After Costa Concordia - Dealing with emergencies in the UK - Hugh Shaw, The Secretary of State's Representative
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
After Costa Concordia -
Dealing with emergencies in the UK
Hugh Shaw, The Secretary of State’s Representative
R + V Re
Frankfurt / Mainz – 4 September, 2014
MSC Rena – Grounding – New Zealand - 2011
Costa Concordia – Grounding –
Italy - 2012
MSC Flaminia – Fire/Explosion –
North Atlantic - 2012
Maritime Maisie – Collision off
South Korea – 2013
So what did they all have in common? 1.All relatively new ships. Av age – 11 yrs. 2.All attracted immense international media coverage. 3.All have resulted in massive financial claims and have attracted widespread concern + criticism from the insurance market and from the wider maritime community – much of which is aimed at coastal States or local authorities.
So is such concern justified? Costa Concordia hull loss - $500m – liability loss $1.5bn and rising. MSC Rena – originally capped at $1.4 bn but may increase as Government decision to leave part wreck on seabed is challenged.
So who is to blame? ► Onone hand as ships are getting larger with time – salvage operations are becoming more complex and expensive. ► On the other hand it is alleged that recent interventions by governments and other authorities have become the main cost drivers in the accident and wreck removal process.
What are the facts? ► ISU report cost of salvaging and removing wrecks increased fivefold between 2005 and 2012 although number of incidents declined; ► Size of ship plays a major role in this development size and complexity = €€€€€€€€€! ► MSC NAPOLI (2007) built 1991 – 4734 TEU – largest in world – today 4x larger; 20000+ TEU; ► Estimated nearly 2000 TEU IMDG; ► Cruise lines building bigger to attract passengers – now approaching 10,000 POB mark; ► Economically sound but in the event of an accident…..
What are the facts? ► Mixed message from salvage industry regarding their capability to deal with this size incident; ► Fewer ports with ability to handle these vessels and their consequence management concern not only to financial sector; ► Governments / Local Authorities will quite correctly insist that accidents and/or wrecks are managed with minimal risk to safety and the environment; ► Costs should not influence preferred methodology.
Maersk McKinney - Moller
Maersk McKinney - Moller ► Overall Length : 400 metres ► Beam: 59.0 metres ► Draft: 14.5 metres; Height 73 metres; ► Longer than 4 football pitches or 5.5 Airbus A380 aircraft ► 18,000 TEU capacity or 109km of containers end to end ► Cargo value US$ 540,000,000 (409m €) ► Cost to build US$ 190,000,000 (143m €)
Allure of the Seas
Allure of the Seas ► Overall Length: 362 m ► Beam: 47 m ► Draft: 9.3 / Height: 72 m ► Passengers: 6296 ► Crew: 2394 ► No of decks: 16 ► Cost to build: US$ 1.2bn.
Role of Governments or Local
Authorities in Dealing with Major
Maritime IncidentsTORREY CANYON BRAER
SEA EMPRESS 1996 72,000 tonnes oil spilled
Lord Donaldson’s Review 1.The ‘Trigger’ point is when there is “a threat of significant pollution” to the UK’s pollution control zone, territorial waters or coastline; 2.Response to the threat of pollution from or involving an offshore installation to be compatible with same from shipping casualty
Lord Donaldson’s Review
3. MCA as a whole should play a much
larger part in operations in response to a
threat of significant pollution than has
been the case in the past ;
4. Involvement of Ministers in Operational
decisions is not a practicable option……Lord Donaldson’s Review
There should be ‘ultimate’
control of salvage by a
Secretary of State’s
Representative acting in the
overriding public interest
SOSREPRole of the SOSREP To represent the Secretaries of State for Transport and Department for Energy and Climate Change by removing or reducing the risk to persons, property and the UK environment arising from accidents involving ships, fixed or floating platforms or sub-sea infrastructure within UK waters, within the remainder of the UK Pollution Control Zone (UK PCZ) and on the UK Continental Shelf.
The SOSREP Function ► One person to act as representative of Secretary of State (s) ► Free to act without recourse to higher authority ► Ultimate & Decisive voice ► Can exercise Ultimate control ► Cannot choose to ignore a situation ► Tacitly approves all actions ► Whilst operations are in progress “Must be “Backed or sacked”
Trigger Situation & Directions ► Accident has to have occurred ► In opinion of SOSREP there is or may be significant pollution / risk to life ► Use of powers urgently needed ► The nature of the directions could not be wider ranging. They are of "any kind whatsoever" provided always that they are for the purposes of preventing or reducing pollution and /or risk to safety and are "as respects the ship and its cargo". ► May be given verbally
Existing UK Legislation ► Marine Safety Act 2003 : Unreasonable Loss & Damage ► The Secretary of State shall pay compensation where: Direction was not reasonably necessary – Account shall be taken of: Extent risk to safety or threat of pollution, etc.
Wreck Removal Convention Entry into force: 14 April 2015 ► Registered owner may contract with any salvor or other person; ► Affected State may lay down conditions for such removal only to the extent necessary to ensure that the removal proceeds effectively in a manner that is consistent with considerations of safety and protection of the environment.
Post 1999 UK Notable Incidents
MSC NAPOLI – Jan 2007
Hydrocarbon Transfer
Cargo Transfer
Completed July 2009…After 924 days!...Cost $200m.
MV RIVERDANCE – Jan 2008
Wreck removal completed November 2008
MSC FLAMINIA – Jul 2012
Initial Challenges • SAR • Cargo – position IMDG units and status • Bunkers • Establish damage and structural integrity • Salvors, Owners, Insurers and Charterers future intentions
Comparisons with MSC NAPOLI
MSC FLAMINIA MSC NAPOLI
Risk Human Health Risk significant pollution
► 75,590 GT ► 53,409 GT
► 4808 TEU / 2876 units ► 2300 units
► 151 IMDG ► 150 IMDG
► 1000T HFO + 650 LS ► 3500T HFOWhat has mixed with what and what resulting compounds have been created. What has been combusted fully and partly – incomplete combustion of e.g. pcb’s can generate dioxins. Composition of the fumes generated though combustion. Possibility of re-ignition. State of remaining containers.
Inspection Team ► UK led team – salvage master + fire fighting expert ► French fire fighting expert representative ► German salvage master, fire fighting expert + HNS specialist Objectives ► The analysis should include a comparison between the risks involved if the ship remains at sea and the risks that it would pose to the place of refuge and its environment ► Ascertain any additional works if casualty to make transit to German territorial waters
Jade Weser Port, Germany – Sep 2012
Future Challenges ► Need for increased communication and co- operation between different stakeholders including shipowners, insurers, classification societies, ports and other relevant authorities and contractors; ► Salvors to request PORs in methodical manner; ► Media and public perception & expectations; ► Threat that insurance underwriters may limit liabilities further – greater friction with Member States?; ► Need for openness, trust and transparency between all parties during incidents.
Thank You for your time…………. For further info contact: hugh.shaw@mcga.gov.uk
You can also read
