The 'collective guarantee' of international human rights: Creating, reinforcing, and undoing legitimacies and mandates between law and politics ...

The ‘collective guarantee’ of international human rights:
               Creating, reinforcing, and undoing legitimacies
                    and mandates between law and politics

                                     Lucas Lixinski*

1. Introduction

    One of the three questions asked of the Inter-American Court (the
Court or IACtHR) in its advisory opinion (the Opinion or OC-26)1 on
the consequences of the denunciation of the American Convention on
Human Rights (ACHR)2 and the Charter of the Organization of Ameri-
can States (OAS Charter)3 forces the IACtHR to think beyond the imme-
diacy of the formal legal mechanisms of denunciation and analyze the
ripple effects of said denunciation to the regional human rights system.
Specifically, the IACtHR answered the following question: ‘What inter-
national human rights obligations do the Member States of the Organi-
zation of American States have in relation to States in the Americas who
have denounced the American Convention on Human Rights and the
Charter of the Organization of American States?’4 Because this request
for an Advisory Opinion was triggered by the Venezuelan denunciation

    *
        Professor, Faculty of Law and Justice, UNSW Sydney.
    1
       Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), ‘Denunciation of the American
Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of the Organization of American States
and the consequences for State human rights obligations (interpretation and scope of
articles 1, 2, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 a 65 and 78 of the American Convention on Human
Rights and 3(l), 17, 45, 53, 106 and 143 of the Charter of the Organization of American
States)’ Advisory Opinion OC-26/20 (9 November 2020) Series A No 26 (OC-26).
     2
       American Convention on Human Rights ‘Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica’ (adopted 22
November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) 1144 UNTS 123.
     3
       Charter of the Organization of American States (adopted 30 April 1948, entered
into force 13 December 1951) 119 UNTS 3; amended by Protocol of Buenos Aires
(entered into force 27 February, 1970) 721 UNTS 324; amended by Protocol of
Cartagena (entered into force 16 November 1988) 25 I.L.M. 527,; amended by Protocol
of Washington (entered into force 25 September 25, 1997) 33 ILM 1005; amended by
Protocol of Managua (entered into force 29 January 1996) 33 ILM 1009.
     4
       Advisory Opinion OC-26 (n 1) para 38.3. Note that all direct quotes in this piece
are my own translations, since the Court has not, at the time of writing, released an official
English version of the advisory opinion.

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of these two treaties, a country experiencing a range of political and eco-
nomic challenges, and in some respects a failing or failed state,5 the ques-
tion of whether other states have residual obligations becomes all the
more important. Colombia’s interest in this specific question can also be
understood because it is a neighboring state to Venezuela, and one with
a much stronger human rights record and to where a number of Vene-
zuelan refugees are flocking.
    In their response to this question, the IACtHR said that there is a
system of ‘collective guarantee’ underlying Inter-American human rights
law, and based on the principles of good neighborliness and solidarity.6
The system, acknowledged in other case law by the Court,7 means ‘a duty
of all states to act together and cooperate to protect the rights and free-
doms they committed internationally to guarantee through their belong-
ing to the regional organization.’8 Therefore, if individual states seek to
leave the system, it is for others to hold them to human rights law on the
basis of the latter states’ international obligations. States should rally to
defend international human rights in the hemisphere, under the supervi-
sion and guidance of the IACtHR.
    Underlying this rallying call is a concern with the integrity and viabil-
ity of the Inter-American Human Rights System, and the question of
whether to uphold or overturn its bodies’ (particularly the Court’s) ex-
tensive jurisprudence that sought to dismiss the voluntary character of
international human rights law. The Inter-American Commission and
Court have over decades relied upon the idea of human rights as a special
type of international legal commitment, less (or not at all) contingent
upon state voluntarism,9 as a central pillar of their activities. This position

      5
         W Finnegan, ‘Venezuela, a failing state’ The New Yorker (7 November 2016)
; S Held, ‘“Failed
state”: Venezuelan displacement and starvation multiply’ Al Jazeera (20 August 2019)
; and K Rapoza, ‘Meanwhile, In The Failed State Of Venezuela, Another ‘Coup’’
Forbes (7 January 2020) .
      6
        Advisory Opinion OC-26 (n 1) para 163.
      7
        IACtHR, Ivcher Bronstein v Peru, Competence (24 September 1999) Series C No
54 para 41; and González et al (“Cotton Field”) v Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits,
Reparations and Costs (16 November 2009) Series C No 205 para 62.
      8
        Advisory Opinion OC-26 (n 1) para 175.4.
      9
        ibid paras 48-49 and 53.

The ‘collective guarantees’ of international human rights                 7

emboldened these organs to develop their jurisprudence in defense of
human rights in the region, and to declare their interpretive approach to
be one not tied to states’ will, but rather to the pro persona principle. In
other words, these international legal obligations do not depend on the
will of states. But, if states could walk away from them via the legal mech-
anisms of denunciation, was this pillar made of sand? At stake is therefore
the power of Inter-American human rights law to withstand a core attack
that could, by attacking this pillar, render the whole system off-balance.
     The Opinion, in seeking to resist a fundamental challenge, positions
the IACtHR closer to political mechanisms, in an attempt to shore up the
Court’s hard-gained legitimacy and its even harder-won jurisprudence on
the status of international human rights as a source of its legitimacy and
authority. The cost of this position is to muddy the waters, as discussed
below, and to place the IACtHR in a difficult position in trying to make
sense of the ever-fluid boundary between international law and politics.
While politics have never been far from the IACtHR’s orbit, it over time
relied consistently on a ‘higher’ international legal order to make sense of
itself and of states’ human rights obligations. Now it seeks to rely on
states themselves.
     I argue that the Court’s opinion in relation to collective guarantees
attempts to expand the Court’s reach in challenging, but potentially fruit-
ful ways. The idea of collective guarantees, turned from a political to a
judicial construct, can help strengthen the IACtHR; it can also further
unravel relations between the Court and states that have accepted its ju-
risdiction. But I show below it is a calculated risk, and one that is almost
inevitable given the Court’s position in relation to its own legitimacy and
mandate in the Americas.
     This piece therefore, by focusing on OC-26, queries the role of poli-
tics and state cooperation with international judicial institutions as a de-
sirable feature of international adjudication. To do so, I first examine in
further detail the idea of collective guarantees articulated in the Opinion.
Next, I use this discussion, and particular the dissenters to the Opinion,
to query the uneasy place of collective guarantees between law and poli-
tics, and what those positions mean for the legitimacy of the Court’s self-
perceived mandate. Concluding remarks follow.

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2. Collective guarantees in Inter-American Human Rights Law

    The question of collective guarantees in Colombia’s request for an
advisory opinion was framed differently, and in a tone that both set out
the stakes of the question more clearly, but also narrowed down its reach.
Specifically, Colombia was concerned with states withdrawing from the
Inter-American System and the OAS who ‘presented furthermore a gen-
eralized framework of serious and systematic human rights violations,
duly documented by the organs of the [OAS], including the [Inter-Amer-
ican Commission]’, and whether ‘the need arose to determine if said ac-
tions can totally eliminate the international human rights protection of
individuals subject to the jurisdiction of the authorities of said state.’ Said
situation would ‘directly affect the protection of human rights in the
Americas, a matter in which all OAS Member States have a legitimate
interest.’10
    Therefore, Colombia formulated its question in the following terms:

    ‘C. When there is a framework of serious and systematic human rights
    violations happening under the jurisdiction of a State in the Americas
    who has denounced the [ACHR] and the [OAS Charter],
    1. What human rights obligations do the remaining OAS Member States
    have?
    2. What mechanisms are available to Member States of the OAS to make
    these obligations effective?
    3. To what mechanisms of international human rights protection can
    persons subject to the jurisdiction of the denouncing state have re-
    course?’11

    The question as originally phrased, therefore, was narrower because
of its focus on states where ‘serious and systematic’ human rights viola-
tions were happening and hinted at a concern with the erga omnes obli-
gations of neighboring states. 12 The fact that these states were on the
same continent and belonged to the same human rights system and re-
gional organization that the perpetrator state had just denounced added
urgency and a sense of regional responsibility, potentially rendering those

    10
       ibid para 2.
    11
       ibid para 3.C.
    12
       ibid para 164.

The ‘collective guarantees’ of international human rights                   9

specially affected states. As specially affected states, these countries could
owe additional obligations to the organization in terms of ensuring com-
pliance with decisions rendered while the denouncing state was still sub-
ject to the OAS and Inter-American human rights bodies (since the de-
nouncing state itself would have no interest in complying with those ob-
ligations after its denunciation took effect). Further, especially affected
states would potentially have standing, under international law doctrines,
to query the responsibility of the denouncing state in fora outside the
Inter-American System and the OAS, which would no longer be able to
exert authority over the denouncing state. The question also queried the
possible rights of victims of human rights violations themselves, which
could have shifted the entire OC-26 away from the technical / institu-
tional focus, and back on the mandate of protection of human rights
holders.
    The Court, however, saw the stakes of the question somewhat differ-
ently. It indicated that the ‘serious and systematic’ wording narrowed
down the question unhelpfully, ‘as it can be one of the relevant factors to
consider in the response, but no necessarily the only one’.13 And it indi-
cated that, in order to speak to the mechanisms available to states in the
region, it was of ‘crucial importance to activate the mechanisms of col-
lective guarantee, a concept that underlies the entire Inter-American sys-
tem’.14 Finally, it said that, in relation to remedies available to persons
subject to the jurisdiction of the denouncing state, it was unable to engage
with the question, as doing so would push the Court outside the hemi-
sphere, and towards universal human rights mechanisms, thus exceeding
the IACtHR’s jurisdiction.
    By rewriting this question to the formulation quoted above in the in-
troduction, the Court engaged in two exclusions that focus the question
on the more institutional aspects of collective guarantees. First, the IAC-
tHR excluded the context of human rights violations (a move that osten-
sibly broadens the question); secondly, it excluded remedies still availa-
ble to potential victims (a move that narrows down the question). Both
moves effectively step away from two caveats that were about substantive
human rights law (gravity of violations, and access to justice). The Court

    13
         ibid para 35.
    14
         ibid para 36.

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later returns to the ‘serious and systematic’ issue, though, albeit as only
one step to trigger the institutional machinery of collective guarantees.
     The Court defines the system of collective guarantees as part of the
‘Inter-American public interest’. 15 The IACtHR articulates it as
grounded on Article 65 of the ACHR, which requires the Court to submit
an annual report to the OAS General Assembly.16 The IACtHR in OC-
26 sees this mechanism as a pathway to enforcement,17 and therefore a
means for the Court to engage with states and political organs of the OAS
in the defense of human rights in the Americas.18 It also leverages Article
65 in this case to make a plea of support for the work of the Court not
just in relation to denunciation, but generally the enforcement of its judg-
ments and decisions on provisional measures and compliance with judg-
ments.19
     This pathway to enforcement, however, is seldom used by the Court
itself, which has its own mechanisms of monitoring compliance with
judgments, with the OAS General Assembly acting as a secondary path-
way.20 In other words, the IACtHR uses this connection to the OAS Gen-
eral Assembly as a handy entryway to discuss collective guarantees. This
mechanism both helps bring together all elements of the OC-26 (the
ACHR, the OAS Charter, and states themselves), and to still keep the
Court separate, through the OAS institutional barrier, from the direct
will of (individual) states, which would go against its position of the
ACHR and international human rights more generally standing above
voluntarist international law.
     The collective guarantee is more than a (rather weak and underuti-
lized) institutional mechanism in the IACtHR’s eyes, however. It carries
with it a duty of states to act jointly and cooperate to protect the rights

    15
       ibid para 169.
    16
       American Convention on Human Rights (n 2) art 65: ‘To each regular session of
the General Assembly of the Organization of American States the Court shall submit, for
the Assembly's consideration, a report on its work during the previous year. It shall
specify, in particular, the cases in which a state has not complied with its judgments,
making any pertinent recommendations.’
    17
       Advisory Opinion OC-26 (n 1) para. 82.
    18
       ibid para 167.
    19
       ibid para 168.
    20
       As discussed in detail in L Lixinski, ‘Mechanisms of Systemic Change in Regional
Human Rights Courts: Swinging the Pendulum between Legitimacy and Impact’ (2019)
8 Cambridge Intl L J 60-83.

The ‘collective guarantees’ of international human rights                11

and freedoms they committed internationally to guaranteeing through
their belonging to the regional organization [the OAS], and, in particu-
lar, (1) externalize when opportune their observations and objections to
any denunciation of the American Convention and / or the OAS Charter
that does not withstand scrutiny in light of the democratic principle and
affect the Inter-American public interest […]; (2) guarantee that the de-
nouncing state does not consider itself to be disconnected from the OAS
until it has fulfilled the human rights obligations acquired through the
multiple protection mechanisms in the framework of their respective
competences, and, in particular, those related to the fulfillment of repa-
rations ordered by the Inter-American Court until the conclusion of the
proceedings; (3) cooperate to investigate and prosecute serious violations
of human rights and thereby eradicate impunity; (4) give international
protection in accordance with the international commitments flowing
from international human rights, humanitarian, and refugee law, admit-
ting to their territory possible asylum seekers, guaranteeing the right to
seek and receive asylum and the respect to the principle of non-re-
foulement, among other rights, until a lasting solution is found; and (5)
to undertake bilateral and multilateral diplomatic efforts, as well as exer-
cise its good offices peacefully, so that those states that have withdrawn
from the OAS return to the regional system. This is all without prejudice
to the universal or other fora or mechanisms that may apply.21
     In this obligation-heavy summary of what the system of collective
guarantees requires of states, it is worth noting that there are many obli-
gations that do not relate to the request for an advisory opinion at all
(such as the obligations in relation to asylum). Further, only one of the
five obligations in this summary relates to the enforcement pathway at
the crux of collective guarantees, Article 65 of the OAS Charter discussed
above. One of the other obligations is institutional (work to get denounc-
ing states back into the OAS), and the other three are substantive obliga-
tions, including on the matter of ‘serious and systematic’ violations of
human rights, which the Court deemed was too narrow a caveat to the
question proposed by Colombia, but is still part of the answer the IAC-
tHR gives to the question it reformulated.

    21
         Advisory Opinion OC-26 (n 1) para 173.

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     This wide scope of states’ obligations in relation to the collective
guarantee projects onto individual states, OAS Member States taken col-
lectively, and through the activities of OAS political organs.22 States have
an obligation to cooperate in good faith to maximize the effectiveness
(effet utile) of international human rights law in the region.23 The same
applies to states in relation to OAS organs, and OAS organs themselves.24
The collective guarantee is therefore meant to be all-encompassing, and,
in addition to creating obligations onto states, it can also expand the
Court’s own powers. Specifically, the IACtHR seems to seek to be able
to scrutinize ‘the context and the formal conditions in which the decision
to denounce [the ACHR and / or OAS Charter] was made internally and
how it corresponds to the established constitutional procedures’,25 fol-
lowed by ‘a substantive examination of the democratic character of the
decision to denounce, […] tied to the good faith of the denunciation
[…].’26 While that language is framed in the Opinion using the passive
voice, and never indicating the subject of the action, it is telling of a re-
luctance to leave these powers to states themselves, and would be in line
with the Court seeking the power to decide itself whether a denunciation
of the Convention is legitimate in its own terms.
     The Court also says that strict scrutiny is required of denunciations
     that show special gravity and can affect hemispheric democratic sta-
bility, peace, and security, with the consequent general effect on human
rights, such as: (1) lack of compliance with the decision made by a pro-
tective organ and motivated by a manifest willingness to not meet its in-
ternational obligations; (2) in the event of indefinite suspension of guar-
antees or an attempt against non-derogable human rights; (3) in the con-
text of serious, massive, or systematic human rights violations; (4) in the
framework of the progressive erosion of democratic institutions; (5) faced

    22
       ibid para 170.
    23
       ibid para 165.
    24
       ibid para 58. Citing IACtHR, Anzualdo Castro v Peru, Preliminary Objection,
Merits, Reparations and Costs (22 September 2009) Series C No 202 para 77; and
Rodríguez Revolorio et al v Guatemala, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and
Costs (14 October 2019) Series C No 387 para 135
    25
       Advisory Opinion OC-26 (n 1) para 171.
    26
       ibid para 172.

The ‘collective guarantees’ of international human rights                              13

with a manifest, irregular, or unconstitutional change or rupture of the
democratic order, and / or (6) during an armed conflict.27
    This language, while referring to the ACHR, also applies to the OAS
Charter, in the Court’s view.28 States have a particular obligation to make
their observations and objections on these matters known, ‘so as to acti-
vate the collective guarantee.’29 In other words, states are necessary to
activate the collective guarantee. But what the collective guarantee means
and requires, and whether it is being successfully met, can, in the IAC-
tHR’s view, be scrutinized by the Court itself.
    If is in fact the case that the Court’s powers can be enhanced via the
collective guarantee mechanism, then what is the nature of the mecha-
nism? Is it a political mechanism of pressure by states, or does it have
legal content? For the Court’s powers to be scrutinized, the mechanism
needs to be legal, but the way in which it is connected to the initiative of
states seems to suggest it is political. This question occupied the dissent-
ing judges, and it speaks directly to the mandate and legitimacy of the
IACtHR.

3. Mandates and legitimacies between law and politics

    The question of whether the collective guarantee is legal or political
matters for the Opinion’s repercussions in the Americas, and also for
thinking about the roles of states as guarantors of international legal ob-
ligations that other states owe. As the International Court of Justice con-
siders, for instance, whether the Gambia can bring a case against Myan-
mar for a violation of the genocide convention in Myanmar against the
Rohingya minority,30 it is worth considering whether states have a legal
or political obligation to induce compliance with international law, and

    27
       Id., para. 113.
    28
       Id., paras. 147 and 158.
    29
       Id., para. 112.
    30
       International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v Myanmar). Note that in the Order
on Provisional Measures of 23 January 2020 the ICJ indicated that, at least in principle,
the Gambia had the right to bring a case on the basis of the erga omnes partes doctrine,
without needing to make further proof of it being affected by acts against the Rohingya.

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the mandates of supervisory organs like international courts and tribu-
nals. Further, should international courts and tribunals have a clear legal
mandate, there are also effects on these courts’ mandates and legitimacy
in relation to states, the ‘international community’, and international law
and legal ordering more broadly.
     On the matter of collective guarantee, there were two dissents to OC-
26. First, Judge Zaffaroni objected to the entire opinion, by claiming that
the IACtHR should not have replied to Colombia’s request for an advi-
sory opinion, since the questions clearly had to do with the Venezuelan
context. Specifically, he argued that the Court should have refused to
engage with these questions because the Venezuelan context is much
richer and more complicated than what the Court could hope to capture
in the context of an Advisory Opinion, particularly one on technical
questions of treaty denunciation.31 In fact, he suggested that the law ‘neu-
tralizes’ important political values at stake.32 Therefore, the Court, by an-
swering the questions, sidestepped important political matters the conse-
quences of which the IACtHR lacked the means to control, meaning it
could not control the ‘perverse and partial deployment of its opinion’,
and it could be weaponized itself in the broader political dispute(s) in-
volving Venezuela.33
     I disagree with Judge Zaffaroni. Most contemporary international ad-
judication tends to involve very complex disputes, and an international
court can often only seize one aspect of it. Sometimes multiple tribunals
seize disputes involving the same two countries, and at times the disputes
spill over a multiplicity of judicial and political fora.34 That is just the
fragmentation of international law and international legal disputes, a

      31
           Advisory Opinion OC-26 (n 1) Dissenting Opinion of Judge E Raúl Zaffaroni para
32.
      32
        ibid paras 14-18.
      33
        ibid para 32.
     34
        See eg the ongoing dispute between Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, which
has already spilled onto the International Court of Justice, the World Trade Organization,
and even the International Civil Aviation Organization. For a partial analysis, see C Rossi,
‘Game of Thrones: The Qatar Crisis and Forced Expulsions on the Arabian Peninsula’
(2018) 7 Penn State J L & Intl Affairs 1-52.

The ‘collective guarantees’ of international human rights                            15

well-documented and -studied phenomenon.35 The inevitable framing,36
with its gains in focus and losses in context, is a natural consequence of
international adjudication in history and even more so today. Therefore,
while I appreciate the loss of context he deplores, it is legitimate in my
view for the Court to seize on the matter through the prism of interna-
tional human rights law, which is well in line with its mandate.
    What Judge Zaffaroni’s dissent does, however, is to underscore the
murkiness of the relationship between law and politics, which is particu-
larly useful in the context of collective guarantee. Unlike other parts of
OC-26, which have to do with legal-technical elements of treaty denun-
ciation, ‘collective guarantee’ is a notion that requires states, through a
political organ of the OAS, to guarantee the implementation, effective-
ness, and enforcement of international legal obligations, and, as discussed
above, it potentially also expands the IACtHR’s powers. It is therefore
useful to query the role of politics in the making and shaping of interna-
tional tribunals’ mandates and legitimacy.
    In this respect, the partially dissenting opinion of Judge Pazmiño
Freire, which dissents from the majority precisely on the matter of col-
lective guarantee, is enlightening. He connects his discussion of the col-
lective guarantee precisely to a need to further the effectiveness of IAC-
tHR judgments.37 He acknowledges that collective guarantee creates ob-
ligations among states parties, but says that the concept is primarily about
the effectiveness of the ACHR organs (the Inter-American Commission
and the Court), which nonetheless do not give these organs a mandate to

     35
         International Law Commission, ‘Study Group on the Fragmentation of
International Law. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the
Diversification and Expansion of International Law; Report of the Study Group of the
International Law Commission, Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi’ UN Doc
A/CN.4/L.682 and Add.1 and Corr. 1 (2006); M Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of Public
International Law: Between Technique and Politics’ (2007) 70 Modern L Rev 1-30; and
J Charney, ‘Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?’ (1998)
271 Recueil des cours de l’Académie de Droit International 101-382.
     36
        A Nollkaemper, ‘Framing Elephant Extinction’ (2014) 3 ESIL Reflections
; and A van Aaken, J-P Elm,
‘Framing in and through International Law’ in A Bianchi, M Hirsch (eds), International
Law’s Invisible Frames – Social Cognition and Knowledge Production in International
Legal Processes (OUP forthcoming)  or
.
     37
        Advisory Opinion OC-26 (n 1) Dissenting Opinion of Judge L Patricio Pazmiño
Freire para 1.

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interfere with the internal affairs of a state.38 Therefore, states should not
be the enforcers of the collective guarantee, because they would inevita-
bly interfere with one another’s internal affairs, which would in his view
unduly politicize an internal decision as to whether to remain a party to
or denounce a treaty.39 Therefore, states should not be allowed to enforce
the collective guarantee on their own, at least inasmuch as it refers to
compliance with international human rights law obligations, nor via the
OAS General Assembly, lest its ‘legitimate political role [be] misconfig-
ured under the appearance of legality, [or] instrumentalized through am-
biguous legal categories’.40 Only the IACtHR can exercise those func-
tions.41
     What Judge Pazmiño suggests seems sound: the concept has clear le-
gal consequences, and therefore should be discussed by a legal organ. In
this sense, he goes even further than the Court did in the majority opin-
ion, by giving the IACtHR an even greater (at least inasmuch as it does
not depend on the initiative by states or the OAS General Assembly)
mandate in relation to the collective guarantee.42 Rather than ostracizing
the political organs of the OAS, however, what Judge Pazmiño suggests
is that they become more like the Court at least in the area of supervision
of compliance with and enforcement of IACtHR judgments. Specifically,
he suggests a closer examination of the Council of Europe model,43 and
the participation of civil society in the OAS General Assembly debates
on enforcement and compliance.44
     What Judge Pazmiño misses in his views, however, is that, without
the link to politics, the Court has no clear basis to supervise the legal
content of the collective guarantee. Further, the Court misses an oppor-
tunity to rally its supporters and allies, not only to help wrestle the de-
parting state into compliance with human rights obligations, but, most
importantly, to keep other states in the hemisphere, who may be ponder-
ing the same, from leaving the system. Multiple states in the region, not

    38
        ibid para 8.
    39
        ibid.
     40
        ibid para 12.
     41
        ibid.
     42
        ibid para. 15.
     43
        Also discussed in Lixinski (n 20).
     44
        Advisory Opinion OC-26 (n 1) Dissenting Opinion of Judge L Patricio Pazmiño
Freire para 17.

The ‘collective guarantees’ of international human rights                           17

only Venezuela, have been critical of the IACtHR’s mandate overreach,
and it being inconsiderate of domestic political contexts and domestic
consensus. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Paraguay even issued
a joint statement to this effect.45 Therefore, despite Judge Pazmiño’s ob-
jections, it seems like the IACtHR is being more mindful of the im-
portance of states parties not only as the perpetrators of human rights
violations, but as integral cogs for the Court to implement its mandate of
enhancing human rights protection in the hemisphere.
     Seen as an institutional mechanism, the collective guarantee is neces-
sarily political, as it requires the interaction of multiple OAS and ACHR
organs. It is also the version of the collective guarantee that is most clearly
legitimate, as it is clearly grounded on both the OAS Charter and the
ACHR Article 65. However, it lacks clear content and it can be easily co-
opted, much in the way political human rights organs are co-opted, as a
means to dodge the enforcement of human rights, rather than facilitate
it.46 If the collective guarantee is seen as a substantive concept, on the
other hand, grounded on international law, it is less legitimate, and dis-
connected from the states and OAS organs who need to actually do the
work of collectively guaranteeing human rights in the hemisphere, par-
ticularly in relation to states that have gone beyond the reach of the Court
by denouncing the relevant treaties. Once the formal tether of treaty ob-
ligation has been severed, it is somewhat naïve to expect a substantive
concept, without a clear institutional machinery, to gain purchase in de-
manding compliance. In this sense, even a politicized and potentially
messy institutional machinery is better than an idealized but unachieva-
ble notion of legal collective guarantee.
     Further, it is unrealistic to expect any law, let alone international (hu-
man rights) law to be fully divorced from politics. As the IACtHR
acknowledged in the Opinion, the collective guarantee, and human rights
more generally, are closely tied to democracy, as a ‘ruling principle and
interpretive guideline’.47 Which is all to say, in order to make this obliga-
tion into more than a paper tiger, the Court needs to ‘sully itself’ in the
relatively muddy waters of political engagement with the states parties it

    45
       As discussed in Lixinski (n 20) 83.
    46
       Critiques of the United Nations Human Rights Council in this respect abound. See
eg R Freedman, ‘The United Nations Human Rights Council: More of the Same?’ (2013)
31 Wisconsin Intl L J 208.
    47
       Advisory Opinion OC-26 (n 1) para 72.

18 QIL 80 (2021) 5-19                                                      ZOOM IN

distrusts. The collective guarantee obligation cannot be interpreted as
being exclusively legal, it also has unavoidable political components. If
the IACtHR treats this political component as simply a threshold ques-
tion, and divorces engagement with states from the substantive legal ob-
ligations it outlines to these states, it risks facing resistance to compliance
at the back end of the process, and perhaps even more so than it currently
faces, since these obligations will not be as clear-cut as obligations that
states owe to persons clearly under their jurisdiction. Shifting the appli-
cation of human rights obligations from states to those under its control
(therefore, a clear vertical line) but rather from states to other states out-
side the first states’ control (therefore, a horizontal line). In order to over-
come this hurdle, the Court needs to accept that this obligation, while
having clear legal content, is more contingent on politics than the Court’s
habitual engagement with international human rights obligations.
     Therefore, the Court seems to willingly seek a balance between inter-
national law and (domestic or regional) politics in OC-26. That choice
positions the Court outside of its preferred source of legitimacy, which
tends to be focused on an abstract understanding of international law,
rather than the concerns of states.48 But it also allows the IACtHR to im-
pact upon international human rights law more effectively, which is a key
objective of any advisory opinion and that can reach all American states,
in the Court’s view.49 After all, the exercise of collective guarantee allows
‘the settlement of disputes within the framework of the essential purposes
of the OAS, which are to attain peace and justice in the American states,
nurture their solidarity, strengthen their cooperation and defend their
sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence, with respect to the
principle of non-intervention […].’50 It seems like a welcome step in an
uncharted direction for the IACtHR, and a pathway to respond to criti-
cisms from states about mandate overreach while saving face, and, argu-
ably, performing mandate overreach, which is not without its own inher-
ent risks.

    48
       L Lixinski, ‘The Consensus Method of Interpretation by the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights’ (2017) 3 Canadian J Comparative and Contemporary L 65-95.
    49
       Advisory Opinion OC-26 (n 1) paras 30-31.
    50
       ibid para 174.

The ‘collective guarantees’ of international human rights              19

4. Concluding remarks

    In OC-26, attempting to shed light on the legal consequences of the
legal-technical mechanism of treaty denunciation, the Inter-American
Court entered the ever-volatile terrain of the region’s politics, and the
extent to which not only the Court, but also states and even OAS organs,
have a responsibility for human rights compliance in the region. By call-
ing states and the OAS to task, the Court also expanded its own mandate,
lending legal content to an otherwise relatively vague cooperation con-
cept.
    The expansion of the Court’s mandate directly or indirectly addresses
concerns across the region about the IACtHR’s mandate overreach. The
Court for the first time made a clear pronouncement about its depend-
ence on states and political institutions, which can come a long way in
enhancing its legitimacy and the state of human rights across the hemi-
sphere. Therefore, despite the Court traditionally mistrusting states as
sources of legitimacy for enhancing human rights in the Americas, at least
now it acknowledges that the job cannot be done without them. Treading
between law and politics, hopefully states will rise to the challenge.