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European Journal
European Journal of of
East Asian Studies 16 (2017) 193–219 East Asian Studies
brill.com/ejea
The asean Economic Community and National
Sovereignty
Towards a Securitisation of Labour Migration? A Press Analysis of Four
Southeast Asian Countries
Jürgen Rüland*
University of Freiburg
juergen.rueland@politik.uni-freiburg.de
Abstract
The article examines whether, and how far, the asean Economic Community (aec)
has triggered a discourse on labour migration in asean member countries which
exhibits a tendency towards securitising the free flow of labour. It begins with the
observation that fears linger in asean’s member countries that market liberalisation
may not only lead to a flooding with imported goods, but also intensify intra-regional
labour migration. The ushering in of the aec can thus be considered a critical juncture
facilitating ideational changes and so exacerbating labour migration politicisation.
Resting on the Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory and a discourse analysis of
72 newspaper articles, and based on a taxonomy of politicisation, the article’s major
findings are that the level of politicisation is limited in the four countries under
investigation. Surprisingly, it is higher in Indonesia than in Singapore and Malaysia
where securitisation effects would have been expected. Explanations suggest that
issues such as terrorism and maritime border concerns are currently more conducive
for securitisation. In Indonesia and Singapore, the level of politicising post-aec labour
migration is higher than in Malaysia and the Philippines due to deeply inculcated
vulnerability and survival discourses, which let elites respond seismically to global and
regional developments.
* For his able research assistance, I am very grateful to Mr Andreas Kattler. I am also indebted
to my co-editors of this special issue, Nicola Piper and Stefan Rother, the participants of the
workshop organised by the Freiburg Institute of Advanced Studies (frias) on 25 and 26 April
2017, the audience of the second Indonesian Conference on Southeast Asian Studies (icseas)
held on 27 and 28 September 2017 at the Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, and two
anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier versions of this manuscript.
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2017 | doi: 10.1163/15700615-01602004
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Keywords
asean Economic Community – securitisation – labour migration
Introduction
For the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (asean) 31 December 2015 was
an auspicious date. It was the day which—after years of meticulous prepara-
tion—heralded the start of the asean Economic Community (aec), a major
component of an asean Community (ac) inaugurated on the same day. The
aec pursues a fourfold objective: it seeks (1) to establish a single market and
production base through facilitating the free flow of goods, services, invest-
ment, capital and skilled labour; (2) to develop Southeast Asia as a competitive
economic region; (3) to create equitable economic development; and (4) to ful-
ly integrate the region into the global economy.1 While, irrespective of its inau-
guration, the aec remains work in progress, it has aroused fears in the eco-
nomically less advanced member countries that market liberalisation will flood
them with foreign products, jeopardising the existence of local small-scale
enterprises in particular. The asean–China Free Trade Area served as a prece-
dent for such concerns as some countries like Indonesia were indeed swamped
by cheap and often substandard imports.2 Although the aec—unlike the Euro-
pean single market—only liberalised the flow of skilled labour, apprehension
surfaced that market opening would accelerate labour mobility, as prior to the
aec the figure for intra-regional labour migration had already risen to 6.8 mil-
lion.3 Given the region’s enormous wealth disparities acting as significant ‘push’
and ‘pull’ factors, such projections cannot be dismissed out of hand. If they ma-
terialised, they would presumably strengthen propensities of governments in
the region to categorise labour migration as a non-traditional security problem.
1 asean. asean Integration Report (Jakarta: asean Secretariat, 2015); Dosch, J. Die asean
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft. Überblick für Wissenschaft und Praxis (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2016).
2 Rüland, Jürgen ‘Why (most) Indonesian businesses fear the asean Economic Community:
struggling with Southeast Asia’s regional corporatism’. Third World Quarterly 37 (6) (2016):
1130–1145.
3 Asian Development Bank. asean Community 2015: Managing Integration for Better Jobs and
Shared Prosperity (Manila: adb, 2014): 83; Rother, S. ‘Labour migration in Southeast Asia:
in search of regional governance’, in Contemporary Southeast Asia: The Politics of Change,
Contestation and Adaptation, 3rd edition, eds A. Ba and M. Beeson, (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2017, forthcoming): 181–197, 183.
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The question addressed by this paper is thus not far-fetched: it examines
how far the aec has triggered a discourse on labour migration in asean mem-
ber countries which exhibits tendencies towards securitising the free flow of
labour. To approach this research question, the paper develops a theoretical
framework which rests on Buzan and associates’ securitisation concept,4 then
introduces the methodology, before presenting and explaining the empirical
findings derived from a discourse analysis of major national and local news-
papers in Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia. The conclusion
summarises the results and presents a short outlook.
Analytical Framework: Securitisation Theory
Two sets of theory-guided arguments which in many cases are closely inter-
twined provide explanations of why and how the liberalisation of labour trig-
gers fears in the local population which give securitising actors a pretext for
securitising labour migration. One body of literature focuses on material fac-
tors such as job competition, education and level of income. The main argu-
ment here is that through accelerated immigration the pie gets smaller for
the local population. Better-trained immigrants take jobs from the locals who,
as a corollary, are relegated to less well-remunerated positions or might even
have to contend with rising unemployment. This problem is exacerbated if the
local labour force is growing rapidly and if this growth cannot be absorbed by
economic growth, especially in periods of economic recession, spurring sen-
timents of relative deprivation in the local population or at least substantial
segments of it. As a result, income and wealth distribution might be associ-
ated with nationality or even primordial factors such as religion or ethnic-
ity. Depending on the type of labour migration, such sentiments can emerge
among low-skilled persons, students, professionals and businesspeople or even
all of these groups together and eventually become a source of escalating social
unrest.
The second set of explanations relates to cognitive and ideational factors.
Increasing labour migration is thereby seen as a process which causes fears
among the local population of losing their national and cultural identities. Peo-
ple living in labour destination countries view their country as being flooded by
foreigners which as a result of the concomitant demographic transformations
4 Buzan, B., O. Wæver and J. de Wilde. Security. A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, co:
Lynne Rienner, 1998).
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relegates locals to aliens in their home country. In labour destination countries,
such sentiments—often going hand in hand with negative attitudes towards
economic liberalisation and neo-liberal globalisation—tend to intensify with
adverse economic scope conditions, specific demographic characteristics such
as the ageing of societies and, in particular, volatile ethnically, religiously and
culturally divided societies.
Although Southeast Asia by and large has been an economic success story,
some of the scope conditions described above also pertain to the region. Most
Southeast Asian countries are deeply divided societies, the increase in pros-
perity and wealth is distributed highly unevenly and recessions—of which the
Asian Financial Crisis of 1997/1998 was the worst—repeatedly slowed down
economic growth. Moreover, the preoccupation with national security and
the ubiquitous survival discourses reflecting the countries’ turbulent past and
highlighting the vulnerabilities of Southeast Asian societies5 provide a fertile
ground for actors’ intent to securitise societal problems including labour migra-
tion. Speeches of Southeast Asian government representatives in the annual
general debate of the un General Assembly as well as the autobiographies and
writings of leading Southeast Asian politicians abundantly show how deep-
seated the fears about the region’s vulnerability to adverse external and internal
influences are, for them elevating survival to the overarching state preference.6
Securitisers are particularly numerous in asean member countries’ exten-
sive security apparatus. Even in the region’s democratising countries such as
Indonesia and the Philippines, security sector reforms have remained incom-
plete,7 giving the armed forces, the police, intelligence agencies and other secu-
rity agencies continued influence on the definition of national security policies.
5 For an example, see the autobiographies of former Singaporean Foreign Minister Jayakumar
and former Thai Foreign Minister Kasem S. Kasemsri and most recently in his 2016 address of
the un general Assembly, Singaporean Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan. See Jayakumar,
S. Diplomacy: A Singapore Experience (Singapore: Straits Times Press, 2011), Kasemri, Kasem S.
From the Elephant to the Eagle: Reflections of a Thai Ambassador (Bangkok: Samphanpanich,
1989) and undocs.org/A/71/PV.22. See further Mahbubani, Kishore. Can Singapore Survive?
(Singapore: Straits Times Press, 2017).
6 For an example, see the autobiography of former Singaporean Foreign Minister Jayakumar,
Jayakumar, S. Diplomacy: A Singapore Experience (Singapore: Straits Times Press, 2011) or
former Thai Foreign Minister Kasem S. Kasemsri, Kasemsri, Kasem S. From the Elephant
to the Eagle: Reflections of a Thai Ambassador (Bangkok: Samphanpanich, 1989) and most
recently, in his 2016 address of the un General Assembly, Singaporean Foreign Minister
Vivian Balakrishnan, un General Assembly, available at undocs.org/A/71/PV.22. See further
Mahbubani, Kishore. Can Singapore Survive? (Singapore: Straits Times Press, 2017).
7 Mietzner, M., ed. The Political Resurgence of the Military in Southeast Asia: Conflict and Leader-
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The obvious nexus between labour migration and security has given rise to
studies which applied the Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory.8 While
these studies chiefly focused on Europe,9 the securitisation approach has also
been applied to labour migration in Southeast Asia,10 although more frequently
the concept has merely been used as a buzzword without further theoreti-
cal elaboration.11 In this respect, the studies of Franco, Curley and Wong and
Arifianto are noteworthy exceptions.12 I share with them the argument that,
despite critique of the framework,13 securitisation theory provides valuable
insights into the security dimension of labour migration. Yet, while these stud-
ies indeed help us understand how securitising actors frame issues of labour
ship (London: Routledge, 2011); Rüland, Jürgen, M.G. Manea and H. Born, eds. The Politics
of Military Reform. Experiences from Indonesia and Nigeria (Heidelberg: Springer, 2013);
Heiduk, F. Security Sector Reform in Southeast Asia: From Policy to Practice (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
8 Buzan et al., Security.
9 From among a sizeable number of studies applying securitisation theory to European
issues of labour migration, see Trombetta, M.J. ‘Linking climate-induced migration and
security within the eu: insights from the securitization debate’. Critical Studies on Security
2 (2) (2014): 131–147; Karyotis, G. ‘Securitization of migration in Greece: process, motives,
and implications’. International Political Sociology 6 (4) (2012): 390–408; and Van Baar, H.
‘Europe’s Romaphobia: problematization, securitization, nomadization’. Environment and
Planning d, Society and Space 29 (2011): 203–212.
10 Piper, Nicola. ‘Gendering the politics of migration’. International Migration Review xl (1)
(2006): 133–164, 138.
11 For an example, see Rahman, M.M., and B.S.A. Yeoh. The Social Organization of Remit-
tances: Channelling Remittances from East and Southeast Asia to Bangladesh (Singapore:
Asian MetaCentre for Population and Sustainable Development, 2006).
12 Franco, J.N. Securitizing/Desecuritizing the Filipinos ‘Outward Migration Issue’ in the Philip-
pines’ Relations with Other Asian Governments, Working Paper No. 99 (Singapore: Nanyang
Technological University, Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2006); Curley, M.G.,
and S. Wong. Security and Migration in Asia. The Dynamics of Securitisation, (London:
Routledge, 2008); and Arifianto, A.R. ‘The Securitization of Transnational Labor Migra-
tion: The Case of Malaysia and Indonesia’. Asian Politics and Policy 1 (4) (2009): 613–
630.
13 Prominently, for a summary of weaknesses see Balzaq, T. ‘The three faces of securiti-
zation: political agency, audience and context’. European Journal of International Rela-
tions 11 (2) (2005): 171–201; Balzaq, T. Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge
and Dissolve (New York: Routledge, 2011); Stritzel, H. ‘Towards a theory of securitization:
Copenhagen and beyond’. European Journal of International Relations 13 (3) (2007): 299–
327; McDonald, M. ‘Securitization and the construction of security’. European Journal of
International Relations 14 (4) (2008): 563–587; see also Kurniawan, Y. The Politics of Secu-
ritization in Democratic Indonesia (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
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migration as an issue of security, they exhibit a tendency of concept stretch-
ing.14 This is the case, if—as in Curley and Wong’s volume—securitisation is
defined as ‘the process by which something becomes a security issue’.15 While
Curley in her theoretical treatment of the labour migration–security nexus
seems to be aware of this problem,16 other studies—including Arifianto’s—
seem to regard any speech act defining labour migration as security problem as
evidence for securitisation. While, arguably, such utterances can be considered
as securitisation moves, they are not framed as an ‘existential threat’, that is, a
threat jeopardising the survival of the referent object. Although governments
often use such discourses to justify restrictions on labour mobility, in many
cases these policy shifts defy what the Copenhagen School defines as extraordi-
nary measures. The latter would be mass deportations, detaining or physically
punishing irregular migrants as the Malaysian government repeatedly did in
the past.17 In other words, studies using securitisation theory to analyse labour
migration exhibit methodological shortcomings.
This article seeks to address this problem by developing in the method-
ology section a taxonomy which also allows the capture and categorisation
of discursive processes which are below the level of securitisation as defined
by Buzan and associates. Also new is the theory’s application to the nexus
of the aec and labour mobility. In the eyes of security-affined audiences, the
aec—despite limiting the liberalisation of labour mobility to skilled labour—
putatively aggravates existing problems associated with the liberalisation of
labour. In this respect, the aec can be considered a ‘critical juncture’, which—
as the theoretical literature on ideational change argues18—may facilitate and
accelerate attitudinal change towards labour migration and support the agenda
of securitisers.
Combining realist and reflexivist arguments, securitisation theory accepts
the realist ontology which regards international relations as characterised by
anarchy and conflict, but transcends realism by arguing that security threats
14 Sartori, G. ‘Concept misformation in comparative politics’. American Political Science
Review 64 (4) (1970): 1033–1053.
15 Curley, M.G., and S. Wong. Security and Migration in Asia. The Dynamics of Securitisation,
(London: Routledge, 2008): 4.
16 Curley, M.G. ‘Levels of Analysis Issues in the Migration–Security Nexus’, in Security and
Migration in Asia. The Dynamics of Securitisation, eds M.G. Curley and S. Wong (London:
Routledge, 2008): 24.
17 Arifianto, ‘The Securitization of Transnational Labor Migration’, 623.
18 Legro, J.W. ‘The transformation of policy ideas’. American Journal of Political Science 44 (3)
(2000): 419–432.
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are socially and politically constructed and hence not exogenously given. Secu-
ritisation is an extreme form of politicisation by which securitising actors
(which may be individuals or social groups) present an issue as posing an
existential threat to a designated referent object. Referent objects are inter-
pretative communities or social contexts such as a state, a nation, a civilisa-
tion or an ideology, constructed by securitising actors.19 The survival of the
referent object requires emergency measures. The latter are actions ‘outside
the normal bounds of political procedure’,20 measures of absolute priority and
urgency that may severely curtail political liberties and civic rights. What secu-
rity threats are is intersubjective and contingent, depending on speech acts
through which security actors frame and dramatise an issue. Yet graduation
from a mere securitising move of a securitising actor to securitisation is depen-
dent on at least one major precondition: that the speaker has the authority to
persuade an audience to accept an existential threat as a shared value. Only
such acceptance by a majority of the audience legitimises the securitisation
and the subsequent imposition of extraordinary measures.21 In the case of this
article, referent objects are the Southeast Asian states and national sovereignty,
potential securitisation actors are the officers of the security agencies of these
states and the audience is the general public. The media—and here in particu-
lar the press—are catalysts which the study assumes securitising actors would
primarily instrumentalise in order to securitise anticipated accelerated labour
migration caused by the aec. It is expected that securitising actors will be
stronger in labour destination countries than in sending countries and stronger
in authoritarian regimes than in democracies.
Methodology
The cases studied in this article are ‘crucial cases’.22 Two of them, Indonesia
and the Philippines, represent ‘least likely’ cases; the two others—Malaysia and
Singapore—qualify as ‘most likely’ cases. The rationale for selecting Indonesia
and the Philippines as ‘least likely’ cases is that securitisation tendencies are
not expected in the two countries, as both are labour-exporting countries.
The inclusion of two liberal English-language newspapers (The Jakarta Post,
19 Buzan et al., Security, 22.
20 Buzan et al., Security, 24.
21 Buzan et al., Security, 25.
22 Gerring, J. Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. 2008).
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Jakarta Globe) in the analysis further strengthens the ‘least likely’ quality of
Indonesia, as it is unlikely that these newspapers serve as wilful platforms
for the securitisation of aec-induced labour mobility. Hence, fears of being
flooded with foreign labour as a consequence of the aec should be non-
existent or low. If, nevertheless, evidence is discovered for the securitisation of
labour migration in Indonesia and the Philippines, it would strongly support
the securitisation argument. Malaysia and Singapore were selected as ‘most
likely’ cases, because it was assumed that, as destination countries with a
substantial share of foreign labour, there is a high probability that issues of
labour migration will be securitised.23 If in the Singaporean and Malaysian
case, against expectations, there is no evidence for the securitisation of labour
mobility, it means that the propositions of the article must be revised. For the
securitisation argument to be valid, empirical results in all four cases must
show securitisation.
As securitising actors are dependent on catalysts and amplifiers for their
messages, it was further assumed that securitising discourses on the labour-
related implications of the aec will find expression in the region’s print media.
Major newspapers from all four countries were thus selected and searched
for articles linking the aec with keywords such as labour migration, labour
migrant, migration, Overseas Filipino Workers (ofws), migrasi, pekerja asing
and tenaga kerja Indonesia (tki). Unfortunately, access to newspaper archives
was limited as not all relevant newspapers have an archive or the archive is not
electronically accessible.24 Of great help was the LexisNexis database which
provided access to The Straits Times, The Business Times, Today (Singapore) and
New Straits Times (Malaysia) archives. Accessible English-language dailies were
The Jakarta Post and Jakarta Globe (Indonesia), the Philippine Daily Inquirer,
The Philippine Star, The Manila Times, BusinessMirror (Philippines) and The
Star (Malaysia). This selection was complemented by Bahasa Indonesia and
Bahasa Malay newspapers such as Republika—a pro-Islamic daily—Detik News
(Indonesia), Utusan Malaysia (Malaysia) and Berita Harian (Singapore), plus—
in the case of Indonesia—a few local newspapers. Unfortunately, the archive
of Kompas, the most important liberal Indonesian-language daily, was not
23 Similar, although not speaking of securitisation, Chang, A.C.H., and B. Welsh. A Global-
ization Backlash? Public Views of Immigration in East Asia, Working Paper Series No. 116
(Taipei: Asian Barometer, 2016).
24 Rüland, Jürgen, J. Lang and Y. Wiese. ‘Political analysis and the Southeast Asian press:
decoding meaning and tracing events’, in Methodology and Research Practice in South-
east Asian Studies, eds M. Huotari, Jürgen Rüland and J. Schlehe (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2014).
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table 1 Newspapers searched for the nexus aec and labour migration
Newspaper Number of articles identified Language
Indonesia
The Jakarta Post 8 English
Jakarta Globe 4 English
Republika 17 Bahasa Indonesia
Others 4 Bahasa Indonesia
Philippines
Philippine Daily Inquirer 6 English
The Philippine Star 3 English
The Manila Times 1 English
BusinessMirror 5 English
Singapore
The Straits Times 7 English
The Business Times 5 English
Today 2 English
Berita Harian 1 Bahasa Malay
Malaysia
New Straits Times 6 English
The Star 2 English
Utusan Malaysia 1 Bahasa Malay
Total 72
source: own compilation
electronically accessible. Table 1 provides an overview of the newspapers se-
lected for analysis and the number of articles found. The time frame for analysis
is essentially the 2014 to 2017 period, that is, the years immediately preceding
and succeeding the inauguration of the aec.
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table 2 Levels of politicisation of labour mobility
Level of politicisation Framing towards the Proposed political Frequency of
referent object action newspaper reports
(per newspaper)
Extreme politicisation Labour mobility Severe measures High intensity (15
(= securitisation) jeopardises the discriminating against or >15 reports per
survival of the immigrants, restricting month)
referent object; high the freedom of
degree of urgency movement and curbing
civic rights; imposing
extraordinary measures
Politicisation Labour mobility is Increased government Moderate intensity
identified as relevant vigilance; preparing to (1
for the security of cope with the problem; report per month)
the referent object; policy responses do
moderate degree of not transcend what is
urgency considered as ‘normal’
Absence or low level Labour mobility is not Labour mobility is not Low intensity (0 or
of politicisation perceived as a security triggering new policies only 1 report per
problem; no or only month)
little urgency
All 72 articles were openly coded.25 It was decided to code the articles induc-
tively as this would not limit the analysis to the theory-informed assumptions
made in the beginning but would also open it to unexpected themes which
might be of relevance for the topic. Empirical findings were ordered by coun-
try, language of the newspaper and worldviews championed by the newspapers
and actors: that is, whether the opinions expressed in the articles were those of
government, business or civil society representatives.
As argued in the theoretical section, there is a great likelihood that not all
securitising moves succeed, calling for a taxonomy that allows for nuancing
agency and policy measures that on first sight appear as forms of securitisation.
Table 2 provides for such a taxonomy which is geared to post-aec labour
25 Mayring, P. Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse. Grundlagen und Techniken (Weinheim: Beltz Verlag,
2010).
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mobility, the theme of this article. It distinguishes ‘extreme politicisation’,
which following Buzan et al. is equated with ‘securitisation’, ‘politicisation’ and
‘absence of politicisation’. The three categories differ along the dimensions of
framing towards the referent object, proposed political action and frequency
of reports per newspaper. The first dimension measures the urgency which is
attached to aec-related labour mobility for the survival of the referent object,
the second probes the severity of the measures coping with labour mobility
and the third assesses the intensity of the discourse on labour mobility. A
high intensity of discursive interaction exists if there are 15 or more reports
per newspaper on aec-triggered labour mobility (or almost daily reporting),
a moderate intensity is defined as occasional reporting (less than 15 reports
and more than one report per month) and a low intensity of reporting occurs
if there are reports only here and there: that is, no or only one report per
month. The taxonomy operationalises securitisation and helps in identifying
the extent to which issues of labour mobility are securitised in the countries
under investigation.
The aec, Labour Migration and Securitisation
While press reporting on labour migration is abundant in the region,26 Table 1
illustrates that the search for articles on the nexus between the aec and labour
migration unexpectedly delivered only a moderate number of hits. The major-
ity of articles appeared in the Indonesian print media, while in the Philippines,
Singapore and, in particular, in Malaysia, only a few articles could be identified.
This finding is surprising given the fact that Indonesia is a labour-exporting
country, while Malaysia and Singapore are destination countries where labour
migrants are often stereotyped27 and sentiments of discontent with the high
percentage of foreign workforce are frequently articulated in private conversa-
tions by ordinary people. In Singapore labour migration has been a major issue
in the 2011 general elections28 and lately—despite policy revisions—even trig-
26 Tan, K.P. ‘Images of the migrant worker in Singapore’s mainstream news media. Prospects
for integration’, in Migration and Integration in Singapore: Policies and Practice, eds
Y.M. Teng, G. Koh and D. Soon (London: Routledge, 2015): 160–191, 162.
27 Tan, ‘Images of the migrant worker’, 162.
28 The elections have been considered as a warning by the ruling People’s Action Party (pap),
which lost about 6 per cent of the vote (The Business Times, 3 August 2015). The govern-
ment subsequently tightened its labour migration policies. See ‘Singapore has tightened
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gered public protest.29 Yet the limited number of articles shows that the nexus
of the aec and labour migration is on the public’s radar, although press reports
do not reach the intensity of a discourse in which extraordinary measures are
proposed by securitising actors as a protection against the influx of foreign
workers. In fact, while acknowledging that at least articles in the Indonesian
print media were not free from fears of the anticipated labour-related conse-
quences of the aec for the country’s sovereignty, it is safe to conclude that the
limited number of newspaper articles found firmly rules out the securitisation
of labour migration in all four cases examined. In no case do articles per news-
paper linking the aec to increased labour mobility exceed three per month.
Three articles appeared in Republika (Indonesia) in November 2015: that is, the
month immediately preceding the inauguration of the aec. As indicated in the
methodological section, the identification of a securitisation discourse would
require, at least in the government-controlled press of Singapore and Malaysia,
a much higher incidence of articles driving home to the audience in dramatised
form the putative existential threats associated with an increased influx of for-
eign workers as a result of the aec. Yet there is definitely no discourse which
presents labour migration as an existential threat to the state as the referent
object.
While the quantity and frequency of articles relating the aec to labour
migration does not allow the suggestion of a securitisation discourse, closer
examination of the articles nevertheless shows that, especially in Indonesia,
security-related themes connecting the aec with labour migration are a topic
occasionally brought up by the press. As Table 5 shows, security issues rank high
among the topics critically discussed by the Indonesian press with regard to
labour migration, although in some cases the nexus between labour migration
and security is implicit and indirect. This holds true for several articles pub-
lished by Republika, an Indonesian-language, pro-Islamic newspaper, which
reported an increase of foreign labour in Indonesia as a whole and in sev-
eral provinces and locations such as East Java, Sukabumi and Batam after
the aec had been launched.30 While this increase tallies with the expecta-
its immigration policies. But there is still hope’, available at https://www.sbsgroup.com
.sg/blog/revised-singapore-immigration-policies/. See also private conversations of the
author with Singaporean citizens in August 2010 and 29 September 2017.
29 The Habibie Center, Migrant Workers Rights. The aec 2015 and Free Movement of Labor:
Case Studies of Indonesia and the Philippines (Jakarta: The Habibie Center, 2015); Yeoh, B.,
and T. Lam. ‘Immigration and its (dis)contents: the challenges of highly skilled migration
in globalizing Singapore’. American Behavioral Scientist 60 (5–6) (2016): 637–658, 16.
30 Republika, 2 February 2016, 1 December 2016 and 10 March 2016.
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tions expressed by most articles, not all Indonesian government agencies seem
to agree that there is a real increase of foreign labour.31 Although this intra-
administrative dispute remains unresolved, the articles leave readers in no
uncertainty that the respective Indonesian authorities, such as the immigra-
tion department and the labour ministry, are vigilant and prepared to handle
the issue. Behind these concerns stands the unstated fear that the influx of for-
eign labour, especially if unregulated, constitutes a perforation of the country’s
borders and thereby compromises national sovereignty. The insistence that
local authorities in particular are able to handle the influx of foreign workers is
certainly a form of politicisation. The strongest indication in this respect is an
article in the online news portal Detik News which reports that the head of the
local immigration office in Purwakarta, Central Java, even enlists the babinsa,
non-commissioned officers manning the military’s parallel structure at the vil-
lage level, to help monitor and manage the problem.32
The latter measure and the news reports about it indeed constitute a form
of securitising aec-related labour mobility—however mild and incipient—
because, as Kurniawan correctly states, ‘the military should be the last resort for
handling internal security threats’.33 It coincides with calls for research projects
by the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs prior to the
inauguration of the aec with the objective of protecting Indonesia’s borders
against the unwanted influx of undocumented labour.34 In Singapore, while
not directly relating it to the aec, the press also singled out the issue of ‘undoc-
umented immigrants crossing the borders’ as a problem with implications for
the city-state’s security, though not one that needs to be settled by the mili-
tary.35
A security dimension is also involved where labour migration is suspected of
facilitating transnationally organised crime such as drug trafficking and human
trafficking. The aec’s liberalised labour mobility may exacerbate these prob-
lems as Indonesia serves as a transient country for labour migrants with the
ultimate destination of Australia and New Zealand.36 Indonesian newspapers
also cite officials of other countries—in one case Thailand—who regard aec-
induced labour mobility as a national security risk.37 Although the few Sin-
31 Republika, 10 March 2016.
32 Detik News, 21 March 2016.
33 Kurniawan, The Politics of Securitization.
34 Interview information obtained from Indonesian ir scholars, 2 September 2014.
35 Tan, ‘Images of the migrant worker’, 169.
36 The Jakarta Post, 20 March 2015.
37 The Jakarta Post, 30 May 2016.
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gaporean articles which linked the aec and labour migration did not raise
the issue, reports with a tendency of criminalising labour migrants do exist in
Singapore as well, as an earlier analysis of images of migrant workers in Singa-
pore’s mainstream media suggests.38 Yet the frequency of these reports and the
urgency they attach to the problem is not sufficient to categorise them as part
of a state-orchestrated securitisation strategy.
While most Indonesian articles do not openly demonise a more liberal
migration regime as a loss of state control and an erosion of national sover-
eignty, they nevertheless express concern about an influx of foreign labour. Yet,
contrasting this view, there are a few articles that take a different perspective,
politicising restrictions imposed on post-aec labour migration. Their outlook
is more regional than national and they regard the failure of asean to agree
on a binding labour migration regime as a setback in the economic compe-
tition with Asia’s rapidly rising great powers of China and India.39 If asean
fails to manage labour migration properly, the reasoning goes, brain drain to
North America and Europe is inevitable, depriving Southeast Asia of highly
qualified professionals and workers who are urgently needed to accelerate
asean’s economic growth. Skill mobility is thereby regarded as a factor enhanc-
ing asean economic competitiveness vis-à-vis other countries or regions with
more favourable employment packages. One Singaporean article stresses this
argument, implying that Singapore’s survival is dependent on highly qualified
immigrants.40 We may consider this argument as one politicising ‘out-going’41
in contrast to ‘in-coming’ labour migration, which in the securitisation litera-
ture on labour migration has so far been the dominant perspective.
Quite remarkably, the Philippine and Malaysian press do not seem to discuss
labour migration as a security problem. The exception is one Philippine article
which warns in quite general terms that asean member countries must man-
age well the influx of irregular workers into their territories42 and a Malaysian
article quoting Prime Minister Najib Razak who promoted the legalisation of
undocumented labour migrants as a strategy enabling better security moni-
toring.43 While the lack of securitising voices may be well understandable in
the case of the Philippines, the region’s largest labour exporter, it is somewhat
surprising in the case of Malaysia given the facts that more than one million
38 Tan, ‘Images of the migrant worker’, 174–176.
39 The Jakarta Post, 5 September 2015.
40 The Straits Times, 21 August 2012.
41 Franco, Securitizing/Desecuritizing.
42 BusinessMirror, 20 August 2015.
43 New Straits Times, 29 January 2016.
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table 3 Attitude expressed in newspaper articles towards the migratory
impact of the aec
Newspaper Critical Implicitly critical Neutral Positive
Indonesia 17 8 8 –
Philippines 5 – 6 4
Singapore 10 1 3 1
Malaysia 1 4 2 2
Total 33 13 19 7
source: own compilation
foreign workers live and work in the country in undocumented status and
that whenever there is a recession the Malaysian government resorts to harsh
securitising measures such as large-scale deportations. It also contradicts sur-
vey results of the Asian Barometer, according to which nearly 90 per cent of
Malaysians are in favour of either a halt to immigration or even a reduction in
the number of immigrants.44
While labour migration spurred by the aec is not forcefully and persistently
politicised in the press, it is nevertheless evaluated critically in the majority
of articles across the four countries. As Table 3 shows, 33 of the 72 analysed
articles display an openly critical attitude towards labour migration in South-
east Asia and tend to believe that existing problems of labour migration even
worsen under the aec. Thirteen articles were implicitly critical as they referred
to problems associated with labour migration by recommending to the gov-
ernment measures that they believe would strengthen the positive effects of
labour mobility. Nineteen articles can be categorised as neutral; they merely
reported facts without commenting on them or provided a balanced report
discussing pros and cons. Only seven exhibited a generally positive attitude
towards increased labour mobility under the aegis of the aec.
Surprisingly, articles openly or implicitly critical of aec-induced labour
migration exhibit greater discontent with the provisions regulating skilled
labour than with the problems associated with low-skilled labour (see Table 4).
44 The aversion of the Singaporean population towards immigration is markedly lower.
Altogether 62.6 per cent of the Asian Barometer respondents said that they do not want
more immigration or that they would prefer a reduction of immigrants (Chang and Welsh,
A Globalization Backlash?).
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table 4 Issues of labour migration most frequently assessed critically in relation to aec by
newspapers in Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia
Issue named critically or implicitly critically Frequency
Themes related to skilled labour and mras 16
Themes related to low-skilled labour 13
Ineffectiveness of Cebu Declaration 2007 8
Blaming other asean countries for problems related to labour migration 8
Increase of foreign labour 7
Security 7
Labour recruitment agencies 3
Sovereignty issues 2
source: own compilation
One issue which was frequently discussed in a much more critical than affir-
mative way concerns the Mutual Recognition Agreements (mras), which are
major tools to regulate skilled labour flows and cover eight professions: engi-
neering, nursing, architecture, medicine, dentistry, tourism, surveying and
accountancy.45 So far, mras do not encompass more than 1 per cent of the
region’s labour force.46 This is not only a miniscule share of the region’s total
labour force: it is also only a minor share of Southeast Asia’s skilled labour.
Articles critical of mras can be distinguished as those that in principle
favour skilled labour mobility but express dissatisfaction with the way the
aec’s labour-related regulations are implemented and those which fundamen-
tally oppose the free flow of labour. The first set of articles tends to complain
that the implementation of mras is extremely slow because of national-level
barriers that impede the movement of professionals. In the case of Thailand,
argue Somkiat Tangkitvanich and Sawaoruj Rattanakhamfu, ‘the requirements
imposed on asean professionals are the same as those of the non-asean
countries’.47 One article in the Philippine Daily Inquirer singled out the health
sector, claiming that medical professionals continue to face particularly high
45 Asian Development Bank, asean Community 2015, 89; Dosch, Die asean Wirtschaftsge-
meinschaft.
46 The Jakarta Post, 30 May 2016.
47 Tangkitvanich, Somkiat and Sawaoruj Rattanakhamfu. ‘Assessing the asean Economic
Community’. East Asia Forum 21 March 2017, available at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/
2017/03/21/assessing-the-asean-economic-community/ (accessed 20 April 2017).
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barriers to movement.48 Other professional jobs beyond those covered by the
mras are not eligible for regional mobility as they—like teachers, lawyers and
civil servants—are only open to national citizens.49 An article in the Singa-
porean Straits Times illustrates why several Indonesian and a lesser number
of Philippine press reports display scepticism towards the aec’s liberalisation
of skilled labour mobility: it not only names several qualifications with which
foreign professionals from fellow asean countries must comply if they seek
employment in the island republic—including language, professional compe-
tence and experience in the respective industry—but also states that Singapore
has already tightened its hiring policies of foreign labour in recent years. The
implicit message of this comment is that obviously Singapore is not prepared to
open its labour market as required by the aec.50 Indonesian news reports also
frequently deplore the lack of skills of Indonesian professionals which—again
referring to the health sector—makes it difficult to compete with economi-
cally more advanced asean countries, and demands that the Indonesian gov-
ernment takes adequate steps to mitigate this problem.51 Years earlier, Health
Minister Siti Fadilah, an economic nationalist, had already strongly advocated
protectionist measures, warning that asean’s single market could severely bur-
den Indonesia’s health industry.52
Articles generally critical of the aec and—with it—of greater labour mobil-
ity also specify conditions which effectively curtail even the highly restricted
labour mobility that the aec permits. Indonesian officials in press interviews
clarified that the country accepts only workers who have skills that Indone-
sians do not have.53 They also view the importation of skilled labour by foreign
investors (under the asean Agreement on Movement of Natural Persons) with
great reservation, insisting that it is allowed only in important and strategic
positions in a company, limited to six months and restricted to technicians and
professionals whose work cannot be done by local staff.54 Critics of the aec,
which in Indonesia is often chided by economic nationalists as a neo-liberal
development agenda, fear that the movement of skilled labour will deepen
48 Philippine Daily Inquirer, 30 September 2015; see also Republika, 6 January 2016.
49 Jakarta Globe, 21 December 2014.
50 The Straits Times, 10 December 2015; for such trends, see also Yeoh and Lam, ‘Immigration
and its (dis)contents’.
51 The Jakarta Post, 5 September 2015, 27 March 2015; Republika 12 January 2016; and Jakarta
Globe, 21 December 2014.
52 Jakarta Globe, 24 November 2008. See also The Jakarta Post, 12 January 2009.
53 Republika, 2 February 2016 and 1 December 2016.
54 Republika, 1 December 2016.
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the gap in skills between asean countries.55 As up to 80 per cent of Philip-
pine, Thai, Vietnamese and Indonesian migrant workers seek employment out-
side asean, they expect brain drain to occur not only in the less developed
countries of the region but in the region as a whole due to the many barri-
ers inhibiting labour mobility.56 While students in Myanmar and Cambodia
express apprehension that professionals from other asean countries take away
their jobs,57 an article in the Philippine Daily Inquirer cites calculations that
by 2025 more than half of all high-skill employment in Cambodia, Indonesia,
Laos, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam could be filled by workers with
insufficient qualifications.58 The fears of widening intra-asean inequalities are
further exacerbated by hinting at the fact that mras are negotiated bilaterally
and the power imbalances of the negotiating countries shape the outcome of
the agreements.59
Themes related to low-skilled labour migration rank second among the top-
ics addressed critically in the press of the four countries under study. Several
articles bemoan the fact that the aec entirely ignores the region’s low-skilled
labour which makes up the overwhelming majority of Southeast Asia’s total
migrant labour.60 Most of the articles in a mantra-like style recite the findings
of an extensive literature on low-skilled labour migration in the region. High-
lighted are the exploitation and vulnerable status of undocumented labour-
ers, especially of women employed as domestic workers,61 but also the often
exploitative role of recruitment agencies.62 In Indonesian and Philippine news
reports, resource persons are cited who regard the aec and the lack of a
region-wide binding labour regime as a recipe for a race to the bottom,63 thus
echoing a stance that legislators and, in particular, civil society organisations
have aired in the debate on the asean Charter since the mid-2000s.64 Some-
55 The Jakarta Post, 27 March 2015.
56 Philippine Daily Inquirer, 30 September 2015.
57 BusinessMirror, 2 July 2015.
58 Philippine Daily Inquirer, 30 September 2015.
59 asean News, 29 April 2016.
60 The Jakarta Post, 27 March 2015.
61 Piper, Nicola, and M. Roces, eds. Wife or Worker? Asian Women and Migration (Lanham,
md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004); Piper, Nicola. ‘A problem by a different name? A review
of research on trafficking in South-East Asia and Oceania’. International Migration 43 (1–2)
(2005) 203–233.
62 Republika, 7 December 2015; BusinessMirror, 20 August 2015; and Berita Harian, 11 January
2017.
63 The Manila Times, 26 October 2013, and The Jakarta Post, 27 March 2015.
64 Rüland, Jürgen. ‘Deepening asean cooperation through democratization? The Indone-
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what surprisingly, a Straits Times article also addresses the topic of low-skilled
labour in asean’s most developed member country.65 Yet the article does not
reflect the plight of domestic workers; instead it muses on how Singaporeans
would organise their lives if this source of convenience were no longer avail-
able should neighbouring states such as Indonesia and Myanmar, where many
of the household helpers originate, temporarily or permanently impose an
embargo on the sending of domestic workers. Frequently addressed is asean’s
obvious inability and unwillingness to negotiate a binding labour regime. Many
articles make the criticism that the asean Declaration on the Protection and
Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers, or Cebu Declaration of 2007, has
still not been implemented today, a fact that is often linked to the unabated
priority asean members accord to national sovereignty and a narrow defini-
tion of national interests.66 Some Indonesian and Philippine articles blame
labour destination countries for this foot-dragging,67 although in general the
articles show restraint towards fellow asean countries, suggesting that bilat-
eral relations are not politicised as a result of cross-border labour flows. Yet
it is surprising that at least in Indonesia and the Philippines, countries with a
vocal civil society, there is no promotion by press reports of an empowerment
of labour migrants and ‘regionalism from below’.68
A comparison of the articles by country (see Table 3), which owing to the
varying numbers of articles is somewhat imbalanced, suggests that Indonesian
and Singaporean news reports are more critical towards aec-induced labour
migration than those of the two other countries. Yet these criticisms are aired
from different angles. While critical Indonesian articles, in line with the coun-
try’s interests as a major labour exporter, mainly address the shortcomings of
the asean labour migration regime and castigate the system’s social injustices
(see Table 5), Singaporean articles convey the message that ‘the boat is full’ and
that if there is an aec-induced influx of foreign workers, it must in the first
place serve national interests. As one Straits Times article stated: ‘There’s a limit
sian legislature and foreign policymaking’. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 9 (3)
(2009): 373–402; Rother, S., and Nicola Piper. ‘Alternative regionalism from below: democ-
ratizing asean’s migration governance’. International Migration 53 (3) (2015): 36–49.
65 The Straits Times, 5 June 2016.
66 The Jakarta Post, 30 May 2016, 2 May 2016, 5 September 2015, 27 March 2015; Republika,
9 May 2011; asean News, 29 April 2016; and The Star, 21 March 2015.
67 The Jakarta Post, 2 May 2016; asean News, 29 April 2016; The Straits Times, 21 August 2012;
and The Star, 1 August 2016.
68 Rother, S. ‘Democratizing asean through “alternative regionalism”? The asean Civil
Society Conference and the asean Youth Forum’. asien 136 (2015): 98–119.
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table 5 Issues of labour migration most frequently assessed critically
in relation to aec by Indonesian newspapers
Issue named critically or implicitly critically Frequency
Themes related to skilled labour and mras 9
Increase of foreign labour in Indonesia 7
Themes related to low-skilled labour 6
Security 6
Ineffectiveness of Cebu Declaration 5
Labour recruitment agencies 2
Labour destination countries 1
source: own compilation
to what kind of immigration we can take. We’ve been very clear that immigra-
tion has to benefit our national interest.’ It regards the conditions for free labour
mobility in Southeast Asia as non-existent, arguing that ‘a certain commonal-
ity of living standards and value-based systems’ needs to be present for free
movement of labour to work.69 Yet, contrary to Indonesia, in Singapore—as in
the Philippines and Malaysia—a majority of articles express satisfaction with
the aec, albeit not necessarily with its labour regulations. As outlined above,
Indonesian press reports also pay greater attention to the security dimension
of migrant labour, but—based on the taxonomy developed in the methodology
section—with one noteworthy exception70 are only moderately politicising the
issue.
In the Indonesian press also some differences can be identified between
English- and Indonesian-language dailies. Language stands here also for differ-
ent worldviews, as the English-language newspapers are laicist and the Bahasa
Indonesia daily Republika is close to political Islam. While The Jakarta Post
strongly criticises the flaws of asean’s labour migration regime and its ex-
ploitative consequences which low-skilled workers in particular have to en-
dure, the Jakarta Globe tends to stress the opportunities of the aec and lib-
eralised skilled labour. This is hardly surprising, given the fact that the Jakarta
Globe is owned by the Riady family which controls the Lippo Group, a large
corporation with a range of economic interests, and thus tends to promote the
69 The Straits Times, 8 July 2015.
70 See the babinsa role, reported in Detik News, 26 March 2016.
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interests of big business. By contrast, Republika tends to be more concerned
with the increased influx of foreign workers after the inauguration of the aec
and with the question of how porous borders can be better protected. This
stance is likewise unsurprising as political Islam in Indonesia tends to be crit-
ical towards the effects of (economic) globalisation and neo-liberal policies,
which are seen as jeopardising public morale and the Islamic identity of the
majority of Indonesians.71
Actor-wise differentiation is more difficult. Indonesian and Philippine news-
papers occasionally refer to international organisations such as the Interna-
tional Labour Organisation (ilo) or the Asian Development Bank (adb) with
expertise in labour issues and professional and vocational training, in which
these organisations generally paint a positive picture of the aec and its liberali-
sation of skilled labour, although they also name the deficiencies which impede
an economically beneficial labour mobility.72 Government officials air different
perspectives, depending on the portfolio they represent. Officials in the eco-
nomic ministries tend to be more receptive towards the aec and increasing
labour mobility, while security officers and officials in the immigration depart-
ments or the interior ministries show much greater reservation, albeit far from
systematically politicising the issue. Not unexpectedly, civil society represen-
tatives, such as ngo activists or labour unionists, also criticise the aec and the
type of labour migration associated with it. Business representatives can be dis-
tinguished into those who take the aec as a starting point for a more liberal
labour regime and those that anticipate brain drain as a result of the aec. The
first group is widely cited in the Singaporean Business Times.73 The other group
has been given a voice in the Malaysian press and seeks to counter brain drain
by automation such as in the Malaysian automotive industry.74
Why There is No Securitisation of Post-aec Labour Migration
While the previous analysis has primarily investigated the question of how far
there has been a post-aec securitisation trend in the policy sector of labour
71 A point also highlighted by Al Makin, a noted Indonesian scholar on religious affairs at the
Sunan Kalijaga University in Yogyakarta during a discussion of the author’s paper at the
second Indonesian Conference of Southeast Asian Studies (icseas), 28 September 2017.
72 The Jakarta Post, 6 January 2015; The Philippine Star, 25 August 2015; and BusinessMirror,
8 October 2014.
73 See, inter alia, The Business Times, 4 December 2014.
74 New Straits Times, 2 April 2015 and 8 January 2015.
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