A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE 2019 NIGERIAN PRESIDENTIAL AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS - ROSA LUXEMBURG FOUNDATION DAKAR SENEGAL PARTICIPATORY ...
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ROSA LUXEMBURG FOUNDATION
DAKAR SENEGAL
PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY SERIES
01 / 2019
A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE
2019 NIGERIAN PRESIDENTIAL
AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
ELECTIONS
Complied by
Dung Pam Sha
Professor of Political Economy
University of Jos, NigeriaI Introduction
The 2019 Nigerian Presidential election was the 9th national election since the return to civil
rule in 1999. It was considered one of the biggest in the country because it accommodated
91 political parties of various sizes and capacities. The electoral management body arranged
for the election of 73 presidential candidates, 109 Senators, and 360 members of the House
of Representatives. It also organised the election of 36 State Governors and 36 State House
of Assembly representatives. It provided for 84,004,084 registered voters to perform their
civil responsibilities. It was a huge undertaking for the Independent Electoral Commission
(INEC). It is crucial to provide an understanding of the factors that shaped the 2019 elections
before discussing the effect on the politics and society in Nigeria. The next section discusses
this.
II A General Background of the 2019 Presidential Elections
The Nature of the Nigerian State
Nigeria is an oil-dependent nation with oil significantly influencing its politics and economic
development. Oil exports are responsible for more than 50 percent of its foreign earnings.
Dependence on oil generates jobless growth and in turn fosters social and economic
inequalities, which have become a huge source of conflict.
Since the Nigerian State has a guaranteed source of income from oil, there is little incentive
to tax citizens. In this situation, citizens have less reason to place pressure on the government
to respond to their needs. The huge royalties at the disposal of state elites gives them power
to decide who gets what proportion of the revenue. Elites then often ‘bribe’ the citizenry by
allocating advantages strategically in order to weaken their demand for accountability1.
Since the Nigerian political elite occupying executive positions and legislature have
constitutional powers over the control of resources generated from oil sales, competition for
control of the state apparatus has become fierce. The control of these royalties led to the
creation of an inner circle of main beneficiaries who were chosen based on class, family,
ethnicity, political affiliations and even region and religion. Top civil servants also benefit
hugely from the distribution of royalties since they are in charge of the implementation of
decisions and projects2.
1
Inge Amundsen (2010), Good governance in Nigeria: A study in political economy and donor support, Oslo:
Norad (Norad Report Discussion no. 17/2010) 74 p. https://www.cmi.no/publications/3783-good-governance-
in-nigeria)
2
Ibid
Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung
2 Sotrac-Mermoz Villa 43 BP : 25013 | Dakar-Sénégal
Téléphone: +221 33 869 75 19 | Fax: +221 33 824 19 95 | Website: www.rosalux.snThe state elite often used oil wealth to influence powerful groups and individuals so that they
did not threaten it or use wealth to build powerful coercive apparatuses (militaries, police, as
well as private military firms and security companies), to ensure compliance by citizens, or
suppress discontent and opposition3. Since 2015, President Mohammadu Buhari’s regime
clearly demonstrated its mastery of control of the state to achieve class goals.
Economics Performance
At the time of assuming office in 2015, the Buhari regime faced a tough recession that
exposed the country’s weak capacity in economic management and its inability to provide a
clear direction out of the crisis. A combination of factors, such the country’s excessive
dependence on oil exports, the dependence on the dictates of the world economy, as well
as excessive corruption, caused macroeconomic instability due to the volatile world oil prices
and lack of good economic management models. The Buhari government was unable to
quickly assemble a credible economic team to design a blue-print out of the recession. The
failure to devise a plan led to the multiplication of problems such as poverty, unemployment,
low GDP growth rates, etc. The table below shows how badly the country fared from 2015
to 2018. The worst was 2016.
Nigeria: Growth Rate 2001-2018 (%)
40
33.7
35
30
25
20
15 10.4
8.2 6.9 7.8
10 6.8 6.2 6.3
4.4 4.9 4.3 5.4
3.8 3.4 2.7 3.5 3.9
5 0.8
0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
This situation negatively impacted the welfare of citizens and in turn the politics of the
country. The debate prior to the elections was on the performance of the Buhari regime in
managing the economy in a manner that would provide this welfare. What contributed
greatly to the jobless growth was the inability of the oil industry (which is capital and
technology intensive, and dominated by foreign companies) to create jobs locally. The period
also saw a significant decline in the manufacturing sector.
3
See full discussion in Ibid
Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung
3 Sotrac-Mermoz Villa 43 BP : 25013 | Dakar-Sénégal
Téléphone: +221 33 869 75 19 | Fax: +221 33 824 19 95 | Website: www.rosalux.snThe table below shows that the performance of the economy, particularly the manufacturing
sector, has been poor since 2016.
There were marginal increases in 2017 and the second half of 2018. There was a massive
decline in the third and last quarter of 2018. This probably explains why, in the last quarter
of 2018, the President warned Nigerians to again brace themselves for the worst of times.
Political Performance
The Buhari regime has been accused of running a cabal within government, implying that
the governing party doesn’t have a grip on the machinery of government. This is best
explained by the prominent roles played by that small group of individuals surrounding the
President4. They take crucial decisions that affect the lives of over 190 million Nigerians and
are often referred to as the “cabal”. This situation created some instability within the ruling
party, evidenced by the numerous conflicts in parliament over the passage of bills initiated
by the President, and his refusal to approve bills passed by the ruling party-dominated
parliament.
Conflicts within the ruling party led to mass defections of key regime members to other
political parties where they felt secure to contest the elections. As noted earlier, there was
no level playing field within the party as the cabal and the party leadership hand-picked
candidates and distributed patronage according to loyalty to the cabal.
4
The President has his cousin and a few relatives in strategic positions in parliament taking decisions for him
due to his ill-health. In the past, his wife Aisha Buhari complained of the manipulation of her husband by this
cabal.
Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung
4 Sotrac-Mermoz Villa 43 BP : 25013 | Dakar-Sénégal
Téléphone: +221 33 869 75 19 | Fax: +221 33 824 19 95 | Website: www.rosalux.snThe regime was criticised for lack of inclusivity and transparency in the manner in which
major appointments were made in the security and administrative structures of government
at the federal level. Ethnicity, religion and loyalty constituted the major criteria for such
appointments and excluded the opposition. The same mistake is about to be repeated, as
following victory at the polls, the President’s wife was quoted as saying that the regime
would reward only those Nigerians who supported the ruling party in its re-election. The lack
of inclusivity was one of the major points used by the opposition party in its campaign against
the ruling party and it resonated in the minds of many who felt marginalised.
Fragility of Intercommunal Relations
The regime came into office with a promise to provide security to all citizens, including
those in North Eastern Nigeria under the occupation of Boko Haram. Some efforts were
made by the regime but politics and corruption delayed the end of the war against the
insurgents. In addition, the regime-recorded efforts in halting inter-communal clashes was
abysmally poor. The ransacking of communities in the North Central zone of the country by
herders contributed to shaping the electoral outcomes in those areas.
The Electoral Management Board
The Justice Uwais report on Electoral Reforms recommended, amongst many measures,
the strengthening of the INEC and the promotion of its independence. It specifically
recommended an independent method of appointing the INEC leadership. This was not
done and has been a source of controversy and distrust of the body.
Immediately after the 2015 elections, the President appointed an acting Chairperson of the
electoral body and there was a public outcry from CSOs and the political opposition against
the appointment on the grounds that the candidate appointed was the President’s cousin5.
The allegation was denied but this singular act reduced the trust people had in the
independence of the electoral body.
The Permanent Voter Cards (PVC) crisis started in 2014 and continued to 2019 when the
Nigerian electorate, registered in specific locations, were required to collect their PVCs in
locations far away from where they lived. Rural locations with aged populations as well as
unemployed youth could not afford to, nor had the inclination, to fetch their PVCs. This was
certainly a programming error on the part of the INEC and led to the disenfranchisement of
a substantial number of the electorate. It is not surprising that the INEC kept announcing
huge numbers of uncollected PVCs.
5
The controversy was around the appointment of one of the INEC Commissioners, Mrs Amina Bala Zakari
Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung
5 Sotrac-Mermoz Villa 43 BP : 25013 | Dakar-Sénégal
Téléphone: +221 33 869 75 19 | Fax: +221 33 824 19 95 | Website: www.rosalux.snAnother problem that affected the credibility of the INEC was the registration of minors and
their participation in local government elections in Kano State. It must be said that Kano is
not the only location where minors are registered as voters.
Setting the stage for the 2019 elections by the ruling party
Given these scenarios, the ruling party knew it was facing tough political competition for its
re-election in 2019. It therefore put a number of measures in place, some unintended but
which had significant impact on the elections. For instance, the regime embarked on the
anti-corruption war, which it promised. Many corrupt politicians were arrested and looted
state funds were recovered. The unintended consequence of this measure was that it left
the opposition party financially weak because most members where compelled to remit
some looted funds to Treasury. The regime was accused of not being holistic in its approach
to fighting corruption since it concentrated its attention on harassing opposition party
politicians.
The regime faced a number of industrial relations crises, the most difficult being those carried
out by trade unions in the education sector such as the Academic Staff Union of Universities
in Nigeria (ASUU) and the Academic Staff Union of Polytechnics in Nigeria, over issues
around the implementation and re-negotiation of collective agreements. There was also a
protracted conflict between the regime and the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) over the
negotiation and implementation of a National Minimum Wage. Many observers were
uncomfortable that the regime wasn’t able to resolve the industrial disputes a few weeks
prior to an important election. Eventually, the regime promised to fulfil the memorandum of
understanding reached with the unions. This last minute understanding to some extent
influenced the electoral outcome. However, it is difficult to say how soon these agreements
will be fulfilled. The attitude of key actors in the new regime will determine the speed and
value of steps taken to realise the agreements.
The controversial removal of the head of the judiciary, Justice Onoghene, and his
replacement by a man close to the presidency a few weeks before the elections was
interpreted by civil society, international election observers, and social media as a safety-net
for the ruling party in case the electoral outcome was challenged by the opposition party in
court. The timing and method used was unconventional and therefore elicited this
interpretation. The PDP party, the runner up in the elections, filed suit with the electoral
tribunal, challenging the processes leading up to the declaration of the flag bearer of the APC
as the President of the country.
Another controversial issue was the refusal by the President to assent to the amendment of
the Electoral Act, which was designed to strengthen the electoral process. The ruling party
felt that sanctioning the bill was a definite way to obstruct it from retaining political power.
Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung
6 Sotrac-Mermoz Villa 43 BP : 25013 | Dakar-Sénégal
Téléphone: +221 33 869 75 19 | Fax: +221 33 824 19 95 | Website: www.rosalux.snThe Presidential and National Assembly Elections
The campaigns started with all parties announcing their campaign promises. In the
interests of time and space I will pay attention to the two major parties, the APC and the
PDP. The former adopted “The Next Level” as its theme, while the former “Making Nigeria
work Again”. For most observers, campaign issues were basically the same: pursuit of a
neoliberal agenda, although the voices from the APC sounded populist while those from
the PDP sounded pro-business. The manifestoes of both parties are clear on how
politicians want to operate the economy of the country. They are neither welfare nor
socially democratic in nature, but purely neoliberal.
As the elections drew nearer, the issue-based campaigns collapsed and gave way to the
use of ethnicity, religion and regionalism by the political elite. Corruption and security
featured in the debates but were downplayed.
Postponement of Elections and its impact
A few hours before the February 16th Presidential and National Assembly elections, the INEC
announced the postponement of the elections on account of challenges around logistics,
despite the fact that it had assured Nigerians all along that there were no problems affecting
the processes. Citizens, civil society and the international observers were perplexed by this
act and demanded a well-laid plan for the rescheduled elections. Citizens interpreted the
shift in the exercise as the handiwork of the ruling party to allow it to address challenges in
electoral wards where it anticipated potential problems. It was argued that the postponement
enabled parties to tamper with the critical election materials that had already been
distributed, such as possession of ballot papers by supporters of parties before the elections.
This created a credibility problem for the INEC.
The Elections and the Votes
The elections were eventually conducted on 23 February 2019. The following challenges
were related to the INEC and its adhoc staff:
deliberate delivery of materials late to polling stations
delivery of insufficient election materials
delivery of incorrect electoral materials to certain polling stations
deliberate manipulation of the card reader to incapacitate it
deliberate use of incorrect elections result sheets to complete causing the results to
be rejected
deliberate disappearance of returning officers from the collation centres to avoid
announcing the genuine results but the filing of unapproved results
Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung
7 Sotrac-Mermoz Villa 43 BP : 25013 | Dakar-Sénégal
Téléphone: +221 33 869 75 19 | Fax: +221 33 824 19 95 | Website: www.rosalux.sn switching of election result figures in favour of ruling party candidates
rewriting results to ensure the mandatory percentage of votes for a candidate, even if
the candidate failed to gain the highest number of votes.
There were also electoral irregularities carried out by political parties including:
vote trading before, during and shortly before collation of results
thumb-printing of ballot papers in secret locations
the stuffing of thumb-printed ballot papers into ballot boxes before elections
commenced
disruption of election through the use of violence
ballot paper and box snatching
burning of ballot papers
molestation of electoral officials
pressure by the INEC to declare unapproved election results
buying of opponents’ party agents
disruption of elections and collation of results by security forces.
After collating the results, the INEC announced that voter turnout was 35.66%. The
total number of votes was 28.6 million as shown below:
Votes in the 2019 Presidential Election
Registered Voters and Votes Scored Total
Total Number Of Registered Voters 84,004,084
Total Number Of Registered Voters (As Collated) 82,344,107
Total Number Of Accredited Voters (As Collated) 29,364,209
Total Number Of Valid Votes (As Collated) 27,324,583
Total Number Of Rejected Votes (As Collated) 1,289,607
Total Number Of Votes Cast (As Collated) 28,614,190
Percentage Turn Out (As Collated) 35.66 -voter turnout
Source: INEC Nigeria, https://www.inecnigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/2019-GE-PRESIDENTIAL-
ELECTION-RESULTS.pdf (retrieved 9.3.2019)
Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung
8 Sotrac-Mermoz Villa 43 BP : 25013 | Dakar-Sénégal
Téléphone: +221 33 869 75 19 | Fax: +221 33 824 19 95 | Website: www.rosalux.snThe table below also shows that participation in elections in Nigeria has been declining
since 2007.
Voter Turnout in Nigerian Presidential Election 1999-2019
Voter Turnout
Year
(%)
1999 52
2003 69
2007 57
2011 54
2015 44
2019 35.66
Source: Center for Public Policy Alternative, 2015 and the INEC 2019
Voter Turnout in Nigerian Presidential Election 1999-2015
Voter Turnout 1999 ‐ 2019 Nigerian Election, (%)
80
70 69
60
57
52 54
50
44
40
36
30
20
10
0
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Source: Center for Public Policy Alternative, 2015 and the INEC,
https://www.inbecnigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/2019-GE-PRESIDENTIAL-ELECTION-
RESULTS.pdf
Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung
9 Sotrac-Mermoz Villa 43 BP : 25013 | Dakar-Sénégal
Téléphone: +221 33 869 75 19 | Fax: +221 33 824 19 95 | Website: www.rosalux.snThe elections also show that in the interim, the National Assembly will comprise 10 of the
91 political parties. The All Progressive Congress (APC) will be the majority party in Senate
while the main opposition parties are the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and YPP. The
House of Representatives will comprise representatives of the AA, ADC, ADP, APC, APM,
APGA, PDP, PRP and SDP. The ruling party will form the majority party in the national
Assembly while the PDP will be the official opposition.
2019 Elections: Members of the National Assembly According to Party Affiliation
By-elections
AA ADC ADP APC APM APGA PDP PRP SDP YPP to be
conducted
Senate 0 0 0 63 0 0 36 0 0 1 8
House of
2 2 1 205 1 6 111 2 1 0 25
Representatives
Source: INEC, https://www.inecnigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/2019-GE-PRESIDENTIAL-ELECTION-
RESULTS.pdf
The number of members indicated above will change as by-elections will be held because
results were either inconclusive or violence prevented the commencement or conclusion of
the exercise. The figures could also change depending on the outcome of court cases before
the electoral tribunal. In addition, there were results that the INEC refused to approve
because they were announced under duress.
The electoral management body declared the incumbent, Mallam Mohammadu Buhari, the
winner of the Presidential elections followed by Mallam Atiku Abubakar.
The outcome is represented in the table below:
Name of Contestant Political Party Number of Votes Remarks
Muhammadu Buhari APC 17 15,191,847 Elected
Abubakar Atiku PDP 11,262,978 Not elected
Felix Nicolas PCP 110,196 Not elected
Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung
10 Sotrac-Mermoz Villa 43 BP : 25013 | Dakar-Sénégal
Téléphone: +221 33 869 75 19 | Fax: +221 33 824 19 95 | Website: www.rosalux.snWhat do the 2019 elections tell us about Nigerian Politics?
The 2019 elections provide a glimpse into the nature of the political class, the strength of
democracy and the level of trust citizens have in political institutions that are expected to
build democracy, etc.
The Political Class
The discourse in Nigeria regarding the nature of the political class revolves around the lack
of cohesion due to factors such as ethnicity, religion and regionalism. Ideology, class and
gender are hardly factors that define the political behaviour of this class. In 2014/15, the large
number of defections from the ruling PDP to the coalition that transformed itself into the
APC showed its fluidity. ‘Rational choice’ dictates the political disposition in circumstances
where the political parties remain largely undemocratic, especially those being controlled by
financiers. The substantial number of defections and counter-defections from one party to
another in the 2018/19 attest to the fact that this class is incapable of building political
institutions to stabilise democracy in the country.
The Nature of Democracy
These elections have significant implications for the development of the democratic system
in Nigeria. The 190 member European Union Observation Team that engaged in a long-term
observation mission stated the following regarding the presidential election:
The presidential and National Assembly elections were competitive… The rhetoric became
more acrimonious and threatening closer to election-day and there were an increasing number
of violent incidents. The INEC’s…. serious operational shortcomings reduced confidence in the
process and put undue burden on voters…. Incumbents at federal and state levels enjoyed
advantages, to the benefit of both leading parties, most notably on federal government
television and state-run media. The controversial suspension of the Chief Justice by the
President was divisive and raised questions about process, timing and jurisdiction. …The
majority of polling units opened extremely late, leaving voters waiting for hours uncertain of
when voting would begin. This was compounded by a general lack of public information from
INEC. As a result, there was confusion and tension, and voters were likely deterred from
participating … important polling procedures were insufficiently followed, and in 14 per cent
some essential materials were missing. On four occasions, voting continued even when smart
card readers malfunctioned. There were evident problems in completing results forms and they
were not publicly displayed in half the counts observed, weakening transparency. …Reports
from security forces and in the media indicated that between approximately 20 and 35 people
were killed on polling day in election-related incidents. INEC had to operate in a complex
security and politically-charged environment. … … [The] procedural weaknesses continue in
relation to checks and transparency in the results collation process. INEC was widely criticised
when, five hours before polling was due to start on 16 February, it postponed the elections by
a week, citing logistical reasons. … Attempts to amend the Electoral Act were unsuccessful
and legal shortcomings continued, including in regards to specific procedures for the use of
smart card readers in polling units. The primaries involved prohibitive financial costs, confusion
Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung
11 Sotrac-Mermoz Villa 43 BP : 25013 | Dakar-Sénégal
Téléphone: +221 33 869 75 19 | Fax: +221 33 824 19 95 | Website: www.rosalux.snand substitution of winners by party leaderships. … Campaign rhetoric became more
acrimonious and hostile. Political finance regulation is dysfunctional due to incomplete legal
provisions and lack of enforcement. Cases of misuse of state resources were generally left
unaddressed. …Federal government-owned radio and a few commercial broadcasters at
national and regional levels offered a diversity of views. However, there was evident partisan
programming by the federal government-owned Nigerian Television Authority (NTA), state-run
media, and local commercial radio stations owned by politicians. Overall, media coverage of
the campaign was dominated by antagonistic commentary by the two leading parties.
Consequently, with the exception of a few states, voters had limited access to diverse and
factual information on which to make an informed choice…. … The president also called for
the military and police to be ruthless with ballot box snatchers.
From the above discussions, and particularly the statement by the EU, it is clear that not all
is well with democratic processes in Nigeria. I will borrow the terminology used by the
Economist Intelligence Unit to describe the state of democracy in the world, to say that
Nigerian electoral processes are in a state of “recessions”6 or “retreat”7 or under “stress”8.
We strongly conclude that Nigerian electoral democracy has declined since 1999 and is
substantiated by the decline in political participation seen by decreasing levels of voter
turnout, low performance of political parties, lack of internal democracy, the violent nature
of elections, the trust deficit in the electoral management body by citizens, the increasing
monetisation of the electoral process and new irregularities introduced into the electoral
process.
Response by Citizens to Loss of Trust in State Institutions
Electoral vigilantism
This is a method designed and developed initially by political party supporters but currently
by civil groups to protect their votes and defend their electoral mandates. It is a way of
ensuring that their votes count in the electoral process. The electoral law demands that the
electorate vote and go home or, if they elect to stay, they must keep a distance of 30 metres
from the polling station in order not to disrupt the electoral process. Nowadays, the
electorate keeps vigil over the process from the beginning, when the votes are cast, to the
collation and announcement. They record the counting and announcement using mobile
phones and take pictures of the result sheets. They also mobilise in large numbers to
escort/follow the presiding officers to the collation centres to ensure that the results are not
6
Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2012 – Democracy at a standstill,
https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=Democracy2012
7
Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy index 2010 - Democracy in retreat,
https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=Democracy2010
8
Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy index 2011 - Democracy under stress,
https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=Democracy2011
Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung
12 Sotrac-Mermoz Villa 43 BP : 25013 | Dakar-Sénégal
Téléphone: +221 33 869 75 19 | Fax: +221 33 824 19 95 | Website: www.rosalux.snchanged on the way but are announced. They then follow the process to the INEC national
collation centre where the results are complied, computed and announced by the Returning
Officer. Their presence in the vicinity of the INEC office sends signals to the electoral umpire
to be transparent.
Secondly, during the 2019 elections, peaceful/civil protests were organised by communities
and political party supporters who felt that their mandates were stolen. This was noted in
Jos when, five days after the Senatorial and House of Assembly election, the results were
not announced. There were other post-election civil protests across the country where
electoral infractions were witnessed. The third response was the violent protests that erupted
after the collation and announcement of results. These reports set the stage for one to make
a fair assessment of the process.
The Political Left
The political Left acknowledged its present deficiencies in competing with bourgeois
politicians for political power using the electoral system. Various platforms are re-examining
methods and strategies of taking over political power. Others have used the liberal provisions
in the electoral law to form and register their political parties. A fairly good attempt was made
by the Labour Party, which was formed and registered by the Nigerian Labour Congress. The
party formed a government at state level a few years back and had some representation in
parliament. It is important to point out that the government wasn’t of the Left. The platform
was only appropriated and used.
Members of the Left extraction indeed registered political parties and vied for various
positions in the 2019 elections, ranging from the position of the President to the lowest
position as a member of the Area Council. I believe that there are lessons to be learned from
this latest experience. One being that the Left has to be more organised to break the
dominance of the bourgeois elite’s hold on power. Sectarianism is a disservice to itself and
to the Nigerian people who are desperately looking for alternatives.
What do the 2019 elections tell us about Nigeria Society?
A Divided Citizenry
The mobilisation and manipulation of Nigerian citizens based on ethnicity, religion and
regionalism by the political elite and the political parties before and during the Presidential
elections indeed further divided a country already fractured along these lines. The 2011 and
2015 elections confirmed a divided nation while the 2019 election did not surprise observers
because of the way the regime handled issues of inclusivity in the four years while in office.
Though the elected President indicated that his regime will address the wide inclusivity
Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung
13 Sotrac-Mermoz Villa 43 BP : 25013 | Dakar-Sénégal
Téléphone: +221 33 869 75 19 | Fax: +221 33 824 19 95 | Website: www.rosalux.sndeficit, it is unclear how the regime will manage its success as well as review its patronage
politics in the near future.
Demand for Accountability is Weak
The wide gap between the rich and the poor, manifested in the distribution of resources,
does not influence electoral choices. As noted earlier, the widening poverty levels across the
regions of the country did not affect the nature of the social contract between the political
class and citizens. This implies that those in control of the state apparatus will continue to
manage national wealth as personal wealth since the electorate are strangely weak in
demanding accountability.
Political civil society is stronger on issues related to the demand for accountability of the
electoral process. They monitored the process from the beginning to the declaration of the
election results.
Task for the new Regime
The first task is for the regime to be honourable enough to take a second look at the electoral
system. It will be crucial to revisit the Justice Uwais report that recommended concrete
suggestions to strengthen the electoral system and reduce some of the administrative
burdens the INEC has to contend with during Nigerian elections. There is need to pay
attention to emerging threats to the electoral processes, especially those designed to
circumvent and defraud electoral procedures.
In the next four years, the regime has to deal with the following nation-building, stability and
governance issues:
a. inclusivity deficit – (regional, ethnic, religious and gender balance to promote nation
building/peacebuilding)
b. the neutralisation of political cabals who have captured governmental power
c. inner regime corruption as a step to fight this national phenomenon.
d. lack of direction in economic policy and management that promises to be citizen
based.
e. authoritarian tendencies inside the government and within the ruling party.
Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung
14 Sotrac-Mermoz Villa 43 BP : 25013 | Dakar-Sénégal
Téléphone: +221 33 869 75 19 | Fax: +221 33 824 19 95 | Website: www.rosalux.snAt this stage, we can only guess the possible direction the regime might take. It is on record
that the President-elect hinted of tougher times in the next few months9 and also indicated
that his administration will be tougher and stricter in the next four years10. These statements
have not been unpacked or given any life yet. However, two scenarios are provided to explain
how the regime could carry on in the next four years.
The first scenario is one in which the regime witnesses a battle between the cabals and the
more liberal party members who will want to see more democratisation in the governance
processes. It will be a battle in the constitution of the political cabinet and principal officers
of the regime. The present group that designed the re-election strategies will not want to be
dislodged in the name of democratisation of governance. This may be a source of conflict
within the ruling party as well as in the Senate and House of Representatives, as witnessed
within the first four years. In this situation a few changes will be made to economic policy
but they will not be sufficient to transform the economy. A few ‘bribes’ will be given to the
electorate in the first few months, but the regime will not be able to sustain this system of
patronage. It will likely be difficult for the regime to fulfil its “next level” programmes due the
internal organisation of the regime.
The second scenario, is that the regime could carry out deeper or full-blown neoliberal
reforms as a way of addressing the challenges confronting the economy. The success of this
will depend on the composition of an economic team to push this agenda. This will include
having a minister in charge of the economy and finances as well as of planning with
technocratic skills. Given party representation in parliament, as shown above, it is possible
to push these reforms without problems. However, it has to avoid the kind of intra-party
squabbles witnessed in the present parliament. More importantly, the regime has to build a
coalition of those willing to push these reforms. The only challenge the regime will have is
with organised labour, which is expecting a minimum wage and better working conditions,
particularly in the educational and the medical sectors. The other challenge will be from the
electorate who re-elected the regime. The bulk of the voters are from poor areas of the
country and have a “revolution of expectations”. They will certainly be let down by the
reforms, which often hurt the poor. This will also define the chances of the party retaining
power in 2023.
9
This was mentioned in the last quarter of 2018 when the regime noted the bouncing back of recession in
the economy
10
This statement was made after his re-election into office in February 2018
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