WITCHCRAFT WARCRAFT - Ararat L. Osipian Of Corrupt Courts, Russian Raiders, and International Investors
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WITCHCRAFT AND
WARCRAFT
Of Corrupt Courts, Russian Raiders, and
International Investors
Ararat L. Osipian1
WITCHCRAFT AND WARCRAFT
Of Corrupt Courts, Russian Raiders, and International Investors
Ararat L. Osipian2
Osipian, Ararat L. Witchcraft and Warcraft: Of Corrupt Courts, Russian Raiders, and
International Investors. : Press, 2012.
This book presents an investigation into the politico-economic and legal issues of
corporate, property and land raiding and its impact on the investment climate in Russia. This
research defines the role of commercial arbitration courts, court bailiffs’ services, and law
enforcement agencies in raiding and highlights the element of corruption in these institutions as
deterministic for raiding. It also addresses major obstacles that domestic and foreign businesses
face due to the problem of raiding.
Key words: corruption, courts, transition, property rights, raiders, rule of law, Russia
JEL codes: I22, K42, P26, P31, P37
The book is intended for professors, scholars, graduate students, students, public officials,
leaders of NGOs and businesses, all who are interested in issues of raiding, corruption, and
privatization.
© Osipian, A.L., 2012
Exit data:
Manuscript in progress, currently 90,000 words (100,000 projected), 21 tables, 14 figures.
Status:
Under review.3
PREFACE
Galloping Russian troika: legislators, courts, siloviki
I have spent all my life under a Communist regime, and I will tell you that a society
without any objective legal scale is a terrible one indeed. But a society with no other
scale but the legal one is not quite worthy of man either.
Aleksandr Isayevich Solzhenitsyn
Hundred and seventy years ago, French political economist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon
declared in his work entitled “Qu’est ce que la propri été?” that “Property is theft.” Eighty years
ago, The Central Executive Committee and the Soviet of People’s Commissars of the USSR
issued a Decree of August 7, 1932 “About the Protection of Property of State Enterprises,
Collective Farms, and Cooperation and Enforcement of Public (Socialist) Property,” better
known as “The Law about Three Spikelets.” Yesterday, international community was watching a
demonstrative prosecution of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, conducted under the slogan “A thief
should sit in jail!” Today, a seventy year old grandma died on the spot in front of security men in
one of Voronezh’s supermarkets because “of shame”; she was suspected of stealing several
chocolate glazed curd bars. And what is going to happen tomorrow?
The evolution from three spikelets to three glazed curd bars reflects metamorphoses of
the modern Russia. As it was in Proudhon’s era, today the state continues to stay on guard of
property. But what is the legitimacy of the state in Russia under the present level of corruption?
Can the category of legitimacy be applied to the category of property? To what extent is raiding
illegitimate and why does it exist? What are the historical roots of raiding and what is its modern
organizational structure? Can the state deal with the growing phenomenon of corporate, property
and land raiding, or is it here to stay for a long time? Are Russian courts armed with the proper
legislation to tackle raiders or do they themselves help raiders, having court bailiffs as raiders at
hand? What is the external impact of foreign investors on the justice system in Russia and how
does it influences raiding? If imperialistic wars are waged for markets and resources, then what
are the raiding wars waged for? Does a raider have the right to come and take away? The
hypothetical question “Am I a trembling creature or do I have the right?,” formulated by Fyodor
Dostoyevsky, remains of a highest relevance today. Thus, this work is dedicated to the right to
property.
Two arts—the art of Witchcraft and the art of Warcraft—merged in the Russian mergers
and acquisitions twist. Corrupt courts, Russian raiders, oligarchs, domestic entrepreneurs, and
foreign investors break their spears over the Russian land not in the fight for justice, fairness, or
total social welfare, but for a banal profit that in Russia comes not from effective conduct of
business, but from property. Access to property equates to access to revenues. If this situation is
so prosaic, than why would one want to even look into it? The triviality of the incentives is
overcome with the originality of methods and an unusual landscape and context that attract the
eye of a scholar. Cooking books, twisting laws and breaking walls—it is all here. What do
Russian judges mix in their cooking pots? While accountants manipulate figures and judges
make biased decisions, storm-troopers mount walls and ram gates of profitable and attractive
enterprises and estates. They are not less proficient at their art of Warcraft as courts and
accountants at the art of Witchcraft.4
In his literary masterpiece written in 1835 and entitled “Dubrovsky,” Aleksandr
Sergeyevich Pushkin gives the full text of the court decision, which points to the unconditional
victory of the raiders over the lawful owner of the targeted estate. The Great Russian poet and
writer directly points to the fact that raiding in Russia may be quite successful while the property
rights of lawful owners of the estate are vulnerable: “…and the secretary began in a high-pitched
voice to read the court’s decision. We quote it in full, believing that everyone will be pleased to
learn one of the methods whereby in Russia a man can lose an estate to which he has
incontestable rights.” Those who will read the text of the court order will have an opportunity to
fully appreciate the word of the Russian court system and to compare it to some court rulings in
modern Russia.
Russian justice system is sometimes referred to as Femida with no bandage. In fact, its
sculptural depiction is that of a woman with scales and shield; no sword and no bandage
available. And if Femida is not blinded, then it may well be biased. Scales and sword workers
have the court system work on the opposite sides of the imaginary barricade: against raiders and
against enterprises, property, and estates targeted by raiders. Commercial disputes in Russia are
resolved in commercial arbitration courts, and court orders are executed by the court bailiff
services. Judges, bailiffs, and law enforcement officers are susceptible to corruption. Corruption
in courts and law enforcement agencies cannot be contained based on the principle of controlling
controllers. Also, courts are not all-powerful. At the end, courts hand down the decisions, but the
laws based on which they hand down these decisions are approved by the legislators. Raiding
takes place at the highest levels: raiders take to political powers and political raiders aim at large
targets by using the state machine.
YUKOS, once Russia’s largest oil company formed of Yuganskneftegaz and
KuibyshevOrgSintez and then enlarged through further privatization, mergers and acquisitions,
no longer exists. However, the Yukos saga continues and Mikhail Khodorkovsky remains behind
bars. The key role in this case was played by criminal courts, while commercial arbitration courts
had little to do with this issue. Major figures in this largely disputed and controversial case are
still either in prison or at large and in exile, hiding in foreign jurisdictions. While some foreign
investors become persona non grata in Russia, Russian businessmen become wanted on charges
of corruption and fraud and demanded for extradition by the prosecutor’s office. William
Browder of Hermitage Capital managed to become both: he is now persona non grata, being
denied Russian visa, and at the same time he is allegedly wanted by the Russian prosecutors to
testify on some business related dealings. Those Russian exiles who managed to escape may be
exonerated, such as Evgeny Chichvarkin, but they still are afraid of returning to Russia.
“Reach out and touch faith,” sings Depeche Mode in its famous single “Personal Jesus”.
Russian oligarchs, both those who are in exile and those still in Russia, should probably sing
“Reach out and touch case,” although they do not have personal court for that matter. Moreover,
acquiring a personal court or a personal pocket judge who would hand down a favorable decision
is not easy, as these cases are to be “reached out” or to be heard in London courts. The United
Kingdom is one of those countries which use common law, unlike courtiers of continental
Europe and the former Soviet republics. Russia uses the civil law system. To try cases in foreign
jurisdictions is certainly not an easy task for anyone.
Above all, it is a fascinating educational process. Jurisdiction, sovereignty,
extraterritoriality, adjudication, forum non-convenience, domicile… All these terms, just a
couple of decades ago absolutely unfamiliar, and indeed, unnecessary to Soviet people, then5
well-preserved behind the Iron Curtain, now become a “must know” things for some of them,
already converted post-Soviet individuals. The no-longer-Homo-Soveticus,1 many of whom hold
several citizenships, carry different passports, and are wanted by prosecutors in different
countries, nevertheless learn eagerly the meaning of the western legal term “Service.” Service is
not just a term or an action; it is a whole legal concept in the common law systems. It’s not like
being served foie gras in a fine Paris restaurant. It is being served some court papers, stupid! And
it is exciting too. “It is like a scene from The Godfather,” says Berezovsky. “I did not receive any
court papers,” says Abramovich.
Boris Abramovich and Roman Arkadievich started a legal quarrel, in which these sons of
Abraham crossed their swords in the fight for Siberian oil and Russian aluminum. The fact that
all these assets in dispute are physically located on the territory of the Russian Federation, which
by the way still is a sovereign nation, are of no concern to the competing parties. They fight for
those assets in London, and as long as there are judges in London courts who agree to adjudicate
on the matter, it does not matter that London is not Kremlin. Or so they think.
As more and more cases are being tried in British courts, London becomes not only a
major destination for Russian businessmen turned political exiles, but also a major legal forum
for resolving their legal disputes. Was it shares or was it protection, or was it shares for
protection? Or maybe it was protection of shares from shareholders? All of the above? None of
the above? We all will have the opportunity to learn the right answer to these confusing
questions as soon as British judges hand down the verdict, demonstrating their undisputed
proficiency in the knowledge of modern Russian realities. One should not have a doubt that these
judges, armed with fine interpreters, will eventually arrive to the fair judgment. Mikhail Chernoj
also wants to keep London commercial courts busy with his quest for some of Oleg Deripaska’s
assets that he claims belong to him. Even though Chernoj is wanted in Spain, he still wants
Russian aluminum in Russia, and he wants it in London, from Israel. If this is not
internationalization, than what is? Chernoj is wanted, but so is Russian aluminum.
In addition to London commercial courts, criminal courts in London are likely to get busy
as well. Gorbuntsov’s attempted assassination of late March 2012 makes us think that in addition
to such essential characteristics or features of the post-Soviet reality as black markets and black
raiders, there may also be black bankers. This latest case in a string of attempted and successful
assassinations in London, which targeted Russian business exiles, points to the variety of tools in
the arsenal of extraterritorial reach.
Both national and transnational laws are no counterbalance to the objective reality and
thus legal issues are frequently resolved in illegal ways. In Russia, objective reality does not fit
into the legal frame. Objective reality, legal system, and moral considerations all play in
resolving corporate disputes over property, especially when it comes to sorting out results of
hostile takeovers. Not all laws are those scripts printed on a fine quality paper and voted for by
the legislative bodies. There are judiciary laws, but there are also natural laws. And there are
social laws, which, somewhat similar to laws of nature, do not depend on will of particular
individuals or even peoples. Legitimacy of property should be considered primarily as a
prerogative of the people, not the state, laws, rulers, or oligarchs. To say that Russia is a society
without any objective legal scale would be a gross overestimation of its problems. To say that
Russia is a society with no other scale but the legal one would be even more misleading.
1
Homo Sovieticus is a pseudo-Latin for “Soviet Man”6 Galloping Russian troika—legislators, courts, siloviki—flies over the endless wide of Russia, grabbing and raiding whatever is of value.
7
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
I. PHENOMENON OF RAIDING: HISTORY AND MODERNITY
II. RAIDERS IN LAW: THE RAIDING OF POWER AND THE POWER OF RAIDING
III. FEMIDA WITH NO BANDAGE: RUSSIAN COURT SYSTEM
IV. HALF-BLIND JUSTICE: COURTS AND RAIDING
V. STATE AND CORRUPTION: CONTROL OF CONTROLLERS
VI. SHOULD A THIEF(?) SIT IN JAIL?: YUKOS REVISITED
VII. DUALITY, MOSAICS, AND POLYCENTRISM: FOREIGN INVESTORS AND
RUSSIAN RAIDERS
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES8
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface
LIST OF TABLES
LIST OF FIGURES
INTRODUCTION
I. PHENOMENON OF RAIDING: HISTORY AND MODERNITY
1.1. Raiding: A recent development or an historical tradition?
…Russian Oprichniks and German raiders: historical roots and examples of raiding
…Defining raiding as a socio-economic phenomenon
1.2. Raiding in western and Russian classics: from “Dubrovsky” to “Raider”
…Dumas to Dreiser: raiding in western classics
…Pushkin to Dostoevsky: raiding in Russian classics
1.3. Concluding remarks
II. RAIDERS IN LAW: THE RAIDING OF POWER AND THE POWER OF RAIDING
2.1. Expansion of raiding: from courtrooms to countries
Raiding at the highest levels: raiders in politics and political raiders
Fairy tales on resource curse: who tells them and who needs them?
2.2. Domestic corporate disputes: how to become persona non grata
Baturin, Baturina, Bank of Moscow, and Moscow Mayor
Is Polonsky next Chichvarkin?: of developers and hunger strikes
2.3. Concluding remarks
III. FEMIDA WITH NO BANDAGE: RUSSIAN COURT SYSTEM
3.1. Court system and raiders: victors are not judged?
Court system in the USSR
Complexity of the court system
3.2. Commercial disputes and Russian courts
Commercial arbitration courts
Bankruptcy
Court bailiff services
3.3. Concluding remarks
IV. HALF-BLIND JUSTICE: COURTS AND RAIDING
4.1. Scales and sword: court system in raiding and against raiders
Court system against raiders
Insufficiency of the legal system
4.2. Commercial arbitration courts: more business, more disputes
And who are the judges? Corruption in courts
Corrupt court as an instrument of raiding
Judiciary centralism and anti-raiding regionalism9 4.3. Concluding remarks V. STATE AND CORRUPTION: CONTROL OF CONTROLLERS 5.1. Legislators, courts, siloviki: galloping Russian troika Defamation in respect to…: defensive reflexes of the authorities Corruption in court bailiff services 5.2. Judges, bailiffs, officers: control of controllers? …Corruption in law enforcement agencies …Anti-corruption and anti-raiding efforts 5.3. Concluding remarks VI. SHOULD A THIEF(?) SIT IN JAIL?: YUKOS REVISITED 6.1 Should a thief(?) sit in jail?: one more thought about Yukos YUKOS: Yuganskneftegaz and KuibyshevOrgSintez State attack on Yukos: return of the assets 6.2. East or West, Yukos is no longer the best International Yukos in the local context Local Yukos in the global context Another try, another trial?: Yukos saga continues 6.3. Concluding remarks VII. DUALITY, MOSAICS, AND POLYCENTRISM: FOREIGN INVESTORS AND RUSSIAN RAIDERS 7.1. Foreign investors on Russian soil: too cold or too hot? Western investors and Russian polycentrism Is corruption really an obstacle? 7.2. Uneasy relations: Foreign pressure and Russian response Khodorkovsky to Hermitage to Magnitsky to…: A list of lists? Legal leverages: Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in action 7.3. Concluding remarks VIII. REACH OUT AND TOUCH CASE: JURISDICTION, SOVEREIGNTY, AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY 8.1. Abramovich v. Abramovich: sons of Abraham in the fight for Siberian oil and Russian aluminum A scene from The Godfather: London as a major legal forum Was it shares or was it protection, or was it shares for protection? 8.2. Chernoj v. Deripaska: keeping London commercial court busy Chernoj is wanted, but so is Russian aluminum Black market, black raiding… black banker? 8.3. Concluding remarks CONCLUSION REFERENCES
10 AUTHOR INDEX SUBJECT INDEX About the author
11
LIST OF TABLES
TABLE Page
PART III
3.1. Number of civil cases considered by courts in the USSR, 1980-1990, thousand
3.2. Number of employees in courts and the justice system in the USSR, by category, as
of January 1, 1991
3.3. Number of notary acts, performed by the state notaries in the USSR, 1980-1990
3.4. Legal aid to citizens in the USSR, 1980-1990, thousand
3.5. Legal aid to citizens in the Russian Federation, 2000-2001
3.6. Work of the Commercial Arbitration Court system in the RF, 1992-2011
3.7. Cases resolved in the Commercial Arbitration Court system in the RF, 1992-2011
3.8. Work of the Commercial Arbitration Courts of Appeals in the RF in 1992-2011
3.9. Work of the Federal Commercial Arbitration Circuit Courts in the RF, 1992-2011
3.10. Work of the Commercial Arbitration Court of Moscow oblast’ in 2007-2011
3.11. Bankruptcy cases in the Commercial Arbitration Court system in the RF, 1998-
2011
3.12. Bankruptcy cases in the Commercial Arbitration Court system in the RF, 1998-
2011: financial recovery and external management
3.13. Bankruptcy cases in the Commercial Arbitration Court system in the RF, 1998-
2011: auctioning and liquidation
3.14. Bankruptcy cases in the Commercial Arbitration Court system in the RF, 1998-
2011: complaints and petitions
3.15. Major indicators of the work by the Federal Services of Court Bailiffs of the RF,
2006-2011
PART V
5.1. Distribution of criminal cases on corruption and malfeasance in the Federal Services
of Court Bailiffs of the RF, 2008 and 2009
5.2. Major obstacles to overcome crisis in Russia (percentage of respondents), 2004
5.3. Events and processes in Russia that worry population most (percentage of
respondents), 2004
5.4. Most important problems for Russia, percent of the respondents, 2008, 2009
5.5. Most crucial problems that impede business in Russia, percent of the respondents,
2007-2009
PART VI
6.1. Official and real tax rate for some oil companies in Russia, 1999-200312
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE Page
PART III
3.1. Structure of the RF Commercial Arbitration Court system
3.2. Work of the Commercial Arbitration Court system in the RF, 1992-2009
3.3. Workload per judge per month in the Commercial Arbitration Court system in the
RF, 1992-2009
3.4. Civil and administrative cases resolved in the Commercial Arbitration Court system
in the RF, 1992-2009
3.5. Work of the Commercial Arbitration Courts of Appeals in the RF in 1992-2009
3.6. Work of the Federal Commercial Arbitration Circuit Courts in the RF, 1992-2009
3.7. Work of the Commercial Arbitration Court of Moscow oblast’ in 2007-2009
3.8. Bankruptcy cases in the Commercial Arbitration Court system in the RF, 1998-2009
3.9. Bankruptcy cases in the Commercial Arbitration Court system in the RF, 1998-2009:
external management
3.10. Bankruptcy cases in the Commercial Arbitration Court system in the RF, 1998-
2009: auctioning and liquidation
3.11. Bankruptcy cases in the Commercial Arbitration Court system in the RF, 1998-
2009: auctioning and liquidation of state and municipal enterprises
3.12. Bankruptcy cases in the Commercial Arbitration Court system in the RF, 1998-
2009: bankruptcies rejected and cases closed due to settlement
3.13. Bankruptcy cases in the Commercial Arbitration Court system in the RF, 1998-
2009: complaints and petitions
PART V
5.1. Distribution of criminal cases on corruption and malfeasance in the Federal Services
of Court Bailiffs of the RF, 2008 and 200913
INTRODUCTION
The Chief Justice wrote that the court power of the great country is not capable of
handling so-called ‘raiding’.
Pavel Astakhov. Raider. 2007.14 PAGES 13-186 ARE NOT PART OF THIS PREVIEW
187
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AUTHOR INDEX
Astakhov, Pavel, Nelson, Ralph,
Avdasheva, S.,
Osipian, Ararat,
Baev, O.,
Bandurin, A., Pistor, Katharina,
Barnes, Andrew, Prokhanov, Oleg,
Black, Bernard, Pushkin, Alexander,
Blasi, Joseph,
Bolva, N., Radaev, Vadim,
Borisov, Yuri, Reznik, G.,
Borovsky, M., Roll, Richard,
Bunin, Igor, Romanova, A.,
Rose-Ackerman, Susan,
Chapaev, Roman, Rozhkov, V.,
Chubais, Anatoly,
Coffee, John C., Sakwa, Richard,
Salter, Malcolm S.,
Dahl’, Vladimir, Sergounin, Alexander,
Danilenko, N., Shlyapnikova, O.,
Dmitrieva, E., Sim, Li-Chem,
Dolgova, A., Starovsky, V.N.,
Dumas, Alexandre,
Tarasov, N.,
Firestone, Thomas, Tarassova, Anna,
Freeland, Chrystina, Treisman, Daniel,
Frye, Timothy, Truhachev, V.,
Il’in, O., Vanyushkin, S.,
Varygin, A.,
Kireev, Aleksei, Vasil’chenko, A.,
Koroleva, M., Volkov, Vadim,
Kraakman, Reinier,
Woodruff, Christopher,
Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich, Woodruff, David,
Lowenstein, Louis,
Xu, Chenggang,
Majorov, A.,
McMillan, John, Zon, Hans van,
Meshchersky, A., Zorkaia, Nataliia,
Mostov, Julie,196
SUBJECT INDEX
absolute monarchy Anisimov, Vasily
abuse of authority Anti-abuse
abuse of public office anti-corruption
abuse of the office Anti-Corruption Bureau
abuse of trust Antiproizvol
Abyzov, Mikhail anti-raider defense strategies
Academy of the National Economy anti-raiding
access to corporate information Anti-Raiding 2008
accountability anti-raiding campaign
Achinski NPZ Anti-raiding Interagency Commission
administrative barriers Anti-raiding Committee of the Chamber of
administrative courts Trade & Commerce
administrative law anti-raiding culture
administrative pressure anti-raiding law
administrative resource anti-raiding legislation
Advertisement, Information, and Setting anti-raiding measures
Committee of Moscow Government Antiterrorist Unit
Ageev, Alexander antitrust
aggressive “American style” tactics apologetic justice
aggressive consolidation appeals
aggressive corporate takeovers appellate courts
Agroprom appraisers
Akademiya narodnogo hozyajstva appropriation
Akhtubinsk Apshiron peninsula
aksakals Arbat
Alekseev, Yuri Arbat Prestige
Alexandrovskaya, Alla arbitrage managers
Alfa-group arbitration business
alienation Arbitration Procedure Code
All-Russian Research Institute Arcelor Mittal
Alpatov, Yuri Arkhangel’skaya oblast’
Altay region Arktikgaz
Altimo Arms Chamber
Alushta Arthur D. Little consulting firm
amendment Ascanio
American industry assault capabilities
American International Group Inc. assaults on property
Analytical Anti-raiding Center assets
Anarchists Astrakhan
Angarskaya NKH attempted hostile takeover
Angarski catalyzes and org-synthesis plant Attorney General
Angarski polymer plant auctioning of municipal enterprises197
auctioning of state enterprises biblical camel
Auditing Chamber bid rigging
auditors bidder
authoritative bureaucratic hierarchy black market
autonomy Black Sea
average bribes blackmail
Avialesohrana Blavatnik, Leonard
AvtoVAZ Blazhivsky, Evgeny
Ayatskov, Dmitry Boev, Valery
Azerbaijan Bogatikov, Alexander
Bolsheviks
Babushkinski court bonus systems
bailiffs Boyarskaya Duma
Bakhmach meat-processing plant Boyko, Maxim
Baku branching out
Bakunin, Mikhail Bratanov, Viktor
ban breach of contract
Bank Deposit Insurance Agency breaches of financial discipline
Bank Moskvy Brezhnev, Leonid
Bank of America Corp. bribe-givers
Bank of Moscow bribery
bankruptcy bribes
bankruptcy cases bribe-takers
bankruptcy claims Britain
bankruptcy costs British Parliament
bankruptcy law of 1998 British pirates
Barmin, Valery Browder, William
barter Bryansknefteprodukt
Bashkiria bubbles on the financial market
Bashkirneft’ Budanov, Yuri
Bashkiroil Buddhist
Bashkortostan Bukato, Victor
Bastille Bukharin, Nikolai
Bastrykin, Alexander Bukreev, Vladimir
Batista Buksman, Alexander
Baturina, Elena bullying
behavior of minority share-holders Bulava
Belarus burden of proof
Belgorodnefteprodukt bureaucracy
Belgorodskaya oblast’ bureaucrat
Belorussia bureaucratic falsifications
Belyakov, Sergei bureaucratization
Berezovsky, Boris burial services
biased court decisions Buryatnefteprodukt
biased decision business ethics198
business secrets Chief of the Investigations Committee
Butyrka child support
Butyrski court China
Buyansky, Stanislav Christian
buy-backs Chubais, Anatoly Borisovich
Bykov, Anatoly Church
Church of Christ the Savior
California Churov, Vladimir
capital flight city cemeteries
capital market City Planning Code
capital markets civil complaints
capital structure changes civil courts
capitalist production civil lawsuits
carrying out of the body civil litigation
cash auctions civil rights watch
Caspian civil servants
Caspian Sea shelf civilized raiding
cassations clan
causing nightmares for business closed joint-stock company
Cellini, Benvenuto codes of conduct
centers of employment codes of conduct
Central Asia Colbert, Jean-Baptiste
Central Election Committee collection of “protection”
centralization of production collections on court orders
certificate-based privatization collections on executive orders
Chaika, Yuri collective farms
Chair of the Deputies’ Ethics Committee of collective labor disputes
the State Duma collectors’ business
Chair of the Higher Qualification Collegiums of Moscow Commercial
Collegiums of the RF Arbitration Court
Chair of the Moscow City Court Colliers International Russia
Chair of the Supreme Court of the RF commercial arbitration court
Chamber of Tax Consultants Commercial Arbitration Court of the
Chamber of Trade & Commerce Russian Federation
charter amendment Commercial Arbitration Courts of Appeals
chastnoe okhrannoe predpriyatie commercial dispute
Chatelet commercial secrets
Chavez, Hugo commercial vessels
Chechnya Commission on International Commercial
check privatization Arbitrage
Chelyabinsk Committee on Government Operations
Cherkasov, Ivan Committee on Property of the Russian
Chicago Duma
Chichvarkin, Evgeny commodity
Chief Justice commodity exchange199 commodity raiding Council of Nobles Communist party of the USSR Council of the Federation company-aggressor court bailiffs compensation ceilings court decisions competition court errors competitors’ wars court injustice complaints court litigation complex organization court system complexity court-ordered restriction concentration of production Courts Decree № 2 (1918) confidential information cover confiscation of property creditors conflict of interest creditors’ demands conflict regulation creditors’ initiated bankruptcies consolidation crime conspiracy crime against property Constitution Crimea Constitutional court Crimean peninsula construction companies criminal activities consumer credit criminal aggression contract killings criminal aspects of raiding contract rights criminal character of raiding control of controllers Criminal Code controlled subsidiary criminal investigations controlling functions criminal justice Convention Against Corruption Criminal Law Convention on Corruption conveyer-belt criminal victimology convictions criminalization cooperator criminology corporate blackmail Cromwell corporate charter Cuban revolution corporate control Cuomo, Andrew corporate finance Cypress corporate law corporate lawyers D’Estourville corporate mergers and acquisitions dacha corporate raiders Dahl’, Vladimir corporate raiding Dahlgren, Lennart corporate restructuring damage of raiding corporate security damage recovery corruptibility of courts Danilkin, Victor corruption debt repayment corruption in courts debtors corruption in law enforcement agencies decentralization cost reduction decision-making
200
default Dorogomilovski district court
defendants Dovgy, Dmitry
defense strategy dubious court decisions
delays Dubov, Vladimir
deliberate tax evasion Dubrovinskiy, Alexander
democratic principles and processes Dubrovsky
democratization Dudley, Robert
democrats Duma
Denisenko, Filaret DuPont
Department of Land Resources
Department for Organized Crime Prevention Eastern Europe
Department of Economic Security of the EBITDA
Chamber of Trade & Commerce of economic crime
the Russian Federation economic crimes in the military
Department of Economic Security of the economic development
Moscow city government economic disputes
Depeche Mode economic environment
depositarum economic growth
Deputy Head of the Prosecutor General economic rent
Deputy inquiry Edinaya Rossiya
Deputy Minister of Economic Development effective owners
Deripaska, Oleg effectiveness
derivative efficiency
desyatina eggs
detective Egiazaryan, Ashot
detectives Egorova, Ol’ga
developers Eksmo
diggers election commissions
Diocletian electricity
Director of the Chamber of Tax Consultants electronic justice
directors of Soviet enterprises embezzlement
disallowed losses embezzling funds
disclosure emission of stock
discrepancies enclaves
discretion Energetichesky standart
disintegration Engels, Frederick
dispersion of property England
disputes that emerge out of trade relations enterprise
distribution entrepreneurial talent
district attorneys entrepreneurship
district courts erroneous court decisions
dividends ethics
divorces Ethics Committee of the State Duma
document fraud European Business Association
dol’shchiki European Court of Human Rights201
Evroset’ Federal’naya sluzhba bezopasnosti
exceeding the office authority Federal’naya sluzhba po finansovym
Excess of powers of office rynkam
executive orders Federal’naya sluzhba sudebnyh pristavov
executive pay Federal’noe gosudarstvennoe unitarnoe
expectation of financial gain predpriyatie
export dependence Federation Council
export-oriented enterprises Feniks
expropriation feudalism
external management fictitious voucher auctioning
extortion fiduciary duties
extra income fiduciary responsibility
extraction of oil products FIG
Exxon Mobil Fili
Filimonov, Alexander
Faberge eggs Filindash, Evgeny
fabricated allegations filings
fair market price financial bubbles
fairness financial crisis of 1998-1999
falsifications financial discipline
family relations financial documents
Far East financial inspectors
Farimex Products Inc. financial motivation
FAS financial pyramids
Faust financial recovery
favorable court decisions financial scandals
Federal Anti-monopoly Services financial security
Federal budget financial-industrial group
Federal Commercial Arbitration District Financier (1912)
Court Finansgrup
Federal Commercial Arbitration Circuit fine
Courts Fink, Yuri
Federal Court of New York State firm-object of takeover
federal government firm-target of takeover
Federal Migration Services First Deputy-Chair of the Highest
Federal Property Agency Commercial Arbitration Court
Federal Security Services First Vice Mayor of Moscow
Federal Services of Court Bailiffs First Deputy Prime Minister
Federal Services on Financial Markets Five-Hundred-Day-Plan
Federal state unitary enterprise flip-in poison pill
Federal state unitary enterprise “Okhrana” flip-over poison pill
federal tax codes Fond sodejstviya reformirovaniyu ZhKH
Federal Tax Services food processing plants
Federal’naya antimonopol’naya sluzhba foot soldiers
Federal’naya nalogovaya sluzhba forced labor202
forceful entry Golden Calf
Ford golden parachutes
Foreign Intelligence Services Goldman Sachs Group Inc.
foreign investments Golovenkivs’ke-plus meat-processing plant
foreign investors Golub
Forestry Firefighter Aviation Detachment Golubkov, Lenia
fortification good governance
Fradkov, Mikhail good western business practices
France gopniki
France Gorbachev, Mikhail
fraud Gosduma
fraudulent activities Great October revolution
free market Greeks
Friedman, Mikhail greenmail
friendly court rulings Gref, German
friendly mergers and acquisitions gross waste
FSB Gruzdev, Vladimir
FSFR Grymchak, Yuri
FSSP GSU
guarantees
Gaddafi, Muammar Gudkov, Gennady
Gaidar, Egor Timurovich Gulf of Mexico
gambling businesses Gusinsky, Vladimir
gangster operations Gutseriev, Chingiskhan
Gasiyev, Maxim Gutseriev, Mikhail
gavel
Gazli Hanty-Mansijsk
Gazprom police harassment
GDP harmful consequences
GDR Head of the Ministry of Economic
Gekko, Gordon Development
Generation Exile Head of the Prosecutor’s Investigation
Georgia Committee
Georgian thief-in-law Head of the Russian Union of Industrialists
Gerashchenko, Victor and Entrepreneurs
German navy submarines Head of the State Duma’s Committee on
German raiders National Security
German socially oriented market economy healthcare
Germany heating supply
Gibraltar offshore HEI
gift Hermes-Moskva
Glavnoe sledstvennoe upravlenie Hermitage Capital
Glazyev, Sergei hierarchy
Glukhov higher education
Goethe, Wolfgang higher education institutionYou can also read
