1/2021 Circles of EU-India Engagement: How Member States Cooperate with India on Global Issues
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1/2021
Circles of EU-India Engagement:
How Member States Cooperate with India on
Global Issues
—
Henrik Chetan Aspengren, Emil Lidén & Axel Nordenstam
PUBLISHED BY THE SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS | UI.SE
Henrik Chetan Aspengren Emil Lidén Axel Nordenstam Acting Head, Asia Program, UI Associate Fellow, UI Analyst, UI © 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs Language editing: Andrew Mash
Content Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 5 Locating the study in the literature...................................................................................... 6 Methodology ...................................................................................................................... 9 Second circle European states’ engagements with India and India’s response....................... 9 Conclusions .......................................................................................................................20 Policy recommendations ....................................................................................................23 References ........................................................................................................................25 © 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 3
Summary
• The report builds on two unique surveys of a group of European and Indian observers with deep
insights into EU-India relations, as well as analyses of official documents to detail how EU
member states engage with India on global issues and India’s response.
• There is growing interest in cooperation with India on global issues, among the EU member
states collectively and the member states individually. The current momentum is partly due to
the changing circumstances and increased uncertainty in world affairs, and partly due to mutual
perceptions of shared values. At the same time, there is also growing scholarly interest in EU-
India relations. Analysis, however, has focused on German and French engagement with India, as
well as that of the EU institutions, rather than the rest of the EU member states.
• By examining the preferences and perspectives of a cross section of eight small and medium-
sized EU member states, this report explores engagement with India and the EU member states
through a wider lens. The authors categorise EU-India relations as a first and second circle. The
first circle encompasses the EU institutions, France and Germany, while the second circle
captures small and medium-sized EU member states.
• India engages with EU member states on a wide range of global issues, conducting diplomatic
talks in different formats with different member states on a number of issues ranging from
security and development policy to cybersecurity and renewable energy. Since 2014, the level of
political attention paid by India to “second circle” member states has been almost as high as that
paid to the major actors. Nonetheless, there are still variations among the member states and
some manage to attract India’s attention better than others. There is also a broader trend for the
member states studied to align their engagement with India’s agenda.
• While several factors foster cooperation on global issues, notably China’s growing global
footprint, engagement is primarily driven by the quest for business opportunities and awareness
of India’s global weight and influence. That said, a lack of both political priority and institutional
capacity impede deeper ties.
• The report finds that some EU member states engage with India on global issues more through
the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy than their own bilateral relationships. Given the
opportunity to engage at both the EU level and in their bilateral relationships, EU member states
tilt towards the EU level, whereas India tilts towards the bilateral level.
• There is untapped potential for second circle EU member states to engage with India on issues
related to the digital age, such as 5G, Artificial Intelligence and cybersecurity. For demanding
high-profile issues, such as human rights, the EU level remains the primary arena of engagement
as the EU collectively is more influential than EU’s small and medium-sized member states
individually.
• To realise the full potential of the EU-India strategic partnership, both the member states and
India must act in a more coordinated manner and increase their parliamentary diplomacy.
© 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 4
Introduction Europe had hitherto played a relatively
small part in India’s foreign policy and was
often seen as a junior partner in the US-led
The European Union (EU) and India find West. Europe’s perceived lack of
themselves in shared circumstances. Both coordinated positions (or competences) on
actors support common international the issues closest to India’s heart influenced
responses to many of today’s global New Delhi’s assessment. Europe, and the
challenges at a time when multilateral EU institutions, in particular, was also
cooperation has become more fragile. Both viewed by India as out of touch with
are increasingly committed to push back realpolitik in Asia, especially in relation to
where Chinese activities are found to run the growing economic and military might of
counter to their respective interests or China.
values, but also to stand behind
international agreements called into In recent years, however, the EU and India
questioned – at least until recently – by the have pinned higher hopes on becoming
United States. Importantly, both the EU and truly strategic partners on global issues,
India are seeking to act in their own right in although frustration remains in areas such
a world where a growing US-Chinese rivalry as trade negotiations and security
is increasingly affecting global politics. 1 cooperation is limited. India has established
comprehensive strategic partnerships with
Europe and India’s shared reading of the Germany and France, and the 2004 EU-India
current challenges in world affairs is strategic partnership has become
reflected in a growing interest in Indo- increasingly substantial. The EU’s Strategy
European cooperation. Europe-India on India, as well as its modified stance on
relations have gone through several phases. China and ambitions to become more
For decades, Europe primarily viewed “geopolitical”, now place it in greater
relations with New Delhi through the lens of alignment with India on global challenges.
poverty reduction and development
cooperation, while political cooperation was However, in discussions on European
generally limited. India’s strong economic engagement with India on global issues,
growth following reforms in the 1990s has and vice versa, the focus has been squarely
provided the impetus for a new narrative in on a first circle of actors: either the EU
the West on India as an emerging economy. institutions or the major actors of Germany,
The emergence of India as a nuclear power France and, until recently, the United
in 1998, followed by a programme of Kingdom. The EU mostly consists of small
modernisation of its armed forces, also and medium-sized member states that
drew attention to its increasing military engage more or less actively with emerging
capabilities. Nonetheless, there was still a or existing global powers either bilaterally
reluctance on both sides regarding a or through the EU’s Common Foreign and
comprehensive political partnership. Security Policy (CFSP). As is discussed
below, we have called these actors “second
1 See Ministry of External Relations. 2019. Speech by President Charles Michel to the Bruegel
External Affairs Minister’s speech at the 4th think tank. Retrieved from
Ramnath Goenka Lecture, 2019. Retrieved from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
https://mea.gov.in/Speeches- releases/2020/09/28/l-autonomie-strategique-
Statements.htm?dtl/32038/External+Affairs+Minist europeenne-est-l-objectif-de-notre-generation-
ers+speech+at+the+4th+Ramnath+Goenka+Lectur discours-du-president-charles-michel-au-groupe-de-
e+2019; European Council 2020. “Strategic reflexion-bruegel/
autonomy for Europe: the aim of our generation”.
© 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairscircle states” in order to distinguish them such as joint projects, agreements and
from the major actors in the first circle. The memoranda of understanding, as well as
research literature on EU-India relations has joint working groups and committees and
very little to say about possible patterns in so on – to political dialogue and
how second circle member states, which coordination (exchanges of visits, joint
have a stake in the world order but not statements, press statements and so on) at
necessarily the capabilities to influence it various levels.
individually, engage with India as an
emerging global power. This is true seen This study therefore addresses three
from the perspective of these states’ questions:
general approaches to India, and of
activities connected to particular issues. It is 1) How is engagement on global issues
also true regardless of whether they choose structured between the small and medium-
to act bilaterally or to go through the EU. sized EU member states and India?
This knowledge gap is unfortunate since the 2) What factors drive or impede
EU’s second circle states are supportive of engagement between these states and
an active India on the global stage, and India?
sometimes play an outsized role in global
affairs, especially through the EU.2 3) Do small and the medium-sized European
As is discussed in more detail below, we states or India prefer bilateral or EU-level
have sought insights on relations with India engagement on global issues?
from observers selected from states from
eight European subregions, and compared Locating the study in the
these with the views of Indian experts on
India’s engagement with EU member literature
states. This numerically limited but cross
sectional approach has enabled us to While the research field of European-Indian
elevate the discussion above individual political and strategic relations is growing it
states to a more aggregate level of analysis has for the past two decades been focused
while also providing a perspective from on the EU’s institutions and a limited
India. Country-specific examples are number of EU member states. Scholarly
provided as appropriate. interest in the EU-India partnership grew
following the signing of a strategic
The focus is on what are commonly referred partnership between the EU and India in
to as global challenges, that is, agenda 2004, and the emergence of more
items in world affairs that demand pronounced strategic thinking on Asia by
international cooperation and are not the EU. 3 This was an explorative phase, in
typically bilateral issues, such as consular which the EU-India scholarship clarified
matters or cultural exchanges. Engagement India’s and the EU’s respective positions in
is defined as all the main forms of
interaction between states, ranging from
structured and formalised cooperation –
2 Busse et al. 2020. EU Coalition Explorer, relations with Brazil, China, India and Russia edited
European Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved by Giovanni Grevi and Álvaro de Vasconcelos,
from https://ecfr.eu/special/eucoalitionexplorer/ European Union Institute for Security Studies, 105-
3 Bava, Ummu Salma. 2008. “The EU and India: 113.
challenges to a strategic partnership” in
Partnerships for effective multilateralism: EU
© 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 6an attempt to assess the prospects for modified version of the first circle to
successful cooperation.4 contemporary conditions replaces the UK
with the EU institutions. In a second circle
Current research on European-Indian comes the smaller and medium-sized
relations has entered a new phase. This member states that have an active agenda
reflects heightened ambitions for the on cooperation with India but only limited
partnership following the EU-India summit bandwidth to expand it. Third comes the
in 2016, the EU Strategy on India and India’s small EU member states that have not
positive response to the EU’s proposition. 5 made their priorities or intentions to work
Scholars and analysts have largely stressed with India explicit. However, Jain provides
a new mutual understanding between the neither explicit theory nor empirics to
two actors and a rekindled interest in the explain how to differentiate between the
strategic partnership. A common second and third circles. Our modification
observation is that international therefore places all the EU member states
cooperation has been enabled by the apart from France and Germany in a second
ambitions of both the EU and India to circle. Figure 1 plots the second circle states
become global actors, coinciding with as closer to or further away from the first
growing uncertainty about China’s activities circle depending on the intensity of their
and US global leadership. This new phase in engagement with India, using data on visits,
the EU-India literature can be roughly trade and formats for political dialogue.
divided into two strands: studies of bilateral
EU-India relations and research into a Thanks to Jain and other contributors to this
handful EU member states’ bilateral new phase of the Europe-India literature,
relations with India. 6 we are now better placed to know the
possibilities and pitfalls of the EU’s
Rajendra Jain’s observations on the “narrow engagements with India, albeit seen from
circles” through which EU-India relations the perspective of first circle actors in
are structured can serve as inspiration for a Brussels, Berlin and Paris. We also know a
conceptualisation of EU-India engagement. 7 little about how some second circle states
The first circle described by Jain perceive their bilateral relations with India –
encompasses the then three major powers and India’s view.
in Europe: France, Germany and the UK. A
4 See e.g. Abhyankar, Rajendra M. India and the the European Union’s Strategic Engagements with
European Union: A Partnership for All Reasons, India. The Swedish Institute of International Affairs,
India Quarterly, Vol. 65 (4), 393-404; Jain, UI Paper no. 9, July 2019, 1-20; Mohan, Garima.
Rajendra K. 2009. India and the European Union: 2019. Prospects for the New EU Strategy on India:
Perceptions and Policies, Paper presented at the Game Changer of Business as Usual? Asie. Visions,
European studies in Asia (ESiA) Network Public No. 108, Ifri, September 2019, 1-26; Mukherjee,
Panel, Asia-Europe Institute, University of Malaysia, Bhaswati. 2019. India and EU: An Insider’s View. Vij
Kuala Lumpur, 19 June 2009, 1-5; Wülbers, Shazia Books India; Sachdeva, Gulshan. 2019. Challenges
Aziz. 2010. The Paradox of EU-India Relations: in Europe. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan; Lidén,
Missed Opportunities in Politics Economics, Emil. 2020. Securing a Shared Neighbourhood: The
Development Cooperation, and Culture. Plymouth: European Union and India as Partners for Security
Lexington Books; Parel, Luis and Vijay Sakhuja. in Africa. The Swedish Institute of International
2012. The EU-India partnership: time to go Affairs, UI Brief no.1 2020, 1-14.
strategic? European Union Institute for Security 6 See e.g. Kugiel, Patryk. 2013. What Does India
Studies. 196 pp; Wagner, Christian. 2015. ”Western Think About Poland? Polish Institute of
Europe” in The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign International Affairs, PISM Policy Paper, No. 15
Policy edited by David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan, (63), June, 1-7.; Campos Palarea, Rubén and
Srinath Raghavan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Jayshree Sengupta 2017. Spain and India: seeking
495-508. stronger bilateral relation. Real Instituto Elcano,
5 Aspengren, Henrik Chetan and Axel Working Paper 2, November 2017, 1-42.
Nordenstam. 2019. The Partnership Shift: Analysing 7 Jain 2009.
© 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 7Nonetheless, until now there has been no the general and more theoretically oriented literature that provides deeper insights into literature on international politics or foreign how the second circle of active smaller and policy. This paper provides some initial medium-sized EU member states – with empirics that should be helpful for their different preferences – engage with policymakers and provide a starting point India as a group or how India responds. for theoretical scholarship. There is also a lack of connections made to © 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 8
Methodology member states. Some respondents,
however, might be more familiar with
This study focuses on India and a select broader Europe-Asia themes. We also
group of EU member states from the consulted official documents issued by
second circle: Greece, Ireland, Lithuania, India’s Ministry of External Affairs, 10 as well
the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain as joint and unilateral statements following
and Sweden, representing the Iberian, official visits. Joint statements are
South, Benelux, Nordic, Baltic and Visegrad negotiated outcomes and thus indicate the
European subregions. The procedure for respective countries’ priorities, but also how
case selection was to select states from the two actors want to portray their
significant subregions that are not relationship with other actors. Unilateral
contending to be in the first circle (Italy) but statements following visits and meetings
still conduct ongoing engagement with are not the result of negotiations but can be
India over time. The Iberian subregion is assumed in such cases to reflect both sides’
represented by two states, due to Portugal’s views of the discussions. Data was collected
EU Presidency in 2021. Portugal has listed between June and November 2020. To
expanded cooperation with India as a enhance our findings and the literature on
priority for its term. 8 EU-India relations, future research could
include a wider set of interviews with
In addition to secondary literature, the different experts and policymakers.
study builds on various primary sources.
First, two separate but similar surveys were Second circle European
directed to respondents in the selected EU states’ engagements with
member states and India, respectively. 9
While the respondents are generally India and India’s response
assessed as having a good overview of their
country’s relations with India, not all have As mentioned above, the literature on
detailed knowledge. The respondents are Europe-India relations tends to focus on the
scholars, analysts and active or retired first circle of the “Big Three” – France,
officials dealing with relations between the Germany and the EU’s institutions. At the
EU and India or the EU and Asia, and same time, smaller and medium-sized
between India or Asia and the individual EU European states of the second circle are
8 European Parliament 2021. Priority dossiers identified trends. Every respondent was informed
under the Portuguese EU Council Presidency, that their participation was voluntary and given the
briefing. European Parliamentary Research Service. chance to indicate their preference for being
Retrieved from anonymous or named in the report.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BR 10 For country-specific information, we
IE/2021/659434/EPRS_BRI(2021)659434_EN.pdf consulted country briefs. Dated between 2018 and
(accessed January 8, 2021). 2020, the length of these briefs varies between
9 These digital surveys combined closed and three and eight pages. The annual reports
open multiple-choice questions. Ten respondents summarise India’s global engagement with Indian
providing the European perspective received a activities by the selected member states and reflect
survey with nine closed multiple-choice questions India’s priorities in the relationships. The length of
and six open-ended questions. Seven respondents the annual reports varies from 282 pages in 2014–
providing the Indian view completed a separate 2015 to 481 pages in 2019–2020. While we did
survey with a slightly adjusted design. This survey not scrutinise the full reports, we consulted the
contained seven multiple-choice questions with chapters for the selected EU member states in order
weighted alternatives as well as one open question to gain further insights into India’s official views on
that allowed additional elaboration. Since the the relationships with the member states.
survey population was small (17 respondents), the
results were not used to draw statistical inferences.
Instead, we qualitatively compared the results and
© 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 9actively engaging with India and India is On a general level there is a significant
responding. However, as we have pointed amount of activity between second circle
out, we know very little about these EU member states and India, but there are
engagements, how they are structured, and also possibilities for scaling-up, as is
the internal commonalities and differences illustrated below. As a group, the countries
in European strategies. selected for this study accounted for 26% of
total EU27-India trade in 2018 (see figure
2). 11
Figure 2. EU-India trade relations
(total trade, in billion USD)
35
40
27
Germany and France Eight selected EU member states Rest of EU27
At the same time, the political attention level representatives, such as the head of
paid to this group by India is almost as state or deputy head of state, the prime
substantial as that paid to the first circle. minister and foreign ministers, and
Figure 3 shows the visits conducted by high- indicates the level of political attention
since 2014. 12
11 World Bank 2020. Data retrieved from 16_Final_compressed.pdf (Accessed December 1,
https://wits.worldbank.org/CountrySnapshot/en/IND 2020); 2018a. Annual Report 2016-2017.
(accessed 16 October 2020). While Eurostat Retrieved from
provides data for EU27 trade with India, the http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/29
authors were not able to access data for export and 521_MEA_ANNUAL_REPORT_2016_17_new.pdf
import of goods as well as services vis-à-vis India (Accessed December 1, 2020); 2018b. Annual
for the respective countries. Therefore, the data Report 2017-2018. Retrieved from
from the World Bank was used. http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/29
12 Ministry of External Affairs. 2014. Annual 788_MEA-AR-2017-18-03-02-2018.pdf (Accessed
Report 2013-2014. Retrieved from December 1, 2020); 2019a. Annual Report 2018-
http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/23 2019. Retrieved from
873_EXTERNAL_AFFAIR__Eng__AR_2013-14.pdf http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/31
(Accessed December 1, 2020); 2015a. Annual 719_MEA_AR18_19.pdf (Accessed December 1,
Report 2014-2015. Retrieved from 2020); 2020a. Annual Report 2019-2020.
http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/25 Retrieved from
009_External_Affairs_2014-2015__English_.pdf http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/32
(Accessed December 1, 2020); 2016. Annual 489_AR_Spread_2020_new.pdf (Accessed
Report 2015-2016. Retrieved from December 1, 2020).
http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/26
525_26525_External_Affairs_English_AR_2015-
© 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 10However, as illustrated above, there are highest political levels, the bilateral talks
variations in how individual states manage between India and the selected countries
to attract India’s attention. Greece, the are conducted in various formats. Foreign
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden Office Consultations constitute the
have a visiting frequency above the mean, institutional mechanism for all the selected
while Ireland, Lithuania and Poland show a countries’ regular bilateral diplomatic talks
frequency below the mean in the past five- between the foreign ministries and India’s
year period. Ministry of External Affairs. 13 Another form
of recurrent diplomatic dialogue is the Joint
In contrast to the first circle actors in Economic Committee/Commission, which
Europe, with which India has negotiated features in the Indo-Greek and Indo-
Strategic Partnerships that facilitate a Portuguese relationship. 14 One difference
regular exchange of perspectives at the between the Foreign Office Consultations
13 Ministry of External Affairs. 2020b. Country ania_2020.pdf (Accessed December 1, 2020);
Brief: India-Poland Relations. Retrieved from Ministry of External Affairs 2020d. Country Brief:
https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India_Pol India-Ireland Relations 2020. Retrieved from
and_Feb_2020.pdf (Accessed December 1, 2020); https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Ireland20
Ministry of External Affairs. 2019b. Country Brief: 20.pdf (Accessed December 1, 2020).
India-Spain Bilateral Relations. Retrieved from 14 Ministry of External Affairs. 2019c. Country
https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/spain_bri Brief: India-Greece Bilateral Relations. Retrieved
ef_sep_2019.pdf (Accessed December 1, 2020); from
Ministry of External Affairs. 2018c. Country Brief: https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Biref_gre
India-Netherlands Bilateral Brief 2018. Retrieved ece_2019.pdf (Accessed December 1, 2020);
from Ministry of External Affairs. 2019d Embassy of India
https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India- Lisbon: Portugal - Bilateral Brief. Retrieved from
NL_Bilateral_Brief_January_2019.pdf (Accessed https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Brief_por
December 1, 2020); Ministry of External Affairs tugal_2019.pdf (Accessed December 1, 2020).
2020c. India-Lithuania Bilateral Brief 2020.
Retrieved from
https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Ind_Lithu
© 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairsand the Joint Economic Commission format meetings of diplomats in India, and the EU
is that the latter focuses on bilateral often holds meetings and dialogues with
economic exchange by convening India together with member state
representatives from the Indian Ministry of representatives.
Commerce and Industry, as well as officials
from other ministries and their European Small and medium-sized second circle
counterparts. A similar but expanded European countries also have opportunities
version in the Indo-Swedish relationship is to publish strategies in order to gain
the Joint Commission for Economic, attention and provide an impetus to their
Industrial and Scientific Cooperation. 15 Next engagements with India. Unlike the 2018
to these recurring formats, engagements EU-wide India-specific strategy, these
are governed by Memorandums of strategies provide a broader conception of a
Understanding and operationalised in Joint country’s engagement with Asia and India’s
Working Groups. position in it, as in the case of Ireland’s 2020
Asia-Pacific Strategy Paper, 16 and the
In addition to these diplomatic prerequisites Netherlands 2020 Indo-Pacific guidelines. 17
for cooperation on issues of mutual interest, One respondent told how their country
Joint Statements adopted at high-level developed a strategy “to coordinate
summits facilitate conversation on political government efforts to increase [the
issues. Ultimately, visits at the highest country’s] presence and visibility in the
political level demonstrate political support region, with India as one of the top
for cooperation on global issues between priorities”. 18 A similar sentiment was shared
India and European countries. Similarly, by another respondent who argued that
partnership agreements add avenues for such strategies could “serve as a new
engagement and create new possibilities for framework for engaging with Asia for the
cooperation, as is the case with the Indo- [country’s foreign ministry] and the
Swedish partnership agreement on joint government at large”. 19 At the same time,
innovation, which is linked to a high-level states have endorsed the 2018 EU Strategy
dialogue on innovation. EU member states on India, acknowledging that strategy-
also have an opportunity to contribute to making is a matter not just for a specific
the Strategic Partnership between the EU country‘s diplomatic outreach, but also for
and India through their membership. its EU-wide engagement.
Diplomats from the member states interact
on common positions within Council groups
and committees. In addition, the EU
Delegation in New Delhi convenes regular
15 Ministry of External Affairs. 2020e. Embassy 17Government of the Netherlands. 2020. Indo-
of India Stockholm: India-Sweden Relations. Pacific: een leidraad voor versterking van de
Retrieved from Nederlandse en EU-samenwerking met partners in
https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Sweden_ Azië. Retrieved from
Bilateral_Brief_for_Website-23_Sep_2019.pdf https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/publicatie
(Accessed December 1, 2020). s/2020/11/13/indo-pacific-een-leidraad-voor-
16Department of Foreign Affairs. 2020. Launch versterking-van-de-nederlandse-en-eu-
of the Asia Pacific Strategy: “Global Ireland: samenwerking-met-partners-in-azie (Accessed
Delivering in the Asia Pacific region to 2025”. December 1, 2020).
Retrieved from https://www.dfa.ie/news-and- 18 Survey response 10, September 27, 2020.
media/speeches/speeches- 19 Survey response 17, October 30, 2020.
archive/2020/january/launch-of-the-asia-pacific-
strategy-global-ireland-delivering-in-the-asia-
pacific-region-to-2025.php (Accessed December 1,
2020).
© 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 12Detailing the second circle engagement and India on a range of global issues. It also
with India on global issues identifies differences in the scope of
cooperation on global issues between
Cooperation on global challenges has European countries and India, and the
become a buzz-phrase in contemporary EU- mismatched perceptions of European and
India relations. However, the kind of global Indian respondents.
issues that should be labelled “global
challenges of mutual concern” in Figure 3 visualises the global issues
engagements with India remains unclear. highlighted for this study based on all the
Given the channels of and mechanisms for survey entries from European and Indian
engagement provided by the established respondents. The more substantial and
formats and the growing attention to global prominent engagement on an issue was in
issues in Europe-India relations, it is also the responses, the larger the word in the
uncertain whether any particular issues word cloud. While an attempt was made to
attract more engagement than others. cover the full range of global issues, there
are undoubtedly other issues that are also
This section elaborates on the forms, of relevance to Europe-India relations.
preferences and methods of engagement
between the second circle member states
The global issues on which the second circle proliferation and export controls, and
European states and India engage counterterrorism. Similarly, cybersecurity,
encompass conventional and non- climate action, renewable energy, and
conventional foreign policy issues, and regional political and security crises
range from security and development policy constituted critical global issues for
to cybersecurity and renewable energy. engagement. This finding is corroborated
Almost all the respondents indicated by a survey of the statements made
engagement on United Nations institutional following official visits, in which issues such
issues, sustainable development, non- as UN reform, cybersecurity,
© 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 13counterterrorism, non-proliferation and different global issues mentioned in Figure
export controls regularly feature. 20 4. At the same time, the mean number of
global issues engaged with through the EU
Besides these dominant issues, Europe- is 6.8 per country. While the survey depicts
India relations involve exchanges and perceived engagement on global issues, it is
bilateral discussions on peacekeeping and important to note that European
peacebuilding, international law and human respondents identify a higher number of
rights. Our study also confirms engagement global issues being discussed through the
to a lesser degree on pressing EU than in bilateral relationships. Even
contemporary issues such as 5G, internet though it is to be expected that the EU-level
governance, Artificial Intelligence (AI), should constitute an avenue for foreign
migration and disaster risk management. policy for these member states, it is striking
that more global issues are discussed in the
A clear finding is that the group of countries EU-wide partnership than in bilateral
selected for the study engage with India on relationships.
a greater number of global issues through
the EU than in their own bilateral One trend in the data is for European
relationships. Only three of the eight second circle states to align themselves
countries engage with India on more than with what they perceive to be India’s
five global issues bilaterally (the preferred issues of engagement and act on
Netherlands, Spain and Sweden). All the these issues. Almost every European
other countries engage bilaterally on four or country studied pursues engagement on UN
fewer global issues. The mean for bilateral institutional issues, indicating their
engagement was 4.1 per country of the 16 response to India’s quest for a permanent
20 Government of Sweden. 2018. Sweden-India e+Ministers+of+Foreign+Affairs+of+India+and+Po
Joint Action Plan, agreed by Prime Minister Stefan land; Ministry of External Affairs. 2015b. Statement
Löfven and Prime Minister Narendra Modi. by Prime Minister at the Joint Press Briefing with
Retrieved from Prime Minister of Ireland. Retrieved from
https://www.government.se/statements/2018/04/s https://mea.gov.in/outoging-visit-
weden-india-joint-action-plan-agreed-by-prime- detail.htm?25837/Statement+by+Prime+Minister+
minister-stefan-lofven-and-prime-minister-narendra- at+the+Joint+Press+Briefing+with+Prime+Minister
modi/ (Accessed December 1, 2020); Kingdom of +of+Ireland; Ministry of External Affairs. 2018d.
the Netherlands. 2018. India-Netherlands Joint Press Release on the State Visit of the President of
Statement during visit of Prime Minister of India to the Hellenic Republic (June 16–19, 2018).
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© 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 14seat on the UN Security Council, and According to Indian respondents, all the
probably also UN candidacies. Nonetheless, global issues examined constitute a topic of
one respondent observed that “the UN is a conversation with European counterparts.
regular talking point in any meetings and This approach correlates well with
discussions, but without any specific contemporary Indian strategic ambitions to
initiatives taken”. 21 Other recurring global be a leading global power and India’s active
issues raised were non-proliferation and diplomacy on global debates. According to
arms export controls, counterterrorism and a recent monograph by India’s Minister of
cybersecurity, all of which are typically part External Affairs, “the India Way [in
of India’s diplomatic agenda. Regional international relations], especially now,
political/security crises were mentioned by would be more of a shaper or decider rather
some European respondents but were than just be an abstainer" on global issues. 23
generally not prominent in the statements Another interpretation of the results could
we analysed, suggesting a lower level of be that India prefers engagement on a
interest on the part of India in engaging on range of issues in order to meet the
these issues with second circle countries. expectations of other actors in the
Despite the fact that climate change international system, especially since India
constitutes an urgent global challenge, lacks a published grand strategy or the
engagement on climate action was institutional capacity to be a driving force in
highlighted by far from all the respondents. that international system.
Migration, 5G, and peacekeeping and The findings also suggest mismatched
peacebuilding constitute global issues perceptions. Whereas every Indian
where there has been scant engagement. In respondent confirmed talks on 5G, AI and
fact, little engagement exists on what internet governance, very few Europeans
constitute core issues for many European identified these as global issues where
countries. For instance, human rights are engagement was being pursued. In
primarily addressed in the EU-wide addition, while Indian respondents
strategic partnership with India, rather than confirmed engagement on the geopolitics
in bilateral talks. This is also corroborated of technology, European respondents were
by official statements following visits. less clear about diplomatic talks pertaining
European countries often raise issues that to technology. At the same time, both sides
are perceived as problematic through the considered cybersecurity to be a matter of
EU. As one respondent noted, “[my both EU-wide and bilateral engagement
country] sometimes prefers to engage with India. The question therefore arises
through the EU, also on political/ strategic whether the difference indicates that there
issues (the Middle East, Ukraine, etc.), to be is greater potential for engagement on
able to hide a bit behind a larger group of technology than many Europeans
countries, or larger countries with more acknowledge. If so, there is a risk that
political clout, when bringing up sensitive European states and India are operating out
points”. 22 of step with each other.
At the same time, Indian respondents
describe a broader scope of engagement on
global issues.
21 Survey response 2, July 14, 2020. 23 Jaishankar, Subrahmanyam. 2020. The India
22 Survey response 17, October 30, 2020. Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World. Noida:
HarperCollins Publishers: p. 211
© 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 15Drivers of and obstacles to engagement their respective countries on India’s
between India and second circle member preferences and priorities is currently
states on global issues limited. None of the European respondents
identified the “global weight and influence”
We asked the survey respondents to of their own country as attractive for India.
indicate what they perceived to be the This imbalance could affect how
factors that were either driving or impeding engagement plays out, and the
engagement. This question was in relation circumstances in which smaller and
to engagement in general on global issues, medium-sized second circle European
rather than specific issues. In a nutshell, the actors might be the more active partner in
drivers of cooperation on global issues were collaboration. As one respondent
identified as economic interests and an suggested: “It is fundamental to consider in
appreciation of India’s global importance, this context the asymmetrical nature of the
while a lack of institutional capacity or effort: India is highly attractive to [my
political priority were identified by both country] but also to the vast majority of
European and Indian respondents as European countries, which essentially for
impeding engagement. Factors in domestic economic reasons are very interested in
politics were not perceived by either side as improving relations”. 25
influencing engagement.
Respondents perceived a second set of
Factors driving engagement drivers as also playing a role, albeit not an
Although there were some differences in unequivocal one. These are factors related
the perceptions of European and Indian to what the survey calls “common values”.
respondents, it is possible to categorise the About half the respondents highlighted
drivers of cooperation on global issues common values as important for both sides.
between the selected European countries Interestingly, Indian respondents
and India in three groups. A first set of highlighted this driver more than European
drivers is those that were perceived to be respondents. This partial emphasis deviates
highly important for both Europeans and from the pattern observed in statements
Indians. Perhaps unsurprisingly, a main following high-level meetings, where
driver was “business opportunities”. This common values in one form or another are
trend is also reflected in joint and unilateral mentioned in almost all the statements.
statements, and the reports by the Indian Quotes from the joint statements following
Ministry of External Affairs, which also refer high-level meetings of the Netherlands and
to bilateral business promotion and related India, Spain and India, and Sweden and
engagement as important factors. India serve as typical examples: “As thriving
democracies, India and the Netherlands
Another main driver identified by both sides share a desire to work closely together and
was “India’s global weight and influence”. with all relevant players to support a rules-
How India performs as an emerging global based international order that upholds
power is a matter of debate. 24 Nonetheless, agreed international norms...” (the
it is clear that the prospects of India Netherlands); “[…] both leaders
becoming a global power increase its acknowledged that India and Spain share a
importance. At the same time, European strong commitment to the principles and
respondents are aware that the influence of values of democracy, freedom, the rule of
24 Pande, Aparna. 2021, Making India Great. 25 Survey response 10, September 27, 2020.
The Promise of a Reluctant Global Power.
HarperCollins: 3–24.
© 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 16law, respect for human rights and the political reasons suggests that a small
territorial integrity of States […]” (Spain); number of influential political actors in both
and “Based on long democratic traditions in the selected countries and India are actively
both countries, the two Prime Ministers promoting closer cooperation. Together
expressed a continued commitment to with the finding discussed further below
democracy, the rule of law, the promotion that “lack of political priority” is a major
and protection of human rights and obstacle to engagement, it is possible to
fundamental freedoms” (Sweden). 26 identify a general lack of energy on both
“Knowledge transfer”, however, appears sides for Europe-India cooperation in the
primarily to be a factor for India, although it political sphere.
is mentioned by some on the European side.
This is not surprising as India has often Factors impeding engagement
explicitly called for knowledge and Respondents on both sides highlight “lack
technology transfers from Europe, for of political priority" as the chief obstacle to
example with regard to green technology. closer engagement. This lack pertains to
European policymakers might wish to engagement as a whole rather than on
consider how this asymmetry should inform specific issues. Interestingly, Indian
their engagement with India. respondents more frequently attribute the
lack of priority to European countries than
The rise of China would appear to be a key to India.
factor that influences the level of
cooperation between India and European Another major obstacle would appear to be
countries. China was mentioned several constraints on institutional capacity, which
times by respondents on both sides, and according to the respondents are
China’s global activities and role are of experienced on both sides. This indicates
growing importance for both sides when that the relevant actors and agencies in
engaging with partners. As one respondent both India and our selected countries have
put it: “Until rather recently, China was seen only limited capacity to pursue strategic
as an opportunity, both in an economic sense dialogues and implement joint initiatives.
and its position on the world stage. This has This lack of capacity might be more
changed drastically in the past few years, pronounced on the Indian side, as European
[…]. In this context, [my country] has been respondents more commonly highlighted it
seeking new partners to work with on its Asia as an obstacle and attributed it primarily to
policy, and India seems to be finally gaining the Indian side. This fits the common
traction in a more consistent way as part of perception of India’s bureaucracy and
the thinking on Indo-Pacific and cooperation especially its diplomatic service as being
with like-minded partners in Asia”. 27 under strain.28
A third set of factors do not play a major The data suggests a lack of coherence
role in promoting cooperation. The two between second circle European states and
factors mentioned in our survey as of lesser India on many global issues. “Similar and/or
importance were “domestic political overlapping positions” was not generally
reasons” and “similar/overlapping perceived as a major driver, although it had
positions”. These low scores require some slightly higher scores among Indian
explanation. The low salience of domestic respondents than European. The lack of
26 Ministry of External Affairs. 2016b; 2017; 28 Bajpai, Kanti and Byron Chong. 2019. India’s
Kingdom of the Netherlands. 2018; Foreign Policy Capacity, Policy Design and Practice,
27 Survey response 17, October 30, 2020. vol. 2, no. 2, 137-162.
© 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 17similar positions is seen by respondents as researchers and media outlets concerning
an obstacle. It is interesting to note that the condition of India’s democracy. Judging
while there is a strategic will to be partners from the perceptions in this limited
on global issues, India and European second selection, any apprehension regarding the
circle states often seem to have divergent current state of democracy in India does not
positions on concrete issues. appear to affect willingness to cooperate in
a major way. Only one European
On the positive side, the environment for respondent highlighted India’s human rights
cooperation appears generally favourable in record as a problem.
the sense that there are few bilateral or
political problems that might affect further Figure 5 provides an overview of the drivers
engagement. “Lack of trust”, “bilateral and obstacles. The x axis separates the
disputes” and “public opinion” are not obstacles and drivers. The y axis plots the
perceived as major obstacles by either side. drivers and obstacles according to their
This is notable given the growing concern scores in the survey, ranging from
voiced by human rights organisations, unimportant to very important.
© 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 18The relationship between EU- and understand the issues of small countries, like
member state-level engagement international law. Plus, there are issues like
UN reform where the EU does not have a
Engagement between second circle EU unified stance, so the bilateral track
member states and India takes place both prevails”. 31
bilaterally and at the EU level. Both sides
acknowledge the benefits of cooperation at While the second circle of European states
both levels. Nonetheless, Europeans and prefers to engage with India on global issues
Indians seem to differ in their preferences at the EU-level, India seems to prefer
for the level of engagement: Europeans tilt bilateral engagement. There are several
towards the EU level while Indians prefer reasons for India’s preference. The fact that
the bilateral level. member states pursue their own bilateral
partnerships with India and that the “Big
Europeans from second circle states seem three” European powers have long
to prefer the EU level mainly because it has emphasised bilateral engagement may have
more impact collectively. In their steered India’s preference for capital-to-
comments, European respondents capital engagement. In addition, while India
particularly mentioned regional issues and has been developing bilateral cooperation
crises such as Syria or Afghanistan, as well with European states since its
as normative discussions on global policies independence, its engagement with the EU
as areas where the EU’s collective influence on global issues has only gradually
and or/expertise is perceived as important. deepened in recent decades. There is much
This perception is also supported by the to suggest that India’s foreign policy has
joint and unilateral statements following been geared structurally to bilateral rather
high-level visits, where – with a few than multilateral cooperation, at least with
exceptions – regional issues/crises are rarely regard to Europe. The various EU member
mentioned. According to one respondent: states are dealt with by different divisions
“Human rights, climate change, disarmament within the Indian Ministry of External Affairs
it is important to keep EU unity on these and responsibility for the EU and its major
issues, and dealing with India on them is member states – France and Germany –
more efficient on EU level”. 29 Another falls under different secretaries. 32 Hence, a
respondent noted that: “The EU has more degree of path dependency is to be
expertise, capacities, roles and leverage to expected in India’s approach. As one
discuss these [global] issues with India”. 30 respondent put it: “It is what major the EU
member states desire, to engage with India
European respondents prefer bilateral bilaterally. This mixed signalling to India
engagement mostly on issues where the EU and the opacity in the functioning of the EC
lacks a fully integrated position or the EU [European Commission] as well as a
institutions’ access to the platform is perceived bias towards China on trade
limited, such as in UN or other multilateral issues and indifference to Indian concerns
contexts, or on issues to which the specific vis-à-vis China has led to this situation”. 33
country gives extra priority. As one Another mentioned that “EU competencies
European respondent put it: “[…] for India, are limited in some areas like
as [a] very big country, it is important to counterterrorism. Similarly, Indian
29Survey response 5, August 31, 2020. https://mea.gov.in/Images/amb1/MeA_organogram
30Survey response 2, July 14, 2020. s_NW_04.pdf (Accessed January 15, 2021).
31 Survey response 5, August 31, 2020. 33 Survey response 14, October 2, 2020.
32 Ministry of External Affairs 2021.
Organogram. Retrieved from
© 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 19policymakers sometimes lack clarity on the change and human rights, while the
EU institutional framework”. 34 That said, member states focus bilaterally on
Indians also see benefits in engaging with promoting the business interests involved,
the EU level. For example, as one Indian such as renewable energy. As one
respondent put it, “If issues are regulatory respondent put it: “I think on the climate
the EU seems the appropriate forum”. 35 change-sustainable front, [my country] has
developed a double strategy through the EU
Overall, however, both sides seem set to in terms of trying to find common ground
continue working on both levels on many with India in global conversations and
issues, suggesting a twin track (or duplicate) bilaterally trying to promote [the country’s]
approach to cooperation. Climate action is companies that are investing in India, for
one such issue. It is possible to discern a example in support of its renewable energy
division of labour in the comments of some policies”. 36 The above discussion on
European respondents, whereby the EU preferences regarding level of engagement
addresses regional security issues and is captured in figure 6.
global policy discussions, such as climate
Conclusions member states view India as an increasingly
indispensable partner in tackling global
issues. When discussing actual influence on
The growing uncertainty in world affairs,
global affairs, however, the European view
and the new conditions and challenges
is partly derived from perceptions of what
facing the international order are bringing
India may become rather than what it
Europe and India closer at the strategic
currently is.
level. Both the EU institutions and the
34 Survey response 13, October 2, 2020. 36 Survey response 10, September 27, 2020.
35 Survey response 16, October 15, 2020.
© 2021 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 20The academic discussion of European in pursuit of a fairly limited agenda. Looking
engagement with India has been dominated in more detail at this engagement, two
by the activities of a first circle of actors – trends can be identified.
France, Germany and until recently the UK –
and the EU’s institutions. We argue, First, the member states studied align their
however, that the EU-India strategic engagement with India’s agenda to a high
partnership must be looked at in a much degree. This could be an illustration of how
broader way. Several smaller states in a member states in the second circle see long-
second circle, according to our terminology, term potential in India and are investing in
are pursuing active engagement with India the relationship by seeking common
as an emerging global power both ground. It is India that is the rising global
bilaterally and through the EU institutions. power – not the individual small and
medium-sized European states. India’s
Bilateral engagements can amplify existing emerging market, growing economic power
opportunities but these countries can also and active efforts to position itself as a
play an outsized role within and through the leading global power in the international
EU and other multilateral organisations. By system lead the EU member states to
actively using their EU membership, identify opportunities in the relationship.
member states in the second circle can Consequently, certain high-profile domestic
temporarily enter the core of EU-India issues, such as human rights, rarely feature
relations by influencing the EU’s common in the bilateral engagement. Instead, the EU
policies and institutions. This double as a collective becomes the primary arena
approach to EU-India relations by second for such discussions.
circle states can be constitutive of the EU-
India strategic partnership and decisive in Second, there is untapped potential in the
shaping the EU’s CFSP. India, in turn, is smaller member states’ India policy.
affected by the economies of second circle Contemporary issues relevant to the digital
states, and increasingly by the international age such as international norms and
order in which they are acting. It is equally standards on 5G, AI and cybersecurity
important for India to acknowledge these constitute such untapped potential and the
states for similar reasons. member states’ technological expertise
serves as a door opener. There is also
Although the smaller EU member states potential in further expanding multilateral
cannot be viewed as a coherent and cooperation. Although India’s limited
coordinated group, there are notable institutional capacity constrains actual
patterns in how and why they engage with impact, India has a long history of
an emerging global power such as India – engagement in multilateral institutions and
and in India’s responses. There are also its influence is growing. 37 Another area of
notable divergences, as well as differing cooperation that could be further explored
rates of success in attracting India’s interest. is peacekeeping and peacebuilding, where
The study confirms an ongoing engagement both sides have capacity but current
on global issues between the EU’s second engagement appears limited.
circle and India which, although wide-
ranging and growing at the collective level, Responding to climate change constitutes
is conducted individually by European states an area for engagement but it was
37 See Arndt, Michael 2019. “India and Policy: Theory and Praxis edited by Harsh V. Pant,
Multilateralism” in New Directions in India’s Foreign pp. 149–171.
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