Surveillance in Hong Kong's Recent Political
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White Supremacy, Nationalism, and
Dialogue Surveillance in Hong Kong’s Recent Political
Turmoil: A Global Perspective
Bo Zhao
Tilburg University, The Netherlands
s.b.zhao@tilburguniversity.edu
Introduction
Different from what happened in Washington, DC, in January 2021 (but with many similarities), the
interesting interplay and unfolded dynamics between white supremacy, nationalism, and radical violence in
Hong Kong’s latest political turmoil seeking democracy and independence, and the consequent stronger
state surveillance, deserve more careful examination and reflection than merely the quick roll-out of Hong
Kong’s new security law. To a large extent, white supremacy can be taken as a significant underlying reason
(or underpinning mentality), among others, motivating Hong Kong’s recent political struggle for Western-
style democracy (and more independence), which for a majority of Hongkongers is superior to China’s
totalitarian, communist regime, especially when the two are unfortunately anchored in conflicting racial
identities (i.e., Hongkongers vs. Chinese). In addition, the political struggle was also more or less stimulated
by the global anti-China campaign and (racial) white supremacy movement that were initiated by Trump
and his political followers in the US. Apparently, there is a lack of academic reflection on the subject.
Thus, different from other papers in this special issue on “Domestic Terrorism, White Supremacy, and State
Surveillance,” I discuss the dynamic interplays between white supremacy, (terrorist) violence, and
nationalism in Hong Kong’s most recent political struggle since 2019, explaining how this results in
escalating state surveillance. I argue: (a) Hong Kong’s political movement for direct election and political
independence partially originated in and is powered by white supremacy and the global anti-China
movement initiated by Trump and his political followers; (b) the political movement confronted strong
Chinese nationalism among older generations of Hongkongers and Chinese mainlanders and resulted in
blunt racial conflicts and radical, bloody violence; and, thus, (c) this led to a political duel between Hong
Kong’s pro-democracy forces (white supremacy believers, most younger generations born after 1997) and
the Chinese nationalists. I argue that the strict implementation of Hong Kong’s new security law, political
electoral reforms, and strong surveillance measures by the Chinese government simply mark the beginning
of the end of the white supremacy that has existed in Hong Kong for more than a century.
White Supremacy in Postcolonial Hong Kong
Historically speaking, white supremacy (white worship or white privilege) has been popularly accepted and
practiced by the majority of Hongkongers. First, Hong Kong was a British colony for more than a century
Zhao, Bo. 2021. White Supremacy, Nationalism, and Surveillance in Hong Kong’s Recent Political Turmoil:
A Global Perspective. Surveillance & Society 19(3): 379-383.
https://ojs.library.queensu.ca/index.php/surveillance-and-society/index | ISSN: 1477-7487
© The author(s), 2021 | Licensed to the Surveillance Studies Network under a Creative Commons
Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives licenseZhao: White Supremacy and was dominated by a long-standing colonial culture in which white people (first British and then other Westerners of white ethical origin, in particular Americans after WWII) have special political, economic, and cultural status. The long colonial tradition has created racial stereotypes, ingrained among Hongkongers who “consciously and unconsciously accepted white supremacy owing to the economic and political divide between the white and yellow groups”; even after Hong Kong’s economy took off, “the colonial legacy remained despite the disappearance of the economic divide” (Lee and Law 2016: 82). The long colonial tradition led to the internalization of white supremacy among Hongkongers who unconsciously accepted white people’s superior status, taking their political, economic, and cultural regimes and values as superior and ideal. Another aspect of white supremacy in Hong Kong lies in the racial discrimination of Hong Kong’s local residents against mainland Chinese and migrants of other racial origins because they regard themselves as more civilized racial groups and the agents or representatives of white people. Before 1997, Hongkongers took great pride in their colonial status because Hong Kong’s political system, economy, and culture were far more advanced than those in mainland China—as Chinese mainlanders then lived in bare poverty—and Hongkongers strongly supported China’s pro-democracy movements, including the 1989 student movement, and, with deep sympathy, helped Chinese in natural disasters. However, the situation changed swiftly after 2010. On one hand, due to China’s fast economic development, Chinese mainlanders became Hong Kong’s largest tourist group and contributed a considerable amount to Hong Kong’s revenue, in addition to escalating investment in Hong Kong’s stock market. However, racial discrimination and conflicts also increased against Chinese tourists due to their “uncultivated” behaviors and mainlander migrants who shared Hong Kong’s limited public resources (e.g., social welfare, housing, medical services). On the other hand, Hong Kong’s economic privilege and special political and cultural status are declining with China’s fast economic growth and opening to the West. The rise of coastal cities like Shanghai and Shenzhen has especially deprived Hong Kong of its special geo-political role bridging China and the Western world, except for being a world-class finance center and free harbor with favorable taxation. The changes have impacts on the superior status of Hongkongers. Their open dislike or hatred of mainlanders, expressed verbally and physically, resulted in declining mainland visitors and tourist revenue. The discrimination or othering of mainland Chinese is characterized by the practice of intra-ethnic racism (Yu 2017: 8), as young Hongkongers affiliated themselves with superior white culture/politics, distancing themselves from mainland Chinese culture and identity (namely, Hongkongers are not Chinese). Many Hongkongers attribute Hong Kong’s fading glory to China’s political interference in Hong Kong affairs and seek more Western democracy (i.e., direct election of local legislators and the governor), even full independence, as a resolution. The anti-China/Chinese sentiment and mentality reached its climax in the most recent political moment in 2020 in the context of a rising global anti-China surge led by Trump and his allies, who see China as a rising power threatening American supremacy and supported anti-China campaigns globally (Kuo 2020). A Final Due: Independence, Nationalism, and Radical Violence When Chinese mainlanders and many local residents (mostly older generations who lived through the colonial time) expressed different political opinions and demanded for social ordering against pro- democracy protesters, open street debates ended in bloodshed, with lives at stake. Such open street confrontations are partially characterized by escalating violence between the pro-democracy, pro- independence group that claimed their Hong Kong identity (i.e., Hong Kong is not China) and the pro- Chinese nationalism group, mainly Chinese migrants and older Hong Kong generations. Finally, a political duel was inevitable in 2020, as the two group’s non-compromising ideologies and racial identities, namely white supremacy (represented by democracy, human rights, liberty, and Hong Kong identity) vs. Chinese nationalism (collectivism, communist, and Chinese identity), clashed with staggering open violence. Radical street violence also escalated because “peaceful” protesters found no peaceful means could help realize their pursuit of democracy (direct election) and political independence. Surveillance & Society 19(3) 380
Zhao: White Supremacy In open street violence, the deeply underlying white supremacy mentality was clearly demonstrated and witnessed. First, it can be observed in the dominating verbal violence against any Chinese in Hong Kong who expressed different political opinions or criticized the use of street violence. There has been a long history of verbal violence calling Chinese mainlanders (new immigrants and tourist shoppers) “locusts,” such as in the protests in 2012 and 2015 (Carrico 2018: 197) as well as openly in local media (Chan 2020). In 2020, hate (racial) speeches became extremely popular and radical among street protesters once mainlanders or any persons with a likely Chinese face were around—i.e., “locusts,” “Wong Chung” (in Cantonese), and “Shi Na” (a racial slur used by Japanese during WWII) (Kuo 2014). Second, violent protesters demonstrated white supremacist mentalities in their crystal clear, differential treatment of white people and Chinese (including local Hong Kong residents). For instance, white journalists and travelers who criticized or interfered in their use of violence on the streets or who voiced political disagreement were free to go, even surrounded by hundreds of violent protestors. In stark contrast, when Chinese journalists and bystanders did the same, or just appeared nearby, they would encounter fierce physical and verbal attacks openly on public streets, even at the airport hall. When white travelers tried to push away these students who blocked cabinet entrances to paralyze subway operations and cause turmoil, these students simply drifted away and went to block other entrances. Again, when Chinese or even local Hong Kong residents did the same, they were physically attacked with blood spilled around, clearly demonstrating the protestors’ obedience/fear of white people. The hatred of Chinese eventually grew into sheer violence of a terrorist nature. A Chinese mainlander could be openly attacked on the street just because one speaks standard Chinese (Strait Times 2019; The Economist 2019). A Japanese bystander was mistaken as a Chinese mainlander and vehemently attacked just because he took pictures of the protest (Jiji 2019). Mainland Chinese-linked shops and enterprises were ransacked and trashed, and local corporations that openly supported the police’s attempts to resume order were no exception (Li 2019). The blunt, racial attacks on mainland Chinese were meant to create disorder and protect riots (Strait Times 2020). Local residents were threatened and searched in order to delete photos taken on site when being suspected of spying for the Chinese government, and a local contractor was doxxed and attacked for participating in Hong Kong’s smart lampposts project (Caitlin 2019). Furthermore, the fact that some protesters waved the US and UK national flags agitated the Chinese majority and aroused strong nationalism in China, especially as some protesters humiliated Chinese national flags in public. The airing of foreign national flags has totally changed the nature of Hong Kong’s political movement from domestic political protest to a global political surge (as part of the global color revolutions), thus inevitably leading to a final duel between Hong Kong’s pro-Western forces (seeking Hong Kong’s independence and non-Chinese identity) and Chinese nationalist forces. The antagonist mentality has been multiplied in the context of a global anti-China/Chinese surge, when Trump and his followers provoked ideas of white supremacy and MAGA both domestically and globally, encouraging the use of force and violence. The escalating white supremacist sentiment and hatred of Chinese cornered the Chinese government, which sought a final solution to root out foreign interference and the associated pro-democracy and independence forces. Last, it is interesting to mention the presence of members of Ukrainian far-right groups in Hong Kong’s protests to show support for protests against the Chinese government, even though they were irrelevant (Cheung 2019). It could be the case that white supremacy extremists likely traveled to Hong Kong to show support and learn street fighting tactics from Hong Kong protesters. Their appearance, however, could serve as a good reason for the Chinese government to suppress white supremacy-related street activities. Ending White Supremacy, Strengthened Surveillance Against this backdrop, the Chinese government felt it must win this battle even at high political and economic cost because it is decisive regarding whether China will virtually regain Hong Kong from white people and their Hong Kong representatives (embracing white supremacy) who fought to separate Hong Surveillance & Society 19(3) 381
Zhao: White Supremacy
Kong from China permanently. Hong Kong, as a densely populated metropolitan city, is totally dependent
on mainland China in terms of food, water, energy, and its whole economy. It is not difficult to predict who
will be the final winner of the last battle when young protesters pursue unrealistic independence.
The most direct consequence is escalating political control of Hong Kong by the Chinese government,
characterized by paramount surveillance to further implement control and political reform. New laws
banning masks on streets and curfew rules were promulgated, and stricter online surveillance was enforced
to increase identification of protestors in digital spaces (Smith 2019). Connecting online activities with
offline street protestors in Hong Kong was a rather successful move by the government, causing a large
scale of deletion of social networking contents and accounts. This move was very similar to the US Federal
Bureau of Investigation’s use of online information for surveillance and punitive practices after the January
6th riots in Washington, DC (Tynes 2021). After June 2020, Hong Kong’s new security law came into force,
imposing harsh penalties on tactics popularly used in protests and including multiple measures to silence
criticisms of Party policies (Hernández 2020). Under this new law, police surveillance of communications
came under Hong Kong’s national security law, potentially granting officers broader powers of interception
(Pang 2021). Most notable was the recent closing of Hong Kong’s pro-democracy Apple Daily newspaper
consequent to the arrest of five editors and executives and the freezing of millions of assets under the
National Security law (Soo and Cheng 2021).
White supremacy has been particularly addressed by an overhauling political reform plan imposed by
Beijing, which only allows patriots to sit in the legislature, not directly elected representatives, by means of
strict political filtering of candidates (Lau 2021). The strict political review, conducted by a special vetting
committee with help from two other government authorities, will block pro-Western democracy and liberty
candidates, and thus block white supremacy believers from legally participating in the future of Hong Kong
politics. In the future, reform of Hong Kong’s educational system is also expected to stress patriotism and
Chinese identity as part of the re-decolonization process. Also, local Hong Kong officials who refused to
make a loyalty oath in writing for public service face resignation or being sacked (Wang and Stevenson
2021). These successive, progressive measures certainly are meant to distance Hong Kong and its younger
generations from Western influences (such as white supremacy-associated ideologies of democracy, liberty,
and human rights) to forge Chinese identity in the long run, and thus these measures mark the beginning of
the end of white supremacy in Hong Kong (at least in politics), given the Chinese government’s well-known
surveillance capacities, both online and offline.
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