The Austrian Federal Office for Heritage Protection: Assisting in the Loot during the War, Administering Restitution after the War

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Robert Holzbauer:
The Austrian Federal Office for Heritage Protection: Assisting in the
     Loot during the War, Administering Restitution after the War

*) Short history of the BDA from the beginning to the „Anschluss“

Three years ago the Austrian Bundesdenkmalamt celebrated its 150th anniversary. In1850
Emperor Franz Joseph gave his consent to establish a „k.k. Central-Commission zur
Erforschung und Erhaltung der Baudenkmale“. Despite of some achievements it is evident
that heritage protection was not of high priority in the last 70 years of the Austrian-
Hungarian Monarchy. Until the breakdown of the monarchy in 1918 all attempts to create a
legal base for this authority failed.

In the first years of the Republic two important laws for the Monument-Authority were
passed: In 1918 the "Ausfuhrverbotsgesetz" (export regulations for works of art and
cultural heritage), in 1923 the "Denkmalschutzgesetz". In the years of economic crisis the
authority was a main target (or victim) of reduction measures. It is rather likely that the
economization of the economization commissioner (Einsparungkommissar) prevented the
Bundesdenkmalamt from its econmization in the twenties.

The so called authoritorian corporate state under Dollfuß and Schuschnig from 1934
incorporated the office as a department into the Ministry of Education; this "Zentralstelle
für Denkmalschutz" had few means and was of less importance. In 1937 the office received
310 applications for subsidy of edificial measures on historical buildings and could approve
only 41 of them. The export law is regarded as one of the most widely ignored laws during
the first republic.

*) Realization of nazi art politics in the "Ostmark"

Under the aspect that the office had faced the menace of financial and personal starvation
in the then so-called „Systemzeit“, the Zentralstelle für Denkmalschutz (after November
1940: Institut für Denkmalpflege) was clearly among the winners of the German occupation
of Austria. Suddenly there were jobs, there was money, there were cars and there was
even power and the consciousness to be of national importance.
The office played an eminent subsidiary role in the dispossession of the Jewish art
collections of Vienna. The fast access to the great collections required the collaboration of
local experts. The plunder of art collections of Austrian Jews enabled the Nazi
bureaucracy to develop the further proceeding of what is now – rather unexactly – called
Nazi-Kunstraub.

We can distinguish three levels of "Nazi-Kunstraub" in the "Ostmark":

ƒ   Systematic measures
Hitler originally planned his Führermuseum, the central paradigma for Nazi art loot as a
Museum of looted art. Additionally the provincial museums in the Ostmark should act as
„satellites“. This conception is clearly visible in the proceedings around the confiscation of
the great Viennese art collections. The „Zentralstelle“ took professional care of
confiscated collections and was responsible for the Zentraldepot für beschlagnahmte
jüdische Kunst (central depot of confiscated Jewish art). This depot was established in
1939 in the Viennese Hofburg; originally under the custody of Kunsthistorisches Museum. It
was the hub for what we can call systematic looting of Jewish art collections in Vienna.

ƒ   Realization of confiscated mobile goods
A great part of dispossession of art objects took place without ideological background.
From the „Anschluss“ in 1938 until the beginning of the war there was a wave of
emigration. From around 200.000 Austrian Jews 130.000 could manage to flee the Nazi
state. Part of the bureaucratic emigration procedure was the inspection of the freight
according to the old Austrian export law. In the years of the First Republic there usually
were some 100 export applications. In 1938 the officials of Zentralstelle had to inspect
10.500 shipments (Umzugsgut). In around 400 cases export permission was refused; this
seems to indicate that the export law was not directly used as a tool for dispossession.

Certainly a Viennese speciality was the cooperation between the Gestapo-Leitstelle Wien,
the tax authorities and the organisation of forwarding agents: 1940 the VUGESTA was
founded (Verwertungsstelle für jüdisches Umzugsgut der Gestapo). Around 5.000 shipments
were confiscated in the storehouses of the forwarding agents. They were sold mostly in the
Viennese Auction house Dorotheum, which served as the most important hub for this kind
of assets, which are well described by the German expression „Fluchtgut“ (flight assets). A
smaller part was sold directly through own channels of Vugesta. The venue was transferred
to the tax authorities of the Reich. Generally this redistribution of Jewish flight assets
had some kind of sociopolitical component. The process also shows strong influence of
corruption, which seems to be a characteristic for the process of aryanization. Shipments
confiscated by the Vugesta often contained art objects, which were already cleared for
export by the monument authority. I will later refer to the realization of these objects.
ƒ   Distortion of the art market
For sake of completeness and without going into details, I also have to state that the Nazi-
system caused distortions of the art market. Generally the Ostmark was not so heavily
affected by this aspect of Art looting as the occupied countries like France, the
Netherlands or Poland. Historical work on the art market in Austria during Nazi rule is a
desideratum.

*) Führervorbehalt
A central aspect of Nazi art politcs (especially for Austria where ist was originally
developed) is the so called „Führervorbehalt“. In June 1938 Hitler decreted that he
himself had to decide about the disposition of confiscated Jewish collections in the
Ostmark:

       „Der Führer beabsichtigt, nach Einziehung der beschlagnahmten Gegenstände die
       Entscheidung über die Verwendung selbst zu treffen.“

Later this Führervorbehalt was expanded according to various occasions: for art objects,
that were only „sichergestellt“, for coins and medals (to prevent access of the Reichsbank)
(?), for collections of foreigners from enemy-countries (to seize the collection of the Polish
Count Lanckoronski); in July 1944 the Führervorbehalt was expanded to the whole Geman
Reich, but at this point not many collections were left to confiscate.

The Zentralstelle für Denkmalschutz (later under the name Institut für Denkmalpflege)
accomplished the practical implementation of the Führervorbehalt in the Ostmark.
Documents clearly show, that the provincial museums believed „Führervorbehalt“ means
more or less art objects for free. The Zentraldepot seemed to be a kind of central
warehouse, where museum officials could work on their wish lists. We learn about a
complex system of wish lists, distribution proposals (Verteilungsvorschläge) and finally of
assignment lists (Zuweisungslisten).

The implementation of the Führervorbehalt by the authority led to close formal and
informal contacts to the inner circle around Hitler and to the top art bureaucrats of the
Reich. Among the documents in the archives of today’s Bundesdenkmalamt there is the so
called Posse-Korrespondenz, a correspondence with Posse, Reimer and Voss which shows
the interests of the Führermuseums-Organisation.
I promised earlier to come back to the realization of art objects that were confiscated
rather accidental within flight assets. Usually they were separated and auctioned off by
the Dorotheum, if there was no interest from a museum and if the Zentralstelle did not
claim the Führervorbehalt. In practice the Dorotheum sold the art objects in public
auctions after there was no objection within six weeks.

The constellation of the Führervorbehalt and an institution for his practical
implementation led to a superior position of the Führermuseum above all other interested
organisations. I would even say that it achieved a quasi-monopole position in the Ostmark.
From the other Art looting Organisations (according to the definition for
Kunstrauborganisationen of the German historian Anja Heuss) only the Göring collection
and the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg made unsuccessfull attempts in the Ostmark.
This is clearly a difference to the situation to the occupied countries. After the war this
should have had the advantage that loot was not too much dispersed; this helped
restitution.

Although the Zentralstelle (or later: the Institut für Denkmalpflege) played an important
subsidiary rule , the authority itself doesn´t fulfill the criteria for a
„Kunstrauboganisation“. From the documents in the archives of BDA we know, that the
office played an active role in the dispossession of around 60 former Austrian art
collections.

Another important task of the authority was safekeeping of art objects facing the danger
of aerial warfare. Archives, libraries, private and public collections (looted or not) were
distributed to more than twohundred recovery depots.

*) The human factor

On academic level there were around 15 officials in the Monument authority during the
years of Nazi-domination. Three of them werde ardent Nazis, one was in exile and the
others did their duty and can best be categorized with the german expression „Mitläufer“.
ƒ   One of the Nazis was Herbert Seiberl (1904-52), head of the office 1938-45.
ƒ   The president of Bundesdenkmalamt from 1946 to 1960 was the renowned art historian
    Otto Demus. He fled to England 1939 and had no affiliation to the Nazi party.
ƒ   An example for the third category is Josef Zykan. The conservative catholic acted as
    managing director of the authority under Seiberl . Although he was not a Nazi, he
    behaved very loyal as a „Musterschüler“.

The outer circle of the Austrian heritage protection produced a number of experts who
participated in Nazi art looting. Assisting Kajetan Mühlmann (according to Petropoulos the
„greatest art plunderer of all time“) plundering Poland, Belgium an the Netherlands we
find the art historians Dagobert Frey, Franz Kieslinger („durch meine Hände sind tausende
Kunstwerke gegangen...“) and Kajetan Mühlmanns half-brother Josef who are listed in
„Lexikon der Denkmalpflege“.

*) After the war
In September 1945 the Bundesdenkmalamt was reestablished. Compared to the
Zentralstelle für Denkmalschutz of 1937 it was now a modern authority, mostly thanks to
the experiences during Nazi domination. In the following years the BDA played an
important role in the implementation of restitution policies. Restitution legislation is a
complex matter. Without going into details it is remarkable that the office never had to
issue official notifications on restitution. But whenever works of art were restituted, the
BDA always was part of the process. Usually restituted objects were handed out from the
recovery depots in the custody of BDA.

In the years immediately after liberation the authority also played an important role as an
interface to the U.S. occupying power. Generally the U.S. handed the art objects under
their custody out to the Austrian government for restitution. It was complex work, to find
out which art objects were of Austrian origin.

Persons who claimed restitution of art objects immediately after the war usually had good
chances, if they knew where their art objects were. From today’s position it is difficult to
understand, why there werde no serious attempts to actively search for victims of the art
looting in the years after the war. Many of the so called restitution files in the archives of
BDA show the remark „Nichts weiter zu veranlassen“ (nothing more to do).

•   Export permits in exchange for donations: The Rothschild case

As regulated in the "Ausfuhrverbotsgesetz“ (expot law) from 1918 the Bundesdenkmalamt
had to decide about export permits. There was no general exception to this law for
restituted works of art. Even it was no general praxis, in some cases export permits for
restituted works of art were given only after donations to federal museums. Demus used
his administrative discretion extensively on the occasion of the restitution of the important
Rothschild-collection. Later he characterized this as "Kuhhandel" (literally: cow trading).
More than 400 objects (now worth around 100 million US$) from the collections Louis and
Alphonse Rothschild came in possesion of Austrian Federal Museums using this method.
They werde restituted in 1999 according to the Kunstrückgabegesetz of 1998.

*) Mauerbach
The process of restitution of art objects seemed completed in the early sixties, but the
question for „errors and failures“ in restitution politics arose every few years, culminating
in new laws. It is evident, that the public interest in Austria over decades was to make a
final stroke. One of the attempts to do this was the "Mauerbach-Auction" of 1996, when
some thousand „heirless“ works of art stored over some years in the abandoned monastery
of Mauerbach near Vienna, were passed over to the Viennese Jewish Community by a
special law and sold at an Auction.

*) The last five years

The final stroke of the Mauerbach auction lasted not very long. In January 1998 two
Schiele paintings from the Museum Leopold were seized in New York´s Museum of Modern
Arts (one of it, Schiele´s "Portrait Wally" is still confiscated). The following public
discussion about Nazi art looting in Austria led Minister of Education Elisabeth Gehrer to
the decision, to open all archives and to encourage research on looted Art. A "Commission
for Provenance Research" was installed, headed by the former Generalkonservator (the
second highest positon in Bundesdenkmalamt) Ernst Bacher. In December 1998 (shortly
before the Washington Conference on Holocaust Era Assets) a new law was passed. The
"Kunstrückgabegesetz" allows the restitution of works of arts from federal museums, if
they came in their possession after a forced donation or if they were looted during the
Nazi-domination. To date around 800 objects were restituted under this law. The historian
Ingo Zechner (Jewish Community of Vienna) sees a paradigm shift. Is this to opitimistic?

The project of Provenance research may have had much success, but there still remain
many questions about Nazi-art-looting in Austria.
*) Conclusion

As the „Zentralstelle“ played its role in Nazi art politics the BDA did its duty implementing
Austrian restitution policies. Restitution was something that Austria was obliged to do.
There was hardly a political discussion and the implementation was half-hearted and
inefficient. It is evident that pressure from the allies had to be applied whenever the
process slowed down.

Maybe art restitution in Austria after the war is best characterized by the Austrian classic
Franz Grillparzer:
       „Das ist der Fluch von unserm edeln Haus:
       Auf halben Wegen und zu halber Tat
       mit halben Mitteln zauderhaft zu streben.“
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