Advanced LD Brief January/February 2020
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Advanced LD Brief January/February 2020
1Resolved: States ought to eliminate their
nuclear arsenals.
This topic brief was written by Jesse Meyer. Jesse is a diamond coach, recipient of the Donald Crabtree
Service Award, the state of Iowa’s 2015 Coach of the Year, member of the TOC’s PF advisory board, and
board member of the Iowa Forensics League. He is currently an assistant coach at Iowa City West High
School. He can be reached at jessemeyer@gmail.com.
2Table of Contents
Contents
Advanced LD Brief January/February 2020 ................................................................................................... 1
Resolved: States ought to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. ......................................................................... 2
Table of Contents ....................................................................................................................................... 3
Topic History and Background ................................................................................................................... 5
Topic Analysis............................................................................................................................................. 8
Values, Criterions, and Definitions ..........................................................................................................10
Miscalculations ........................................................................................................................................14
Sample Evidence ..................................................................................................................................16
Further Reading ...................................................................................................................................18
Deterrence ...............................................................................................................................................19
Sample Evidence ..................................................................................................................................21
Further Reading ...................................................................................................................................25
Proliferation .............................................................................................................................................26
Sample Evidence ..................................................................................................................................28
Further Reading ...................................................................................................................................32
Morality....................................................................................................................................................33
Sample Evidence ..................................................................................................................................36
Further Reading ...................................................................................................................................40
Social Contract .........................................................................................................................................41
Sample Evidence ..................................................................................................................................43
Further Reading ...................................................................................................................................46
Survival .....................................................................................................................................................47
Sample Evidence ..................................................................................................................................50
Further Reading ...................................................................................................................................54
Accidents/Disposal...................................................................................................................................55
Sample Evidence ..................................................................................................................................58
Further Reading ...................................................................................................................................61
Spark ........................................................................................................................................................62
Sample Evidence ..................................................................................................................................64
3Further Reading ...................................................................................................................................67
Conclusion................................................................................................................................................68
Aff and Neg Arguments At-A-Glance .......................................................................................................69
4Topic History and Background
The concept of radioactivity was discovered by scientists and husband and wife Pierre
and Marie Curie in 1898. During an experiment a substance that was created by the processing
of inert elements created the element Radium. This element emitted a huge amount of
radiation over time and slowly poisoned the Currie’s. Shortly after their deaths, scientists saw
the potential behind the idea of radioactive elements in both energy production and potentially
weaponization. However, dur to the times, ideas had moved faster than science and technology
and all attempts at this failed.
The dream of radioactive energy fueled many a science fiction writer. In 1914, HG.
Wells, was inspired to write the alien weapons in his book, War of the Worlds, off of the
potential destructive power of atomic energy. In 1924. Winston Churchill wrote a speculative
policy on the political implication of atomic weapons. In 1933, Adolf Hitler rose to power in
Germany. His desire to create a third Reich that spanned the globe, he determined that a
weapon of immense power would be needed to overcome the resource disadvantage of the
German empire. Fearing what he might make them down Jewish and other German scientists
fled the nation and settled in London and the United States. It was through this migration that
Leó Szilárd fled to London where he proposed, and in 1934 patented, the idea of a nuclear
chain reaction via neutrons.
In August 1939, Albert Einstein wrote a letter to U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt
warning him concerned that Germany might have its own project to develop fission-based
weapons. Roosevelt responded by setting up the Uranium Committee, It was only after the
attack on Peral Harbor that Roosevelt took things seriously. Roosevelt appointed Robert
Oppenheimer to head up the group of scientists whose soul job was to develop atomic
weapons into something that can be used the allies before the NAZI’s. This project was called
the “Manhattan Project.” With headquarters at Blue Ridge and Los Alamos, the Americans
began their work. During this time, the United Kingdom was read into the file, but the USSR was
not. Oak Ridge processed the uranium into workable nuclear material and Los Alamos
constructed the weapon. In 1943, Oppenheimer advocated two detonation devices receive
further testing. One was a plutonium gun to trigger the chain reaction and the other was a
plutonium implosion. By 1944, the implosion method was chosen, and Operation Fat Man was
given the green light. Testing commenced in mid-1944 in the desert of New Mexico. From the
testing, three weapons were created for final use. After D-Day and the inevitable victory in
Europe, Allied High Command determined that an invasion of the Japanese home islands would
take millions of troops with a potential of a half a million Allied soldiers killed. In weighing the
potential for deaths vs war speed, the choice was made to drop the bomb. On August 6, 1945, a
uranium-based weapon, Little Boy, was detonated above the Japanese city of Hiroshima, and
three days later, a plutonium-based weapon, Fat Man, was detonated above the Japanese city
5of Nagasaki. Over one hundred thousand civilians were killed in the initial blast with thousands
more dying in the years after due to radiation relations effects.
Shortly after the end of World War II, Soviet spies began sending data from the tests
and projects back to the USSR. USSR troops began to search the remains of Europe for any
remaining German scientists who might have information on the German nuclear projects. In
1949, the USSR, using mostly stolen science, tested their first atomic bomb. The nuclear arms
race had begun. After the detonation of the first atomic weapons test in the United States, the
scientists of the Manhattan project called for a restriction of nuclear energy as it had the
potential to end the world. However, the alure of power was too powerful for politicians and
the race continued. Over the next two decades, the nations of China, France, the United
Kingdom, and South Africa would all develop nuclear weapons. In the 1971’s rumors would
circulate that Israel had developed a small number of nuclear weapons with the help of the
United States. These rumors have never been confirmed but it is universally understood as true.
In the 1981’s South Africa voluntarily disarmed their nuclear weapons program. After the
collapse of the Soviet Union, there were a dozen more nuclear states as the now independent
nations had leftover weapons from the USSR. Over the next few years, they would transfer the
weapons back to the Russians. In the 1991’s. India and Pakistan would both develop nuclear
weapons andong with the means to launch them. In the mid 2000’s, North Korea would test
their first atomic weapon followed with their first thermonuclear weapon a decade later.
As we progress from the 1940’s until now, the weapons have become more advanced.
The first weapons were crude atomic weapons; They worked by combining a core of plutonium
in a shell of plutonium. The sudden force of neutrons being combined caused the core to
overhead and fuse plutonium into heavier elements. This type of explosion is devastation but
relatively small. The atomic weapons detonated over Japan were only in the hundreds of tons
of TNT (kiloton). The weapons developed by every nation in the 1940-60’s was based on
thermonuclear weapons. They used heavier radioactive elements. They could be built smaller
and with more impact. Weapons could not extend into the megaton range (capable of
devastating a region the size of the New York City area)/ The USSR developed the most
powerful bomb in the world. Codenamed “Tsar,” the bomb detonated over the Arctic Circle was
only 50 megatons. The shockwave could be registered on scientific instruments on its third pass
over the world. This was only a mid-range bomb according to the Russians as they could have
amped up the power to 100 megatons.
Nuclear weapons play an important role in the international policies of the world. For
nations that poses these weapons, there are three means to launch or deliver weapons; via
bombers, missels and subs. This is called the nuclear triad, and every nation that has nuclear
weapons strives to fulfill these triad as a means of delivery. In North Korea, our greatest fear is
not necessarily their weapons, which they already own, but that they will one day develop a
delivery system that can reach the United States. When dealing with some nations, attention is
played to nuclear states. India and Pakistan have fought six wars over the course of the last 70
6years, but they have not fought a war since both nations acquired and tested a bomb. South
Korea and japan have not developed their weapons programs due to the nuclear protection
provided by our sharing agreement.
Although we could cover it more here, concepts like deterrence, miscalculation, and
other issues that might develop into arguments will be discussed later in the file in the
framework and under arguments. Please read on.
7Topic Analysis
The topic of nuclear disarmament hits at the very core of both the idea of debate and at
Lincoln Douglas debate. This topic is asking us to look at the result for most debate advantages,
nuclear war, and asking us to debate the mechanism for which this will occur through lenses of
pragmatism and morality. What I mean by this is that we avoid the entire context of what an
advantage might say and debate the context for which nuclear weapons are built, stored,
armed, and used and how we get from bomb in a bunker to total global end.
This topic should also bring us closer to how much a nuclear weapon affects us on a
daily basis. For lots of us out there, weapons are thousands of miles away and pose no real
threat to us. But to others, the threat is real. Those that work with the weapons daily, those
that live in areas of first strike, those that live in areas of fallout and in the paths of prevailing
winds, those that have to deal with the waste and the mining, all have a bested interest in the
creation or destructrion of our nuclear weapons. For years, the acronym that ruled
international politics when it came to nuclear war was “MAD” or mutually assured destruction.
The idea was that any nation that launched a first strike would allow others free reign to
retaliate in kind. To destroy one was to destroy everyone. Appropriate that it is called MAD this
concept still governs our use of weapons. The minute that any one nation launches, it is almost
impossible to determine targets as most weapons are sub orbital and final destinations can’t be
determined for sure until reentry. Thus, to prevent destruction before retaliation, other nations
would be inclined to launch. Mad for sure.
For decades, activists have touted the benefits of disarmament and the harms of
nuclear deterrence. Robert Oppenheimer, the father of the atomic bomb, was branded a
Communist sympathizer when he came out against his own creation. General Colin Powel was
labeled a “liberal” by the Bush Administration when he spoke out on TV while working for the
same administration about how pointless nuclear deterrence was. Theorists and writers and
philosophers are seen as academics and “bleeding hearts” if they argue that nuclear arms are
dangerous. However, rarely can we dismiss people with expertise in the fields they critique with
simple ad hom attacks. Their arguments must be evaluated.
Treaties have attempted to limit the testing and use of weapons. The Non-Proliferation
Treaty sought to stop more nations from acquiring nuclear weapons- this failed. The
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty hoped to stop testing of nuclear weapons- this failed on
multiple occasions. The Start and Salt treaties attempted to limit the number of weapons the
US and USSR could own. This was working, however in the last decade, our disarmament has
slowed. Obama, in his final year as president, only removed 309 weapons from service. This put
our total at just under 5000. Under President Trump, we are planning a rebuilding of our
nuclear arsenal, in defiance of treaties. The NMD and Ballistic Weapons Treaties were
withdrawn by President George W. Bush so we could build Regan’s dream of a space-based
8weapons interceptor system. Abolitionists argue that we can’t be trusted to police ourselves so
total disarmament is necessary.
On the other side of the coin are the nuclear hawks. They argue that we need our
weapons to defend against real threats. We live in a world where the thing that is respected the
most, that is understood the most, and is universal no matter what country or nation you come
from is force. For the last 75 years, our nuclear weapons have been a security blanket keeping
not only the United States safe, but our allies at peace and potentially, from proliferating
weapons of their own. Furthermore, our reliance on nuclear weapons has kept international
order as nations are far less willing to go to war with nations that have ties to one of the major
nuclear superpowers. Beyond that, nuclear weapons development has led to huge jumps up
the scientific ladder. Developments in transportation, rocket technology, and even medicine
have came from nuclear weapons and the experimentation that lead to their development. We
can’t turn a blind eye to this.
The debate over nuclear weapons is unique as it is the fundamental end impact for most
debate cases. Nuclear weapons have a special place in the world. Almost no other impact or
thing we can do to each other can lead to total world extinction. However, nuclear war is one of
the few that can. So, lets start by looking at the value and criterion structures that might be
used in debate. I will note that the coverage on the values and criterions will be to discuss their
applications in debate. As to how they relate to arguments, you can go more in depth in the
argument sections below. This is done so that I don’t end up repeating myself a ton.
9Values, Criterions, and Definitions
On the affirmative, you could value life. Life, one could argue, is a prerequisite to all
other values. Being alive is the door to other value systems and functions of society. Nucellar
weapons, as will be shown multiple times in this brief, threatens the basic concept of life and
has the ability to put even the chance of life at risk. This means that nuclear weapons stop a
prerequisite to humanity.
Survival is as a potential value follows the same logic as life. Although one could use
survival on both sides of the topic, but I think the biggest splash will be made on the
affirmative. Using Carl Sagan’s work (see a card om the Survival section) you could argue that
life on Earth is special as this is the only planet we know of thus far that can support life and for
the time being, it is the only planet that we can live on. To risk the destruction of this world
means we end life for humanity but also life for every living thing on Earth and an entire history
that is awash in culture and civilization will end. Nuclear weapons represent a unique threat to
this surivival as they are one of the few humans made objects that has the power to do such a
thing.
Morality or a moral obligation is derived from the core context of the world “ought” in
the resolution. For most debaters, the world “ought” to imply a moral obligation or the idea
that morality exists and affirming requires the use of a moral lens. As is explained under the
“Morality” section, nuclear weapons and namely the use cause extensive human suffering and
death which violates the basic tenants of what is moral. Furthermore, almost every other
argument could be linked back to morality in some way as the means used to justify action do
not justify a moral end.
Peace or global peace might be a value system that others will gloss over. However, if
we look at the root cause of why we are debating for the abolition and disarmament of nuclear
weapons, the end goal is that of stabilizing the international community. Removal of nuclear
weapons necessitates a global peace structure to replace what once was.
Social Contract Theory as justified in the “Social Contract” section discusses how the
very foundations of democracy are violated by the drive for a nuclear weapons stockpile. Just
governments then can’t exist as long as there exists a form of nuclear weapons and thus you
must affirm.
Looking to the negative, your value structures would likely stem from the absence or
sudden absence of nuclear weapons. To snap your fingers and abolish nuclear weapons all at
once would leave a power vacuum that nations would rush to fill. So, the first value would be
international stability. For decades, we have learned to live with the nuclear weapon neighbor
so to speak of. We may not love it nor may it always be welcomed, but it has been the
foundation of international relations for so long that absent our weapons, nations would all of a
10sudden be left to fend with a we world order. This might cause wars, famine, and conflict on a
scale that would rival a nuclear war.
Realism is a solid value for the negative. The realistic nature of international relations is
that nations will fight tooth and nail to keep their weapons. If you want a real-world example of
how this is playing out right now, look no further than North Korea. They have lied, cheated,
and deceived the international community to gain a nuclear deterrent because they believe
that it is the only way for them to protect their nation from outside force. Realism states that
nations do not exist in a perfect utopia and that we must operation under the assumption that
every action is motivated by a desire for something more than what we can see. In the case of
nuclear weapons, it might be power, control, or dreams of keeping control, In such a world,
nations won’t relinquish their weapons and this obstacle might be something that even fiat
can’t overcome.
Deterrence or self-defense is another strong value structure as the basic concept of our
weapons today is that of defending ourselves from external threats. Threats might take the
form of a hostile nation that threatens us first with weapons they create first or rouge groups
that create weapons of war. Threats might be from rival nations seeking to expand their sphere
of influence. Or threats might come from a war that was declared legitimately but has the
potential to harm our own citizens. Either way, for decades nuclear weapons have provided a
deterrence for us and we need to maintain this.
Looking to a criterion structure that could fit the values for the affirmative and negative,
you would want to pick something that allows you to measure the value. Considering the
resolution, you would want to use this as a gauge of when we have met the value or
established the value as a true fact. In the case of the affirmative, the generic criterion would
be “eliminating our nuclear arsenal” as it not only is mandated by the resolution, but it sets the
standard of nothing less that total abolition. This protects you from counterplans that PIC out of
specific instances for keeping weapons or specific weapons systems. Other than that, I would
pick criterions that match the verbiage of the case and the value. If you are using life as a value,
then a criterion might be “when all life is protected against nuclear threats.” The key moment is
to establish a test for the value that matches the language of your case and directly links back
to your resolution.
On the negative, a value structure that allows you some flexibility would be to say,
“maintaining our nuclear weapons arsenals.” This is a converse of the affirmative and allows
you to defend a broad range of arguments on the negative case like survival, deterrence, self-
defense, and others. If you are a LARP debate, your criterion, if you have one, might be related
to your counterplan. Use the criterion as a psudo-counterplan text and as a justification
mechanism for the counterplan. So, you could say that your value is international stability and
the criterion is “maintaining a only submarine launched warheads.” This would allow you to
claim a deterrence effect, stability internationally, and you still can claim some of the
advantages of the affirmative. Outside of this, the argumentation and choice is much the same
11as for the affirmative. Chose a criterion structure that fits the language of your case and links to
the resolution.
When we look at definitions, we see a few points of contention that have to be
addressed.
States’- This term as quoted from Websters and used by multiple legal sources and the federal
government, a state is defined as “A nation or territory considered as an organized political
community under one government.” This means that a state extends to lands beyond
traditional borders. US subs would count as part of the United States as they are US soil. So,
would bases in foreign countries or bombers flying over nations. This would not mean
individual states within the United States as those entities are at the will of the federal
government and violate the “one government” clause of the definition. This would also limit
out most non state actors like terrorist groups as they don’t have a defined nation or area and
their government structure is viewed but not globally recognized. IE- ISIS hasn’t been extended
a seat at the UN and I doubt that they will any time soon. So, we hit a snag in the plans for
disarmament as it limits this to recognized nations. Terrorist states, not recognized, if they get
weapons are free to operate.
Eliminate- A classic and basic definition means “to remove.” This is pretty cut and dry. But the
not so easy part is that the definition does not specify the speed at which we eliminate. So do
we assume that once the judge votes aff, all of the weapons are gone and we are left to see
what fills in the void or does the affirmative get to specify in an advocacy text the timeline for
disarmament? If the aff defends this, does the negative have grounds for a theory violation that
the speed of disarmament is their ground and the aff must defend an immediate removal? The
other point of contention is that the resolution does not specify how we eliminate the
weapons. This will play a role in the ‘spark” section.
Their- A possessive that indicates ownership. In this case, it refers to states. Thus, we are
eliminating our weapons. We are not forcing others to eliminate theirs. So, the debate on the
negative becomes this; what if a nation like Russia or China refuses to disarm? What kind of
solvency can we gain from this if every nation won’t disarm? Can the negative gain offense
from one nation saying “no” and arguing that gives them unlimited hegemony? Also, since we
are eliminating our weapons, does this mean that if a nation really wants to disarm but can’t
afford the process, we can’t help? The US and international community have been helping
nations disarm their weapons for years. To say to nations that want to give them up now they
can’t because they are too poor might harm the affirmative and solvency.
12Nuclear arsenal- Defined by ICAN, a nuclear arsenal is defined as “A weapon whose destructive
power comes from nuclear energy; an atomic bomb or a hydrogen bomb.” My feeling is that
some debaters will conflate the idea of the “arsenal” and “a weapon” together or use the terms
interchangeability. You are debating the entirety of our nuclear weapons systems as defined by
arsenal not just warheads, or one part of the nuclear triad. Also, and this goes without saying,
that this means an offensive or defensive device. Things like radiation therapy in hospitals don’t
count as they were never designed to be weapons. I know this might seem silly, but I have
heard this argued as a contention before.
The important thing to remember is to keep the debate clean. On a topic such as
nuclear disarmament, either the judges will be at the complete mercy of the debaters as they
know nothing about the topic or they will come in thinking they know everything about the
topic and you will be fighting this perception. The best thing to do in either way is to lay out a
clear link chain and really give the judge clear voting issues in the end. Judges that are new to
the topic will appreciate the breakdown and judges that are experienced will have to evaluate
the line by line and can’t ignore your explanations. Above all, remember that this debate will
stem into the world of emption. Emption is good as it shows a human connection, but it is
important to link this back to real world facts and statistics that actually prove one side true or
false. Don’t just think reading a dozen “nuke war bad” cards will win you the debate. You still
need t relate these to the resolution and your case.
13Miscalculations
First, when we look at the concept of morality, the question on both sides arises as who
which side provides a moral basis for either the existence of nuclear weapons or the abolition
of nuclear weapons. Looking back at the history of the creation and development of the
weapons, at any given time, it was seen that morality, both sides had claims that nuclear
weapons were moral. For the affirmative, one can argue that the act of possession leads to an
inevitable temptation and the desire to use such weapons in war. During the transition to our
new president in the winter of 2016, Donald Trump was quoted in a meeting as having asked
the question “Why can’t we just nuke them?” This attitude demonstrates the general feeling
among most people that our problems can be solved by going from a point of agitation to
mushroom clouds without repercussions. Although it is impossible to know the details of what
really goes through the minds of everyone who believes that nuclear weapons can solve the
problems of the world, part of the issue may be the fact that those with the weapons see
themselves as indestructible or untouchable. In a hypothetical war, if the United States were to
use even a small nuclear weapon, the international community would lose their collective
minds so to speak. But on the flip side, which nation would date take retaliatory action against
us? Yes, it is almost a certainty tht there would be diplomatic consequences to our use of the
weapons as nations attempt to restrict trade, banking, and influence, but in a globalized world,
how far can they go before the effects of a US isolated world start to ripple across the
continents? And then if this is not the course of action, what nation is bold enough to send
military forces in retaliation against a nation that has just shown the ability to use such a
weapon in war? Even small nuclear states can use the potential fear of a second or third strike
to their advantage. Israel has kept many challengers at bay for decades by concealing their
almost assured nuclear weapons as a “hidden six gun” while India and Pakistan have managed
to stay out of major conflict since 1998 (their longest stretch without a full blown war since the
creation of both nations) due to both nations having nuclear weapons. North Korea has
continued to develop and test their nuclear weapons systems as a deterrent to what they
believe is a potential invasion by the United States. They look at nations like Iraq and Libya that
gave up their weapons of mass destruction programs years ago and later say no way to
maintain control over the populace or no way to deter the American invasions of the 2000’s.
Because of this “hidden six shooters” mentality, nations have not shown the willingness
to voluntarily disarm their nuclear arsenals. In history, the only nations that have disarmed or
turned over their weapons were the former Soviet Bloc nations that after the fall of the USSR,
realized they were now legally responsible for the hundreds of nuclear weapons in their new
countries. This power and cost were too much for them to want or bear and they turned to
Russia and the US to help them get the weapons out of their nations. The other is South Africa,
which both created and disarmed their nuclear program under voluntary circumstances. So
those that hold weapons are tempted to use such devices in combat, so to eliminate the
14weapons takes away the temptation. Even if the desire and want to go to war still exists,
countries will have to do it the old-fashioned way with troops, planes, and ships.
The second impact off the temptation is that of miscalculation. Actions between nations
are constantly misunderstood and only through diplomatic channels can they be resolved. In
modern times, this all happens diplomat to diplomat and behind the scenes, so the public is
non the wiser that there was a potential conflict or misunderstanding. In the past, however, the
miscalculations had devastating impacts. World War I was a direct result of a misunderstanding
of actions Between Austria, France, Russia and the Ottomans. Failure to read diplomatic
communications correctly and in a timely fashion led us to the attack at Peral Harbor, and a
broken radio on a fighter jet doing routine patrols over the Northern US almost got the US into
a World War. If we look to nuclear miscalculations, in the Cuban Missile Crisis, during the
blockade of Cuba, a Russian submarine had accidentally crossed the line due to faulty radar and
the US began to drop light depth charges designed to bring the sub to the surface without
causing damage. Think of them as warning shots underwater. The sub commander, thinking
that the chargers were real and designed to sink their ship, believed that the war had started.
He and his first officer activated their keys to launch their entire load of nuclear tipped rockets
at targets in the Southern US including New Orleans, Miami, Orlando, Washington DC, and
every major military base below the Mason Dixon line. It was only because the second officer
who had to verify the command and press turn his key to confirm refused to that we averted
nuclear war. In 1992, a clock of geese (further proof that geese are evil) confused a Russian
radar station in Norway. The Russian thought that the Us had launched a first strike and had
brought the nuclear football (the suitcase with nuclear launch codes and a radio transmitter) to
then President Boris Yeltsin. Yeltsin had activated his codes and was preparing to turn his key
when he paused and said, “Let’s wait 5 minutes.” This 5-minute wait allowed the Russians to
establish that it was a goose, not the Top Gun pilot Goose and thus nuclear war was averted
again.
History is scattered with other times where misunderstandings or misreading signs has
almost led us to the brink of nuclear war. If we were to eliminate the weapons, although war
could still happen, and as the examples from the pre nuclear age showed, has happened, the
consequences are far less devastating than that of a potential nuclear exchange. Even though
there are multiple examples of non-nuclear miscalc when compared to even the brinksmanship
that is nuclear miscalculations, the risk is greater. In a nuclear launch, one small explosion or a
small exchange of weapons could kill more people than most wars in totality.
15Sample Evidence
Nuclear weapons force aggression into covert channels, increasing miscalculation
Betts 2000, Richard, Professor and the Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at
Columbia, "Universal Deterrence or Conceptual Collapse? Liberal Pessimism and Utopian
Realism," The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order, ed. Utgoff,
p. 66-67]
The notionthat widespread nuclear capability would inhibit aggression by creating a world of porcupines or a "unit veto system"
of omnilateral deterrence is
an old one. The suppression of military interventionism, however, could simply channel
impulses to meddle into covert political action or other less direct methods . These in turn could increase diplomatic
tension and the chances of miscalculation, especially since many of the political systems of the potential
proliferators are likely to be weak, permeable, and praetorian, unlike the stable institutionalized governments of the developed world.
Internal political weakness and externally deployable military strength (via WMD) are a volatile combination . It
was reckless enough for the Argentine junta in 1982 to divert public attention from internal economic problems by grabbing the Falkland (or Malvinas) Islands-
one of only two cases of a non-nuclear state initiating combat against a nuclear power (the other being Egypt and Syria against Israel in 1973).
Miscalculation more likely
Wilcock 1997, Luke, "Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and the Efficacy of Deterrence," Interstate
Online, Issue 50, Spring, http://users.aber.ac.uk/scty34/50/prolif.htm, accessed 8/3/02]
Evidently the regional consequences of nuclear proliferation raise some important questions, but what are the
wider implications of nuclear weapons proliferation? How will emergent nuclear states affect stability on an international scale? For
Stanley Hoffmann, "a world of many nuclear states would raise extremely difficult issues of management." The crucial
factor is perceived to be the resultant increase in difficulty in decision making, that more nuclear powers will complicate calculations
and that mis-perceptions will become more dangerous and more likely as a consequence . It is argued that the
relatively clear-cut bipolarity which characterised the Cold War would diminish and that "uncertainties will tempt instead of deter. " Having got used
to a stable nuclear world, states may start to take the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons for granted and in
so doing become more and more daring in their foreign policy aims. (ftntlO) Nuclear weapons possession might
create ambitions, ambitions which are likely to be conflictual.
Proliferation increases the risk of inadvertent escalation
McGwire 1994, Michael, Faculty of Social and Political Science at Cambridge, "Is There a Future
for Nuclear Weapons?" International Affairs, 70, 2, p. 224-225]
Advocates of an LSN world claim that nuclear war would be prevented by the deterrent effect of mutually assured destruction. This assumes that war is always
the outcome of rational decision-making and ignores the possibility of accidental or inadvertent war. Recent
analysis of the command,
control and communications (C3) systems ofUS and Soviet strategic forces during the Cold War argues that a significant
probability of procedural and systems malfunctions (and hence mistaken activation of strike plans) was inherent in both
systems. Inadvertent war can come about through misunderstanding and/or the momentum of events. The Cuban missile crisis is a classic
example of this process, but access to the archives is revealing other incipient cases, the misreading of a NATO exercise in November 1983 being a
good example. So far our luck has held, but it will be severely tested as_we move from a bipolar to a multipolar
16game, where the new players' nuclear C3 will be more prone to system errors, and each player's
understanding of the others' thought processes will be even more rudimentary . And can we assume that the
other players will all be as cautious as the Soviet Union , which saw the primary threat as inadvertent war, a danger that could be
avoided but not prevented? Or are they more likely to emulate the United States, which believed that war could be
prevented by the threat of escalation , and was prepared to up the ante in a crisis? The existence of two or more such players
would sharply increase the future probability of inadvertent and accidental war .
17Further Reading
Borger, Julian. 2-16-2018, "Nuclear risk at its highest since Cuban missile crisis, says ex-energy
secretary," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/15/nuclear-
weapons-ernest-moniz-accident-risk
Creamer, Robert. 9-28-2017, "The Greatest Threat To U.S. Security Is A Miscalculation Or
Mistake," HuffPost, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/greatest-threat-to-us-security-
miscalculation-or_b_59ccd965e4b028e6bb0a687d
Gower, John. 3-6-2018, "The Dangerous Illogic of Twenty-First-Century Deterrence Through
Planning for Nuclear Warfighting," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/03/06/dangerous-illogic-of-twenty-first-century-
deterrence-through-planning-for-nuclear-warfighting-pub-75717
Schlosser, Eric.12-23-2016, "World War Three, by Mistake," New Yorker,
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/world-war-three-by-mistake
Voice, 9-18-2019, "Risks of nuclear accident, misjudgement or miscalculation have not been
higher since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis,"
https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/media-coverage/risks-of-nuclear-
accident-misjudgement-or-miscalculation-have-not-been-higher-since-the-1962-cuban-
missile-crisis/
18Deterrence
Theodor Roosevelt was famous for saying “Walk softly but carry a big stick.” When we
unpack the metaphor, tread lightly into the world but make sure that you are ready to defend
yourselves. Teddy was famous for his harrowing military career and being a tough as nails
president who believed that the best defense was a great offense. His leadership built up the
Great White Fleet which sailed around the world enforcing the will of America. He proclaimed a
decade before World War I that the old-world system of alliances and treaties would bring the
world to ruin and stressed America’s need to built up their military. He believed in the concept
that you don’t need to worry about the guy with a gun if you have a canon. That is the principal
of deterrence. Deterrence, in short, is the ability to scare away any and all threats to your or
your nation before they become serious through a short of force. This show of force can be a
literal show of force like parading military might through the nation’s capital or foreign nations
or as Teddy did, around the world in the navy or through a mutual understanding of the power
that the deterrence force has such as quoting numbers or statistics or the general knowledge of
military strength or in this case, our nuclear arsenal.
The concept of deterrence is simple and is used in much the same way that gun rights
advocates use the nature of self-defense to justify the ability to own and carry weapons. If you
are armed and people know it, the odds of being attacked are reduced because of the chance
of harm to the attacking party. In the world, whether it be a person, animal, or national level,
force looks to the weakest first and uses that as a prey target. Self-defense theory justifies that
even the weakest animal can deter an attack if it shows that any potential attack would lead to
massive harms to the attacker. On the international level, this has historically been done with
troop movements and army sizes. As technology advanced, armies with bronze and then iron,
and then steel weapons became superior. Armor became a necessity and eventually, projectile
weapons became standard. Then weapons such as naval ships, trucks, cars, tanks, and air
superiority fighters replaced simple troop movements. Now, we live in a nuclear age where at
the push of a button, battlefields can be turned to glass and entire cities wiped out. This power
has becomes the new king of the hill that at times has both brought us closer to war through
miscalculations as well as diverted war because of a fear that one action might send the whole
world into chaos. Since the mid 1970’s when most nations solidified their status as nuclear
powers, nations have generally avoided large scale wars in exchange for smaller more regional
conflicts. Even before this time, conflicts like Korea and Vietnam might have led to larger troops
movements, bigger battles, and more deaths if one or both sides fighting in the conflict had not
had nuclear weapons and troops felt the freedom to attack en mass like the days of old. Even
new nuclear powers like Pakistan and India have avoided major conflict in recent times due to
their nuclear weapons. So great are the power of nuclear weapons and the nations that have
19them that others have been placed under the shield or umbrella of others like a protectorate.
Japan and Korea have agreed to non develop a nuclear weapons program even though most
experts agree that they could have a functioning bomb within 3-5 years because they are
protected by the nuclear guarantee and promise of the United States. German and Austria both
gave up their nuclear ambitions’ decades ago because of protection assurances from France
and the United Kingdom. The former Soviet states gave up the Russian weapons in their
possession after the fall of the USSR for protection guarantees from the new nation of Russia to
protect them under their umbrella.
The flip side to this is the inevitable arms race. As the pervious example showed, armies
gave way to numbers and new technology and eventually nuclear weapons. But once a nation
reached nuclear status, it drove competition for numbers. Much as the USSR wanted nuclear
technology in a post WWII future, the United States needed to develop new systems to attempt
to further deter this new rising power. This paved the way from the atomic weapon to the
nuclear weapon to the thermonuclear weapon. Then the delivery systems had to advance.
Bombers gave way to ballistic weapons to Intercontinental rockets. Single warhead weapons
gave way to peacemaker multiple weapon warheads. Submarines gained the ability to launch
medium range warheads. Russia, in the meantime, was less technologically advanced, so
instead of trying to build more accurate bombs, they just built bigger bombs. 200 nuclear
weapons gave way to 500 then 1000 the 10000. Soon, both the USSR and USA had enough
nuclear weapons to level the world multiple times. This was all done in the name of deterrence.
We have reached an apex. Many nuclear powers realize that the cost of deterrence is
too high. To keep up with a huge nuclear stockpile requires billions of dollars. This money could
be going towards other programs that yield a better international image. For years, nations like
the US and Russia have been slowly dismantling their older nuclear weapons and not building
any new weapons. Treaties like Salt I and II and Start I and II both put limits on the number of
weapons that nations can have. However, under Presidents Putin and Trump, both nations have
pledged to withdraw or ignore these treaties in leu of rebuilding their arsenals. Could we be
seeing a return to deterrence? In the case of the resolution, one must ask that if we eliminate
our weapons, would re return to a state of armies clashing on the field? Would this be better
than the threat posed by our existing nuclear fleets? And do nuclear weapons really deter us
from conflict or does our modern-day diplomacy and globalization do that for us?
20Sample Evidence
MAD means that deterrence theory fails
Ellsberg 2017m Daniel [American activist and former US Military Analyst], The Doomsday Machine:
Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017. P. 345-7)
The bottom line is that arrangements made in Russia and the United States have long made it highly
likely, if not virtually certain, that a single Hiroshima-type fission weapon exploding on either
Washington or Moscow— whether deliberate or the result of a mistaken attack (as in Fail Safe or Dr.
Strangelove) or as a result of an independent terrorist action—would lead to the end of human
civilization (and most other species). That has been, and remains, the inevitable result of maintaining
forces on both sides that are capable of causing nuclear winter, and at the same time are poised to
attack each other’s capital and control system, in response to fallible warnings, in the delusion that such
an attack will limit damage to the homeland, compared with the consequences of waiting for actual
explosions to occur on more than one target. Here, then, is the actual situation that has prevailed for
more than half a century. Each side prepares and actually intends to attack the other’s “military nervous
system,” command and control, especially its head and brain, the national command headquarters, in
the first wave of a general war, however it originates. This has become the only hope of preempting and
paralyzing the other’s retaliatory capability in such a way as to avoid total devastation; it is what must
above all be deterred by the opponent. But in fact it, too, is thoroughly suicidal unless the other side has
failed to delegate authority well below the highest levels. Because each side does in fact delegate, hopes
for decapitation are totally unfounded. But for the duration of the Cold War, for fear of frightening their
own publics, their allies, and the world, neither side discouraged these hopes in the other by
acknowledging its own delegation.
The logic of deterrence is protected by a cadre of highly trained, personally invested
professionals who encourage the public to turn a blind eye to nuclear weapons.
Kultgen, 2015 (John [Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at University of Missouri, specializing in
philosophy of science and warfare], Abolition of Nuclear Weapons as Moral Imperative, Lexington
Books: Lanham, NC.)
(iv) People who thoughtlessly assume that deterrence works. Perhaps the largest portion of those who
are complacent about nuclear deterrence as national policy, including many of the people of the types
sketched above, succumb to the fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc. They think it obvious that
deterrence works since nuclear weapons have not been used since Nagasaki (that is, not used in war,
though obviously used as a tool of power politics). They are anxious to be reassured by an establishment
that has a vested interest in maintaining the balance of terror. The estab- lishment is happy to oblige.
Some of this group believes what they want to believe. Others trust “the experts” because they are
imbued with a technocratic mentality nourished by what Randall Collins calls our credential society.18
Collins observes that we live in a culture where many of the things that are most important to us are
21decided by specialists certified to take care of us by credentials that attest that they possess expertise
lacked by the ordinary person. Responsibility for monitoring the quality of their work is largely assigned
to their peers and professional societies. These are commis- sioned by society to see that high standards
are met by practitioners of the particular specialty. All of this insures that they will receive hand- some
compensation for their work and discredits work of individuals who are not certified. Outsiders are
discouraged from criticizing profes- sional decisions in the absence of egregious incompetence or moral
turpi- tude. For the most part the credential system works for the benefit of those who receive the
services of experts. In any event the system seems a necessity in the face of the explosion of scientific
knowledge and its prac- tical applications. The downside is that it accustoms people to turn their fate
over to others who may not be equipped to handle its moral dilem- mas and are biased by a narrow
professional outlook as well as their own material interests. In our case the nuclear fate of citizens is in
the hands of an establish- ment that is locked into deterrence as the only protection against the danger
that lies in the accessibility of nuclear technology to other nations. The careers of the members of the
establishment depend on maintaining the policy, regularly modernizing the weapons, finding new
threats to counter with them and convincing the public that its very survival hinges on their work. It is
only natural that a large segment of the public that lack the special knowledge to make informed
judgments persuade them- selves that they are in good hands, that the experts know best. It is too
frightening to think otherwise.
Nuclear deterrence fails and we have a moral obligation to eliminate nuclear arsenals.
Kultgen, 2015 (John [Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at University of Missouri, specializing in
philosophy of science and warfare], Abolition of Nuclear Weapons as Moral Imperative, Lexington
Books: Lanham, NC.)
On February 16–17, 2011, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation hosted a conference in Santa Barbara, CA
on the dangers of nuclear deterrence. On the final day of the conference, participants drafted the Santa
Barbara Declaration, an urgent call to action for the public to reject nuclear deter- rence.10 The
declaration first summarizes how deterrence is oppressive: Nuclear deterrence is a doctrine that is used
as a justification by nuclear weapon states and their allies for the continued possession and threat- ened
use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence is the threat of a nuclear strike in response to a hostile
action. However, the nature of the hostile action is often not clearly defined, making possible the use of
nuclear weapons in a wide range of circumstances. Nuclear deterrence threatens the murder of many
millions of inno- cent people, along with severe economic, climate, environmental, agri- cultural, and
health consequences beyond the area of attack. Nuclear deterrence requires massive commitments of
resources to the industrial infrastructures and organizations that make up the world’s nuclear weapons
establishments, its only beneficiaries. Then it highlights its flaws: Despite its catastrophic potential,
nuclear deterrence is widely, though wrongly, perceived to provide protection to nuclear weapon states,
their allies, and their citizens. Nuclear deterrence has numerous major problems:
1. Its power to protect is a dangerous fabrication. The threat or use of nuclear weapons provides no
protection against an attack.
2. It assumes rational leaders, but there can be irrational or paranoid leaders on any side of a conflict.
223. Threatening or committing mass murder with nuclear weapons is illegal and criminal. It violates
fundamental legal precepts of do- mestic and international law, threatening the indiscriminate slaugh-
ter of innocent people.
4. It is deeply immoral for the same reasons it is illegal: it threatens indiscriminate and grossly
disproportionate death and destruction.
5. It diverts human and economic resources desperately needed to meet basic human needs around the
world. Globally, approximate- ly $100 billion is spent annually on nuclear forces.
6. It has no effect against non-state extremists, who govern no territo- ry or population.
7. It is vulnerable to cyber attack, sabotage, and human or technical error, which could result in a
nuclear strike.
8. It sets an example for additional countries to pursue nuclear weap- ons for their own nuclear
deterrent force.
And finally, a call to action: Its benefits are illusory. Any use of nuclear weapons would be catas- trophic.
Nuclear deterrence is discriminatory, anti-democratic and un- sustainable. This practice must be
discredited and replaced with an urgent commitment to achieve global nuclear disarmament. We must
change the discourse by speaking truth to power and speaking truth to each other. Before another
nuclear weapon is used, nuclear deterrence must be replaced by humane, legal, and moral security
strategies. We call upon people everywhere to join us in demanding that the nuclear weapon states and
their allies reject nuclear deterrence and negotiate without delay a Nuclear Weapons Convention for the
phased, verifiable, irre- versible and transparent elimination of all nuclear weapons.
Proliferation results in conflict deterrence, not use
Waltz 2007m Ken [Professor of political science, Berkley], ”A nuclear Iran”, Journal of international
affairs, Spring/summer 2007, 60.2)
Richard Betts: Ken, would Iranian nuclear weapons have any potential function other than as a pure deterrent?
Could they function for coercive purposes in the region, especially given that other countries in the region do not
yet have nuclear weapons? Do you think that the solution is to spread nuclear weapons to other regimes in the
region, or to involve the United States in extended deterrence to deal with that prospect? And, if so, is that in the
interests of the United States? Kenneth Waltz: No one has discovered how to use nuclear weapons other
than for deterrence. Let me amend that. There is a form of blackmail that might work, and that is blackmail for
money North Korea might have had that in mind. But when most people say "nuclear blackmail," they think of one
country saying, "We have nuclear weapons, and unless you do this--whatever this is--we'll drop one on you." That's
simply not plausible. Nobody has tried it, and, if anyone does, it won't work. There are many countries with
nuclear weapons, the United States among them, and we haven't figured out how to do anything with
these things, except to use them for deterrence. How is a relatively backward, dinky nuclear country
going to manage to use its nuclear weapons for purposes other than deterrence? I don't see any
possibility of that. It may be, as Scott says, that possessing nuclear weapons gives a country a little more
freedom of action. But it certainly does not gain much ability to act in a conventional way because it has
23nuclear weapons. Again, nuclear weapons have one purpose and only one purpose, and that's
deterrence.
Nuclear Weapons lower incentives for war, modify state behavior, and conventional
war
Wesley 2005, Michael [Executive Director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy], Australian
Journal of International Affairs, September, “It’s Time To Scrap the NPT,” EBSCO, p. 293-294)
A fifth concern is that conflicts between regional powers will become more likely as the demise of the NPT results in more states with nuclear
weapons. An increase in regional conflict in Asia may well be coming, mainly as a result of the newly intense patterns
of competition among that continent’s new great powers. But possession of nuclear weapons will more likely have
a positive (containing, de-escalating) effect on such conflicts, rather than a negative (escalating, broadening)
effect. The most dangerous strategy one can choose in a war is to make a nuclear-armed state feel desperate; as a
result, conflicts involving nuclear-armed states are more likely to be carefully limited and confined to stakes that
are calculated to be well below the nuclear threshold of It’s time to scrap the NPT 293 all parties (Waltz 1981: 20). Moreover,
history shows that nuclear weapons have only been used or threatened to de-escalate or bring an end to conventional
conflicts: the experience or prospect of catastrophic damage has tended to be a powerful motive forcing
belligerents to modify their objectives. Further, the costs of nuclear war would be proportionately greater for new
as opposed to the older nuclear states: the smallness of the territory and high rates of urbanisation of most aspiring nuclear states
would ensure that a nuclear exchange would devastate a greater percentage of their populations and industry than projected exchanges
between the superpowers were estimated to imperil during the height of the Cold War. The case of India and Pakistan offers some
cautious hope that in some cases, after an unstable and dangerous period, acquisition of nuclear weapons will
cause opponents to begin to address the root causes of their antagonism and delimit spheres of interest.
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