The Crack Attack Politics and Media in the Crack Scare
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03-Newman Reader.qxd 12/16/03 5:20 PM Page 47
♦
The Crack Attack
Politics and Media in the Crack Scare
Craig Reinarman and Harry G. Levine
(1997)
America discovered crack and overdosed on oratory.
—New York Times
(Editorial, October 4, 1988)
This New York Times editorial had a certain coined. But most such users had a stake in
unintended irony, for “America’s paper of conventional life. Therefore, when they felt
record” itself had long been one of the leading their cocaine use was too heavy or out of con-
orators, supplying a steady stream of the stuff trol, they had the incentives and resources to
on which the nation had, as they put it, “over- cut down, quit, or get private treatment.
dosed.” Irony aside, the editorial hit the mark. There was no orgy of media and political
The use of powder cocaine by affluent people attention in the late 1970s when the prevalence
in music, film, sports, and business had been of cocaine use jumped sharply, or even after
common since the 1970s. According to surveys middle-class and upper-class users began to
by the National Institute on Drug Abuse use heavily, especially when freebasing. Like
(NIDA), by 1985, more than twenty-two the crack users who followed them, basers had
million Americans in all social classes and found that this mode of ingesting cocaine pro-
occupations had reported at least trying duced a much more intense and far shorter
cocaine. Cocaine smoking originated with “high” because it delivered more pure cocaine
“freebasing,” which began increasing by the into the brain far more directly and rapidly
late 1970s (see Inciardi, 1987; Siegel, 1982). than by snorting. Many basers had found that
Then (as now) most cocaine users bought crack’s intense, brutally brief rush, combined
cocaine hydrochloride (powder) for intranasal with the painful “low” or “down” that immedi-
use (snorting). But by the end of the 1970s, ately followed, produced a powerful desire
some users had begun to “cook” powder immediately to repeat use—to binge (Waldorf
cocaine down to crystalline or “base” form for et al., 1991).
smoking. All phases of freebasing, from selling Crack’s pharmacological power alone does
to smoking, took place most often in the pri- not explain the attention it received. In 1986,
vacy of homes and offices of middle-class or politicians and the media focused on crack—
well-to-do users. They typically purchased and the drug scare began—when cocaine
cocaine in units of a gram or more costing $80 smoking became visible among a “dangerous”
to $100 a gram. These relatively affluent group. Crack attracted the attention of politi-
“basers” had been discovering the intense rush cians and the media because of its downward
of smoking cocaine, as well as the risks, for a mobility to and increased visibility in ghettos
number of years before the term “crack” was and barrios. The new users were a different
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48 PART 1 ♦ THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY
social class, race, and status (Duster, 1970; a thousand stories discussing crack (Inciardi,
Washton and Gold, 1987). Crack was sold in 1987, p. 481; Trebach, 1987, pp. 6–16). Like
smaller, cheaper, precooked units, on ghetto the TV networks, leading news magazines
streets, to poorer, younger buyers who were such as Time and Newsweek seemed deter-
already seen as a threat (e.g., New York Times, mined not to be outdone; each devoted five
August 30, 1987; Newsweek, November 23, cover stories to crack and the “drug crisis” in
1987; Boston Globe, May 18, 1988). Crack 1986 alone.
spread cocaine smoking into poor populations In the fall of 1986, the CBS news show 48
already beset with a cornucopia of troubles Hours aired a heavily promoted documentary
(Wilson, 1987). These people tended to have called “48 Hours on Crack Street,” which Dan
fewer bonds to conventional society, less to Rather previewed on his evening news show:
lose, and far fewer resources to cope with or “Tonight, CBS News takes you to the streets, to
shield themselves from drug-related problems. the war zone, for an unusual two hours of
The earliest mass media reference to the hands-on horror.” Among many shots from
new form of cocaine may have been a Los hidden cameras was one of New York Senator
Angeles Times article in late 1984 (November Alphonse D’Amato and then-U.S. Attorney
25, p. cc1) on the use of cocaine “rocks” in Rudolf Guiliani, incognito, purchasing crack to
ghettos and barrios in Los Angeles. By late dramatize the brazenness of street corner sales
1985, the New York Times made the national in the ghetto. All this was good business for
media’s first specific reference to “crack” in a CBS: the program earned the highest Nielsen
story about three teenagers seeking treatment rating of any similar news show in the previous
for cocaine abuse (November 17, p. B12). At five years—fifteen million viewers (Diamond
the start of 1986, crack was known only in a et al., 1987, p. 10). Three years later, after poor
few impoverished neighborhoods in Los ratings nearly killed 48 Hours, the show kicked
Angeles, New York, Miami, and perhaps a few off its season with a three-hour special,
other large cities. . . . “Return to Crack Street.”
The intense media competition for audi-
The Frenzy: Cocaine ence shares and advertising dollars spawned
and Crack in the Public Eye many similar shows. Three days after “48
Hours on Crack Street,” NBC ran its own
When two celebrity athletes died in what prime-time special, “Cocaine Country,” which
news stories called “crack-related deaths” in suggested that cocaine and crack use had
the spring of 1986, the media seemed to sense become pandemic. This was one of dozens of
a potential bonanza. Coverage skyrocketed separate stories on crack and cocaine produced
and crack became widely known. “Dramatic by NBC alone—an unprecedented fifteen hours
footage” of black and Latino men being of air time—in the seven months leading up
carted off in chains, or of police breaking to the 1986 elections (Diamond et al., 1987;
down crack house doors, became a near Hoffman, 1987). By mid-1986, Newsweek
nightly news event. In July 1986 alone, the claimed that crack was the biggest story since
three major TV networks offered seventy-four Vietnam and Watergate (June 15, p. 15), and
evening news segments on drugs, half of these Time soon followed by calling crack “the
about crack (Diamond et al., 1987; Reeves and Issue of the Year” (September 22, 1986, p. 25).
Campbell, 1994). In the months leading up to The words “plague,” “epidemic,” and “crisis”
the November elections, a handful of national had become routine. The New York Times,
newspapers and magazines produced roughly for example, did a three-part, front-page03-Newman Reader.qxd 12/16/03 5:20 PM Page 49
Chapter 3 ♦ Building Reality: The Social Construction of Knowledge 49
series called “The Crack Plague” (June 24, stories—28,476 column inches—about the
1988, p. A1). drug crisis. Even Richard Harwood (1989),
The crack scare began in 1986, but it the Post’s own ombudsman, editorialized
waned somewhat in 1987 (a nonelection against what he called the loss of “a proper
year). In 1988, drugs returned to the national sense of perspective” due to such a “hyperbole
stage as stories about the “crack epidemic” epidemic.” He said that “politicians are doing a
again appeared regularly on front pages and number on people’s heads.” In the fall of 1989,
TV screens (Reeves and Campbell, 1994). another major new federal antidrug bill to
One politician after another reenlisted in further increase drug war funding (S-1233)
the War on Drugs. In that election year, as in began winding its way through Congress. In
1986, overwhelming majorities of both houses September, President Bush’s “drug czar,”
of Congress voted for new antidrug laws William Bennett, unveiled his comprehensive
with long mandatory prison terms, death battle plan, the National Drug Control Strategy.
sentences, and large increases in funding His introduction asks, “What . . . accounts for
for police and prisons. The annual federal the intensifying drug-related chaos that we see
budget for antidrug efforts surged from less every day in our newspapers and on television?
than $2 billion in 1981 to more than $12 One word explains much of it. That word is
billion in 1993. The budget for the Drug crack. . . . Crack is responsible for the fact that
Enforcement Administration (DEA) quadru- vast patches of the American urban landscape
pled between 1981 and 1992 (Massing, 1993). are rapidly deteriorating” (The White House,
The Bush administration alone spent $45 1989, p. 3, original emphasis). . . .
billion—more than all other presidents since On September 5, 1989, President Bush,
Nixon combined—mostly for law enforcement speaking from the presidential desk in the
(Horgan, 1993; Office of National Drug Oval Office, announced his plan for achieving
Control Policy, 1992). . . . “victory over drugs” in his first major prime-
An April 1988 ABC News special report time address to the nation, broadcast on all
termed crack “a plague” that was “eating away three national television networks. We want
at the fabric of America.” According to this to focus on this incident as an example of the
documentary, Americans spend “$20 billion a way politicians and the media systematically
year on cocaine,” American businesses lose misinformed and deceived the public in order
“$60 billion” a year in productivity because to promote the War on Drugs. During the
their workers use drugs, “the educational address, Bush held up to the cameras a clear
system is being undermined” by student drug plastic bag of crack labeled “EVIDENCE.” He
use, and “the family” is “disintegrating” in the announced that it was “seized a few days ago in
face of this “epidemic.” This program did not a park across the street from the White House”
give its millions of viewers any evidence to (Washington Post, September 22, 1989, p. A1).
support such dramatic claims, but it did give Its contents, Bush said, were “turning our cities
them a powerful vocabulary of attribution: into battle zones and murdering our children.”
“drugs,” especially crack, threatened all the The president proclaimed that, because of
central institutions in American life—families, crack and other drugs, he would “more than
communities, schools, businesses, law enforce- double” federal assistance to state and local law
ment, even national sovereignty. enforcement (New York Times, September 6,
This media frenzy continued into 1989. 1989, p. A11). The next morning the picture of
Between October 1988 and October 1989, for the president holding a bag of crack was on the
example, the Washington Post alone ran 1,565 front pages of newspapers across America.03-Newman Reader.qxd 12/16/03 5:20 PM Page 50
50 PART 1 ♦ THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY
About two weeks later, the Washington teenager seemed baffled by the request:
Post, and then National Public Radio and other “Where the [expletive deleted] is the White
newspapers, discovered how the president of House?” he asked. Therefore, McMullan told
the United States had obtained his bag of the Post, “we had to manipulate him to get him
crack. According to White House and DEA down there. It wasn’t easy” (Isikoff, 1989).
officials, “the idea of the President holding The undesirability of selling crack in
up crack was [first] included in some drafts” Lafayette Park was confirmed by men from
of his speech. Bush enthusiastically approved. Washington, D.C., imprisoned for drug selling,
A White House aide told the Post that the and interviewed by National Public Radio. All
president “liked the prop. . . . It drove the point agreed that nobody would sell crack there
home.” Bush and his advisors also decided because, among other reasons, there would
that the crack should be seized in Lafayette be no customers. The crack-using population
Park across from the White House so the pres- was in Washington’s poor African-American
ident could say that crack had become so neighborhoods some distance from the White
pervasive that it was being sold “in front of the House. The Washington Post and other papers
White House” (Isikoff, 1989). also reported that the undercover DEA agents
This decision set up a complex chain of had not, after all, actually seized the crack, as
events. White House Communications Director Bush had claimed in his speech. Rather, the
David Demarst asked Cabinet Affairs Secretary DEA agents purchased it from Jackson for
David Bates to instruct the Justice Department $2,400 and then let him go.
“to find some crack that fit the description in This incident illustrates how a drug scare
the speech.” Bates called Richard Weatherbee, distorts and perverts public knowledge and
special assistant to Attorney General Dick policy. The claim that crack was threatening
Thornburgh, who then called James Milford, every neighborhood in America was not based
executive assistant to the DEA chief. Finally, on evidence; after three years of the scare,
Milford phoned William McMullen, special crack remained predominantly in the inner
agent in charge of the DEA’s Washington office, cities where it began. Instead, this claim
and told him to arrange an undercover crack appears to have been based on the symbolic
buy near the White House because “evidently, political value seen by Bush’s speech writers.
the President wants to show it could be bought When they sought, after the fact, to purchase
anywhere” (Isikoff, 1989). their own crack to prove this point, they found
Despite their best efforts, the top federal that reality did not match their script. Instead
drug agents were not able to find anyone of changing the script to reflect reality, a series
selling crack (or any other drug) in Lafayette of high-level officials instructed federal drug
Park, or anywhere else in the vicinity of the agents to create a reality that would fit the
White House. Therefore, in order to carry out script. Finally, the president of the United
their assignment, DEA agents had to entice States displayed the procured prop on nation-
someone to come to the park to make the sale. al television. Yet, when all this was revealed,
Apparently, the only person the DEA could neither politicians nor the media were led to
convince was Keith Jackson, an eighteen-year- question the president’s policies or his claims
old African-American high school senior. about crack’s pervasiveness.
McMullan reported that it was difficult As a result of Bush’s performance and all
because Jackson “did not even know where the other antidrug publicity and propaganda,
the White House was.” The DEA’s secret tape in 1988 and 1989, the drug war commanded
recording of the conversation revealed that the more public attention than any other issue.03-Newman Reader.qxd 12/16/03 5:20 PM Page 51
Chapter 3 ♦ Building Reality: The Social Construction of Knowledge 51
The media and politicians’ antidrug crusade less notice from politicians and the media,
succeeded in making many Americans even it remained institutionalized, bureaucratically
more fearful of crack and other illicit drugs. A powerful, and extremely well funded (especially
New York Times/CBS News poll has periodi- police, military, and education/propaganda
cally asked Americans to identify “the most activities).
important problem facing this country today.” From the opening shots in 1986 to
In January 1985, 23% answered war or nuclear President Bush’s national address in 1989, and
war; less than 1% believed the most important through all the stories about “crack babies” in
problem was drugs. In September 1989, short- 1990 and 1991, politicians and the media
ly after the president’s speech and the blizzard depicted crack as supremely evil—the most
of drug stories that followed, 64% of those important cause of America’s problems. As
polled believed that drugs were now the most recently as February of 1994, a prominent
important problem, and only 1% thought that New York Times journalist repeated the claim
war or nuclear war was most important. Even that “An entire generation is being sacrificed to
the New York Times declared in a lead editorial [crack]” (Staples, 1994). As in all drug scares
that this reversal was “incredible” and then since the nineteenth-century crusade against
gently suggested that problems like war, alcohol, a core feature of drug war discourse is
“homelessness and the need to give poor the routinization of caricature—worst cases
children a chance in life” should perhaps framed as typical cases, the episodic rhetorically
be given more attention (September 28, 1989, recrafted into the epidemic.
p. A26).
A year later, during a lull in antidrug Official Government Evidence
speeches and coverage, the percentage citing
“drugs” as the nation’s top problem had On those rare occasions when politicians and
dropped to 10%. Noting this “precipitous fall journalists cited statistical evidence to support
from a remarkable height,” the Times observed their claims about the prevalence of crack and
that an “alliance of Presidents and news direc- other drug use, they usually relied on two basic
tors” shaped public opinion about drugs. sources, both funded by the National Institute
Indeed, once the White House let it be known on Drug Abuse. One was the Drug Abuse
that the president would be giving a prime- Warning Network (DAWN), a monitoring
time address on the subject, all three networks project set up to survey a sample of hospitals,
tripled their coverage of drugs in the two crisis and treatment centers, and coroners
weeks prior to his speech and quadrupled it for across the country about drug-related emer-
a week afterward (New York Times, September gencies and deaths. The other was the National
6, 1990, p. A11; see also Reeves and Campbell, Household Survey on Drug Abuse among gen-
1994). All this occurred while nearly every eral population households and among young
index of drug use was dropping. people. Other data sources existed, but these
The crack scare continued in 1990 and usually were either anecdotal, specific to a par-
1991, although with somewhat less media ticular location, or based on a skewed sample.
and political attention. By the beginning of Therefore, we review what these two NIDA
1992—the last year of the Bush administra- data sources had to say about crack because
tion—the War on Drugs in general, and the they were the only national data and because
crack scare in particular, had begun to decline they are still considered by experts and claims
significantly in prominence and importance. makers to be the most reliable form of
However, even as the drug war was receiving evidence available.03-Newman Reader.qxd 12/16/03 5:20 PM Page 52
52 PART 1 ♦ THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY
The Drug Abuse Warning Network The DAWN data on deaths in which
cocaine was mentioned by medical examiners
DAWN collects data on a whole series of also must be closely examined. When the crack
drugs—from amphetamine to aspirin—that scare got under way in 1986, coroners coded
might be present in emergencies or fatalities. 1,092 deaths as “cocaine related” (NIDA,
These data take the form of “mentions.” A drug 1986a), and as crack spread, this number, too,
mention is produced when a patient, or some- increased substantially. In 1989, the secretary
one with a patient, tells attending medical per- of health and human services reported a 20%
sonnel that the patient recently used the drug, or decline in both deaths and emergency room
occasionally, if a blood test shows the presence of episodes in which cocaine was mentioned, but
the drug. These data provided perhaps the only both indices rose again in 1991 and 1992. The
piece of statistical support for the crack scare. 1992 DAWN figures showed 3,020 deaths in
They indicated that cocaine was “mentioned” in which cocaine was mentioned (NIDA, 1992).
an increasing number of emergency room But cocaine alone was mentioned in only
episodes in the 1980s. During 1986, as the scare a fraction of these deaths; in 1986, for example,
moved into full swing, there were an estimated in less than one in five (NIDA, 1986a). In most
51,600 emergency room episodes in which of these cases, cocaine had been used with other
cocaine was mentioned (NIDA, 1993a). In sub- drugs, again, most often alcohol. Although any
sequent years, the estimated number of such death is tragic, cocaine’s role in such fatalities
mentions continued to rise, providing clear remains ambiguous. “Cocaine related” is not
cause for concern. By 1989, for example, the esti- the same as “cocaine caused,” and “cocaine-
mated number of emergency room episodes in related deaths” does not mean “deaths due to
which cocaine was mentioned had more than cocaine.” There is little doubt that cocaine
doubled to 110,000. Although the estimate contributes to some significant (but unknown)
dropped sharply in 1990 to 80,400, by 1992, it percentage of such deaths. But journalists,
had risen again to 119,800 (NIDA, 1993a). politicians, and most of the experts on whom
Unfortunately, the meaning of a mention they relied never acknowledged the ambigui-
is ambiguous. In many of these cases, cocaine ties in the data. Nor did they commonly pro-
was probably incidental to the emergency vide any comparative perspective. For example,
room visit. Such episodes included routine for every one cocaine-related death in the U.S.,
cases in which people went to emergency there have been approximately two hundred
rooms, for example, after being injured as pas- tobacco-related deaths and at least fifty
sengers in auto accidents and in home acci- alcohol-related deaths. Seen in this light,
dents. Moreover, in most cases, cocaine was cocaine’s role in mortality and morbidity was
only one of the drugs in the person’s system; substantially less than media accounts and
most people had also been drinking alcohol. political rhetoric implied.
Finally, the DAWN data do not include infor- More serious interpretive and empirical
mation about preexisting medical or mental difficulties appeared when the DAWN data were
health conditions that make any drug use, legal used to support claims about crack. Despite all
or illegal, more risky. For all these reasons, one the attention paid to the crack “plague” in 1986,
cannot properly infer direct cause from the when crack was allegedly “killing a whole
estimates of emergency room mentions. generation,” the DAWN data contained no
Cocaine did play a causal role in many of these specific information on crack as distinct from
emergency cases, but no one knows how many cocaine. In fact, the DAWN data show that in
or what proportion of the total they were. the vast majority of both emergencies and03-Newman Reader.qxd 12/16/03 5:20 PM Page 53
Chapter 3 ♦ Building Reality: The Social Construction of Knowledge 53
deaths in which cocaine received a mention, story shows how even the most respectable
the mode of ingestion of cocaine was not media institutions sometimes skew facts about
“smoking” and therefore could not have been drug use to fit a story line. In the article’s
caused by crack. Thus, although it is likely that “lead,” the Times announced a rise in the
crack played a role in some of the emergencies percentage of high school seniors reporting
and deaths in which cocaine was “mentioned,” “daily” use of cocaine. Only later did one learn
the data necessary to attribute them accurately that this had risen very slightly and, more
to crack did not exist. important for evaluating claims of a “plague,”
that daily use among seniors had now reached
0.4%. Daily crack use, even by this fraction of
NIDA Surveys 1% of high school seniors, is surely troubling,
The NIDA-sponsored surveys of drug use but it hardly constituted a new drug epidemic
produce the data that are the statistical basis or plague. Still later in the story, the Times pre-
of all estimates of the prevalence of cocaine sented a table showing other declines in
and other drug use. One of the core claims in cocaine use by young adults and high school
the crack scare was that drug use among seniors. Indeed, as the Times noted toward the
teenagers and young adults was already high end of its piece, virtually all forms of teenage
and that it was growing at an alarming rate. drug use (including marijuana, LSD, and
Although politicians and the media often heroin) had declined—as they had in previous
referred to teen drug use as an “epidemic” or years (New York Times, February 24, 1987,
“plague,” the best official evidence available at p. A21; cf. Johnston et al., 1988; NIDA, 1991).
the time did not support such claims. The Two leading NIDA scholars, reporting in
National Household Survey on Drug Abuse 1986 on the results of the household survey in
surveys over eight thousand randomly selected Science magazine, wrote that “both annual
households each year. These surveys show that prevalence and current prevalence [of all drug
the number of Americans who had used any use] among college students and the total sam-
illegal drug in the previous month began to ple up to four years after high school has been
decline in 1979, and in the early years of the relatively stable between 1980 and 1985”
crack scare, use of drugs, including cocaine, (Kozel and Adams, 1986, p. 973). The director
continued to decline (New York Times, of NIDA’s high school surveys, Dr. Lloyd
September 24, 1989, p. A1; Newsweek, February Johnston, made a similar point in 1987: “To
19, 1990, p. 74). Lifetime prevalence of cocaine some degree the fad quality of drugs has worn
use among young people (the percentage of off ” (New York Times, February 24, 1987,
those twelve through twenty-five years old p. A21). When the findings of the high school
who had “ever” tried it) peaked in 1982, four senior survey for 1987 were released, the
years before the scare began, and continued survey’s director reported that “the most
to decline after that (NIDA, 1991, p. 14). The important” finding was that cocaine had again
sharpest rise in lifetime prevalence among “showed a significant drop in use.” He even
young adults had taken place between 1972 reported a decline in the use of crack (Johnston
and 1979; it produced no claims of an epi- et al., 1988).
demic or plague by politicians and journalists These reported declines were in keeping
(Johnston et al., 1988; NIDA, 1986b). with the general downward trend in drug
In February 1987, NIDA released the use. In the early 1980s, according to the NIDA
results of its 1986 annual survey of high school surveys, about one in six young Americans had
seniors. The New York Times handling of the tried cocaine powder. But between 1986 and03-Newman Reader.qxd 12/16/03 5:20 PM Page 54
54 PART 1 ♦ THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY
1987, the proportion of both high school seniors America” and that it had become “America’s
and young adults who had used cocaine in any drug of choice.” His colleagues at the other
form in the previous year dropped by 20% networks and in the print media had made
(Johnston et al., 1988). Further, two-thirds of similar claims. An ordinarily competent news
those who had ever tried cocaine had not used consumer might well have gathered the
it in the previous month. Although a significant impression that crack could be found in
minority of young people had tried cocaine the lockers of most high school students. Yet, at
powder at some point, the great majority of the time of these press reports, there were no
them did not continue to use it. prevalence statistics at all on crack and no
There had been a few signs of increasing evidence of any sort showing that smoking
cocaine use. The proportion of youngsters crack had become the preferred mode even of
who reported using cocaine at least once in cocaine use, much less of drug use.
the previous month had increased slightly When NIDA released the first official data
over the years, although it never exceeded 2% on crack a few months later, they still did not
of all teens in the seven national household support claims about widespread crack use.
surveys between 1972 and 1985. The 1988 On the contrary, the NIDA survey found that
NIDA household survey found an increase in most cocaine use could not have been crack
the number of adult daily users of cocaine, because the preferred mode of use for 90% of
presumably the group that included crack cocaine users was “sniffing” rather than smok-
addicts. But this group constituted only about ing (NIDA, 1986a; see also Inciardi, 1987). An
1.3% of those adults who had ever used cocaine. all-but-ignored Drug Enforcement Admini-
NIDA also estimated that about 0.5% of the stration press release issued in August 1986,
total U.S. adult population had used cocaine in during the first hysterical summer of the crack
the week prior to the survey (NIDA, 1988). scare, sought to correct the misperception that
But aside from these few slight increases, crack use was now the major drug problem in
almost all other measures showed that the America. The DEA said, “Crack is currently the
trends in official drug use statistics had been subject of considerable media attention. . . .
down even before the scare began. . . . The The result has been a distortion of the public
figures for cocaine use in particular were drop- perception of the extent of crack use as com-
ping just as crisis claims were reaching a crescen- pared to the use of other drugs. . . . [Crack]
do, and had dropped still further precisely presently appears to be a secondary rather than
when the Bush/Bennett battle plan was being primary problem in most areas” (Drug
announced with such fanfare in 1989. Indeed, as Enforcement Administration, cited in Diamond
White House officials anonymously admitted a et al., 1987, p. 10; Inciardi, 1987, p. 482).
few weeks after the president’s “bag of crack” The first official measures of the prevalence
speech, the new plan’s “true goals” were far more of teenage crack use began with NIDA’s 1986
modest than its rhetoric: the Bush plan was high school survey. It found that 4.1% of high
“simply to move the nation ‘a little bit’ beyond school seniors reported having tried crack (at
where current trends would put it anyway” least once) in the previous year. This figure
(New York Times, September 24, 1989, p. A1). dropped to 3.9% in 1987 and to 3.1% in 1988,
a 25% decline (Johnston et al., 1988; National
Report on Substance Abuse, 1994, p. 3). This
National Survey Data on Crack means that at the peak of crack use, 96% of
Tom Brokaw reported on NBC Nightly News America’s high school seniors had never tried
in 1986 (May 23) that crack was “flooding crack, much less gone on to more regular use,03-Newman Reader.qxd 12/16/03 5:20 PM Page 55
Chapter 3 ♦ Building Reality: The Social Construction of Knowledge 55
abuse, or addiction. Any drug use among the prevalence turned out to be low to start with and
young is certainly worrisome, particularly to have declined throughout the scare (National
when in such an intense form as crack. Report on Substance Abuse, 1994, p. 3).
However, at the start of the crusade to save “a
whole generation” of children from death by Crack as an Epidemic and Plague
crack in the spring of 1986, the latest official
data showed a national total of eight “cocaine- The empirical evidence on crack use suggests
related” deaths of young people age eighteen that politicians and journalists have routinely
and under for the preceding year (Trebach, used the words “epidemic” and “plague”
1987, p. 11). There was no way to determine imprecisely and rhetorically as words of warn-
whether any of these deaths involved crack use ing, alarm, and danger. Therefore, on the basis
or even if cocaine was in fact the direct cause. of press reports, it is difficult to determine if
In general, the government’s national there was any legitimacy at all in the descrip-
surveys indicate that a substantial minority tion of crack use as an epidemic or plague.
of teenagers and young adults experiment Like most other drug researchers and epidemi-
with illicit drugs. But as with other forms ologists, we have concluded that crack addic-
of youthful deviance, most tend to abandon tion has never been anything but relatively
such behavior as they assume adult roles. rare across the great middle strata of the U.S.
Politicians, the media, and antidrug advertise- population. If the word “epidemic” is used to
ments often claimed that cocaine is inevitably mean a disease or diseaselike condition that is
addicting but that crack is still worse because “widespread” or “prevalent,” then there has
it is “instantaneously addicting.” However, never been an epidemic of crack addiction (or
according to the official national surveys, two- even crack use) among the vast majority of
thirds of Americans of all ages who had ever Americans. Among the urban poor, however,
tried cocaine had not used it in the month especially African-American and Latino youth,
prior to the surveys. It is clear that the vast heavy crack use has been more common. An
majority of the more than twenty-two million “epidemic of crack use” might be a descrip-
Americans who have tried cocaine do not use tion of what happened among a distinct
it in crack form, do not escalate to regular use, minority of teenagers and young adults from
and do not end up addicted. . . . impoverished urban neighborhoods in the
In sum, the official evidence on cocaine mid to late 1980s. However, many more people
and crack available during the crack scare gave use tobacco and alcohol heavily than use
a rather different picture than Americans cocaine in any form. Alcohol drinking and
received from the media and politicians. The tobacco smoking each kills far more people
sharp rise in mentions of cocaine in emer- than all forms of cocaine and heroin use com-
gency room episodes and coroners’ reports bined. Therefore, “epidemic” would be more
did offer cause for concern. But the best official appropriate to describe tobacco and alcohol
evidence of drug use never supported the claims use. But politicians and the media have not
about an “epidemic” or “plague” throughout talked about tobacco and alcohol use as epi-
America or about “instantaneous addiction.” demics or plagues. The word “epidemic” also
Moreover, as media attention to crack was can mean a rapidly spreading disease. In this
burgeoning, the actual extent of crack use was precise sense as well, in inner-city neighbor-
virtually unknown, and most other official hoods, crack use may have been epidemic
measures of cocaine use were actually decreas- (spreading rapidly) for a few years among
ing. Once crack use was actually measured, its impoverished young African-Americans and03-Newman Reader.qxd 12/16/03 5:20 PM Page 56
56 PART 1 ♦ THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY
Latinos. However, crack use was never spreading among high school students. As the Times
fast or far enough among the general population explained, on the weekend, “practically every
to be termed an epidemic there. town has at least one underage party, indoors
“Plague” is even a stronger word than or out” and that “fake identification cards,
epidemic. Plague can mean a “deadly contagious older siblings, friends, and even parents all
disease,” an epidemic “with great mortality,” or help teenagers obtain” alcohol.
it can refer to a “pestilence,” an “infestation of The point we wish to emphasize is that
a pest, [e.g.,] a plague of caterpillars.” Crack is even though illicit alcohol use was far more
a central nervous system stimulant. Continuous prevalent than cocaine or crack use, and even
and frequent use of crack often burns people though it held substantial risk for alcohol depen-
out and does them substantial psychological dence, addiction, drinking-driving deaths,
and physical harm. But even very heavy use and other alcohol-related problems, the media
does not usually directly kill users. In this and politicians have not campaigned against
sense, crack use is not a plague. One could say teen drunkenness. Used as a descriptive term
that drug dealers were “infesting” some blocks meaning “prevalent,” the word “epidemic” fits
of some poor neighborhoods in some cities, teenage drinking far better than it does teenage
that there were pockets of plague in some crack use. Although many organizations have
specific areas; but that was not how “crack campaigned against drinking and driving by
plague” was used. teenagers, the politicians and media have not
When evaluating whether the extent and used terms like “epidemic” or “plague” to call
dangers of crack use match the claims of attention to illicit teenage drinking and drunk-
politicians and the media, it is instructive to enness. Unlike the Times articles on crack,
compare how other drug use patterns are often on the front page, this article on teen
discussed. For example, an unusually bal- drunkenness was placed in the second section
anced New York Times story (October 7, 1989, on a Saturday.
p. 26) compared crack and alcohol use It is also worth noting the unintentionally
among suburban teenagers and focused on ironic mixing of metaphors, or of diagnoses
the middle class. The Times reported that, and remedies, when advocates for the War on
except for a few “urban pockets” in suburban Drugs described crack use as an epidemic or
counties, “crack and other narcotics are rarely plague. Although such disease terminology
seen in the suburbs, whether modest or was used to call attention to the consequences
wealthy.” . . . of crack use, most of the federal government’s
The Times also reported that high school domestic responses have centered on using
seniors were outdrinking the general adult police to arrest users. Treatment and preven-
population. Compared to 64% of teenagers, only tion have always received a far smaller propor-
55% of adults had consumed alcohol in the tion of total federal antidrug funding than
last month. Furthermore, teenagers have been police and prisons do as a means of handling
drinking more than adults since at least 1972, the “epidemic.” If crack use is primarily a crime
when the surveys began. Even more significant problem, then terms like “wave” (as in crime
is the kind of drinking teenagers do—what the wave) would be more fitting. But if this truly is
Times called “excessive ‘binge’ drinking”: “More an “epidemic”—a widespread disease—then
than a third of the high school seniors had said police and prisons are the wrong remedy, and
that in the last two weeks they had had five or the victims of the epidemic should be offered
more drinks in a row.” Drinking is, of course, treatment, public health programs, and social
the most widespread form of illicit drug use services. . . .03-Newman Reader.qxd 12/16/03 5:20 PM Page 57
Chapter 3 ♦ Building Reality: The Social Construction of Knowledge 57
The Political Context the drama, making it appear as if the story had
of the “Crack Crisis” no authors aside from dealers and addicts.
Their writing of the crack drama kept abusers,
If the many claims about an “epidemic” or dealers, crimes, and casualties under spot-
“plague” endangering “a whole generation” of lights while hiding other important factors in
youth were at odds with the best official data, the shadows. We suggest that over and above
then what else was animating the new War on the very real problems some users suffered
Drugs? In fact, even if all the exaggerated with crack, the rise of the New Right and the
claims about crack had been true, it would competition between political parties in a con-
not explain all the attention crack received. servative context contributed significantly to
Poverty, homelessness, auto accidents, handgun the making of the crack scare.
deaths, and environmental hazards are also
widespread, costly, even deadly, but most The New Right
politicians and journalists never speak of them and Its Moral Ideology
in terms of crisis or plague. Indeed, far more
people were (and still are) injured and killed During the post-Watergate rebuilding of the
every year by domestic violence than by illicit Republican Party, far right wing political
drugs, but one would never know this from organizations and fundamentalist Christian
media reports or political speeches. The exis- groups set about to impose what they called
tence of government studies suggesting that “traditional family values” on public policy.
crack contributed to the deaths of a small pro- This self-proclaimed “New Right” felt increas-
portion of its users, that an unknown but some- ingly threatened by the diffusion of modernist
what larger minority of users became addicted values, behaviors, and cultural practices—
to it, that its use was related to some forms of particularly by what they saw as the intercon-
crime, and so on were neither necessary nor nected forms of 1960s hedonism involved in sex
sufficient conditions for all the attention crack outside (heterosexual) marriage and conscious-
received (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977). ness alteration with (illicit) drugs. The New
Like other sociologists, historians, and Right formed a core constituency for Ronald
students of drug law and public policy, we sug- Reagan, an extreme conservative who had come
gest that understanding antidrug campaigns to prominence as governor of California in part
requires more than evidence of drug abuse and by taking a hard line against the new political
drug-related problems, which can be found in movements and cultural practices of the 1960s.
almost any period. It requires analyzing these Once he became president in 1981, Reagan
crusades and scares as phenomena in their and his appointees attempted to restructure
own right and understanding the broader public policy according to a radically conserv-
social, political, and economic circumstances ative ideology. Through the lens of this ideolo-
under which they occur (see, e.g., Bakalar and gy, most social problems appeared to be simply
Grinspoon, 1984; Brecher, 1972; Duster, 1970; the consequences of individual moral choices
Gusfield, 1963, 1981; Lindesmith, 1965; Morgan, (Ryan, 1976). Programs and research that had
1978; Musto, 1973; Rumbarger, 1989). The crack for many years been directed at the social and
scare also must be understood in terms of its structural sources of social problems were sys-
political context and its appeal to important tematically defunded in budgets and delegiti-
groups within American society. The mass media mated in discourse. Unemployment, poverty,
and politicians, however, did not talk about urban decay, school crises, crime, and all their
drugs this way. Rather, they decontextualized attendant forms of human troubles were03-Newman Reader.qxd 12/16/03 5:20 PM Page 58
58 PART 1 ♦ THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY
spoken of and acted upon as if they were the problems on the deviant individuals and then
result of individual deviance, immorality, or expand the nets of social control to imprison
weakness. The most basic premise of social those people for causing the problems.
science—that individual choices are influ- The crack crisis had other, more specific
enced by social circumstances—was rejected as political uses. Nancy Reagan was a highly
left-wing ideology. Reagan and the New Right visible antidrug crusader, crisscrossing the
constricted the aperture of attribution for nation to urge schoolchildren to “Just Say No”
America’s ills so that only the lone deviant to drugs. Mrs. Reagan’s crusade began in 1983
came into focus. They conceptualized people (before crack came into existence) when her
in trouble as people who make trouble “p.r.-conscious operatives,” as Time maga-
(Gusfield, 1985); they made social control zine called them, convinced her that “serious-
rather than social welfare the organizing axis minded displays” of “social consciousness”
of public policy (Reinarman, 1988). would “make her appear more caring and less
With regard to drug problems, this frivolous.” Such a public relations strategy was
conservative ideology is a form of sociological important to Mrs. Reagan. The press had often
denial. For the New Right, people did not so criticized her for spending hundreds of thou-
much abuse drugs because they were jobless, sands of dollars on new china for the White
homeless, poor, depressed, or alienated; they House, lavish galas for wealthy friends, and
were jobless, homeless, poor, depressed, or high-fashion evening gowns at a time when
alienated because they were weak, immoral, or her husband’s economic policies had induced
foolish enough to use illicit drugs. For the right a sharp recession, raised joblessness to near
wing, American business productivity was not Depression-era levels, and cut funding for
lagging because investors spent their capital on virtually all programs for the poor. Time
mergers and stock speculation instead of on explained that “the timing and destinations of
new plants and equipment, or for any number her antidrug excursions last year were coordi-
of other economic reasons routinely men- nated with the Reagan-Bush campaign officials
tioned in the Wall Street Journal or Business to satisfy their particular political needs”
Week. Rather, conservatives claimed that busi- (Time, January 14, 1985, p. 30). . . .
nesses had difficulty competing partly because
many workers were using drugs. In this view, Political Party Competition
U.S. education was in trouble not because it
had suffered demoralizing budget cuts, but The primary political task facing liberals in the
because a “generation” of students was “on 1980s was to recapture some of the electorate
drugs” and their teachers did not “get tough” that had gone over to the Right. Reagan’s
with them. The new drug warriors did not see shrewdness in symbolically colonizing “middle
crime plaguing the ghettos and barrios for all American” fears put Democrats on the defen-
the reasons it always has, but because of the sive. Most Democrats responded by moving to
influence of a new chemical bogeyman. Crack the right and pouncing upon the drug issue.
was a godsend to the Right. They used it and Part of the early energy for the drug scare in
the drug issue as an ideological fig leaf to place the spring and summer of 1986 came from
over the unsightly urban ills that had increased Democratic candidates trading charges with
markedly under Reagan administration social their Republican opponents about being “soft
and economic policies. “The drug problem” on drugs.” Many candidates challenged each
served conservative politicians as an all-purpose other to take urine tests as a symbol of
scapegoat. They could blame an array of their commitment to a “drug-free America.”03-Newman Reader.qxd 12/16/03 5:20 PM Page 59
Chapter 3 ♦ Building Reality: The Social Construction of Knowledge 59
One Southern politician even proposed that again the crack issue had political utility. One
candidates’ spouses be tested. A California common observation about the 1988 presi-
senatorial candidate charged his opponent dential election campaigns was that there were
with being “a noncombatant in the war on no domestic or foreign policy crises looming
drugs” (San Francisco Chronicle, August 12, on which the two parties could differentiate
1986, p. 9). By the fall of 1986, increasingly themselves. As a New York Times headline put
strident calls for a drug war became so much a it: “Drugs as 1988 Issue: Filling a Vacuum”
part of candidates’ standard stump speeches (May 24, 1988, p. A14). In the 1988 primary
that even conservative columnist William season, candidates of both parties moved to fill
Safire complained of antidrug “hysteria” and this vacuum in part by drug-baiting their
“narcomania” (New York Times, September 11, opponents and attacking them as “soft on
1986, p. A27). Politicians demanded every- drugs.” In the fall, both Democrats Dukakis
thing from death penalties in North America and Bentsen and Republicans Bush and
to bombing raids in South America. Quayle claimed that their opponents were soft
Crack could not have appeared at a more on drugs while asserting that their side would
opportune political moment. After years of wage a “real War on Drugs.” And, just as they
dull debates on budget balancing, a “hot” issue did before the 1986 election, members of
had arrived just in time for a crucial election. Congress from both parties overwhelmingly
In an age of fiscal constraint, when most prob- passed a new, even more strict and costly
lems were seen as intractable and most solu- antidrug bill.
tions costly, the crack crisis was the one “safe” The antidrug speeches favoring such
issue on which all politicians could take “tough expenditures became increasingly transparent
stands” without losing a single vote or cam- as posturing, even to many of the speakers. For
paign contribution. The legislative results of example, Senator Christopher Dodd (D-Conn)
the competition to “get tough” included a $2 called the flurry of antidrug amendments a
billion law in 1986, the so-called “Drug-Free “feeding frenzy” (New York Times, May 22,
America Act,” which whizzed through the 1988, p. E4). An aide to another senator admit-
House (392 to 16) just in time for members ted that “everybody was scrambling to get a
of Congress to go home and tell their piece of the action” (New York Times, May 24,
constituents about it. In the heat of the 1988, p. A14). Even President Reagan’s spoke-
preelection, antidrug hysteria, the symbolic sperson, Marlin Fitzwater, told the White
value of such spending seemed to dwarf the House press corps that “everybody wants to
deficit worries that had hamstrung other legis- out-drug each other in terms of political
lation. According to Newsweek, what occurred rhetoric” (Boston Globe, May 18, 1988, p. 4).
was “a can-you-top-this competition” among But however transparent, such election-year
“election-bound members of both parties” posturing—magnified by a media hungry for
seeking tough antidrug amendments. The the readers and ratings that dramatic drug sto-
1986 drug bill, as Representative David ries bring—enhanced the viability of claims
McCurdy (D-Okla) put it, was “out of control,” about the menace of crack far more than any
adding through a wry smile, “but of course I’m available empirical evidence could. In the fall
for it” (September 22, 1986, p. 39). of 1989, Congress finalized yet another major
The prominence of the drug issue antidrug bill costing more than the other two
dropped sharply in both political speeches and combined. According to research by the
media coverage after the 1986 election, but Government Accounting Office, the federal
returned during the 1988 primaries. Once government spent more than $23 billion on the03-Newman Reader.qxd 12/16/03 5:20 PM Page 60
60 PART 1 ♦ THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY
drug war during the Reagan era, three-fourths The End of the Crack Scare
of it for law enforcement (Alcoholism and Drug
Abuse Week, 1989, p. 3). . . . In the 1980s, the conservative drive to reduce
Politicians and the media were forging, social spending exacerbated the enduring
not following, public opinion. The speeches problems of impoverished African-American
and stories led the oft-cited poll results, not and Latino city residents. Partly in response, a
the other way around. In 1987, between minority of the young urban poor turned
elections—when drug problems persisted in either to crack sales as their best shot at the
the ghettos and barrios but when the drug American Dream and/or to the crack high as
scare was not so enflamed by election rhetoric their best shot at a fleeting moment of plea-
and media coverage—only 3 to 5% of those sure. Inner-city churches, community organi-
surveyed picked drugs as our most impor- zations, and parent groups then tried to defend
tant problem (New York Times, May 24, 1988, their children and neighborhoods from drug
p. A14). But then again in 1989, immediately dealing and use on the one hand and to lobby
following President Bush’s speech escalating for services and jobs on the other hand. But the
the drug war, nearly two-thirds of the people crack scare did not inspire politicians of either
polled identified drugs as America’s most party to address the worsening conditions and
important problem. When the media and growing needs of the inner-city poor and
politicians invoked “public opinion” as the working class or to launch a “Marshall Plan for
driving force behind their actions against cities.” In the meantime, the white middle-class
crack, they inverted the actual causal sequence majority viewed with alarm the growing num-
(Edelman, 1964, p. 172). bers, visibility, and desperation of the urban
We argued in the previous section that the poor. And for years many Americans believed
New Right and other conservatives found the central fiction of the crack scare: that drug
ideological utility in the crack scare. In this use was not a symptom of urban decay but one
section, we have suggested that conservatives of its most important causes.
were not the only political group in America All this gave federal and local authorities
to help foment the scare and to benefit from justification for widening the nets of social
it. Liberals and Democrats, too, found in crack control. Of course, the new drug squads did
and drugs a means of recapturing Democratic not reduce the dangerousness of impoverished
defectors by appearing more conservative. urban neighborhoods. But the crack scare did
And they too found drugs to be a convenient increase criminal justice system supervision of
scapegoat for the worsening conditions in the the underclass. By 1992, one in four young
inner cities. All this happened at a historical African-American males was in jail or prison
moment when the Right successfully stigma- or on probation or parole—more than were in
tized the liberals’ traditional solutions to the higher education. . . . During the crack scare,
problems of the poor as ineffective and costly. the prison population more than doubled,
Thus, in addition to the political capital to be largely because of the arrests of drug users and
gained by waging the war, the new chemical small dealers. This gave the U.S. the highest
bogeyman afforded politicians across the ide- incarceration rate in the world (Currie, 1985;
ological spectrum both an explanation for Irwin and Austin, 1994).
pressing public problems and an excuse for By the end of 1992, however, the crack
not proposing the unpopular taxing, spend- scare seemed spent. There are a number of
ing, or redistributing needed to do something overlapping reasons for this. Most important
about them. was the failure of the War on Drugs itself.03-Newman Reader.qxd 12/16/03 5:20 PM Page 61
Chapter 3 ♦ Building Reality: The Social Construction of Knowledge 61
Democrats as well as Republicans supported those coming from the president. Therefore, as
the War on Drugs, but the Reagan and Bush the White House withdrew from the drug
administrations initiated and led it, and the issue, so did the press.
drug war required support from the White After about 1989, it became increasingly
House. George Bush appointed William difficult to sustain the exaggerated claims of
Bennett to be a “tough” and extremely high the beginning of the crack scare. The main-
profile “drug czar” to lead the campaign stream media began to publish stories critical
against drugs. But Bennett, criticized for his of earlier news coverage (though usually not
bombastic style, quit after only eighteen their own). . . . Newsweek finally admitted in
months (some press accounts referred to it 1990 what it called the “dirty little secret”
as the “czar’s abdication”). After that, the Bush about crack that it had concealed in all of
administration downplayed the drug war, and its earlier scare stories: “A lot of people use it
it hardly figured at all in the presidential without getting addicted,” and that the anony-
primaries or campaign in 1992. Bill Clinton mous “media” had “hyped instant and total
said during the campaign that there were no addiction” (February 19, 1990, pp. 74–75). As
easy solutions to drug problems and that pro- early as 1988, it was clear that crack was not
grams that work only on reducing supply were “destroying a whole generation”; it was not
doomed to fail. The Clinton administration even spreading beyond the same poverty
eschewed the phrase “War on Drugs,” and Lee context that had long given rise to hard-core
Brown, Clinton’s first top drug official, explic- heroin addiction. Moreover, because of the
itly rejected the title of drug czar (Reinarman, obvious destructive effects of heavy use, people
1994). After billions of tax dollars had been in ghettos and barrios had come to view “crack
spent and millions of young Americans had heads” as even lower in status than winos or
been imprisoned, hard-core drug problems junkies. Even crack dealers preferred powder
remained. With so little to show for years of cocaine and routinely disparaged crack heads
drug war, politicians seemed to discover the (Williams, 1989). All of this meant that drugs
limits of the drug issue as a political weapon. in general, and crack in particular, declined in
Moreover, with both parties firmly in favor of newsworthiness. Media competition had
the “get tough” approach, there was no longer fueled the crack scare in its early years, and the
any partisan political advantage to be had. same scramble for dramatic stories guaranteed
The news media probably would have that the media would move on to other stories.
written dramatic stories about the appear- By 1992, the crack scare had faded beyond the
ance of smokeable cocaine in poor neighbor- media’s horizon of hot new issues.
hoods at any time. Television producers have Finally, the crack scare could recede into
found that drug stories, especially timely, well- the background partly because it had been
advertised, dramatic ones, often receive high institutionalized. Between 1986 and 1992,
ratings. But the context of the Reagan-led drug Congress passed and two presidents signed a
war encouraged the media to write such pieces. series of increasingly harsh antidrug laws.
Conservatives had long complained that the Federal antidrug funding increased for seven
media had a liberal bias; in the mid-1980s, successive years, and an array of prison and
drug coverage allowed the media to rebut police programs was established or expanded.
such criticism and to establish conservative All levels of government, from schools to cities,
credentials (Reeves and Campbell, 1994). As counties, and states, established agencies
we have suggested, news coverage of drugs rose to warn about crack and other drug problems.
and fell with political initiatives, especially And multimillion-dollar, corporate-sponsored,You can also read
