An Analysis of Kim Jong Un's Speech to the 7th Session of the 14th DPRK SPA
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An Analysis of Kim Jong Un’s
Speech to the 7th Session of the
14th DPRK SPA
Hong, Min
(Director, North Korean Research Division)
Hong, Jea Hwan
(Research Fellow, North Korean Research Division)
2022.
2022.01.
09.27.
15.| |CO
CO22-04
22-26
Speaking to the 7th session of its 14th Supreme People’s Assembly, Chairman Kim Jong Un stayed
focused on sending a message of deterrence through nuclear weapons to the outside world. By
deterrence, Chairman Kim seems to mean not only deterring the US but also deterring an unwanted
war or escalation of war. He also made clear his determination not to abandon nuclear weapons
and the irreversibility of the advancement of nuclear weapons. These are probably intended to
incapacitate the US and South Korean policies toward North Korea in the short-run and induce
a shift in US perceptions and attitudes. They also reflect North Korea’s intention to closely watch
the intensifying and prolonging US-China and US-Russia conflicts and take advantage of the time
to reinforce its military capabilities, rather than conducting preemptive, offensive actions that may
provoke the US.
The Nuclear Force Policy Law and Chairman Kim’s speech probably target Chinese Party Congress
slated for October. They are intended as Pyongyang’s message to China, reflecting its commitment
to North Korea-China united front and cooperation by demonstrating its firm resolve to fight against
the US and its willingness to pressure and keep in check the US and South Korea based on its
determination not to abandon nuclear weapons and continue nuclear advancement. Also they
may be aimed at demonstrating its commitment to nuclear advancement and achieving deterrence
through nuclear doctrine instead of nuclear tests, which are hard to be carried out right away.
The new law and the speech seem to show North Korea’s aggression to lower the threshold
of using nuclear weapons in the form of doctrine; but, in light of their content and context,
they seem intended to achieve deterrence against the US and war, create strategic room for
maneuver, and form North Korea-China or North Korea-Russia united front in response to US
and South Korean coordination on North Korean nuclear programs and enhancement of the
ROK-US extended deterrence and US-China and US-Russia conflicts and confrontation. Despite
its ostensible aggression, the speech carries underlying feelings of insecurity due to political
uncertainties, prolonged economic difficulties, and so on. Speaking of the economy and people’s
livelihood, Chairman Kim mostly reiterated the existing policies, rather than explaining what’s been
achieved. He also designated a better supply of food and consumer goods as a vital task. He
emphasized making progress in the country’s pandemic prevention and control capabilities and
vaccination campaigns, which mirrors the fear for possible spread of COVID-19 variants after natural
herd immunity is achieved.
1
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The Narrative of the Speech: Defensive Responses and Feelings of
Insecurity behind Offensive Nuclear Policy
At the 7th session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) held on
September 7-8, North Korea adopted a new law, On the Nuclear Force Policy of
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) (hereinafter the Nuclear Force
Policy Law), enunciating the country’s doctrine for the operation, control, and use
of nuclear weapons. At the meeting, Chairman Kim Jong Un made an about 50
minute-long speech, which mainly concerned the adoption of the law and policies
on the economy and people’s livelihood.
The main points of the speech are as follows: (1) North Korea’s determination
not to give up nuclear weapons and the irreversibility of the advancement of nuclear
weapons, (2) legal basis for the command, control, and use of nuclear weapons, (3)
North Korea’s willingness to use Republic of Korea (ROK)-United States (US)
military build-up and their enhancement of extended deterrence as an ‘opportunity’
to reinforce its military forces, (4) emphasis on agriculture and light manufacturing
and improvement of the government’s grain procurement and food distribution for
a better supply of food and consumer goods, (5) preparation of a construction plan
for the Grand Canal that connects the country’s East and West coasts, and (6) making
progress in the country’s pandemic prevention and control capabilities and
vaccination campaigns. Chairman Kim’s speech this time was a bit disorganized in
terms of composition and development of the narrative.
The overall narrative of the speech is as follows: political tension has escalated
because of the “confrontation and fight between imperialism and socialism”; we
should enhance deterrence against the US and war to counter the US and its
followers’ increasing hostile policy; therefore, there would be no more negotiation
for denuclearization, and we would enhance our nuclear force to keep pace with
changing political circumstances while continuing to carry though the tasks to resolve
pressing issues of the economy and people’s livelihood under the principle of
“full-scale development of socialism.” Previous speeches by Chairman Kim have
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been usually characterized by clear division of paragraphs by agenda item, sector,
or subject; they had a narrative structure that highlights historical significance fitting
with the topic of the speech; they usually contained an orderly flow of the text from
assessment of the current situation and review of policy programs by agenda item
to provision of the directions for future responses, key tasks, and general conclusion.
However, this time, Chairman Kim’s speech exposed unclear division of paragraphs
and a disorderly flow of the text.
Chairman Kim spent about 21 minutes explaining the legal basis for the passage
of the Nuclear Force Policy Law. Speaking of the background and purpose of
transforming the country’s nuclear policy (doctrine) into a law and future tasks,
Chairman Kim stayed focused on sending a message of deterrence through nuclear
weapons to the outside world. His remarks ostensibly target the US, but they also
imply preventing a war in Northeast Asia and deterring war itself at the level of
protecting national sovereignty and interests. This means, by deterrence, Chairman
Kim meant deterring not only the US strikes but also North Korea being involved
in an unwanted war or an escalation of war. What is noteworthy in this regard is
his comments that reflect his view of the latest international political circumstances,
such as “inevitable confrontation and fight between socialism and imperialism” and
the creation of a new Cold War structure due to “the US and its followers (the
imperialist alliance)” and their “pursuit of global hegemony.” Given his view that
“the military circumstances around the country has been worsening for a long time,
and we should thoroughly prepare ourselves,” what he meant by deterrence may
need to be interpreted from diverse perspectives. Another important point of the
speech is his clear expression of willingness not to engage in negotiations about
denuclearization and to pursue irreversible advancement of nuclear weapons. The
expression seems intended to disturb and incapacitate South Korean and US policies
toward North Korea based on the denuclearization principle in the short-run, and,
in the long-run, it is probably to induce a fundamental change in US perceptions
and attitudes toward North Korea.
All in all, through its narrative structure and text, the speech ostensibly argues
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for an offensive nuclear policy, but it carries underlying feelings of insecurity due
to political uncertainties in the region, especially in Northeast Asia, the country’s
deepening isolation and growing pressure from the US, the enhancement of ROK-US
extended deterrence, and aggravating living conditions of the people. Speaking of
the economy and people’s livelihood, Chairman Kim mostly reiterated the existing
policies, rather than explaining what’s been achieved. He also designated a better
supply of food and consumer goods as a vital task, directly revealing the difficulties
facing people’s livelihood. Making progress in the country’s pandemic prevention
and control capabilities and vaccination campaigns, as was emphasized in the speech,
mirrors the fear for possible spread of COVID-19 variants after natural herd
immunity has been achieved.
Declaring a Detailed Doctrine: Achieving Deterrence at Nuclear Strategy Level
Judging from what Chairman Kim spoke at the SPA, North Korea’s adoption of
the Nuclear Force Policy Law is intended to carry out two tasks. One is to “declare
at home and abroad that, now, North Korea has come to possess war deterrence
by law as a means of national defense,” and the other is to “draw an irretrievable
line so that there can be no bargaining over North Korea’s nuclear weapons.” Looking
from the perspective of nuclear strategy, the first one, focused on making public
the system and principles of the management, operation, and use of nuclear weapons,
both internally and externally, aims to send the message of deterrence. It is a kind
of declaration strategy to deter adversary actions by communicating the purpose
for which nuclear weapons are developed and used, the focus of nuclear programs
between first use and second strike, the main targets of nuclear programs, and so
on. Meanwhile the latter is in the context of negotiation or diplomatic strategy aimed
at inducing a change in adversary perceptions and attitudes by declaring to the
outside world the determination not to give up nuclear weapons.
A nuclear strategy starts from deterrence and consists of nuclear force and nuclear
doctrine. While nuclear force refers to the hardware elements of nuclear strategy—
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the real, physical nuclear capabilities to launch nuclear strikes, nuclear doctrine is
indicative of the software elements of nuclear strategy—the strategy for the
operation of nuclear weapons. The key to a successful nuclear strategy is to achieve
deterrence by well combining nuclear force and nuclear doctrine. For this to happen,
three conditions should be met: capability, communication, and credibility. Capability
means the physical force that can do damage to adversaries through nuclear
weapons. Communication refers to letting adversaries know that we have nuclear
weapons and the kinds of actions that should be avoided and the responses to be
expected when the avoided actions are conducted. Nuclear weapons states usually
want to express their willingness as clearly as possible through various means and
channels, such as official statements and declarations, state leaders’ speeches or
comments, law and regulations, and saber-rattling. Credibility is to let adversaries
accept that the use of nuclear weapons will be carried out, and a sufficient price
will be paid if certain avoided actions are conducted. The latter two conditions belong
to nuclear doctrine.
The nuclear weapons tests and training during the 1st nuclear advancement period
from 2013 to 2017 and the 2nd advancement period since 2019 fall in the realm
of nuclear force that demonstrates its nuclear capabilities. On the other hand, the
speeches and laws and regulations to declare its nuclear policies fall in the realm
of nuclear doctrine that communicates its intentions and shows the credibility. The
Nuclear Force Policy Law (nuclear doctrine) constitutes a North Korean style nuclear
strategy aimed to respond to changing political circumstances, including the
development of more technologically advanced and diversified nuclear weapons,
deepening US-China and US-Russia conflicts, and the enhancement of the ROK-US
extended deterrence. It is also a nuclear doctrine aimed to enhance communication
and credibility with the focus on deterring adversaries by letting them know its firm
willingness. Given this, it is fair to say that the new law contains an offensive
mechanism toward the outside world and, at the same time, a defensive mechanism
focused on deterrence.
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Multiple Targets of Deterrence: Against the US and War
The new law and Chairman Kim’s speech highlight deterrence as a part of North
Korea’s nuclear strategy. The goal is to display the country’s nuclear capabilities
through weapons tests and saber-rattling as well as its commitment to deterrence
against the US by making legal and political declarations for the operation of nuclear
weapons. One example is Chairman Kim’s comment that North Korean nuclear
weapons are the tool to “responsibly fulfill its vital mission of deterring the US and
its followers from making grave political and military provocations and managing
threats emerging on the horizon.” The comment is motivated by the intention to
let the US know exactly the principles and conditions under which North Korea would
use nuclear weapons, thereby deterring the US from launching preemptive precision
strikes or using nuclear weapons against North Korea based on its own assessment
of the circumstances.
Also notable in the speech is that the word deterrence is meant for multiple targets.
Consider how North Korea perceives “many disturbing circumstances” being evolved
at home and abroad. In the speech, Chairman Kim said, “The military circumstances
around the country has been deteriorating in the long-run,” and “Confrontation and
fight between socialism and imperialism is unavoidable.” He also claimed that North
Korea’s nuclear force is “a tool to prevent a war on the Korean Peninsula and beyond
in Northeast Asia and ensure the world’s strategic security.” There is a possibility
of North Korea being involved in an unwanted war as US-China and US-Russia
conflicts intensify. For example, North Korea may have to take a certain stance to
safeguard the national interests if a war breaks out in a neighboring country. Also
it has to decide what to do if South Korea is engaged in the war, or if it is called
upon or forced to participate in the war, or the war expands to the Korean Peninsula.
Chairman Kim’s use of the word deterrence may have actually meant war deterrence
as a part of effort to deter an unwanted war in advance and counter the possibility
of the country being involved or called upon to be involved in such a war if it breaks
out.
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Since last year, North Korea has frequently mentioned rapidly changing political
circumstances and uncertainties and war deterrence against unspecified targets.
Chairman Kim’s comment this time seems related to them in some way. Given this,
although the new law and the speech seem to focus on deterring the US at first
glance, the target audience may actually include China and Russia. North Korea may
wish to play its part in a united front with China and Russia for diplomatic, military,
and economic cooperation to counter US efforts to besiege and pressure China and
isolate and contain North Korea. At the same time, it may wish to achieve North
Korean style war deterrence that can minimize the possibility of an unwanted war
being broken out or expanded or its being involved or called upon to get involved
in such a war or engaged in a proxy war and that can protect national independence
and interests. It is in this context that expressions such as “our own determination,”
“preservation of national sovereignty,” and “protection of national interests” were
used in the speech.
Negotiations about Denuclearization and Irreversible Advancement of Nuclear
Weapons: A Call for a Fundamental Change in the US Approach to the DPRK
The Nuclear Force Policy Law and Chairman Kim’s speech sent a calculated
strategic message in terms of negotiations and toward the US: North Korea would
never abandon nuclear weapons, and the advancement of nuclear weapons is
irreversible. The first and foremost message of the new law and Chairman Kim’s
speech is that there would be no more negotiations for denuclearization. This calls
for a shift in the framework of negotiations and, more fundamentally, the US approach
toward North Korea. Previously North Korea said it would accept negotiations for
denuclearization on the conditions of US changing its calculations in 2019 and withdrawing
its hostile policies toward North Korea in 2020. This time, by eliminating the prospect of
denuclearization talks with a higher threshold (conditions) all together, North Korea
seems to be calling for a fundamental change in South Korean and US approaches.
That is probably intended to disturb and incapacitate South Korean and US policies
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toward North Korea implemented based on assumed North Korean willingness or
actions for denuclearization. In a way, it is Pyongyang’s response to recent South
Korea-US moves to enhance their coordination on North Korean nuclear issues and
their reinforced extended deterrence. It may have been North Korea’s answer to
Seoul’s “Audacious Initiative.”
The second message is that North Korea’s advancement of nuclear weapons is
irreversible. That means that North Korea would continue to advance its nuclear
weapons as long as US hostilities and nuclear threats from outside the country
continue. Chairman Kim openly said that North Korea would take US hostilities or
South Korea’s arms build-up as a “justification” for its nuclear advancement and
an “opportunity” to reinforce its military forces. According to Chairman Kim, a part
of the effort is to strengthen the country’s war deterrence by developing weapons
matching the needs of modern warfare and turning advanced strategic and tactical
weapons systems into real war-fighting weaponry. Particularly notable of his speech
is a remark on consistently expanding the “operation scope of tactical nuclear
weapons” and diversifying launch vehicles to raise the credibility and efficacy of
North Korean “nuclear posture.” This is an imitative or tit-for-tat countermeasure
to US Nuclear Posture Reviews (NPR). The 2022 US NPR, which has yet to be
published and is generally expected to stand in line with the 2018 US NPR, is likely
to emphasize the need to shore up deterrence through a tailored nuclear strategy
based on flexibility, among others. This lowers the bar for using nuclear weapons
with the focus on the development and deployment of low-yield (tactical) nuclear
weapons. Former US President Donald Trump had suggested launching preemptive
precision strikes on North Korea with low-yield nuclear weapons. The US nuclear
strategy stipulated in the 2022 NPR under the Biden administration is not expected
to mark a major departure from that position. It would be reasonable, therefore,
to deem North Korea’s adoption of the Nuclear Force Policy Law a mimicry,
tit-for-tat countermeasure to US nuclear strategy.
In the meantime, on the aspect of North Korean strategy for negotiations or
relations with the US, the new law and the speech seem intended to induce a
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fundamental shift in US approach (toward a DPRK-US agreement on limited nuclear
disarmament or arms control while continuing to possess nuclear weapons). The
new law also stipulated that the country would “assess nuclear threats coming from
the outside and changes in international nuclear posture at all times and renew and
enhance its nuclear force in quantity and quality based on the assessment” and
“renew the strategy for the use of nuclear weapons on a regular basis.” This implies
that North Korea is going to release its own version of NPR on a regular basis.
More broadly, it may suggest that North Korea is willing to not only achieve
deterrence against the US by developing tactical nuclear weapons and turning them
into real war-fighting capability but also use evolving US nuclear strategy, nuclear
arms race in Northeast Asia, and US-China confrontation as the justification for its
nuclear build-up and weapons.
Declaration of an Expanded Operation of Tactical Nuclear Weapons, an Imitative
Countermeasure to US NPRs
Notably, the new law, in essence, functions as a North Korean version of nuclear
posture review that imitates the US NPRs. Chairman Kim’s speech is reminiscent
of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s speech to Russian Federal Assembly in 2018.
The Nuclear Force Policy Law is analogous to US NPRs in both its form and content,
and Chairman Kim’s speech, President Putin’s two-hour long annual state of the
nation address to the Russian State Duma on March 1, 2018, through which President
Putin unveiled a Russian plan to develop and deploy low-yield tactical nuclear and
advanced non-nuclear weapons as a warning to the US. At that time, President Putin
introduced the plan for the development and deployment of hypersonic and
submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) aimed to counter US missile defense
in an offensive manner, displaying Russian tactical nuclear weapons and other
advanced non-nuclear weapons on a large screen. Shocked by the address, the US
suggested aggressive countermeasures, including the development and deployment
of SLCMs loaded with low-yield nuclear warheads and submarine-launched ballistic
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missiles (SLBM) through its 2018 NPR released at the end of the year. These caused
a rush to the climax in the nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia. Chairman Kim’s
speech seems intended to achieve similar effects: he introduced North Korean
nuclear doctrine in a showy, tit-for-tat manner and declared an expanded operation
of tactical nuclear weapons in response to the reinforced ROK-US extended
deterrence, and resumption of large-scale ROK-US joint military exercises, and
continued US nuclear policy that hints at the possible first use of nuclear weapons
against North Korea.
Specified Nuclear Doctrine: Reinforcement of the Ultimate Goal and Specification
of the Operational Doctrine
The new law is characterized by specified doctrine for the operation of nuclear
weapons. In its preamble, the new law explicitly stated that the ultimate goal is for
North Korea to become a nuclear weapons state. It also stipulated the purpose of
nuclear weapons, composition of nuclear posture, and aims of nuclear policy and
doctrine. These were not stipulated in the new law’s predecessor, On Consolidating
the Status of a Self-defensive Nuclear Weapons State (hereinafter the Nuclear
Weapons State Law), passed in 2013. The new law deliberately refers to US NPRs
in its form and content and defined nuclear posture in the preamble. It specifies
that North Korea’s nuclear posture consists of nuclear deterrence (capability),
nuclear force policy, and strategy for the use of nuclear weapons, and that its nuclear
weapons are operated in a proactive, effective, flexible, and purpose-oriented
manner. Compared to the 2013 law, the new law elucidates the doctrine for the
operation of nuclear weapons in much more detail through revisions and additions,
such as expansion and renewal of nuclear force in quantity and quality in Article
9 (revision), command and control of nuclear force in Article 3 (revision), execution
of the decision to use nuclear weapons in Article 4 (addition), conditions for the
use of nuclear weapons in Article 6 (addition), and constant mobilization of nuclear
force in Article 7 (addition).
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Nuclear doctrine mainly consists of two levels: One is the military and security
level related to the operation of nuclear weapons, and another is the level of ultimate
goal for which the advancement of nuclear weapons is implemented. The former
is to provide the justification for possessing or using nuclear weapons (deterrence
and retaliation), the scope and methods of using them, the operation of nuclear
weapons, timing (first use or second strike), available resources, and principles for
command and control and management and supervision. The latter is to express the
ultimate goal for which nuclear weapons are developed, the strategic value of nuclear
weapons, position on international norms for nuclear weapons, and so on. From 2013
until recently, North Korea has expressed its nuclear doctrine mainly in light of
ultimate goal. With the adoption of the new law, it reinforced not only the ultimate
goal doctrine with rich detail but the operational doctrine with lots of new provisions.
Five Conditions for Use: Countering the US’s Use of Low-yield Weapons or
Preemptive Nuclear Strikes
It is necessary to look closely into the five conditions under which North Korea
claimed in Article 6 of the new law that it can use nuclear weapons. On the surface,
they look like a gesture of aggression lowering the bar for using nuclear weapons.
Yet a more balanced point of view is needed here to consider various aspects,
including North Korea’s proverbial tit-for-tat stance or strategy toward the US, a
mimicry countermeasure to US nuclear strategy, and counter-rhetoric. More
importantly, it is necessary to look into the background and intention behind the
timing—why at this point in time does North Korea unveil the specifics of its nuclear
strategy? Above all, the law can be deemed as an imitative countermeasure to the
above-mentioned US NPRs. The 2018 US NPR called for a flexible, tailored nuclear
deterrent strategy to deter nuclear and non-nuclear attacks, assure allies and
partners, and achieve US objectives if deterrence fails, leaving the door open for
using low-yield nuclear warheads. By only vaguely describing the conditions under
which the US can employ nuclear weapons as “extreme circumstances,” it allowed
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the US’s first use of nuclear weapons if the US is under nuclear or conventional
attack. This also opened up the possibility of the US using nuclear weapons
preemptively based on its own assessment of the circumstances. It has been in this
context that North Korea has continuously criticized US threat of “first use.” Most
of the circumstances enumerated in the new law as the conditions under which North
Korea may use nuclear weapons seem intended to deter the US out of the concern
that it may launch a preemptive strike based on its own judgment. Certain expressions
in the conditions clause, such as “when North Korea is under attack with nuclear
or other weapons of mass destruction” and when a strike is launched on “the
leadership,” “national nuclear force command body,” or “important strategic targets”
show that North Korea fears nuclear strikes the most as they constitute the key
strategic pillars of governing the country.
Psychological Warfare against the US and South Korea Utilizing Nuclear
Propaganda
Nuclear doctrine may be viewed in light of nuclear propaganda. Nuclear propaganda
means using nuclear weapons and missiles as rhetorical devices for political and
diplomatic purposes at strategic and tactical levels. Since the Cold War era, nuclear
propaganda has focused on two agitative elements: security and fear. On the one
hand, nuclear propaganda justifies the possession of nuclear weapons in the security
realm among the public and to the world. On the other hand, it instills fear into
adversaries through the possession of nuclear weapons and hides fear arising from
adversarial nuclear threats. North Korea’s nuclear propaganda uses political
techniques designed to solidify cohesion of the people, promote the leadership,
publicize the regime’s accomplishments and capabilities, and inspire awe. It is also
diplomatically and symbolically significant in that it attempts to change the policies
of adversary or other states.
North Korea seems to have unveiled the new law as a part of its psychological
warfare against the US and South Korea. The intention is to test the ROK-US alliance
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and see how they respond and to bring China and Russia to their side by disclosing
an offensive nuclear policy to counter the reinforced ROK-US extended nuclear
deterrence and coordination for denuclearization and growing blocization in the world
order. Other motivations may include showing off the absolute status and power of
Chairman Kim as the monolithic authority over command, control, and operation of
North Korean nuclear weapons and solidifying social cohesion and control in the
face of a multitude of difficulties at home.
Nuclear Doctrine as a Message to China Prior to Chinese Party Congress
Since 2019, North Korea has explicitly attempted to raise the threshold for
denuclearization and reiterated its commitment to irreversible advancement of
nuclear weapons. The recent nuclear doctrine is also consistent with past references
to the possibility of launching “preemptive nuclear strikes,” which have increased
especially after the release of the 2010 foreign ministry memorandum and the
adoption of the 2013 Nuclear Weapons State Law. Except for added details, the
doctrine is no major departure from the existing nuclear policy. So the question is
why at this point North Korea reconfirms the doctrine by turning it into a law and
delivering a speech on it.
A hint comes from North Korea’s attempt to use “military circumstances around
the country” and “escalating tension” as a “justification” and “opportunity” for its
military build-up. North Korea seems determined to closely watch the intensifying
and prolonging US-China and US-Russia conflicts and take advantage of the current
situation to reinforce its military capabilities, rather than conducting preemptive,
offensive actions that may provoke the US. Also the statement that the country
“would keep assessing the changes in external nuclear threats and global nuclear
posture” and correspondingly enhance its nuclear force reflects its intention to adjust
the timing of actions that can have significant repercussions, such as nuclear tests,
in accordance with circumstances around the country. In the meantime, to expand
the room for justification and opportunity, it is desirable that Chinese and Russian
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determination and their policies against the US gain momentum and North Korea’s
united front with China and Russia gain strength.
Against this backdrop, the release of the law and the speech probably target the
China-Russia summit and Chinese Party Congress slated for October. Through the
speech, Chairman Kim clearly expressed his view of the confrontation between
socialism and the US-led imperialist coalition, asking, “What is a just country” and
“Which country is standing proudly and directly against the evil empire of America.”
North Korea is highly likely to wish Chinese President Xi Jinping to solidify the basis
for his third term at the Party Congress and explicitly take a more offensive, hardline
stance in its US strategy. In this sense, the release of the new law and the delivery
of the speech are probably intended as Pyongyang’s message to China reflecting
its commitment to North Korea-China united front and cooperation by demonstrating
its firm resolve to fight against the US before Chinese Party Congress is held and
its willingness to pressure and keep in check the US and South Korea based on
its determination not to abandon nuclear weapons and continue to advance nuclear
weapons.
At the same time, the law and the speech may be aimed at demonstrating its
commitment to nuclear advancement and achieving deterrence through nuclear
doctrine instead of nuclear tests, which are hard to be carried out right away for
technical and political reasons. In conclusion, the new law and the speech ostensibly
show North Korea’s aggression to lower the threshold of using nuclear weapons,
taking the form of doctrine; however, in light of their content and context, they seem
intended to achieve deterrence against the US and war, create strategic room for
maneuver, and form North Korea-China or North Korea-Russia united front in
response to US and South Korean coordination on North Korean nuclear programs
and enhancement of the ROK-US extended deterrence and US-China and US-Russia
conflicts and confrontation.
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Emphasis on Better Living Conditions of the People and Plan for Grand Canal
between East and West
Speaking to the SPA, Chairman Kim spent much time on economic issues. Overall,
he focused on laying out the directions for the management of the national economy
and encouraging the expansion of production, rather than highlighting what’s been
achieved in the economic sector. He also emphasized agriculture and light
manufacturing, which is closely related to the livelihood of the people, as well as
cities and counties’ nurturing of industries of their own. This implies that there have
been no significant changes in the economic policies.
There were several notable points in Chairman Kim’s speech. He mentioned the
targets of the five-year economic plan with specific numbers, saying “As declared
at the 8th Party Congress, (our goal is to) raise the gross domestic product and
the production of consumer goods more than 1.4 times and 1.3 times, respectively,
by 2025 with the level of 2020 as a basis point.” This translates into the average
annual growth rate of 7% over the period of the five-year plan. So far, the five-year
plan, released in early 2021, has been assessed as having realistic goals in
consideration of sanctions on North Korea and the failure of the five-year economic
strategy from 2016 to 2020. Chairman Kim’s speech goes against the assessment:
The five-year plan, too, seems to have pursued ambitious goals. However, given
the current international sanctions and the border closure continuing for almost two
years, it will be hard for North Korea to meet those goals.
In agriculture, Chairman Kim reiterated what had been emphasized so far, such
as the expansion of wheat production and the improvement of living conditions in
rural villages, while counting the improvement of the government’s grain
procurement and food distribution as an important task. He provided no further detail,
but judging from what he had spoken at the 8th Party Congress in 2021, his comment
this year may be suggesting an increase in the government procurement of food.
At the 2021 Party Congress, Chairman Kim said, “We need to set the 2019 level
as the benchmark for mandatory government procurement of food and reach the
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benchmark every year for the upcoming two to three years. And we also need to
increase the amount of government procurement of food going forward so as to
ensure normal distribution of food for the people.” Given the good harvest in North
Korea in 2019, Chairman Kim’s comment may translate into increased government
procurement of food and increased burden on farmers, if the comment is materialized
into an action.
Another point to note is “conducting economic feasibility studies and preparing
meticulous implementation plans for anticipated economic projects, such as the
construction of a Great Canal that connects the East and West coasts.” This is the
first time for North Korea to speak of the construction of a Great Canal connecting
the East and West coasts. The purpose of the project is probably to enable ship sailing
between the coasts of the country through the land, which is currently impossible,
as well as to stimulate the economy through a large-scale construction project. The
mention, “conducting economic feasibility studies and preparing meticulous
implementation plans,” implies that a concrete plan has yet to be prepared. The great
canal construction plan may have something to do with the “Audacious Initiative” of
the South Korean government, and the financial and technological hurdles may be too
high for North Korea to overcome by itself. In this regard, it is necessary to keep
close eyes on how the North Korean authorities would shape the purposes and
directions of the project going forward. ⓒKINU 2022
※ The views expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author and are not to be construed
as representing those of the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU).
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