The 2018 Presidential Election in Brazil - dynamics and scenarios Carlos Pereira - Eesp-FGV
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Carlos Pereira
The 2018 Presidential Election in Brazil
dynamics and scenarios
FGV EESP, São Paulo, April 03, 2018
Rules and schedule
q Two round elections
q First round on October 07 and runoff on October 28
q No independent candidates are allowed (April 07 is
deadline for candidate party affiliation).
q Party conventions (July 20 - August 05)
q Enrolling official candidacies (August 15)
q Electoral campaign (August 16)
q Electoral justice approves/rejects candidacies
(September 17)
q Campaign on radio and TV (August 26 - September
29)
The context
The exceptionalism of the 2018 election
¨ For the first time the incumbent is not competitive
¨ For the first time there is a viable outsider
¨ Weakened polarization: PT x PSDB but without their
main actors
¨ Exclusive public funding of campaigns
How corruption affects the electoral game?
¨ Do corruption charges affect electoral odds?
¨ Do voters refrain from voting in corrupt candidates
who share their ideology/party?
¨ Do court convictions affect electoral odds?
How corruption affects the presidential
race?
Latinobarometro 2017 (Corruption as the main concern)
Latinoamerica 10
Uruguay 1
Venezuela 1
El Salvador 2
Honduras 3
Nicaragua 3
Panama 4
Guatemala 5
Costa Rica 6
Argentina 6
Ecuador 6
Paraguay 10
Bolivia 11
Chile 12
Mexico 13
Dom. Rep. 15
Peru 19
Colombia 20
Brazil 31
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
The Paradox of unpopular corruption and
popular corrupt politicians:
In Brazil as well…
• Luiz Ignácio Lula da Silva
¨ Former President of Brazil (2003-2006
and 2007-2010).
¨ He was accused by Public Prosecutors as
the main leader of a criminal organization
(Petrobras Scandal)
¨ He has convicted for 9 years and a half
for passive corruption and money laundry.
¨ The sentence was confirmed by the second
instance of the justice with an increase in
jail time (12 years and one month).
¨ He is still ahead in the pools for the 2018
presidential election.The Paradox of unpopular corruption and
popular corrupt politicians:
Examples flourish everywhere
¨ Ehud Olmert (Israel)
¨ Jacques Chirac (França)
¨ Asif Ali Zadari (Paquistão)
¨ Silvio Berlusconi (Itália)
¨ Edwin Edwards (Louisiana)
¨ Paulo Maluf (São Paulo)What explains this paradox?
q Lack of information about candidates’
involvement in corruption
q Public spending (public goods) moderates the
negative impact of corruption on the probability
of reelection
q Even informed voters may vote for allegedly
corrupt incumbents if they expect to receive
material benefitsWhy information is not enough to curb corruption?
.2
Marginal Effect of Corruption on Reelection
−.6 −.4 −.2 0
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Public Spending
Although corruption decreases the probability of mayors’ reelection (29%), this
negative effect vanishes when public goods increase.Does corruption trumps ideology ?
What psychological mechanisms?
q Cognitive trade-off (tolerance): one should purposely choose a
corrupt candidate when the benefits of sharing ideological
views are preferred
q Change in perception (misperception): Ideology may change
the perception of corruption, in such a way that voters may see
corrupt candidates as honest..
q ideology may facilitate seeing someone else as similar to oneself and,
for this reason, discounting corrupt informationDoes corruption trumps ideology?
Traditionally ideology has been understood as a position on left-right continuum
q While some citizens may see liberalism and
conservatism as primarily about social issues, others in
terms of economics, while others as relevant to
ideological categorizations.
q higher tolerance to a dishonest candidate
ideologically preferred in both economic and social
dimensions (sophisticated ideologues) than in one of
these two dimensions (inconsistent ideologues).Ideology trumps rejection of corruption! There exist significant differences between subjects in which ideology matched compared to when they did not match, both in economic and social ideological dimensions
Effect of cost-benefit tradeoff on the probability of vote change for different levels of perception of corruption
Sum-up of the main findings
q Voters are more likely to choose a dishonest candidate
when they share the same ideology, even if corrupt.
q This effect is stronger when both economic and social ideological
dimensions match;
q People are less likely to perceive as corrupt politicians
who share their ideology
q The way corruption is perceived affects choice:
q the ideologically preferred candidate is corrupt, people are
motivated to search for other reasons to support him.
q motivated reasoning can manifest in both misperception of
corruption and a biased cost-benefit tradeoffDo convictions affect voters’ choice?
50% 47%
45% 43%
41%
40%
34% 33%
35%
vote for candidate B
30% 27%
24%
25%
20% 19%
20%
14% 14%
15% 12% 11% 11% 12%
10%
10% 6%
4%
5%
0%
Social Matching
Social Matching
Social Matching
Social Mismatching
Social Mismatching
Social Control
Social Control
Social Mismatching
Social Control
Economic Control Economic Matching Economic Mismatching
Suspect Convicted
• The majority of respondents voted on candidate A, who had no record related to
corruption and voted more often in the candidate B when suspect of corruption (33% on
average) than when convicted for corruption (11% on average, χ² (1) = 58.0; p <
0.001).
• The effect of ideology is significant for the suspect candidate (χ² (8) = 19.8; p =
0.01) but not for the convicted candidate (χ² (1) = 8.52; p < 0.385).Do convictions affect voters’ choices? q Judicial punishment works not only curbing deviant behavior but also it has an effect on voters’ perception and their electoral choice q Judicial conviction and the imposition of penalties may discourage future misconduct and free voters from the spell of corrupt politicians.
Any evidence that conviction matter?
DataFolha Pool (31/01/2018)
Results First round
q Still shows Lula ahead
Lula 36%
with 36%
Bolsonaro 18%
q Above average among
Marina 8%
elementary education
(47%) Alckimin 6%
Ciro 6%
q Family income of two
minimal wage (47%) Álvaro Dias 4%
Manuela 2%
q North (46%)
Collor 2%
q Northeast (60%) Meireles 1%
Blanks/Nulls 19%Any evidence that conviction matter?
DataFolha Pool (31/01/2018)
After the confirmation of Lula’s conviction in the second instance of the justice (TRF-4)
q The number of undecided, blanks and nulls has reached
46% of the electorate.
q It suggests that a portion of Lula’s voters has already started to
consider voting in alternative candidates
q The number of voters that no longer considers voting in
candidates supported by Lula increased from 48 to
53%.
q Lula should not rum: 51%
q Lula will not run: 43%
q Rejection of Lula: 40% (Temer 60%; Collor 44%;
Bolsonaro 29%; Alckmin 26%)Lula and PT’s electoral strategies
Judicial survival
¨ Lula and PT will keep his candidacy as long as they can.
¨ This strategy may lead the PT and the entire left to be out of the runoff.
Dilemma
¨ How could the PT get rid of Lula, who is ahead in the race, and start
betting in an alternative candidate?
The best for the left
q The sooner Lula’s judicial penalties are implemented, the more unified and
competitive would be the leftIs the PSDB (center-right) vs. PT (center-left) fight over? Puzzle: ¨ Without Lula in the electoral race, will the left be fragmented? ¨ PT will have an alternative candidate no matter what. ¨ Will PT lose its capacity to nuclearize the left? ¨ Would the left no longer be competitive in 2018? ¨ Who will be the “new PT” in the near future?
How will the center react and play?
Will the government launch a candidate?
Positive Negative
q Macroeconomic ¨ Temer is a toxic asset
stabilization ¨ JBS Corruption scandal
q Federal intervention in ¨ Two accusations from the
Rio de Janeiro General Public
Prosecutor
q There are costs for
¨ Extremely low level of
changes in the partisan popularity (3%) and
trajectories (majoritarian government approval
vs. legislative)Government Approval in Latin America
Latinobarometro 2017
Latinoamerica 36
Brazil 6
El Salvador 17
Mexico 20
Paraguay 21
Panama 22
Peru 30
Colombia 30
Venezuela 32
Chile 33
Argentina 36
Guatemala 38
Uruguay 41
Honduras 47
Costa Rica 50
Dom. Rep. 52
Bolivia 57
Ecuador 66
Nicaragua 67
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80How will the center react and play?
How will the center react and play?
Will the PSDB launch a competitive candidate?
q PSDB plays the presidential game as protagonist
since 1994 no matter if it is the winner or the loser.
q Current Governor of São Paulo, Geraldo Alckmin
q PSDB is a national party with high degree of local
connections.
q It governs several cities and important states.How will the right parties react and play?
Will Bolsonaro be a competitive candidate?
q Bolsonaro will probably run for a small party.
q He will have a smaller slot on TV and radio
q Also a smaller portion of public funding
q His main asset is social media
q It mostly works for converted voters
q He is a single issue playerDistribution of electoral and partisan public funds
(R$ million), about 2.4 billion
MDB 304.9
PT 300.9
PSDB 258.8
PP 176.8
PSB 160.4
PSD 151.7
PR 147.4
DEM 116.4
PRB 96.8
PTB 85.5
PDT 85
SD 58.6
PSC 53.3
PDdoB 42.7
PODE 41.5
PPS 40.5
PV 38.7
PROS 34.8
PSOL 32.7
PHS 25.1
AVANTE 22.1
PEN 15.2
PSL 14.8
REDE 14.6
PTC 7.2
PRP 6.6
PSDC 5.2
PMN 5
PRTB 4.9
PSTU 3.1
PPL 2.8
PCB 2.4
PCO 2
NOVO 1.9
PMB 1.9
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350Electoral funds and number of cities governed by the party
350 1200
300 1026
1000
250
792 800
200
600
539
150
494
413 400
100 334
295
262 265 256
200
50
118 104
101
80 87
53 62
28 30 14 36
0 3 4 10 9 19 15 5 2 0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Electoral Funds CitiesElectoral funds and number of cities governed by a party
Dominant Beliefs in 2018’s Election
Mental molds about how the world should work
q Developmentalism (1964-1994)
q Social inclusion without fiscal constraints
(1995-1994)
q Fiscally sound social inclusion (1995-ut to now).
q Intolerance to corruption (specially after the
Mensalão trial).
q Corruption is the main issue, ahead of unemployment,
security, healthFiscally Sound Social Inclusion Dominant Belief
Discussion
Take home lessons:
q Two forces running in opposite directions
q Socialdemand for the novelty vs. professionalism with
concentrated assets.
q The Lula’s strategy of keeping his candidacy will
fragment the left and their candidates will not be
electorally viable
q Candidates that deviate from the dominant belief
will not be competitiveYou can also read
