Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS)
publicly, would be comparable to the The gas deal allowed Putin to demon-
price that European customers were strate that Russia enjoyed alternative
paying for supplies from Gazprom.8 economic and diplomatic options in
Initially, Gazprom expected that Chi- the face of Western sanctions. How-
na would invest 25 billion USD in the ever, the terms of the negotiations
construction of the pipeline, known largely favored China. The gas sup-
as Power of Siberia. However, this ar- plies for the Power of Siberia pipeline
rangement fell apart, and Gazprom is will come from fields in Eastern Sibe-
now financing the pipeline’s construc- ria, which Russia can supply only to
tion by itself. In July 2017, CNPC Asian countries because they remain
announced that it would receive the unconnected by pipeline to European
first supplies from the Power of Sibe- markets. The western Altai route re-
ria pipeline in December 2019, about mains Russia’s preferred option for a
one year behind schedule.9 gas pipeline to China. This proposed
33STRATEG I C TR EN DS 201 8
The Gas Transmission System in Russia’s East
As of May 2017
Okha Sakhalin II
Russia 4
Sakhalin III
1 Chayandiskoye
Pow Yuzhno-
er Komsomolsk
3 of
Sib -on-Amur Sakhalinsk
eri
a
2 Khabarovsk
Japan
Kovyktinskoye
Blagoveshchensk Birobidzhan
China
Irkutsk
Vladivostok
Mongolia
Gas pipelines in operation Gas production centers:
Ongoin projects 1 Krasnoyarsk
Prospective gas pipelines 2 Irkutsk
Fields / Prospective Fields 3 Yakutia
Amur Gas Processing Plant 4 Sakhalin
Source: PJSC Gazprom (18.5.2017)
pipeline, which would pass through As a result, Russia has assumed the
the two countries’ short western border financial burden for Power of Siberia,
between Kazakhstan and Mongolia, an expensive project, without gaining
would draw its supplies from gas fields much ability to play the “China card”
in Western Siberia that are already in gas negotiations with Europe.
connected by pipeline to Europe. Un-
der this option, Russia would be able Chinese investors also gained oppor-
to play China off against its European tunities to invest in Russia’s energy
customers, thereby gaining bargain- sector, a sphere in which they had
ing leverage. China has expressed little long faced restrictions. China’s Silk
interest in the Altai pipeline, however, Road Fund, which was established to
largely because it has a multitude of finance projects that are part of the
other options for gas supply, including Belt and Road Initiative, purchased
imports of gas by pipeline from Cen- a 9.9 per cent stake in the Yamal
tral Asia and of liquefied natural gas LNG project.11 The Silk Road Fund
(LNG) from a variety of suppliers.10 also purchased a 10 per cent stake in
34RO OM FOR M AN E UVE R
Sibur, Russia’s largest petrochemicals Asia, oil supplies from Russia arrive in
group, whose investors include Gen- China through an overland pipeline,
nady Timchenko, a friend of Putin’s reducing China’s vulnerability to na-
who is under Western sanctions.12 val blockade in a potential conflict
In September 2017, the Chinese en- with the US.
ergy conglomerate CEFC purchased
a stake of more than 14 per cent in China also seized opportunities to
Rosneft, Russia’s largest oil company, gain access to advanced Russian
from Glencore and the Qatar Invest- weaponry. Although Russia has been
ment Authority, which had acquired China’s largest foreign arms supplier
a 19.5 per cent stake in the company throughout the post-Cold War era,
less than one year earlier. The purpose Russian officials were reluctant for
of the Rosneft deals, apparently, was to many years to supply China with their
close holes in Russia’s state budget.13 most sophisticated weapons technol-
The Chinese company’s acquisition of ogy. From the mid-2000s until recent
this stake in Rosneft suggested, how- years, Russian arms sales to China
ever, that the balance of power in the contracted sharply. Russian officials
energy relationship was tilting further had grown frustrated with Chinese
in China’s favor.14 copying of their weapons technology,
while China focused on domestic
In early 2018, rising oil prices of- production. Starting around 2012,
fered hope for the Russian economy. China once again turned to Russia
The collapse in oil prices that began for military technology, first aircraft
in 2014, in combination with West- engines and later advanced weaponry
ern sanctions, struck a heavy blow that would enhance its anti-access/
to the Russian economy and to the area denial capabilities in the Asia-
government’s budget. With oil prices Pacific region. Following the onset of
once again rising, however, Goldman the Ukraine crisis, China succeeded
Sachs projected 3.3 per cent economic in purchasing top-flight Russian
growth for Russia this year.15 Russia weapons for this purpose. The two
also edged out Saudi Arabia as China’s most important purchases were the
leading oil supplier for the second S-400 air defense system and 24 Su-
consecutive year in 2017, accounting 35 fighter jets.
for more than 14 per cent of China’s
oil imports.16 For China, Russia serves The S-400 system of anti-aircraft mis-
as an important source of diversity of siles can strike aircraft, unmanned
supply. As with deliveries from Central aerial vehicles (UAVs), and cruise
35STRATEG I C TR EN DS 201 8
Russian Arms Exports to China, 1992 – 2016
Volume of arms exports (SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIVs*), expressed in millions)
1992 1023
1993 1011
1994 72
1995 489
1996 1241
1997 732
1998 174
1999 1462
2000 2231
2001 2500
2002 2526
2003 2076
2004 2888
2005 3107
2006 2472
2007 1324
2008 1529
2009 1102
2010 744
2011 811
2012 741
2013 803
2014 713
2015 758
2016 643
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
* “SIPRI statistical data on arms transfers relates to actual deliveries of major conventional weapons. […] The TIV is based on the
known unit production costs of a core set of weapons and is intended to represent the transfer of military resources rather
than the financial value of the transfer” (see SIPRI Arms Transfers Database – Methodology).
Note: Recent sales are projected to increase volumes of export deliveries back to levels approaching the peak of the mid-2000s.
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
missiles at a range of up to 380 kilo- amounts of the airspace near Taiwan
meters. China plans to deploy the sys- and the Paracel and Senkaku Islands,
tem along its coastline, giving the PLA all of which the US could be called
the capability to contest significant upon to defend in a crisis. The Su-35
36RO OM FOR M AN E UVE R
fighter jets enjoy advantages in range next-generation air defense system,
and maneuverability over China’s ex- the S-500.18
isting fighter force. These Russian arms
sales to China, therefore, significantly The major weapons systems that Rus-
complicate the US military’s task of sia has sold to China recently are well
defending its allies and providing se- suited for maritime contingencies,
curity in the Asia-Pacific region.17 not for a potential land invasion of
Russia. By strengthening China’s mil-
For China, these sales represented an itary capabilities in a potential con-
opportunity to gain access to systems flict with the US and its allies in the
in which Russia maintains a techno- Asia-Pacific region, Russia diverts US
logical edge. Russia’s decision to sell strategic focus toward Asia and away
these advanced systems to China, on from Europe. In this way, these Rus-
the other hand, was informed by a se- sian arms sales complicate European
ries of considerations. The sales offer security policies. With US resources
an opportunity to strengthen politi- and strategic attention increasingly
cal and military relations with China, stretched thin, NATO’s European
which Russia views as a crucial partner members might face increased pres-
at a time of strained relations with the sure, in the coming years, to increase
West. Russia had already completed their own military spending and con-
research and development on these tributions to European security.
weapons systems, and sales to China
offered an opportunity to maximize The Regional Level: Spheres of
profits from existing technologies. Influence
Russian officials believed that China The challenges that China and Rus-
was likely to gain access to these tech- sia pose to the international order
nologies in any case, so Russia might take shape primarily at the regional
as well earn revenues from their sale. level. Although both countries are
Russia remained concerned about the seeking to increase their influence on
possibility of Chinese copying of Rus- the international stage, with China’s
sian designs, but the length of time capabilities in this respect rising rap-
needed for such efforts partly assuaged idly, they have the greatest capacity to
these worries. For example, Russia pursue their respective goals close to
calculated that by the time China suc- home. Both countries are effectively
ceeded in producing its own version seeking spheres of influence in their
of the S-400, Russia’s defense sec- respective regions – Russia in the
tor would already have produced the post-Soviet territories, and China in
37STRATEG I C TR EN DS 201 8
the Asia-Pacific. Both countries have influence has grown rapidly. Xi Jin-
engaged in “probing” to test the lim- ping’s announcement in September
its of US power and commitment to 2013 of China’s plans for the Silk
regional allies.19 Road Economic Belt, which later be-
came one component of the Belt and
Neither country fully supports the Road Initiative, heightened Russia’s
other’s regional objectives, which is concerns. China’s plans to finance in-
one reason why they are unlikely to frastructure projects through Central
form an alliance. For example, Chi- Asia and onward to Europe and the
na expressed measured support for Middle East threatened to marginal-
Russia’s war in Georgia in 2008, but ize Russia further in the region. To
declined to join Russia in recogniz- date, however, China and Russia have
ing the sovereignty of two breakaway avoided a clash in Central Asia and
regions from that country. Similarly, have sought to reach an accommoda-
China sympathized with Russia’s view tion. Symbolic of these efforts was a
that the West had fomented the revo- May 2015 bilateral agreement to link
lution in Ukraine and that further up the Silk Road Economic Belt with
expansion of Euro-Atlantic institu- the Eurasian Economic Union, the
tions to the east was unacceptable. Russian-led regional integration pro-
Yet China could not support Rus- ject. Although the fulfillment of this
sia’s annexation of Crimea because it aspiration will require concrete pro-
violated core principles of Chinese jects, a prospect that remains uncer-
foreign policy, including support for tain, this agreement expressed the two
state sovereignty and territorial integ- countries’ political desire to accom-
rity. Russia, in turn, remains officially modate each other’s regional interests.
neutral on China’s maritime disputes
in the South China Sea and the East Several factors help to explain efforts
China Sea. In essence, both countries by China and Russia to achieve coop-
observe a “friendly neutrality” regard- eration in Central Asia. For Russia,
ing the other’s regional affairs.20 This ceding regional influence to China
arrangement enhances both countries’ is undesirable, but also virtually una-
strategic room for maneuver. voidable. Russia lacks the economic
and financial weight to compete with
Central Asia is one region in which the China in promoting regional eco-
interests of China and Russia could nomic development. The Ukraine cri-
clash. Russia still regards the region sis, which erupted just a few months
as its backyard, but China’s regional after Xi announced his initiative,
38RO OM FOR M AN E UVE R
caused a sharp downturn in Russia’s the situation by encouraging China
relations with the West, underscoring to invest in infrastructure projects in
China’s importance in Russia’s foreign Russia. One concern among Russian
policy. Russia was unwilling to risk a policymakers and analysts is that the
rupture in this crucial relationship by Belt and Road Initiative could end up
aggressively challenging China’s grow- largely bypassing Russia, focusing in-
ing presence in Central Asia. stead on Central Asian infrastructure
projects and port facilities in Europe.
For its part, China recognized that its Russia hopes to entice Chinese invest-
ambitious Silk Road plans would be ment in a transport corridor passing
far more likely to succeed with Russia’s through Russian territory and onward
support than in the face of Russian to Europe. At a time when China is
opposition. China sought to reassure investing in infrastructure projects in
Russia by emphasizing that its goal was multiple directions, Russia also hopes
to promote regional economic devel- to attract China’s interest in the Rus-
opment, not to strengthen its political sian Far East. Russian scholars have
influence or security presence in the proposed linking centers of produc-
region. Some analysts, particularly on tion in China’s Northeast by rail to
the Russian side, have proposed a “di- ports in the Russian Far East, which
vision of labor” in which China would are in many cases closer than China’s
serve as the primary engine of regional own ports. Russian leaders also hope
economic development, while Russia that China’s interest in Arctic Sea
would maintain its role as the region’s shipping will generate investment
main security provider. The long-term in Russian port facilities along this
prospects for such an arrangement route, though they will balance this
remain uncertain, however. China’s desire against concerns about China’s
growing economic influence in the re- expanding influence in the Arctic.21
gion will inevitably lead to increased
political influence, and the need to In the Asia-Pacific region, the inter-
protect its investments in the region ests of China and Russia do not fully
may eventually lead China to consider coincide. China is an emerging su-
expanding its security presence there perpower that aims to gain primacy
as well. in Asia, while Russia’s influence in the
region has dwindled. Russia would
In the face of China’s relentless ex- prefer to maintain a diverse portfolio
pansion of influence in Central Asia, of relationships in Asia, rather than
Russia has sought to make the best of risk becoming overly dependent on
39STRATEG I C TR EN DS 201 8
China. Partly for this reason, Rus- of enforcement, and vowed not to
sia has resisted China’s calls to form a abide by it. A few weeks later, while
united front in their respective terri- attending the G-20 conference in
torial disputes with Japan and to of- Hangzhou, China, Putin declared his
fer increased support for China’s posi- support for China’s rejection of the
tions on other maritime disputes. In ruling. He also backed China’s posi-
the period leading up to the Ukraine tion that outside powers such as the
crisis, Russia and Japan energized bi- US should stay out of these disputes.
lateral diplomacy with the goal of That same month, Russia and China
resolving their dispute over the Kuril held joint naval exercises in the South
Islands. Just as Russia sought balance China Sea. Through these exercises,
in its Asian diplomacy, Japan sought China appeared determined to signal
to improve relations with Russia as a both its defiance of the court’s ruling
hedge against the rise of China. These and its ability to turn to Russia for
talks broke down when Japan joined diplomatic support.
Western sanctions against Russia, and
efforts to revive them have been un- In regions such as Central Asia and
successful. Russia’s close relations with the Asia-Pacific, as in bilateral rela-
Vietnam, which is involved in mari- tions, the growing imbalance of pow-
time territorial disputes with China in er in China’s favor has pushed Russia
the South China Sea, also cause ten- to adopt positions that are increas-
sion in China-Russia relations. ingly favorable to China. This trend is
also visible at the global level.
Although Russia officially maintains
neutrality on China’s territorial dis- The Global Level: An Increasingly
putes in the South China Sea, it ap- Close Partnership
pears to have edged closer to China’s China-Russia relations have gained
position. In July 2016, the Permanent momentum at the global level, par-
Court of Arbitration in The Hague ticularly since the onset of the Ukraine
ruled that China’s sweeping claims crisis. This has been especially appar-
to control over waters encompass- ent in the two countries’ handling of
ing around 90 per cent of the South the North Korean nuclear crisis, as
China Sea were in violation of the they have maintained solidarity in
UN Convention on the Law of the opposing most forms of US pressure
Sea (UNCLOS), of which China on the regime in Pyongyang. The two
was a signatory. China rejected the countries stood together in opposing
court’s ruling, which had no means the deployment of the Terminal High
40RO OM FOR M AN E UVE R
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) sys- Middle East more broadly, China’s
tem in South Korea, insisting that this inclination is to remain above the
system would threaten their own nu- fray. For example, China attempts
clear deterrent capabilities. In 2017, to maintain a balance in its relations
as the crisis over North Korea’s nuclear with Iran and Saudi Arabia, hoping to
program intensified, China and Rus- enjoy the economic benefits of rela-
sia issued a joint declaration calling for tions with both of these rivals. China
a “dual freeze” in which North Korea is largely content to stand aside as
would cease conducting nuclear and Russia pursues its own interests in
missile tests in return for a suspension Syria and elsewhere in the region.
of joint military exercises by the US
and South Korea. During the fall of China and Russia are likely to maintain
2017, they worked together in the UN solidarity on several other internation-
Security Council to water down pro- al issues as well. Both countries oppose
posed sanctions on the North Korean US plans for missile defense, asserting
regime, most importantly by oppos- that such plans could erode their nu-
ing an oil embargo. China and Russia clear deterrent capabilities. In Decem-
demonstrated that they would make ber 2017, for the second time, the two
serious efforts to restrain the North countries conducted a joint, comput-
Korean regime only in exchange for er-simulated missile defense exercise.
strategic concessions that would re- China and Russia also hold similar
duce the US political and security views on issues relating to cyberspace,
presence in Northeast Asia.22 often in ways that clash with Western
notions. In particular, they support the
In Northeast Asia, Russia has deferred right of governments to exert consider-
to China’s leadership. In the Middle able control in this domain as a natural
East, by contrast, China has been con- extension of state sovereignty.23 At the
tent to let Russia play a leading role. same time, both countries appear to
Russia is sure to be outspoken in op- be stepping up efforts to use a variety
posing efforts by the Trump admin- of methods, including social media,
istration to renegotiate or discard the to increase their influence in Western
nuclear deal with Iran, an issue on countries, in some cases seeking to fo-
which it can count on China’s sup- ment chaos within these societies and
port. In this case, Russia and China are undermine confidence in democracy.
likely to find considerable support for Western countries will continue to be
their position among European coun- alert to threats from this kind of “sharp
tries as well. On issues concerning the power”.24
41STRATEG I C TR EN DS 201 8
As this overview demonstrates, China Russia’s sparsely populated, underde-
and Russia have expanded their coop- veloped eastern regions and China’s
eration across a range of issues. The populous bordering regions. Russian
prospect of a geopolitically significant leaders worry that China eventually
China-Russia bloc, possibly even a could dominate the Russian Far East
quasi-alliance involving close political economically. Russia’s strategy to re-
coordination, seems more plausible sist a threatened Chinese invasion of
than it did even a few years ago. Some Russian territory, admittedly a sce-
prominent analysts in China have nario that Russian strategists consider
called for an alliance with Russia, call- extremely unlikely, appears to rely ul-
ing this an essential step for resisting timately on nuclear deterrence, based
US strategic pressure as their country partly on the threat to use tactical nu-
continues to rise.25 However, this re- clear weapons in the early stages of a
mains a minority view among Chinese conflict. In the view of many analysts,
leaders and strategists. In both China a major driving force behind Russia’s
and Russia, the political consensus alleged violations of the Intermediate-
holds that an alliance would unduly Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is
restrict diplomatic flexibility and in- the desire of Russian military plan-
cur unnecessary risk. The leadership ners to establish an effective counter
in both countries views the current, to China’s growing arsenal of missiles,
looser arrangement as the best way many of which are of the intermedi-
to maximize the value of the bilateral ate ranges prohibited by the treaty.26
relationship.
Despite such lingering concerns, the
Although the strategic partnership has two countries have formed a close
grown increasingly close, Russia con- partnership that is likely to prove re-
tinues to harbor long-term concerns. silient for the immediate future. The
China’s growing advantage in what its last quarter-century of interactions
strategists call “comprehensive nation- has revealed some inherent limitations
al power” could eventually cause Rus- in the China-Russia relationship, but
sian leaders to reevaluate their strategic this partnership has also proven more
priorities, possibly in ways that would resilient than many predicted. Simi-
undermine the relationship. Although larities in the two countries’ national
concerns about Chinese immigration identities, especially their discomfort
to the Russian Far East have subsid- with US primacy, opposition to an
ed since the 1990s, a glaring demo- international order dominated by lib-
graphic imbalance still exists between eral values, and sensitivity to criticism
42RO OM FOR M AN E UVE R
of their own domestic governance 4 S.G. Luzyanin, Zhao Huasheng et al., Russian-
Chinese Dialogue: The 2016 Model (Moscow:
and human rights records, are cru- Russia International Affairs Council, 2016), 9.
cial factors.27 Some Russian analysts,
5 Fu Ying, “How China Sees Russia: Beijing and
while acknowledging that the initial Moscow Are Close, but Not Allies”, in: Foreign
economic benefits of Russia’s pivot to Affairs, (01/02.2016), 96 – 105.
China had been disappointing, never- 6 Alexander Gabuev, Friends With Benefits?
theless argued that a convergence of Russian-Chinese Relations After the Ukraine Cri-
sis (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2016),
political interests, not economics, pro- 15.
vided the essential foundation for the
7 Alexander Gabuev, “A Pivot to Nowhere: The
China-Russia relationship.28 Realities of Russia’s Asia Policy”, Carnegie
Moscow Center, 22.04.2016.
The current arrangement offers both 8 Lucy Hornby and Jamil Anderlini, “China and
China and Russia some strategic room Russia sign $400bn gas deal”, in: Financial
Times, 21.05.2014.
for maneuver, but China is the main
beneficiary. A report by US analysts in 9 Lynn-Yuqian Lin, “Can Gazprom deliver
Power of Siberia gas to China by 2020?”, Wood
2017 argued that the US position in Mackenzie, 06.09.2017.
the “strategic triangle” had deteriorat-
10 Bobo Lo, A Wary Embrace: What the China-
ed because of tension in US relations Russia Relationship Means for the World (Sydney:
with both China and Russia, allowing Lowy Institute for International Policy and
Penguin Random House Australia, 2017), 33,
China to occupy the “hinge”.29 This 154 n86.
advantageous position gives a further
11 Reuters Staff ,“Russia’s Novatek completes deal
boost to the rise of China, which al- to sell Yamal LNG stake to China’s Silk Road”
ready poses a major challenge to US in: Reuters, 15.3.2016.
foreign policy. The rise of China, in 12 Jack Farchy, “China fund to buy 10% stake
turn, will divert US attention to Asia, in Russia’s largest petrochemicals group”, in:
Financial Times, 14.12.2016.
heightening the challenges of ensuring
European security. 13 Olesya Astrakhova and Chen Aizhu, “China
invests $9.1 billion in Rosneft as Glencore,
Qatar cut stakes”, in: Reuters, 08.09.2017.
1 The White House, National Security Strategy of 14 Stephen Blank, “Kremlin Ties Rosneft Closer
the United States of America, 12.2017, 2, 25. to China”, in: Eurasia Daily Monitor/Jamestown
Foundation, 08.11.2017.
2 U.S. Department of Defense, Summary of the
2018 National Defense Strategy of the United 15 Andrew E. Kramer, “Rising Oil Prices Buoy
States of America: Sharpening the American Russia’s Economy, Despite Sanctions”, in: The
Military’s Competitive Edge, 01.2018, 2. Italics in New York Times, 18.01.2018.
original.
16 Reuters Staff, “Russia remains China’s largest
3 Simon Tisdall, “Donald Trump attempting to oil supplier for 10th month,” in: Reuters,
play Nixon’s ‘China card’ in reverse”, in: The 25.01.2018.
Guardian, 12.12.2016.
43STRATEG I C TR EN DS 201 8
17 Paul Schwartz, “Russia-China Defense Coopera- 29 Robert Sutter, “Foreword”, in: Michael S.
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09.02.2017. Common Ground and Strategic Fault Lines”,
The National Bureau of Asian Research Special
18 Vassily Kashin, “Selling S-400s to China: A Report no. 66, 07.2017, 40.
New Front in the Cold War?”, Carnegie Moscow
Center, 27.04.2015.
19 Jakub J.Grygiel and A. Wess Mitchell, The
Unquiet Frontier: Rising Rivals, Vulnerable Allies,
and the Crisis of American Power (Princeton/
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016).
20 [Zhao Huasheng, “Have China-Russia relations
changed fundamentally?”, in: Pengbo Xinwen,
04.07.2016].
21 Camilla T.N. Sørensen and Ekaterina Klimenko,
“Emerging Chinese-Russian Cooperation in the
Arctic: Possibilities and Constraints”, in: SIPRI
Policy Paper 46, 06.2017.
22 Artyom Lukin, “The North Korea Nuclear
Problem and the US-China-Russia Strategic
Triangle”, in: Russian Analytical Digest, no. 209,
24.10.2017, 2 – 5.
23 Elaine Korzak, “The Next Level for China-
Russia Cyberspace Cooperation?”, Council on
Foreign Relations, 20.08.2015.
24 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “How Sharp Power Threatens
Soft Power”, in: Foreign Affairs, 24.01.2018.
25 Brian G. Carlson, “China-Russia Relations and
the Inertia of History,” in: Survival 58, no. 3
(06/07.2016), 213 – 222.
26 Ankit Panda, “The Uncertain Future of the
INF Treaty”, Council on Foreign Relations,
21.12.2017.
27 Gilbert Rozman, The Sino-Russian Challenge to
the World Order: National Identities, Bilateral
Relations, and East Versus West in the 2010s
(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center
Press, 2014).
28 Alexander Lukin, “Russia’s Pivot to Asia: Myth
or Reality”, in: Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn’, no. 7
(2014), 90 – 107.
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