U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONS: POLICY CHALLENGES FOR THE CONGRESS - VOL. 25, NO. 1 FEBRUARY 15-21, 2010
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U.S.-Russia Relations: Policy Challenges for the Congress VOL. 25, NO. 1 FEBRUARY 15–21, 2010 DIRECTOR: Dick Clark Washington, DC
This project was funded by Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors. Copyright © 2010 by The Aspen Institute The Aspen Institute One Dupont Circle, nw Washington, DC 20036-1133 Published in the United States of America in 2010 by The Aspen Institute All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 0-89843-522-6 1773/CP/BK
Table of Contents Rapporteur’s Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Robert Legvold Russia Back at the Center of U.S. Foreign Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Thomas Graham Russia and American Nuclear Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Steven Miller U.S.-Russian Relations: The Energy Dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Angela Stent Squaring U.S. Policy Toward Russia With U.S. Interests in the Larger Post-Soviet Space . . . . . . . 29 Steven Pifer Conference Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Conference Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Rapporteur’s Summary
Robert Legvold, Ph.D.
Professor of Political Science
Columbia University
The 35th seminar of the Aspen Institute’s West. It, notwithstanding the buffeting from
Congressional Program on Russia convened the 2008 economic crisis, sees itself as a major
in Madrid, February 15-21. Thirteen senators player, wants its voice heard, and means to
and congressional representatives met with ten assert itself in a world viewed as highly competi-
scholars, four of them from Russia, to discuss tive. Simultaneously, the broader geopolitical
the broad theme of “U.S.-Russia Relations: landscape no longer encourages notions of a
Policy Challenges for the Congress.” Thirteen United States standing astride the international
months into the Obama administration, the order, solving problems alone or with a few
meeting offered a good opportunity to assess willing partners. Rather it is a world increas-
the progress achieved in reversing the dis- ingly marked by great upheaval, shifting power
tinctly sour course of the relationship in recent balances, and uncertain outcomes—a world of
years as well as to explore the challenge that intricate challenges exceeding the capacity of
lies ahead. The agenda was designed both to any state, however powerful, to resolve alone.
cover critical dimensions of U.S.-Russian rela- Second, Graham stressed the importance of
tions—from nuclear arms control to tensions Russia to the United States—an importance
over U.S.-Russian interaction in the post-Soviet often underestimated. If one agrees that U.S.
space—and to highlight areas where Congress’ vital interests are containing nuclear prolifera-
role will be particularly important. tion, revitalizing the global economy, stabiliz-
Hence, the seminar opened with an overarch- ing the broader Middle East, securing energy
ing assessment of the relationship and what has supplies, coping with the rise of China, and
been accomplished since Presidents Medvedev repairing relations with Europe, in roughly that
and Obama laid out their ambitious agenda in order, then Russia matters, because it figures
London in April 2009. Thomas Graham, former significantly in all of these categories, with the
senior director of Russian affairs at the National possible exception of the second.
Security Council, led the session. He struck Then and later members of the group were
three themes that stirred debate and shadowed not totally convinced. Some wondered why, if
the discussion over the next three days. First, Russia is so important, it seems so low a priority
he argued that the United States not only faces in U.S. policy. Others acknowledged Russia’s
a Russia that is fundamentally different from centrality in controlling nuclear weapons and
the Russia of the 1990s, but does so in a larger preventing their proliferation and its promi-
geopolitical context also much changed. Russia nence as an energy exporter, but questioned
is no longer prostrate, a supplicant for Western either its capacity or readiness to deliver in
assistance, and eager to be in and like the other spheres, including the nuclear stand-
1off with Iran and the war in Afghanistan. As United States of Russia as a declining power
the week wore on and the relationship was matched on the Russian side by an increasing
explored in greater depth, some of this skepti- tendency to see the United States as a power in
cism dissipated, only to be replaced by resig- decline as a consequence of the policy failures
nation among more than one congressional of the last decade, a view that adds to uncer-
member over Congress’s inability to focus on a tainty in Moscow as it tries to come to terms
U.S.-Russian agenda framed in complex terms. with the rise of China.
Graham’s third theme generated still more A third Russian noted that these points, while
discussion. Given his first two points, he argued valid, did not necessarily discredit the Obama
that the United States needed to approach administration’s effort to re-engage with Russia;
Russia differently from in the past. For all the they only underscored that the path will not be
seeming contrasts in the policies of the two easy. Instead it becomes increasingly obvious
countries and notwithstanding the deep dis- that the United States needs more partners
trust built up over the prior decade, nothing that are strong and independent—and Russia
in the way Russia views itself or the outside is stronger and “virulently independent.” To
world precludes cooperation on issues of high- succeed, however, the United States needs
est priority for the United States. But to realize to embrace a new, more subtle narrative for
this potential the United States will have to Russia—one that recognizes a Russia that in
deal with the agenda Russia has, not the one its nature is ever “more Western,” while in its
we would like it to have. Others took the point
policy becoming ever “less pro-Western.”
further, suggesting that, if Russia is critical to
success in areas of high priority to the United The third challenge was more fundamental,
States, then Washington should take a harder and reflected a concern among some congres-
look at the tradeoffs it is willing to make in sional members. What if, they asked, rather
order to secure Russian support. than a self-confident, albeit assertive Russia,
ready to cooperate with the United States, the
This line of argument produced three chal-
Russia likely to emerge is sliding into serious
lenges. First, one member asked what the
Obama administration’s new Russia policy had trouble, threatened by a demographic crisis,
achieved—implicitly suggesting that, if not plagued by corruption, unable to move forward
much, then the policy approach advocated with reform, and vulnerable to future economic
held limited promise. It was a genuine, not a shocks? Presumably this would require a dif-
rhetorical question, and the answer—a START ferent U.S. policy response—one marked by
I follow-on agreement if reached and greater greater reserve and caution. The question left
U.S.-Russian consensus on the Iran nuclear the issue unifying the morning’s discussion still
issue were not a bad year’s work–seemed to more at the center of things. Throughout the
resonate. The second challenge came from the discussion, both U.S. and Russian scholars had
Russian side, and was not so much a refutation underscored that a critical moment in Russia’s
as a complication. Russia, said one Russian development had arrived, driven in part by the
scholar, poses a hard challenge, particularly, effects of the recent economic crisis and the
when preventing further NATO enlargement harsh realization of what it meant to be depen-
matters far more to its leaders than tightening dent on resource exports: Russia’s elite, across
the nuclear non-proliferation regime; when its the political spectrum, now realizes that mod-
new military doctrine privileges limiting the ernization, the goal articulated by President
U.S. unilateral use of force over the struggle Medvedev, can no longer be postponed. The
against terrorism. Another noted the problem problem arises, however, in the divisions over
raised by the widespread perception in the how this is to be accomplished.
2Day Two: The Nuclear Dimension Treaty to pursue nuclear disarmament in return
Steven Miller, the director of the International for other states forgoing the development of
Security Program at the Belfer Center for nuclear weapons.
Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s The discussion that followed focused on
Kennedy School of Government, led the sec- the prospects for a post-START I agreement.
ond session, an exploration of the critical U.S.- Although the consensus seemed to be that an
Russian nuclear dimension. Consistent with the agreement was likely—not least, because, as one
general thrust of Graham’s argument on the U.S. participant put it, it preserves the super-
first day, Miller—with little resistance from the power nuclear status of both countries—one
group—emphasized Russia’s centrality in each well-informed Russian warned that opposition
of the three areas of concern to the United to the treaty was building in hard-line Russian
States: managing the nuclear relationship with circles. Nor was it assumed that ratification in
Russia (key because the two countries have the U.S. Senate would be easy or swift. The
more than 90 percent of the world’s nuclear history of strategic arms control agreements is
weapons); preserving and then strengthening of a long and slow ratification process involv-
the nuclear non-proliferation regime, including ing years not months. In this case, however, as
addressing the Iranian and North Korean chal- several participants cautioned, significant delay
lenge; and guarding against nuclear terrorism. would severely cripple efforts to put the U.S.-
When thinking about the role of nuclear Russian relationship on a more positive track.
weapons in U.S.-Russian relations, he said, Not surprisingly, the bulk of the conversation
the two countries are still operating with not turned on Iran and the threat its nuclear pro-
only hardware from the Cold War but also gram posed for the non-proliferation regime.
its “software”—that is, its mental frameworks. Miller began by stressing the looming threat
Moreover, over the last decade, the system posed by the exploding interest in domestic
slowly constructed in the last years of the Cold nuclear power in many parts of the world.
War for managing this relationship has largely Preventing this “nuclear renaissance” from pro-
collapsed. Whether it should be reconstituted, ducing a surge of countries with the capacity to
and whether—were an interim follow-on agree- build a nuclear weapon, he noted, will require
ment to the now expired START I agreement great effort both to strengthen the non-prolif-
to be achieved—a new more ambitious round eration regime and to fashion good practices
of strategic arms control negotiations should among nuclear-power exporting manufactur-
be launched raises legitimate questions. Is ers. Russia will be critical to achieving both.
a negotiated strategic nuclear arms control On Iran, attention shifted to Russia’s willing-
regime necessary, given the natural constraints ness—and, if willing, capacity—to influence the
leading to the attrition of Russian forces? Is it outcome. Russia, most agreed, does not want a
worth the inevitable complications and frictions nuclear-armed Iran, but, because it has a much
that long negotiations and the perils of ratifica- broader array of stakes than the United States
tion entail? Miller answered his own questions in its relationship with Iran, it has not given
by citing four potential benefits from a mutu- the nuclear issue the same priority nor has it
ally acceptable legal framework: (a) increased been willing to apply the same pressure on
predictability in each side’s nuclear activities; Iran as the United States. That may be chang-
(b) increased transparency concerning each ing, as Russia’s relationship with Iran grows
side’s arsenal; (c) an increased ability to shape rockier and its willingness to entertain the idea
future developments; and (d) increased cred- of stricter sanctions appears to be increasing.
ibility attached to the U.S. and Russian commit- Still, several members of Congress concluded
ment under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation that real cooperation between Russia and the
3United States on the Iran problem was unlikely liquefied natural gas (LNG) from North Africa
in the absence of progress on a broader and begin to alter the energy equation.
more constructive U.S.-Russian agenda. While in the abstract one would think that
The more dramatic proposition came from the world’s largest exporter of energy and
both a Russian and a U.S. expert. Each implied the world’s largest importer of energy would
that the problem itself had been miscast: that have natural grounds for cooperation, Stent
the best had been made the enemy of the good. explained why reality is often different. At
By focusing on a maximum objective—rolling root the two countries have sharply contrasting
back Iran’s enrichment program—the more notions of energy security: The United States
pertinent objective of blocking the weapon- cares most about security of supply for itself
ization of nuclear material was endangered. and allies; Russia, the security of demand. The
They recommended instead a considerable United States works to promote the diversifi-
strengthening of International Atomic Energy cation of suppliers and supply routes; Russia,
Agency (IAEA) mechanisms for policing any their monopolization. Add to this the Russian
sign of weaponization along with far stiffer tendency to favor non-transparent deals and
penalties under Article 10 of the Nuclear Non- the primacy of state over commercial interests,
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for withdrawal from and the obstacles to cooperation become more
the treaty. The idea passed without much reac- understandable.
tion from members of Congress. The initial part of the discussion then turned
to the basic question of whether Russia’s great
Day Three: Energy, the Environment, and reserves of oil and gas are a curse or a bless-
Climate Change ing. While some of the Russian participants
Angela Stent, professor of government and suggested that on balance, whether right or
director of the Center for Eurasian, Russian wrong, the Russian leadership clearly sees
and East European Studies at Georgetown these resources as an advantage and one to be
University, began the session by reminding peo- exploited to the greatest extent possible, oth-
ple that U.S. concern over excessive European ers maintained that there is no simple answer.
dependency on Russian energy had a long histo- Oil at prices too low raises political risks within
ry tracing back to the Kennedy administration’s society; too high and they become an obstacle
discontent over the 1963 Druzhba oil pipeline. to economic reform and compensation for the
Energy, she noted, plays a complex role in the absence of democracy.
U.S.-Russia relationship, only partially captured On the issue of Russian energy leverage over
by sensational episodes such as the recent gas Europe, the Russian participants introduced
and oil cutoffs to Russia’s neighbors during several nuances beyond the obvious point that
price disputes. For Russia, the importance of oil Europe’s supply dependency is partially offset
and gas revenue to the national economy is a by Russia’s market dependency (more than 80
two-edged sword, permitting economic growth percent of Russian oil and gas exports flow to
and foreign policy confidence when prices are the European market and through pipeline
high, raising the specter of social instability infrastructure that cannot be easily re-routed
and underscoring Russia’s essential weakness to other destinations). For example, third
when they are low. And, even as Russia moves parties, such as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and
to strengthen exclusive control over transit to Kazakhstan, use energy for their own politi-
Europe by building the Nord and South Stream cal purposes, and are not merely pawns in a
pipelines, it suddenly finds itself with uncer- Russian game. Second, the more Russia forces
tain demand as the development of shale gas countries, such as Ukraine and Belarus, to pay
in Europe and North America and the flow of world market prices for oil and gas, the more it
4strengthens the independence of these states, needs to eliminate obstacles limiting Russian
and even more so, if the pressure leads them investment in U.S. energy projects. They also
to strive for greater energy efficiency. Third, recognized that delaying the re-submission of
it is difficult to imagine what a generalized the U.S.-Russian agreement under section 123
European energy dependency means when dif- of the Atomic Energy Act adds an unnecessary
ferent parts of Europe depend in such varying obstacle to bilateral cooperation in the nuclear
degree on Russian gas and oil. energy field.
Turning to the issue of U.S.-Russian energy The goal of this session, however, was not
cooperation, a Russian participant insisted that to treat the energy dimension in isolation, but
the starting point should be the de-politiciza- to link it with the collateral issue of climate
tion of energy issues by all sides, followed by a change. Here, too, Stent noted that the picture
serious effort to fashion a regime designed to is mixed. Although Russia is the world’s third
protect the interests of consumers, producers, largest emitter of greenhouse gases, after the
and transit countries, not simply the interests United States and China, and, therefore, needs
of one segment. The problem, another Russia to be part of the solution, until recently Russian
participant said, is that too many influential leaders have shown little willingness to exercise
Russians believe that the United States wants leadership in this area. Part of the reason may
to keep Russia a raw-material exporter—that it be that the effects of global warming are seen
does not want Russia as a high-tech competitor. to cut two ways: on the one hand, temperature
They assume, therefore, that they might as well increases may open new areas to agriculture in
do as they please at home and with their neigh- Russia’s north, but, on the other, they will also
bors, counting on the West’s need for Russian likely thaw the permafrost, and, hence, disrupt
oil and gas to temper its reaction. Hence, it is energy infrastructure, while releasing large
important that U.S. officials and congressional quantities of methane gas.
representatives, when meeting with Russian
parliamentarians, journalists, and business peo- As a result, and the point was underscored by
ple, convey the stake the United States has in a members of Congress, while espousing support
modernized Russia with high-tech capabilities; for a stricter regime at the Copenhagen UN
but, at the same time, that they make plain what Conference on Climate Change last December,
Russia must do to reduce the impediments on Russia’s representatives insisted on preserv-
foreign investment. ing quotas that would, in fact, allow Russia
to increase emissions. That noted, other con-
And, indeed, among congressional members
gressional members argued that, if as a conse-
a readiness to think of ways the United States
quence of Copenhagen’s failure, new interna-
and Russia could cooperate in high-tech areas
tional forums emerge to deal with the problem
was instantly apparent. Similarly so was enthu-
siasm for pushing cooperation in promoting of climate change, Russia would have to be
energy efficiency in the two societies, an idea treated as an important participant in them.
now receiving attention in the new U.S.-Russia Stent, in her paper, reviews aspects of an evolv-
Binational Presidential Commission. Among ing Russian approach to climate change that
congressional members with the deepest knowl- hold some promise for U.S.-Russian coopera-
edge on energy issues, there was, in fact, puzzle- tion in this area.
ment over why Russia is not straining to attract Stent also addressed an issue where energy,
industry from abroad that would find low-cost climate change, and security intersect: con-
energy a major incentive to invest in Russia. trol over the rich hydrocarbon reserves in the
On the other hand, as some congressional Arctic. Global warming, if it continues at the
representatives noted, cooperation should be present pace, will open the region to mineral
a two-way street, and, hence, the United States exploration and exploitation within a matter
5of decades, and already the states bordering it Pifer, however, went on to argue that, whatev-
are staking their claims, and backing them up er are Russian aims, policy results to this point
with military planning. Hence, this is an area have been far from satisfying. On the contrary,
where the United States and Russia have good often Russian actions have had the effect of
reason to pursue cooperation, building on what antagonizing or frightening its neighbors, and,
they have achieved in the Arctic Council, rather as a result, pushing them away from Russia. Not
than allow events to descend into competition just Ukraine or Georgia, but recently a naturally
and friction. Stent also reminded congressional allied state like Belarus has sought to create
members that the United States’ long-standing more space for itself in its relationship with
refusal to ratify the 1982 UN Convention on the Russia. The reaction of Russian participants
Law of the Sea seriously weakens Washington’s was more an elaboration than refutation of
ability to make legal claims to Arctic resources Pifer’s point. Said one, “Empires don’t go away
beyond its exclusive (200-mile) economic zone. overnight.” Adjusting to the loss of large parts
of the Russian and Soviet empire has been emo-
Day Four: U.S.-Russian Interaction in the tionally and politically far more wrenching than
Post-Soviet Space the collapse of Soviet power in Eastern Europe.
Many of the new states are also going through
The seminar wound up by focusing on argu-
a post-imperial transition, struggling to assert
ably the most vexing and contentious dimen-
their identity, a process that often involves dif-
sion of U.S.-Russian relations—the interaction
ferentiating—and at times distancing—them-
of the two countries in and among the states of
selves from Russia. Another Russian made the
the former Soviet Union. Steven Pifer, senior
point more sharply saying that a number of the
fellow at the Brookings Institution and former
post-Soviet states have chosen to fan an anti-
U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, launched the
Russian nationalism, which is then reciprocated
discussion. He offered as a starting proposi-
by the Russian side.
tion that, at its core, the problem inheres in
the fundamentally conflicting approaches of Still, as one Russian participant put it, those
the two countries to the region. Russia believes determining the fate of these states will not be
that to preserve and enhance its great-power Russia or the United States, but these states
status it must maintain its position within the themselves. Hence, much of the focus on
post-Soviet space. It does not aspire to re-create U.S. and Russian jockeying in the region and
the Soviet empire, but it does seek neighbors much of the talk of “zones of influence” are
deferential to Russian concerns, friendly gov- throwbacks to another era—archaic echoes of
ernments open to Russian investment, and a a “great game.” Rather it is these countries that
veto over basic choices by them seen as inimi- will decide for themselves with whom they will
cal to Moscow’s interests. The United States, identify. A U.S. expert agreed. Too much think-
in contrast, while wanting to build a construc- ing, he said, is still within a Cold War paradigm,
tive relationship with Russia, also wishes to see treating developments in the post-Soviet space
Russia surrounded by strong, independent, as a zero-sum geopolitical competition. This is
democratically-oriented states, and strives to bad for the United States and Russia, because
fashion a policy geared to this end. This often it allows third parties to exploit this mindset
leaves the U.S. struggling to square a circle. to their advantage and to U.S. disadvantage. It
Never is this clearer than in the case of NATO also leaves Washington and Moscow oblivious
and its potential role with Ukraine and Georgia. to how dramatically the broader international
The United States’ intentions on this score are context has changed, including the growing
not anti-Russian, but Washington has no way of influence of other outside powers in the post-
persuading Moscow that this is so. Soviet space, most notably China.
6Pifer took a somewhat more equanimous Others had grown more convinced that the
view of the challenge. For the moment, he United States had a real stake in seeing Russia
argued, the most acute source of tension has successfully navigate this passage in its history,
eased. The NATO question has been defused and, therefore, sensed a need for the United
by the outcome of the recent Ukrainian elec- States to think more carefully and creatively
tions, which placed in power a Ukrainian leader about ways in which it could be helpful. For
opposed to Ukrainian NATO membership, some this included being true to core U.S. val-
and before that by the effects of the Russian- ues, insisting before Russian listeners that the
Georgian war, which for the foreseeable future prosperity enjoyed by the United States owed
had disqualified Georgia. In an area like Central much to our respect for civil liberties, property
Asia, the key dynamic now features Russia and rights, and the rule of law.
China, leaving the United States with a lower
Still others worried that policymakers and
profile and the potentially positive role of a
politicians were too stuck on “looking down
mild balancer between the two. In these cir-
cumstances, the chief objective of U.S. policy narrow pipes,” when they needed a broader
in the post-Soviet space should be what Pifer prism. Rather than concentrating on the prob-
called “three noes:” no war in or between these lems in U.S.-Russian relations, we would be
states; no failed or failing states; and no Russian better off concentrating on problems where
domination over any of these states. And the U.S.-Russian cooperation is essential. Rather
path forward should focus on, first, simply than framing issues always in bilateral terms, we
managing the U.S.-Russian interaction, work- should focus more on fitting the relationship
ing to minimize competitive tendencies and into a multi-dimensional view of a world popu-
a misreading of one another’s intentions; sec- lated by multiple players. Said one congressio-
ond, on developing a direct dialogue between nal member, “We need a larger palette” when
the two governments on these issues—but a painting Russia’s place in U.S. foreign policy.
dialogue that is transparent to all the states The point echoed something Thomas Graham
concerned; and, third, exploring ideas, includ- had said in the opening session: It is very dif-
ing those advanced by the Russian leadership, ficult to draw into a single, coherent Russia
for enhancing Europe’s security architecture in policy fragments of concern that are scattered
ways that mitigate the security weaknesses in the across a wide range of issue areas, each the con-
post-Soviet space. cern of policymakers with different geographi-
Where are the United States and Russia cal and thematic preoccupations. No longer is
really headed in their relationship? What are Russia what the Soviet Union once was, a point
the priorities on which the United States should of departure on almost all key issues. Rather it
focus when dealing with Russia? How should is a factor, often an important factor, but only a
China be factored into the relationship? And factor in many different areas; and designing a
how is one to assess the internal challenges fac- policy capable of mastering a Russia agenda as
ing Russia, including the demographic crisis? elusive as it is important is not easy.
7Russia Back at the Center of U.S. Foreign Policy
Thomas Graham, Ph.D.
Former Senior Director of Russia Affairs
National Security Council
Russia is one of the most consequential ests and less concerned by Russia’s domestic
countries in the world today, given its mas- developments. Although the atmosphere has
sive nuclear arsenal and expertise in nuclear improved greatly during the past year, and
energy; vast energy reserves and other natural Presidents Obama and Medvedev have laid out
resources; geopolitical position astride Europe, an ambitious agenda of cooperation, mutually
the broader Middle East, and East Asia; UN beneficial cooperation on concrete matters has
Security Council veto; and scientific prowess. proved elusive, as the extended endgame in
And it will remain so, whether it is strong and negotiations of the START follow-on treaty has
can mobilize those resources for its own pur- demonstrated.
poses, or it is weak and stronger powers and
more agile transnational actors (such as ter-
rorists) exploit them for their own ends. Since
The Russia We Face
the breakup of the Soviet Union nearly twenty The counterpart in this third attempt is not
years ago, Russia’s cooperation has helped the the Russia the Clinton or Bush Administration
United States achieve our strategic goals, while faced. It has recovered its pride after the deep
its opposition has complicated the challenges national humiliation of the 1990s, and the rapid
we face. economic recovery during Putin’s presidency
For that reason, the United States has sought elevated its global standing and provided levers
constructive relations with post-Soviet Russia— for advancing its strategic interests. Although
so far with little enduring success. The Clinton much Western commentary raises alarm about
Administration’s ambitions to facilitate Russia’s a return to Soviet attitudes and behavior, Russia
transformation into a pro-Western free-market bears greater similarities to 18th- and 19th-
democracy collapsed in the wake of Russia’s century Imperial Russia. Like the elites of that
financial meltdown in 1998 and growing period, today’s approach international affairs
acrimony over NATO expansion. The Bush from a realist, not an ideological, perspective.
Administration’s effort to build a strategic part- They start from the following assumptions:
nership quickly ran afoul of competition in the • Global affairs are fundamentally competi-
former Soviet space and American concerns tive (although not necessarily zero-sum),
about Russia’s authoritarian path. with the great powers seeking advantage
President Obama’s decision to “reset” rela- and lesser states adapting to great-power
tions marks the beginning of the third attempt arrangements. The goal of foreign policy
at enduring constructive relations, one focused is to advance interests, not to spread val-
pragmatically on advancing our strategic inter- ues, and Russia should be pragmatic—
9some would say deeply cynical—in the was global hegemony, which by definition would
pursuit of its interests. deny Russia great-power status. More worri-
some to Moscow has been what it sees as an
• Russia is a great power and should be
active U.S. effort to erode Russian power, first
respected as such. “Russia can exist as a
of all by expanding NATO and supporting anti-
strong state, as a global player, or it will not
Russian leaders in the former Soviet space. The
exist at all,” Medvedev has noted.
2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, viewed by
• The former Soviet space—which is also the the Kremlin as a U.S.-instigated dress rehearsal
former Imperial Russian space—is essen- for regime change in Russia, effectively put an
tial to Russia’s great-power status. Primacy end to any hopes of strategic partnership dur-
in that region gives Russia geopolitical heft ing the Bush Administration.
and is critical to its security and well-being. For those reasons, Moscow wants to con-
• A centralized, tightly controlled domestic strain the United States. It seeks to do this in
political process is crucial to maintain- three ways: by forming anti-American coali-
ing domestic order and protecting and tions in fact if not in name (e.g., the Shanghai
advancing Russia’s strategic interests. Cooperation Organization, which includes
China and several Central Asian states, as a
Despite a remarkable recovery under Putin, means to limit American influence in Central
Russia faces formidable challenges to sustaining Asia); by enhancing the role of the UN Security
sufficient economic growth—quantitative and Council in global affairs, because Russia can
qualitative—to back up its great-power aspira- veto American initiatives; and by reaching legal-
tions. The global economic crisis drove that ly and politically binding agreements with the
point home: In 2009, Russia was among the United States that limit our options and make
worst performing economies in the G-20. The our behavior more predictable.
focus now is on modernization: infrastructure
Moscow also considers the moment oppor-
renewal, diversification away from an excessive
tune to rein in the United States. While it still
reliance on commodities, mastery of cutting-
sees the U.S. as the dominant world power, it
edge technologies, and creation of an innova-
believes the U.S. is in decline, a consequence
tion society. Moscow knows that Russia cannot
of the failed foreign policies of the Bush
manage this task on its own. It needs invest-
Administration, the ongoing financial crisis,
ment, technology, and know-how from abroad.
and the damage both of those have done to
Although China might be able to provide some
our confidence and our reputation for compe-
of the investment, only the West can provide
tence. In this view, the Obama Administration
the needed technology and know-how. That
needs the “reset” more than Moscow does,
recognition lies behind efforts to rebuild rela-
and Moscow can still squeeze out concessions
tions with Europe and the United States after
before reciprocating in a serious way.
the near-total breakdown in the wake of the war
with Georgia in 2008.
Moscow, nevertheless, remains deeply suspi- The New Geopolitical Context
cious of U.S. motives and still sees the United If the Obama Administration faces a changed
States as the primary foreign threat to Russia’s Russia, it also faces a new geopolitical context.
great-power status. Vice President Biden’s com- Simply put, not only is the Cold War history,
ments last summer about Russia’s decline, even so is the post-Cold War world. The dominant
though disowned by President Obama, raised American view of a generation ago, that the
doubts that the Administration was willing to United States would lead the world as free-
treat Russia as a major power and reinforced market democracy ineluctably spread across the
concerns that the United States’ ultimate goal globe, no longer describes current realities or
10the immediate future. Rather, the world has First, common challenges do not necessar-
entered a period of great upheaval of uncer- ily translate into common interests, and even
tain duration until a new global equilibrium where interests are shared, they often rank dif-
emerges. ferently in each country’s priorities.
While the character of that new equilibrium • Iran provides an apt illustration. Russia
is unclear, the trends shaping it have been evi- shares the American interest in prevent-
dent for some time. Global dynamism is shift- ing Iran from developing nuclear weap-
ing from Europe and the Atlantic region to East ons, but not our sense of urgency. At the
Asia and the Pacific region. The Middle East same time, it fears an American or Israeli
lies in the midst of an historic struggle between military strike that would further desta-
the forces of tradition and modernity, which is bilize the region along Russia’s southern
spawning violent extremism with global ambi- border, and it is concerned that tough
tions. The dark side of globalization presents a sanctions are a path to a military strike
set of challenges—the proliferation of weapons (as was the case with Iraq). While it sup-
of mass destruction, international terrorism, ports American engagement with Iran, it
unregulated global financial flows, transnational is concerned that normalization of rela-
crime, pandemic diseases, and climate change— tions would jeopardize Russia’s own com-
that are beyond the capacity of any single state mercial relations with that country and
to master and for which leading internation- could turn it into a strong competitor
al institutions have proved inadequate. The in European gas markets, where Russia
nation-state, the fundamental unit of the inter- earns a considerable share of its state rev-
national order since the Peace of Westphalia enues. Obtaining Russian support for our
in 1648, is under pressure from supranational, approach on the nuclear issue will require
sub-national, and transnational entities, while taking into account Russia’s full range of
the vast increase in the number of states since interests in Iran, as well as other matters
the Second World War militates against effective (see the next point).
international cooperation and action.
Second, building cooperation will require
trade-offs. As much as we would like to work
Can We Work with Russia to Advance Our on discrete issues on their merits, for Moscow
Interests? everything is linked. We will not persuade it
What do the new Russia and geopolitical to help us on our priorities, unless we are pre-
context mean for U.S.-Russian relations? That pared to help it achieve its goals (or, at a mini-
there is, to be sure, no easy path to construc- mum, not obstruct its efforts). This will require
tive relations, particularly given the deep dis- some tough choices.
trust that has grown over the past two decades • The former Soviet space presents per-
and the complexity of the challenges we face. haps the greatest challenge because there
Nevertheless, it is also true that nothing in the is a fundamental conflict in interests.
way Russia defines itself precludes cooperation Reasserting authority across that region, in
on issues of high priority to the United States, which Medvedev has indicated Russia has
while the new geopolitical context presents “privileged interests,” is a top Russian pri-
common challenges that could provide the ority, which entails constraining American
basis for productive interaction, if we pursue influence. The war against Georgia was
our Russia policy with a clear sense of our own intended to send the clear message that
interests and Russia’s and with patience and Moscow could and would use force to
skill. Five considerations should shape our defend its interests, if necessary. The
approach. United States, however, refuses to acknowl-
11edge a Russian sphere of influence or priv- and oil resources, increasingly located in
ileged interests and sees strategic benefit difficult geological and climatic zones,
in strengthening ties with, in particular, while the United States has an interest in
Ukraine, Georgia, and Kazakhstan. The bringing greater volumes of oil and gas
urgent task is to define clearly our vital to global markets. The issue of equality
interests in this region and then balance and reciprocity involves the willingness of
our policies toward Russia and the other the United States to permit Russian equity
former Soviet states in a way that advances participation in U.S. energy infrastructure.
those interests, while minimizing the dam- Moscow wants guaranteed access to U.S.
age U.S.-Russian rivalry in the region does markets for its (often state-owned) firms in
to overall relations, including cooperation exchange for expanded access to its mar-
on our top priorities, such as Iran. kets for American firms. Thus far, Moscow
believes we have unfairly restricted access
Third, Russia will demand, if not real equal-
to our markets for political purposes.
ity and reciprocity, at least the convincing
appearance of such. • Moscow sees our failure to graduate Russia
• For this reason, strategic arms control, from the Jackson-Vanik Amendment3 as
nonproliferation, and civil nuclear energy evidence of a fundamental unwillingness
to respect it as an equal and a major
provide promising grounds for coopera-
power.
tion: They are among the few areas of
common interest in which the United Fourth, more often than not, we will be
States and Russia can come together dealing with Russia in a multilateral context.
as genuine equals and credibly present We need to ensure that its voice is heard, but
themselves as global leaders. Previous we also need to demonstrate that we can and
administrations have already laid a foun- will proceed with others should Russia seek to
dation, which includes the Nunn-Lugar obstruct progress.
Cooperative Threat Reduction pro- • Two broad issues illustrate this point. On
gram, the Megatons to Megawatts pro- most global economic issues, the contri-
gram (which uses down-blended highly- bution Russia can make lags far behind
enriched uranium from dismantled Soviet that not only of the G-7, but also of China
nuclear weapons for power generation and India, and those countries will be our
in American civil nuclear reactors), and primary interlocutors and determine the
the U.S.-Russian-led Global Initiative to range of possible action and the limits
Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Further coop- of cooperation. We need, nevertheless,
eration will depend on Senate action on to ensure that Russia has a seat at the
a START1 follow-on treaty—once that table to encourage responsible behavior.
has been negotiated—and Congressional On European security issues, we need to
action on the “123 Agreement”2 on bilat- engage seriously on Medvedev’s call for
eral civil nuclear cooperation, which the a review of architecture and take account
Bush Administration withdrew from con- of Russian concerns as a sign of respect—
sideration after the Russo-Georgian war and because we need to rethink European
and which the Obama Administration security in the new geopolitical context
needs to resubmit. for our own purposes. But we also need
to be prepared to work separately with
• There are also ample opportunities in
our European allies and partners, should
broader energy-related cooperation. U.S.
Russia prove unconstructive.
firms have the technology and manage-
ment skills Russia needs to develop its gas
12Fifth, presidential engagement is critical to References
success. Only that will demonstrate to the
Russians the respect and seriousness of pur- 1 The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the
U.S. and the former Soviet Union, instituted in 1994
pose they believe is their due; only the presi-
to limit the number of nuclear warheads each country
dent can set the priorities, make the trade-offs,
possesses, expired on December 5, 2009, but remains
and energize and discipline the bureaucracy
in force pending a successor agreement.
to implement his preferred course of action.
Absent presidential engagement, relations will 2 A “123 Agreement” is an agreement between the U.S.
drift and, if history is a guide, not in a positive and a foreign country on the peaceful use of nuclear
direction. energy, which is lacking between the U.S. and Russia.
• The Bilateral Presidential Commission 3 “Jackson-Vanik” is an amendment contained in the
coordinated by Secretary of State Clinton 1974 Trade Act that effectively denies unconditional
and Foreign Minister Lavrov provides a normal trade relations to certain countries, includ-
framework for productive interaction, ing Russia, that had non-market economies and that
restricted emigration rights. Normal trade relations
although it still needs to demonstrate its
may be extended, on a conditional basis, to a country
worth in practice. Congressional engage-
subject to the law only if the President determines that
ment with Russian parliamentarians pro-
it complies with the freedom of emigration require-
vides an additional and valuable channel
ments of the amendment. Since 1994, Russia has been
of communication. Those channels can found in compliance with the freedom of emigration
amplify President Obama’s engagement requirements. It continues to be subject to semi-annu-
but they cannot substitute for it. In 2010, al compliance reviews. Ending the application of the
he will decide in a practical way, by the way Jackson-Vanik provisions to Russia requires legislation
he apportions his time, how much of a pri- by Congress.
ority Russia really is, compared to all the
other challenges, domestic and foreign,
that are competing for his attention.
13Russia and American Nuclear Interests
Steven E. Miller, Ph.D.
Director, International Security Program
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Harvard University
Russia is crucial to the pursuit of America’s ences are compatible. But from the perspective
nuclear interests. It is centrally connected of American policy the much more important
to three contexts in which potential nuclear point is that interaction between the United
threats to the United States arise: in the bilat- States and Russia on nuclear issues is inevi-
eral nuclear relationship with Russia, which tably linked to and influenced by the wider
encompasses more than 90% of the nuclear political relationship between the two powers.
weapons that presently exist; in the realm of Unfortunately, the story line here has been
nuclear proliferation, where the spread of disappointing. The high hopes in the early
nuclear weapons to hostile states can jeopar- post-Cold War years for robust strategic part-
dize American security and interests while also nership between Moscow and Washington and
undermining the nonproliferation regime; and high degrees of harmony in their interests and
in connection with nuclear terrorism, which policies have not been realized. Instead, there
will be an all too plausible (and frightening) has been bickering over the Balkans in the
possibility if nuclear weapons or weapons-usable 1990s, Russian anger over the progression of
materials were to leak into a nuclear black mar- NATO enlargement, American anger over the
ket. Russia is a critical player in each of these Russian opposition to the Iraq war, competition
contexts. Consequently, Russian participation for influence and energy in the Caucasus and
and cooperation is a necessary component of Central Asia, strong Russian objection to U.S.
any efforts to effectively manage or resolve the missile defense policies, American frustration
nuclear problems on the U.S. policy agenda. at the evolution of Russia’s internal political
Without some degree of common cause with and economic system, Russian frustration at
Russia, it will not be possible to minimize the Washington’s criticisms of Russia’s internal
nuclear threats to the United States. Russia affairs, and—far from least—severe mutual
must be part of the solution or it will be part of recriminations over the Russian intervention in
the problem. Georgia. Over a two-decade period, the cumu-
The record of U.S.-Russian nuclear diploma- lative effect of these bruising collisions has been
cy in recent years, however, is mixed—marked to produce a substantial retreat by Moscow
as much by friction, disagreement, suspicion from the conciliatory pro-American posture it
and acrimony as by common interest and col- adopted in the early post-Cold War period, a
laborative action. Some of the difficulties in growing estrangement from the United States
this relationship reflect the reality that these within the Russian political elite, a rising suspi-
two powers will never have identical interests cion in Moscow of Washington’s motives, and
even if in many respects their nuclear prefer- an increasing tendency on the part of Russia’s
15policymakers to resist American pressure and as it did at the peak of the Soviet-American
diverge from Washington’s policies. Russian nuclear competition. However, estimates of
rhetoric about the United States is now some- the current Russian nuclear weapons stock-
times shockingly harsh, and an undertone pile suggest that thousands of nuclear weap-
of rivalry can be detected in American and ons remain in its arsenal. According to one
Russian perceptions of one another (coexist- recent assessment, for example, Russia has
ing with persistent rhetoric about partnership). approximately 5,000 deployed nuclear weap-
The Obama Administration came to power ons and another 8,000 in reserve or awaiting
proclaiming the need to improve relations with dismantlement.1 This arsenal remains the single
Russia and famously called for hitting the “reset largest physical threat to American security. Further,
button.” How easy it will be to overcome the Russian nuclear weapons policy is still at least
accumulated frustrations and grievances of two partially driven by residual concerns about the
decades remains to be seen. United States (much as U.S. nuclear weapons
Can the United States effectively pursue its policy is still influenced by a perceived need
nuclear interests while relations with Moscow to “hedge” against a possible Russian nuclear
are deteriorating? Are there significant trad- threat). Despite the end of the Cold War and
eoffs in relations with Russia between the the passage of nearly two decades, Moscow and
nuclear portfolio and other contentious issues Washington have not succeeded in escaping the
on the U.S.-Russia agenda? Has Washington deterrence framework in their nuclear relation-
given sufficient weight to the possible costs in ship. Thus, though the nuclear danger is not
the nuclear realm of antagonizing Russia in perceived to be as grave as it once was due to
other policy areas? Such questions have enor- the altered political context, in a physical sense
mous implications because major nuclear issues Russia and the United States continue to pose
are at play in U.S.-Russian relations. an enormous potential threat to one another.
For a protracted period, the U.S.-Russia nuclear
relationship has persisted in this odd limbo, no
Russia and the Management of the longer fierce enemies but still committed at
Strategic Nuclear Balance least to some extent to the logic of deterrence.
The bilateral nuclear relationship between Both sides appear to harbor some concern that
Moscow and Washington is unsettled. No lon- a more hostile—and hence more dangerous—
ger bitter enemies but not quite reliable friends, nuclear relationship could recur. The restora-
Russia and the United States find their nuclear tion of more open and intense nuclear hostil-
arsenals sitting uneasily in the middle of their ity (and with it the possible revival of nuclear
relationship. They have neither eliminated arms racing) in a relationship that still involves
nuclear threats as a factor in their relationship nuclear weapons in the thousands is obviously
nor found some reassuring new framework for undesirable from the perspective of minimizing
governing their post-Cold War nuclear interac- nuclear threats to the United States. This leads
tions. to the conclusion that U.S. nuclear interests are
This matters for one very simple but compel- best served by measures that dampen nuclear
ling reason: very substantial nuclear weapons hostility, constrain or reduce the nuclear forces
capability still exists in the U.S.-Russian nuclear on both sides, and provide some collabora-
context. The intense and prodigious nuclear tive bilateral management of the U.S.-Russian
rivalry that marked the Cold War is thankfully nuclear relationship.
consigned to history but a substantial residue That broad proposition, however, does not
of nuclear weapons capability remains. It is of map easily onto the current diplomatic real-
course true that Moscow no longer commands ity. The arms control framework built up
several tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, over several decades to shape and manage
16the nuclear postures of the two sides and the full weight of the U.S.-Russian nuclear rela-
nuclear interactions between them has weak- tionship. Moreover, the summit at which the
ened significantly. The ABM Treaty, negoti- Moscow Treaty was signed brought to a stop for
ated in 1972 by President Nixon, was intended half a decade the strategic arms control process
to prevent defensive deployments on one side between the United States and Russia. After
from driving the other to ever larger and 2002, for the first time in nearly a quarter of
more capable offensive forces, thus avoiding a century, there were no negotiations ongoing
a so-called offense-defense arms race. But the and none desired or anticipated.
ABM Treaty no longer exists because in 2002 Thus, Moscow and Washington have neither
the United States exercised its (legal) right to a settled nuclear relationship nor an established
withdraw. The START II agreement, signed in and intact negotiated framework and mecha-
1993 by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin, mandated nism for managing their nuclear affairs. The
significant cuts in strategic nuclear forces and current negotiations for a follow-on to START
banned multiple warhead missiles, a step that I represent a step in the direction of trying to
was regarded as significantly buttressing to redefine the nuclear relationship and rebuild
the stability of the nuclear balance. However, the diplomatic framework governing their
START II never entered into force because nuclear affairs. As this exercise evolves beyond
Russian ratification of the agreement included the immediate issue of replacing START I, it
conditions that the United States never met. will necessarily have to confront a number of
In June, 2002, Russia renounced START II in fundamental issues, most of which have not yet
response to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM been addressed in any conclusive fashion.
Treaty, which violated one of the Russian con-
ditions for ratification. Thus two of the major • The role of deterrence: Is deterrence a
products of Cold War nuclear arms control desirable, necessary, or inescapable com-
have been eliminated. ponent of the U.S.-Russian relationship?
If not, what conceptual framework should
Further, the 1991 START I agreement, which
replace it?
has been the basic governing document in
the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship for the • The role of arms control: Should arms
past two decades, and which contained all control remain at the center of the U.S.-
the verification provisions associated with stra- Russian nuclear relationship? How much
tegic arms control, expired on December 5, does it matter if a negotiated framework is
2009. Negotiations for a follow-on agreement lacking? Some in the United States believe
have been under way for the past year and are that it is no longer necessary—a relic of
reported to be nearing completion, but for the the past. Nuclear arsenals are dramatically
moment there is no legally binding verification reduced and will be cut further due to
regime in place (and the negotiations have political and financial factors; Moscow and
been longer and more difficult than expected). Washington are no longer enemies and do
The only bilateral strategic nuclear treaty in not need to engage in a laborious nuclear
force today is the 2002 Moscow Treaty, a docu- arms control process. Others believe that
ment of less than one page that was meant as it is essential to create a transparent, veri-
an addendum to START I for the purpose of fied, negotiated regulatory framework to
reducing overall numbers of deployed strategic govern U.S.-Russian nuclear relations to
warheads. Much criticized for drafting errors, avoid undesirable developments down the
the Moscow Treaty contains no verification road and to signal restraint to the wider
provisions and expires at exactly the same world (which matters in the context of
moment that it takes effect on December 31, Article VI disarmament obligations under
2012. It is not a document that can bear the the NPT). This debate will be consequen-
17tial when Washington considers future almost certainly have to be addressed in
treaties. future negotiations down the road. How
can this issue be handled? Will the United
• The role of verification: How much veri-
States be prepared to accept limits on
fication is enough? This has become an
conventional deployments? Will it be pre-
issue in the current START I follow-on
pared to let this issue stymie nuclear nego-
negotiations.
tiations? Are there solutions that Moscow
• The limits of force reductions: How low will find acceptable?
can we go? What are the criteria? Can The nuclear order in which the United States
strategic stability be maintained at low must function will be to a large extent deter-
numbers? At what point will other nuclear mined by the nuclear relationship it works out
powers need to be brought into the nego- with Russia. We are at a juncture where many
tiations? basic issues are beginning to be addressed and
• The role of missile defenses: Now that the the answers that prevail will shape the nuclear
ABM Treaty has been abandoned, how will future. This is an issue that deserves to be at the
missile defenses fit into the U.S.-Russian center of U.S. policy, that should garner high
nuclear relationship? Russia clearly finds priority among decision-makers on both sides,
them objectionable and to some extent and that should play a prominent role in the
threatening. Standard arguments against formation of U.S. policy toward Russia. Today
missile defense still need to be confronted: this set of issues is competing with many other
they can easily be negated by the deploy- serious problems and does not always seem
ment of much cheaper offensive forces, to make its way onto the high-level agenda.
producing outcomes that provide little Careless or inattentive treatment of the U.S.-
effective defense while provoking larger Russian nuclear relationship could produce an
offensive threats; missile defense systems outcome we regret.
are self protecting and fail catastrophically
if opponents attack them at their weak Russia and the Management of the
points (notably ground-based radars and Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime
space-based sensors). Russia has proposed Every American president since the end of
collaborative pursuit of missile defenses; the Cold War has proclaimed nuclear prolif-
under what circumstances would this be eration to be the gravest threat to U.S. secu-
acceptable to the United States? Many big rity. The United States and its international
questions are begging for answers. interests can be seriously jeopardized if nuclear
• Conventional threats to nuclear forces: weapons should somehow spread to the hands
This is an asymmetric issue, of consider- of hostile, irresponsible states or to terrorists.
able concern to Russia and much less wor- Accordingly, preventing the spread of nuclear
risome to the United States, which appears weapons has been one of the highest priorities
to be moving steadily in the direction in American security policy—a proposition gen-
of acquiring such capabilities.2 Moscow erally accepted by both political parties and by
fears that very precise missiles armed with both sides of the political spectrum. Few objec-
specialized conventional ordinance will be tives are more important.
capable of destroying its nuclear assets. It In this context, too, Russia is a critical player.
therefore insists that these conventional It is a leading exporter of nuclear technology—
threats be addressed in the nuclear nego- including most recently the signing of a huge
tiations. Even if this issue is finessed in nuclear deal with India involving many bil-
the START I follow-on agreement, it will lions of dollars and more than a dozen nuclear
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