Wikileaks and the New Politics of Diplomacy
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Wikileaks and the New Politics of Diplomacy
by Mushahid Ali and CPT (NS) Benjamin Ho
Abstract:
The Wikileaks disclosures has result in embarrassment to the parties concerned, but no real harm done
to the US and its partners. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the leaks are inconsequential. Those
who raise the banner of freedom of information should also recognize the need for secrecy, especially
when the stakes go beyond intellectual curiosity and mass interest, to involve life and death.
Keywords: Diplomacy; International Relations; New Media; Wikileaks
Introduction
meets_with_China %27s_Communist_Party_Leader,_Mao_Tse-_
Princes who have achieved great things have
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:President_Nixon_
been those who have known how to trick men
with their cunning, and who, in the end, have
overcome those abiding by honest principles. The
Tung,_02-29-1972_-_NARA_-_194759.tif
following words, attributed to Niccolo Machiavelli
in his landmark work The Prince, are generally
taken to be the de facto standards governing a
realist paradigm of international politics. The
familiar saying “in politics, there are no permanent
friends or foes; only permanent interests” rings
true daily in the corridors of power. Deception is
widely acknowledged by international diplomats President Nixon Meets Mao Zedong, February 1972
and political statesmen to be part and parcel of
the political game. that the Pakistani intelligence services have
played a game of double-cross with the Central
The revelation of United States (US) diplomatic
Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the War Against
cables ought not to surprise members of the
Terror is nothing new; intelligence services
political community. A colleague of mine studying
have always been engaged in various forms of
at a top international relations university quipped
that “any self-respecting academic, diplomat or subversive activity against each other regardless
defense official should know that such news are of friend or foe. Likewise, cables revealing that
the basic, core stuff of international politics. the CIA had instructed US diplomats at its
Those gossip mills and write ups—most of overseas embassies to gather sensitive details
them marked Confidential or below Secret—are on their foreign counterparts should not be
standard [fare].” For instance, the revelation surprising; diplomats are tasked with promoting
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their countries’ interests and obtaining intimate potentially derailed or jeopardized the success of
information on other diplomats surely contributes the meeting.
towards that goal. On the other hand, spy games between Beijing
If such information-gathering activities are and Washington are hardly new, as David Wise
common practice in international diplomacy, why vividly recounts in his latest book, Tiger Trap:
then the political furor generated? To understand, America’s Secret Spy War with China. Likewise in
we need to be cognizant of the means in which First Directorate, Oleg Kalugin, a former Committee
states enter into diplomatic of State Security (KGB) general,
relations with each other. In The revelation of tells of the relentless slew of
the jargon of international US diplomatic cables KGB-CIA espionage battles
politics, governmental actions at the height of the Cold War
to engage in diplomatic
ought not to surprise
and how both agencies
activity with each other are members of the political resorted to a barrage of tactics
termed “track one” activities community. from media disinformation
while unofficial efforts by to assassination attempts to
nongovernmental professionals are classified outmaneuver each other.
under the “track two” category. Publicly,
countries have generally adopted a mixture of According to Arthur Kulnick, who teaches in
track one and two approaches in their conduct of the Department of International Relations at
international politics. In addition to these two, Boston University, the use of covert operations as
a third means of diplomacy is also available, that
is, through covert actions (or what I would term
as “off-track” means) undertaken by intelligence
services. Such actions can either be cooperative
or antagonistic—depending on the relationship
between two countries. In the case of the former,
they are often used to shield diplomatic activity
from the gaze of the public eye; in the case of the
Rais67, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:R%C3%A9volution_des_Jasmins_05.jpg
latter, such means are employed in order to guard
against or to subvert the foreign government in
question.
For instance, plans for the historic meeting
between US president Richard Nixon and China’s
Mao Zedong in 1972 were shrouded in such secrecy
that even top US state officials were deliberately
kept out of the picture. The visit by US National
Security Advisor Henry Kissinger to Beijing a year
earlier to pave the way for Nixon’s subsequent
visit was reportedly kept secret from then-
Secretary of State William Rogers. More crucially,
these covert preparations also allowed the US
to escape the attentions of both the American Tank in Front of the Cathedral of Tunis During the Jasmine
and Chinese public, whose opinions could have Revolution
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an instrument of a country’s foreign policy (in this a constant state of preparedness for overt
case, the US) is not new. Kulnick, who is also a conflict, a common interest in avoiding it, an
former CIA officer, points out that “covert action assignment of some geo-strategic value to every
may prove useful when military action is too part of the globe, and an implicit ‘rules of the
strong and where diplomacy seems ineffective.” game’ code that included toleration for covert
As such, explains Kulnick, policy makers look to actions below a certain threshold that did not
covert action as a “third option” as a potential introduce a major change in the power balance.”
tool against the “bad guys.” All these have changed today as the number of
This “third option” or “off-track means” participants in the political process increase.
however is often seen as being incompatible with Where diplomacy used to be the proprietary of
Western democratic ethos that is characterized by the political elites such as heads of state and
practices such as political transparency, informed ministers, private, corporate, and international
consent and truth-telling. Acts of deception—or nongovernmental actors now play a large and
in some cases, outright lying—are seen to be increasingly visible role. As the diplomatic
violating the norms of an international system fallout of Wikileaks evinced, the multiplication of
in which political actors are expected to “play by information sources (journalists, business owners
the rules.” and academics) involved in diplomatic activity in
What these rules are and whether states today’s world makes it increasingly difficult for
choose to play by these rules is less clear. While a state to exercise the full panoply of authority
those who engage in espionage activity may over the articulation of its foreign policy.
be prosecuted by the offended country, covert While the need for greater government
operations remain outside the legal aegis of the
international system. In other words, decisions to
accountability is certainly to be
utilize covert action in matters of statecraft are welcomed, it is unclear whether
ostensibly the state’s to make. But such decisions full disclosure of the dynamics of
can be problematic, particularly if acts of diplomacy—if such a goal is even
secrecy are deemed antithetical to the character possible—is necessarily a good thing.
of international law making. In their book
Regulating Covert Action, writers Michael Reisman What then is the future of international
and James Baker highlight the moral ambiguity diplomacy? Would the new global environment—
that acts of secrecy invoke: “secrecy often has marked by widespread technology usage—render
benefits for the agents of action, but it is a the diplomatic pouch irrelevant in matters of
property of actions which has substantial political statecraft? Would diplomatic activity—now
costs, particularly with regard to democratic viewed as potentially “leakable”—be reduced to a
principles of sharing participation in deciding on soft public relations exercise, one that is shorn of
the pronunciation of hard truths that diplomacy
particular actions before the fact and in reviewing
so often requires? Indeed, we have seen a myriad
and ascribing responsibility after the fact.”
of responses from the personalities concerned.
Furthermore, as the authors observed, much While some leaders brushed off the embarrassing
of the covert operations undertaken were rooted revelations, at least in public, others went on the
in a Cold War geopolitical context, that was offensive. In some cases, the US found it prudent
“marked by a clear delineation of the adversaries, to withdraw its ambassadors as their ability
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to function was compromised. In less prickly greater secrecy as government officials become
situations, the offended countries registered increasingly wary of official communication.
their protests to the state department. Chesterman observes: “The message that is
almost certainly going through every major power
Some examples from West Asia and North Africa
is: be careful what you commit to writing.” Such
are illustrative. Iran’s president Ahmedinejad, who
an outcome, if true, would indeed be deplorable
was depicted in the cables as being unpopular
for the future of international diplomacy. While
in the Gulf region, dismissed the Wikileaks
the need for greater government accountability
disclosures as “psychological warfare.” He claimed
is certainly to be welcomed, it is unclear whether
the US had deliberately leaked its own files in a
plot to discredit him. Saudi King Abdullah was full disclosure of the dynamics of diplomacy—
reported to be discomfited by reports that he had if such a goal is even possible—is necessarily a
urged the US to cut off the head of the snake, good thing.
in reference to the Iranian president’s defiant As such, two guiding principles are suggested:
posture on developing a nuclear capability. first, to be open about the grounds of secrecy,
In Tunisia and Libya, there was short- with clear criteria which can be defended; second,
term fallout. Washington had to pull out its protect less but protect it better. As one historian
ambassador in Tripoli because COL Gaddafi had argues, there is a vast amount of information that
been stung by comments about his attachment governments keep secret for apparently no good
to his “voluptuous blonde Ukrainian nurse.” The reason. A cursory glance at the leaked reports
ambassador in Tunis was similarly withdrawn due suggests that many of the classified reports could
to his unflattering reports about the president, easily have appeared as news analysis pieces in
Zein al Abdine bin Ali and his son. The critical newspapers. Truly classified information should
assessment of the regime’s long-term stability be handled in a classified manner and not to be
proved to be prescient. Within a month of the uploaded into a database accessible to all and
cables’ publications, Tunis was in the grip of sundry.
what some called the first Wikileaks revolution in There is a vast amount of information
Jasmine Square. Not surprisingly, Gaddafi warned
Tunisians not to be tricked by Wikileaks, which
that governments keep secret for
he described as “published information written apparently no good reason.
by lying ambassadors in order to create chaos.”
The assessment of the impact of the Wikileaks
Turkey’s Prime Minister reacted furiously to cables
disclosures has wound down to a more realistic
that suggested he was a corrupt closet Islamist.
one of embarrassment to parties concerned, but
Mexico’s president was enraged by negative
no real harm done to the US and its partners. The
reports of his conduct of the drug war in his exposures of corrupt practices or crooked acts in
country. some developing countries or illicit deals between
According to Simon Chesterman, law professor developed countries have had no lasting effect
at the National University of Singapore, the on the countries concerned, because those are
immediate consequences in the aftermath common knowledge to their people. Nevertheless,
of Wikileaks is not greater transparency, but this does not mean that we should view the leaks
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as inconsequential trivia; indeed, there are those one’s neighbor, especially if what is at stake is
who would use such information for harmful not simply a matter of satisfying intellectual
ends or to enrich themselves at the expense of curiosity or sustaining mass interest, but that
other communities. Those who raise the banner which ultimately involves life and death.
of freedom of information should also recognize
the need for secrecy as a means of protecting
Mr Mushahid Ali has been a Senior Fellow at RSIS, NTU, since June 2010.
He was also with RSIS’ predecessor, the Institute of Defense and Strategic
Studies from 2001 to 2004. He is the Coordinator of Conferences and
Events and Supervising Editor of RSIS publications. His areas of interest
are Regional Security in Southeast Asia and Politics and Strategic Affairs
of West Asia and the Middle East.
Mr Mushahid Ali was with Singapore’s Foreign Service from 1970 to 2000,
serving as Counselor in Singapore missions in Kuala Lumpur, Tokyo, London,
Jakarta, Hong Kong, and was Charge d’Affaires in Riyadh. While with the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs he was Deputy Director (International) (1977-
1980) and Chief of Protocol (1991-1995), before becoming Ambassador to
Cambodia (1995-2000). Called out from retirement, he served with the
Ministry of Defense (MINDEF) as Counselor in Cairo from 2005 to 2010.
Born in Johor, Malaya in 1941 and educated in Singapore at Gan Eng Seng
School, Mr Mushahid Ali obtained a Bachelor of Arts (Hons) from the
University of Singapore (NUS) in 1968. After leaving school, he became a
reporter with the Straits Times Press (1959-1963) and was a journalist with
Radio and Television Singapore (1963-1966). He was enlisted for National
Service from 1968 to 1969 and was an officer in MINDEF Public Relations.
Married with three grownup children, Mr Mushahid Ali was awarded the
Public Administration Medal (Silver) by the President of Singapore and
made a Commander, Royal Order of Sahametrei by the King of Cambodia.
CPT (NS) Benjamin Ho is an Associate Research Fellow at the Center of
Multilateralism Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
(RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU). His research interests
include the study of multilateral institutions in the Asia-Pacific region,
China’s foreign policy and political philosophy, and Singapore’s national
security and intelligence. He holds a Bachelor of Communication Studies
degree and a Masters degree in International Relations (both from NTU).
He was commissioned as an Armor Officer and is currently a company
commander with the 430 Singapore Armored Regiment.
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