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A joint publication for U.S. Artillery professionals March - April 2019
Fires
Strong
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Headquarters,
http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin
Department of the Army. PB 644-19-2
• 1
Table of contents
3
5
Ready to Fight Tonight
By Brig. Gen. Brian Gibson
US Artillery in World War I
By Scott Cortese
Editor
Vacant
Art Director
7 The Future of Fires Rick Paape, Jr.
By Lt. Col. (ret.) William Veitch Assistant Editor
Monica Wood
9 Sustaining Deep Fires in Decisive Action The Fires staff can be reached by email at
By Maj. Daniel J. N. Belzer usarmy.sill.fcoe.mbx.fires-bulletin-mailbox@
mail.mil or by phone at (580) 442-5121.
13 What’s in a Name? Disclaimer
By Capt. Peter Mitchell Fires, a professional bulletin, is published
bimonthly by Headquarters, Department of
15 Mastering Terrain Within Your Position Area the Army under the auspices of the Fires Cen-
Artillery ter of Excellence, 455 McNair Ave., Fort Sill, OK
By Capt. Francis Porcase 73503. The views expressed within are those
of the authors and not the Department of De-
18 Using Behavioral Science to Ready Air Defenders fense or its elements. The content contained
for the Future Fight within Fires does not necessarily reflect the
By Chief Warrant Officer 5 Eric Maule and Dr. Rhett Graves U.S. Army’s position or supercede information
in other official publications. Use of new items
26 Artillery Tag constitutes neither affirmation of their accura-
By Capt. Berek F. Bartlett cy nor product endorsements. Fires assumes
no responsibility for any unsolicited material.
28 Psychological Operations in Support of Fires By order of Mark A. Milley, General, United
By Capt. Joseph DiDonato, Sgt. Alexander Barker and States Army, Chief of Staff.
Sgt. Jacob Schwartz Official:
31 Gender Integration into Combat Arms
By Master Sgt. Jesus Robles Gerald B. O’Keefe
Administrative Assistant to the
34 Establishing Effective Junior Air Defense Officers Secretary of the Army, Auth. 1513304
By 1st Lt. Bradley T. Hodgkins
36 Lessons Learned from Korea Wilson A. Shoffner
By 1st Lt. Hannah Jones Major General, United States Army
Commanding General, Fort Sill, Okla.
38 Korean Counterfire Purpose
By Chief Warrant Officer 2 Matthew Pfannerstill and Originally founded as the Field Artillery
Sgt. 1st Class Gary Weathersbee, Jr. Journal, Fires serves as a forum for the discus-
sions of all Fires professionals, Active, Reserves
42 Patriot Training for Large-scale Combat and National Guard; disseminates profession-
Operations al knowledge about progress, development
By Lt. Col. Tom M. Noble, Capt. Samantha K. Griesinger and and best use in campaigns; cultivates a com-
Capt. John M. Moriarity mon understanding of the power, limitations
and application of joint Fires, both lethal and
45 Simulated Training, Real Learning nonlethal; fosters joint Fires interdependency
By Capt. Ryan Scott among the armed services; and promotes the
understanding of and interoperability between
48 Successful Field Artillery Battalion Intelligence the branches, all of which contribute to the
Support to Brigade Targeting good of the Army, joint and combined forces
By Capt. (P) Tim Wilson and Sgt. 1st Class Kurt Legnon and our nation.
Fires is pleased to grant permission to re-
50 The Importance of a Mentor print; please credit Fires, the author(s) and
By Capt. Jean Tomte photographers.
2 • Fires, March-April 2019, Fires Strong
Air Defense Artillery Mud to Space
Ready to Fight Tonight
Air Defense Artillery is in a pe- edge of our Warrant Officer Corps,
riod of transformation and growth we have split the AMD Systems
that is needed to effectively sup- Tactician/Technician (140E) Mili-
port U.S. military operations. The tary Occupation Specialty (MOS)
2018 Air Defense Artillery Train- into two separate tracks: 140K MOS
ing Strategy laid the foundation to AMD Systems Tactician and MOS
transform training and education 140L AMD Systems Technician.
to prepare air defenders to com- The last class of 140Es graduated
bat air and missile defense (AMD) in June 2018, and in December we
threats. Over the last year, the graduated the first classes of 140K
ADA school focused on increasing and 140L MOSs. The separation
the rigor and technical expertise of the 140E MOS was necessary to
in the Officer Education System develop a Warrant Officer that can
(OES), Warrant Officer Education provide precise technical advice to
System (WOES) and Noncommis- commanders.
sioned Officer Education System In the 140A MOS Warrant Offi-
Brig. Gen. Brian Gibson (NCOES). Additionally, the school cer Advanced Course, the school
U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery maximized credentialing oppor- added Information Control Of-
School commandant tunities for air defenders to re- ficer training on joint networks.
ceive civilian certifications related Students develop and brief a plan
to their military occupational spe- to integrate and employ Army
cialty. weapons, sensors, and C2 systems
The ADA Captains Career into a joint operational network
Course (CCC) and Basic Officer scenario. The plan development
Leaders Course (BOLC) are going provides our Warrants an in-depth
through revisions to develop inspi- understanding of capability and
rational leaders who are analytical limitations of those networked
and logical thinkers, being both systems. Most importantly, this
technically and tactically com- process gives our students a better
petent. These revisions will rein- knowledge of interoperability and
force student knowledge of ADA how to connect our Army systems
core competencies: (1) Understand with the joint community.
ADA capabilities and doctrine, For NCOES, the ADA school has
(2) Synchronize AMD operations been busy completing and incor-
(across warfighting functions and porating technical classes back into
joint/coalition AMD), (3) Conduct the Senior Leader Course (SLC)
AMD mission command, (4) Exe- and the Advanced Leaders Course
cute AMD force operations, (5) and (ALC), reinforcing the technical
Execute AMD engagement opera- competency of our NCO Corps.
tions. Instead of having only two cen-
The CCC and BOLC courses tralized classes for SLC and ALC
also continue to train with allied the school now has 12 classes with
partners to strengthen our allianc- each ADA MOS having an individ-
es and build partnership capac- ual school code to attend NCOES.
ity. Highlighted by the first allied To prepare our air defenders to
Patriot Top Gun Course graduat- transition from military service
ing eight international students the ADA school recently signed a
last October. This graduate-level memorandum of agreement with
program is a mirror image of the Upper Iowa University to offer a
U.S. course that focuses on Ballis- Bachelor of Science Information
tic Missile Defense planning and Technology (IT) degree for Com-
developing student expertise in mand and Control System Tech-
air defense posture against aerial nicians (140A) Warrant Officers
threats. and Air Defense Enhanced Early
To increase the depth of knowl- Warning System Operators (14H).
http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 3
portunities including CompTIA A+,
Network+ and Security+. The 140L
Warrant Officers take certification
classes on Basic Electronic AC/DC
at Red River Technology Center,
Duncan, Okla. With funding from
TRADOC, the Occupational Safe-
ty and Health Administration pro-
vides Patriot Launching Station
Enhanced Operator/Maintainer
(14T) AIT students the opportunity
to certify on Class VII Rough Ter-
rain Forklift Trucks (over 1,075 14T
AIT Soldiers certified to date).
To keep pace with evolving tech-
nology, and new learning meth-
ods, the school has introduced
new training devices to increase
the level of realism as well as the
number of repetitions. The addi-
tion of new Stinger trainers places
air defenders in a virtual and in-
teractive three-dimensional world
where they face numerous combat
situations and are able to demon-
strate their technical competence
in a much more realistic setting.
In December 2018, the ADA
school conducted a grand open-
ing ceremony for the new Count-
er-Rocket Artillery Mortar
(C-RAM) Classrooms and Virtu-
A Soldier from E Battery, 2nd Bat- The Bachelor of Science IT de- al Maintenance Trainers. These
talion, 1st Air Defense Artillery, gree plan would award a new 14H trainers provide the same func-
demonstrates Air and Missile De- just graduating from Advanced tionality as the actual C-RAM sys-
fense operations for Lt. Gen. Mi- Individual Training (AIT) 14 se- tem without the risk of physically
chael Bills, Eighth Army command- mester hours towards the bachelor damaging equipment. Instructors
er. (Cpl. Kim Jun Seo/35th ADA degree. The 14 semester hours is can also program faults into the
BDE) roughly one college semester and virtual systems and allow students
valued at $15,000. Similarly, a new the ability to practice preventive
140A Warrant Officer Basic Course maintenance and troubleshooting
(WOBC) graduate would receive procedures. Previously the school
40 semester hours. was limited to train on two C-RAM
14H AIT Soldiers from 30th weapon systems, but with the new
Air Defense Artillery Brigade be- classroom and virtual technology,
came the first class to take a civil- 36 virtual C-RAM trainers allow
ian certification course on Comp- students to acquire experience be-
TIA IT Fundamentals at Fort Sill, fore they conduct hands-on train-
Okla. The IT Fundamentals course ing on the real guns.
teaches Soldiers basic concepts of As threats continue to evolve
computer security best practices we are resolute on what matters;
while providing students with an building an Air and Missle Defense
understanding of the infrastruc- force of competent Soldiers and
ture of common operating sys- leaders, equipping the force with
tems and networks. In the coming the right equipment at the right
months, 14G AIT students will also time, and strengthening our allied
begin taking the CompTIA IT Fun- and coalition partnerships. With
damentals course. this focus, we will provide Soldiers
140A Warrant Officers have sim- and leaders ready to meet the chal-
ilarly embraced credentialing op- lenges of the next century.
4 • Fires, March-April 2019, Fires Strong
US Artillery in World War I
By Scott Cortese
Editor’s note: This article is the first U.S. Army’s pre-war Infantry Drill ways. It lacked experienced ju-
in a series of three articles highlight- Regulations and Field Service nior leadership, trained Soldiers,
ing U.S. Field Artillery operations in Regulations and coined the term weapons and equipment.
World War I. “open warfare” in describing the Little emphasis was given to the
As Gen. John Pershing, com- American way to fight. This doc- Army during the first three years
mander of the American Expedi- trine was centered upon the con- of war as the nation wrestled with
tionary Force (AEF), and his staff cept that infantry needed to be debate between neutrality and
surveyed the French battlefield self-reliant so that, “…the rifle and getting involved in Europe’s af-
after arriving in June 1917 there the bayonet remain the supreme fairs. By April of 1917, the active
must have been a look of dis- weapons of the infantry Soldier Army’s ranks had consisted of
gust upon his face after what he and that the ultimate success of only 137,000 men with another
had witnessed. What he saw were the Army depends upon their 181,000 more Soldiers in the Na-
miles of trench lines that stretched proper use in open warfare.”2 tional Guard. 4 This was hardly
from northern France, weaving in These regulations also stated that the million Soldiers that Pershing
and out along the French coun- heavy weaponry, such as artil- felt were required to defeat the
tryside pressing southward. These lery, existed solely for the pur- Germans.
very same trench lines had barely pose of supporting the infantry. The artillery branch of the
moved a hundred yards in either If brought out of the trenches and U.S. Army represented these and
direction since autumn of 1914. into the open, Pershing was con- other shortcomings as well. In
Several attempts by the French fident that the Germans would be August 1914, the outbreak of the
and British to break the stalemate decisively defeated. war, the artillery ranks numbered
resulted in obscene casualty fig- Previous attempts by the Allies only 266 officers and 4,992 en-
ures such as those which occurred to bring about “open war” had listed men. By the time Persh-
at the Battle of the Somme. Worse failed because they just simply ing first walked the battlefields in
still, Pershing saw first-hand the lacked the capability to break the northern France, the artillery had
toll those years of this form of stalemate due in part to the inef- grown to 1,130 officers and 21,874
warfare had taken upon the Sol- fectiveness of its artillery against enlisted men. Toward the end
diers inside the trenches. These the German fortifications and of the war in November 1918, its
muddy, filthy and rat-infested also the low quality of their ar- ranks had swelled to 22,393 offi-
holes were manned by degraded tillery shells which sometimes cers and 439,760 enlisted men.
men. failed to detonate upon impact. It’s important to point out that
It was incredible to Pershing Also, Pershing believed that many this huge increase in strength oc-
that the French and British com- years of trench warfare had taken curred during the last 19 months
manders had seemingly lacked away the Allied Soldier’s aggres- of the war while the previous
the aggressiveness to change the siveness and led them to accept 33 months were literally squan-
situation and consigned their an artillery-centered doctrine that dered.5 In short, by the time the
men to this sort of horrible dead- he considered to be futile.3 Iron- AEF artillerymen entered combat
lock. He also felt that the Allies’ ically after the AEF’s initial bat- they were primarily made up of
over-reliance on heavy weapons, tles, Pershing and his field com- raw recruits with inexperienced
particularly artillery, exacerbated manders would eventually realize junior officers leading them. With
the circumstances.1 Determined that the Allies really weren’t so the Allies clamoring for the AEF
to make America’s participation over-reliant on artillery at all. In to get into the war, training had
significant and help bring about fact, as the AEF tactics evolved in begun immediately during the
an end to the war, Pershing and the use of this critical asset, artil- fall of 1917.
his staff desperately desired to lery would become essential to Because time was of the es-
show the Allies the “American” victory. sence, the training that the Amer-
way to fight a war. At the outbreak of World War I, icans received in the U.S. was
Pershing held strongly to the the U.S. Army was utterly ill-pre- very brief and taught them the
battle doctrine outlined in the pared to enter the war in many minimum skills necessary of an
1 Mark E. Grotelueschen, Doctrine Under Trial: American Artillery Employment in World War I (London: Greenwood Press, 2001), 14.
2 As quoted in: Grotelueschen, Doctrine Under Trial, 16-17.
3 Grotelueschen, Doctrine Under Trial, 14.
4 Edward G. Lengel, To Conquer Hell: The Meuse-Argonne 1918 (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 2008), 18.
5 Ian V. Hogg, The Guns 1914-1918 (New York: Ballantine Books, 1971), 88-89.
http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 5
artilleryman. Addressing an in- Atlantic with American artillery ed the French trainers, Irwin coming class of artillery officers pieces. Rather, it was decided that noted that, “The French instruc- at the School of Fire for Field Ar- the AEF would use French artil- tors were officers of experience, tillery at Fort Sill, Okla., Col. A. S. lery guns upon arriving in Eu- devoted to their profession, and Fleming made it clear that, “The rope. The U.S. stopped producing eager to render every assistance need of even partially educated its own artillery piece, the M1903 to their allies.” However, he also Field Artillery officers is so urgent 3-inch gun, in order to produce sided with those same detractors that the school term has been re- a gun that would chamber the by collaborating that, “It became duced to a minimum. Tactics and French ammunition.8 apparent to me, as the instruction broad knowledge necessary for As it turned out, this gun was proceeded, that the long period of the proper emplacement and use not produced in significant num- stationary or trench warfare had of artillery you must learn else- bers nor was it readily available caused a very palpable disregard where…And since the ultimate for training. To make up for this of the methods necessary in a reason for the existence of artil- equipment shortfall, a rather re- war of movement.”10 This was but lery is to shoot, our primary and sourceful artilleryman, Capt. a precursor to the training they final object is to teach you the James Fort, came up with an ex- were to receive over the next sev- technique of shooting.”6 Unfor- cellent idea to train his battery. eral months. tunately for the Americans, they Artillery guns were available once Adding to the difficulty, the wound up being instructed in the every three days and for only an AEF artillery lacked the number French manner of shooting. hour and a half for Fort’s Soldiers of horses required for its mobil- Due to the lack of trained Amer- to train on. Instead of waiting, ity. Horses were obviously instru- ican artillery officers, the AEF re- Fort took the initiative and had a mental in transporting artillery lied upon the French to provide local college, the Georgia School guns around the battlefield. This artillery instructors. There were of Technology, build a wooden made it extremely complex, if between 70 and 80 French artil- replica. The gun was complete not impossible, for the men to re- lery officers in America, which with a spare sighting mechanism hearse the movements required included one or two at each Field and iron wheels. Fort had noted of Pershing’s open warfare con- Artillery camp. The French, ob- that this training aid worked rath- cept. viously, were well-versed in ar- er well as, “The gun has inspired As a result, the artillerymen of tillery techniques used in trench great enthusiasm on the part of the 2nd Field Artillery Brigade warfare and also woefully igno- the men and is proving to be of spent six to eight weeks becoming rant of Pershing’s concept of open considerable value in their train- quite adept at firing pre-arranged warfare. Maj. Gen. William Snow, ing.”9 As 1917 drew to a close and defensive and shifting barrages. chief of Field Artillery for the U.S. with the smallest amount of in- Upon completion, the brigade Army, observed that the French struction conducted in the States, worked jointly with French artil- instructors, “had been but a little the AEF shipped off to France to lery batteries in a “quiet” sector time in the service, were not well continue their training. of the front south of the town of grounded in Field Artillery, had Arriving in Valdahon, France, Verdun. The final phase of their left France at the height of stabi- in January 1918, the first artillery training was to culminate in a lized warfare, and consequently units of the AEF began training month-long exercise emphasiz- knew no Field Artillery except the on their newly assigned French ing the concepts of open war- trench phase.”7 artillery pieces, the 75 mm and fare. Unfortunately, a major Ger- To further compound these 155 mm guns. Brig. Gen. George man offensive in the Chemin des early problems, severe shortages Irwin commanded one of the Dames area in May 1918 cut this of equipment left the AEF little largest Field Artillery brigades, training short to only six days. Be- to train with. Early on when the the 2nd Field Artillery Brigade ing rushed to the battlefield, the U.S. entered the war it was de- of the 2nd Infantry Division. entire AEF would soon be forced cided not take up precious cargo Contrary to the way in which his to put their abbreviated training space on troop ships crossing the counterparts in the U.S. regard- into practice.11 6 Col. A. S. Fleming, “The Mission of the School of Fire for Field Artillery,” The Field Artillery Journal Volume VII, Number 4 (1917): 383-84. 7 As quoted in: Grotelueschen, Doctrine Under Trial, 13. 8 Hogg, The Guns 1914-1918, 94. 9 Capt. James L. Fort, “Improvised Methods of Instruction Employed in National Army Camps,” The Field Artillery Journal Volume VII, Number 4 (1917): 459. 10 Brig. Gen. George Le R. Irwin, “Notes on the Training and Handling of Divisional Artillery in France,” The Field Artillery Journal Volume IX, Number 5 (1919): 489-90. 11 Grotelueschen, Doctrine Under Trial, 21-22. 6 • Fires, March-April 2019, Fires Strong
The Future
of Fires
The Branches Remain
Separate Specializations
By Lt. Col. (ret.) William Veitch
As a retired Air Defense Artilleryman I read the
recent article by 1st Lt. Taylor Maroni entitled “The
future of Field Artillery, merging with air defense,”
as one can imagine, with some interest. My point of
view is more positive, in that I do not believe Fires,
the Field Artillery or air defense branches, and the
United States military as a whole face an uncertain
future. What we may face are threats that are yet
to be defined, threats more of a peer nature, and
perhaps organizational and materiel shortfalls due
to funding constraints. We must first look at the
threat(s) and then structure our military forces ac-
cordingly, within the constraints imposed by Con-
gress, against a prioritized list of missions.
With respect to air defense, I have seen the branch’s
history traced back to the coast artillery regiments
within the Field Artillery. At the turn of the last cen-
tury and through the First World War, coast artillery
performed the mission of homeland defense, much
as air defense has done since the 1950s. During the
Second World War coast artillery became obsolete
and units morphed or transformed into the an-
ti-aircraft artillery (AAA). AAA units provided force
protection to fixed assets and maneuver elements
alike. It was units such as these that were the genesis
of short range air defense (SHORAD) forces in the
modern Army. Corps and above force and asset pro-
tection had its genesis in the NIKE Ajax and Hercu-
les units of the 1950s. These later became our High
to Medium Altitude Defense (HIMAD) forces; even-
tually including HAWK, Improved HAWK (IHAWK)
and Patriot (before Patriot achieved an anti-missile
capability just prior to Desert Storm). Today Patriot
and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
units perform force and asset protection in the corps
and above role, and C-RAM (soon to be Improved
Force Protection Capability) performs protection of
fixed assets.
Before there is an adjusting of Field Artillery and
Air Defense Artillery job specialties, merging of mis-
sions, assigning additional missions, or creating hy-
brid/composite battalions one needs to have a clear
http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 7
understanding of air defense concepts and control mon core to everyone in this integrated environ- measures. In simple terms, an air defense unit de- ment. Only after the core material was taught would tects, classifies (aircraft, cruise missile, unmanned I split the13 and 14 MOS personnel out into their aircraft systems, tactical ballistic missile, interconti- “specializations”. I would follow the same method- nental ballistic missile), and identifies (friend, foe or ology with NCO schools. And who knows? At some unknown) an airborne object. However, depending point that hybrid officer or NCO capable of strad- on the rules of engagement for a given state or stage dling both specializations may actually develop! of alert, engagement authority does not necessarily The article stated the rationale for splitting the exist at the firing platoon or battery level. branches was “Combat in Vietnam required the of- Air defense units, especially those such as Patri- ficer to arrive as a proficient Field Artilleryman and ot and THAAD do not operate within an Army-only not a hybrid field and Air Defense Artilleryman. chain of command. More often than not, these units Army commanders in Vietnam simply did not have are under the command and control of either an Air the time to train an Air Defense Artilleryman to be Force or Naval commander in a multi-domain op- competent in Field Artillery […] who had had insuffi- erational setting. From my days as an IHAWK firing cient training in the basic techniques.” The same can platoon leader in NATO during the Cold War, en- be said for any of the conflicts that have followed, gagement authority was held at the U.S. Air Forces and that may follow. I would maintain that special- Europe Sector Operating Center. Our missiles were ization is a plus, not a minus in our contribution to under Centralized Command-Centralized Control. the Army fighting where it is told to fight, and win- In practicing for wartime, this command and con- ning where it fights. The main argument for splitting trol (C2) relationship could be reduced to Central- the branches was trying to teach officers both kinds ized Command-Decentralized Control where en- of artillery prevented them from attaining the profi- gagement authority was pushed to a lower echelon ciency necessary in order to carry out basic functions while higher echelons still held override authority. in either specialty. That argument remains valid to As communications networks overloaded or failed, this day. Fire direction and control of surface-to-sur- or threats came in massive waves, the C2 relation- face assets is entirely different (terms, tactics, rules, ship could go to Decentralized Command-Decen- procedures) than fire direction and control of sur- tralized Control where each battalion (or worst case face-to-air assets. The current Multi-Domain Oper- if communications were entirely lost, each battery/ ations literature, including TRADOC Pamphlet 525- firing platoon) held engagement authority. 3-1 and Multi-Domain Operations RIMPAC 2018, With the advent of hypervelocity rounds on the stresses the need for modernized and layered air battlefield, I remain unconvinced we are at a point and missile defense. This leads me to believe we are of making any decisions going forward concerning still two branches going forward. combining the branches within the Fires communi- In closing, Maroni stated “A core tenant of the ty. Theoretically speaking, the advent of hyperveloc- Field Artillery has always been the ability to perform ity rounds may provide the potential for increasing degraded operations if the situation required it. As the number of launch platforms available to count- things currently stand, it is already a challenge for er an air and missile defense threat. However, as I new fire control Soldiers to learn manual gunnery have described above, engagement of such threats as they do not learn it at advanced individual train- is seldom accomplished in a vacuum, or at the line ing (AIT), and now they will have to learn the rocket unit level. More often, engagement is a coordinated side as well.” Her point is well taken and it is a shame Multi-Domain effort with decisions made at higher manual gunnery is no longer taught in AIT. My final echelons. What I can see as a potential future out- point, to the community at large, is we should learn come is hypervelocity equipped 155 mm air defense and practice our degraded (manual) operations fre- units interspersed across the battlefield with Patriot quently in all branches. In a head-to-head battle and THAAD reserved for countering missile threats. with a peer, or near-peer competitor, we must ex- In the very near, immediate future, after an almost pect to operate in a cyber and electromagnetic con- 50 year estrangement of the branches, we must de- tested and degraded environment. Proficiency in velop a true Fires community. I do not envision a manual operations is the key to winning in combat time where a 155 mm conventional artillery battery in degraded environments. An over reliance on our commander rises to command a Patriot battalion. digital systems will prove fatal in such an environ- This to me is entirely two different skill sets and is ment. Innovate for the future, but remember your not a good use of personnel, education, training and roots (past)! investment. My vision is more oriented on Basic Of- Lt. Col. William Veitch is a retired Air Defense Artillery- ficers Leaders Course and Captain’s Career Course man. He was commissioned with a Bachelors in Business (what I knew as the officer basic and advanced cours- and Operations Research from Ohio University and re- es). In both of these courses I am certain there are ceived his Masters in Business and Computer Science from many common classes. In order to build commu- Texas A&M University. He served with C Battery, 2nd nity, I would combine all incoming 13 and 14 MOS Battalion, 57th ADA and served as the Patriot Software personnel into these courses and teach all the com- Branch Chief at the Directorate of Combat Developments. 8 • Fires, March-April 2019, Fires Strong
Sustaining
Deep Fires in
Decisive Action
By Maj. Daniel J. N. Belzer
Foreword: Sustaining the artillery forces the BCT commander to planning, resourcing and execut-
throughout large-scale combat oper- assume risk in developing obsta- ing sustained distribution to artil-
ations is the deciding factor in mass- cle belts, or in supplying artillery lery formations.
ing Fires on the enemy. Unchanged formations with the appropri- This was a predictable conse-
as a tenet of decisive action for gen- ate amount of ammunition. Maj. quence of low-order conflicts.
erations, recent history reminds us of Daniel Belzer’s article highlights The queen of battle has made
the final Chinese offensive of the Ko- the points of friction with com- leaps and bounds to learn, train
rean War. Launched in July of 1953, munication systems and current and adapt to the measured lethal-
the Chinese offensive culminated in Military Table of Organization ity and policing functions that
a final battle intended to remind the and Equipment capabilities as COIN requires. Artillery forma-
United Nations forces that the Com- it relates to sustaining the artil- tions must regain their former
munists had achieved their objectives lery fight. His examination and relevance, and sustainment or-
and had forced a UN withdrawal. recommendations will drive the ganizations must modernize to
Chinese artillery forces fired 705,000 battlefield calculus conversations prepare for tactical logistics in
rounds against the UN, and the UN that must happen in the force. decisive action. Tolerating force
artillery returned more than 4.7 mil- This article also emphasizes Maj. structures and unit systems as
lion total rounds. . Achieving UN Gen. Wilson A. Shoffner’s focus they are is either abrogating our
targeting objectives required a stag- on “…mitigating identified Fires duty to the Army to lead change
gering volume of fire. Our history gaps to conduct large-scale com- that wins wars, or foolishly as-
highlights how critical distribution is bat operations against a near-peer suming that we will prosecute fu-
in artillery units; resourced incorrect- competitor.” ture wars like the last two. Togeth-
ly, artillery formations cannot mass Artillery is the king of battle. Has er, we can build and implement
on the enemy effectively. been since the advent of bows and systems that reliably sustain the
Multiple National Training arrows. But the king, in counter volume of fire required to defeat
Center rotations prove that direct insurgency (COIN), is dead. Long a peer adversary.
support light artillery battalions live the king-- in decisive action. I’ve previously written about
lack the haul capacity to transport This transition may seem tanta- sustainment priorities in decisive
their basic load of ammunition. mount to killing a sacred cow. To action, and those articles are the
We must change how we resource say that anything to do with COIN baseline to this discussion. In the
this fight to win in future conflicts. is dead sounds ridiculous. It flies spring of 2017, I wrote an editorial
As it stands, artillery battalions in the face of nearly 15 years of for the Center for Army Lessons
are dependent upon heavy haul recent experience. It sounds like Learned regarding the ebb and
transport from brigade and divi- an artilleryman’s mix of wishful flow of commodities in decisive
sional sustainment formations to thinking and blind hopefulness. action in an article called “Color
augment their forward support Not so. The king of battle, the Codes for Reporting,” which was
companies. This arrangement most lethal weapon platform in later published in sustainment
degrades haul capacity for other any brigade combat team, is crit- magazine. Using that work as a
critical classes of supply. It un- ically under-resourced in decisive starting point, I wrote an article
dermines operational reach and action, and the sustainment com- aimed at contrasting the differ-
endurance and limits freedom munity should lead change to- ences between supply-focused
of action for a brigade combat ward correcting it. Years of COIN COIN and distribution-focused
team (BCT) commander. This and modularity leave our army decisive action titled “The 96-
is especially true during defen- with gaps in our systems that hour Distribution Targeting Cy-
sive preparations. This shortfall exacerbate our challenges with cle.” This article builds on those
http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 9
theses and focuses two operation- commonly called “days of sup- quirements based upon effects al concepts into tactical systems. ply” (DoS), is an imprecise mea- the brigade commander wants Adjusting the sustainment ar- sure of performance or effective- to retain at the BCT level. Com- chitecture for artillery units is not ness. DoS does not identify the municating in terms of a retained rocket science, even if we’re fir- size of the unit in question - and capability (e.g. 45 minutes of ing rockets. Second Infantry Di- will always create confusion in a smoke on a battalion-size breach) vision DIVARTY identified these higher headquarters by treating effectively trains logisticians to shortfalls during a recent brigade all units as the same. This is espe- plan ammunition resupply based external evaluation. The broad- cially true with the ammunition upon future operations. We are er towed artillery force, whether - the largest distribution tonnage accountable to know the maneu- in a DIVARTY or brigade combat requirement in a decisive action ver plan as it changes - not just team (BCT), could immediate- concept of support. I’ve written accountable to recalling the de- ly implement these systems, and about days of supply and per- tails of a sustainment rehearsal. would certainly benefit by creat- centage-based resupply triggers Table 1 below highlights a way to ing a link between targeting and before in “Distribution and Safety build a menu of retained capabil- sustainment planning. Stocks,” and I stand by the conclu- ities into a unit standard operat- Before anything else, artillery sions I reached at that time; DoS ing procedure (SOP). Planning is organizations must integrate is both imprecise and inaccurate, always preferable to reacting - an- their forward support company and percentage-based triggers ticipation is the most overlooked (FSC) commanders into the BCT trade perceived precision (often of the sustainment tenets. Many targeting process - the same way citing percentages to two decimal sustainment organizations create that support operations section places) for an arbitrary goal (like detailed plans with adequate re- (SPOs) integrate them in the op- 3 DoS). Neither 75.01 percent, nor dundancy; very few have systems erations planning process. “What 3.1 DoS enables a commander to in place that enable informed ini- we have here is a failure to com- make a decision. Neither is as ef- tiative within the concept of sup- municate” comes specifically to fective as communicating the ca- port. mind. Sustainment and artillery pabilities available at his disposal. Using consumption data during organizations don’t often speak To reach common terms of major combat operations should the same language. Worse, exist- reference, artillery organizations always be a distant third option ing metrics for stock objectives, should communicate their re- behind planned and targeted Figure 1. An example layout of retained capabilities. This system assists S3s in managing flexible fire support to the BCT, and likewise helps FSC commanders visualize equipment utilization requirements in the absence of (or in advance of) more detailed maneuver plans. (Courtesy illustration) 10 • Fires, March-April 2019, Fires Strong
Figure 2. An example concept of support diagram. This method is specifically designed to reduce distribution methods
and resupply schedules into a single format that builds shared understanding during the planning process.
stock objectives and baseline SOPs. Brigade Figure 3. Forward support company (FSC) commander overlap in
fire support officers (FSOs) communicating key artillery planning functions. Leveraging the FSC commander
requirements or resupply triggers in a num- in these processes will improve the reliability of support within the
ber of fire missions or in a specific number of battalion, and provide predictability to the brigade support battal-
retained capabilities creates a system where ion support operations and the artillery battalion S3. (Rick Paape/
ammunition requirements are consistent. Courtesy information).
This method permits a mix of shell and fuse
combinations that is consistent across the
spectrum of operations - precisely correct-
ing the problem with “days of supply” as a
metric.
This system reinforces a battalion com-
mander’s ability to direct and mass Fires on
specific, high-value targets, for an extend-
ed period of time, with minor adjustments
from standard operating procedure. Fur-
ther, it creates consistency within the distri-
bution network, increasing predictability for
the Brigade Support Battalion. This will al-
low the BSB commander to anticipate when
and how to weight the main effort.
The artillery battalion is the brigade’s pri-
mary commodity customer in terms of raw
tonnage. Second ID DIVARTY created a sys-
tem that reduces complicated synchroniza-
tion matrices into a simple concept of sup-
port and delivery schedule. It won’t replace
the complex tables that the BSB fights from,
but it will allow the BCT SPO, FSO, FA battal-
ion S3 and FSC commander to share a com-
mon vision of resupply operations within
http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 11Operations Orders
Decision Making fighting functions are unavoidably
BN CDR’s Vision
S3
Process
XO
Sustainment
Planning & Execution
and permanently linked in deci-
Operations • Concept of
Process
• Intent
Operations
• Concept of FSC CDR sive action. Systems and methods
• Visualization Operations • Concept of support
(BN, FSC CDRs)
• Endstate
• Fire control
• Graphic control
• Fire control • Sustainment created or trained during COIN
measures
• Graphic control
measures
estimate
all suffer from the same flaws.
The volume of fire required will
quickly overcome a supply-fo-
cused concept of support, espe-
Concept of Support cially if that system relies upon
Attack Guidance TLWS
Fires Coordination &
Targeting Proces
Enemy threat analysis
S2
FSCOORD BCT FSO FSC CDR
Develop how the
consumption rates to determine
Defines method and Synchronized
(FSCOORD, FSO, Identifies potential time table for operational battalion will stock objectives or resupply time-
FSC CDR) targets support BCT
engaging targets targeting
operations lines. Artillery battalions need to
integrate their FSC commanders
into the targeting process. Done
right, BCT FSOs and FSC com-
manders can firmly establish dis-
Synchronization
Sustainment
CL V Forecasting
Matrix tribution requirements, methods
LOGSTAT LOGSYNC Tool
Planning Process
(XO, BSB SPO,
S4 XO, FSC CDR XO, S3, FSC CDR, S4, BSB SPO, BCT S4,
FSC CDR
and schedules. Left undone, ar-
Consumption Validation BAO, FDO
BCT S4, FSC CDR) Predictive planning Delivery and tillery battalions will constantly
backhaul schedule
fight through ammunition lim-
itations. Those battalions will be
reduced to a limited counter-fire
Figure 4. Field-grade ownership, integrating Forward support company com- role, unable to mass Fires on ma-
manders in roles and responsibilities shared understanding during the plan- jor objectives. This is a culture
ning process. (Rick Paape/Courtesy information) shift, and some will be reticent
to add responsibilities to an FSC
the maneuver fight. This system ing the load handling system plat- commander’s plate.
creates a simple visualization for form with artillery formations On the other hand, when major
scheduled resupply operations, requires immediate revision. Ar- combat operations begin, units
and could be adapted to use a “D+” mored brigade combat teams ar- will fight with the systems they
schedule, or a day of the week tillery FSCs can distribute a third have. Logistics is a great leading
schedule with minimal labor. Lo- more ammunition with the same indicator of success. If not solved
gisticians learn and communicate utilization based upon their PLS now, units cannot be surprised
in basic targeting terms, and artil- density, to say nothing of their when they struggle to change lat-
lerymen communicate in precise higher personnel authorizations. er.
language describing methods and It’s time for the Combined Arms Acknowledgments and Notes:
timelines for distribution. Support Command (CASCOM) This article benefited from sustained
Integrating FSC commanders and the Fires Center of Excellence support from Col. David S. Pierce,
into this fight is practical but often (FCoE) to solve this problem to- Majors “JT” Turner and Adam Bu-
overlooked. Artillery battalions gether. The current CASCOM chanan, and Sgt. 1st Class Benjamin
need to link artillery operations estimation tools are consistent- Tivao. Helpful comments and insights
(S3), BCT sustainment operations ly disproved by national training also were provided by many other
(SPO), and fire support planning center consumption rates. CAS- members, both officer and enlisted, of
officers together more clarity in COM student texts rely exces- the 2nd Infantry Division DIVARTY
their roles and responsibilities. sively upon historical data, rather team. Any remaining errors are my
Figure 3 below highlights this than the standard coefficient of own.
link, while Figure 4 highlights a forces and means analysis. FCoE Maj. Daniel Belzer has a B.S. in
way to separate the “fights” be- produces articles arguing over Mechanical Engineering from the
tween those critical field grade the number of guns in each bat- Virginia Military Institute and an
roles, and how a unit might inte- tery, rather than solving the larger Master’s degree in Supply Chain
grate their FSC commander’s re- problem of unit basic load esti- Management from Virginia Com-
sponsibilities to capitalize on that mates and how to sustain them. If monwealth University. He has served
overlap. units can find ways to implement in tactical logistics and advisory roles
With consistency, accountabili- systems that clearly communicate in the 10th Mountain and 101st Air-
ty, and shared understanding, the deep Fires and match them with borne Divisions during Operation
next step for units to address is distribution cycles, the strategic Inherent Freedom and OEF, and now
equipment utilization. Relooking Army must find a way to match serves as the Executive Officer for
the placement of palletized load the equipment, and the doctrine, 308th BSB, 17th Field Artillery Bri-
system (PLS) assets cannot wait to decisive action. gade.
any longer. The error in match- The Fires and sustainment war-
12 • Fires, March-April 2019, Fires StrongWhat’s in a Name?
The Case For Dubbing IMSHORAD and MSHORAD
By Capt. Peter Mitchell
Names are great. Nothing has more power to res- en C-RAM (Counter-Rocket, Artillery and Mortar),
cue military equipment from the ignominy of his- JLENS ( Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense
torical obscurity than a good, punchy, colloquial Elevated Netted Sensor System), IFPC (Indirect Fire
name. Historical examples from the Army’s past are Protection Capability), and THAAD (Terminal High
myriad. Ask someone about the ‘U.S. Rifle, Caliber Altitude Area Defense). Once so-called, the acronym
.30, M1’ and you’ll get a blank stare, but that same sets in place like concrete and is practically impossi-
person will be able to recognize a Garand. Same ble to remove.
goes for the ‘Rocket Launcher, M1A1’, more com- Thus, now that new weapons systems have been
monly known as a bazooka. approved it is important to have a vetting process
America’s British allies realized the ease of nam- in place to establish proper names for IMSHORAD
ing when they were inundated with U.S. lend-lease (Interim Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense), and
equipment during the Second War World. Instead of upcoming MSHORAD. Such a process must be
memorizing countless different and illogical num- transparent and able to lend an ear to the will of the
ber/letter combinations (everything started with vox populi. The Air Defense branch should hold an
M1 be it a tank, rifle, hand grenade or entrenching open poll with a list of good, strong names for both
tool), the British attached nomenclatures. Thus the new systems within the year. Such an action would
‘Light Tank M3’ became Stuart, the ‘Medium Tank, not only drive enthusiasm within the branch for the
M4’ became Sherman, and the ‘105 mm Howitzer heralded return of SHORAD, but also provide ex-
Motor Carriage M7’ became Priest. Even the Ro- cellent public exposure outside to the Army at large
man legions called their ubiquitous light catapult an and the civilian world.
‘onager’ after its kick being similar to a wild donkey. Some humble suggestions from the author:
Nowadays it is equally as important to save new air The IMSHORAD recently approved for produc-
defense equipment from hideously bland and clin- tion is a Stryker variant made by Leonardo DRS
ical acronyms, reducing complex weapons of war to equipped with both Stinger and Longbow Hellfire
a mere job description. This fate has already befall- missiles, M230 chain gun and the 7.62 mm coaxial
An artist’s conception of a Interim Maneuver Short-
Range Air Defense Stryker. (Courtesy illustration)
http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 13machine gun.1 An excellent name for this particular ally means “circle eyed,” a very appropriate term for
vehicle would be the Sergeant Stout for two reasons. the wide reflective lens of a weaponized laser. This
First, the name honors the only Air Defender ever Greek name also carries on the convention started
to receive the Medal of Honor. Secondly, the nam- by the Nike Ajax, Hercules and Zeus. To make mat-
ing convention also serves to help obliterate the $1.8 ters even better, the name Cyclops also belongs to
billion mistake known as the M247 Sergeant York.2 a famous fictional and copyrighted superhero who
Alternatively, in the same way that the M2 Bradley shares an affinity for lasers.
Infantry Fighting Vehicle was equipped with Sting- So then, what’s in a name? A rose by any other
ers to become the Bradley Linebacker, so too could name might smell as sweet, but calling a rose a Pho-
the Army carry on its legacy by calling the new IMS- tosynthetic Air Fragrance Integrated Delivery Sys-
HORAD vehicle the Stryker Linebacker. tem (or PAFIDS) is an affront to the English language
As for the all-new MSHORAD, the Air and Mis- and basic human decency. If the Air Defenders of
sile Defense modernization director and former the future are to fight with these systems, let us at
ADA commandant, Brig. Gen. Randall McIntire, has least give them the opportunity to tell war stories to
said that it will be “less about missile technology” their grandchildren without having to hear the inev-
and have “more of a directed-energy focus.”3 That itable questioning response: “But Grandpa, what do
means that along with missiles, the new MSHORAD those letters stand for?”
(whatever its chassis) will be equipped with a 50 kw Capt. Peter Mitchell is an air defense battery command-
laser. The best possible name for such a machine er at Fort Sill, Okla. The views expressed in this article are
would be Cyclops. In ancient Greek mythology, the those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or
cyclops were a race of giants with one great eye in the position of the U.S. Army, Department of Defense or the
middle of their foreheads. The word kyklopes liter- U.S. Government.
1 Jen Judson, US Army’s Interim Short-Range Air Defense Solution Crystallizes, Defense News, https://www.defensenews.com/land/2018/06/28/us-armys-interim-short-range-air-defense-solu-
tion-crystallizes/ written June 22, 2018.
2 Rudy Abramson, Weinberger Kills Anti-Aircraft Gun: After $1.8 Billion, He Says Sgt. York Is Ineffective, Not Worth Further Cost, Los Angeles Times http://articles.latimes.com/1985-08-28/news/
mn-24923_1_air-defense, written August 28, 1985.
3 Sydney J. Freedberg, Army Boosts Investment In Lasers, Breaking Defense https://breakingdefense.com/2018/10/army-boosts-investment-in-lasers/, written October 16, 2018
A Stryker is equipped with a Mobile Expeditionary High Energy Laser system. (Courtesy photo)
14 • Fires, March-April 2019, Fires StrongMastering Terrain Within Your Position Area Artillery
By Capt. Francis Porcase
As a Paladin battery command- counter-battery fire, the next most
er organic to 1st Battalion, 41st significant threat was a dismount-
Field Artillery Regiment attached ed attack. In order to disrupt any
to 210th Field Artillery Brigade, potential attack, we incorporated
it became very clear very quick- OPs/LPs. “Observation posts and
ly that B Battery and I needed to listening posts are key elements
become “masters of the terrain” for providing early warning.” 3
if we were to train and potential- We also maximized C-wire to
ly fight in the harsh, unforgiving funnel any potential attackers
landscape that is the Korean Pen- into our engagement areas, and
insula. However, let me make my- placed claymores to mitigate any
self clear that the lessons learned dead space the enemy may use to
here will not just apply to the Ko- attack. Your goal with these mea-
rean Peninsula, but can be utilized sures is to provide early warning
during a combat training cen- so that you may maximize your
ter rotation, a home station field direct-fire weapons systems, or
training exercise or deployment. allow sufficient time to retro-
In order to provide some struc- grade to your alternate PAA if
ture to this, I will reference the the approaching force pose too
characteristics of the defense. As great a threat. Regardless of your
a firing battery commander these technique or assets available, you
characteristics should be equally must get out of your cannons, car- Soldiers from B Battery, 1st Battal-
as important to you as the five re- rier ammunition tracked vehicles, ion, 41st Field Artillery, emplace their
quirements for accurate fire, be- light medium tactical vehicles or Paladin at the Rooster 7 Training
cause once you occupy your po- HMMWVs and walk the terrain Area, Republic of Korea. (Courtesy
sition area artillery (PAA) you are around your PAA to give yourself photo)
subsequently in a defensive pos- a fighting chance at disrupting
ture. Army Doctrine Publication the enemy before he attacks your ery plans. While not directly tied
3-90 states that “the defending PAA. to engagement of defense, is vital
commander uses the character- Flexibility is critical within a to being flexible with the PAA.
istics of the defense: disruption, PAA. A flexible firing battery or Batteries and platoons must have
flexibility, mass and concentra- platoon allows the commander, a primary and alternate commu-
tion, preparation and security.”1 platoon leaders and section chiefs nications location in the event you
The following will show how to react quickly and violently to must conduct platoon operation
the characteristics of the defense any threat or incident.4 In order center (POC) to POC or POC to
directly contributed to B Battery, to be flexible, the battery must battery operations center (BOC)
1-41st FA, 210th FA Brigade be- understand the following. One, transfers. At a minimum, search
coming “masters of the terrain.” where is the alternate PAA and for an alternate fire direction cen-
The purpose of disruption is what is the route? With surviv- ter location capable of reaching
“to disrupt the attackers’ tempo ability being the number one goal the guns with voice communica-
and synchronization with actions for a firing battery, this should be tion. A flexible CASEVAC plan will
designed to prevent them from your top priority. Second, is to inevitably benefit your PAA; upon
massing combat power.”2 Once create an accurate and effective occupation, identify platoon-level
your battery is in position ready defensive diagram. It is critical to casualty collection points (CCPs),
to fire (IPRTF) within any PAA, your survival that following be- primary and alternate CASEVAC
you are vulnerable to attack. So coming IPRTF, that the creation vehicles, and REHEARSE it! The
you may ask “how did we mitigate of a defensive diagram is not over- first sergeant should publish the
this within our PAA?” looked. (See Figure 1). Lastly, the battery CCP location and have
First, we had to know our ene- establishment of solid communi- at a minimum conducted a map
my and the most significant threat cations, casualty evacuation (CA- recon to the nearest Role 1. If this
to the battery. After eliminating SEVAC) and maintenance/recov- is not happening, you are failing
1 ADP 3-90 Paragraph 46. PG.11
2 ADRP 3-90 Paragraph 4-4, page 4-1
3 ATP 3-09.70, Paragraph 4-6, page 4-2
4 ATP 3-09.70 paragraph 4-10, Page 4-3
http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 15your battery and must rectify this Time Task Personnel
ASAP. Ensure the battery forward
maintenance team is located in H+2 • Establish firing capability Platoon
a position they can either con- H+5 • Ensure GUNs take up concealed PSG/GSG
duct maintenance or move to ef- positions IAW fire mission tactics
fectively and operate as needed. • Ensure FAASVs are positioned to maximize
Don’t hesitate to use your M88 (if fields of fire, observation and concealment
IAW occupation formation and to cover
you have one) to level terrain or most likely enemy avenues of approach
break some brush. In conclusion, • Ensure BOC and Maint truck/M88
being flexible means surviving take up concealed positions
and surviving allows your battery H+15 • Begin engagement area development PSG/GSG
and platoons to continue their • Reposition vehicles (if necessary)
mission. based on occupation formation
“The defender seeks to mass • Assign sectors of fire
the effects of overwhelming com- • Establish TRPs and direct fire targets
bat power at points and times of H+15 • Record T&E mechanism settings on range cards Track TCs
the defender’s own choosing.”5
H+20 • Determine ranges to TRPs and dead space Track TCs
Batteries, platoons, and sec-
tions must maximize their crew H+20 • Establish platoon rearm point PSG/GSG
served weapons capabilities. In H+30 • Establish LP/OPs with commo (PRC-127 or TA-312) PSG/GSG
Korea, the vegetation is so thick in • Manned from designated FAASV crews
the summer that it effectively ne- • Positioned approximately 150
gates the effective range of your meters away from FAASV
.50 caliber and MK-19s. Creative • Positioned to maximize observation and concealment
• Positioned to overwatch dismounted
thinking and some yard work will or mounted avenues of approach not
benefit the PAA greatly. Do not already covered by FAASVs or GUNs
hesitate to dismount your crew • Equipped with AT-4, map, binos and NVGs
served onto a tripod and tie them • Establish LP/OP break point (when enemy
into the platoon/battery defense crosses the break point approaching
the PA, LP/OP returns to FAASV)
in that manner. Just be cautious of • Establish anti-armor team positions
the distance placed from the sec- (if different than LP/OPs)
tion and how it will be manned. • Positioned ideally where 2 separate
A battery that is flexible and able flank shots are possible
to disrupt the enemy, will subse- H+30 • Emplace M8 alarms 100 meters upwind and FAASV Drivers
quently be able to mass and con- reposition as wind direction changes
centrate their crew served weap-
H+35 • Range cards are completed and ready to be Track TCs
ons effectively. Sector sketches, inspected by PSG (two copies are made – one
interlocking fields of fire, and for the position and one for the PSG)
common target reference points
H+35 • Camouflage vehicles with vegetation Drivers
(TRPs) are all necessary to accom- from the surrounding area
plish this task (See Figure 2). The • Place sandbags around sensitive equipment
terrain in your PAA, dispersion of (collimators, tires, ballistic shields, etc.)
sections, and friendly units with- H+40 • Select displacement routes (primary and alternate) PSG/GSG
in the area of operation will also • Select CCP
contribute to your ability to mass • Select EPW collection point
and concentrate.
H+50 • Emplace claymore mines and trip flares Drivers
Preparation may be the single along dismounted avenues of approach
most beneficial characteristic of (location determined by PL/PSG)
• Emplace anti-tank mines along
5 ADP 3-90 Paragraph 49. PG 12 mounted avenues of approach
H+60 • Establish final protective line PL/PSG/GSG
Figure 1. The Platoon defense check- • Defensive diagram completed
list for the 1st Battalion, 41st Field • Establish pre-planned illumination targets
Artillery tactical standing operat- • Establish pre-planned immediate suppression/
smoke targets along approaches to the PA
ing procedure. Similar checklists will
mitigate lapses in critical components H+80 • Establish sleep plan PSG/GSG
necessary to successfully defend a • Mark sectors of fire for night operations
unit’s position area artillery. Addi- H+120 • Rehearse appropriate battle drills PL/PSG
tionally, quality checklists are located
H+180 • PMCS on all vehicles Drivers/TCs
in ATP 3-90.50, Appendix B.
16 • Fires, March-April 2019, Fires StrongYou can also read
