Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown - How the Rwandan government has legitimized its rule 2010-2019 - Diva-portal.org
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Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown How the Rwandan government has legitimized its rule 2010-2019 Sara Kjellström Uppsala University Department of Political Science Master Thesis, Spring 2020 Words: 16 574 Supervisor: Anders Sjögren
Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to study how electoral authoritarian regimes remain resilient over
time, by observing how they handle challenges to their rule. More specifically, the thesis will
focus on the strategies used to legitimize further rule. This will be achieved by conducting a
case study on Rwanda and investigating how the Rwandan government uses insecurity and
threat perception to legitimize further rule during the period 2010-2019. The theoretical
framework consists of both Andreas Schedler’s definition of an electoral authoritarian regime
as well as securitization theory. The material used is speech acts by important actors from the
time period in question as well as law changes and information on how existing laws are used.
With the use of critical discourse analysis, the thesis concludes that the Rwandan government
has developed a discourse of traitor/patriot by securitizing traitors, strategically varying in
intensity throughout the time period. Political opposition is effectively repressed by referring
to the threats mentioned in the speech acts. To successfully circumvent the main flaw of
electoral authoritarian regimes according to Schedler’s theory (uncertainty), the Rwandan
government creates uncertainties themselves and then refers to the very same uncertainties to
legitimize continuous rule.
Key words: electoral authoritarian regimes, Rwanda, securitization, legitimization
2Table of Contents
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................4
1.1 Research question .........................................................................................................6
1.2 Previous research ..........................................................................................................6
1.3 Disposition ...................................................................................................................8
2. Theory ...............................................................................................................................9
2.1 Electoral authoritarian regimes......................................................................................9
2.2 Security ...................................................................................................................... 11
2.2.1 Securitization theory by the Copenhagen School .................................................. 11
2.2.2 Critique ................................................................................................................ 13
2.3 Analytical framework ................................................................................................. 14
3. Method ............................................................................................................................ 15
3.1 Critical discourse analysis ........................................................................................... 15
3.2 Sources ....................................................................................................................... 18
3.3 Material ...................................................................................................................... 19
3.4 Scope and limitations .................................................................................................. 20
3.4.1 Rwanda ................................................................................................................ 20
3.4.2 Time frame .......................................................................................................... 21
3.4.3 Background information 2003-2009 ..................................................................... 21
4. Analysis ........................................................................................................................... 22
4.1 Time period 2010-2012............................................................................................... 23
4.1.1 Securitization in practice ...................................................................................... 23
4.1.2 Speech acts .......................................................................................................... 25
4.2 Time period 2013-2015............................................................................................... 28
4.2.1 Securitization in practice ...................................................................................... 28
4.2.2 Speech acts .......................................................................................................... 29
4.3 Time period 2016-2019............................................................................................... 34
4.3.1 Securitization in practice ...................................................................................... 34
4.3.2 Speech acts .......................................................................................................... 37
5. Discussion and summary ................................................................................................ 40
6. Conclusion....................................................................................................................... 43
7. Sources ............................................................................................................................ 45
31. Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, the traditional authoritarian regime has been challenged by a
new type of authoritarian regime. This new type of authoritarian regime can on a spectrum be
placed between democracy and authoritarianism– this thesis will refer to it as an electoral
authoritarian regime (EAR). Other names include hybrid regimes, illiberal democracy, semi-
authoritarianism and stealth authoritarianism. On paper, this regime resembles a democracy –
with constitutionally protected free and fair elections, independent judicial institutions and the
existence of opposition parties, for example. However, these democratic institutions are
abused to wash away the sins of autocrats. In practice, democratic institutions are violated to a
large extent – often with legal backing – which at the end of the day brings this type of regime
closer to the authoritarian end of the spectrum.
EARs have gained a reputation for being particularly resilient, constantly adapting
their strategies to enable further rule. According to Schedler (2013), the main structural flaw
of EARs lies in uncertainty – institutional as well as informational. EARs never know if their
rule is secure, and if it is, they do not know how secure. For EARs, maintaining power while
displaying supposed dedication to the pillars of democracy is the goal. Coercion, repression
and simply imprisoning political dissidents only works to a certain extent and often comes off
as too undemocratic. The optics are less than ideal, especially for EARs that heavily depend
on foreign aid where demands for democracy are part of the deal. The regime would also lose
its status as electoral authoritarian and simply becomes authoritarian. Because of this, EARs
are often careful to legitimize questioned aspects of their rule by referring to what can be
perceived as genuine concerns for the state and its citizens, oftentimes connected to state
security. This way EARs can avoid, or at least attempt to avoid, accusations of
authoritarianism. The importance of studying legitimization in EARs lies in the fact these
legitimizations are what EARs use in order to continuously enable undemocratic rule. In order
to ensure continuous rule, the grounds on which the regime’s legitimization is based often
need to change over time. How do EARs act when previously used legitimizations no longer
are viewed as acceptable?
In order for a legitimization to be effective, EARs need to refer to problems that
citizens or other audiences of messaging can relate to. Referring to a threat to society, for
example, justifies certain measures, pointing to the duty to protect the country. In addition,
criticism from the international community can then easily be dismissed as non-sense, since
one can point to the specific reasons why these political actions are justified. The international
4community will instead be told off for the lack of understanding of the special situation the
country is in. This strategy facilitates long-term rule, since there will always be issues worth
prioritizing and the leadership will be showcased as all-knowing.
This thesis will discuss Rwanda and how its government has handled challenges to
legitimizing its rule. Since the end of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, Rwanda has been praised
for peaceful reconciliation and for a fast recovery, and was therefore for long the international
community’s darling. The fear of a recurrence of the genocide has long been used as the basis
for legitimization of the President Paul Kagame and his ruling party Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF). After the genocide Rwanda needed a strong and stable government, and the
legitimization of the government and its policies was thus based on preventing another
genocide. Considering the nature of the genocide, the new constitution put in place in 2003
banned any recognition of ethnic groups or differences, political opponents were often
accused of violating the law of genocide ideology and the need for peace was often
highlighted. Although this was reasonable to a certain extent considering the historical
circumstances, the genocide was used as legitimization of the government itself, as a security
precaution.
However, there is reason to believe the legitimization tactic of the government has
changed. Despite regular elections, no real political opposition exists. Kagame and the RPF
secured their second win in the 2010 presidential elections. In addition, the year 2014 was
approaching, marking 20 years since the genocide, which means a new generation of citizens
become eligible to partake in politics. Considering Rwanda is a receiver of large amounts of
international aid (up to 40 % of the regime’s revenues came from foreign donors in 2016
according to World Economic Forum), the government cannot continuously use the same
legitimization strategy all while being heavily criticized for undemocratic tendencies. The
effectiveness of the genocide as a legitimization strategy began to weaken and other grounds
for legitimization was needed, yet this was (meant to be) Kagame’s last seven years as
President. To ensure further rule, the government turned to threat perception and insecurity as
legitimization.
The overarching purpose of this thesis is to study legitimization strategies in EARs. In
order to achieve this, the thesis will focus on how the Rwandan government coped with
challenges to its rule by changing the grounds for legitimization. More specifically, it studies
how the Rwandan government through discourse uses threat perception and insecurity from
2010 and onwards, in order to legitimize itself and thus consolidate long-term rule.
51.1 Research question
Since the genocide is becoming an event of the past, legitimization must be rooted in
something other than the genocide in order for it to still be relevant. Yet, it should ideally be
rooted in security concerns. The effectiveness of using the genocide as legitimization was
because it was based on fear of history repeating itself, thus legitimizing policies that would
help prevent another genocide. The research question is a descriptive question, with the aim
of presenting reality as it is. It is focused on the time period 2010-2019 and goes as follows:
How has the Rwandan government used insecurity and threat perception to legitimize further
rule after 2010?
1.2 Previous research
Considering the aim of this thesis is to investigate how the Rwandan government handles
challenges in legitimization so as to secure long-term rule, previous research focuses on the
theoretical perspectives of legitimization strategies, and thus resilience, in EARs. This is vital
in order to map previous theoretical contributions to the field, and to clarify how this thesis
fills the gaps left by previous research. But first, it is important to point out the difference
between legitimacy and legitimization. Legitimacy is rooted in the relationship between the
government and its citizens and is thus measured through analyzing political attitudes of
citizens, for example. Legitimacy is hard to measure in EARs since it would require data on
support for the government and its leader, and such data is most likely not available or, if
available, not accurate. Legitimization, however, is the government’s process of providing
legitimacy, through discourses and strategies (Berger & Luckmann 1967, Ansell 2001). As
mentioned, perpetual legitimization is essential for the longevity of EARs.
Legitimization has largely been studied from the two perspectives of international
legitimization (Hoffman 2014, Holbig 2011). Defensive international legitimization is based
on the positioning of the nation state against the international community, whether it be other
governments or international organizations like the United Nations. Expansive international
legitimization, on the other hand, focuses on a wider range of methods to strengthen the
national legitimacy through the use of the international community. This thesis will however
focus more on legitimization in the national arena, and less on international legitimization.
The legitimization of EARs, and thus their stability, is not as theorized and covered as the
stability of for example democracies. In fact, researchers have questioned whether the concept
6of legitimization can be applied properly on non-democratic states. However, EARs cannot
solely rely on coercion and abuse of power in the long-run, especially since they per
definition aim to showcase some sort of democratic façade. The traditional concept of
legitimization has therefore been adapted to enable analysis of legitimization in EARs.
Ribgy (1982) adapted the concept of legitimization by introducing the term “goal-
rational legitimacy” – legitimization strategies where the end justifies the means (such as
strategies to achieve communism). Previous research has also included legitimization as one
of the three pillars through which EARs find their stability: repression, co-option and
legitimization (Gerschewski 2013). These three pillars reinforce each other, making them part
of a particularly stable foundation on which the resilience of EARs rests. Schlumberger and
Bank (2002) arrive at similar conclusions regarding EAR resilience, but their pillars consist of
“enhanced political legitimacy, significantly changed political elites and inherited instruments
of authoritarian control” (Schlumberger and Bank 2002). Out of these pillars, legitimization is
the less obvious component.
Focusing specifically on the pillar of legitimization, Hutcherson and Petersson
introduce the idea of legitimization as derived from different issues. They argue that
legitimization is often extracted from, and rests upon, different pillars, for example economic
growth or security and order. When one pillar of legitimization begins to falter, another pillar
of legitimization needs to be strengthened in order to preserve overall (supposed) legitimacy.
Constant legitimization delivery is required in order to maintain the rule of the government
(Hutcherson & Petersson 2016).
Another perspective to observe when studying legitimization strategies in EARs is the
story of the political myth, and how the political myth changes over time. Political myths are
a part of every nation, and act as unifying story for all citizens within a nation (Smith 1991,
Hosking & Schöpflin 1997). Political myths are easiest defined as an important story, and are
the most effective when a significant group of people act as if it is true (Peterson, 2013). The
reason the political myth is important when discussing challenges in legitimization in EARs is
because they often steer political action. All political myths represent an “emotional
attachment on the collective level” (Bottici & Challand 2013, 4). Furthermore, political myths
motivate political action, which is the important aspect in this context considering it connects
political action with the process of legitimization. Bell (2013) focused particularly on the
nature of political myths. Bell concluded that they are “temporally and spatially extended
discursive realm wherein the struggle for control of peoples’ memories and the formation of
nationalist myths is debated, contested and subverted incessantly” (Bell 2003, 66). Political
7myths do not stay unchanged forever, they are shaped and constructed over time, often
intentionally and to suit a certain purpose. Political myths are perpetually challenged (Bell
2003, Tranter & Donoghue 2014). The passing of time either results in the political myth
remaining unchanged, and hence the successful legitimization of the government, or it results
in the replacement of the myth, as well as of the government.
This thesis aims to contribute to research regarding how EARs deal with challenges in
how to legitimize its rule. Previous attempts to study the subject has focused on the pillars of
legitimization and how regimes need to continuously make sure that the pillars of
legitimization are effective. Furthermore, the utilization of a political myth can help in
legitimizing further rule depending on how it is used. It can be argued that the political myth
in the case of Rwanda is the genocide which affects almost every political decision. However,
it is more of a historical backdrop than a myth (a myth is per definition not true, which of
course does not apply to the genocide), which makes it an even stronger foundation for future
legitimization.
In Rwanda, the pillars of legitimization are not used simultaneously in varying degree
as Hutcherson & Peter claim, but instead one pillar for legitimization is eventually replaced
by another pillar. Previous research has not focused adequately on the nature of the regimes it
studies, in this case EARs, and how this affects the legitimization strategy. This thesis argues
that one of the main characteristics of EARs – uncertainty – is used in an advantageous way
to legitimize further rule. By making sure that legitimization is embedded in the same issue,
the genocide and the lessons learned in this case, it can be argued that this enables the
government to hold on to power in a more legitimate way than simply using the same reason
continuously, although in varying degree. This thesis contributes to the field by illustrating
how, if managed properly, the main flaw of an EAR can in fact be the cause of its long-term
strength.
1.3 Disposition
After this introductory chapter, chapter 2 focuses on theory. First, a section introducing
EARs, and second, a section on securitization theory. The last part of the theory chapter will
focus on the analytical framework, deducted from securitization theory. The following
chapter 3 will present the methodology used, sources, scope and limitations, as well as a
background section on the time period 2003-2009. The analysis will be conducted in chapter
5 and a summarizing discussion in chapter 6. Finally, chapter 7 will conclude the thesis and
its findings.
82. Theory
2.1 Electoral authoritarian regimes
In order to theorize the strategies of an EAR, Andreas Schedler’s theory will be used.
Schedler’s definition is the most extensive one and focuses on all democratic institutions of
society, as opposed to other theorists’ definitions which focus more on the elections held in
EARs and how these are manipulated. Although most definitions are applicable to a certain
extent, Schedler also discusses the nature of EARs and the nature of their power, which is
beneficial when analyzing the strategic actions an EAR, in this case legitimization. To
illustrate this, Schedler speaks of the challenges EARs face, what he refers to as the politics of
uncertainty.
According to Schedler, EARs do not repress the existence of representative
institutions, but instead become experts in manipulating them (Schedler 2013). According to
Schedler, EARs are essentially authoritarian regimes, hiding behind a democratic façade.
Institutional autonomy is never a goal for leaders in these types of regimes. The goal is
instead to achieve the continuity of power that exists in authoritarian regimes, backed up by
the legitimacy of winning elections. The main difference between electoral democracy and
electoral authoritarianism is not the presence of elections, which exists in both systems, but
the nature of the elections (Schedler 2013). In EARs, elections are held regularly, both
presidential and parliamentary, in order to uphold some resemblance of a functioning
democracy, and the opposition is often allowed to run. But these elections, unlike in
democracies, do not fulfil minimal democratic requirements – they are far from free and fair.
The nature of elections is also the main difference between electoral authoritarianism and
pure authoritarianism. In EARs, competition does exist but the incumbent leader is almost
guaranteed a win, and almost always does win (Schedler 2013). But up until then, political
campaigns by the opposition are allowed and the election result may give a few parliamentary
seats to the opposition so as to maintain the image of a legitimate win.
But the focus of this thesis is not the elections in EARs, but instead how EARs handle
challenges and threats to their rule. According to Schedler, all EARs are haunted by two
forms of uncertainty, institutional uncertainty that derives from their structural insecurity and
informational uncertainty that derives from their structural opacity (Schedler 2013). EARs
can never relax, as they perpetually have to “prevent, detect, and contain threats to their hold
on power”, illustrating their problem with security, and they never know “how good they are
at preventing, detecting, and containing threats to their survival in power”, illustrating the
9problem with opacity (Schedler 2013, 1). To summarize, the power of EARs is never secure,
neither do EARs know exactly how secure their power is. Both institutional and informational
uncertainty are “connected and mutually reinforcing” (Schedler 2013, 2).
As a consequence of these uncertainties, EARs face two challenges: “… the
construction of political realities (the management of threats) and the construction of political
appearances (the management of threat perceptions)” (Schedler 2013, 1). Long-term
uncertainty forces regimes to act in terms of coping with the uncertainty but also by changing
it. However, regimes can also use uncertainty to their advantage by transforming, suppressing
or heightening it, making “uncertainty is a powerful independent variable as well as a crucial
dependent variable” (Schedler 2013, 2). Thus, compared to other researchers, Schedler
recognizes the fact that uncertainty can be both an independent variable and a dependent
variable. When uncertainty limits regimes, they must act in an adaptive manner. Regimes
shape their beliefs and make calculations according to the information that they have, and
they “adjust to perceived levels of regime security through self-protective strategies”
(Schedler 2013, 2). When uncertainty aids regimes, they act in a creative manner. Regimes
then transform their beliefs and make calculations through “communicative strategies” and
they modify “levels of regime security through strategies of threat containment and threat
creation” (Schedler 2013, 2). For the different types of uncertainty, see Table 1.1. To
conclude, in order for regimes to hold onto power, they need to shape the uncertainties
themselves. The focus will be on how the Rwandan government shapes uncertainties through
communications about insecurity as well how they argue for threat management and
containment.
(Schedler 2013, 2)
102.2 Security
The theory that will be used as a base for the analytical framework is securitization. Since the
use of the genocide as legitimization was rooted in security, future legitimizations are most
likely connected to security as well, making securitization a fitting theory. After WWII,
security became related to protecting a specific way of life and the prevailing political order,
it no longer only meant military defense (Buzan et al 1998). Security is also closely tied to a
state’s sovereignty and how to protect this sovereignty. In International Relations (IR),
security is closely related to power politics, as opposed to security in everyday life meaning
“without threat”. This thesis will use the Copenhagen School’s (CS) perspective on security,
which was first developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver in the 1980s. According to the CS,
when concentrating on a political issue in terms of security, “an assumption that something is
related to threat and defense is automatically made” (Buzan et al 1998, 21). One of the
specific theories in security studies developed by the CS is securitization, which will be used
in this thesis.
2.2.1 Securitization theory by the Copenhagen School
The CS widens the concept of security studies to include the non-military concerns such as
economic, environmental, societal and political concerns, yet not moving away from the core
assumptions regarding threat and survival. Societal securitization is of special importance
here, since the thesis focuses on the utilization of securitization to secure long-term rule, by
illustrating how further rule by the Kagame government is necessary due to challenges to the
Rwandan society. Societal securitization can be described as the “…ability of a society to
persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats”
(Wæver et al 1993, 23). This makes the CS view on security a fitting approach in this case
considering the fact that military actions are not what is discussed here. In addition, the CS
approach makes it possible to not only focus on ‘real’ security issues but also the process and
practices of securitization. The term security is a social construct according to the CS, since it
has several dimensions and depends on the historical context (Buzan et al 1998).
Securitization is essentially the process that captures how an issue is framed, thus
securitization is first and foremost a speech act, according to the CS. One can present an issue
as being of uttermost importance using “language of survival, urgency and priority of action”
(Buzan et al 1998, 23). Making an issue seem as an existential threat makes it possible to
prioritize the issue and take immediate action. The existential threat thus justifies taking
political measures that are otherwise viewed as extreme in order to deal with the existential
11threat (Buzan et al 1998). These measures entail breaking rules. But the breaking of rules in
itself is not what leads to a successful securitization, but it is the fact that breaking of rules is
justified by the existential threat (Buzan et al 1998). If the appropriate measures are not taken,
an alarming picture is painted where the chance to act has passed and society as we know it
may no longer exist. To summarize, securitization means turning an issue into a security
issue.
That being said, it does not mean simply identifying threats, but focusing on the whole
process of constructing an issue as a threat. Illustrating that an issue is a threat does not equal
complete securitization. Declaring an issue as a security issue is defined as ‘the securitizing
move’, but in order for the securitization to be successful the audience (the people for whom
the issue is securitized) needs to accept the issue being securitized and also accept the
measures being taken to handle the issue (Buzan et al 1998). But it is important to mention
that the audience in this context does not necessarily mean the whole population, but can
instead mean political elites, the military or other groups. The securitization move can be
considered extreme or illegitimate by the general population, but legitimate by a smaller
audience and thus be successful (Does 2013).
Hence, there are three components that need to be present in order for the
securitization to be successful: 1) existential threat, 2) emergency action, 3) effect of
emergency action on interunit relations (Buzan et al 1998). The effect of emergency action on
interunit relations means the effect that the taking of emergency action has on the relationship
between the person who is securitizing and the audience. This, however, is not relevant in this
thesis. Considering Rwanda is not fully democratic, the actions of the President or
government does not necessarily have to be accepted by the audience, i.e. Rwandan citizens.
Furthermore, the actions of the President alone do not have to be accepted even by a smaller
audience, for example the Parliament. The CS acknowledges that securitization may in
include more than just the speech act, since in some contexts it is “…wise to shift the focus
from the securitizing actor who performs the act to the logic that shapes the action” (Buzan et
al 1998, 41). By possibly including more than just speech acts, one achieves a better
understanding of the underlying reason securitization is occurring and why a particular issue
is being securitized. Furthermore, if the following three components are present the
securitization process is made even easier: 1) the way in which the issue is spoken about, i.e.
the language of emergency and unavoidability needs to be used, 2) the actor attempting to
securitize an issue has to have authority since the audience then easier accepts the
securitization process, and 3) the issue is generally viewed as threatening, even without
12securitization (Buzan et al 1998). Concerning the last point, in this sense, a successful speech
act therefore “depends on a combination of language and society” (Buzan et al 1998, 32).
Buzan et al distinguishes between three units as part of the analysis: referent objects,
securitizing actors, and functional actors. A referent object is the object or issue presented as
existentially threatened, i.e. the issue being securitized (Buzan et al 1998). The referent object
is referred to as something that has to survive, therefore demands extraordinary measure to
save it. Traditionally the state, and indirectly the nation, has been an obvious referent object
that deserves protection. Securitizing the state is also easily done considering the state has an
apparent “authorized representative” in the form of the government, thus the state speaks for
itself (Buzan et al 1998, 42). But while the CS recognizes the historical importance of the
state, other referent objects are possible. The securitizing actor is the actor who securitizes by
presenting the referent object as existentially threatened (Buzan et al 1998). This often
includes people in power, such as government actors like presidents, prime ministers, and
members of parliament. But it can also include other actors such as heads of organizations,
the United Nations, other states collaborating with the state in question. According to Buzan
et al, a securitizing actor cannot simply be an individual but has to be a person with authority
(Buzan et al 1998). Functional actors are those who influence the decision to securitize,
which is less relevant in this case but can include the media and civil society organizations
(Buzan et al 1998). This study focuses only on the referent objects and the securitizing actors,
since the aim is to observe the securitization process by the government (the securitizing actor
in this case) over time, and more specifically how the government’s actions can be viewed as
a logical part of the securitization process.
2.2.2 Critique
One main point of critique against the CS view on security and securitization is that it places
limitations on who can be viewed as a securitizing actor. Since securitization according to the
CS per definition must lead to extraordinary measures, the securitizing actor must then be
someone with authority. Some argue that this favors state actors, leaders and political elites,
since these are usually the only ones in a powerful enough position to turn an issue into a
security threat, and thus enabling extraordinary measures to be taken (Mitropoulos 2015, 24).
The CS therefore disregards the role of the media, for example, in securitizing issues. In this
thesis, this is not an issue considering the Rwandan government is what is being studied.
Furthermore, since securitization according to the CS must involve the extraordinary
measures taken after a security threat has been declared, the theory misses out on the process
13leading up to the extraordinary measures. A long-term securitization process, growing in
intensity, can be just as valuable when studying securitization as the full securitization process
defined by the CS. McDonald, for example, finds that the CS thus “defines the context too
narrowly, with the focus lying exclusively on the time of intervention – the moment of
articulating a security threat” (McDonald 2008, 564). Although this critique does not change
the usefulness of the CS theory in this case, the analysis will present securitization as well as
the extraordinary measures taken over time, thus acknowledging that securitization can vary
in intensity throughout the process.
As opposed to the CS, Balzacq argues that effective securitization is in fact focused on
the audience. He points out that the securitizing actor has to identify its audience “needs,
feelings and interests”, and “tune his/her language to the audience’s experience” in order to
appear convincing (Balzacq 2005, 184). Though the audience in this case is not as relevant,
how the language used in speech acts can be connected to the personal experiences of the
population is a valid point, which will be considered when analyzing.
Lastly, there has been criticism about whether or not the CS approach to securitization
works on cases outside of Europe. The use of speech acts to convey political messages by
people of authority is a large part of political culture in the Western World, but political
cultures differ and other acts besides speech acts might be more common in other parts of the
world (McDonald 2008). Although Eurocentrism is always relevant to address, the CS
approach to securitization is still relevant to the thesis in question since the analysis is not
based on if the securitizing actors securitize through speech acts, but instead focus lies on how
the securitizing actors securitize in their existing speech acts.
2.3 Analytical framework
Once again, the concept of security is socially constructed. It is important to note that security
cannot act as an analytical concept on its own. When using the CS theory on securitization,
the securitizing actors are the ones who decide which issues are securitized, so using the
securitizing actors’ definitions of security is therefore encouraged, if not necessary. This can
only be found by reading and analyzing the speech acts. In order to find an answer to the
research question, the analytical framework will consist of questions to use on the speech acts.
The analytical questions are based on the process of securitization, i.e. who or what is a threat
and against what, how do the securitizing actors illustrate this and how do they suggest
dealing with it.
14Analytical questions
1.) Who or what is the referent object, i.e. the object or issue presented as existentially
threatened by the securitizing actors?
2.) Who or what is the threat and how is this illustrated?
3.) What is the suggested emergency action, i.e. how should the threat be dealt with
according to the securitizing actors?
3. Method
This is a qualitative case study, consisting of a single case – Rwanda. A case study is a good
method to use since the advantage of case studies is the high internal validity, with the
possibility to create a strong research design with extensive information on data collection
and interpretation (Bryman 2001). However, the lack of high external validity in case studies
may be a problem, meaning the results may be hard to generalize and use in other studies. But
seeing as this thesis is an in-depth study with no intention to generalize the case-specific
results for a large number of cases, this is not an issue. Qualitative analysis is based on an
interpretative framework, which is necessary in order to successfully use securitization to
study the construction of insecurity and threat perception (Bryman 2001).
3.1 Critical discourse analysis
Discourse analysis is a type of qualitative text analysis, with the specific aim to critically
examine the content in the chosen material (Esaiasson et al 2012). Traditionally, discourse
analysis has been defined as the study of words in a specific social context, but it has
developed and can now also entail the study of other human expressions (Esaiasson et al
2012). A discourse essentially constructs what is possible to say and not say when it comes to
certain issues, and it claims that how issues are spoken of is crucial in terms of how we
interpret the world around us (Esaiasson et al 2012). A discourse can always change,
especially if a leading actor deliberately changes the way he or she talks about an issue
(Bryman 2001).
The specific method used for this study is critical discourse analysis (CDA). CDA is
mainly associated with the works of Fairclough, who viewed social practices as “…tied to
specific historical contexts and as the means by which existing social relations are reproduced
or contested and different interests served” (McLoughlin 2017, 5). Focusing on the word
critical, CDA is considered to be “discourse analysis with an attitude” (Van Dijk 2001, 96).
15Societal problems are key in CDA, as the method claims that discourse (language) plays a
large role in producing and reinforcing abuse of power and authority. The notion of
“common-sense” is often used as a manifestation of power and can be defined as using a
discourse to display social practices as normal and a given, resulting in acceptance of the
social practice itself (McLoughlin 2017, 5). CDA thus focuses on critically analyzing and
exposing the practices described as “common-sense” by those who set the discourse. Though
it should be noted that “critically analyze” does not necessarily entail a negative
interpretation. CDA goes well with the chosen theory, securitization theory, since
securitization is a process over time where words, as well as images and videos, are used to
build a sense of threat. CDA not only examines the type of language used but also shines light
on power structures, and since the thesis argues that the Rwandan government shapes the
uncertainties that legitimize its rule, CDA provides a good way of studying how the discourse
has changed in order to benefit the government. Furthermore, this thesis is a so-called actor-
central study, focusing on the actors creating the discourse (Esaiasson et al 2012). As opposed
to a study that only focuses on which ideas are being constructed rather than on the actors
constructing the ideas, it is in this context vital to note who says what, since only actors of
authority can securitize.
The critique against CDA is mainly focused on the issue of interpretation. The results
of an CDA is largely based on the researcher’s interpretation. This can be a weakness, but can
be dealt with by comparing the results of this study to other studies (Milliken 1999). Besides,
since the aim of the thesis is to examine the government’s perspective, the interpretation will
focus more on the securitizing actors and what they possibly aimed to convey through their
speech acts, and focus less on the personal understanding of the researcher. Another critique
of CDA, and discourse analysis in general, is that its results does not display reality as it is.
But CDA does not aim to prescribe different meanings to texts, but instead read texts as they
are and try to illustrate how a specific discourse is produced through the text in question
(McLoughlin 2017). Again, this type of analysis emerges as a good choice for this study since
the language used by the Rwandan government does not necessarily portray reality, instead
the government uses language to portray the type of reality that is beneficial to its rule. Hence,
language does not create reality, but one can only analyze reality “through the descriptions
made in language” (Sayyid and Zac 1998, 254).
Since the aim of the thesis implies that the government has made continued rule
possible during the period of study, the results from analyzing speech acts by securitizing
actors will be cross-checked with actual changes regarding attempts by the government to
16stabilize its rule. According to the CS approach, extraordinary actions are taken as a result of
securitization. Simply illustrating if and how issues has been rhetorically securitized in
Rwanda during the given time period would be relevant research as well, depending on how
you use the CS theory. However, in order to fulfil the aim and answer the research question,
demonstrating how attempts to legitimize further rule actually lead to further rule are needed.
In other words, if the legitimization of further rule was successful will be illustrated by
demonstrating concrete effects of securitization on policy and lawmaking. In this case, both
newly implemented laws restricting political diversity as well as opponents will be included
but also how existing laws have been used, i.e. how charges and sentences have been
legitimized in court and other instances. The reasoning behind charges and sentences towards
journalists, media houses and other opponents are relevant to include, since it can give the
researcher an indication if restrictions in practice are legitimized by referrals to the issue that
has been securitized by securitizing actors.
When the speech acts were analyzed using CDA, two contexts were considered: the
context of the speech act as a whole and the context in which the speech act is presented. In
order to understand a specific passage in a speech act, one must understand the speech act as a
whole, and vice versa. But even more importantly, the context of the speech act itself was
taken into account, in order not to focus too much on single words here and there. In addition,
the method used on other materials can by all means be used when interpreting speech acts,
meaning one examines different interpretation options (hypotheses) and discusses which one
seems the most likely, considering the knowledge we have about the context (Esaiasson et al
2012). If the speech act is interpreted this way, what are the consequences? Do these
consequences align with our knowledge of the situation overall? Basically, one chooses the
interpretation that it best paired with one’s understanding of the situation surrounding the
speech acts. In this case, does a certain interpretation of a speech act by Kagame correspond
to how he acts in reality, for example how political dissents are handled in Rwanda? This
makes the sections describing securitization in practice essential in terms of complementing
the interpretation of the speech acts, as well as achieving the complete picture of
securitization. The speech acts and their most notable quotes are compared to the real-life
examples brought up in the section on securitization in practice. If the, for example,
emergency action suggested in the speech acts actually occurred, then the conclusion is made
that securitization is in fact taking place.
When reading the speech acts, focus has been on quotes mentioning security or similar
concepts, and political dissidents, either by name or by indirect referrals. Sentences or words
17which imply how the government handles challenges are especially noted, as well as the
language used to describe these challenges. References to the genocide are also worth noting.
The reason references to the genocide are important in this context is because it strengthens
the credibility of the actors’ statements. Since the genocide and the trauma it left behind is
still an open wound for many in Rwanda, mentioning the genocide facilitates the securitizing
actors’ quest to shape the perceptions of their audience.
3.2 Sources
The sources used for this study are mostly Rwandan sources, since the focus is on the actions
and language of the Rwandan government. Primary sources are therefore best if available,
meaning material directly from the Rwandan government. This has been used to a certain
extent, as speech acts by Kagame or other government officials and general press releases
have been found through the Rwandan government’s official website. Speech acts by Kagame
has also been found on newspapers’ websites such as The New Times or The Rwandan. When
looking at actual changes regarding restrictions on rights, for example, a number of sources
have been used. International organizations’ annual reports on Rwanda provide a summary of
democratic developments, or drawbacks, for a specific year.
When using other sources than Rwandan, bias is a legitimate issue. The truthfulness
needs to be analyzed when using material coming from sources that have an interest in
showcasing the Rwandan government as incompetent, such as countries in the region with
which Rwanda currently have conflicts with. If such sources are used, one needs to be aware
of the possible bias and at least try to analyze it from different angles. However, most material
is taken from Rwandan sources, limiting the impact of this type of bias. For material coming
directly from the Rwandan government, bias is less of an issue since what the thesis is
focused on is how the Rwandan government legitimizes itself through speech acts. One can
assume that the government means what it says and that its statements are an accurate
representation of the government’s view on these matters. When using Rwandan newspapers
to find material, whether they are faithful to the government or critical of it, only direct quotes
by Kagame or other government officials has been used. The same goes with comments or
interviews. Considering many newspapers are faithful to the government, interpretations or
comments on political events are most likely biased in favor of the government. Speech acts
by Kagame have also often been cross-checked across multiple websites in order to make sure
that the speech in question actually occurred and that the content is accurate.
18Sources such as international organizations such as Human Rights Watch (HRW),
Freedom House (FH) or Amnesty International (AI) is another issue that must be addressed as
one must always be critical of the accuracy of the content. These types of organizations often
receive heavy criticism from non-democratic governments. If a report is critical of the
Rwandan government and how they handled a specific situation, the Rwandan government
will most likely always dispute the truthfulness of the report. This is expected, and while this
does not mean that the government presents the correct facts, it also does not mean that the
organization in question presents the correct facts either. However, several organizations
often present similar criticism, which makes the information more credible. In addition, the
government does not always deny that a political opponent or dissident was imprisoned for
example, but it does argue that its action was justified and often provide a reason. The focus
then shifts from the question of if opponents were imprisoned, to the question of why they
were imprisoned. This is exactly what this thesis aims to focus on, the legitimization strategy
used by the government. Hence, the information from international organizations will not be
analyzed for its truthfulness but used more as a backdrop and to illustrate the context of the
speech acts.
3.3 Material
All material used has been in English, or translated to English by an English-speaking
Rwandan newspaper. The government’s official journal, The Gazette, is published in three of
the official languages of Rwanda – English, French and Kinyarwanda. Speech acts in
Kinyarwanda that have not been translated have not been used in order to avoid
mistranslation. When it comes to the availability, it was difficult to find large amounts of
material that had been translated into English considering many speech acts by Kagame, for
example, are held in Kinyarwanda. Kagame’s official website and YouTube channel have
recently begun to include English subtitles to his speech acts. A translation service could have
been used, in order to increase the number of speech acts. But considering it is not only the
ideas presented in a speech act that are important but also the exact words used to describe
these ideas, the risk of losing specific words because of mistranslation was assessed too big a
risk.
The number of speech acts from the time period of 2010-2019 is 25. Considering all
the speech acts are very expressive, the number of speech acts can be considered to be
enough, although it would have been better to have more speech acts in order to further
strengthen the analysis. Most are speech acts by Kagame, but a few are government press
19releases with comments by the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Louise Mushikiwabo.
When selecting which speech acts to include, there are two ways to reason. One can either
select typical speech acts, as there is no reason to believe other speech acts are any different
from those selected, or select critical speech acts, which are speech acts that are most likely to
include the discourse one is searching for (Esaiasson et al 2012). In this case, the speech acts
that have been selected are those where the securitizing actors have the possibility to
securitize, i.e. critical speech acts. When looking at speech acts concerning the inauguration
of a school or the launch of a new health initiative, for example, the absence of securitization
would most likely depend on the topic of the speech act. However, speech acts where Kagame
addresses party members, military officers or the Parliament are more valuable because if
securitization is taking place, these types of speech acts would indicate that. Again, this
makes the number of speech acts used adequate in terms of finding an answer to the research
question.
Concerning a large portion of the material is speeches, the issue of speech writers
should be acknowledged. Some are critical to using speeches, arguing that speeches held by
heads of state or other government representatives are often not written by the speaker, but by
a speech writer. The extent to which the Rwandan government uses speech writers is not
known. However, the content of the speech is often known to the speaker, and the speech
writers’ task is merely to mirror the opinions of the speaker using the best words and
expressions possible, but without changing the ideas brought up (Le Pestre, 1997).
3.4 Scope and limitations
3.4.1 Rwanda
The main factor for choosing Rwanda to study legitimizations does not lie in the fact that its
democratic institutions are weak, since that is expected considering its status as an EAR.
The main reason is because the Rwandan government has managed to successfully hold onto
power for more than twenty years and counting, despite a challenge to their legitimization.
The government’s previous legitimization strategy was to a large extent understandable, and
the government could stay in power and at the same time build international legitimacy.
However, the passing of time made the utilization of the genocide less acceptable. But
considering Kagame is due to stay on as President until at least 2024 , one cannot say
anything other than that the government has been successful in going from one legitimization
to another, making Rwanda a good case for analyzing an EAR’s long-term strategy regarding
legitimization of its rule.
203.4.2 Time frame
The time frame of the thesis is 2010-2019. To observe legitimization strategies, a longer time
period of study is needed in order to track the changes made, in order to accurately provide an
answer to the research question. The research question assumes changes in legitimizations
after 2010 and onwards. The material used to answer the research question will thus be from
the time period of 2010-2019, since it is during that time period that the changes occurred.
This also makes sure the modified constitution from 2015 is included. The first regular
elections after the genocide of 1994 were not held until 2003, an election which resulted in
Kagame’s first official win. However, Kagame has been President since 2000, without the
legitimacy of winning an election. Since 2003, general elections have been held every seven
years, making 2010 and 2017 the subsequent elections years.
Since it is well known that the genocide was used as legitimization in the years after
the genocide and during Kagame’s first term, the time period of 2003-2009 will act as a
background chapter. It is important to include for contextual reasons, but it will not be part of
the analysis. It should also be noted that the use of the genocide as legitimization has not
completely been replaced, although it is used to a much lesser extent. Rwanda has had the
same leadership (Kagame and the RPF) during the whole period, excluding change of
president or political change as a factor for changes in legitimization. No large-scale changes
to the political system of Rwanda have been made during this period either, other than
amendments to the constitution.
3.4.3 Background information 2003-2009
Since the focus of this thesis lies on analyzing legitimizations from 2010 and onwards, the
time period of 2003-2009 should be touched upon, although briefly. The main legitimization
used during this time period was the genocide. In 2003, a new constitution was put in place,
which clearly stated the limitations on for example freedom of speech in order to prevent
another genocide. Sentences such as “The State of Rwanda commits itself to…fighting the
ideology of genocide and all its manifestations” (article 9) and “Propagation of ethnic,
regional, racial or discrimination or any other form of division is punishable by law” (article
33) illustrate the constitution’s limits to freedom of speech (The Constitute Project 2017).
Furthermore, the law 47/2001, passed December 18th 2001, was frequently used during this
period to limit freedom of speech and thus restrict political opposition. Law 47/2001, also
known as the divisionism law, stated that:
21Discrimination is any speech, writing, or actions based on ethnicity, region
or country of origin, the color of the skin, physical features, sex, language,
religion or ideas…
Sectarianism means the use of any speech, written statement or action that
divides people, that is likely to spark conflicts among people, or that causes an
uprising which might degenerate into strife among people based on
discrimination mentioned in article one (1
(The Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda 2001)
Again, strict laws against discrimination were to a large extent justifiable, but they
were also abused. Journalists and newspapers were frequently charged with the crime of
divisionism, discrimination, or for promoting genocide ideology (The Committee to Protect
Journalists 2006). Politicians and political parties were also targeted. Leading up to the 2003
presidential elections, 47 members of the strongest opposition party, Democratic Republican
Movement (MDR), were held responsible for causing “discrimination and “divisionism”
(York, 2014). The party ultimately collapsed and its leader, Faustin Twagiramungu, ran as an
independent candidate. Two other political parties, the Liberal Party and the Social
Democratic Party supported Kagame in the same presidential elections, but when they
presented their own candidates in the parliamentary elections the same year, both parties were
accused of divisionism (Amnesty International 2004). In April 2009, BBC’s Kinyarwanda
service was temporarily banned after the airing of a controversial documentary, Rwanda: The
Untold Story, since it pointed to possible war crimes committed by the RPF during the
genocide. The documentary was accused of promoting genocide denial and of “re-writing
Rwandan history” (The Committee to Protect Journalists 2014). BBC’s Kinyarwanda service
is now banned indefinitely.
4. Analysis
As mentioned, the thesis focuses on the years 2010-2019. To better illustrate the change in
legitimization over the years, the analysis will be divided into three time periods: 2010-2012,
2013-2015, and 2016-2019. Considering laws and policy changes implemented during this
time period will be included in the analysis, the three time periods helps in understanding
when the government felt particularly insecure and when it used this uncertainty to their
advantage. Election years, for example, are particularly important for the government, both in
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