THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN PUBLIC SECURITY IN GUATEMALA - Assessing the Limitation of the Role of the Armed Forces in Public Security ...
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AP Photo: Moises Castillo THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN PUBLIC SECURITY IN GUATEMALA Assessing the Limitation of the Role of the Armed Forces in Public Security Activities SEPTEMBER 2020 | SERIES 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 4
KEY FINDINGS 6
THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN PUBLIC SECURITY IN GUATEMALA: 8
ASSESSING THE LIMITATION OF THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN
PUBLIC SECURITY ACTIVITIES
LEGAL FRAMEWORK REGULATING THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE
GUATEMALAN ARMED FORCES IN POLICING 9
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR THE ARMY IN PUBLIC SECURITY
ACTIVITIES 12
ARMY RESOURCES 15
Human Resources 15
Financial Resources 18
PLAN TO WITHDRAW FROM PUBLIC SECURITY TASKS 23
CONDUCT OF THE ARMED FORCES 24
Accountability 25
Public Confidence in the Army 26
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 28
NOTES 29
THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN PUBLIC SECURITY IN GUATEMALA SEPTEMBER 2020 | 35. Strengthening civilian police forces; of the Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio
INTRODUCTION 6. Limiting the role of the armed forces in
public security activities;
de la Defensa Nacional). In addition, requests for
statistical information were made via the Public
7. Protecting human rights; Information Access Law (Ley de Acceso a la
In the last decade, the problem of insecurity THE CENTRAL AMERICA MONITOR 8. Improving transparency. Información Pública, LAIP), which establishes a
and impunity has deeply affected the people
specific process by which government agencies
of Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, The Central America Monitor is based on the
The Monitor reports are published by area and must receive information requests and respond
making this region (known as the Northern premise that accurate, objective, and complete
by country. The first series of reports will serve within a set timeframe.
Triangle of Central America) one of the most data and information are necessary to reduce
violent in the world. High levels of violence, as the baseline for subsequent analysis, which
the high levels of violence and insecurity, We decided that the report’s primary data
corruption, and impunity have eroded the will be updated annually. Each annual series
and establish rule of law and governance in would be obtained via public information
capacity of the states to develop accessible of reports will be analyzed in comparison with
a democratic state. This will allow efforts to requests, in order to evaluate the effectiveness
and efficient institutions, and address the reports from the previous year. This allows
move beyond abstract discussions of reform to of Guatemala’s transparency laws, including
needs of their populations. researchers, civil society organizations, and
specific measures of change. the response rate to information requests
other actors to assess the level of progress in
strengthening the rule of law and reducing and the degree of cooperation by the various
The absence of effective responses has The Monitor is based on a series of more than government institutions that were petitioned.
insecurity.
weakened citizens’ confidence in state 100 quantitative and qualitative indicators that
institutions, leading to an alarming number allow a more profound level of analysis of the Unfortunately, the Ministry of National Defense
of people who have been internally displaced The first round of Monitor reports will primarily
successes or setbacks made in eight key areas denied the majority of our information requests,
or forced to migrate to other countries to focus on data sets from an approximate 4-year
in each of the three countries.1 More than stating that disclosure of the information
escape the violence and lack of economic time period, 2014 to 2017, in order to provide a
a comprehensive list, the indicators seek to “would compromise national security.” The lack
opportunities. snapshot of Central America’s institutions.
identify a way to examine and assess the level of of transparency in this area is concerning, given
progress of the three countries in strengthening that the request was for basic information, such
The Monitor will serve as a tool for searchable,
Against this backdrop, the Washington the rule of law and democratic institutions. The as the size and number of troops in the Army, as
easy-to-comprehend data, delineating trends,
Office on Latin America (WOLA), the Myrna indicators seek to identify the main challenges opposed to sensitive information that could pose
progress, patterns, and gaps within and between
Mack Foundation (FMM) of Guatemala, in each of the selected areas and examine how a risk to national security in any manner. Other
the three countries of the Northern Triangle.
the University Institute for Public Opinion institutions are (or are not) being strengthened information was requested regarding indicators
The data, graphics, charts, and reports will be
(Iudop) of the José Simeón Cañas Central over time. The Monitor uses information from to analyze the degree of Army participation
available on the Monitor’s website.
American University (UCA) of El Salvador, different sources, including official documents in internal police functions during the period
and the University Institute on Democracy, and statistics, surveys, interviews, information under analysis, such as the number of members
Peace and Security (IUDPAS) of Honduras from emblematic cases, and analysis of existing This report of the Central America Monitor,
of the Armed Forces assigned to public security
have developed a tool for monitoring laws and regulations. produced by the Myrna Mack Foundation, aims
tasks and the municipalities in which the Army
and evaluating the policies and strategies to define a baseline for the indicators related to
deployed for public security activities.
currently being implemented in Guatemala, limiting the role of the armed forces in public
The indicators were developed over several
Honduras, and El Salvador to reduce security activities in Guatemala.
months in a process that included an The refusal to provide this information not only
insecurity and violence, strengthen the extensive review of international standards makes it impossible to perform a comprehensive
rule of law, improve transparency and and consultation with experts. The eight areas ABOUT THE RESEARCH FOR THIS analysis of the Armed Forces and their
accountability, protect human rights, and analyzed by the Monitor include: REPORT participation in internal police functions, but
fight corruption. This initiative has been also represents an alarming tendency of opacity
made possible thanks to the support of the 1. Strengthening the capacity of the justice The quantitative data in this report was obtained regarding civic oversight and accountability for
Latin America Division of the Swiss Agency system; via the bibliographic review of official reports, possible human rights violations committed by
for Development and Cooperation, the 2. Cooperation with anti-impunity institutional annals, and relevant information this institution in the exercise of police functions.
Tinker Foundation, the Seattle International commissions; available on the official transparency web pages
Foundation (SIF), and the Moriah Fund. 3. Combatting corruption;
4. Tackling violence and organized crime;
THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN PUBLIC SECURITY IN GUATEMALA SEPTEMBER 2020 | 4 THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN PUBLIC SECURITY IN GUATEMALA SEPTEMBER 2020 | 5KEY FINDINGS • Between 2014 and 2017, the Ministry of National Defense was allocated, on average,
an annual amount of Q70,444,267.50 ($9.1 million) to cover the Army’s participation in
public security tasks. The Defense Ministry’s budget steadily increased throughout the
• Guatemala ended 36 years of internal armed conflict with the signing of the 1996 Peace four-year period covered in this report, with an increase of 3.2 percent between 2014
Accords. A key provision to the cessation of hostilities was the creation of the National and 2015, 5.6 percent between 2015 and 2016, and 4.6 percent between 2016 and
Civilian Police (Policía Nacional Civil, PNC) in 1997 (which assumed responsibility for 2017. Despite the implementation of the plan meant to withdraw the Army from public
domestic security), reducing the number of Army troops, and withdrawing them from security duties throughout 2017, the Army’s budget for public security increased during
internal police functions. In the years following the signing of the Peace Accords, the that same year as compared with the previous year. In fact, the budget allocated for
government made progress on this front. 2017 was the highest of the four years under study. This number highlights the disparity
between the state’s supposed goal of less military participation in public security tasks,
• Despite this progress, beginning in 2000, successive governments cited citizen insecurity and what was actually being financed.
as a reason for enacting decrees and laws enabling the Army to once again take part in
police duties, in clear violation of the Peace Accords. These actions included removing • In the four-year period covered by this report (2014-2017), the Human Rights
limits to the number of troops, authorizing the military’s participation in combatting Ombudperson’s Office (Procurador de los Derechos Humanos, PDH) received 172 legal
organized and common crime, and allowing the military to provide security at pre-trial complaints of alleged human rights violations by the Army, an average of 43 complaints
detention centers, prisons, and rehabilitation centers, among other sites. Over the years, per year. These figures only represent the complaints received by the Ombudsperson’s
the Army was also empowered to maintain order and security in jails and penitentiaries; Office and omit those cases that go unreported; as such, the true number of human
pursue and detain fugitive prisoners; and take inmates into custody. Additionally, rights violations is probably higher.
they established forces combining the Army and PNC and consolidated coordination
mechanisms for the Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional) in all
• In analyzing the level of public confidence in the Army, public surveys administered
matters of internal and external security.
between 2015 and 2017 (no data is available for 2014) show little change between 2015
and 2016. In 2015, 42.8 percent of the population expressed great or some trust in the
• In late 2016, faced with growing mainstream rejection of the militarization of policing Armed Forces, while 54.4 percent had little or none. In 2016, 44.6 percent reported
duties, the state announced the “Operationalization Plan for the Gradual Withdrawal they had great or some trust, while 52.6 percent had little or none. Nonetheless, 2017
of the Guatemalan Army from Citizen Security Tasks.” Said plan sought to completely showed a notable loss of trust in comparison with previous years, with 35.4 percent
withdraw the Armed Forces from police functions in three distinct phases prior to the reporting great or some trust in the Armed Forces and 62.7 percent having little or
end of 2017. Despite some progress– such as the reduction of the Armed Forces (from none. Another important trend is revealed when the data is disaggregated by sex. In
30 zones to 11) and the withdrawal of some 2,100 troops – the plan did not meet its the three years under analysis, men reported having greater trust in the Armed Forces
initial deadline. An anticipated final withdrawal of the military from policing duties was than women. For example, in 2017 42.2 percent of men and 29.4 percent of women
pushed back to March 2018. reported having great or some trust in the Armed Forces, a divide evident in each year.
• The Ministry of National Defense denied a significant number of public information
requests concerning the size of the Army and its participation in public security. This lack
of transparency is worrisome, given that the requests were for basic information and did
not include information that could pose a risk to national security in any manner. Not only
does this lack of transparency make a comprehensive analysis of the Armed Forces and
their participation in domestic police functions impossible, it also represents an alarming
trend toward opacity. This is especially concerning when it comes to monitoring and
pushing for accountability for possible human rights violations committed by the Armed
Forces when exercising police functions.
THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN PUBLIC SECURITY IN GUATEMALA SEPTEMBER 2020 | 6 THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN PUBLIC SECURITY IN GUATEMALA SEPTEMBER 2020 | 7THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK REGULATING THE
PUBLIC SECURITY IN GUATEMALA INVOLVEMENT OF THE GUATEMALAN
Assessing the Limitation of the Role of the ARMED FORCES IN POLICING
Armed Forces in Public Security Activities The Army is accountable to the Ministry of
National Defense and is divided into three bodies:
The Constitutive Law of the Guatemalan Army
affirms these provisions and roles for the Armed
Land Forces, Air Forces, and Naval Forces. Forces, among other organic guidelines. It should
Democracies throughout Latin America have Until the transition to democracy in 1985,
According to the Ministry of National Defense, be noted that the Constitution precedes the
struggled to consolidate civilian control over Guatemala did not have civilian control over
the Guatemalan Army traces its history from creation of the PNC; as such, the Constitution
their armed forces, based on the principle of a its Armed Forces, which were responsible for
the colonial era in the 16th Century, evolving does not mention or grant power to any police
firm separation between soldiers and police. Due internal and external security. A few key aspects
pursuant to several Constitutions starting with force at the national level. Nonetheless, Article
to their particular circumstances, countries in of the 1996 Peace Accords included the creation
its independence from Spain and the United 259 authorizes the creation of police forces at
the region have not had to employ their armies of the National Civilian Police, a reduction in the
Provinces of Central America (Provincias Unidas the municipal level for the purpose of “executing
to defend their citizens from foreign invaders. number of Army troops, and withdrawal of the
de Centroamérica).6 Currently, Chapter V of its ordinances and complying with its provisions”
Notwithstanding, the governments have often Army from domestic security functions.2 This
the 1985 Political Constitution of the Republic and “under direct orders of the mayor.”9
turned to their armies to combat organized demand was in large part a result of the grave
of Guatemala regulates the Army’s integration,
crime and other forms of crime. human rights violations perpetrated by the
organization, and goals. Its legal system is also Following the signing of the Peace Accords, the
Army during the internal armed conflict.
based on the Constitutive Law of the Army (Ley government convened a Popular Consultation
There are several factors that demonstrate Constitutiva del Ejército) and other related laws on May 16, 1999, posing four questions to
the difference between the armed forces and In the years following the signing of the Peace described below.7 the general public regarding constitutional
police forces. On one hand, the armed forces Accords, the State made progress on this
reforms.10 One of them proposed the
are trained to fight wars, while police are agenda: the PNC was created in 1997 and
THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF recognition of the role of the PNC in the
designed to ensure compliance with the law. In assumed responsibility for domestic security;
THE REPUBLIC OF GUATEMALA AND Constitution and the establishment of a clearer
this sense, police should be trained to employ the Army’s role in police and domestic functions
CONSTITUTIVE LAW OF THE GUATEMALAN division between the functions of the PNC
the minimum amount of force necessary to was decreased;3 and the size of the Army was
ARMY and Armed Forces. In large part due to low
ensure compliance with the community’s laws, reduced from 47,000 troops in 1996 to some
voter turnout (an 81.45% abstention rate) and
while military personnel are trained to employ 18,500 in 2015.4
EArticle 246 of the Constitution names the opposition from conservative sectors, none of
overwhelming lethal force against an enemy.
President of Guatemala as the Commander- the proposed amendments were approved and
Despite this progress, and continuing to reject the Constitution remains without mention of
in-Chief of the Army and grants him/her
Despite this difference, successive governments constitutional reforms, commencing in 2000, the PNC.11
authorization to issue orders, including
in Guatemala have turned to the Army to address several governments enacted decrees and
mobilization and demobilization. Article 244
public security needs, which has increased the laws enabling the Army to once again take
establishes that the Army “is an institution GOVERNMENTAL ACCORD 90-96
risk of human rights violations committed by the part in police duties. With an alarming state of
dedicated to maintaining the independence,
government. citizen insecurity, security has also represented
sovereignty, and honor of Guatemala, the
an important issue in elections, with several In March 1996, the government issued
integrity of the territory, peace, and internal
candidates gaining power by promising to Governmental Accord 90-96, which explicitly
and external security.”8 In addition, Article 249
impose “iron fist” tactics to combat crime.5 granted authorization for collaboration
declares that “the Army shall cooperate in
between the civilian security forces and Army in
emergency situations or public disasters.” These
the area of “combatting organized and common
three articles form the legal foundation cited
crime.” The Accord names the Ministry of the
in several laws for expanding the role of the
Interior (Ministerio de Gobernación) as the
Armed Forces into the country’s internal police
entity responsible for drafting, executing, and
functions.
supervising public security plans, though with
THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN PUBLIC SECURITY IN GUATEMALA SEPTEMBER 2020 | 8 THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN PUBLIC SECURITY IN GUATEMALA SEPTEMBER 2020 | 9support and collaboration from the Ministry function under the direction and responsibility security; 2) external security; 3) intelligence; to “support the civilian security forces in their
of National Defense and the Army.12 It should of the Ministry of the Interior. The Accord puts and 4) risk management and civil defense. While duties to prevent and combat organized crime
be noted that the State ratified this Accord in a time limit on the composition and duration of this law did not fundamentally change the role [and] common crime and reestablish or maintain
the midst of peace negotiations and only nine these combined forces, declaring that “they shall of the Armed Forces, it formalized a mechanism citizen security when the security circumstances
months prior to the signing of the final and be of an exceptional, limited character and shall for channeling all matters of security, including in the country require their assistance, or the
definitive Peace Accords, enabling a broad role not exceed a total of 60 days.” internal police functions. ordinary means available to the civilian security
for the Army in society and internal security forces are deemed insufficient.”20
during the transition from war to peace. GOVERNMENTAL ACCORDS 178-2004 AND GOVERNMENTAL ACCORDS 31-2015 AND
216-2011 115-2017 Two years after the Accord’s issuance, the
DECREE 40-2000 AND GOVERNMENTAL squadrons’ name changed to Strategic Battalions
ACCORD 87-2000 As part of the Guatemalan Army’s Modernization In 2015, the State approved the creation of of Military Reserves (Batallones Estratégicos de
Plan, in 2004 (by means of Governmental the Squadrons of the Special Reserve Corps Reservas Militares) via Governmental Accord
In 2000, by means of Decree 40-2000, Accord 178-2004), the government established for Citizen Security (Escuadrones del Cuerpo 115-2017.21 It is noteworthy that by late 2015,
the government augmented the Army’s a maximum threshold of 15,500 Army troops.16 Especial de Reserva para la Seguridad the year in which the CERSC was created, the
authorization to support civilian security forces Nonetheless, this Accord has been reformed Ciudadana, CERSC) through Governmental Army had already allocated a total of 4,500
in combatting organized and common crime several times; one of the most relevant reforms Accord 31-2015. The squadrons’ mission is soldiers to comprise said squadrons.”22
“when the security circumstances in the country occurred in 2011 (through Governmental Accord
require assistance, or the ordinary means 216-2011), which eliminated all restrictions on
available to civilian security forces are deemed the number of troops in the Armed Forces. BOX 1
insufficient.13 The Decree also authorizes the Authorization was given to recruit personnel
LEGAL FRAMEWORK ALLOWING THE PARTICIPATION OF THE GUATEMALAN
provision of military units, when requested “to comply with its constitutionally-assigned
by the Ministry of the Interior, to guard “the mission, in accordance with current national ARMY IN POLICING FUNCTIONS
perimeter of pre-trial detention centers, security needs” and “with the goal of supporting
establishments in which criminal sentences work to reestablish or maintain citizen security, • Names the President of Guatemala as the Commander-in-
are served, rehabilitation centers, and other as well as provide support to humanitarian Chief of the Army.
The Political Constitution of • Establishes that the Army is an institution dedicated to
places of imprisonment.” That same year, the work and in cases of public disasters or national
the Republic of Guatemala maintaining the independence, sovereignty, and honor
government issued Governmental Accord 87- emergencies”.17
and Constitutive Law of the of Guatemala, the integrity of the territory, peace, and
2000 permitting the Army to cooperate “to internal and external security.
Guatemalan Army
maintain order and security in the country’s DECREE 18-2008 • Authorized the army’s cooperation in emergency situations
penitentiary system’s centers and jails” when or public disasters
its support is requested by the Ministry of the The Framework Law of the National Security • Grants authorization for collaboration between the
Interior.14 System (Decree 18-2008) was enacted In 2008. Governmental Accord 90-96 civilian security forces and Army in the area of combatting
The purpose of this law is to “establish the legal organized and common crime.
GOVERNMENTAL ACCORD 264-2001 regulations of an organic and functional nature • Expands the Army’s authorization to support civilian
that are necessary for the State of Guatemala security forces in combatting organized and common
crime
Governmental Accord 264-2001 established to perform internal and external security and Decree 40-2000
that, as a part of its role to prevent and combat intelligence activities in a coordinated manner.”18 • Permits the military to guard the perimeter of pre-trial
detention centers, prisons and rehabilitation centers,
crime, the Army can “pursue and detain fugitive With that goal, it established the National
among others.
prisoners, as well as guard the inmates in Security System (Sistema Nacional de Seguridad)
• Authorizes the Army to cooperate in maintaining order
penitentiary centers and perimeter security.”15 by integrating the Ministries of National Governmental Accord 87-2000 and security in the country’s penitentiary system’s centers
In order to coordinate the Army’s support of Defense and Interior, among others, in order to and jails.
and collaboration with civilian security forces improve coordination in security activities.19 The
in this task, the Accord also provided for the law divided the work of the National Security
integration of “combined security forces” that System into four principal spheres: 1) internal
THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN PUBLIC SECURITY IN GUATEMALA SEPTEMBER 2020 | 10 THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN PUBLIC SECURITY IN GUATEMALA SEPTEMBER 2020 | 11Once the roadmap for the support request has Army in matters of citizen security, the person(s)
• Allows the Army to pursue and detain fugitive prisoners, been finalized and submitted, those in charge responsible and the degree of their responsibility
as well as guard the inmates in penitentiary centers and of the operation and their counterparts in may be fully established.
perimeter security. the Ministry of National Defense establish
Governmental Accord 264-2001
• Establishes the integration of “combined security forces” contact and initiate monitoring and a checklist There are several national regulations regarding
that function under the direction and responsibility of the for the operation through to its completion. the Armed Forces’ comportment while deployed
Ministry of the Interior.
The operations checklist is produced by the in public security operations, such as:25
Governmental Accords 178- • Eliminates all restrictions on the number of troops in the Liaison Department of the National Defense
2004 and 216-2011 Armed Forces. Chief of Staff and must include the following • Code of conduct for the members of units
information:24 participating in operations in support of
• Establishes the National Security System by integrating
the Ministries of National Defense and the Interior, • Corresponding number for the support public security.
Decree 18-2008
among others, to improve the coordination of internal and operation
external security activities as well as state intelligence.
• Quantity and type of operation that is • Rules of employment for units participating
• Establishes the Strategic Battalions of Military Reserves in operations in support of public security.
Governmental Accords 31-2015 carried out
(originally named the Squadrons of the Special Reserve
and 115-2017 Regulations regarding general rules, use of
Corps for Citizen Security) • Unit designated to provide support to the force, and the manner of operating during
civilian security forces activities in support of public security.
• Name and contact information of the
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR THE ARMY IN person in charge of the operation • Management guide for unit commanders in
PUBLIC SECURITY ACTIVITIES • Number of officials participating in the
support of public security that also guides
behavior in various scenarios, including
operation
patrols, raids, and inspections of public jails.
Deriving its legal foundation from the forces • Place where the operation is carried out
aforementioned laws, the Ministry of National • Place where the operation will take place • Other observations, such as the hour the • Conduct manual to follow during incidents
Defense has internal procedures and rules
• Number of personnel needed for the operation will commence, manner in which that can occur during the employment of
governing the conduct of the Armed Forces
operation it will be carried out, and other data viewed personnel in support of public security
when they are deployed in support of internal
as important activities.26 This document guides actions
security forces. Among them is the Procedure • Necessary equipment that will be during various incidents in diverse scenarios
for Providing Support to Civilian Security Forces, employed by the military personnel
The procedure requires constant monitoring of related to the activities in support of public
which regulates the process from the request
• Contact information for the person the operation and involvement of the Armed security.
for support to the Armed Forces through the
end of the operation (see Figure 1). As a first in charge of the civilian security forces Forces. It also requires the official in charge of
designated for the operation the operation to inform the Head of the Liaison These documents fall outside the scope of this
step, the procedure requires the requesting
Department of the National Defense Chief report; however, it is worth highlighting an
entity to submit a verbal or written request for • Meeting place to establish contact with
of Staff regarding the end of the operation, important element related to the use of force. In
support to the Head of the Liaison Department the civilian security forces
relevant developments, and the results obtained line with international human rights standards,
of the National Defense Chief of Staff. If the
• Date the roadmap is developed for the therein. the use of force policy dictates that the
request for support is authorized, a roadmap is
request for support following rules must be followed, among others:
developed for it that must include the following
• Authorization of the request from the Taking into consideration the implication of the 1) maintain and defend the dignity and rights of
information:23
National Defense Chief of Staff Armed Forces in grave human rights violations all persons, regardless of sex, race, religion, or
• Brief description of the type of operation political thinking; 2) utilize “minimum” force; 3)
• Stamp and signature of the Head of committed against Guatemalan civilians,
to be supported utilize force proportional to the threat, though
the Liaison Department of the National procedural records and documentation are
• Date and time the personnel should valued positively, such that in the event that avoiding as much as possible the use of arms;
Defense Chief of Staff 4) exhaust all non-violent means to resolve the
present themselves to the civilian security excesses or abuses occur on the part of the
situation prior to utilizing firearms; and 5) utilize
THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN PUBLIC SECURITY IN GUATEMALA SEPTEMBER 2020 | 12 THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN PUBLIC SECURITY IN GUATEMALA SEPTEMBER 2020 | 13lethal force “in self-defense and/or to protect a room for arbitrary and subjective discretion of
FIGURE 1 force.”27 military personnel. They also fail to consider the
FLOWCHART OF THE PROCEDURE TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO CIVILIAN risk of using the Armed Forces in public security
SECURITY FORCES Unfortunately, these regulations leave much activities, given that their members are trained
room for ambiguity. Despite the fact that and taught to utilize lethal force as a principle
START certain sections employ international human of war, contrary to the training received by
rights instruments as their legal basis, they leave members of the National Civilian Police.
Receive request for Is request in writing? YES Make contact to
assistance exchange details ARMY RESOURCES
NO
YES
Inform the Head of the
HUMAN RESOURCES information regarding the size of the Army in
Make written request NO Is it urgent? terms of the number of its troops, as opposed
Liaison Department to sensitive information that could pose a
The Army is divided into three bodies: Land
Forces, Air Forces, and Marine Forces. For the risk to national security in any manner. Other
Head of the Liaison purposes of this report, only the Land Forces information was requested regarding indicators
Inform petitioner of Department requests to analyze the degree of Army participation
NO Authorization granted? will be studied. Table 2 shows the military ranks
decision and the basis for in internal police functions during the period
request denial authorization from the in this force.
YES National Defense Chief under analysis, such as:
of Staff
As part of the research for this report, a request
National Defense Chief • The number of members of the Armed
was made to the Ministry of National Defense
of Staff issues order by Forces assigned to public security tasks.
Send roadmap for for the Army’s entire payroll, including reserve
telephone
assistance request officials, disaggregated by military rank, for the
2014-2017 period. Despite the general nature • The municipalities in which the Army
to Joint Operations Develop roadmap for deploys for public security activities.
Command - National of the information requested, the Ministry
assistance denied the request, declaring that, in accordance
Defense Chief of Staff Send operations
with Ministry of National Defense Resolutions Unfortunately, the Ministry of National Defense
checklist to the
Joint Operations Begin operations 07860 of 2011 and 01-2018 of 2018, “the also rejected those requests, employing the
National Defense Chief
Command prepares checklist period for withholding the information related same justification cited above.
of Staff
and sends message to the strength of force of the Guatemalan
Army in each municipality, or data on troops The refusal to provide this information not only
Command receives Continue monitoring
Operation concludes assigned to each brigade, base, barracks, and makes it impossible to perform a comprehensive
message, appoints the operation deployment throughout national territory, was analysis (qualitative and quantitative) of the
leader and unit
classified and expanded, due to the fact that Armed Forces and their participation in internal
Offical in charge issues Head of the Liaison the provision of such information would harm police functions, but also represents an alarming
protocol Department notifies national security, as it would reveal information tendency of opacity regarding civic oversight
National Defense Chief related to the mechanisms and strength of and accountability for possible human rights
Offical in charge of Staff the Guatemalan Army, whose dissemination violations committed by this institution in the
establishes contact would compromise national security, as well as exercise of police functions.
Follow procedures the execution of internal and external security
regulating assistance plans, assessments, and programs.” In March 2018, after nearly 18 years of
to armed forces participating in citizen security work, the Army
END The lack of transparency in this area is withdrew from the streets the nine military
Source: Ministry of National Defense concerning, given that the request was for basic squadrons (CERSC) that reportedly were
THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN PUBLIC SECURITY IN GUATEMALA SEPTEMBER 2020 | 14 THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN PUBLIC SECURITY IN GUATEMALA SEPTEMBER 2020 | 15comprised of nearly 5,600 soldiers.28 the efforts made and commitments assumed by As of 2012, then-President Otto Pérez Molina with the goal of preventing, combatting,
the Guatemalan State in terms of withdrawing established a series of interagency task forces dismantling, and eradicating criminal actions
The IACHR, in its report on the state of human its Armed Forces from public security work.29 between the Armed Forces and PNC with the throughout the Republic, though with an
rights in Guatemala, saluted and encouraged purported purpose of improving the prevention emphasis in the departments listed above.
of and fight against crime. The government To that end, coordination can be undertaken
announced the creation of Task Force Maya, with the Public Prosecutor’s Office
BOX 2 comprised of 200 Army troops and 100 police (Ministerio Público, MP), Superintendency
ARMY RANKS WITHIN THE MILITARY30 officers, in September 2012 in Guatemala City of Tax Administration (Superintendencia de
and assigned it geographical responsibility for Administración Tributaria, SAT), and other
Zone 18 of the capital.31 government agencies, as well as with
General Officers
national and international entities.
• Division General In November of that same year, the government
• Brigade General inaugurated Task Force Kaminal, comprised • Strengthen crime prevention domestically,
of 250 PNC and Army personnel, with prioritizing border areas and areas of high
Superior Officers responsibility for security in Zones 7 and 12 in incidence of crime perpetrated by common
• Colonel Guatemala City.32 The government installed Task criminals or organized criminal networks.
Force Tecún Umán, comprised of more than
• Lieutenant Colonel 200 soldiers, in December 2013 and tasked it • Perform operations to dismantle, eradicate,
• Major with responsibility for border security in the and combat criminal activities.
department of San Marcos.33
Junior Officers
• Generate protocols for defining criteria for
• First Captain In March 2015, Pérez Molina and his counterpart, actions in any operations undertaken.37
• Second Captain Juan Orlando Hernández of Honduras,
established Task Force Maya-Chortí, the first All of these task forces continued their
• Lieutenant binational force between the two countries. operations through the end of 2017. It should
• Second Lieutenant It had 600 police officers and soldiers from be noted that the security agents received
Guatemala and Honduras and was responsible significant assistance from the United States for
Specialists and Soldiers for promoting security–including organized their operations, which included training in the
• Sergeant Major crime, common crime, and drug-trafficking use of arms, operations in urban areas, defense
activities–along the border between the and arrest tactics, compiling intelligence,
• Technical Sergeant departments of El Progreso and Chiquimula.34 traffic control, and searching for vehicles and
• First Sergeant persons,38 [and] donations of Jeeps, trucks,
• Second Sergeant Task Force Xinca,35 comprised of 250 agents vehicle scanners, multiband radios, and tactical
from the PNC and Army, was launched in August equipment, among others.39
• Corporal 2017 and assumed responsibility for security in
• Soldier First Class the departments of Jutiapa, Santa Rosa, Jalapa, Although the first task forces were initially
Escuintla, and southern Chiquimula.36 created for ensuring security in the metropolitan
area, in November 2017, the Ministry of the
Due to the fact that these task forces were Interior highlighted the importance of the work
Source: Ministry of National Defense created during the period of study covered by being performed by the Xinca, Chortí, and Tecún
this report, some of their functions are detailed Umán Task Forces in protecting the borders
as follows: with El Salvador, Honduras, and Mexico in the
fight against organized crime, drug-trafficking,
• Carry out interagency security operations and smuggling of contraband, given that due
THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN PUBLIC SECURITY IN GUATEMALA SEPTEMBER 2020 | 16 THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN PUBLIC SECURITY IN GUATEMALA SEPTEMBER 2020 | 17to their geographic location, the countries of FINANCIAL RESOURCES The Ministry of National Defense’s budget does department). Within this category, the funding
Central America’s Northern Triangle pique the not disaggregate allocations by Land, Marine, or is divided amongst ‘Territorial Defense,’ ‘Airspace
interest of transnational criminal organizations Despite the Ministry of National Defense’s Air Forces, making it impossible to determine Defense,’ and ‘Defense of Jurisdictional Waters.’
as a hub to conduct illegal activities. refusal to provide information regarding human the precise amount of resources earmarked for The majority of the funds in this category – an
resources, it did provide data on its general the Army. Nonetheless, the division of funding annual average of Q491,534,352 ($63.6 million)
The work of the aforementioned task forces, finances and funding for the Army’s participation among line item categories within the budget – were allocated to ‘Territorial Defense’ for
carried out under the coordination of the fifth in public security tasks during the 2014-2017 provide a partial understanding. Between 2015 Army operations. In comparison with the overall
Vice Minister of Government, entailed the 2016 period. and 2017, the line item category that received budget, this means that an average of 24.4% of
launch of the Jaguar Plan in Petén department, the most funding was ‘Defense of Territorial the funds allocated to the Ministry of National
involving raids, captures, and the identification Sovereignty and Integrity,’ with an annual Defense were earmarked for the Army, not
According to the information provided, the
of several trafficking routes and blind spots on average of Q766,705,913 ($99.2 million), or counting those funds shared by the Army and
Ministry of National Defense received an
the border, as well as the implementation of the 37.9% of the entire budget (for 2014, it was other departments.
average budgetary allocation equivalent to
Fortress Plan (Plan Fortaleza) in 2017, executed not possible to obtain data disaggregated by
Q2,027,029,229 ($262.4 million) between
by the task forces together with the Special 2014 and 2017. Despite an increase between
Naval Forces, due to the increase in the seizure
of maritime tracks along the Pacific seaboard.
2014 and 2015, there was an overall TABLE 2*
decrease of 6.4% in the allocations during the
BUDGET OF THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, DISAGGREGATED BY
period under consideration. With regard to
In addition, by 2018 the government had Guatemala’s overall budget, the percentage of
LINE ITEM CATEGORY, 2014-2017
announced the reinforcement of the task forces funds earmarked for the Ministry of National 2015 2016 2017
through the launch of a new strategy: the Defense also decreased, representing 3% of the Line Item Category
beginning of actions by the fourth Interagency Amount % Amount % Amount %
government’s total expenditures in 2014 and
Task Force Jaguar based in the Petén and an 2.5% in 2017. Central Activities Q566,441,474 27.0% Q492,822,902 23.9% Q480,069,898 25.2%
increase in PNC troops.40
Activities common to
TABLE 1 Programs 11, 12, 13
and 14, Education and
Q302,491,933 14.4% Q298,239,460 14.5% Q264,655,631 13.9%
BUDGET OF THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE IN COMPARISON TO THE Health Services
OVERALL BUDGET OF THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT, 2014-2017 Defense of Territorial
Sovereignty and Q762,105,009 36.3% Q796,389,677 38.6% Q741,623,053 38.9%
Integrity
Year 2014 2015 2016 2017 Prevention of
Criminal Acts against Q198,916,098 9.5% Q202,222,087 9.8% Q104,349,046 5.5%
Overall Budget of Patrimony
the Guatemalan Q66,985,000,000 Q70,600,000,000 70,796,000,000 77,309,000,000 Preparation for
government the Mobilization of
Defense, Prevention Q28,972,972 1.4% Q29,696,735 1.4% Q26,597,455 1.4%
MINDEF Budget Q2,037,900,000 Q2,100,253,199 Q2,061,647,718 Q1,908,316,000 and Mitigation of
Disasters
Proportion of the
Government’s Regulation of Marine
3.0% 3.0% 2.9% 2.5% Q10,229,668 0.5% Q10,517,859 0.5% Q8,690,341 0.5%
Budget Allocated Spaces
to MINDEF
Support for Peace
Source: Integrated Accounting System of Guatemala Missions and Q74,273,314 3.5% Q74,952,267 3.6% Q102,464,631 5.4%
Diplomacy
THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN PUBLIC SECURITY IN GUATEMALA SEPTEMBER 2020 | 18 THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN PUBLIC SECURITY IN GUATEMALA SEPTEMBER 2020 | 19Line Item Category
2015 2016 2017 GRAPH 1
Amount % Amount % Amount % INTERNAL ALLOCATION OF FUNDS WITHIN THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL
Support for the DEFENSE
Reduction of the Q0 0.0% Q0 0.0% Q32,559,214 1.7%
Homicide Rate 100%
7.5% 7.6% 7.7%
0.0% 0.0%
Expenses not Allocable 3.5% 3.5% 1.7%
Q156,822,731 7.5% Q156,806,731 7.6% Q147,306,731 7.7% 90% 0.5% 0.5%
to Programs 1.4% 1.4% 5.4%
0.5%
9.5% 9.8% 1.4%
80% 5.5%
Total Q2,100,253,199 100.0% Q2,061,647,718 100.0% Q1,908,316,000 100.0%
70%
Source: Ministry of National Defense
*Financial data disaggregated by line item category was not available for 2014 60% 36.3% 38.9%
38.6%
50%
40%
14.4% 13.9%
30% 14.5%
20%
27.1% 23.9% 25.2%
10%
0%
2015 2016 2017
Expenses not allocable to programs
Support for the reduction of the homicide rate
Support for peace missions and diplomacy
Regulation of marine spaces
Preparation for the mobilization of defense, prevention and mitigation of disasters
Prevention of criminal acts against patrimony
Defense of territorial sovereignty and integrity
Activities common to programs, 11, 12, 13 and 14, education and health services
Central activities
THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN PUBLIC SECURITY IN GUATEMALA SEPTEMBER 2020 | 20 THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN PUBLIC SECURITY IN GUATEMALA SEPTEMBER 2020 | 21With regard to the participation of the Army it is without a doubt a timely moment to analyze withdraw military forces from public security Ministry of National Defense’s expenditures in
in public security, as illustrated in Table 3, the the quality of the execution of public funding tasks; therefore, such funds should have been the area of security were paid for by the Ministry
government allocated an annual average of for the Ministry of National Defense in this allocated to strengthening the PNC. of the Interior, while in any event the reasonable
Q70,444,267.50 ($9.1 million USD) during the sense; given that while the military troops began thing would have been to invest those funds in
four years covered by this report. The amount to decrease their activities that year in public One of the strongest criticisms leveled regarding strengthening the PNC.43
allocated rose each year, increasing 3.2% security tasks, the budgetary increase for that the financial aspect at the time was that the
between 2014 and 2015, 5.6% between 2015 line item is contradictory.
and 2016, and 4.6% between 2016 and 2017.
Proportionately, these amounts represented On a related note, during the same year, the
PLAN TO WITHDRAW FROM PUBLIC
3.2% of the Ministry of National Defense’s government publicly announced the existence SECURITY TASKS
overall budget in 2014 and 2015, 3.5% in 2016, of a bonus, dubbed the “extraordinary
and 3.9% in 2017. responsibility bonus,” approved and charged “A strong and democratic State is one that strengthening the PNC, prioritizing training of
against line item 015 (by means of Accord 10- does not utilize violence to function.”44 security agents, transparency from the Ministry,
It is important to note that, despite the 2016), and paid on a monthly basis to some and improved financial administration, among
implementation of the Operationalization Plan personnel who provided defense services as After the signature of Peace Accords and other areas.46 His administration also considered
for the Gradual Withdrawal of the Guatemalan well as the Presidential Chiefs of Staff (Estado establishment of the PNC, successive designing a plan and timeline for limiting the
Army from Citizen Security Tasks throughout Mayor Presidencial). Through opaque means, governments made commitments to strengthen role of the Armed Forces in internal security,
2017, the Army’s budget for public security this bonus was paid to then-President Jimmy and professionalize the PNC and, when it discussed and analyzed by the National Security
increased during that same year as compared Morales in the amount of at least Q450,000 had sufficient capacity, withdraw the Armed Council, which deemed that the aforementioned
with the previous year. In fact, the budget ($58,267.84) over a period of nine months.41 Forces from police functions. Despite their plan should be classified as reserved information.
allocated for 2017 was the highest of the four Revelation of this news caused such outrage declarations, as can be seen in the preceding
years under analysis, revealing an apparent gap that Morales, after a public recommendation sections, administrations continued expanding In December 2016, the National Security Council
between the government’s stated goals and the from the General Comptroller of Accounts the role of the Armed Forces in public security finalized and approved the Operationalization
financial reality at the time. (Contraloría General de Cuentas, CGC), was for nearly the past 20 years. Plan for the Gradual Withdrawal of the
ordered to “return” the controversial bonus, Guatemalan Army from Citizen Security Tasks.47
What has been described above can generate a situation that demonstrates the need to dig The military program in support of the PNC This plan entered into force in January 2017
suspicion, given that it was precisely in 2017 deeper into the quality of budgetary execution remained in force during several administrations, with the goal of withdrawing the Armed Forces
when the plan to withdraw elements of the of this line item, and is worth future study. including its creation under the Óscar Berger from police functions in three phases:48
Army from citizen security tasks began. As such, administration and continuation during the
administrations of Álvaro Colom, Otto Pérez 1. During the first four months of 2017:
Molina, Alejandro Maldonado, and part of restructure and reorganize the CERSC,
TABLE 3 Jimmy Morales’ administration, who became participating solely at the request and
BUDGET ALLOCATION OF THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE FOR THE president in 2016. Notwithstanding, as one in accompaniment of the PNC in five
PARTICIPATION OF THE ARMY IN PUBLIC SECURITY TASKS of the commitments assumed by Guatemala departments and 30 municipalities of the
under the Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity in country, identified as the ‘red zone.’
Year 2014 2015 2016 2017 Central America’s Northern Triangle promoted
Amount Q66,108,417.93 Q68,229,703.02 Q72,071,296.17 Q75,367,652.89 by the United States government, the support 2. In the second four-month period of the year:
provided by members of the Army was finally withdraw 50% of the personnel comprising
Source: Ministry of National Defense reduced.45 the CERSC, ceasing their support duties,
and remaining solely by request of the PNC
In January 2016, Francisco Rivas assumed only in 11 municipalities of the departments
In 2016, the Army’s spokeswoman indicated Squadron and other units entailing an increase
control over the Ministry of the Interior. In his included in the ‘red zone.’
that the increase in recent years was due to the in personnel, an assertion that contradicts the
capacity as Minister, he demonstrated – for the
addition of four units to the Citizen Security fact that 2017 saw the beginning of the plan to
first time since 2000 – a real commitment to 3. By the end of 2017: withdraw the entirety of
THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN PUBLIC SECURITY IN GUATEMALA SEPTEMBER 2020 | 22 THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN PUBLIC SECURITY IN GUATEMALA SEPTEMBER 2020 | 23the CERSC, leaving its responsibilities to the to 11 and withdrawing some 2,100 troops Experts in this field interpreted these actions have assisted the task forces, thereby making
PNC (save those duties that support tasks from police duties.50 To that end, the PNC was as a means of repositioning the military as the them vulnerable to later being threatened or
of border security, guarding the perimeters strengthened in parallel fashion, and would go sole ‘guarantor’ of security in the country, which suffering attacks. As such, the task forces depart
of jails, and humanitarian assistance during on to assign nearly 40,000 agents to citizen could open the doors to some sectors of the and simply leave communities with no one to
natural disasters). security activities.51 population accepting it as a regular political defend them.59
actor.57
During the second phase of the plan, the CERSC Nonetheless, in December of that same year, ACCOUNTABILITY
personnel must perform the tasks related two weeks prior to the time planned for the Against this backdrop, many experts in the
All legal complaints regarding accountability for
to 1) national borders and defense against completion of the entire withdrawal, the field of security assert that, despite the use
alleged human rights violations committed by
transnational threats – cooperative and national Ministry of National Defense asked the Ministry of the Armed Forces in police duties, visible
the Armed Forces are managed by the Human
security; 2) protection of critical infrastructure of the Interior to postpone the final withdrawal improvements were not made in public security.
Rights Ombudperson’s Office (Procurador de
and contribution to national development of the Armed Forces for an additional three Even worse, but predictable, the domestic
los Derechos Humanos, PDH). As part of the
– national security; 3) institutional support months, until the end of March 2018. As such, deployment of the military led to growing
research for this report, the Central America
within the sphere of internal security – public by the end of the period under study, some tension between the Armed Forces and the
Monitor requested information from the
and citizen security; and 4) cooperation within 4,200 members of the Armed Forces remained general public as well as periodic incidents of
Ministry of National Defense regarding the
the sphere of risk management, civil defense in public security tasks in several zones in the violence. In fact, according to the Office of the
number of investigations into human rights
and the national system for assistance during country.52 High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
violations perpetrated by members of the
natural disasters – public and citizen security. in Guatemala, in two zones where task forces
Army. However, the Ministry declared that
The support provided by the Army in 2017 in Lastly, in April 2018, then-President Jimmy operated in 2014, homicides rose from 5% to
such figures did not exist “by virtue of the fact
the sphere of citizen security thus depended on Morales announced fulfillment and the end 39%, “despite a reduction in 2012 when said
that the Ministry of National Defense does not
the requirements made by the PNC.49 of the Plan, indicating that this would not task forces began operations.”58
perform investigations.” According to the PDH
entail a reduction of the Army but rather, its and shown in Table 3, a total of 172 complaints
As has been noted, throughout 2017, progress reinforcement and modernization in the face of In this vein, an analyst in the security field affirmed were received during the period under study, or
was made in executing the Plan by reducing the the significant threats faced by the country.53 that, while it is true that the task forces gained an average of 43 complaints per year. It should
presence of the Armed Forces from 30 zones control over the country, the public, and criminal be highlighted that these figures only represent
groups, those achievements are not sustainable the complaints received by the PDH and omit
over time and, ultimately, do not prevent crime.
CONDUCT OF THE ARMED FORCES For example, the occupation of Zone 18 led
unreported incidents or unfiled cases; as such,
the real number of human rights violations is
criminal groups to move to other areas, though likely much higher.
The most visible aspect of military presence in soldiers in government positions, particularly in not before first identifying individuals who may
governmental management work was the joint managing policies affecting security; the use of
patrols between military troops and police agents the Army in matters of citizen security; and the
(which began in 2000, as a result of Decree 40- increased militarization of territories, utilizing
2000). A mechanism which began as an element old mechanisms of counterinsurgency military
TABLE 4
of the support provided by the Ministry of intelligence for societal control – identification, NUMBER OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY FOR
National Defense to the PNC–which generated tracking, execution, and repression.55 HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS SUBMITTED TO THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR’S
strong arguments as to its constitutionality– OFFICE AND OFFICES OF HUMAN RIGHTS OMBUDSPERSONS
was later considered commonplace and was In this regard, the problem of violence cannot
perpetuated by many successive governments.54 be simply reduced to gangs or ‘heavy crime,’ as Year 2014 2015 2016 2017
more or less 60% of the population is affected by Number of
47 47 44 34
Particularly in the government of the Patriot extortion, which translates into the absence of complaints
Party, the “iron fist” (‘mano dura’) motto the government56 (that is, it will not be resolved Source: Ministry of National Defense and Human Rights Ombudsperson's Office
materialized through a “security policy” that was due to the mere presence of Army elements in
essentially based on the appointment of retired security tasks).
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